WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.040 --> 00:00:03.200 I want you to picture the dead of winter. It's 2 00:00:03.200 --> 00:00:04.679 February twelve, two thousand and. 3 00:00:04.719 --> 00:00:06.360 Nine, right in the heart of winter. 4 00:00:06.480 --> 00:00:09.599 Yeah, just outside of Buffalo, New York. It's night. It 5 00:00:09.679 --> 00:00:14.400 is brutally cold, and there's this heavy, just disorienting mix 6 00:00:14.519 --> 00:00:16.600 of snow and fog hanging in the air. 7 00:00:16.640 --> 00:00:18.399 And if you put yourself in the shows of a 8 00:00:18.399 --> 00:00:20.839 first responder that night, you know, you're sitting in your 9 00:00:20.920 --> 00:00:23.320 vehicle when a dispatch call comes over the radio, that 10 00:00:23.440 --> 00:00:27.280 just it literally stops your heart. I can't even imagine 11 00:00:27.399 --> 00:00:31.000 plane crash, house on fire. You hit the sirens, and 12 00:00:31.039 --> 00:00:34.640 you just rush toward six h thirty eight Long Street. 13 00:00:34.759 --> 00:00:38.399 It's in a quiet suburban neighborhood called Clarence Center, right, and. 14 00:00:38.359 --> 00:00:41.399 As you turn the final corner, the entire village is 15 00:00:41.439 --> 00:00:44.240 suddenly illuminated. I mean, there are these towering flames reaching 16 00:00:44.240 --> 00:00:47.439 into the sky. The heat radiating off the crash site 17 00:00:47.479 --> 00:00:49.079 is so intense it feels like you're standing next to 18 00:00:49.119 --> 00:00:50.560 a massive bonfire. 19 00:00:50.079 --> 00:00:52.479 Even though you're forced to stay like one hundred. 20 00:00:52.159 --> 00:00:55.479 Feet back exactly, and peering through the thick black smoke, 21 00:00:56.399 --> 00:01:00.359 you see this surreal, honestly almost impossible sight. A two 22 00:01:00.399 --> 00:01:04.200 story suburban house has been completely criffed into its own basement, 23 00:01:04.519 --> 00:01:07.599 and sitting directly on top of the burning debris is 24 00:01:07.680 --> 00:01:11.319 the massive severed tail section of a commercial airplane. 25 00:01:11.359 --> 00:01:14.359 Fifty people lost their lives in that wreckage, all forty 26 00:01:14.439 --> 00:01:17.439 nine passengers and crew on board Continental Connection flight three 27 00:01:17.480 --> 00:01:21.519 four oh seven, plus one man on the ground, Douglas Wallinski, 28 00:01:21.799 --> 00:01:24.680 who was actually inside the house at the time. 29 00:01:24.560 --> 00:01:27.640 Right His wife and daughter managed to escape the flames, thankfully, 30 00:01:27.719 --> 00:01:31.040 but for everyone else, the destruction was just absolute. It was. 31 00:01:31.400 --> 00:01:33.959 So we've gathered a massive stack of sources today to 32 00:01:34.000 --> 00:01:36.359 try and make sense of this tragedy. For this deep dive, 33 00:01:36.840 --> 00:01:40.920 we're pulling directly from the official NTSB accident reports, which 34 00:01:40.959 --> 00:01:44.680 are thousands of pages long, along with investigative journalism on 35 00:01:44.719 --> 00:01:48.359 regional airlines and some really cutting edge research on aerospace 36 00:01:48.560 --> 00:01:49.840 human factors engineering. 37 00:01:49.959 --> 00:01:52.760 Because our mission here is to step into the shoes 38 00:01:52.799 --> 00:01:54.560 of the investigators exactly. 39 00:01:54.599 --> 00:01:56.599 We aren't just looking for a broken part or some 40 00:01:56.680 --> 00:02:00.200 mechanical failure. We're going to uncover the hidden psychological and 41 00:02:00.239 --> 00:02:04.040 systemic elements that caused highly trained professionals to make just 42 00:02:04.079 --> 00:02:07.799 an unthinkable error. And you know how the ashes of 43 00:02:07.799 --> 00:02:10.240 flight three four oh seven fundamentally change the laws of 44 00:02:10.240 --> 00:02:10.599 the sky. 45 00:02:11.000 --> 00:02:14.039 The sheer complexity of this investigation makes it a defining 46 00:02:14.080 --> 00:02:18.000 moment in aviation history. Really, because the evidence trails lead 47 00:02:18.120 --> 00:02:20.879 far away from the crash slight itself. It proves that 48 00:02:20.960 --> 00:02:25.199 a disaster of this magnitude is rarely a single catastrophic event. 49 00:02:25.360 --> 00:02:26.879 It's a chain reaction, right. 50 00:02:26.919 --> 00:02:32.240 A slow accumulation of small, seemingly disconnected factors, A casual conversation, 51 00:02:32.719 --> 00:02:36.560 a misnight of sleep, a flipped switch, all inevitably colliding. 