WEBVTT 1 00:00:01.360 --> 00:00:03.919 Hey, folks, Welcome to episode three hundred and eighty nine 2 00:00:03.960 --> 00:00:07.040 of The Team House. I'm Jack Murphy here with tonight's 3 00:00:07.040 --> 00:00:11.279 guest Anthony Vincey. He's the author of The Fourth Intelligence Revolution, 4 00:00:11.439 --> 00:00:14.359 The Future of Espionage and the Battle to Save America. 5 00:00:15.080 --> 00:00:20.000 I've recently just looked through this book and it's needed 6 00:00:20.760 --> 00:00:22.679 a lot of topics in here to cover. Well, we'll 7 00:00:22.719 --> 00:00:25.120 get into as many as we can. But Anthony, first, 8 00:00:25.120 --> 00:00:26.839 thank you for joining us on the show today. 9 00:00:27.440 --> 00:00:29.160 Thanks so much for having me. Appreciate it. 10 00:00:30.519 --> 00:00:32.520 So tell us a little bit, you know, getting into 11 00:00:32.560 --> 00:00:36.119 your background about how you came to the intelligence community. 12 00:00:38.320 --> 00:00:38.679 Yeah. 13 00:00:38.719 --> 00:00:41.759 Well, I, like a lot of guys in my generation, 14 00:00:43.000 --> 00:00:46.320 nine eleven happened and I saw that I heard that 15 00:00:46.520 --> 00:00:50.560 call loud and clear and realized it was my time 16 00:00:50.600 --> 00:00:53.840 to serve. My father was a marine, he was in Vietnam. 17 00:00:53.640 --> 00:00:56.359 My grandfather was in the army. He was in World 18 00:00:56.359 --> 00:01:00.079 War Two, and this is my war. And so I 19 00:01:00.159 --> 00:01:03.479 signed up and became an intelligence officer. 20 00:01:04.640 --> 00:01:06.560 And your pathway was through the army. 21 00:01:06.560 --> 00:01:10.799 Correct, No, I was a civilian. I just went in straight. 22 00:01:11.640 --> 00:01:13.920 My brother was a marine. He went that direction. I 23 00:01:13.959 --> 00:01:16.319 went the other direction, and and and you know, I 24 00:01:16.760 --> 00:01:21.079 wanted to be a spy, So I okay, so that 25 00:01:21.200 --> 00:01:21.760 was my path. 26 00:01:22.000 --> 00:01:24.400 Talk to us about the particular path that you took 27 00:01:25.480 --> 00:01:26.400 and how that went. 28 00:01:28.079 --> 00:01:30.200 Yeah, well, you know, look like I said, I I 29 00:01:30.280 --> 00:01:33.000 was kind of in it to go and serve and 30 00:01:33.040 --> 00:01:36.879 get in the game and go to war frankly, and 31 00:01:37.079 --> 00:01:41.599 I decided I wanted to do military intelligence side of it. 32 00:01:41.719 --> 00:01:45.400 That's the direction I went, and I signed up. You know. 33 00:01:45.480 --> 00:01:48.400 The weird thing is, you know, you think it's going 34 00:01:48.480 --> 00:01:52.200 to be some crazy recruiting operation and somebody's gonna tap 35 00:01:52.200 --> 00:01:55.000 your shoulder, you know, at a at a bar or something. 36 00:01:55.079 --> 00:01:57.680 But you know, bottom line, you still got to put 37 00:01:57.680 --> 00:02:01.719 an application into the website. And so so I did, 38 00:02:01.760 --> 00:02:04.719 and uh and and signed up. It is an immense 39 00:02:04.799 --> 00:02:08.360 amount of selection that you go through for these kinds 40 00:02:08.400 --> 00:02:13.319 of jobs. The clearance, you know, where there's everything, and 41 00:02:13.319 --> 00:02:16.719 then lesh joint government and then when you when you 42 00:02:16.759 --> 00:02:18.879 want to go to training program to go to the 43 00:02:18.919 --> 00:02:24.599 farm midday, uh to you know, make sure personality type 44 00:02:24.719 --> 00:02:28.479 and you're able to handle yourself, you scrolling things like that, 45 00:02:28.639 --> 00:02:32.520 and UH made it through all that and UH when 46 00:02:32.240 --> 00:02:34.319 when went down south training. 47 00:02:35.560 --> 00:02:38.879 Where was that for cho where is it that they 48 00:02:38.919 --> 00:02:39.240 do that? 49 00:02:40.520 --> 00:02:46.719 Uh well, in fact, I had the specific location named 50 00:02:46.800 --> 00:02:51.400 in my book and I was asked to remove that 51 00:02:51.800 --> 00:02:54.960 location in my review process and write that it is 52 00:02:55.000 --> 00:02:56.080 in southern Virginia. 53 00:02:56.319 --> 00:03:00.000 Oh you you went to the premiere human trade craft school. 54 00:03:00.520 --> 00:03:06.759 Yeah, yeah, okay, gotcha. But so this is interesting. 55 00:03:06.800 --> 00:03:10.840 You're a civilian, you're doing military intelligence, but you're going 56 00:03:11.039 --> 00:03:15.479 through case officer training as a civilian. What was this 57 00:03:15.599 --> 00:03:18.520 position that you took, and you know, how do how 58 00:03:18.560 --> 00:03:21.879 does this work? You know, sort of as a military 59 00:03:21.960 --> 00:03:23.120 civilian so to speak. 60 00:03:24.280 --> 00:03:27.439 Yeah, it was a case officer role, and you know, 61 00:03:27.560 --> 00:03:31.919 there there was you know, there there's a little history, 62 00:03:32.560 --> 00:03:36.960 uh to it in that you know, military has always 63 00:03:37.000 --> 00:03:41.680 had intelligence and the you know, the the military intelligence 64 00:03:41.680 --> 00:03:45.800 agencies like DA and so forth have have played a role. 65 00:03:46.560 --> 00:03:49.360 And then you know, if you look back in post 66 00:03:49.439 --> 00:03:54.240 nine eleven, Donald Rumsfeld when he was Secretary, you know, 67 00:03:54.919 --> 00:03:58.080 wanted the military to have people who could go down 68 00:03:58.120 --> 00:04:02.120 Raine Afghanistan after ninety eleven, and they didn't, is my 69 00:04:02.199 --> 00:04:06.560 understanding reading the history. The CIA obviously did and they 70 00:04:06.599 --> 00:04:12.360 sent Jawbreaker and the other teams out there, and so Rumsfeld, 71 00:04:12.560 --> 00:04:14.360 you know, you can kind of read said, you know, 72 00:04:14.400 --> 00:04:17.560 we need to stand up some some capability here, and 73 00:04:17.639 --> 00:04:17.959 they did. 74 00:04:20.240 --> 00:04:23.360 And so you went through your training, and you know, 75 00:04:23.560 --> 00:04:25.680 are you able to say what agency you were actually 76 00:04:25.720 --> 00:04:26.240 working for? 77 00:04:27.519 --> 00:04:29.000 Yeah, I was at I was at d I A 78 00:04:29.839 --> 00:04:30.920 when I when I went through. 79 00:04:31.079 --> 00:04:35.560 Yeah, and what is like the roles and responsibility of 80 00:04:35.600 --> 00:04:38.079 a d I A case officer, Like we've had many 81 00:04:38.079 --> 00:04:41.160 CIA folks on here. I think probably our listeners are 82 00:04:41.199 --> 00:04:45.160 pretty well familiar with what they do, but yours is 83 00:04:45.199 --> 00:04:46.600 similar but different, right. 84 00:04:47.519 --> 00:04:55.720 Yeah, yeah, yeah, same job, same case officer job. You know, spot, assess, develop, recruit, 85 00:04:55.920 --> 00:04:59.879 handle assets, right, figure out guys who have placement and access, 86 00:05:00.600 --> 00:05:03.240 you know, whether that's in a terrorist group or whether 87 00:05:03.240 --> 00:05:06.959 that's in the Ministry of Defense, and and get them 88 00:05:07.000 --> 00:05:10.360 to provide me with secrets and then get those secrets 89 00:05:10.399 --> 00:05:15.160 back to Washington or or or or to a FOB somewhere. 90 00:05:16.000 --> 00:05:18.720 You know. I think that the primary difference you see 91 00:05:18.720 --> 00:05:20.839 between c I A and d I A is that 92 00:05:21.000 --> 00:05:25.639 d A is there for strategic military intelligence. You know, 93 00:05:25.680 --> 00:05:29.680 the these are these are missions where you know, and 94 00:05:29.839 --> 00:05:36.639 it involves counter terrorism, counter you know, insurgency operations of course, 95 00:05:36.800 --> 00:05:40.360 but it also involves you know, really traditional military intelligence 96 00:05:40.439 --> 00:05:47.439 like order a battle, military equipment, you know, those kinds 97 00:05:47.439 --> 00:05:51.560 of things, preparing you know, preparation of the battlefield, all 98 00:05:51.600 --> 00:05:55.480 of that that's reporting up. It's it's not typically as 99 00:05:55.560 --> 00:05:59.360 tactical as you might get within the services, you know, 100 00:05:59.480 --> 00:06:04.079 where where you've got you know, you know, guys looking 101 00:06:04.120 --> 00:06:07.639 out just around their fobs and things like this, collecting 102 00:06:07.639 --> 00:06:10.600 on the battlefield and so forth. But it's sort of 103 00:06:10.600 --> 00:06:13.600 at the more strategic level, as opposed to CIA, which 104 00:06:13.639 --> 00:06:20.040 is looking really broadly at American foreign policy, at geopolitics, 105 00:06:20.319 --> 00:06:25.800 at strategy, also at some you know, military issues, you know, 106 00:06:25.879 --> 00:06:28.519 especially when they're kind of the national level military issues. 107 00:06:29.279 --> 00:06:31.600 It's and you know, when you say not at the 108 00:06:31.639 --> 00:06:34.600 tactical level, that includes you're also probably not laid up 109 00:06:34.959 --> 00:06:38.439 wearing a gilly suit looking through a spotter scope observing 110 00:06:38.480 --> 00:06:41.839 the enemy for a week on end. It's more like 111 00:06:42.360 --> 00:06:45.120 the adversary is developing a new ballistic missile. Can we 112 00:06:45.160 --> 00:06:48.040 get the specs on it? That's what I imagine anyway. 113 00:06:49.279 --> 00:06:53.079 Yeah, that that's definitely, you know, I think where the 114 00:06:53.199 --> 00:06:57.000 traditional military intelligence was, you know, if you think about 115 00:06:57.040 --> 00:07:00.000 like the Cold War, you know, even up through the nineties, 116 00:07:00.160 --> 00:07:04.360 is yeah, you know, they're developing ballistic missile. They they've 117 00:07:04.560 --> 00:07:10.040 you know, they're looking to acquire something from US to 118 00:07:10.079 --> 00:07:12.519 develop a system. You know, if there's a counter intelligence 119 00:07:12.560 --> 00:07:17.279 angle to that Post nine eleven with Iraq in Afghanistan. 120 00:07:18.000 --> 00:07:21.399 You know, I went to Iraq, That's where I deployed. 121 00:07:22.279 --> 00:07:26.120 And you know you're in you're in traditional counter terrorism 122 00:07:26.199 --> 00:07:29.519 counter insurgency operations as well. I mean you're you're looking 123 00:07:29.560 --> 00:07:35.279 to figure out where you know, insurgents are located, where 124 00:07:35.399 --> 00:07:39.920 terrorist groups are located. You're you're thinking about who's in 125 00:07:40.199 --> 00:07:45.519 who's in command of those terrorists are insurgence groups, and 126 00:07:45.519 --> 00:07:48.639 and and those sorts of military things. I think everybody 127 00:07:48.759 --> 00:07:50.199 was just chipping in on the same mission. 128 00:07:51.399 --> 00:07:55.040 What was that like for you personally, because you mentioned 129 00:07:55.079 --> 00:07:58.199 the sort of changing roles here, but this was also 130 00:07:58.319 --> 00:08:01.800 your time you you joined Post nine eleven. But from 131 00:08:01.839 --> 00:08:04.199 what you're describing, like this kind of is a very 132 00:08:04.519 --> 00:08:08.000 tactical thing to sort of like build out a terrorist 133 00:08:08.079 --> 00:08:12.759 organization's chart of you know, how they work. It's not 134 00:08:13.600 --> 00:08:16.240 you know, the Chinese are developing a new strike fighter, 135 00:08:16.639 --> 00:08:18.720 you know, can we get the plans for the ejection seat? 136 00:08:18.839 --> 00:08:23.360 Like it's a very different type of intelligence I would think, I. 137 00:08:23.279 --> 00:08:25.000 Mean, you know, you only know what you know, and 138 00:08:25.120 --> 00:08:27.800 I went in, you know, I was that that was 139 00:08:27.879 --> 00:08:30.879 the only world I knew. Actually, you know, I I 140 00:08:31.680 --> 00:08:34.799 deployed in two thousand and eight, and you know, we 141 00:08:34.799 --> 00:08:38.159 were you know, it took took some time in training 142 00:08:38.240 --> 00:08:42.440 before that. And the only thing I was thinking when 143 00:08:42.480 --> 00:08:45.639 I joined intelligence, that's what we did, Like we were 144 00:08:45.679 --> 00:08:50.120 focused on coin and CT and that other kind of 145 00:08:50.320 --> 00:08:54.120 military intelligence kind of seemed old fashioned to me in 146 00:08:54.200 --> 00:08:56.559 some way. You know, it was like I was like, yeah, 147 00:08:56.639 --> 00:08:59.639 that's in. I understood that it was important and somebody 148 00:08:59.679 --> 00:09:02.559 had to do it. But you know, myself and a 149 00:09:02.559 --> 00:09:05.000 lot of guys who signed up post ninety eleven were like, 150 00:09:05.159 --> 00:09:07.200 we're here to be in the game, and this is 151 00:09:07.240 --> 00:09:12.039 where it is. And and you know what's interesting is 152 00:09:12.080 --> 00:09:14.679 that sort of started to change, you know, over time, 153 00:09:14.720 --> 00:09:16.919 and by the time you know, we'll get into it later, 154 00:09:16.960 --> 00:09:19.360 by the time I came back into the government later 155 00:09:19.399 --> 00:09:22.159 at NGA, that was sort of ending and gone and 156 00:09:22.200 --> 00:09:26.120 we'd moved back into this like these great power politics 157 00:09:26.399 --> 00:09:29.279 and you know, Cold War style operations again. 158 00:09:30.000 --> 00:09:31.919 Are there any stories from that period of time that 159 00:09:31.960 --> 00:09:35.320 you're able to tell about being in theater chasing terrorists down. 160 00:09:37.360 --> 00:09:40.080 Well, you know what one thing I would say is 161 00:09:40.120 --> 00:09:43.279 this is, you know a lot of a lot of 162 00:09:43.279 --> 00:09:47.639 people think about kind of the case officer job from 163 00:09:47.720 --> 00:09:51.639 that that Cold War approach, like, Hey, I'm gonna go out. 164 00:09:51.679 --> 00:09:53.759 I'm gonna find some source who works at the embassy, 165 00:09:53.799 --> 00:09:57.360 you know, foreign embassy or maybe they're a you know, 166 00:09:57.679 --> 00:10:01.360 adversary intelligence officer, like a KGB guy, and I'm gonna 167 00:10:01.559 --> 00:10:05.279 try to recruit him and take people to dinner and 168 00:10:05.480 --> 00:10:08.879 you know, doing doing SDRs and you know, pretty cities 169 00:10:08.919 --> 00:10:12.240 in Europe, and that's obviously not what it was like 170 00:10:12.559 --> 00:10:14.639 during during you know, when you're in Baghdad or a 171 00:10:14.679 --> 00:10:18.519 place like this and where you know you have you're 172 00:10:18.559 --> 00:10:21.639 bringing in. Now you're operating in a war zone and 173 00:10:21.720 --> 00:10:24.480 you have to protect yourself in the same exact way 174 00:10:25.240 --> 00:10:28.799 as as as as as a soldier would, as anybody 175 00:10:28.799 --> 00:10:31.480 would who's sort of outside the wire, right, So you're 176 00:10:31.519 --> 00:10:35.080 doing all of those things and you you have weapons, 177 00:10:35.159 --> 00:10:40.000 maybe have security outside of yourself. Usually typically a case 178 00:10:40.039 --> 00:10:45.960 officers operating alone in that job. Historically maybe maybe with 179 00:10:46.039 --> 00:10:49.440 an interpreter, but typically alone. You learn the language yourself, 180 00:10:49.480 --> 00:10:52.080 and now maybe you need to operate with security or 181 00:10:52.080 --> 00:10:55.840 at least driver you're you're you're armed, because you need 182 00:10:55.879 --> 00:10:58.759 to defend yourself if there if a situation arises, you 183 00:10:58.879 --> 00:11:03.320 have to be in really strong communications because if something 184 00:11:03.360 --> 00:11:06.240 bad happened, obviously you need to call for help. All 185 00:11:06.360 --> 00:11:09.320 those things are not what you picture when you picture 186 00:11:09.360 --> 00:11:12.960 Cold War operations, Like the last thing you want is 187 00:11:13.000 --> 00:11:15.559 like a radio or some piece of comms gear on 188 00:11:15.600 --> 00:11:18.799 you potentially because that could give away what you're doing. Right, 189 00:11:18.879 --> 00:11:22.200 and so you're trying to operate clandestinely, you know, in 190 00:11:22.720 --> 00:11:28.159 Vienna nineteen eighty six or something. But now in Iraq 191 00:11:28.240 --> 00:11:32.559 you're operating like a soldier in many ways, but you're 192 00:11:32.600 --> 00:11:35.200 trying to also be as clandestine as you can, to 193 00:11:35.240 --> 00:11:39.720 stay off the radar, to stay low profile. That's just 194 00:11:39.759 --> 00:11:43.879 a really different environment. And it's interesting we had done 195 00:11:43.919 --> 00:11:48.639 that before. And when I was kind of in training, 196 00:11:49.159 --> 00:11:52.720 I met one of the OSS guys, the Office Strategic Services. 197 00:11:53.000 --> 00:11:55.720 These are like the OGS, you know, they were World 198 00:11:55.799 --> 00:12:02.159 War Two eras, pre CIA, pre pre special Forces, you know, 199 00:12:02.519 --> 00:12:05.639 and and these guys were you know, they were badasses 200 00:12:05.679 --> 00:12:08.440 and they were operating behind enemy lines. There's a group 201 00:12:08.480 --> 00:12:12.000 called the Jedburghs, of which this guy I met was 202 00:12:12.000 --> 00:12:14.799 was one where they would send him behind the lines 203 00:12:15.720 --> 00:12:18.799 sabotage and so forth. And that was really kind of 204 00:12:18.799 --> 00:12:22.200 the last time we did we did that much, you 205 00:12:22.240 --> 00:12:25.840 know operation. I know in Vietnam they did some, but 206 00:12:25.960 --> 00:12:28.440 World War two is the last time where we did. 207 00:12:28.519 --> 00:12:30.600 You know, that's what the force was doing basically. 208 00:12:31.960 --> 00:12:34.080 Did you have any kind of like close calls you 209 00:12:34.159 --> 00:12:36.879 mentioned having a roll around with security. Were there any 210 00:12:37.240 --> 00:12:39.600 dicey situations where you're like, I don't know if we're 211 00:12:39.600 --> 00:12:40.440 going to make it out of here. 212 00:12:43.279 --> 00:12:48.840 Yeah, yeah, yeah, definitely a little nervous there in a 213 00:12:48.840 --> 00:12:54.360 few situations, and you know, things things were blowing up 214 00:12:54.360 --> 00:12:58.480 a lot in that period of time in Baghdad. But 215 00:12:59.279 --> 00:13:01.399 you know, I I think like a lot of like 216 00:13:01.440 --> 00:13:04.440 a lot of people who are in those environments, you 217 00:13:04.440 --> 00:13:06.399 you sort of you do a lot of training before 218 00:13:06.440 --> 00:13:09.399 you go, and you're with a lot of guys who 219 00:13:09.399 --> 00:13:12.279 know what they're doing, and you feel like, you know, 220 00:13:12.320 --> 00:13:14.600 you're young, and you know, I was in my twenties, 221 00:13:14.600 --> 00:13:17.240 and you feel like you're invincible and I can handle it. 222 00:13:17.159 --> 00:13:20.279 It's going to be fine, and uh, you know, thank god, 223 00:13:20.320 --> 00:13:23.679 I walked out, okay, and and and people I was 224 00:13:23.720 --> 00:13:24.320 working with it. 225 00:13:26.240 --> 00:13:29.519 And after that, did you have any more like traditional 226 00:13:29.519 --> 00:13:31.799 assignments where I know, liked I a guys work out 227 00:13:31.840 --> 00:13:33.720 of the embassies a lot. 228 00:13:35.799 --> 00:13:40.879 Yeah, I don't. I I did have traditional assignments. I 229 00:13:40.919 --> 00:13:43.799 don't want to say specifically you know where I was 230 00:13:43.840 --> 00:13:46.639 working out of, but but I had traditional assignments, which 231 00:13:47.000 --> 00:13:49.039 you know, is a real it's a it's it's it's 232 00:13:49.080 --> 00:13:52.440 a weird transition when you go from this environment where 233 00:13:52.440 --> 00:13:57.279 you're operating pretty pretty tactically, you're you're you're doing a lot. 234 00:13:58.279 --> 00:14:00.399 You know, you're you're just working all the time. You're 235 00:14:00.519 --> 00:14:03.919 you're you're just constantly running through the intelligence cycle like 236 00:14:04.159 --> 00:14:07.240 in real time because things are moving so fast, to 237 00:14:07.799 --> 00:14:11.159 like a more traditional environment in in a you know, 238 00:14:11.320 --> 00:14:15.480 typical world city where things slow down a lot and 239 00:14:15.519 --> 00:14:20.559 you start to think much more strategically long term things 240 00:14:20.639 --> 00:14:25.200 take a while, you know, and and for a lot 241 00:14:25.279 --> 00:14:29.240 of us, myself included, that that transition was hard. It 242 00:14:29.279 --> 00:14:31.159 was it was hard to kind of go back to that. 243 00:14:31.360 --> 00:14:34.519 It didn't feel that sense of mission that you did 244 00:14:34.600 --> 00:14:37.039 that was just paramount when you're down range or when 245 00:14:37.080 --> 00:14:41.240 you're supporting somebody who is. But you know, it's two 246 00:14:41.480 --> 00:14:42.639 very different worlds. 