52 00:02:36.960 --> 00:02:39.400 Well, when a sixty thousand pound aircraft drops out of 53 00:02:39.439 --> 00:02:43.280 the sky without forward momentum, investigators can't just guess what happened. 54 00:02:43.879 --> 00:02:46.680 So to understand the scene and Clarence Center, we actually 55 00:02:46.719 --> 00:02:49.680 need to rewind the clock a few hours, right, he do? 56 00:02:49.759 --> 00:02:51.599 We have to go back to the flight's origin on 57 00:02:51.639 --> 00:02:54.919 the tarmac in Newark, New Jersey, where the passengers were 58 00:02:55.319 --> 00:02:57.759 enduring a grueling two hour weather. 59 00:02:57.599 --> 00:02:58.919 Delay, which is miserable. 60 00:02:59.039 --> 00:03:01.919 Oh, a two hour delay fundamentally shifts the mood in 61 00:03:01.960 --> 00:03:05.319 a cabin, especially considering the actual flight time from Newark 62 00:03:05.319 --> 00:03:07.680 to Buffalo is only scheduled for about fifty three minutes. 63 00:03:07.879 --> 00:03:10.560 Wow, So they were delayed longer than the flight itself. 64 00:03:10.520 --> 00:03:14.680 Way longer. And you have this Canadian made Bombardier Q 65 00:03:14.840 --> 00:03:19.759 four hundred, which is a very capable, popular twin engine turboprop, 66 00:03:20.080 --> 00:03:22.759 filled with forty five exhausted people. 67 00:03:23.639 --> 00:03:26.639 You read through the passenger manifests and the personal stories 68 00:03:26.919 --> 00:03:28.719 and it just breaks your heart. You have people like 69 00:03:29.039 --> 00:03:31.919 Leise Kellner who was a law student studying down in Florida. 70 00:03:32.000 --> 00:03:33.639 She just wanted to get home to Buffalo for a 71 00:03:33.719 --> 00:03:35.520 quick visit to see her nieces and nephews. 72 00:03:35.639 --> 00:03:38.039 Yeah, these passengers had just been peeling off the hours 73 00:03:38.039 --> 00:03:41.800 in the terminal, drinking terrible airport coffee, desperate to get home, 74 00:03:42.280 --> 00:03:46.360 and up front, the crew was feeling that exact same fatigue. 75 00:03:46.439 --> 00:03:50.280 The aircraft is commanded by Captain Marvin Renslow alongside First 76 00:03:50.280 --> 00:03:53.479 Officer Rebecca Shaw and First Officer Show is twenty four 77 00:03:53.520 --> 00:03:56.039 years old, relatively new to the airline, flying with them 78 00:03:56.080 --> 00:03:59.280 for just over a year. As they finally get airborne 79 00:03:59.280 --> 00:04:02.280 and cruised through the night, heading northwest over upstate New York, 80 00:04:02.680 --> 00:04:05.919 the atmosphere in the cockpit actually doesn't reflect the tension 81 00:04:05.919 --> 00:04:08.439 of the weather outside. It's surprisingly relaxed. 82 00:04:08.719 --> 00:04:11.400 The black box audio which well, we'll get into how 83 00:04:11.439 --> 00:04:14.719 they recover that in a minute. It captures them just chatting. 84 00:04:14.879 --> 00:04:18.879 They're talking about Shaw's career trajectory, debating whether she has 85 00:04:18.920 --> 00:04:22.279 the hours to upgrade to a captain position, discussing quality 86 00:04:22.279 --> 00:04:23.879 of life, the housing. 87 00:04:23.560 --> 00:04:25.160 Market, complex, scheduling stuff. 88 00:04:25.240 --> 00:04:28.000 Yeah, it honestly sounds like two co workers just passing 89 00:04:28.040 --> 00:04:30.920 the time in a break room. And they keep this up. 90 00:04:30.920 --> 00:04:33.399 As the flight nears its end, they descend to twenty 91 00:04:33.399 --> 00:04:36.800 three hundred feet, they run through the standard approach checklists. 92 00:04:37.120 --> 00:04:39.240 The landing gear clunks down right, and. 93 00:04:39.199 --> 00:04:41.959 The flaps are extended to fifteen degrees, which alters the 94 00:04:41.959 --> 00:04:45.319 wing shape to provide more lift at slower speeds. The 95 00:04:45.360 --> 00:04:48.040 passengers can likely see the hazy lights of the Buffalo 96 00:04:48.040 --> 00:04:49.800 suburbs through the clouds at this point. 97 00:04:49.879 --> 00:04:50.879 So everything is normal. 98 00:04:51.000 --> 00:04:54.839 Everything happening in that cockpit is consistent with a perfectly routine, 99 00:04:54.879 --> 00:04:59.399 standard configuration for landing. The aircraft is functioning exactly as. 100 00:04:59.399 --> 00:05:02.800 It should, and then the colmn just shatters out of 101 00:05:02.839 --> 00:05:06.360 absolutely nowhere. The steering yolk in the cockpit the control 102 00:05:06.399 --> 00:05:08.839 column begins to violently shake in the pilot's hands. 