247 00:14:43.559 --> 00:14:45.240 So I want to take a minute today to tell 248 00:14:45.279 --> 00:14:48.159 you guys about the Perfect Gene. I've been wearing them 249 00:14:48.200 --> 00:14:50.600 for a few weeks now and really enjoy them, and 250 00:14:50.600 --> 00:14:53.440 I just want to share it with our audience. You know, 251 00:14:53.600 --> 00:14:56.919 sometimes jeans have this problem where you know, you guys 252 00:14:57.000 --> 00:14:59.639 all have seen these skinny genes that they like crush 253 00:14:59.639 --> 00:15:02.039 your ball and you know it's just not comfortable to 254 00:15:02.080 --> 00:15:04.240 wear or the other way around. The jeans are like 255 00:15:04.279 --> 00:15:06.279 too baggy. You know, you have this sort of like 256 00:15:06.399 --> 00:15:10.320 diaper in your ass area looks like. 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See site for details. 314 00:18:23.680 --> 00:18:26.400 And thank you ghost bed for sponsoring the show. Please 315 00:18:26.720 --> 00:18:30.519 check out the link down the description and support our sponsor. 316 00:18:32.960 --> 00:18:35.920 I mean, yeah, I don't need to ask where you were, 317 00:18:36.039 --> 00:18:37.920 but are you able to talk a little bit about 318 00:18:37.920 --> 00:18:40.680 how that functions because as I understand it, I suppose 319 00:18:40.720 --> 00:18:42.920 it depends on the size of the embassy. But there's 320 00:18:42.920 --> 00:18:45.839 some case officers and there's some analysts from the DIA. 321 00:18:48.000 --> 00:18:49.279 What is their actual job. 322 00:18:52.240 --> 00:18:54.720 Yeah, I don't want to get into the specifics of 323 00:18:56.079 --> 00:18:58.519 how they do it or where they do it, but you, 324 00:18:58.680 --> 00:19:05.119 I'll say the generally the way that human human intelligence 325 00:19:05.119 --> 00:19:07.880 collectors of any stripe could be a case officer, could 326 00:19:07.880 --> 00:19:11.279 be a deprieve debriefer. You know, there's there's there's multiple 327 00:19:11.279 --> 00:19:15.359 people whose job it is to collect information from other 328 00:19:15.440 --> 00:19:19.920 human beings. And you're going out there and you know, 329 00:19:20.119 --> 00:19:23.559 either maybe you're recruiting a source, like I said, and 330 00:19:23.960 --> 00:19:28.039 collecting information from them. If you're a debrief or you're 331 00:19:28.079 --> 00:19:31.680 just debriefing say a friendly like an American person or something, 332 00:19:33.000 --> 00:19:34.839 and you're bringing that back and you're writing it up. 333 00:19:35.640 --> 00:19:38.039 At a at a literal level, you've got a you 334 00:19:38.119 --> 00:19:41.000 have a set of collection requirements, and you know what 335 00:19:41.039 --> 00:19:43.400 you need to ask about. You know, maybe one day 336 00:19:43.440 --> 00:19:47.160 it's how is this laser made? And the next day 337 00:19:47.200 --> 00:19:49.519 it is you know, where is shake so and so? 338 00:19:49.839 --> 00:19:54.000 And how do I find him and and And you're 339 00:19:54.079 --> 00:19:57.000 you're asking those questions. You're you're you're taking notes, you're 340 00:19:57.039 --> 00:19:59.119 bringing that back, and you're writing it up. And then 341 00:19:59.160 --> 00:20:02.519 that that is the and going off to two analysts 342 00:20:02.880 --> 00:20:07.680 who are putting that information together ultimately combined with with 343 00:20:07.759 --> 00:20:10.920 other with other intelligence by all source analysts who are 344 00:20:10.920 --> 00:20:13.319 going to put all the pieces together and report it 345 00:20:13.400 --> 00:20:15.880 up the chain. And like I said, you know, with 346 00:20:15.960 --> 00:20:18.279 a with d I, A or other military intelligence that 347 00:20:18.359 --> 00:20:22.519 might go to you know, to one of the services 348 00:20:22.559 --> 00:20:25.599 and to their intel unit, to like a two shop somewhere. 349 00:20:26.680 --> 00:20:30.759 It might go directly. Some of this stuff, especially strategically, 350 00:20:30.759 --> 00:20:33.759 it's just going directly to generals, right, I mean, it's 351 00:20:33.559 --> 00:20:36.599 it goes right up the chain, but it's also going 352 00:20:36.640 --> 00:20:39.599 to feedback into the White House and so forth into 353 00:20:39.599 --> 00:20:43.240 the National Security Council because a lot of this stuff 354 00:20:43.240 --> 00:20:46.319 can be strategic and it can matter, you know, And 355 00:20:46.359 --> 00:20:48.680 that that was kind of a weird thing during post 356 00:20:48.799 --> 00:20:52.480 nine eleven, where things that seemed tactical, like where is 357 00:20:52.559 --> 00:20:56.000 this one person, uh, this one bad guy all of 358 00:20:56.039 --> 00:21:00.559 a sudden are strategic, like it's like president level stuff, 359 00:21:00.680 --> 00:21:03.039 like they want to know where these guys are because 360 00:21:03.160 --> 00:21:06.160 you know that was the enemy. Then it's totally different today, 361 00:21:06.400 --> 00:21:09.400 you know, where you know, we're worried about you know, 362 00:21:10.200 --> 00:21:13.599 nuclear weapons again, or worried about you know, China's going 363 00:21:13.640 --> 00:21:14.160 to go to war. 364 00:21:16.079 --> 00:21:18.200 And how many years did you spend at D I A. 365 00:21:20.480 --> 00:21:24.240 Yeah, I was there. I was there for as a 366 00:21:24.279 --> 00:21:28.799 govey for for several years. I don't I don't want 367 00:21:28.839 --> 00:21:31.079 to get into specifics because I was in different roles 368 00:21:31.119 --> 00:21:32.759 and it may not match up with my. 369 00:21:35.240 --> 00:21:39.440 LinkedIn What what what is your LinkedIn say? 370 00:21:41.640 --> 00:21:44.759 I think it says I was you know, as a 371 00:21:44.799 --> 00:21:50.480 staff officer for uh. Yeah. That that's that's the weird 372 00:21:50.480 --> 00:21:53.039 thing with the book coming out, you know, all this 373 00:21:53.079 --> 00:21:56.960 stuff I didn't talk about at all period. And then 374 00:21:57.000 --> 00:21:59.599 when I joined n g A, I was sort of 375 00:21:59.680 --> 00:22:01.920 out it right because I was in this public role, 376 00:22:02.400 --> 00:22:06.440 but I still still really didn't talk about it. I said, 377 00:22:06.480 --> 00:22:09.759 I was an intelligence officer, and and you know, people 378 00:22:09.799 --> 00:22:13.160 I knew were like, hey, I thought I thought you 379 00:22:13.160 --> 00:22:15.240 were up to something, like it was weird that you 380 00:22:15.319 --> 00:22:18.640 were like gone for months at a time. But it 381 00:22:18.680 --> 00:22:21.400 was really only with this book where you know, with 382 00:22:21.480 --> 00:22:24.160 a book like this and you're you're telling your story 383 00:22:24.240 --> 00:22:27.240 that that all the agencies actually come in and take 384 00:22:27.279 --> 00:22:30.240 a look that I was able to say really anything. 385 00:22:31.559 --> 00:22:34.960 And so still remain a little bit cautious of where 386 00:22:35.039 --> 00:22:37.759 I where I draw the line, because you know, as 387 00:22:37.920 --> 00:22:41.000 as you know, you still want to protect those are 388 00:22:41.079 --> 00:22:43.640 still still in there doing doing the same job. 389 00:22:44.839 --> 00:22:48.400 So according to your LinkedIn, I take it you had 390 00:22:48.519 --> 00:22:51.359 a sort of breaking service between d I A and 391 00:22:51.559 --> 00:22:52.240 the n g I. 392 00:22:53.519 --> 00:22:57.839 Yeah, so I I left, you know, I again, I 393 00:22:57.920 --> 00:23:00.799 was there to go down range and to serve I 394 00:23:01.000 --> 00:23:06.359 never really saw myself as like a lifelong government employee, 395 00:23:06.359 --> 00:23:08.480 that that's not what I was necessarily in it for. 396 00:23:09.799 --> 00:23:12.279 And and I left and I went back. I had 397 00:23:12.279 --> 00:23:14.599 worked in the tech community briefly right after college and 398 00:23:14.640 --> 00:23:17.440 I went back into the tech community and I founded 399 00:23:17.480 --> 00:23:21.720 a startup and kind of ran that for a while. 400 00:23:22.799 --> 00:23:26.839 And when I exited that, that company, I you know, 401 00:23:27.000 --> 00:23:31.680 was looking to get back involved again, you know, but 402 00:23:31.759 --> 00:23:34.480 this time maybe just advise or something like that, and 403 00:23:34.559 --> 00:23:38.039 I joined. I was invited to join the advisory board 404 00:23:38.079 --> 00:23:42.319 at NGA, and the director at the time, Robert Cardillo, 405 00:23:42.400 --> 00:23:45.400 and the deputy director, Sue Gordon, were looking for somebody 406 00:23:45.400 --> 00:23:49.079 who knew intelligence but also knew the tech industry and 407 00:23:49.240 --> 00:23:52.359 new kind of Silicon Valley and really the cutting edge. 408 00:23:52.599 --> 00:23:58.240 And today that's common, but you know, five ten years ago, 409 00:23:58.440 --> 00:24:00.640 it was actually pretty rare. There weren't that many people. 410 00:24:01.519 --> 00:24:03.960 There was this real hard line like Silicon Valley people 411 00:24:04.000 --> 00:24:08.480 didn't want to touch national security, and national security people 412 00:24:08.519 --> 00:24:10.960 didn't really have a seat to do anything in Silicon 413 00:24:11.039 --> 00:24:13.279 Valley world. And I had happened to kind of get 414 00:24:13.319 --> 00:24:17.759 into that, and so I went on their advisory board 415 00:24:17.799 --> 00:24:21.119 and tried to help figure out how to use AI 416 00:24:21.240 --> 00:24:26.000 and how to use commercial data. And then they I said, 417 00:24:26.200 --> 00:24:29.400 I gave them kind of a strategy to execute around that, 418 00:24:29.440 --> 00:24:31.240 and they just called my bluff and said, why don't 419 00:24:31.240 --> 00:24:34.119 you come in and execute that strategy. And so that's 420 00:24:34.160 --> 00:24:35.759 how I ended up going back in as a as 421 00:24:35.799 --> 00:24:36.440 a govy again. 422 00:24:37.319 --> 00:24:39.759 So tell us what the NGA is. 423 00:24:40.400 --> 00:24:43.279 I think it's just one of those organizations that that 424 00:24:43.519 --> 00:24:46.079 you know, the general public isn't familiar with, but plays 425 00:24:46.240 --> 00:24:47.200 a very important role. 426 00:24:49.359 --> 00:24:49.680 Yeah. 427 00:24:49.720 --> 00:24:55.799 So NNGA is National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and they do 428 00:24:55.880 --> 00:24:58.680 geospatial intelligence, which is is kind of like a new 429 00:24:59.119 --> 00:25:05.720 form of intelligence, and it incorporates imagery intelligence. So you know, 430 00:25:05.759 --> 00:25:10.160 they're classified and commercial satellites in space taking pictures and 431 00:25:10.680 --> 00:25:15.359 using uh you know, sometimes using you know, visual imagery, 432 00:25:15.480 --> 00:25:20.680 sometimes using radar imagery and other forms of imagery, and 433 00:25:20.720 --> 00:25:24.759 they they analyze that. They they quite literally, if you 434 00:25:24.759 --> 00:25:27.079 can imagine it. Back in the Cold War, they would 435 00:25:27.200 --> 00:25:29.279 get a piece of film from a satellite and they 436 00:25:29.279 --> 00:25:31.759 would look at it with a magnifying glass and try 437 00:25:31.799 --> 00:25:35.799 to see where the Soviet bomber was. Right. That's updated 438 00:25:35.839 --> 00:25:38.519 now and it all goes through computers, but it's essentially 439 00:25:38.559 --> 00:25:41.440 the same thing, and they're trying to see, you know, 440 00:25:41.680 --> 00:25:44.559 is there is there a missile on the launch pad? 441 00:25:45.160 --> 00:25:45.319 Right? 442 00:25:45.480 --> 00:25:49.960 And you know, and and and and and how far 443 00:25:50.119 --> 00:25:52.400 left of that can you get even before it gets 444 00:25:52.440 --> 00:25:54.640 the launch pad or you're seeing some indicator that it 445 00:25:54.720 --> 00:25:57.759 might go to the launch pad, right, So they're doing 446 00:25:57.799 --> 00:26:00.279 that kind of intelligence. But and they're doing that for 447 00:26:00.880 --> 00:26:03.640 full motion video off of drones for example as well. 448 00:26:04.599 --> 00:26:07.759 And they're doing geospatial intelligence, which is I like to 449 00:26:07.759 --> 00:26:11.160 explains kind of like Google Maps. You know, if you 450 00:26:11.279 --> 00:26:13.319 if you look at Google Maps, really what it is 451 00:26:13.480 --> 00:26:17.640 is a geospatial information tools. So you've got a map 452 00:26:17.720 --> 00:26:21.559 and you've got location and and you're appending information to 453 00:26:21.599 --> 00:26:25.720 that location. And geospatial intelligence is about figuring out where 454 00:26:25.759 --> 00:26:28.799 something is and and when when it was there or 455 00:26:28.960 --> 00:26:32.960 is there right and what it is and making intelligence 456 00:26:33.000 --> 00:26:37.920 tools out of that. So for example, you know, if 457 00:26:37.960 --> 00:26:42.480 there's uh, you know, thinking about like maybe there's a 458 00:26:42.519 --> 00:26:44.960 missile on the launch pad, Well you've got it. You've 459 00:26:45.000 --> 00:26:47.119 got kind of a map of that area, and you're 460 00:26:47.519 --> 00:26:50.839 you could put and append the information about all the 461 00:26:50.839 --> 00:26:55.160 other facilities on there, who's there, how things changed over time, 462 00:26:55.200 --> 00:27:00.160 and create a geospatial product like that. And so that's 463 00:27:00.200 --> 00:27:03.039 what that agency does. It's hugely important. Not a lot 464 00:27:03.079 --> 00:27:05.200 of people think about it, but it's one of the 465 00:27:05.200 --> 00:27:09.240 agencies that keeps everybody safe because for some of the 466 00:27:09.279 --> 00:27:13.240 biggest threats in the world, like unwarned launch from like 467 00:27:13.279 --> 00:27:16.119 a North Korea, really some of the only ways to 468 00:27:16.160 --> 00:27:19.200 get intelligence out of places like that is from satellites. 469 00:27:20.359 --> 00:27:22.759 You can't it's real hard to send a human source 470 00:27:22.880 --> 00:27:26.200 to North Korea, and it can be very hard to 471 00:27:26.240 --> 00:27:30.799 even get signals intelligence from there. So this is where 472 00:27:30.839 --> 00:27:33.319 a lot of that information comes. And these analysts are 473 00:27:33.400 --> 00:27:37.200 coming there and keeping watch globally all the time to 474 00:27:37.279 --> 00:27:39.680 make sure we're not attacked, but also at the tactical 475 00:27:39.759 --> 00:27:44.599 level are producing targeting packages for conventional units, for special 476 00:27:44.640 --> 00:27:47.599 operation units and things like that that are necessary for 477 00:27:47.720 --> 00:27:49.359 kind of tactical operations as well. 478 00:27:51.480 --> 00:27:53.880 You know, as you're talking, it reminds me of my 479 00:27:54.880 --> 00:27:58.240 friend Sean Naylor wrote a story, one of my favorite 480 00:27:58.279 --> 00:28:01.160 stories about this I've ever read, about the Cuban missile 481 00:28:01.200 --> 00:28:04.960 crisis and how there were some Cuban assets we had 482 00:28:04.960 --> 00:28:07.759 recruited that went up river and took a picture of 483 00:28:07.920 --> 00:28:10.559 the launch site or the launcher i can't remember exactly, 484 00:28:11.160 --> 00:28:13.880 came back and said, hey, we we found it, and 485 00:28:14.039 --> 00:28:17.119 that allowed us to then send you two spyplanes over 486 00:28:17.680 --> 00:28:22.640 and take photographs and confirm just like fascinating stuff how 487 00:28:22.640 --> 00:28:23.960 that all comes together. 488 00:28:24.599 --> 00:28:27.279 And that that's where n GA came from. So so 489 00:28:28.039 --> 00:28:35.279 during the Cold War, there was ENDPIIC National Photographic Intelligence Center, 490 00:28:36.680 --> 00:28:41.160 which was it's it its own office, I think it 491 00:28:41.240 --> 00:28:43.839 reported up through the CIA at that time, and they 492 00:28:43.880 --> 00:28:49.880 were literally analyzing that U two footage or uh. And 493 00:28:49.920 --> 00:28:53.400 then there was also the d M A Defense Mapping Agency, 494 00:28:53.480 --> 00:28:57.559 which was that you know, under the Defense Department was 495 00:28:57.559 --> 00:29:01.839 making maps. Those two groups and they successors, along with 496 00:29:01.880 --> 00:29:06.119 some other pieces, became n g A after I think 497 00:29:06.119 --> 00:29:08.440 around two thousand and three mm hmmm. 498 00:29:10.319 --> 00:29:12.599 And is n g A in any way involved in 499 00:29:12.680 --> 00:29:17.200 sort of like the technology I guess development or continuum 500 00:29:17.359 --> 00:29:20.720 of like developing spy satellites and surveillance drones and things 501 00:29:20.799 --> 00:29:25.039 like that, or is it purely an analytical agency. 502 00:29:25.200 --> 00:29:30.880 It's an analytical agency. So n ROW National Reconnaissance Office 503 00:29:32.279 --> 00:29:36.559 designs and acquires and and and kind of manages the 504 00:29:36.640 --> 00:29:44.160 running of satellites for for the intelligence community. And n 505 00:29:44.240 --> 00:29:48.680 g A works very closely with n ROW and it 506 00:29:48.720 --> 00:29:53.720 supports the ground mission so that you know the tasking 507 00:29:53.799 --> 00:29:59.000 of those satellites and the requirements of you know, what 508 00:29:59.119 --> 00:30:02.440 should be collected and so forth. But n GA is 509 00:30:02.519 --> 00:30:08.039 involved with requirements for future systems. So what sort of 510 00:30:08.200 --> 00:30:11.240 intelligence should we be able to get off of these satellites, 511 00:30:11.279 --> 00:30:13.519 because you can imagine the analysts want to have a 512 00:30:13.559 --> 00:30:15.640 say and what is the next generation of satellite is 513 00:30:15.680 --> 00:30:18.480 going to want to do. But they n g A 514 00:30:18.640 --> 00:30:22.759 then is not making the satellite themselves. That that's going 515 00:30:22.839 --> 00:30:25.759 to go on to another agency. And then n g 516 00:30:25.880 --> 00:30:28.720 A is very very used to be very very involved 517 00:30:29.160 --> 00:30:34.759 and fully ran acquiring commercial satellite images and ran a 518 00:30:34.799 --> 00:30:37.599 big contract with Digital Globe and g o I for 519 00:30:37.599 --> 00:30:41.440 a long time, and then other satellite commercial satellite companies 520 00:30:41.519 --> 00:30:45.200 like Planet Labs and so forth. That that mission has 521 00:30:45.240 --> 00:30:48.640 also moved to n A ROW to actually do the acquisition. 