103 00:05:09.319 --> 00:05:13.399 The aviation term for this is a stick shaker. It's 104 00:05:13.439 --> 00:05:16.199 an intentional, highly aggressive mechanical warning. 105 00:05:16.439 --> 00:05:16.680 Right. 106 00:05:16.759 --> 00:05:20.279 It's loud, it vibrates intensely, and it's designed to physically 107 00:05:20.480 --> 00:05:25.040 jar the pilots. It basically activates when the airplane's computers 108 00:05:25.040 --> 00:05:28.120 detect that the aircraft is losing lift and is on 109 00:05:28.319 --> 00:05:31.560 the absolute ragged edge of entering an aerodynamic stall. 110 00:05:31.759 --> 00:05:35.560 Like it physically rattles your hands to communicate, hey, you 111 00:05:35.639 --> 00:05:38.120 are about to fall out of the sky. Oh, exactly, 112 00:05:38.199 --> 00:05:42.199 and the ensuing seconds are just sheer chaos. The audio 113 00:05:42.279 --> 00:05:45.920 captures the captain fighting the controls First Officer Shaw frantically reacting, 114 00:05:46.240 --> 00:05:50.160 but the Q four hundred slips entirely out of their command. Yeah, 115 00:05:50.160 --> 00:05:53.319 it rolls, violently, pitches over and simply plumbus out of 116 00:05:53.319 --> 00:05:56.439 the sky, dropping off the air traffic control radar in Buffalo. 117 00:05:56.439 --> 00:05:59.120 In a matter of seconds, it entered an unrecoverable dive, 118 00:05:59.279 --> 00:06:01.959 plummeting directly into that Clarence Center neighborhood. 119 00:06:02.040 --> 00:06:04.319 I'm trying to wrap my head around the physics of this, though, 120 00:06:04.360 --> 00:06:06.319 because if I'm driving my car on the highway, it 121 00:06:06.360 --> 00:06:09.199 doesn't just spontaneously lose all this momentum and roll into 122 00:06:09.199 --> 00:06:11.720 a ditch unless the engine completely dies or I slam 123 00:06:11.720 --> 00:06:14.040 on the brakes. Yeah, something has to actively kill that 124 00:06:14.120 --> 00:06:14.759 forward energy. 125 00:06:14.839 --> 00:06:15.079 Yeah. 126 00:06:15.079 --> 00:06:18.040 So investigators arrive at a scene that is nothing but 127 00:06:18.199 --> 00:06:22.920 burning rubble. Where do they even begin to look for that? 128 00:06:23.079 --> 00:06:26.920 Cause, well, they desperately need the flight data. When NTSB 129 00:06:27.040 --> 00:06:31.160 investigators like Clint Crookshanks first walked onto the scene, they 130 00:06:31.199 --> 00:06:35.079 were stepping into an absolute nightmare scenario. I bet the 131 00:06:35.120 --> 00:06:38.360 wreckage had completely collapsed into a basement under ten feet 132 00:06:38.399 --> 00:06:42.040 of smoldering house debris. The house's natural gas line had 133 00:06:42.079 --> 00:06:46.480 actually ruptured and was continuously feeding the flames, making the 134 00:06:46.519 --> 00:06:48.399 center of the wreckage an active inferno. 135 00:06:48.600 --> 00:06:50.519 So the very evidence they need to solve the mystery 136 00:06:50.639 --> 00:06:52.399 is literally melting in front of their. 137 00:06:52.240 --> 00:06:57.360 Eyes exactly Ordinarily, standard safety protocols dictate that investigators wait 138 00:06:57.399 --> 00:06:59.759 for a fire to completely burn itself out before they 139 00:07:00.000 --> 00:07:02.439 aproach to the center of a crash. The environment is 140 00:07:02.480 --> 00:07:05.399 just too toxic and volatile, right, obviously, But they realized 141 00:07:05.439 --> 00:07:08.839 the black boxes, the flight data recorder, and the cockpit 142 00:07:08.920 --> 00:07:12.279 voice recorder were located in the tail section of the airplane, 143 00:07:12.399 --> 00:07:15.199 and that tail section was acting like a chimney, sitting 144 00:07:15.240 --> 00:07:17.959 directly over the hottest part of the fire. Oh man, 145 00:07:18.040 --> 00:07:20.439 the data was highly perishable. 146 00:07:20.040 --> 00:07:23.199 So the urgency must have been frantic. The NTSB actually 147 00:07:23.279 --> 00:07:26.120 coordinated with the local fire department to bring in a 148 00:07:26.120 --> 00:07:27.040 massive chopsaw. 149 00:07:27.199 --> 00:07:28.000 Yeah, chop saw. 150 00:07:28.279 --> 00:07:31.079 They waited the heat and cut a physical hole straight 151 00:07:31.120 --> 00:07:34.560 through the smoldering composite materials of the fuselage just to 152 00:07:34.639 --> 00:07:38.160 rip those recorders out before the internal memory boards melted. 153 00:07:37.920 --> 00:07:42.680 Which is incredible, and the extraction was successful preserving the data, 154 00:07:43.519 --> 00:07:47.759 but the broader recovery was this painstaking, grueling process. The 155 00:07:47.839 --> 00:07:51.800 local authority is actually brought in forensic anthropology graduate students 156 00:07:51.800 --> 00:07:52.439 to assist. 157 00:07:52.519 --> 00:07:52.839 Wow. 158 00:07:53.199 --> 00:07:55.680 Yeah, these young students were literally on their hands and 159 00:07:55.759 --> 00:07:59.639 knees in the freezing wet snow, using small masonry trowels 160 00:07:59.639 --> 00:08:03.319 and hands brooms to meticulously sift through the ash. They 161 00:08:03.319 --> 00:08:05.839 had to separate the aircraft components from the remnants of 162 00:08:05.879 --> 00:08:09.439 the house, all while respectfully recovering the victims. 163 00:08:09.120 --> 00:08:12.639 Which eventually allowed the NTSB structural engineers to step back 164 00:08:12.680 --> 00:08:16.360 and do something called the four corners check. Now, I imagine 165 00:08:16.279 --> 00:08:18.439 that just means finding the furthest points of the plane 166 00:08:18.439 --> 00:08:20.120 to figure out the size of the impact crater. 167 00:08:20.399 --> 00:08:24.560 It's actually a fundamental diagnostic tool. By locating the nose, 168 00:08:24.800 --> 00:08:27.480 the tail, and the specific tips of both the left 169 00:08:27.480 --> 00:08:31.279 and right wings, investigators can map the structural integrity of 170 00:08:31.319 --> 00:08:33.080 the aircraft prior to impact. 171 00:08:33.200 --> 00:08:33.759 Oh I see. 172 00:08:33.960 --> 00:08:36.519 It took days of scraping through the ice and ash, 173 00:08:36.600 --> 00:08:39.399 but they located all four points within the immediate footprint 174 00:08:39.399 --> 00:08:39.879 of the house. 175 00:08:39.960 --> 00:08:43.399 Wow. Okay, So that definitively proved the plane did not 176 00:08:43.519 --> 00:08:47.039 suffer an inflight breakup. No doors blew off, no wings 177 00:08:47.080 --> 00:08:49.919 snapped in the sky. The Q four hundred was entirely 178 00:08:49.960 --> 00:08:53.000 whole and mechanically intact right up until the millisecond it 179 00:08:53.080 --> 00:08:53.559 hit the ground. 180 00:08:53.600 --> 00:08:54.000 That's right. 181 00:08:54.039 --> 00:08:56.200 Okay, So we have a mechanically whole airplane that falls 182 00:08:56.200 --> 00:08:59.399 from the sky in February. I think anyone who flies 183 00:08:59.399 --> 00:09:02.399 in winter mediately thinks of the same culprit ice ice. 184 00:09:02.720 --> 00:09:05.399 And when you read the transcripts from that recovered Cockpait 185 00:09:05.480 --> 00:09:09.399 voice recorder, it feels like they found the smoking gun immediately, 186 00:09:09.759 --> 00:09:12.240 I mean six minutes before the crash. First Officer Shaw says, 187 00:09:12.559 --> 00:09:15.600 is that ice on the windshield? Captain Renslow replies, Oh yeah, 188 00:09:15.679 --> 00:09:16.480 it's lots of ice. 189 00:09:17.200 --> 00:09:19.440 Shaw I even mentioned she has never flown in icing 190 00:09:19.480 --> 00:09:21.879 conditions this severe in her entire career. 191 00:09:22.279 --> 00:09:25.519 Right, So, ice is an insidious threat in aviation. But 192 00:09:25.559 --> 00:09:27.960 people often assume that ice brings an airplane down simply 193 00:09:27.960 --> 00:09:30.279 because it makes the airframe too heavy. That's always what 194 00:09:30.360 --> 00:09:33.320 I pictured, you know, like a huge block of ice 195 00:09:33.360 --> 00:09:36.159 forms the plane weighs an extra two tons, and the 196 00:09:36.159 --> 00:09:37.279 engines just can't pull it. 197 00:09:37.559 --> 00:09:40.480 The weight is a factor, sure, but the true danger 198 00:09:40.720 --> 00:09:42.159 is aerodynamic disruption. 199 00:09:42.440 --> 00:09:42.759 Okay. 200 00:09:42.919 --> 00:09:46.879 See, an airplane wing generates lyft because of its very specific, 201 00:09:47.240 --> 00:09:51.799 meticulously engineered curved shape. As air travels over that curve, 202 00:09:51.960 --> 00:09:55.440 it creates low pressure above the wing, effectively sucking the 203 00:09:55.440 --> 00:09:56.320 plane into the sky. 204 00:09:56.559 --> 00:09:57.759 Right aerodynamics. 