522 00:30:49.680 --> 00:30:56.839 N GA remains very involved with acquiring and developing in 523 00:30:56.920 --> 00:31:02.440 some places analytical systems like geospatial analytical systems and in 524 00:31:02.480 --> 00:31:05.680 particular computer vision and things like this, which is a 525 00:31:06.119 --> 00:31:11.519 form of you know, imagery analysis, right, And that's what 526 00:31:11.599 --> 00:31:14.240 I was very very involved with when I was at NGA. 527 00:31:15.440 --> 00:31:17.279 And I'm sure we'll get into this in a bit, 528 00:31:17.359 --> 00:31:20.160 but I have to imagine that they are really looking 529 00:31:20.200 --> 00:31:23.480 at AI for imagery analysis that if we can plug 530 00:31:23.519 --> 00:31:27.079 in the profile of this missile launcher and then have 531 00:31:27.160 --> 00:31:30.400 the computer search hundreds and hundreds of photographs and video, 532 00:31:30.720 --> 00:31:32.000 that would be a huge thing for them. 533 00:31:33.480 --> 00:31:36.279 Yeah, exactly. I mean when I came to NNGA, that 534 00:31:36.599 --> 00:31:39.279 that was really what I was trying to do. And 535 00:31:39.480 --> 00:31:43.759 at that time, you know, there had been research on 536 00:31:44.160 --> 00:31:47.519 computer vision for decades really, you know, going back to 537 00:31:47.640 --> 00:31:51.240 the even the seventies, right like, people were trying to 538 00:31:51.279 --> 00:31:54.279 do this, but it didn't work very well. And they 539 00:31:54.319 --> 00:31:59.720 were now around twenty fifteen, twenty sixteen, twenty seventeen, computer 540 00:31:59.799 --> 00:32:03.599 vision got much much better because they started using machine 541 00:32:03.680 --> 00:32:06.559 learning to do this and and I sort of realized 542 00:32:06.599 --> 00:32:09.200 that when I came into NGA, and and that was 543 00:32:09.240 --> 00:32:12.119 really many ways my role was. Part of my role 544 00:32:12.279 --> 00:32:14.200 was to figure out how to do that, how to 545 00:32:14.240 --> 00:32:17.400 acquire those kinds of technologies because they were being developed 546 00:32:17.440 --> 00:32:21.039 in Silicon Valley in places like Stanford not it you know, 547 00:32:21.359 --> 00:32:24.799 in national labs, or or or by the military or 548 00:32:24.799 --> 00:32:27.720 by the prime contractors. For the most part, how to 549 00:32:27.759 --> 00:32:29.839 acquire that stuff and how to bring it into the 550 00:32:29.839 --> 00:32:33.279 mission because you know, what was also happening is the 551 00:32:33.359 --> 00:32:37.519 amount of imagery was just skyrocketing, and we had more 552 00:32:37.559 --> 00:32:40.640 and more classified systems because they build up over time, 553 00:32:40.920 --> 00:32:42.279 and then all of a sudden, we had all these 554 00:32:42.319 --> 00:32:46.480 commercial satellites with all of their data, and now we're 555 00:32:46.799 --> 00:32:49.799 you can there's a limit to the number of analysts 556 00:32:50.519 --> 00:32:52.759 you can have in the world, right and how many 557 00:32:53.119 --> 00:32:55.960 how many billets does does an agency have? And does 558 00:32:55.960 --> 00:32:58.319 the Congress want a fund? And so there is a 559 00:32:58.480 --> 00:33:01.319 there's a maximum capacity, and so how do you how 560 00:33:01.359 --> 00:33:03.039 do you break through that? And how do you ensure 561 00:33:03.079 --> 00:33:05.480 that something doesn't slip through and that missile ends up 562 00:33:05.519 --> 00:33:07.519 on the launch pad and you don't just miss it, right, 563 00:33:08.160 --> 00:33:11.119 And so AI was a way to do that because 564 00:33:11.160 --> 00:33:13.759 you can identify objects in an image that you can 565 00:33:13.799 --> 00:33:17.000 tell if they've changed and so forth, and then automatically 566 00:33:17.079 --> 00:33:19.160 alert and that that was the goal, and that's what 567 00:33:19.160 --> 00:33:19.799 we're trying to do. 568 00:33:21.079 --> 00:33:24.000 And so you said you came on first as a 569 00:33:24.039 --> 00:33:29.119 member of the advisory board. But then if I recall correctly, yeah, 570 00:33:29.160 --> 00:33:32.599 you became the chief technology Officer, which normally that's like 571 00:33:32.640 --> 00:33:35.599 a position at like Hewert Packard or something like that. 572 00:33:35.680 --> 00:33:39.039 It's not something you commonly associate with an intelligence agency. 573 00:33:39.839 --> 00:33:42.079 Tell us about how that role came about and what 574 00:33:42.160 --> 00:33:43.359 it actually was for you. 575 00:33:44.200 --> 00:33:47.160 Yeah, Well, I started out as I was the Associate 576 00:33:47.200 --> 00:33:53.160 director for Capabilities, which is a less sexy title but 577 00:33:53.440 --> 00:33:58.240 an immensely powerful title because I had responsibility for all 578 00:33:58.279 --> 00:34:01.759 the technology, all the art and d all the contracting, 579 00:34:01.839 --> 00:34:05.240 the procurement, the strategy, and the budget of the agency 580 00:34:06.240 --> 00:34:10.239 and so was really managing about half that agency. And 581 00:34:10.679 --> 00:34:13.679 this was I was so amazing about what the director 582 00:34:13.760 --> 00:34:17.000 wanted to do. He took you know, somebody was forward 583 00:34:17.079 --> 00:34:19.199 leaning and kind of a tech guy and pretty young, 584 00:34:19.239 --> 00:34:23.559 I mean it was thirty nine at the time, and said, 585 00:34:24.119 --> 00:34:25.880 not only do you have this mission, which is I 586 00:34:25.920 --> 00:34:30.239 want you to transform how we do intelligence, but here 587 00:34:30.280 --> 00:34:35.360 are all these resources, and now go and go and 588 00:34:35.400 --> 00:34:38.920 do it. And we built a lot of different offices 589 00:34:38.960 --> 00:34:43.239 and organizations to do that. Over time. Then I transitioned 590 00:34:43.239 --> 00:34:46.880 into this Chief Technology Officer role, which was a piece 591 00:34:46.920 --> 00:34:53.159 of that which was really thinking about the big the 592 00:34:53.760 --> 00:34:58.440 big technology strategies. You know, how do we you know, 593 00:34:58.480 --> 00:35:02.159 what kind of technologies do we need, whether to develop 594 00:35:02.199 --> 00:35:05.599 internally or to buy from externally, and how do we 595 00:35:05.679 --> 00:35:08.559 get them into the system and how do we incorporate 596 00:35:08.639 --> 00:35:14.199 them with existing technology systems that are typically designed by 597 00:35:14.199 --> 00:35:18.719 a contractor, how do we incorporate them into workflows and processes? 598 00:35:18.760 --> 00:35:22.880 How do we train people to use these systems? And 599 00:35:22.880 --> 00:35:26.679 and also really be the advisor, you know, to the 600 00:35:26.960 --> 00:35:30.440 director on technology and on these kinds of technologies. And 601 00:35:30.440 --> 00:35:33.679 that's really what that role became about over time. 602 00:35:38.480 --> 00:35:41.239 And what were some of like the big like I guess, 603 00:35:41.719 --> 00:35:43.760 hurdles that you were facing at the time, whether they 604 00:35:43.760 --> 00:35:48.000 were technological or bureaucratic, the sort of the I guess 605 00:35:48.039 --> 00:35:50.719 I'm asking about, what sort of the big main thrust 606 00:35:50.960 --> 00:35:53.039 was of your position at that time, what you were 607 00:35:53.039 --> 00:35:56.039 trying to accomplish. 608 00:35:56.480 --> 00:36:01.679 Yeah, so if you imagine taking a step back, if 609 00:36:01.679 --> 00:36:04.480 you say to yourself, Okay, we've got this mission. We 610 00:36:04.519 --> 00:36:09.440 need to analyze all this imagery. There's too much image images, right, 611 00:36:09.519 --> 00:36:11.400 so what do we do. We need to use some 612 00:36:11.400 --> 00:36:17.360 technology to do that. So you know, at first I thought, 613 00:36:17.639 --> 00:36:19.800 and you would think, right, okay, I just have to 614 00:36:19.800 --> 00:36:23.000 go buy some technology. So part of that was, let 615 00:36:23.000 --> 00:36:25.400 me just go buy some technology. So we opened up 616 00:36:25.400 --> 00:36:29.159 an office in San Francisco where these technology companies were. 617 00:36:30.239 --> 00:36:32.800 We set up an OTA consortium to make it easier 618 00:36:32.840 --> 00:36:35.639 to buy some of these technologies. We worked with ink 619 00:36:35.800 --> 00:36:38.840 Tel and things like that, which is the CIA's venture 620 00:36:38.880 --> 00:36:43.239 capital organization, to even invest in these companies and to 621 00:36:43.320 --> 00:36:46.199 try to get them to do business. I would go 622 00:36:46.960 --> 00:36:49.320 directly talk to a lot of these companies because again, 623 00:36:49.360 --> 00:36:51.760 at that time, a lot of Silicon Valley did not 624 00:36:51.840 --> 00:36:55.119 want to do business with an intelligence agency. They really didn't. 625 00:36:55.599 --> 00:36:58.639 They did not want to be our customer. I couldn't 626 00:36:58.679 --> 00:36:59.599 even give them money. 627 00:37:00.239 --> 00:37:03.079 It wasn't until they realized that defence tech was recession 628 00:37:03.159 --> 00:37:06.559 proof investing the way real estate is that they finally 629 00:37:06.599 --> 00:37:08.920 got on board exactly. 630 00:37:09.800 --> 00:37:12.519 And you know, they actually at the time would look 631 00:37:12.559 --> 00:37:17.519 at defense revenue and counted as zero in terms of 632 00:37:17.639 --> 00:37:20.360 like a lot of investors, venture capital investors would count 633 00:37:20.400 --> 00:37:22.400 defense revenue as zero when. 634 00:37:22.639 --> 00:37:24.559 Because the risk was too high. What what was the 635 00:37:24.599 --> 00:37:25.440 thought behind. 636 00:37:25.199 --> 00:37:28.199 That that it you know, that it took so long 637 00:37:28.400 --> 00:37:32.480 to get government revenue that it that it every year 638 00:37:32.639 --> 00:37:35.719 had to be renewed, so it wasn't as sticky that 639 00:37:35.719 --> 00:37:39.800 that the margin was lower than than you know, commercial 640 00:37:39.880 --> 00:37:45.880 SaaS margin and so forth, right, and so they didn't 641 00:37:45.880 --> 00:37:48.599 think they were, you know, we were sophisticated customers and 642 00:37:48.639 --> 00:37:51.440 so forth, I kind of knew. I had been on 643 00:37:51.519 --> 00:37:53.320 the other side, so I sort of knew how to 644 00:37:53.320 --> 00:37:57.079 communicate a little bit with the investors and with the companies, 645 00:37:57.119 --> 00:37:59.320 and that A big part of my role was at 646 00:37:59.360 --> 00:38:02.679 so to go and get this technology. But that was 647 00:38:02.719 --> 00:38:05.320 an obstacle, you know, to to sort of convince people. 648 00:38:05.360 --> 00:38:08.239 A lot of what I did was give speeches to 649 00:38:08.360 --> 00:38:12.320 people like that and and meet with you know, vcs 650 00:38:12.400 --> 00:38:16.760 and so forth, and and then but then once you 651 00:38:16.800 --> 00:38:19.519 get the technology. Actually it turned out that was the 652 00:38:19.559 --> 00:38:22.199 easy part. Like that was the It just got harder 653 00:38:22.280 --> 00:38:26.920 from there, right because now, okay, I've got this cool 654 00:38:27.920 --> 00:38:31.519 you know, algorithm approach, this this computer vision system made 655 00:38:31.559 --> 00:38:34.880 by some cool Silicon Valley company where guys are working 656 00:38:34.920 --> 00:38:38.840 in hoodie sweatshirts, you know, at a we work and 657 00:38:38.840 --> 00:38:43.360 and then yeah and then uh they and then all 658 00:38:43.400 --> 00:38:47.360 of a sudden you realize, well, you can't just like 659 00:38:47.400 --> 00:38:50.519 plug that in right there there. There wasn't a lot 660 00:38:50.559 --> 00:38:52.920 of a lot of cloud computing at the time. Most 661 00:38:52.960 --> 00:38:54.920 of what we did was still on prem It was 662 00:38:55.280 --> 00:38:57.519 out of servers that we own that were you know, 663 00:38:58.119 --> 00:39:05.039 government owned and operated, and there were the way the 664 00:39:05.079 --> 00:39:08.880 workflow works, the way the processes work in these agencies. 665 00:39:09.320 --> 00:39:12.360 There's a lot of pieces of locked software that have 666 00:39:12.480 --> 00:39:17.079 been made through this really long, multi year requirements process 667 00:39:17.480 --> 00:39:21.119 by a single contractor, and to mod that in any 668 00:39:21.119 --> 00:39:25.639 way requires another year, two years, you know, to say, hey, well, 669 00:39:25.679 --> 00:39:27.679 I just want to take the data from the system 670 00:39:27.719 --> 00:39:31.000 and incorporated this other algorithm. They're like, yeah, no problem that. 671 00:39:31.480 --> 00:39:35.000 You know that twenty five million dollars and eighteen months 672 00:39:35.079 --> 00:39:38.599 we got it. Just no problem. And you're like, that's 673 00:39:38.599 --> 00:39:42.920 just not going to work. And so like that integration 674 00:39:43.119 --> 00:39:47.480 part becomes really really hard and threatens people, right because 675 00:39:47.960 --> 00:39:54.000 companies contracting companies have those contracts. They employ people in 676 00:39:54.119 --> 00:39:57.519 states to build that stuff, and they call their congressman 677 00:39:58.400 --> 00:40:01.000 if they're threatened. People who job it is to be 678 00:40:01.039 --> 00:40:06.400 a pro program manager at n GA are threatened because hey, 679 00:40:06.920 --> 00:40:09.599 I've worked my whole life to get this system in place. 680 00:40:10.079 --> 00:40:12.480 You know, it's taken me years, and now you're telling 681 00:40:12.519 --> 00:40:14.679 me you want to remove it and put in this 682 00:40:14.719 --> 00:40:18.480 thing that these guys built in their garage, you know, 683 00:40:18.599 --> 00:40:21.599 in six months, and they've never they don't even have clearances. 684 00:40:21.760 --> 00:40:23.599 By the way, I don't even know if this is good, 685 00:40:23.840 --> 00:40:26.800 which gets into the other issue is, you know, it's 686 00:40:26.840 --> 00:40:30.880 got to be secure, you know, unlike a company where 687 00:40:31.039 --> 00:40:32.760 you know, if you get hacked at a company, it's 688 00:40:32.880 --> 00:40:35.960 it's it's a bad day. You know, you maybe lose 689 00:40:36.000 --> 00:40:40.360 some money. You know, your product fails. You know you 690 00:40:40.400 --> 00:40:44.039 have an unsecure system. In an intelligence agency, you know, 691 00:40:44.119 --> 00:40:48.800 somebody dies right like that that that soft guy in 692 00:40:48.840 --> 00:40:51.360 the field now has a piece of compromised you know, 693 00:40:51.440 --> 00:40:56.119 map or or imagery that is dangerous, right, and so 694 00:40:57.360 --> 00:41:00.079 you've got to take the security piece very seriously and 695 00:41:00.119 --> 00:41:02.599 figure out how to you know, now, how do you 696 00:41:03.119 --> 00:41:05.599 ensure that this kind of technology is secure? And how 697 00:41:05.639 --> 00:41:08.000 do you bring bring those companies in. You've got to 698 00:41:08.000 --> 00:41:12.320 get clearances now for companies where you know, the CEO 699 00:41:12.440 --> 00:41:14.760 has never even heard of a clearance. They don't even 700 00:41:14.760 --> 00:41:17.280 know what you're talking about. And you're saying, no, I need, 701 00:41:17.320 --> 00:41:19.239 I need to your guys to get a clearance. They 702 00:41:19.239 --> 00:41:21.119 need to come, you know, work in the Beltway now, 703 00:41:21.639 --> 00:41:24.119 and so you've got to go through that. And then 704 00:41:24.559 --> 00:41:27.280 let's just say you can make it through all that 705 00:41:28.119 --> 00:41:31.280 right now, you've got to convince an analyst to use 706 00:41:31.320 --> 00:41:35.559 it because you know, remember these these people take their 707 00:41:35.639 --> 00:41:38.760 job very very seriously, right. I don't know if if 708 00:41:38.800 --> 00:41:43.400 you watch House of Dynamite, that that that movie Catherine Bigelow, 709 00:41:43.440 --> 00:41:46.840 and it's it's about an unwarned launch where you know 710 00:41:46.920 --> 00:41:49.599 nuclear missile is coming for America and it's gonna blow 711 00:41:49.639 --> 00:41:52.400 up and it's killed millions of people, and it's it's 712 00:41:52.519 --> 00:41:56.920 it's a very intense movie. But this is a real job. 713 00:41:57.039 --> 00:42:00.239 People go to work every day and they worry about 714 00:42:00.239 --> 00:42:02.920 that day and day out. That's what an NGAA analyst 715 00:42:02.960 --> 00:42:05.400 is doing. They're worried somebody's going to launch a missile 716 00:42:06.039 --> 00:42:07.840 and it's going to hit a wahu and it's going 717 00:42:07.880 --> 00:42:12.559 to kill a million people. And so when you kind 718 00:42:12.559 --> 00:42:15.400 of walk in and you say, I know you have 719 00:42:15.480 --> 00:42:17.639 your system locked down, and you've been doing this for 720 00:42:17.760 --> 00:42:19.880 years and you've been trained to do this, you're the 721 00:42:19.920 --> 00:42:21.880 best at it in the world, and I know this 722 00:42:21.920 --> 00:42:23.199 is the way you like to do it. But hey, 723 00:42:23.239 --> 00:42:27.280 I have this new technology. It's going to fundamentally change 724 00:42:27.280 --> 00:42:30.199 how you do it. And you know they're going to 725 00:42:30.239 --> 00:42:33.559 be skeptical and they're going to be like, I don't 726 00:42:33.599 --> 00:42:37.000 trust it. I'm not sure how it gets integrated, and 727 00:42:37.000 --> 00:42:39.239 not just them, by the way, the customers as well 728 00:42:39.480 --> 00:42:41.880 outside of the agency who are sending these reports that 729 00:42:41.960 --> 00:42:44.400 they're going to be like, wait, you're telling me this. 730 00:42:44.760 --> 00:42:48.800 You know, this piece of intelligence was made by a machine, 731 00:42:48.239 --> 00:42:51.920 not by Joe, who I've been working with for the 732 00:42:52.000 --> 00:42:55.079 last fifteen years, who's the best imagery analyst. You got. 733 00:42:55.280 --> 00:42:57.239 It's made by a machine. They're not going to trust 734 00:42:57.280 --> 00:42:59.119 it either, and so you have to get over that. 735 00:42:59.239 --> 00:43:02.599 So there's a lot of of you know, working with 736 00:43:02.679 --> 00:43:04.800 people to build that trust. There's a lot of tests 737 00:43:04.800 --> 00:43:08.400 and evaluation. There's a lot of training for people of 738 00:43:08.440 --> 00:43:12.039 how to use these systems, ultimately recruiting people now to 739 00:43:12.119 --> 00:43:14.840 help you make all these systems and integrate them. So 740 00:43:15.079 --> 00:43:18.880 it becomes this very big issue, and it was hard, 741 00:43:19.280 --> 00:43:22.239 and you know, I worked on it and lots of 742 00:43:22.239 --> 00:43:26.239 other people date as well. But it is starting to 743 00:43:26.280 --> 00:43:30.239 happen now. And I'll say one more thing, which is recently, 744 00:43:30.320 --> 00:43:35.519 so not this current director NGA, but the one previous. 745 00:43:35.639 --> 00:43:39.519 So eight nine years after I had started down this path, 746 00:43:40.800 --> 00:43:46.280 the director announced publicly that they are now publishing intelligence 747 00:43:46.320 --> 00:43:49.719 reports in which quote unquote no human hands have touched them. 748 00:43:50.119 --> 00:43:52.599 So it is happening, and it only took you know, 749 00:43:53.280 --> 00:43:54.280 eight or nine years. 750 00:43:55.639 --> 00:43:57.880 What did you do to get buy in, you know, 751 00:43:58.039 --> 00:44:01.639 institutionally within the organization, because I understand what you're saying. 752 00:44:01.679 --> 00:44:03.760 It's like if you're a soldier and they hand you 753 00:44:03.800 --> 00:44:05.400 a new rifle and they say this is going to 754 00:44:05.400 --> 00:44:07.840 be your rifle. Now you're like, bro, I don't need this. 755 00:44:07.880 --> 00:44:09.519 What is this piece of garbage? I'll just use a 756 00:44:09.519 --> 00:44:10.800 slingshot like I always have. 757 00:44:12.719 --> 00:44:15.719 Yeah, yeah, I mean, well, it's the same Like anybody 758 00:44:15.760 --> 00:44:19.079 who's used technology downrange will say the same thing. Like 759 00:44:19.320 --> 00:44:22.239 you basically look at a new piece of technology that 760 00:44:22.320 --> 00:44:24.639 somebody gives you, like a new radio or something, and 761 00:44:24.679 --> 00:44:27.239 you're like, look, I already know this thing's going to break, 762 00:44:27.480 --> 00:44:30.000 Like I already know I can't trust it, right, Like 763 00:44:31.880 --> 00:44:36.079 so whatever you say, So yeah, you know, how do 764 00:44:36.119 --> 00:44:39.639 you do it? Well? You know, one of the things 765 00:44:39.719 --> 00:44:42.280 is I think you got to start in a place 766 00:44:42.559 --> 00:44:47.079 where you are working with the analysts, for example, or 767 00:44:47.119 --> 00:44:49.559 with the people that are going to use it. As 768 00:44:49.599 --> 00:44:52.280 you're developing this stuff, as you're acquiring it. You've got 769 00:44:52.280 --> 00:44:54.559 to bring them in and have them be part of 770 00:44:54.559 --> 00:44:56.920 the process so they see it, they kind of walk 771 00:44:56.960 --> 00:45:01.000 down the path with you and have choice and and 772 00:45:01.079 --> 00:45:02.880 a lot of them when they do see it are like, 773 00:45:02.960 --> 00:45:06.119 oh wow, that's that's actually pretty cool, Like I would 774 00:45:06.159 --> 00:45:08.119 like to use that, like how do we do it? 775 00:45:08.199 --> 00:45:09.960 And you've got to get that, you've got to get 776 00:45:10.000 --> 00:45:14.320 buy in there. And I tried to, you know, work 777 00:45:14.599 --> 00:45:17.199 with with those folks as as much as I could, 778 00:45:17.519 --> 00:45:20.800 you know, and the director of the of Analysis at 779 00:45:20.800 --> 00:45:24.119 that time, who was also very much trying to do this, 780 00:45:24.400 --> 00:45:27.400 and and we would partner on these things. There would 781 00:45:27.440 --> 00:45:31.159 be tension because she's you know, she's worried about her 782 00:45:31.199 --> 00:45:32.800 people and I'm worried about what I got to do 783 00:45:32.840 --> 00:45:35.480 their retention. But we tried to work together. So that's 784 00:45:35.480 --> 00:45:37.880 the first part. And I think you have to do 785 00:45:37.920 --> 00:45:40.440 a lot of tests and evaluation, like you need to show, 786 00:45:40.559 --> 00:45:43.639 you need to have rigorous testing and really show this 787 00:45:43.679 --> 00:45:45.199 is how it's going to work. Here are the limits. 788 00:45:45.280 --> 00:45:46.960 And and the thing is it can't be the limit 789 00:45:47.079 --> 00:45:50.480 can't be like perfection. People aren't perfect either, you know, 790 00:45:50.679 --> 00:45:56.559 like analysts fail sometimes it's something you know. They they 791 00:45:56.639 --> 00:46:00.440 can be compromised as well, you know, yeah, and AI 792 00:46:00.519 --> 00:46:02.920 can be hacked, but you know, a person can be recruited. 793 00:46:03.199 --> 00:46:04.880 Trust me, It's what I used to do for a living, 794 00:46:05.320 --> 00:46:08.400 and so like you're you know, you've got to you've 795 00:46:08.440 --> 00:46:10.639 got to try to get to a point where it's 796 00:46:11.360 --> 00:46:14.199 you know, how good it is and what the performance 797 00:46:14.280 --> 00:46:17.079 envelope is and how close it is to a person 798 00:46:18.559 --> 00:46:20.920 and then and then show that and share that and 799 00:46:20.960 --> 00:46:24.320 be open with that with with the people who are 800 00:46:24.360 --> 00:46:28.360 ultimately going to use it, And then I think you 801 00:46:28.360 --> 00:46:31.440 you also have to. My view is is try it 802 00:46:31.480 --> 00:46:37.519 out in less risky missions. Some people will say they 803 00:46:37.559 --> 00:46:41.239 want to try AI out and like business operations, and 804 00:46:41.280 --> 00:46:43.280 that's where a lot of people were at that time 805 00:46:43.360 --> 00:46:45.239 and saying, well, yeah, we can use this for like 806 00:46:45.639 --> 00:46:50.559 business stuff, you know, admin HR finance. I think you 807 00:46:50.639 --> 00:46:52.320 have to go straight for mission because that's the thing 808 00:46:52.360 --> 00:46:55.079 we have to get right. But there are missions that 809 00:46:55.159 --> 00:46:59.400 are less risky than others. Right, you can worry about 810 00:46:59.440 --> 00:47:02.960 a mission in Africa rather than saying, yeah, we're gonna 811 00:47:03.880 --> 00:47:07.519 entrust it to monitoring you know, Russian nuclear weapons, Like 812 00:47:07.519 --> 00:47:09.800 we don't have to start with Russian nuclear weapons. We 813 00:47:09.880 --> 00:47:12.800 can entrust it to a mission that you know, if 814 00:47:12.800 --> 00:47:15.400 it if it fails, it is not the literal end 815 00:47:15.400 --> 00:47:15.920 of the world. 816 00:47:17.639 --> 00:47:19.000 That's uh, that's comforting. 817 00:47:20.239 --> 00:47:20.440 Yeah. 818 00:47:20.800 --> 00:47:26.440 Yeah, uh and so after this, I mean you, I 819 00:47:26.760 --> 00:47:30.159 take it, have gone back into the private sector. And 820 00:47:30.960 --> 00:47:33.280 this is this is just a little aside before we 821 00:47:33.320 --> 00:47:36.719 get into more serious subject matter. But I read in 822 00:47:36.760 --> 00:47:39.440 your book that you are sitting on the board of 823 00:47:39.480 --> 00:47:44.599 a company that wants to resurrect the wooly mammoth. Now, 824 00:47:45.199 --> 00:47:47.960 I will point out, I will point out, Anthony, that 825 00:47:48.000 --> 00:47:52.440 we Homo sapian men hunted that menace to extinction hundreds 826 00:47:52.440 --> 00:47:55.280 of thousands of years ago. Now you're all about bringing 827 00:47:55.280 --> 00:47:57.000 in new technology. Why do you want to bring this 828 00:47:57.119 --> 00:47:58.480 menace back into the world. 829 00:47:59.800 --> 00:48:03.400 There, there we go. You know, they're they're trying to 830 00:48:03.440 --> 00:48:08.159 resurrect dire wolves too, So you know, I uh well, 831 00:48:08.199 --> 00:48:11.800 when I left, I I went into investing. I went 832 00:48:11.840 --> 00:48:14.519 to Bridgewater Associate, it's a hedge fund, and then and 833 00:48:14.559 --> 00:48:17.840 then I went to Serber's Capital, a private equity fund, 834 00:48:18.000 --> 00:48:20.719 and and I worked for Steve Finberg, who's who's now 835 00:48:20.719 --> 00:48:24.039 the Deputy Secretary of War, which was a privilege. He's 836 00:48:24.039 --> 00:48:28.039 an incredibly smart guy and I think really helping the 837 00:48:28.039 --> 00:48:30.920 mission right now. And uh, yeah, it's true. I also 838 00:48:30.960 --> 00:48:35.360 sat on some boards. I remained interested in tech and 839 00:48:35.360 --> 00:48:39.920 and in particular in in technologies that I think, you know, 840 00:48:39.960 --> 00:48:42.559 we're either dual use where I thought, you know, these 841 00:48:42.599 --> 00:48:45.599 are gonna maybe they have a commercial aspect, but they 842 00:48:45.639 --> 00:48:47.880 also are going to help the mission, or where I 843 00:48:47.920 --> 00:48:49.639 felt like it was an area that we needed to 844 00:48:49.639 --> 00:48:53.360 compete with China on. And I think biotechnology is one 845 00:48:53.400 --> 00:48:56.719 of those areas, and and America really needs to compete 846 00:48:56.719 --> 00:48:59.800 in that area. And I think Colossal's doing that. And 847 00:48:59.840 --> 00:49:02.360 I'm I'm not in the company. I'm an advisor to 848 00:49:02.400 --> 00:49:05.000 the company, so I don't work there on a day 849 00:49:05.000 --> 00:49:08.840 to day basis. But Ben Lamb, the CEO, is is 850 00:49:09.679 --> 00:49:13.760 very strong CEO. He's doing you know, unbelievable things like 851 00:49:13.880 --> 00:49:17.920 Elon Musk level craziness, like saying, hey, when I first 852 00:49:17.960 --> 00:49:19.920 heard it, I had the same reaction. I was like, wait, 853 00:49:20.000 --> 00:49:22.800 what is this Jurassic Park? Are you going to try 854 00:49:22.800 --> 00:49:26.519 to like resurrect of wooly Mammoth? This is insanity. But 855 00:49:26.599 --> 00:49:29.000 he partnered with this guy, George Church, who is like 856 00:49:29.920 --> 00:49:34.440 one of the great you know, like you know scientists 857 00:49:34.480 --> 00:49:37.880 in this space in the world. He really he's like 858 00:49:37.920 --> 00:49:41.920 a legend. And he's like George is like no, no, no, 859 00:49:42.000 --> 00:49:44.920 this is this is a doable thing. This can happen. 860 00:49:45.800 --> 00:49:48.119 And yeah, it's about the it's you know, it's about 861 00:49:48.159 --> 00:49:50.239 the wooly mammoth and the dire wolf, and they're they're 862 00:49:50.280 --> 00:49:54.119 looking at other things. But it's also about you know, animals, 863 00:49:54.119 --> 00:50:00.079 and we've made extinct more recently as well, and and 864 00:50:00.199 --> 00:50:02.440 or ones that are highly endangered and so forth. So 865 00:50:02.440 --> 00:50:03.880 they're doing pretty amazing work. 866 00:50:04.280 --> 00:50:07.599 I'm more partial to the giant armadillo, maybe the giant sloth, 867 00:50:07.760 --> 00:50:10.360 but you know that's that's just user preference. 868 00:50:10.960 --> 00:50:12.639 You No, I'm glad you brought that up there. 869 00:50:12.679 --> 00:50:15.519 There's a whole chapter in your book about synthetic biology 870 00:50:15.519 --> 00:50:17.639 that I want to get into in a minute here. 871 00:50:18.440 --> 00:50:21.000 But tell us about the Fourth Intelligence Revolution. Why did 872 00:50:21.039 --> 00:50:22.519 you write this book and what's it about? 873 00:50:24.880 --> 00:50:28.360 Yeah, well, you know, kind of reflects my background. Like 874 00:50:28.440 --> 00:50:31.480 I went into intelligence, and I saw one type of 875 00:50:31.519 --> 00:50:35.559 intelligence that saw counter terrors and counter insurgency type operations. 876 00:50:36.840 --> 00:50:38.719 And then I left and I came back and all 877 00:50:38.719 --> 00:50:42.239 of a sudden, it was completely different. And when I 878 00:50:42.320 --> 00:50:45.880 left NNGA, I really started to reflect on that and 879 00:50:45.880 --> 00:50:49.360 and I was like I sort of witnessed two very 880 00:50:49.360 --> 00:50:53.719 different forms of you know, approaches to intelligence and and 881 00:50:54.000 --> 00:50:56.719 was kind of there for this like new revolution beginning 882 00:50:56.760 --> 00:51:01.519 to happen. And so I wrote an article and Foreign 883 00:51:01.519 --> 00:51:06.559 Affairs about the AI aspects of this. But then I realized, look, 884 00:51:06.599 --> 00:51:09.079 it's even bigger than just that, and so so what 885 00:51:09.119 --> 00:51:10.639 I did in the book is I kind of backed 886 00:51:10.679 --> 00:51:12.679 up and I said, you know, let's let's look at 887 00:51:12.719 --> 00:51:15.599 the history of intelligence how we got here. And I 888 00:51:15.840 --> 00:51:18.400 really started World War two because that was really the 889 00:51:18.440 --> 00:51:21.360 first time we had what what we would all consider 890 00:51:21.480 --> 00:51:25.280 like a true intelligence agency with all the features. And 891 00:51:25.320 --> 00:51:27.800 then and then, you know, we shut that down after 892 00:51:27.840 --> 00:51:30.159 the World War Two and then stood up the CIA 893 00:51:30.239 --> 00:51:32.719 and all these other agencies like d i A and 894 00:51:32.840 --> 00:51:35.960 NSA and so forth, and that was the Second Revolution. 895 00:51:36.079 --> 00:51:40.480 It was an entirely different way of doing intelligence. The 896 00:51:40.960 --> 00:51:43.639 you know, OSS was like cowboys, you know, just out 897 00:51:43.639 --> 00:51:47.840 there trying to you know, collect and do ops. The 898 00:51:47.920 --> 00:51:53.519 CIA and the NSA, these were professional, you know, well financed, 899 00:51:53.840 --> 00:51:58.880 large global organizations up against AGB, you know, up against 900 00:51:58.920 --> 00:52:03.440 this other there very professional global organization. And we really 901 00:52:03.760 --> 00:52:09.119 professionalize intelligence. And then you know, nine eleven change intelligence again, 902 00:52:09.480 --> 00:52:11.920 and all of a sudden, we weren't going up against 903 00:52:12.400 --> 00:52:14.559 nation states. We weren't going up against the Soviets. We're 904 00:52:14.559 --> 00:52:18.480 going up against this decentralized enemy in al Qaeda and 905 00:52:18.519 --> 00:52:23.400 other terrorist organizations, and we had to intelligence had to adapt, 906 00:52:24.039 --> 00:52:26.559 and we had to start using a lot more commercial stuff, 907 00:52:26.599 --> 00:52:29.880 for example, using the Internet, using cell phones and things 908 00:52:29.920 --> 00:52:32.719 like that, having this kind of network intelligence and using 909 00:52:32.760 --> 00:52:36.079 more open source information for example. That changed again, and 910 00:52:36.119 --> 00:52:40.840 now we're hitting this new revolution, this fourth Revolution, where 911 00:52:41.599 --> 00:52:44.840 AI and China are really driving that revolution. 912 00:52:47.679 --> 00:52:50.800 There's a series of different topics that you cover in 913 00:52:50.840 --> 00:52:54.599 the book, aside from the history, but weeding into things, 914 00:52:54.639 --> 00:52:58.480 and since we're just talking about the biological aspect, and 915 00:52:58.639 --> 00:53:01.440 just because I've a person sort of a weird personal 916 00:53:01.440 --> 00:53:04.559 interest in it, just because for no other reason, I 917 00:53:04.599 --> 00:53:05.119 feel like. 918 00:53:05.159 --> 00:53:07.239 This topic isn't really talked about as much. 919 00:53:07.639 --> 00:53:10.400 You know, we talk about quantum computing, we talk about AI, 920 00:53:10.519 --> 00:53:13.960 we talk about drones, but I mean, maybe we could 921 00:53:13.960 --> 00:53:16.199 start there. Why do you think we don't focus on 922 00:53:16.440 --> 00:53:19.880 the biological that you know, on gene editing and some 923 00:53:19.960 --> 00:53:23.360 of these other technologies. Is it because of like bioethics 924 00:53:23.400 --> 00:53:25.440 and medical laws and things like that that we have 925 00:53:25.519 --> 00:53:29.559 in America that kind of prohibit experimenting with those things. 926 00:53:31.320 --> 00:53:37.599 Yeah, it feels sometimes like AI like ten years ago. 927 00:53:37.800 --> 00:53:41.000 So people in the space ten years ago realized there 928 00:53:41.079 --> 00:53:43.599 was a lot happening. But day to day, if you talked, 929 00:53:43.679 --> 00:53:46.719 you know, if you went to two thousand and you know, 930 00:53:46.840 --> 00:53:49.320 fifteen and you talk to somebody about AI, they'd be 931 00:53:49.400 --> 00:53:52.559 like like an average person and be like, I don't really, 932 00:53:52.840 --> 00:53:55.159 I don't know. I know social media. I'm just getting 933 00:53:55.239 --> 00:53:57.599 used to social media and cell phones, Like what are 934 00:53:57.639 --> 00:54:00.599 you talking about? And now it's it's everywhere and it's 935 00:54:00.639 --> 00:54:03.519 on everybody's minds and it's changing the world. I feel 936 00:54:03.519 --> 00:54:08.360 like biotechnology hasn't had that like LM moment, right, There 937 00:54:08.679 --> 00:54:11.639 hasn't been that jat GPT. But we're seeing the signs. 938 00:54:11.760 --> 00:54:16.679 I mean, they made this this COVID vaccine in like 939 00:54:16.880 --> 00:54:21.280 months instead of years. We're seeing you know, people curing 940 00:54:21.360 --> 00:54:27.559 like blindness and diseases by changing people's DNA. Where Like, 941 00:54:27.639 --> 00:54:30.800 there is a real business in the world that is 942 00:54:30.840 --> 00:54:33.440 trying to resurrect the bly mammoth and that is a 943 00:54:33.559 --> 00:54:38.320 real possibility, and they birthed a dire wolf actually, so 944 00:54:39.039 --> 00:54:42.840 like it is starting to happen in a real way. 945 00:54:43.280 --> 00:54:48.559 It just hasn't sort of gotten big yet. And whenever 946 00:54:48.639 --> 00:54:52.840 you've got a technology like that, nations are going to 947 00:54:52.920 --> 00:54:56.679 care and they're going to figure out a way to 948 00:54:56.960 --> 00:54:59.280 use it for national security. They're also going to figure 949 00:54:59.280 --> 00:55:03.280 out a way to spy on it. And when I 950 00:55:03.320 --> 00:55:06.079 was you know, I partially put that chapter in the 951 00:55:06.119 --> 00:55:08.840 book is I wanted people to realize this was now 952 00:55:08.880 --> 00:55:11.079 in the game. This is part of the game now. 953 00:55:11.920 --> 00:55:18.119 And there are you know, Chinese companies collecting DNA information globally. 954 00:55:18.440 --> 00:55:22.480 There's a company called BGI Genomics. It's a massive biotech 955 00:55:22.519 --> 00:55:27.239 company out of China that collects people's DNA and they 956 00:55:27.679 --> 00:55:30.840 do it through COVID tests. They do it through like 957 00:55:30.920 --> 00:55:35.199 prenatal tests for like pregnant women thankfully not available here 958 00:55:35.239 --> 00:55:39.079 but available in Europe. And they're collecting this information. This 959 00:55:39.199 --> 00:55:43.320 same company has contracts with the PLA, with the People's 960 00:55:43.320 --> 00:55:47.000 Liberation Army and they're doing work in one of those 961 00:55:47.039 --> 00:55:50.199 things that they're doing work on the When you read 962 00:55:50.199 --> 00:55:55.159 the description, it talks about population improvement, right like like, okay, 963 00:55:55.559 --> 00:55:57.480 where are we going with this? And you're doing this 964 00:55:57.559 --> 00:56:00.559 with the PLA. And when I hear population improvement, and 965 00:56:00.599 --> 00:56:04.719 I hear people's liberation army. I hear super soldier like, 966 00:56:05.280 --> 00:56:09.079 I don't care what they say. That that's my you know, 967 00:56:09.400 --> 00:56:12.119 analyst brain. That's what I would say is going on there? 968 00:56:13.920 --> 00:56:14.880 Can you explain to people? 969 00:56:14.960 --> 00:56:16.800 I will first, I agree with you, like, when this 970 00:56:16.880 --> 00:56:18.800 takes off, it's going to be like the invention of 971 00:56:18.840 --> 00:56:21.320 the internet, or it's going to be one of those 972 00:56:21.320 --> 00:56:24.400 things that just changes the world. But can you talk 973 00:56:24.440 --> 00:56:27.719 to people like more specifically what we're talking about. A 974 00:56:27.760 --> 00:56:31.400 country that's harvesting people's DNA and mass Obviously that should 975 00:56:31.440 --> 00:56:34.719 scare the hell out of everyone. But the potential this 976 00:56:34.800 --> 00:56:40.880 technology has is to give people superhuman strength, endurance, intelligence, perhaps. 977 00:56:42.039 --> 00:56:47.960 Yeah, exactly so when you when when you have these 978 00:56:48.000 --> 00:56:51.000 types of tools like Crisper, for example, which allows you 979 00:56:51.280 --> 00:56:56.159 to change to change a gene and and how it's 980 00:56:56.199 --> 00:56:59.480 expressed in a person, and you can do things like that, 981 00:56:59.559 --> 00:57:02.440 you can make people immune to a disease, you can 982 00:57:03.400 --> 00:57:06.679 remove a genetic mutation of some sort, and you can 983 00:57:06.800 --> 00:57:12.039 absolutely do things like make them stronger or more resistant 984 00:57:12.159 --> 00:57:17.599 to cold, have a higher cold tolerance, for example, or 985 00:57:17.920 --> 00:57:22.280 potentially smarter. We're not there yet, I don't from what 986 00:57:22.360 --> 00:57:24.760 I read in the literature where we can do those 987 00:57:24.760 --> 00:57:29.239 big things because they're complicated. You know, intelligence is affected 988 00:57:29.239 --> 00:57:33.559 by many things. But people are absolutely working on it. 989 00:57:33.719 --> 00:57:38.960 Companies are working on it. But you know, governments are governments, 990 00:57:38.960 --> 00:57:42.119 and an authoritarian government and one that's known, for example, 991 00:57:42.760 --> 00:57:47.719 to have in the past performed experiments on political prisoners 992 00:57:47.800 --> 00:57:51.599 for example, like illegal experiments. Like you've got to assume, 993 00:57:51.639 --> 00:57:52.960 of course they're not going to come out and say this, 994 00:57:53.199 --> 00:57:55.840 but you've got to assume they're doing those kinds of experiments, 995 00:57:56.840 --> 00:57:59.760 and they could be used. Like you said, they can 996 00:57:59.800 --> 00:58:02.000 make people stronger, they can make them smarter. A lot 997 00:58:02.039 --> 00:58:04.280 of people think super Soldier and they think, oh, it's 998 00:58:04.320 --> 00:58:05.639 just like going to be in the movie and it's 999 00:58:05.679 --> 00:58:09.039 going to be really fast, strong guy. Actually, what scares 1000 00:58:09.119 --> 00:58:12.679 me way more is like you give people an extra 1001 00:58:12.719 --> 00:58:16.239 fifty IQ points, Like that's far scarier in our world 1002 00:58:16.440 --> 00:58:21.280 of competition, where people like that could be become intelligence 1003 00:58:21.280 --> 00:58:25.960 handlists or inventors or compete with us through robotics and 1004 00:58:26.000 --> 00:58:29.800 other things. Right, So they could absolutely do that. There's 1005 00:58:29.840 --> 00:58:37.679 an even darker side, which is could you create genetic bioweapons, right, 1006 00:58:37.920 --> 00:58:46.519 and could you target a disease to a specific ethnic group, right, 1007 00:58:46.800 --> 00:58:50.599 or could you target it to a specific individual. And 1008 00:58:50.639 --> 00:58:54.519 this can seem crazy, but it's actually already happened. So 1009 00:58:55.199 --> 00:58:59.880 in South Africa under apartheid, they tried. They had a program, 1010 00:59:00.159 --> 00:59:04.719 the apartheid government had a program to create you know, 1011 00:59:04.800 --> 00:59:08.960 bioweapons and essence that would affect black people and wouldn't 1012 00:59:09.000 --> 00:59:11.800 be targeted at white people like they This is reported 1013 00:59:11.840 --> 00:59:15.039 and it's scary. So there is a history of this happening. 