205 00:09:57.919 --> 00:10:01.159 But when super cooled water droplets strike the leading edge 206 00:10:01.200 --> 00:10:05.200 of a wing, they freeze instantly, creating these jagged, irregular 207 00:10:05.240 --> 00:10:09.000 horns of ice. This utterly destroys the smooth flow of air. 208 00:10:09.320 --> 00:10:12.919 The lift just evaporates, regardless of how powerful the engines are. 209 00:10:13.000 --> 00:10:15.759 But wait, commercial turbo props that fly in the Northeast 210 00:10:15.759 --> 00:10:17.840 are built for this. They have de icing boots, yes 211 00:10:17.840 --> 00:10:21.639 they do. These are thick, durable rubber bladders running along 212 00:10:21.639 --> 00:10:23.759 the front edges of the wings and the tail when 213 00:10:23.799 --> 00:10:27.919 the pilots flip a switch. Pneumatic valves take hot, highly compressed, 214 00:10:27.960 --> 00:10:31.440 bleed air straight from the engines and inflate these rubber 215 00:10:31.440 --> 00:10:35.480 bladders like balloons. They physically expand and crack the ice 216 00:10:35.519 --> 00:10:37.759 off the metal, so it just blows away in the wind. 217 00:10:37.960 --> 00:10:41.759 And investigators naturally suspected a failure of this system. They 218 00:10:41.879 --> 00:10:44.720 dug through the molten aluminum in the basement and successfully 219 00:10:44.720 --> 00:10:47.840 recovered five of the six pneumatic de icing valves. 220 00:10:47.960 --> 00:10:48.559 Did they work? 221 00:10:49.120 --> 00:10:52.240 They send them to a specialized lab, tested their electrical 222 00:10:52.279 --> 00:10:55.879 continuity and pressure thresholds, and discovered every single one of 223 00:10:55.919 --> 00:10:59.960 them was functioning flawlessly. The de icing boots were actively warm. 224 00:11:00.360 --> 00:11:02.360 Okay, And this is where the data from the flight 225 00:11:02.440 --> 00:11:06.720 data recorder drops another massive twist into the investigation. The 226 00:11:06.840 --> 00:11:09.559 NTSB ran the math on the specific weight of the 227 00:11:09.600 --> 00:11:13.000 aircraft and the weather conditions that night. They calculated that 228 00:11:13.000 --> 00:11:15.919 the Q four hundred's absolute minimum stall speed you know, 229 00:11:15.960 --> 00:11:18.159 the speed at which the wings can no longer generate 230 00:11:18.279 --> 00:11:20.879 enough lift to keep flying, was about one hundred and 231 00:11:20.879 --> 00:11:25.159 eleven knots. But when that violent stickshaker warning activated, the 232 00:11:25.240 --> 00:11:27.399 data showed the plane was flying at one hundred and 233 00:11:27.399 --> 00:11:29.039 thirty one knots. 234 00:11:28.799 --> 00:11:31.600 The aircraft was cruising a full twenty knots above the 235 00:11:31.679 --> 00:11:36.000 danger zone. By analyzing the engine torque required to maintain 236 00:11:36.000 --> 00:11:38.759 at totter and thirty one knots, investigators proved the plane 237 00:11:38.840 --> 00:11:41.480 was not bogged down by ice. It had a very 238 00:11:41.600 --> 00:11:45.600 manageable normal accumulation that the boots were handling just fine. 239 00:11:45.799 --> 00:11:46.279 Wow. 240 00:11:46.440 --> 00:11:49.320 The terrifying realization was that when the stick shaker went off, 241 00:11:49.480 --> 00:11:53.039 the airplane was not actually stalling. It was flying perfectly fine. 242 00:11:53.240 --> 00:11:55.759 Okay, So if the plane was installing and the ice 243 00:11:55.879 --> 00:11:59.240 wasn't dragging it down, why did the onboard computer scream 244 00:11:59.279 --> 00:12:01.120 at the pilot's they were falling out of the sky. 245 00:12:01.360 --> 00:12:05.159 The answer lies in a tiny specific toggle switch located 246 00:12:05.200 --> 00:12:07.679 on the overhead panel in the Q four hundreds cockpit. 247 00:12:07.840 --> 00:12:09.679 It's known as the reference speed switch. 248 00:12:09.799 --> 00:12:12.519 Now, I would guess that flipping this switch basically tells 249 00:12:12.519 --> 00:12:15.440 the computer, hey, we're in a storm, be extra sensitive 250 00:12:15.480 --> 00:12:16.039 to stalls. 251 00:12:16.399 --> 00:12:20.759 That is the exact underlying logic. When pilots enter known 252 00:12:21.000 --> 00:12:25.799 icing conditions, Standard operating procedure mandates they move this switch 253 00:12:25.919 --> 00:12:29.440 to the increase position. Because even a thin layer of 254 00:12:29.480 --> 00:12:31.759 ice can slightly increase the speed at which a plane 255 00:12:31.759 --> 00:12:34.879 will stall. This switch acts as a safety. 