1014 00:59:15.320 --> 00:59:20.320 And I'll say I'll say one more thing as another 1015 00:59:20.440 --> 00:59:22.760 signal that you can see this is happening, is that 1016 00:59:23.280 --> 00:59:27.599 when g came to San Francisco to meet with Biden 1017 00:59:28.320 --> 00:59:32.079 a few years ago and he got up from the 1018 00:59:32.159 --> 00:59:38.199 table after the meeting, his guys came in immediately and 1019 00:59:38.320 --> 00:59:42.280 wipe down every surface anything he touched with his body. 1020 00:59:42.440 --> 00:59:45.199 Immediately they were there wiping it all down. So there's 1021 00:59:45.280 --> 00:59:49.519 no genetic residue. Like they know, they know the danger 1022 00:59:50.360 --> 00:59:52.000 and they're watching out for it. 1023 00:59:52.360 --> 00:59:53.159 That's interesting. 1024 00:59:54.000 --> 00:59:57.599 Yeah, based on your research and the people you talk to, 1025 00:59:58.920 --> 01:00:01.800 where do you p receive us as a country being 1026 01:00:01.840 --> 01:00:05.159 with this subject right now? From a national security standpoint? 1027 01:00:05.679 --> 01:00:07.960 Do we have any real endeavors in this or is 1028 01:00:08.000 --> 01:00:10.599 it just something that's sort of like, you know, maybe 1029 01:00:10.679 --> 01:00:13.559 DARPA has on three x five cards somewhere. 1030 01:00:13.599 --> 01:00:14.000 I don't know. 1031 01:00:15.599 --> 01:00:18.719 Yeah, I mean, you know, look, historically we were the 1032 01:00:18.719 --> 01:00:22.519 ones doing all this research. We had the best biotechnology people. 1033 01:00:23.119 --> 01:00:27.559 You know, Daudna won the Nobel Prize, she's an American for 1034 01:00:27.760 --> 01:00:33.400 inventing crisper. Like, we have had the best historically, and 1035 01:00:33.960 --> 01:00:37.320 I believe that we continue to have the best. But 1036 01:00:37.880 --> 01:00:41.719 you know, when you're in an authoritarian country like China, 1037 01:00:42.480 --> 01:00:46.840 the rules that we would apply to how you do 1038 01:00:46.920 --> 01:00:51.360 human testing, for example, don't have to apply either publicly. 1039 01:00:51.639 --> 01:00:54.519 They just change those rules, or they can do things 1040 01:00:54.519 --> 01:00:57.840 secretly that we just wouldn't do. We just you know, 1041 01:00:57.880 --> 01:01:02.079 we're not going to have a lab in experiment on 1042 01:01:02.239 --> 01:01:04.320 an ethnic group. It's just not going to do that. 1043 01:01:04.599 --> 01:01:07.920 Whereas in China they have literal concentration camps for the 1044 01:01:07.960 --> 01:01:12.159 wigers and easily could experiment on an entire population if 1045 01:01:12.199 --> 01:01:14.480 they wanted. And maybe they are. It's hard to say 1046 01:01:14.639 --> 01:01:18.920 because it's kept secret, but so I think they and 1047 01:01:19.000 --> 01:01:25.800 they're definitely investing heavily in the space and BGI Genomics 1048 01:01:25.840 --> 01:01:30.280 and other companies have stolen American ip in this space 1049 01:01:30.360 --> 01:01:33.800 to kind of move more quickly, and then they're investing 1050 01:01:33.840 --> 01:01:36.760 their own money and training their own scientists and having 1051 01:01:36.760 --> 01:01:39.079 them come over here and get PhDs and go back there. 1052 01:01:39.320 --> 01:01:43.719 So they're definitely making a push, you know, and militarily 1053 01:01:43.760 --> 01:01:46.400 it's hard to know what they're doing because it would 1054 01:01:46.440 --> 01:01:50.280 be classified. Of course, on our side, you know, we've 1055 01:01:50.360 --> 01:01:54.760 continued to do research dart Buzz, continue to have you know, 1056 01:01:55.000 --> 01:02:00.119 biological programs for example. But I don't think that we're 1057 01:02:00.679 --> 01:02:03.400 you know, if you ask me, I don't think that 1058 01:02:03.519 --> 01:02:06.440 we put the level of effort into it that we 1059 01:02:06.519 --> 01:02:09.760 should be if you just simply look at the level 1060 01:02:09.800 --> 01:02:13.519 of the threat, and to me, bioweapons are right there 1061 01:02:13.679 --> 01:02:18.079 under nuclear weapon as the most dangerous possible thing, and 1062 01:02:18.599 --> 01:02:22.239 I don't believe that we spend just under nuclear weapons 1063 01:02:22.239 --> 01:02:26.159 amount of money on this. I think, for example, we 1064 01:02:26.199 --> 01:02:31.920 need to do far more monitoring of diseases because people 1065 01:02:32.000 --> 01:02:35.320 saw what could happen with a major disease with COVID. 1066 01:02:36.039 --> 01:02:38.599 Nation states saw it. Also, terrorist groups saw it and 1067 01:02:38.639 --> 01:02:41.719 realize like, oh wow, this is how you do damage, 1068 01:02:41.760 --> 01:02:44.199 trillions of dollars of damage and you kill millions of people. 1069 01:02:44.840 --> 01:02:47.079 You know, that sounds great. To a lot of enemies 1070 01:02:47.119 --> 01:02:51.000 of America, and so we need to really get better 1071 01:02:51.039 --> 01:02:53.440 at monitoring for this stuff and then figuring out how 1072 01:02:53.440 --> 01:02:56.239 to respond. And then I believe, and I kind of 1073 01:02:56.559 --> 01:02:59.119 suggested in the book, like we may need an entire 1074 01:02:59.400 --> 01:03:03.639 intelligence agency that just does this, it just focuses on 1075 01:03:03.719 --> 01:03:07.800 biothreats and genetic engineering and synthetic biology and all of 1076 01:03:07.800 --> 01:03:09.679 these things in the future. It's that important. 1077 01:03:11.679 --> 01:03:14.159 I do feel that it's one of those subjects that 1078 01:03:14.320 --> 01:03:17.000 it is sort of like, you know, the way like 1079 01:03:17.199 --> 01:03:20.719 when chat GPT was released, Suddenly the public becomes you know, 1080 01:03:20.760 --> 01:03:22.920 it's in their face. They understand it and they see it, 1081 01:03:23.239 --> 01:03:24.960 and I'm like, oh wow, this is a real thing. 1082 01:03:25.360 --> 01:03:27.639 I mean on the biological front, you shut her to 1083 01:03:27.679 --> 01:03:30.719 think what is going to be that relevatory moment for 1084 01:03:30.800 --> 01:03:33.280 the public that's like, oh shit, this is for real. 1085 01:03:35.400 --> 01:03:37.280 I mean, maybe it is when they see a wooly 1086 01:03:37.320 --> 01:03:41.960 mammoth walking around, yeah, maybe you know. Or or it's 1087 01:03:42.039 --> 01:03:46.199 when you know they see like a genetically engineered person 1088 01:03:46.599 --> 01:03:50.719 walking around where you know, China did this. They there 1089 01:03:50.800 --> 01:03:54.360 there was there was a scientist there who changed the 1090 01:03:54.440 --> 01:03:59.760 genes of of of a fetus and and or of 1091 01:03:59.840 --> 01:04:06.440 a of a of a of a child to cure 1092 01:04:06.440 --> 01:04:10.360 them of AIDS or to make them immune to it. 1093 01:04:10.360 --> 01:04:13.760 It apparently worked, And we don't know much of what 1094 01:04:13.920 --> 01:04:19.559 happened after that because they kept they said that they 1095 01:04:19.639 --> 01:04:24.599 arrested the guy. I haven't seen any reporting of really 1096 01:04:24.599 --> 01:04:27.320 what's happened for all, you know, who knows. Maybe he's 1097 01:04:27.360 --> 01:04:30.199 just working in a lab now, right, Like it's hard, 1098 01:04:30.400 --> 01:04:32.639 that's the problem in an authoritarian state. You can't know 1099 01:04:32.679 --> 01:04:36.840 what really happened, right, But you know, I think I 1100 01:04:36.880 --> 01:04:39.760 think if people see that happening. I think if somebody, 1101 01:04:39.800 --> 01:04:45.920 if they see, if they if we see another COVID 1102 01:04:46.159 --> 01:04:50.199 like epidemic where it's very clear that it was designed, 1103 01:04:51.719 --> 01:04:53.840 I think people are going to wake up and become very, 1104 01:04:53.920 --> 01:04:54.480 very worried. 1105 01:04:55.440 --> 01:05:00.400 M Well, let's because we've mentioned it several times already. 1106 01:05:00.440 --> 01:05:03.840 Let's turn our attention to AI. And I think you 1107 01:05:03.840 --> 01:05:06.760 have a whole chapter in the book about it, and 1108 01:05:06.880 --> 01:05:10.079 much ink has been spilt on this subject. You said yourself, 1109 01:05:10.079 --> 01:05:14.639 you wrote in Foreign Affairs about it. Cut through the 1110 01:05:15.000 --> 01:05:17.440 fog of wars to speak, tell us how is this 1111 01:05:17.480 --> 01:05:20.960 technology going to affect us from a national security standpoint? 1112 01:05:22.320 --> 01:05:25.800 Yeah, yeah, I'd like to baseline AI a little bit. 1113 01:05:25.840 --> 01:05:28.920 There's a lot of different AI out there. It means 1114 01:05:28.920 --> 01:05:30.639 a lot of different things, a lot of different people. 1115 01:05:30.679 --> 01:05:34.199 But I would say this is to me, how think 1116 01:05:34.239 --> 01:05:37.760 about it is. It's it's a technology that's doing something 1117 01:05:39.800 --> 01:05:42.719 like a person would do it, and as as a 1118 01:05:42.719 --> 01:05:46.199 person would do it. So it's not you know when 1119 01:05:46.199 --> 01:05:52.159 I say an AI system that's identifying objects on an image, 1120 01:05:52.199 --> 01:05:55.320 like it's picking out the missiles. And so if you 1121 01:05:55.440 --> 01:05:56.960 just feeded a lot of images, it is going to 1122 01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:00.599 say there's a missile. That's not there's no rule, right, 1123 01:06:00.840 --> 01:06:05.239 It's it's actually thinking in a sense, And and you 1124 01:06:05.280 --> 01:06:07.239 can give it any image, you don't have to show 1125 01:06:07.280 --> 01:06:10.360 it even it sometimes and it can pick it out. 1126 01:06:10.960 --> 01:06:13.960 That's what's sort of new here. And chat GPT and 1127 01:06:14.039 --> 01:06:17.519 these other LM models like Claude and so forth are 1128 01:06:18.039 --> 01:06:21.880 are the biggest example ever I think in history of this. 1129 01:06:22.159 --> 01:06:27.440 Like they they produce information like a person, and they 1130 01:06:27.480 --> 01:06:31.320 can do things that a person that we have traditionally 1131 01:06:31.320 --> 01:06:34.320 thought only a person could do because it requires some 1132 01:06:34.480 --> 01:06:39.199 level of like thought and reaction and adaptation, right, and 1133 01:06:39.280 --> 01:06:42.880 so in intelligence, look, I think just broadly people are 1134 01:06:42.880 --> 01:06:45.280 going to apply AI to do all sorts of jobs 1135 01:06:45.280 --> 01:06:48.679 that people do. It's gonna do. It's gonna draft contracts. 1136 01:06:48.679 --> 01:06:52.880 It already is draft contracts for lawyers. It's gonna help 1137 01:06:52.960 --> 01:06:56.119 teach kids, like you know, kids use this in school 1138 01:06:56.159 --> 01:06:59.360 and learn from different AI systems. It's going to make 1139 01:06:59.400 --> 01:07:03.199 movies like if you've gone on soorra or nano banana 1140 01:07:03.280 --> 01:07:09.119 or something like, can make make a little movie. Same 1141 01:07:09.159 --> 01:07:14.039 thing is going to happen in intelligence and this technology 1142 01:07:14.119 --> 01:07:16.599 AI is going to do all of the different things 1143 01:07:16.599 --> 01:07:19.800 and intelligence that a person does today. It's going to 1144 01:07:19.840 --> 01:07:22.440 do what's called the intelligent cycle. It's going to help 1145 01:07:22.480 --> 01:07:25.280 the collect information, it's going to analyze that information, it's 1146 01:07:25.320 --> 01:07:28.000 going to disseminate it. It's going to help plan the 1147 01:07:28.079 --> 01:07:31.280 next information that needs to be collected and so forth. 1148 01:07:32.519 --> 01:07:35.039 And it's going to be used on sensors like drones 1149 01:07:35.280 --> 01:07:41.880 to autonomously fly them, remove them, and to identify what 1150 01:07:41.920 --> 01:07:44.920 they're seeing and then to collect that information and then 1151 01:07:45.039 --> 01:07:47.679 send it to another drone or send it to another 1152 01:07:47.719 --> 01:07:50.920 AI system to be analyzed. So I think what's going 1153 01:07:50.960 --> 01:07:53.679 to happen is that all of the parts of intelligence 1154 01:07:53.719 --> 01:07:56.800 are going to be done by AI over time and 1155 01:07:56.840 --> 01:07:59.280 I sort of say in the book, within five years, 1156 01:08:01.000 --> 01:08:04.320 ninety plus percent of intelligence will will be done in 1157 01:08:04.360 --> 01:08:09.400 some way by an AI. And that also what's going 1158 01:08:09.440 --> 01:08:12.599 to happen is intelligence is going to be made for 1159 01:08:12.920 --> 01:08:16.880 and buy machines. So these AI systems are going to 1160 01:08:16.920 --> 01:08:19.399 go collect and analyze intelligence and feed it to other 1161 01:08:19.439 --> 01:08:22.880 AI systems, and some of them are going to be 1162 01:08:22.880 --> 01:08:27.079 like drones feeding it to drones, or AI analytical systems 1163 01:08:27.079 --> 01:08:30.199 feeding it to other AI analytical systems, and that's really new, 1164 01:08:30.960 --> 01:08:34.000 and we really don't even know how that's going to 1165 01:08:34.079 --> 01:08:37.920 work quite yet, but I'm pretty confident that that is 1166 01:08:38.000 --> 01:08:42.279 what will happen. And people intelligence officers are going to 1167 01:08:42.359 --> 01:08:46.159 do jobs that are very very different, Like an analyst 1168 01:08:46.279 --> 01:08:49.920 might not just their job might not be to do 1169 01:08:50.039 --> 01:08:52.960 traditional analysis. Is probably not going to be to read 1170 01:08:53.000 --> 01:08:55.159 a bunch of reports and then write a new report. 1171 01:08:55.840 --> 01:08:58.600 They're maybe going to task an AI to read those 1172 01:08:58.600 --> 01:09:00.560 reports and write the report, and they're going to Q 1173 01:09:00.680 --> 01:09:02.680 see it or have a vision or figure out what 1174 01:09:02.800 --> 01:09:04.920 questions ask. But really I think what they're going to 1175 01:09:05.000 --> 01:09:08.479 do is partner with somebody in operations or with a 1176 01:09:08.560 --> 01:09:11.239 general or with a president to be their interface and 1177 01:09:11.279 --> 01:09:14.000 that's what it will be to be an intelligence officer 1178 01:09:14.039 --> 01:09:16.319 and an analyst, not to do it in the old way. 1179 01:09:17.319 --> 01:09:19.640 Even for a case officer, I think you're going to 1180 01:09:19.760 --> 01:09:22.479 need to use AI systems. You know, we're still going 1181 01:09:22.520 --> 01:09:25.840 to collect human intelligence. Ultimately, we still occasionally have to 1182 01:09:25.880 --> 01:09:29.079 go recruit another human being to give as information. But 1183 01:09:29.600 --> 01:09:31.880 you're going to need AI to help you deal with 1184 01:09:31.920 --> 01:09:33.319 all the surveillance for example. 1185 01:09:35.079 --> 01:09:37.960 This is a little bit of a metaphysical question, I suppose, 1186 01:09:38.159 --> 01:09:41.920 but unfortunately you get there very quickly with these kind 1187 01:09:41.960 --> 01:09:45.640 of conversations about advanced technology. What do you think that's 1188 01:09:45.680 --> 01:09:49.159 going to mean for us institutionally when we have a 1189 01:09:49.199 --> 01:09:51.840 population of people who really don't know how to do 1190 01:09:51.960 --> 01:09:55.359 anything that it's so phantomo logical the way that these 1191 01:09:55.399 --> 01:09:58.720 systems work in the background and generate this information and 1192 01:09:58.760 --> 01:10:00.920 feed into each other. And you know, you're just the 1193 01:10:00.960 --> 01:10:02.960 guy that gets the report out of the machine, and 1194 01:10:03.319 --> 01:10:05.159 your whole job is to like hand it to the 1195 01:10:05.199 --> 01:10:08.119 next guy. I mean, what do you that's like going 1196 01:10:08.199 --> 01:10:11.479 to reshape the human species? I mean, if you think 1197 01:10:11.520 --> 01:10:12.079 about it. 1198 01:10:13.199 --> 01:10:16.239 I mean, you know, it's already happened in some ways, 1199 01:10:16.319 --> 01:10:22.600 right like in America, we've forgotten how to manufacture many 1200 01:10:22.640 --> 01:10:25.640 things that we used to manufacture, Like we literally just 1201 01:10:25.840 --> 01:10:28.720 the people who used to make something, who knew how 1202 01:10:28.760 --> 01:10:33.279 to mine and manufacture rare Earth's magnets like literally have 1203 01:10:33.399 --> 01:10:36.600 died off where they just never trained another generation. So 1204 01:10:36.640 --> 01:10:40.439 we'd like have forgotten things or like iron working, you know, 1205 01:10:40.520 --> 01:10:42.760 like iron working that you used to be able to 1206 01:10:42.800 --> 01:10:45.399 do in the eighteen hundreds, Like there are very very 1207 01:10:45.439 --> 01:10:49.279 few people left in the world who can do that 1208 01:10:49.399 --> 01:10:52.960 kind of artisanal craft. Right, So we've definitely this has 1209 01:10:53.000 --> 01:10:58.640 happened before with technology, and I think it will happen 1210 01:10:58.720 --> 01:11:03.760 with AI. It's inevitable, and we're going to have to 1211 01:11:03.800 --> 01:11:09.520 at a minimum continue to teach people some of the basics. 1212 01:11:10.439 --> 01:11:14.000 And I think about like long division sometimes, like when 1213 01:11:14.039 --> 01:11:17.560 I was in school in the eighties and learning long division, 1214 01:11:17.760 --> 01:11:19.560 and I knew there were calculators, and I'm like, why 1215 01:11:19.600 --> 01:11:21.640 are you teaching me long division? Like I'm never going 1216 01:11:21.680 --> 01:11:26.199 to do it, and they still stubbornly taught us. And 1217 01:11:26.319 --> 01:11:29.000 it's true, like I can't remember the last time I 1218 01:11:29.000 --> 01:11:33.000 did long division by hand. I just would use a calculator, 1219 01:11:33.079 --> 01:11:34.960 but you still needed to learn it so you could 1220 01:11:35.039 --> 01:11:39.359 understand math generally, and so we could identify mathematicians and 1221 01:11:40.399 --> 01:11:43.399 engineers and like, you know, do you you needed those 1222 01:11:43.399 --> 01:11:46.039 building blocks? Right? I think the same thing will have 1223 01:11:46.119 --> 01:11:50.119 to happen where even though the AI can do this stuff, 1224 01:11:50.880 --> 01:11:55.000 we still have to teach people, especially children, but even 1225 01:11:55.039 --> 01:11:56.960 adults how to do this stuff. You're still going to 1226 01:11:57.039 --> 01:11:59.199 need to learn how to write. You're still going to 1227 01:11:59.279 --> 01:12:02.239 need to learn how to do intelligence analysis, even if 1228 01:12:02.279 --> 01:12:03.840 you're not going to really do it that much in 1229 01:12:03.880 --> 01:12:04.800 your day to day job. 1230 01:12:06.520 --> 01:12:11.439 Right, Right, What was the other question about AI that 1231 01:12:11.520 --> 01:12:12.399 I wanted to ask you? 1232 01:12:12.439 --> 01:12:12.800 Oh? 1233 01:12:12.840 --> 01:12:15.840 So, I guess the other one that i'd ask from 1234 01:12:15.840 --> 01:12:20.399 more of a military standpoint is I do have some 1235 01:12:20.520 --> 01:12:23.720 trepidation I have to say about the way the pitch 1236 01:12:23.800 --> 01:12:26.880 decks are sent out to the public that this is 1237 01:12:26.920 --> 01:12:32.079 like this utopian technology in a future conflict are We're 1238 01:12:32.119 --> 01:12:34.279 still going to need soldiers that have to take the 1239 01:12:34.359 --> 01:12:36.359 hill at some point, right. I think the war in 1240 01:12:36.439 --> 01:12:39.640 Ukraine has shown us that ultimately, no matter how sexy 1241 01:12:39.680 --> 01:12:42.680 your cyber ops are, you have to have soldiers taking 1242 01:12:42.720 --> 01:12:46.960 ground and holding it. How do you see AI interfacing 1243 01:12:47.000 --> 01:12:47.319 with that? 1244 01:12:49.279 --> 01:12:52.720 Yeah, that's that's the that's sort of the interesting thing, right, 1245 01:12:52.800 --> 01:12:55.439 I start off the book and with this like William 1246 01:12:55.439 --> 01:12:58.920 Gibson quote he was he was a science fiction author 1247 01:12:59.119 --> 01:13:01.279 and he said, the future is here, but it's not 1248 01:13:01.399 --> 01:13:05.840 evenly distributed. And so I think what happens with technology 1249 01:13:05.880 --> 01:13:07.960 you sort of see both things at the same time. 1250 01:13:08.079 --> 01:13:11.399 Like in