256 00:12:34.559 --> 00:12:35.840 Buffer, makes sense. 257 00:12:36.159 --> 00:12:39.600 It artificially raises the threshold for the warning systems. It 258 00:12:39.639 --> 00:12:42.279 tells the computer to trigger the stick shaker much earlier 259 00:12:42.360 --> 00:12:44.679 than it normally would, ensuring the pilots have plenty of 260 00:12:44.720 --> 00:12:46.639 time to react and keep their air speed up. 261 00:12:46.879 --> 00:12:49.759 Okay, so the system did exactly what it was programmed 262 00:12:49.759 --> 00:12:53.240 to do. Investigators sifted through the charred remains of the cockpit, 263 00:12:53.679 --> 00:12:56.679 found the outs protection panel and confirmed the switch had 264 00:12:56.679 --> 00:13:00.120 been tuggled to increase and because it was on the 265 00:13:00.120 --> 00:13:03.720 plane's flight computer recalculated the safety margins and displayed a 266 00:13:03.759 --> 00:13:06.240 series of bright red warning bars on the air speed 267 00:13:06.279 --> 00:13:08.919 indicators right in the pilot's line of sight. 268 00:13:09.200 --> 00:13:13.399 The visual warnings were glaring, but the crew missed them entirely. 269 00:13:13.440 --> 00:13:14.559 They just didn't see them. 270 00:13:14.879 --> 00:13:18.480 No, As they lowered the landing gear and extended the flaps, 271 00:13:18.840 --> 00:13:21.960 the increased drag naturally caused the airplane to slow down. 272 00:13:22.559 --> 00:13:26.840 The speed decayed, dropping toward that artificially raised safety threshold, 273 00:13:27.159 --> 00:13:30.320 and because they hadn't noticed the red bars, the sudden, 274 00:13:30.519 --> 00:13:34.240 violent activation of the stick shaker caught them completely off guard. 275 00:13:34.080 --> 00:13:37.679 Which triggers the most horrific ten seconds of the entire flight. 276 00:13:38.000 --> 00:13:42.120 The yoke starts aggressively shaking, rattling their teeth, and this 277 00:13:42.159 --> 00:13:45.519 is where the tragedy compounds. Because the standard procedure for 278 00:13:45.559 --> 00:13:49.399 recovering from a stall warning is aviation one oh one. 279 00:13:49.440 --> 00:13:52.759 Every student pilot learns this on day one. You push 280 00:13:52.840 --> 00:13:54.679 the nose of the aircraft down toward the ground to 281 00:13:54.679 --> 00:13:57.919 gain speed, to get air flowing rapidly back over the wings. Right, 282 00:13:58.080 --> 00:14:00.799 But Captain Ronslow does something completely inexplicable. 283 00:14:00.840 --> 00:14:03.039 The flight data recorder captures both the position of the 284 00:14:03.039 --> 00:14:05.759 control column and the physical pounds of force applied to 285 00:14:05.840 --> 00:14:09.600 it when the shaker activated. Captain Renslow pulled backward on 286 00:14:09.639 --> 00:14:13.159 the yoke. He pulled with tremendous physical force, fighting the 287 00:14:13.200 --> 00:14:16.200 airplane's own automated attempts to push the nose down. 288 00:14:16.279 --> 00:14:18.639 He's pitching the nose of the sixty thousand pound airplane 289 00:14:18.720 --> 00:14:19.399 up into the sky. 290 00:14:19.759 --> 00:14:22.720 By aiming the nose up while they were already flying slowly, 291 00:14:23.120 --> 00:14:26.519 he rapidly bled off whatever Ford momentum and air speed 292 00:14:26.559 --> 00:14:29.320 they still had. He was forcing the aircraft into the 293 00:14:29.360 --> 00:14:31.720 exact aerodynamic stall. The computer was trying to. 294 00:14:31.679 --> 00:14:34.840 Prevent, and First Officer Shaw, sitting in the right seat, 295 00:14:34.919 --> 00:14:38.960 trying to fix the chaos, reaches over and retracts the flaps. 296 00:14:38.600 --> 00:14:41.399 Which is terrible because the flaps were providing the crucial 297 00:14:41.399 --> 00:14:45.480 extra lift keeping them airborne at that low speed. Retracting 298 00:14:45.480 --> 00:14:48.480 them was effectively pulling the rug out from under the aircraft. 299 00:14:48.519 --> 00:14:51.200 Oh my god, you have a captain aggressively pitching the 300 00:14:51.240 --> 00:14:55.000 nose up, destroying their speed, and a first officer stripping 301 00:14:55.000 --> 00:14:57.480 away their lift. If they had taken their hands off 302 00:14:57.480 --> 00:15:01.320 the controls entirely or simply push forward, the Q four 303 00:15:01.399 --> 00:15:05.480 hundred would have comfortably recovered with hundreds of feet to spare. Instead, 304 00:15:05.799 --> 00:15:08.759 these two professionals took a healthy airplane and muscled it 305 00:15:08.840 --> 00:15:10.120 into a fatal plunge. 306 00:15:10.200 --> 00:15:13.279 This is the core mystery of flight three four oh seven. 307 00:15:13.919 --> 00:15:17.679 Why would two individuals who have dedicated their lives to aviation, 308 00:15:18.080 --> 00:15:21.799 sitting inside a multimillion dollar machine commit such a fundamental 309 00:15:21.919 --> 00:15:25.960 backward error. To figure that out, the NTSB investigators had 310 00:15:25.960 --> 00:15:28.639 to leave the craft site. They had to turn into 311 00:15:28.679 --> 00:15:31.799 detectives and track the daily lives of Marvin Renslow and 312 00:15:31.799 --> 00:15:34.519 Rebeccah Shaw for the seventy two hours leading up to 313 00:15:34.519 --> 00:15:35.200 the crash. 314 00:15:35.000 --> 00:15:38.840 And that biographical timeline exposed the dark, hidden underbelly of 315 00:15:38.879 --> 00:15:42.279 regional airline economics. In two thousand and nine, Continental Connection 316 00:15:42.320 --> 00:15:44.559 Flight three four to seven was not actually flown by 317 00:15:44.600 --> 00:15:48.559 Continental Airlines. It was outsourced to a smaller regional carrier 318 00:15:48.639 --> 00:15:52.720 called Colgan Air. Right these regional carriers operate roughly half 319 00:15:52.759 --> 00:15:55.600 of all domestic passenger flights in the United States, flying 320 00:15:55.639 --> 00:15:58.120 the exact same routes as the majors, but their financial 321 00:15:58.120 --> 00:16:00.559 structures and working conditions were ratic different. 322 00:16:00.639 --> 00:16:04.080 The pay disparity is staggering. To look at Captain Renslaw, 323 00:16:04.080 --> 00:16:06.440 the man holding the lives of fifty people in his hands, 324 00:16:06.639 --> 00:16:09.159 was making about sixty thousand dollars a year. The first 325 00:16:09.159 --> 00:16:12.559 officer shaw salary was horrifying. She was making under sixteen 326 00:16:12.600 --> 00:16:13.559 thousand dollars a year. 327 00:16:13.799 --> 00:16:16.559 She was earning significantly less than a fast food manager 328 00:16:16.679 --> 00:16:19.120 or a city bus driver at the time, yet she 329 00:16:19.360 --> 00:16:23.759 was responsible for navigating a complex turbo crop through winter storms. 330 00:16:23.799 --> 00:16:27.360 Because they were paid poverty level wages, neither pilot could 331 00:16:27.360 --> 00:16:30.440 actually afford to live anywhere near their assigned base in Newark, 332 00:16:30.559 --> 00:16:34.759 New Jersey. The NTSB subpoened their phone records and credit 333 00:16:34.759 --> 00:16:38.600 cards to trace their commutes. Shaw lived across the entire 334 00:16:38.639 --> 00:16:41.600 country in Seattle, Yeah. To get to work for this shift, 335 00:16:41.960 --> 00:16:44.360 she rode in a jump seat on a FedEx cargo 336 00:16:44.399 --> 00:16:48.159 plane overnight, flying from Seattle to Memphis, then Memphis to 337 00:16:48.200 --> 00:16:49.519 Newark just to clock in. 338 00:16:49.759 --> 00:16:52.519 And Captain Renslow was based in Florida. He had flown 339 00:16:52.559 --> 00:16:54.240 up to Newark worked for a couple of days, and 340 00:16:54.320 --> 00:16:57.039 investigators discovered that on the night before the crash, he 341 00:16:57.080 --> 00:16:59.320 didn't go to a hotel. He couldn't afford a fifty 342 00:16:59.320 --> 00:16:59.919 dollars motel. 343 00:17:00.440 --> 00:17:00.879 Wow. 344 00:17:01.159 --> 00:17:04.519 He was seen sleeping on a sofa in the airline's bustling, 345 00:17:04.599 --> 00:17:06.519 noisy crew lounge at the airport. 346 00:17:06.720 --> 00:17:09.119 Sleeping on a couch in a room with fluorescent lights 347 00:17:09.160 --> 00:17:12.160 and people constantly walking in and out. That's insane. 348 00:17:12.359 --> 00:17:15.839 Sleeping in the lounge was technically a violation of company policy, 349 00:17:16.240 --> 00:17:19.960 but the NTSB found it was an open secret. Management 350 00:17:20.000 --> 00:17:22.279 basically looked the other way because everyone knew the pilots 351 00:17:22.319 --> 00:17:25.759 couldn't afford lodging. By the time Shawn Renslow strapped into 352 00:17:25.799 --> 00:17:28.240 the cockpit of flight three four oh seven, they were 353 00:17:28.240 --> 00:17:33.200 both profoundly dangerously fatigued. Their circadian rhythms were wrecked, and 354 00:17:33.240 --> 00:17:35.599 they had accumulated massive sleep. 