Ukraine, they're these autonomous drones and there are also 1251 01:13:11.439 --> 01:13:14.199 guys in trenches, you know, digging them out with a 1252 01:13:14.239 --> 01:13:19.560 shovel that like literally you could take a Roman legionnaire 1253 01:13:20.039 --> 01:13:22.159 and put him in that trench and he would know 1254 01:13:22.159 --> 01:13:24.319 what to do. You know, he'd be like, oh, I 1255 01:13:24.359 --> 01:13:26.880 see here's a shovel. I'm gonna dig it out, and like, okay, 1256 01:13:26.880 --> 01:13:28.600 you don't have a bow and arrow, you have a rifle, 1257 01:13:28.680 --> 01:13:31.119 but I get it. Like bad guy over there, I'm 1258 01:13:31.159 --> 01:13:34.239 over here, he's shooting. I'm shooting. You know, he would 1259 01:13:34.279 --> 01:13:37.640 get it. It still works. But then there's this drone 1260 01:13:37.640 --> 01:13:40.520 flying over. I think that there will be more of that, 1261 01:13:40.920 --> 01:13:46.279 and like maybe a taste of it is like Operation Spiderweb, 1262 01:13:46.800 --> 01:13:51.159 which is this Ukraine operation where they took the drones 1263 01:13:51.760 --> 01:13:54.720 they had to get them for deployed into like Siberia 1264 01:13:54.760 --> 01:13:57.680 and other parts of Russia and then they kind of 1265 01:13:58.199 --> 01:14:01.600 flew them either remotely or autonomous lead to attack, but 1266 01:14:01.720 --> 01:14:05.479 they needed people to get downrange. So you're still doing 1267 01:14:05.560 --> 01:14:09.680 these like super complex you know operations to move stuff 1268 01:14:10.239 --> 01:14:13.560 and get it there and then and then you're letting 1269 01:14:13.560 --> 01:14:16.720 the machines do it now, you know, imagine that in 1270 01:14:16.760 --> 01:14:20.840 more of a warfare scenario where you've got maybe special 1271 01:14:20.880 --> 01:14:24.239 operations guys who've got to get this downrange and are 1272 01:14:24.359 --> 01:14:28.479 using these weapons or yeah, you're you're having the drones 1273 01:14:28.560 --> 01:14:31.640 come in, but the people are you know, kind of 1274 01:14:31.680 --> 01:14:34.760 innately flexible in a way that AI is just not 1275 01:14:34.920 --> 01:14:39.159 there and machines are not and survivable in a way, 1276 01:14:39.319 --> 01:14:41.960 right Like, you know, at the end of the day, 1277 01:14:42.520 --> 01:14:45.119 if you have a United States marine on an island, 1278 01:14:45.720 --> 01:14:47.600 like he could run out of ammunition and he's going 1279 01:14:47.640 --> 01:14:49.039 to be like, oh, I see, I can cut down 1280 01:14:49.039 --> 01:14:51.319 this like you know, stick and turn it into a 1281 01:14:51.319 --> 01:14:55.560 spear and continue to fight. Right Like, We're still going 1282 01:14:55.640 --> 01:15:00.359 to need guys downrange doing this or controlling these systems 1283 01:15:00.479 --> 01:15:05.159 or positioning them or you know, ultimately to take and 1284 01:15:05.319 --> 01:15:09.439 occupy a piece of land, you need to put a 1285 01:15:09.479 --> 01:15:12.159 person there, Like putting a drone there is not going 1286 01:15:12.199 --> 01:15:14.720 to work, Like the locals are going to be like 1287 01:15:15.680 --> 01:15:17.119 they're just going to wait for the thing to run 1288 01:15:17.159 --> 01:15:20.199 out of batteries, so you're still going to need to 1289 01:15:20.199 --> 01:15:22.319 put people. I think it's going to be this mix 1290 01:15:22.760 --> 01:15:26.359 and nobody really knows what it looks like quite yet, 1291 01:15:27.000 --> 01:15:29.399 but we're going to kind of figure it out in 1292 01:15:29.560 --> 01:15:30.720 Ukraine's like the preview. 1293 01:15:31.039 --> 01:15:33.399 Yeah, no, good point. Yeah, it's not going to happen 1294 01:15:33.399 --> 01:15:37.600 all at once. Do we want to talk briefly about 1295 01:15:37.720 --> 01:15:41.039 quantum computing and what that's going to change from an 1296 01:15:41.039 --> 01:15:42.159 intelligence standpoint? 1297 01:15:44.199 --> 01:15:47.279 Yeah, I mean, you know, quantum is interesting. I mean 1298 01:15:47.439 --> 01:15:50.720 to me, it's a little further off than than AI. 1299 01:15:51.600 --> 01:15:54.199 You know, like we were talking about biotech a minute ago, 1300 01:15:54.239 --> 01:15:56.880 and it's like we're in the pre l M phase. 1301 01:15:56.920 --> 01:15:58.640 I don't even think we're in the pre l M 1302 01:15:58.720 --> 01:16:02.520 phase with quantum quid it yet, but when it does hit, 1303 01:16:02.840 --> 01:16:07.039 and it is one where there could be true strategic surprise, right, Like, 1304 01:16:07.840 --> 01:16:11.000 for all we know, China has invested half a trillion 1305 01:16:11.039 --> 01:16:14.520 dollars in creating a quantum computer. Secretly like a Manhattan 1306 01:16:14.560 --> 01:16:18.840 project could happen, I would be surprised. That's like by 1307 01:16:18.920 --> 01:16:23.640 definition surprise, but at some point someone is going to 1308 01:16:23.640 --> 01:16:25.960 make one of these computers. And the biggest thing for 1309 01:16:26.000 --> 01:16:30.039 intelligence is that such a computer could break encryption and 1310 01:16:30.119 --> 01:16:34.640 traditional encryption, and that doesn't just mean the encryption of 1311 01:16:34.800 --> 01:16:39.279 what we're currently transmitting. So we could start today and 1312 01:16:40.000 --> 01:16:43.199 you know, encrypt everything in what's called post quantum encryption. 1313 01:16:43.279 --> 01:16:46.079 That couldn't be broken by such a computer. But it's 1314 01:16:46.159 --> 01:16:50.159 all the old information. And they could have collected that 1315 01:16:50.279 --> 01:16:55.199 old information, including like nuclear information for example, right like 1316 01:16:55.680 --> 01:16:59.399 anything that would have been encrypted and transmitted over any 1317 01:16:59.399 --> 01:17:01.560 period of time and going back to the beginning of 1318 01:17:02.279 --> 01:17:07.399 you know, computers really and and then they'll you know, 1319 01:17:07.520 --> 01:17:11.560 potentially could decrypt that and that that will be you know, 1320 01:17:11.600 --> 01:17:14.960 a major turning point. I think that that information will 1321 01:17:15.000 --> 01:17:16.760 be out there. Do you ever see that movie Sneakers 1322 01:17:17.920 --> 01:17:20.760 Robert Redford from the nineties, great movie? You know that 1323 01:17:20.760 --> 01:17:24.960 that's you know, spoiler, that's what it's about. And you 1324 01:17:25.000 --> 01:17:27.760 know they're able to break into anything and and sort 1325 01:17:27.800 --> 01:17:29.960 of look at anything, and like a world like that 1326 01:17:30.000 --> 01:17:33.680 could be really scary and for intelligence would change everything 1327 01:17:33.680 --> 01:17:37.560 because all of our old intelligence, which is still sensitive 1328 01:17:37.600 --> 01:17:40.319 by the way, twenty thirty year old intelligence is still 1329 01:17:40.359 --> 01:17:44.680 important you know, it could be it could be decrypted, 1330 01:17:44.720 --> 01:17:46.159 and that would be a major issue. 1331 01:17:48.239 --> 01:17:51.680 Let's get into economic espionage. There's a whole chapter in 1332 01:17:51.680 --> 01:17:52.840 your book about that topic. 1333 01:17:55.079 --> 01:17:55.520 Yeah. 1334 01:17:55.800 --> 01:17:59.000 You know. One of the other aspects of this, of 1335 01:17:59.039 --> 01:18:03.199 this fourth Intelligence Revolution, is that it's it's not just 1336 01:18:03.199 --> 01:18:06.279 about political and military issues, which is how you know, 1337 01:18:06.319 --> 01:18:11.439 we traditionally think about competitions with the Soviets or or 1338 01:18:11.479 --> 01:18:15.279 without CATA or something. It's about economics. It's about science 1339 01:18:15.279 --> 01:18:19.279 and technology, and that includes on the intelligence side. And 1340 01:18:19.560 --> 01:18:25.279 China has been performing economic espionage on America for years, 1341 01:18:26.279 --> 01:18:31.960 right They're they're collecting information about American companies about their 1342 01:18:32.000 --> 01:18:35.760 intellectual property, and they're passing that to their own companies 1343 01:18:35.880 --> 01:18:39.840 to replicate a product, for example, or they're they're trying 1344 01:18:39.840 --> 01:18:44.359 to slow down our companies in some way. They you know, 1345 01:18:44.439 --> 01:18:49.479 they're recruiting people to collect information like insider threats within 1346 01:18:49.520 --> 01:18:54.479 these organizations. So they're doing economic espionage. And we have 1347 01:18:54.520 --> 01:18:58.439 always done a little bit of economic espionage, I mean, 1348 01:18:59.159 --> 01:19:01.640 but it's not really been a big part of it 1349 01:19:01.680 --> 01:19:06.079 because the Soviets weren't an economic superpower, like, it wasn't 1350 01:19:06.199 --> 01:19:09.359 that big of an issue. After the defeat of the 1351 01:19:09.359 --> 01:19:12.039 Soviet Union. Like in the nineties, we were the superpower, 1352 01:19:12.159 --> 01:19:14.800 we were globalizing, we weren't focused on other you know, 1353 01:19:14.880 --> 01:19:18.840 collecting other people's information that much. Clinton. President Clinton did 1354 01:19:18.960 --> 01:19:23.000 ask for some economic information, but not a ton. And 1355 01:19:23.039 --> 01:19:26.199 then during the Global War on Terror, like we were 1356 01:19:26.239 --> 01:19:29.880 focused on counter terrorism and like they were not economic actors. 1357 01:19:29.960 --> 01:19:34.359 So all of a sudden, now we're worried about, you know, 1358 01:19:34.520 --> 01:19:37.640 economic issues, and I think that we need to build 1359 01:19:37.720 --> 01:19:42.039 up the capability now to do economic intelligence ourselves, to 1360 01:19:42.239 --> 01:19:45.680 know what Chinese companies are doing, maybe to try to 1361 01:19:45.680 --> 01:19:48.880 stop them from doing it. Right, what if, for example, 1362 01:19:48.960 --> 01:19:51.680 and I'll give you an example, what if there was 1363 01:19:51.760 --> 01:19:55.479 another global epidemic that was far more powerful than COVID 1364 01:19:55.680 --> 01:19:58.920 and millions and millions of people were dying, and China 1365 01:19:58.920 --> 01:20:03.920 would not share with us a vaccine, which you think 1366 01:20:03.920 --> 01:20:08.840 it's justified to steal that vaccine. Of course, like this 1367 01:20:08.880 --> 01:20:11.600 is what you know our country does, we'd have to 1368 01:20:11.600 --> 01:20:14.159 steal it. So or what if we wanted to know 1369 01:20:14.199 --> 01:20:17.359 if their companies were making this quantum computer that would 1370 01:20:17.399 --> 01:20:22.399 be able to get our information and all the encrypted information, 1371 01:20:22.439 --> 01:20:25.000 including about nuclear weapons and things like this and really 1372 01:20:25.039 --> 01:20:28.920 threaten us like you've got to. I think you're justified 1373 01:20:28.960 --> 01:20:32.399 to go get that information. And I think presidents need that, 1374 01:20:32.800 --> 01:20:36.319 and the Trump administration has made it clear that economic 1375 01:20:36.359 --> 01:20:39.600 competition is a big part of its policy. They should 1376 01:20:39.600 --> 01:20:42.239 be provided with the information they need to make decisions, 1377 01:20:42.760 --> 01:20:46.039 and that includes classified secret information. 1378 01:20:49.159 --> 01:20:53.920 Isn't also One of the interesting things my perception of it, anyway, 1379 01:20:54.159 --> 01:20:56.800 tell me if I'm wrong, is that in other countries, 1380 01:20:56.920 --> 01:21:00.479 like so like France, for example, the DGSE can help 1381 01:21:00.720 --> 01:21:06.399 French companies make sales and make a profit, whereas like 1382 01:21:06.439 --> 01:21:09.199 the CIA, I don't think is allowed to work with, 1383 01:21:09.720 --> 01:21:13.199 you know, an American tech company or or car company 1384 01:21:13.279 --> 01:21:16.119 or whatever else to help them sell their product abroad. 1385 01:21:17.520 --> 01:21:20.079 Yeah, you know, you can get a master's degree in 1386 01:21:20.199 --> 01:21:24.119 economic warfare in France. That's cool, Like they're yeah, they're 1387 01:21:24.199 --> 01:21:27.239 they definitely do it. And other countries do as well. 1388 01:21:27.680 --> 01:21:30.920 China does it, Israel does it. We have we have 1389 01:21:31.159 --> 01:21:35.079 we have not done this sort of thing. And so 1390 01:21:35.119 --> 01:21:37.239 I break it apart into kind of like two pieces, 1391 01:21:37.880 --> 01:21:40.119 Like one is this issue that I think you were 1392 01:21:40.159 --> 01:21:44.399 referring to, which is picking winners and like having the 1393 01:21:44.439 --> 01:21:48.039 government help a company. When I was writing the book, 1394 01:21:48.279 --> 01:21:51.399 I still thought that was like for boting, like, we're 1395 01:21:51.439 --> 01:21:53.239 not going to do that. I just wrote about the 1396 01:21:53.279 --> 01:21:56.279 other thing, which was, well, we need to collect this 1397 01:21:56.760 --> 01:22:00.680 economic information that's important to national security and give it 1398 01:22:00.720 --> 01:22:03.880 to policy makers so they can make the right decisions 1399 01:22:04.119 --> 01:22:07.520 about economic issues. Right, so they can know how far 1400 01:22:07.560 --> 01:22:11.199 along is China with making a quantum device, how far 1401 01:22:11.239 --> 01:22:14.199 along are they with AI or biotechnology. We need to 1402 01:22:14.239 --> 01:22:20.279 know that information. It's national security. And their companies, by 1403 01:22:20.319 --> 01:22:25.439 the way, are state controlled. Oftentimes they have state owned enterprises, 1404 01:22:25.479 --> 01:22:27.199 and even if they're not owned by the state, they 1405 01:22:27.199 --> 01:22:31.319 can be controlled by the state, so they're not purely 1406 01:22:31.680 --> 01:22:33.880 you know, economic actors, and we need to be able 1407 01:22:33.920 --> 01:22:35.640 to know what they're trying to do and if they're 1408 01:22:35.680 --> 01:22:39.560 harming American companies or American people and stop that. Right. 1409 01:22:39.640 --> 01:22:42.319 So that's what I was thinking about, and I think 1410 01:22:42.359 --> 01:22:45.279 that's what we need to do. Since I've written the book, 1411 01:22:45.399 --> 01:22:51.439 the rules are changing and our government now owns ten 1412 01:22:51.479 --> 01:22:58.159 percent of Intel, and we are investing directly in companies, 1413 01:22:59.640 --> 01:23:04.520 you know, that make and manufacture things that are important 1414 01:23:04.800 --> 01:23:08.319 to the national security industrial base, the defense industrial base, 1415 01:23:08.479 --> 01:23:11.720 like companies that make rare earths like MP materials, for example. 1416 01:23:12.399 --> 01:23:16.560 So I can now whereas even two years ago I 1417 01:23:16.640 --> 01:23:19.439 probably would have gotten on here and said, no way, 1418 01:23:19.720 --> 01:23:23.319 we draw the line at sharing that information. Now I 1419 01:23:23.359 --> 01:23:26.479 think we might be headed in a direction where we 1420 01:23:26.600 --> 01:23:31.600 could share that information, and we might do so, and 1421 01:23:31.680 --> 01:23:35.159 we would be justified to do so, because it's that 1422 01:23:35.359 --> 01:23:41.600 important that we compete in these technology spaces or in 1423 01:23:41.640 --> 01:23:44.479 these manufacturing and supply chain spaces, and so we'd be 1424 01:23:44.680 --> 01:23:47.199 justified to do that now. At the same time, and 1425 01:23:47.279 --> 01:23:50.560 this is the capitalist in me and the libertarian in me, 1426 01:23:51.159 --> 01:23:53.800 I also don't want to break our system, which is 1427 01:23:53.840 --> 01:23:57.680 a good system where companies compete with each other. Right, 1428 01:23:57.720 --> 01:24:00.640 So if you're picking winners who are bad winners, you're 1429 01:24:00.680 --> 01:24:03.920 going to get bad companies, right, and like you're not 1430 01:24:03.960 --> 01:24:05.960 going to pick the right one, and government is not 1431 01:24:06.119 --> 01:24:09.960 great at picking like the best technology of the best company. 1432 01:24:10.279 --> 01:24:13.039 So I still want there to be that competition personally. 1433 01:24:13.800 --> 01:24:16.079 So what I would love to see is a solution 1434 01:24:16.279 --> 01:24:21.159 where there was a way, for example, to you know, 1435 01:24:21.479 --> 01:24:24.720 get information if it was necessary, and supply it to 1436 01:24:24.800 --> 01:24:27.840 an American company if we had to, but to do 1437 01:24:27.920 --> 01:24:31.560 that in a way that maintained American companies competing with 1438 01:24:31.600 --> 01:24:33.479 each other, so it didn't like a fairweb. 1439 01:24:36.760 --> 01:24:40.239 Another topic you get into is open source intelligence and 1440 01:24:40.279 --> 01:24:44.880 how that's kind of like rewriting the landscape of intelligence collection. 1441 01:24:45.880 --> 01:24:47.359 What's your perspective on that. 1442 01:24:49.520 --> 01:24:53.800 Yeah, again, there's always been open source intelligence. Even even 1443 01:24:53.920 --> 01:24:56.399 Bill Donovan who started the OSS would talk about it 1444 01:24:56.960 --> 01:25:00.760 and the importance, and you know, they would collect newspapers, 1445 01:25:01.439 --> 01:25:05.199 they would they would you know, watch you know, the 1446 01:25:05.479 --> 01:25:09.760 television of the countries we're at war with, right to 1447 01:25:09.760 --> 01:25:14.000 see what's going on. So we would absolutely do that historically, 1448 01:25:14.159 --> 01:25:17.239 but post nine eleven it became more and more important 1449 01:25:18.199 --> 01:25:22.119 as we realized there was just more information in the 1450 01:25:22.119 --> 01:25:26.800 open world than in the classified world. And now it's 1451 01:25:26.840 --> 01:25:29.680 even more the case because again we're competing in these 1452 01:25:29.720 --> 01:25:34.439 areas like economics or science and technology, where almost all 1453 01:25:34.479 --> 01:25:38.199 of that information is open source. It's not classified, it's 1454 01:25:38.199 --> 01:25:41.760 not made behind some you know, in some military base, 1455 01:25:41.840 --> 01:25:45.279 it's it's at a company, in an office somewhere, and 1456 01:25:45.399 --> 01:25:49.680 so the intelligence community needs to be able to use 1457 01:25:49.720 --> 01:25:52.960 that information effectively, to obtain it and use it effectively 1458 01:25:53.560 --> 01:25:58.319 to to compete in those areas. In particular, Now there's 1459 01:25:58.319 --> 01:26:01.640 a downside to open source and which is, well, it's 1460 01:26:01.680 --> 01:26:06.279 open source, so the you know, your adversary knows that 1461 01:26:06.319 --> 01:26:10.159 it's out there and can compromise it. They could change it, 1462 01:26:10.600 --> 01:26:14.079 right they or or if there's there's open source in 1463 01:26:14.119 --> 01:26:17.840 the sense of like commercial satellites for example, that you know, you, 1464 01:26:17.840 --> 01:26:20.840 you and I could go buy commercial satellite image right now, 1465 01:26:21.000 --> 01:26:24.640 you know online, but you know, China or Russia or 1466 01:26:24.680 --> 01:26:26.880 these other countries know that they're up there, and so 1467 01:26:26.920 --> 01:26:29.840 they could hide their things. They could use a cyber 1468 01:26:29.880 --> 01:26:33.239 attack to change you know, what the what the satellite 1469 01:26:33.279 --> 01:26:36.439 sees or something like this, And so we've got to 1470 01:26:36.520 --> 01:26:39.439 be careful. At the same time, it's secure about using 1471 01:26:39.439 --> 01:26:44.079 this open source information, and we still need the classified stuff, 1472 01:26:44.760 --> 01:26:48.399 right because that's really where you get your edge, Like 1473 01:26:48.479 --> 01:26:52.920 I want an unfair advantage, Like that's the nature of intelligence. 