355 00:17:35.359 --> 00:17:38.640 Debt, and that profound fatigue acts like a poison on 356 00:17:38.680 --> 00:17:42.119 a pilot's cognitive abilities. It explains the conversation on the 357 00:17:42.119 --> 00:17:45.720 cockpit voice recorder we discussed earlier. They weren't just being friendly. 358 00:17:45.839 --> 00:17:48.680 Chatting casually about Shaw's career while descending through ten thousand 359 00:17:48.720 --> 00:17:51.880 feet is a direct violation of a federal law known 360 00:17:51.920 --> 00:17:53.839 as the Sterile Cockpit Rule right. 361 00:17:53.839 --> 00:17:56.799 The Steri Cockpit Rule mandates that during critical phases of 362 00:17:56.839 --> 00:18:01.200 flight so taxi takeoff, landing, and all all operations below 363 00:18:01.319 --> 00:18:05.119 ten thousand feet, pilots are strictly prohibited from engaging in 364 00:18:05.200 --> 00:18:08.519 any non essential conversation. No talking about the weekend, no 365 00:18:08.599 --> 00:18:11.920 reading newspapers, nothing. It's designed to ensure one hundred percent 366 00:18:11.960 --> 00:18:14.519 of their cognitive bandwidth is focused on the instruments and 367 00:18:14.559 --> 00:18:15.960 the aircraft's energy state. 368 00:18:16.240 --> 00:18:19.039 But when you're operating on three hours of awful sleep, 369 00:18:19.640 --> 00:18:24.359 your brain loses the ability to maintain broad situational awareness. 370 00:18:24.920 --> 00:18:27.880 You get tunnel vision. You focus on the conversation just 371 00:18:27.920 --> 00:18:30.480 to stay awake, but you lose track of the airplane 372 00:18:31.079 --> 00:18:33.759 because they were chatting and distracted. They ran through their 373 00:18:33.839 --> 00:18:37.359 landing checklists late because they were rushing to catch up. 374 00:18:37.599 --> 00:18:41.400 Their eyes glossed right over the bright red warning bars 375 00:18:41.440 --> 00:18:44.359 on their screens, indicating their speed was decaying. 376 00:18:44.799 --> 00:18:48.240 It is a textbook cascade of human factors. When the 377 00:18:48.240 --> 00:18:53.200 stickshaker finally erupts, shattering that relaxed atmosphere, their sleep deprived 378 00:18:53.240 --> 00:18:57.079 brains suffer a massive psychological phenomenon known as the startle effect. 379 00:18:57.200 --> 00:19:00.319 The startle effect right when a human being is yearly 380 00:19:00.359 --> 00:19:04.559 fatigued and suddenly frightened, The brain bypasses higher order logical 381 00:19:04.599 --> 00:19:07.400 training like pushed the nose down to gain speed, and 382 00:19:07.480 --> 00:19:12.400 defaults to sheer. Panic, survival instinct, and biological instinct dictates 383 00:19:12.400 --> 00:19:14.279 that if you feel like you were falling toward the ground, 384 00:19:14.359 --> 00:19:16.039 you pull back to get away from it. 385 00:19:16.039 --> 00:19:19.519 It's an absolutely heartbreaking realization. The plane didn't fail them. 386 00:19:19.759 --> 00:19:23.359 The system failed them. The regional airline industry's economic model 387 00:19:23.400 --> 00:19:27.160 prioritized cheap tickets, overrested pilots, and fifty people paid the 388 00:19:27.240 --> 00:19:30.400 ultimate price. But the story of Flight three twenty four 389 00:19:30.400 --> 00:19:32.759 oh seven didn't end in that basement and Clarence Center. 390 00:19:33.119 --> 00:19:35.119 The families of those victims made sure of it. 391 00:19:35.400 --> 00:19:38.240 They did. The families refused to accept a report that 392 00:19:38.319 --> 00:19:42.279 simply blamed pilot error. John Kellner, the father of the 393 00:19:42.359 --> 00:19:46.240 law student Elise Tilmer, along with dozens of other grieving relatives, 394 00:19:46.680 --> 00:19:51.039 organized an incredible grassroots movement. They turned their profound grief 395 00:19:51.119 --> 00:19:53.920 into fierce, relentless political advocacy. 396 00:19:54.279 --> 00:19:57.240 Right they took countless trips to Washington, d C. Practically 397 00:19:57.319 --> 00:19:59.799 living in the halls of Congress, demanding systemic change. 398 00:20:00.000 --> 00:20:02.640 Oh pressure was immovable, and they won. The Flight three 399 00:20:02.799 --> 00:20:05.440 four oh seven families forced the US Congress to pass 400 00:20:05.480 --> 00:20:09.440 the Airline's Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 401 00:20:09.440 --> 00:20:13.880