1474 01:26:52.920 --> 01:26:55.880 That's the game. It's it's not like this isn't there 1475 01:26:55.920 --> 01:26:59.640 are no rules. I'm purposely trying to cheat. I'm purposely 1476 01:26:59.640 --> 01:27:02.079 trying to get something that you don't know about. You 1477 01:27:02.079 --> 01:27:03.840 didn't even know I was able to do it. I'm 1478 01:27:03.880 --> 01:27:08.359 doing it secretly, clandestinely, right, And so we still need 1479 01:27:08.399 --> 01:27:10.760 those classified systems. So I think we sort of need. 1480 01:27:10.800 --> 01:27:13.600 I call it like a Barbell approach, right, Like we 1481 01:27:13.640 --> 01:27:15.560 need the open source stuff, but we need the super 1482 01:27:15.560 --> 01:27:16.600 classified stuff too. 1483 01:27:17.039 --> 01:27:18.279 So you're going to have to find a way to 1484 01:27:18.319 --> 01:27:19.560 integrate the two systems. 1485 01:27:20.720 --> 01:27:22.960 And you've got to integrate the two systems and bring 1486 01:27:23.000 --> 01:27:24.439 the data together. Absolutely. 1487 01:27:25.560 --> 01:27:28.399 Another chapter of your book and another This is something 1488 01:27:28.439 --> 01:27:30.760 that's also been talked about quite a bit in recent years, 1489 01:27:30.880 --> 01:27:36.439 is cognitive warfare, disinformation, these type of subjects. And I 1490 01:27:36.479 --> 01:27:40.159 think back to a conversation we had with somebody about 1491 01:27:40.319 --> 01:27:43.520 the about Russia and the war in Ukraine, and he 1492 01:27:43.680 --> 01:27:45.920 was kind of saying, how like this is sort of 1493 01:27:45.960 --> 01:27:49.520 like the ultimate checkmate against America because a country like 1494 01:27:49.600 --> 01:27:53.079 Russia can feed us disinformation and feed our public disinformation 1495 01:27:53.159 --> 01:27:55.960 all day, but here in America we have the First Amendment. 1496 01:27:56.119 --> 01:27:59.079 You know, you can't stop people from talking, you can't 1497 01:27:59.079 --> 01:28:01.079 tell them don't say that. And it's like kind of 1498 01:28:01.079 --> 01:28:04.399 the ultimate checkmate for somebody who's a dictator that they 1499 01:28:04.439 --> 01:28:06.199 can mess with us all day and we don't have 1500 01:28:06.279 --> 01:28:06.880 a defense. 1501 01:28:08.760 --> 01:28:11.279 Yeah, not only do we not have a defense, like 1502 01:28:11.319 --> 01:28:16.880 we actually don't want one because having a defense would 1503 01:28:16.920 --> 01:28:20.399 actually break you know, our rights in some way go 1504 01:28:20.439 --> 01:28:24.279 against our rights. Yeah, it's true to me. The future is, 1505 01:28:24.920 --> 01:28:28.000 you know, future conflict is going to be about cognitive warfare. 1506 01:28:28.039 --> 01:28:31.479 And what you're doing in cognitive warfare is you're trying 1507 01:28:31.520 --> 01:28:36.000 to influence you know who you're competing against, your adversary, 1508 01:28:36.119 --> 01:28:39.520 and get them to maybe not want to fight, right, Like, 1509 01:28:39.640 --> 01:28:42.920 that's what propaganda is often about, like get people to 1510 01:28:42.960 --> 01:28:46.239 not want to fight or disrupt them. You know, Russia 1511 01:28:47.079 --> 01:28:50.560 tried to disrupt the twenty sixteen election. I don't personally 1512 01:28:50.560 --> 01:28:53.319 think they were even choosing a side. I think they 1513 01:28:53.680 --> 01:28:56.880 didn't care. I think they just wanted to create disruption 1514 01:28:57.000 --> 01:29:01.439 and chaos and make Americans sort of hate each other more, right, 1515 01:29:01.520 --> 01:29:04.439 Like that was the goal, and that's a win for them, right. 1516 01:29:04.520 --> 01:29:06.880 And that's another form of cognitive warfare where you're not 1517 01:29:07.319 --> 01:29:09.880 you're you're influencing people, but maybe not to an end. 1518 01:29:11.279 --> 01:29:15.640 What's what's happening now, and what really scares me is 1519 01:29:15.680 --> 01:29:20.720 that now you've got cognitive warfare and artificial intelligence and 1520 01:29:21.079 --> 01:29:24.960 propaganda and information operation. Cognitive warfare in the past used 1521 01:29:24.960 --> 01:29:27.319 to be kind of like a one way street. You 1522 01:29:27.359 --> 01:29:29.960 could essentially advertise, right, like you could put out a 1523 01:29:30.000 --> 01:29:34.079 flyer or an ad or on Facebook like they did 1524 01:29:34.079 --> 01:29:38.800 in the election hack, or you could you know, like 1525 01:29:39.439 --> 01:29:43.079 spread rumors and things like this. Right, but now with AI, 1526 01:29:43.600 --> 01:29:47.279 AI is like a two way street. Right when you 1527 01:29:47.359 --> 01:29:49.640 talk to an AI, you talk to it like you 1528 01:29:49.680 --> 01:29:51.760 ask it a question, then ask you a question back. 1529 01:29:52.399 --> 01:29:56.319 And and AI is becoming this arbitrar of information. It's 1530 01:29:56.359 --> 01:29:58.640 where we're all going to go to get information in 1531 01:29:58.680 --> 01:30:02.960 the future. And the danger is that if an AI 1532 01:30:03.119 --> 01:30:08.119 system is owned by an adversary country like China owns 1533 01:30:08.319 --> 01:30:14.680 deep Seek and it's still available here, or they infiltrate 1534 01:30:14.920 --> 01:30:16.960 one of ours, they hack it in some way, which 1535 01:30:17.000 --> 01:30:19.479 is not as hard as you would think. There's some 1536 01:30:19.479 --> 01:30:22.960 studies recently by Anthropic for example, like that show that 1537 01:30:23.000 --> 01:30:26.800 it's it's actually pretty pretty straightforward to change these big 1538 01:30:26.920 --> 01:30:31.960 lms that they could use that to go to do 1539 01:30:32.119 --> 01:30:36.680 cognitive warfare and to influence people using these systems, and 1540 01:30:37.079 --> 01:30:41.680 I believe influence them subtly and even go after like 1541 01:30:41.800 --> 01:30:44.479 kids in grade school with this kind of stuff because 1542 01:30:44.560 --> 01:30:46.800 kids are starting to use AI as well. So it's 1543 01:30:46.840 --> 01:30:50.760 a major threat. So we're seeing, you know, this move 1544 01:30:50.960 --> 01:30:55.359 from these traditional propaganda like threats to the middle ground 1545 01:30:55.439 --> 01:30:58.199 is probably like social media like threats like TikTok, which 1546 01:30:58.239 --> 01:31:02.000 is a massive threat by the way, and should absolutely 1547 01:31:02.079 --> 01:31:04.880 be handed over to American company or shut down because 1548 01:31:04.920 --> 01:31:11.520 it's targeted a generation generation Z and is used. It 1549 01:31:11.680 --> 01:31:15.359 sensors information and it influences its users, and this has 1550 01:31:15.359 --> 01:31:18.560 been demonstrated. But we're going to move from that into 1551 01:31:18.680 --> 01:31:24.239 AI being like the platform to perform cognitive warfare. And 1552 01:31:24.319 --> 01:31:28.640 that's that's incredibly dangerous and we really don't even have 1553 01:31:28.680 --> 01:31:33.000 defenses right now, and to your earlier point, we don't 1554 01:31:33.000 --> 01:31:37.000 even necessarily want the government to censor this kind of stuff, 1555 01:31:37.399 --> 01:31:39.520 right So who do you have? And that's partially what 1556 01:31:39.560 --> 01:31:41.199 I write in the book of how well, what is 1557 01:31:41.239 --> 01:31:42.920 the solution I get into a solution? 1558 01:31:44.600 --> 01:31:48.359 Yeah, I want to get into solutions. Next one more 1559 01:31:48.399 --> 01:31:52.840 point on cognitive warfare, and I want to ask you about, like, 1560 01:31:52.920 --> 01:31:56.319 how do you think we'll have to approach information assurance 1561 01:31:56.479 --> 01:32:00.520 as we've been talking about the public being propagandized. But 1562 01:32:00.600 --> 01:32:04.079 I think right now today, as a soldier, you get 1563 01:32:04.079 --> 01:32:07.319 a message over the radio over the assault net from 1564 01:32:07.359 --> 01:32:09.880 your commander and he's giving you an order, and he 1565 01:32:09.920 --> 01:32:12.359 tells you to go somewhere and do something, and you 1566 01:32:12.439 --> 01:32:15.960 have confidence that in that information, that that is your commander. 1567 01:32:16.039 --> 01:32:18.119 You saw the guy at work today, you know who 1568 01:32:18.159 --> 01:32:21.920 he is, his commander. His orders are coming over an 1569 01:32:21.960 --> 01:32:24.520 encrypted net. It's coming right to you. 1570 01:32:24.439 --> 01:32:24.640 You know. 1571 01:32:24.760 --> 01:32:27.760 Okay, we're we know where we're going and what we're doing. 1572 01:32:27.760 --> 01:32:30.439 And I have confidence that this information is coming down 1573 01:32:30.479 --> 01:32:33.800 through proper legal channels. But in the future and some 1574 01:32:34.079 --> 01:32:36.680 of the technologies you've been describing, I mean, how do 1575 01:32:36.760 --> 01:32:39.720 I know my commander's voice wasn't modulated by AI and 1576 01:32:39.760 --> 01:32:41.439 it's being fed to me. How do I know that 1577 01:32:41.479 --> 01:32:44.680 the imagery on being given hasn't been doctored somehow? You know, 1578 01:32:44.760 --> 01:32:46.920 all of these different questions that like how do you 1579 01:32:47.000 --> 01:32:47.680 know what's real? 1580 01:32:48.960 --> 01:32:55.479 Yeah, I mean you don't. That's the problem. And I 1581 01:32:55.840 --> 01:32:58.600 think that kind of stuff's absolutely going to happen. I mean, 1582 01:32:59.359 --> 01:33:03.239 the our supply chain could be corrupted, and there there 1583 01:33:03.279 --> 01:33:09.359 could be an attack on even a classified or secure 1584 01:33:09.840 --> 01:33:15.960 communications system. The the you know, the voice of a 1585 01:33:16.000 --> 01:33:18.720 person could be faked or the writing style or something 1586 01:33:18.840 --> 01:33:22.880 like this, and what are you gonna do? And you 1587 01:33:22.920 --> 01:33:25.520 know the thing is in warfare in particular, there's always 1588 01:33:25.520 --> 01:33:29.680 been deception, right, Like we've always all all sides try 1589 01:33:29.760 --> 01:33:32.720 to do that and trick the other guy. And you know, 1590 01:33:32.760 --> 01:33:35.760 you look back even at like in in in in 1591 01:33:35.760 --> 01:33:39.800 in in World War two, you know, the password could 1592 01:33:39.800 --> 01:33:43.279 be compromised or something, so you know, people guys would 1593 01:33:43.279 --> 01:33:45.560 do things like be like, well, who's the shortstop on 1594 01:33:45.600 --> 01:33:48.439 the Yankees? Or like ask them questions where you know, 1595 01:33:48.479 --> 01:33:50.800 you can ask multiple questions to be like how do 1596 01:33:50.840 --> 01:33:55.680 you know you know? And and even during you know, 1597 01:33:56.000 --> 01:33:58.680 al Qaeda actually went through this because to them, like 1598 01:33:58.800 --> 01:34:02.439 we were the technological enemy, right, and so they're like, 1599 01:34:02.520 --> 01:34:05.159 oh my god, these guys can listen to everything we're doing. 1600 01:34:05.159 --> 01:34:08.159 They've got drones, they can spy on my cell phone, 1601 01:34:08.760 --> 01:34:12.000 and so they would do stuff like they would never 1602 01:34:12.119 --> 01:34:16.279 be like here's the operation. They'd be like, hey, you know, Mohammed, 1603 01:34:18.159 --> 01:34:21.640 you remember that place when we were kids that we 1604 01:34:21.680 --> 01:34:26.560 would go and you know, we would hang out with 1605 01:34:26.960 --> 01:34:30.119 you know, so and so, and we would go climb 1606 01:34:30.159 --> 01:34:34.119 that hill and there was a swing set. Well that's 1607 01:34:34.359 --> 01:34:38.520 you remember the direction of that place from the village, Well, 1608 01:34:38.520 --> 01:34:40.680 that's the direction I want you to go. And like 1609 01:34:41.159 --> 01:34:44.119 doesn't matter how much encryption or like sneaky people like 1610 01:34:44.840 --> 01:34:47.119 you don't know, there's a there's like two guys in 1611 01:34:47.159 --> 01:34:48.920 the world who know that, and it's those two guys, 1612 01:34:48.960 --> 01:34:51.359 and so how do you So there are ways to 1613 01:34:51.840 --> 01:34:55.319 you know, exist and this. And then the thing is, 1614 01:34:55.399 --> 01:34:57.119 it's not just going to happen to these soldiers. I 1615 01:34:57.119 --> 01:34:59.760 think it's gonna happen to everybody. This is really what 1616 01:34:59.840 --> 01:35:03.159 I get into the book is that everyone is now 1617 01:35:03.199 --> 01:35:06.239 going to be spied on like this and have information 1618 01:35:06.359 --> 01:35:11.239 operations committed against them, all of us and even kids. 1619 01:35:11.319 --> 01:35:13.520 This is going to happen. They're gonna have those same doubts. 1620 01:35:13.880 --> 01:35:16.479 And right now you already see like where you know, 1621 01:35:16.640 --> 01:35:20.520 old folks sometimes have like their you know, their grandkids, 1622 01:35:20.640 --> 01:35:23.560 that somebody will fake the voice and last them for money. Well, 1623 01:35:23.560 --> 01:35:27.319 that could also be done, by the way, by a 1624 01:35:27.359 --> 01:35:30.279 foreign intelligence agency if they wanted, or it could just 1625 01:35:30.319 --> 01:35:33.920 be done as a type of disruption information operation if 1626 01:35:33.920 --> 01:35:35.920 you did it a lot, just to get people concerned 1627 01:35:35.960 --> 01:35:37.239 and scared, for example. 1628 01:35:38.840 --> 01:35:42.920 So let's talk about intelligence four point zero and some 1629 01:35:42.960 --> 01:35:45.479 of the solutions that you propose in your book. And 1630 01:35:46.319 --> 01:35:48.520 one thing to kind of preface all this, I guess 1631 01:35:48.960 --> 01:35:52.560 and don't I really don't mean to delve into partisan politics, 1632 01:35:52.600 --> 01:35:54.239 but I feel like right now, we're at this sort 1633 01:35:54.279 --> 01:35:56.439 of moment where, depending on who you talk to and 1634 01:35:56.479 --> 01:35:59.880 what they believe, we're either in this phase of disruption 1635 01:36:00.680 --> 01:36:04.039 and reform and we're shaking things up and we're making deals, 1636 01:36:04.640 --> 01:36:08.520 or American intelligence is hanging by a thread. It needs 1637 01:36:08.560 --> 01:36:11.760 to be saved, I mean, never mind reformed, Like, can 1638 01:36:11.800 --> 01:36:14.560 we save this thing? Can we resurrect these relationships? 1639 01:36:15.479 --> 01:36:16.119 Do you have. 1640 01:36:16.000 --> 01:36:18.800 A Again, I'm not trying to drag you into into 1641 01:36:18.800 --> 01:36:21.920 making partisan comments if you don't want to, but where 1642 01:36:21.960 --> 01:36:24.079 do you see where we are like in this moment? 1643 01:36:25.439 --> 01:36:30.600 Yeah? I you know, look, I would think about it 1644 01:36:30.680 --> 01:36:32.720 like this, like that that problem said. I was just 1645 01:36:32.720 --> 01:36:34.960 bringing up that we could exist in a world where 1646 01:36:35.000 --> 01:36:39.079 like any information could be faked right at any time, 1647 01:36:39.279 --> 01:36:42.359 including by adversaries who are trying to harm us as 1648 01:36:42.399 --> 01:36:46.079 a nation. Right, that's the world we're going into. And 1649 01:36:46.119 --> 01:36:48.399 they are harming us, they're trying to change information and 1650 01:36:48.439 --> 01:36:51.479 get us to disrupt distrust things. What do you do? 1651 01:36:52.000 --> 01:36:54.279 What do you do in that kind of scenario? And 1652 01:36:54.359 --> 01:36:59.399 you don't necessarily want an intelligence agency to help you there, 1653 01:37:00.359 --> 01:37:03.840 because the last thing we want is a CIA to 1654 01:37:03.880 --> 01:37:06.560 come in and start censoring information because they're like, oh, 1655 01:37:06.600 --> 01:37:09.479 this is disinformation, so I'm in a censor and it's like, 1656 01:37:09.560 --> 01:37:12.800 well no, actually, even if it is disinformation, even if 1657 01:37:12.800 --> 01:37:15.359 you know for a fact, that was created by a 1658 01:37:15.439 --> 01:37:19.640 gru you know, Russian intelligence unit, I still like, somebody 1659 01:37:19.640 --> 01:37:21.760 still has a right to see it, like it's crazy, 1660 01:37:21.920 --> 01:37:24.840 but that's true and that's a fact, and so you 1661 01:37:24.920 --> 01:37:28.520 can't censor this stuff. So actually, I think shutting down 1662 01:37:28.600 --> 01:37:32.159 the form align the counterform Malign Influence Center for example 1663 01:37:32.159 --> 01:37:34.319 at Odie and I was like a good idea, Like 1664 01:37:34.439 --> 01:37:37.520 I don't think it was particularly harmful, but I can 1665 01:37:37.560 --> 01:37:41.279 imagine this scenario where it could become harmful, you know, 1666 01:37:41.439 --> 01:37:44.399 if any side decided they wanted to use that to 1667 01:37:44.439 --> 01:37:47.720 manipulate information. So nobody wants that, but you still have 1668 01:37:47.800 --> 01:37:51.520 to protect yourself against these threats, right, And I think 1669 01:37:51.560 --> 01:37:55.680 the way to protect ourselves is that everybody now has 1670 01:37:55.760 --> 01:37:59.159 to become that resilient endpoint, right, And you have to 1671 01:37:59.760 --> 01:38:03.359 get trained to think like an intelligence officer and have 1672 01:38:03.479 --> 01:38:07.199 some level of caution and say, oh, that could be 1673 01:38:07.760 --> 01:38:10.840 you know, a piece of disinformation. This could be actually 1674 01:38:10.840 --> 01:38:13.640 somebody just trying to collect information so they can model 1675 01:38:13.640 --> 01:38:16.359 how I think. And this AI could use that to 1676 01:38:16.439 --> 01:38:19.279 influence me over time. Right, And then there are ways 1677 01:38:19.359 --> 01:38:22.520 that you can be taught to, like intelligence officers are 1678 01:38:22.600 --> 01:38:25.880 to deal with that doubt, right, Like one way you 1679 01:38:25.920 --> 01:38:28.840 deal with it is triangulating information. You just never trust 1680 01:38:28.840 --> 01:38:33.319 one source, right, Like the most intelligence officers would never 1681 01:38:33.359 --> 01:38:35.319 trust a single source, no matter how good you thought 1682 01:38:35.319 --> 01:38:37.039 it was. It could be a satellite you built with 1683 01:38:37.079 --> 01:38:40.399 your own hands, and you'd be like, I'm still have 1684 01:38:40.520 --> 01:38:44.119 some level of doubt here, right, Anything could happen, and 1685 01:38:44.199 --> 01:38:47.760 so you use multiple sources, right, or you assess the 1686 01:38:47.840 --> 01:38:49.960 risk of Oh, you look at a piece of technology 1687 01:38:49.960 --> 01:38:52.159 and say who owns it? And you trace that back 1688 01:38:52.199 --> 01:38:54.199 and you're like, oh, it is owned by China, should 1689 01:38:54.319 --> 01:38:56.640 you know, be careful about it. So I think that 1690 01:38:56.680 --> 01:38:58.960 we have to start looking at people as the endpoint 1691 01:38:59.000 --> 01:39:02.720 almost in like cyber security terms, and make them resilient 1692 01:39:03.479 --> 01:39:07.279 at the individual citizen level, where you're protecting yourself, you're 1693 01:39:07.319 --> 01:39:11.159 protecting your family and your community, and that's separate from 1694 01:39:11.239 --> 01:39:14.479 an intelligence agency. And I almost think about it as 1695 01:39:14.520 --> 01:39:18.279 like police versus neighborhood watch, right, Like we we still 1696 01:39:18.319 --> 01:39:20.359 have police and we still need those guys to go 1697 01:39:20.479 --> 01:39:25.840 out and shut down the next Internet Research Agency IRA threat, right, 1698 01:39:26.720 --> 01:39:29.800 But we also need people who are part of the community, 1699 01:39:29.840 --> 01:39:32.119 looking out for each other and looking out for ourselves. 1700 01:39:32.680 --> 01:39:35.640 And so when I think about what's going on in 1701 01:39:35.640 --> 01:39:40.079 the intelligence community today, like you know, we can argue 1702 01:39:40.119 --> 01:39:43.720 about whether the you know, there's changes here or there. 1703 01:39:44.199 --> 01:39:47.680 I actually think we need to actually think outside of 1704 01:39:47.680 --> 01:39:53.079 the agencies entirely and make those agencies better. They should 1705 01:39:53.199 --> 01:39:55.960 use AI and do all these things, but we should 1706 01:39:55.960 --> 01:39:58.880 be building as civil society, as a group of citizens 1707 01:39:59.319 --> 01:40:03.199 our own you know, intelligence function to protect ourselves, because 1708 01:40:03.199 --> 01:40:05.119 that's the only way to protect yourself from some of 1709 01:40:05.159 --> 01:40:05.920 these threats. 1710 01:40:06.640 --> 01:40:09.119 I think in your book you say we're all intelligence 1711 01:40:09.159 --> 01:40:12.520 officers now, which is kind of true in a weird way. 1712 01:40:12.800 --> 01:40:15.000 Or I guess, you know, a modification of that old 1713 01:40:15.039 --> 01:40:17.960 saying you might not be interested in intelligence, but it's 1714 01:40:17.960 --> 01:40:21.479 interested in you. How do you think we would go 1715 01:40:21.520 --> 01:40:24.279 about it? I mean, is this about bringing back high 1716 01:40:24.279 --> 01:40:28.479 school civics class and media literacy or is there something 1717 01:40:28.600 --> 01:40:32.119 something more to it? Because to accomplish what you're talking about, 1718 01:40:32.159 --> 01:40:34.560 I think we're going to need that gene editing, fifty 1719 01:40:35.079 --> 01:40:40.039 additional IQ points for each person in America, to navigate 1720 01:40:40.159 --> 01:40:40.520 all of that. 1721 01:40:42.000 --> 01:40:44.479 I mean we sort of we sort of did it 1722 01:40:44.520 --> 01:40:48.000 in recent memory, which is we essentially taught three hundred 1723 01:40:48.039 --> 01:40:52.760 million Americans to do cybersecurity. Right. Like if you went 1724 01:40:52.760 --> 01:40:55.479 back to nineteen ninety five and you talk to an 1725 01:40:55.479 --> 01:40:58.640 average American and you're like, hey, in the future, you're, 1726 01:40:58.920 --> 01:41:00.960 first of all, you're going to know what cybersecurity is, 1727 01:41:01.000 --> 01:41:03.159 which you've probably never heard of, and you're going to 1728 01:41:03.199 --> 01:41:04.800 be able to do it. And they would be like, 1729 01:41:04.840 --> 01:41:05.920 I don't know what you're talking about. 1730 01:41:06.319 --> 01:41:08.720 Like everyone using encrypted tech st apps and. 1731 01:41:08.680 --> 01:41:12.560 Things like everybody today in America is taught to. 1732 01:41:12.560 --> 01:41:13.520 Change their password. 1733 01:41:14.039 --> 01:41:17.399 They're taught like children are taught like, hey, there could 1734 01:41:17.439 --> 01:41:19.079 be a bad guy. There could be a hacker. You 1735 01:41:19.119 --> 01:41:22.279 need to change your passwords so somebody doesn't like try 1736 01:41:22.319 --> 01:41:26.159 to steal your computer data. Right there. We're taught at 1737 01:41:26.279 --> 01:41:29.439 work and in school to not click on phishing emails. Right. 1738 01:41:29.680 --> 01:41:33.159 We have taught our entire society to be somewhat resilient 1739 01:41:33.760 --> 01:41:37.520 against cyber threats, right. I think we can do the 1740 01:41:37.600 --> 01:41:42.279 same thing for espionage threats and information operation threats and 1741 01:41:42.439 --> 01:41:46.520 teach them very basic skills starting in grade school in 1742 01:41:46.520 --> 01:41:49.000 like an age appropriate way in grade school, but ultimately 1743 01:41:49.039 --> 01:41:51.760 by high school and college and in work, like in 1744 01:41:51.840 --> 01:41:54.720 a real way, here are some basic things you can do. 1745 01:41:54.720 --> 01:41:58.840 Don't trust just any piece of information you see, right, 1746 01:41:58.920 --> 01:42:01.319 You need to think about where it came from, what's 1747 01:42:01.359 --> 01:42:05.319 the source, triangulate it with something like if it looks weird, 1748 01:42:05.359 --> 01:42:09.000 it probably is weird, right Like, And hey, don't trust 1749 01:42:09.079 --> 01:42:12.039 any piece of technology that you're given. Like we've been 1750 01:42:12.079 --> 01:42:15.560 taught as a society to just trust technology because historically 1751 01:42:15.600 --> 01:42:17.960 it's just been a consumer good that was made by 1752 01:42:17.960 --> 01:42:21.319 another American. That's not the case anymore. Like apps and 1753 01:42:21.359 --> 01:42:24.039 so forth come from people who don't have our best 1754 01:42:24.039 --> 01:42:26.359 intentions at heart, right, and they're not just trying to 1755 01:42:26.399 --> 01:42:28.960 make money, And so you need to start and look 1756 01:42:28.960 --> 01:42:32.479 and say, Okay, I don't just simply trust technology. I 1757 01:42:32.520 --> 01:42:35.600 think like an intelligence officer, I'm going to assess where 1758 01:42:35.600 --> 01:42:38.479 it's from and what the threats might be and give 1759 01:42:38.520 --> 01:42:41.800 it a second and those kinds of things they those 1760 01:42:41.800 --> 01:42:44.760 are These are basic life skills that I do think 1761 01:42:44.800 --> 01:42:47.600 can be taught at a literal level in grade school 1762 01:42:48.600 --> 01:42:51.119 and in high school and at work and and so forth. 1763 01:42:51.319 --> 01:42:54.239 But I don't even think they necessarily have to even 1764 01:42:54.279 --> 01:42:57.840 be taught by the government. They can be you know, 1765 01:42:58.079 --> 01:43:02.359 taught by families and you know, and and parents can 1766 01:43:02.399 --> 01:43:06.159 teach their kids and and and so forth. Right like that, 1767 01:43:06.439 --> 01:43:10.920 it's not rocket science, Like like you're your your you know, 1768 01:43:11.079 --> 01:43:13.279 your trust me, your average case officer is not a 1769 01:43:13.359 --> 01:43:17.119 rocket scientist. Like these are people who like you know, 1770 01:43:17.239 --> 01:43:19.479 are just like good at talking and like taking people 1771 01:43:19.520 --> 01:43:21.720 to dinner. Like this is this does not have to 1772 01:43:21.800 --> 01:43:25.439 be you know, super super complicated, but like there's just 1773 01:43:25.479 --> 01:43:27.840 a basic way to think. And it doesn't mean being 1774 01:43:27.920 --> 01:43:31.720 paranoid all the time. Just means being basically cautious the 1775 01:43:31.760 --> 01:43:35.039 way we are with crime. Right Like you you know, 1776 01:43:35.079 --> 01:43:36.840 if you have if you have a child, you teach 1777 01:43:36.880 --> 01:43:39.359 your child like from an early age, like, hey, we're 1778 01:43:39.399 --> 01:43:41.399 in a bad neighborhood. Just be careful, hold my hand, 1779 01:43:41.800 --> 01:43:45.479 don't leave stuff out in the car if it's parked overnight, 1780 01:43:46.119 --> 01:43:48.560 you know, because if somebody might break in. Like we 1781 01:43:48.720 --> 01:43:52.800 teach these things. I mean, we teach kids active shooter drills. Unfortunately, 1782 01:43:53.239 --> 01:43:55.520 like they understand there are threats in the world. This 1783 01:43:55.600 --> 01:43:58.600 is another threat and let's you know, go out and 1784 01:43:58.640 --> 01:44:00.840 show people how to deal with this threat. 1785 01:44:01.520 --> 01:44:05.079 Yeah, I mean, I strongly agree with you that we 1786 01:44:05.159 --> 01:44:07.640 need to do a lot more to invest in individual 1787 01:44:07.720 --> 01:44:11.800 human beings and human capital and education and all these things. 1788 01:44:13.880 --> 01:44:19.000 I think you're right about, you know, educating children specifically, 1789 01:44:19.439 --> 01:44:22.079 because I really think anyone who's my age or older 1790 01:44:22.279 --> 01:44:26.520 is in some ways already lost sadly, and I look 1791 01:44:26.560 --> 01:44:28.960 at like, you know, you can log onto some social 1792 01:44:29.039 --> 01:44:34.119 media and see people my parents' age freaking out about 1793 01:44:34.239 --> 01:44:38.479 what is to me obvious AI slop. It's just somebody 1794 01:44:38.640 --> 01:44:41.960 had AI generate a picture through it on Facebook, And 1795 01:44:42.039 --> 01:44:45.399 now these people are sixty seventy years old losing their 1796 01:44:45.439 --> 01:44:47.880 minds about it. And it's like, I see when I 1797 01:44:47.880 --> 01:44:50.199 see that, I'm like, I'm not sure how you knows 1798 01:44:50.239 --> 01:44:55.560 as a society, how we recover from sort of like 1799 01:44:55.680 --> 01:44:57.640 our feet have come off the ground. You mentioned you 1800 01:44:57.680 --> 01:45:01.039 mentioned Baudriard in your book, and you know how there 1801 01:45:01.079 --> 01:45:03.279 was a time where, you know, maybe in the nineties 1802 01:45:03.279 --> 01:45:06.000 when he was writing that stuff, it didn't seem totally 1803 01:45:06.279 --> 01:45:08.680 real or relevant. But now here we are in twenty 1804 01:45:08.720 --> 01:45:11.560 twenty five, and it really does feel like we're living 1805 01:45:11.560 --> 01:45:12.159 in that world. 1806 01:45:13.359 --> 01:45:17.399 Yeah, I mean it is. Yeah. The good, good, good 1807 01:45:17.399 --> 01:45:20.880 pick from the book and and like yeah, he was 1808 01:45:20.920 --> 01:45:23.560 writing about how we'd all be in this simulacro like 1809 01:45:23.640 --> 01:45:26.119 everything would be fake and there wouldn't be real anymore, 1810 01:45:26.119 --> 01:45:28.920 and like the internet's sort of becoming like that, like 1811 01:45:29.479 --> 01:45:31.920 where you know, the AI is just like feeding on 1812 01:45:32.000 --> 01:45:35.000 itself almost and it is you know, that is an 1813 01:45:35.079 --> 01:45:40.359 imaginable world or where like there's just doubt, right, like 1814 01:45:40.399 --> 01:45:44.560 you're just not sure what the trust. But I'll tell you, 1815 01:45:44.600 --> 01:45:49.880 what I really worry about is actually not those kind 1816 01:45:49.880 --> 01:45:53.319 of call them big fake things, like obvious fake things. 1817 01:45:53.399 --> 01:45:56.640 Like what I really worry about is when it's like 1818 01:45:56.760 --> 01:46:01.520 really subtle, right, like when you just change and adjective 1819 01:46:02.079 --> 01:46:04.880 that someone uses, or even like the tone of their voice, 1820 01:46:05.840 --> 01:46:10.560 that subtly influences how somebody thinks about something, right, And 1821 01:46:10.720 --> 01:46:13.840 it'd be so hard to spot that, right if you're 1822 01:46:13.880 --> 01:46:18.159 just changing single words or tone, right, and and but 1823 01:46:18.560 --> 01:46:23.279 doing that those subtle changes continuously and over time, like 1824 01:46:23.560 --> 01:46:25.920 you're talking to an AI and it never says something 1825 01:46:25.960 --> 01:46:29.439 blatant like Tiana mins Square never happened, the Weakers are 1826 01:46:29.479 --> 01:46:32.439 free people, Like it never says anything like that. It 1827 01:46:32.600 --> 01:46:36.479 just always gives you like a slightly skewed answer, right, 1828 01:46:36.640 --> 01:46:41.439 like you know, like you know Tianamen Square. Instead of 1829 01:46:41.439 --> 01:46:44.680 saying Tianaman Square was a terrible human rights abuse, it 1830 01:46:44.720 --> 01:46:47.640 says Tianaman Square could have been done better, you know, 1831 01:46:47.800 --> 01:46:50.239 something like that, right, like it, like it. It just 1832 01:46:50.279 --> 01:46:52.680 makes these subtle change or even more subtle than that, 1833 01:46:52.960 --> 01:46:57.239 right over time, and that influences people over time. And 1834 01:46:57.279 --> 01:46:59.560 that's what like our generation I think is going to 1835 01:46:59.600 --> 01:47:03.159 fall for, like our parents generation is falling for like 1836 01:47:03.199 --> 01:47:05.720 the blatant, fake ones, but like I think we're going 1837 01:47:05.800 --> 01:47:09.359 to fall for the subtle stuff where like you can't 1838 01:47:09.399 --> 01:47:11.439 even see it and you're like, oh, this looks like 1839 01:47:11.479 --> 01:47:13.560 a New York Times story or a Wall Street Journal 1840 01:47:13.640 --> 01:47:16.720 story or a news back story, whatever your preferred like 1841 01:47:17.239 --> 01:47:20.960 media outlet is, and you're like, and everything it adds 1842 01:47:21.039 --> 01:47:24.520 on the site where I read it through chat GPT, 1843 01:47:25.079 --> 01:47:30.199 but there's just subtle words changed. And that that's to 1844 01:47:30.239 --> 01:47:32.680 me the scariest thing and probably where all this goes. 1845 01:47:33.920 --> 01:47:36.800 Yeah, right, it's it's hard or impossible for someone to 1846 01:47:37.079 --> 01:47:41.960 spot a negative, right if TikTok just kind of sensors 1847 01:47:42.119 --> 01:47:46.840 or deprioritizes any content about say Taiwan, you know, most 1848 01:47:46.880 --> 01:47:49.600 people aren't going to realize that content just isn't there 1849 01:47:49.680 --> 01:47:51.319 and that it isn't reaching them. 1850 01:47:51.640 --> 01:47:52.600 There's not going to know. 1851 01:47:53.640 --> 01:47:56.039 That's it. I mean, that is literally what's happening with 1852 01:47:56.119 --> 01:48:00.039 TikTok right now where they do these studies. There's this 1853 01:48:00.279 --> 01:48:03.439 group out of Ruckers that has done these it's called 1854 01:48:03.640 --> 01:48:07.439 like a volume metric statistical study, and they show that 1855 01:48:07.800 --> 01:48:11.720 on TikTok versus other social media sites like Instagram, there's 1856 01:48:11.920 --> 01:48:16.560 less mention of Taneman Square, the weikers, or these human 1857 01:48:16.640 --> 01:48:20.520 rights abuses for example. It's not that it's zero, right, 1858 01:48:20.760 --> 01:48:23.399 it's plausibly deniable. They're like, you know, look you can 1859 01:48:23.399 --> 01:48:26.880 see the weaker stuff here, just less. And then what 1860 01:48:26.960 --> 01:48:31.359 they've shown these groups is that it's working because the 1861 01:48:31.479 --> 01:48:35.319 longer they show this, the longer you are on TikTok, 1862 01:48:35.359 --> 01:48:39.039 the more you use it, the more benevolent view of 1863 01:48:39.640 --> 01:48:42.359 the human rights record of the Chinese Communist Party you 1864 01:48:42.399 --> 01:48:47.840 will have. Right. And so it's like just these subtle 1865 01:48:47.880 --> 01:48:50.279 things have an effect, and when you look at it 1866 01:48:50.319 --> 01:48:54.560 across a generation like and millions of people, it has 1867 01:48:54.680 --> 01:48:59.479 enough of effect. For example, that could lead to more 1868 01:48:59.640 --> 01:49:03.920 of a not being elected who wanted to defend Taiwan 1869 01:49:04.000 --> 01:49:07.520 in a war. And so over time, as there are 1870 01:49:07.600 --> 01:49:09.880 more and more voters in this group and just enough 1871 01:49:09.880 --> 01:49:12.960 of them have been skewed in this direction, America all 1872 01:49:12.960 --> 01:49:15.399 of a sudden, China doesn't have to worry about is 1873 01:49:15.439 --> 01:49:19.680 defending Taiwan because they have convinced an entire generation that 1874 01:49:19.720 --> 01:49:21.439 we shouldn't defend it in the first place. 1875 01:49:22.800 --> 01:49:24.479 Yeah, no, exactly. 1876 01:49:26.000 --> 01:49:29.840 So the book The Fourth Intelligence Revolution, this is out today, 1877 01:49:29.960 --> 01:49:33.880 right out today. People can go and find this wherever 1878 01:49:33.920 --> 01:49:37.119 books are sold. Anthony, are there, like we covered a 1879 01:49:37.159 --> 01:49:39.359 lot of ground in this interview. Are there any topics 1880 01:49:39.359 --> 01:49:41.199 that you'd really like to talk about that we didn't 1881 01:49:41.239 --> 01:49:42.039 get into. 1882 01:49:43.039 --> 01:49:45.359 Well, just say one thing, like it can be sort 1883 01:49:45.359 --> 01:49:47.960 of depressing to hear about all this a high and 1884 01:49:48.920 --> 01:49:51.800 cognitive warfare and all of these things. And I sort 1885 01:49:51.800 --> 01:49:54.479 of end the book on this, like, look, ultimately, at 1886 01:49:54.479 --> 01:49:56.319 the end of the day, America is still the most 1887 01:49:56.359 --> 01:49:59.920 powerful nation in the world. It's very clear on essentially 1888 01:50:00.079 --> 01:50:03.560 every line. And now what I think we need to 1889 01:50:03.560 --> 01:50:05.960 do is kind of keep it that way. And there's 1890 01:50:06.039 --> 01:50:08.920 still room for people to come and serve and do 1891 01:50:09.039 --> 01:50:12.439 that directly in government and become an intelligence officer. And 1892 01:50:12.439 --> 01:50:15.680 by the way, you don't need to study you know, 1893 01:50:15.760 --> 01:50:18.800 international relations and speak five languages anymore. Maybe you're a 1894 01:50:18.840 --> 01:50:23.239 technologist or you have you have an MBA, and right like, 1895 01:50:23.520 --> 01:50:26.239 we need MBAs because we're doing economic intelligence, right like, 1896 01:50:26.680 --> 01:50:30.880 so there's still room to serve and help it. But 1897 01:50:30.920 --> 01:50:34.840 even if you're outside of intelligence, like you're working at 1898 01:50:34.880 --> 01:50:37.840 a tech company or something, you can still help that company. 1899 01:50:37.920 --> 01:50:41.239 Like building these dual use technologies matters. It helps, like 1900 01:50:41.279 --> 01:50:43.840 we need them. We need people who care about this stuff, 1901 01:50:43.920 --> 01:50:46.680 and we also need people to just know what's going 1902 01:50:46.720 --> 01:50:48.880 on in intelligence so that you can kind of be 1903 01:50:48.920 --> 01:50:52.960 part of the system, maybe become like a citizen intelligence officer, 1904 01:50:53.039 --> 01:50:55.439 like I said, to defend yourself and your family and 1905 01:50:55.439 --> 01:50:59.680 your community, but also to know what our government's doing. Right. 1906 01:50:59.760 --> 01:51:04.079 And like every time there's this intelligence revolution, there's been 1907 01:51:04.079 --> 01:51:07.279 a backlash. We had the Church Commission, we had Edward Snowden, Like, 1908 01:51:07.720 --> 01:51:11.960 inevitably intelligence will overstep the bounds. That just seems to 1909 01:51:11.960 --> 01:51:17.399 be a truism unfortunately. But by paying attention, bye, by 1910 01:51:17.960 --> 01:51:21.319 focusing on what's going on and like, you can help 1911 01:51:21.439 --> 01:51:26.399 to ensure that it does the right things. We still 1912 01:51:26.439 --> 01:51:28.920 need to transform, We still need to you know, touch 1913 01:51:28.960 --> 01:51:32.439 the chalk line, and that's what intelligence does sometimes. But 1914 01:51:33.079 --> 01:51:35.439 you know, you can play a role in elect the 1915 01:51:35.520 --> 01:51:38.760 right people and make the right choices, and that's important. 1916 01:51:38.800 --> 01:51:41.079 And so that's I was, you know, I hoped I 1917 01:51:41.159 --> 01:51:42.880 sort of ended the book on that, and I think 1918 01:51:42.880 --> 01:51:46.439 it's sort of the most important takeaway, Anthony. 1919 01:51:46.479 --> 01:51:48.880 Where can people go to find you online if they're 1920 01:51:48.880 --> 01:51:52.199 interested in connecting with you or you know that any 1921 01:51:52.199 --> 01:51:54.439 of the companies that you're sitting on the boards of. 1922 01:51:54.359 --> 01:51:58.000 Now, yeah, you can hit me up. I have a 1923 01:51:58.039 --> 01:52:02.439 website Anthony Vincey dot com and all my social sites 1924 01:52:02.479 --> 01:52:04.840 are on there. I have a substack three kinds of 1925 01:52:04.920 --> 01:52:08.399 Intelligence that I published, and I get into some of 1926 01:52:08.439 --> 01:52:12.199 these types of issues and technology and national security. And 1927 01:52:12.279 --> 01:52:14.279 you can hit me up on LinkedIn or on x 1928 01:52:15.520 --> 01:52:18.039 and you know, would love love to hear from you, 1929 01:52:18.119 --> 01:52:22.199 and and and you know, love to kind of help, 1930 01:52:22.399 --> 01:52:24.479 you know, continue being part of the community and helping 1931 01:52:24.520 --> 01:52:27.239 people learn about sbnage and what's going on. 1932 01:52:27.920 --> 01:52:31.079 So again, the book is the Fourth Intelligence Revolution by 1933 01:52:31.119 --> 01:52:34.640 our guest Anthony Vinci. The books available now. There will 1934 01:52:34.640 --> 01:52:37.199 be links down the description for people listening to the 1935 01:52:37.239 --> 01:52:40.840 podcast or watching this on the YouTube's to go and 1936 01:52:40.920 --> 01:52:44.520 check it out. Anthony, thank you for joining us on 1937 01:52:44.560 --> 01:52:47.279 a Friday evening and spending some of your time with us. 1938 01:52:47.960 --> 01:52:51.199 Thanks so much for having me. Appreciate it and everyone else. 1939 01:52:51.199 --> 01:52:53.319 Will see you guys next time. Actually, we'll see you 1940 01:52:53.359 --> 01:52:57.680 in twenty twenty six. Hey guys, I want to tell 1941 01:52:57.720 --> 01:52:59.960 all of you today about a new newsletter that we're 1942 01:53:00.079 --> 01:53:04.600 launching that encompasses both the Teamhouse podcast, the eyes On podcast, 1943 01:53:05.000 --> 01:53:08.319 and the high Side News outlet, which I run with 1944 01:53:08.439 --> 01:53:12.560 Sean Naylor. 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