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Speaker 1: Okay, So have you heard about the Montak monster. Yeah,

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washed up on a beach right out there on Long Island.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, pretty freaky looking thing.

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Speaker 1: People have all these crazy theories about what it was.

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Some even think it might be connected to.

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Speaker 2: Plumb Islandum Island, huh.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's right there, just a few miles off the coast.

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Speaker 2: Interesting.

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Speaker 1: Officially, it's a research facility, you know, for animal diseases,

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but there are all sorts of rumors like about secret

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experiments and stuff.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, I see where you're going with this.

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Speaker 1: So we're diving into Plumb Island today. All the research

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you've gathered, news articles, old documents, even some declassified government stuff.

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Speaker 2: Sounds like we're in for a wild ride.

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Speaker 1: Absolutely. So. On the surface, we've got this place, the

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Plumb Island Animal Disease Center right right, and they're setting

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some serious stuff there. Foot and mouth disease, African swine fever.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, those are no joke. I mean, if an outbreak

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of something like that ever hit devastating, right totally.

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Speaker 3: Think about the two thousand and one foot and mouth

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outbreak in the ukped out millions of animals, cost billions.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I remember hearing about that.

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Speaker 3: So the research they're doing at Plumb Island, it's definitely

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important for sure.

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Speaker 1: But then you know, you start digging a little deeper

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into the history of.

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Speaker 2: This place, and what do you find.

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Speaker 1: Well, it wasn't always about protecting livestock. Go back to

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the nineteen fifties Cold War paranoia and.

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Speaker 2: All that, So we're talking biowarfare exactly. Makes sense.

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Speaker 3: During the Cold War, both sides were terrified of bioweapons.

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Speaker 1: And Plumb Island it was right in the thick of it.

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Speaker 3: So they weren't just studying these diseases, they were weaponizing.

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Speaker 1: Them pretty much. Yeah. The idea was to target enemy livestock,

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cripple their food supply, right.

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Speaker 2: A way to wage war without firing.

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Speaker 1: A shot exactly. And there's this, uh, well, some evidence

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that suggests it wasn't just animal diseases they were looking at, oh,

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a human body. They found it on the island.

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Speaker 2: Hold on a human body.

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Speaker 1: Evidence of some kind of invasive brain surgery.

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Speaker 2: They say, that's chilling. What else do we know about this?

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Speaker 1: Not much. It's all pretty hush hush still, but it

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definitely makes you wonder if they were experimenting on humans too.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, no kidding, and it wouldn't be the first time

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a government dabbled in that kind of dark science, right.

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Speaker 1: Well, and then to add to all this, there's this

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whole Nazi connection Nazis, what do you mean? Well, after

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World War Two, you know, the US recruited all these

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German scientists through this program called Operation paper Clip.

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Speaker 2: Oh right, I've heard about that. They brought over rocket scientists, engineers.

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Speaker 1: And bioweapons experts. One of them was this guy, Eric Traub,

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specialized in using insects to spread diseases tics.

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Speaker 2: In particular ticks, as in lyme disease tics.

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Speaker 1: You're getting ahead of me, but yeah, Tis Traub. He

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was working on this stuff back in Germany on an

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island called Rheims.

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Speaker 3: Island, weaponizing tics, huh, turning them into tiny little disease bombs.

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Speaker 2: That's disturbing stuff.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, in both the US and the Soviets they picked

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up on his research during the Cold War.

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Speaker 3: So we have this biowarfare facility, possible human experimentation, ties

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to Nazi scientists, and weaponized ticks.

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Speaker 2: Where does lime disease fit into this?

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Speaker 1: Well, that's where things get really interesting. In nineteen seventy five,

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there was this security guard Ronnie. He was working near

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Plum Island and he got bitten by a tick.

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Speaker 2: What happened to him?

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Speaker 1: He came down with all the classic symptoms of lime disease, bullseye, rash,

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joint pain, fatigue, the whole nine yards.

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Speaker 2: And this was near Plumb Island, yep.

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Speaker 1: And it was just a few years after this massive

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outbreak of African swine fever hit Cuba, first and only

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outbreak in the Western Hemisphere.

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Speaker 3: They say, I remember that devastated their pig population. Cuba

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blamed the CIA claimed it was a deliberate attack, and.

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Speaker 1: The CIA denied it, of course. But it all happened

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right in the middle of Operation Mongoose. Operation Mongoose, the

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CIA's covert op center to get rid of Castro, and

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some of the plans for that they did include using bioweapons.

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Speaker 3: So you've got a possible bioweapon attack in Cuba, a

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security garden, your Plum Island contracting a new and mysterious disease.

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The timing is pretty suspicious, don't you think?

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Speaker 1: Suspicious? Yeah? And there are more connections. The scientists who

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discovered line disease, doctor Willie Bergdorffer.

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Speaker 2: What about him?

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Speaker 1: He had a history of developing bioweapons for the US military,

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specifically weaponized ticks.

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Speaker 3: Wait a minute, the guy who discovered line disease was

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also working on weaponized tics. That's a little too coincidental

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for my liking.

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Speaker 1: You're telling me. And then there's this little tidbit. Between

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nineteen sixty six and nineteen sixty nine, the government released

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over three hundred thousand research ticks into the wild.

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Speaker 2: Three hundred thousand ticks? What were they thinking?

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Speaker 1: And included in that release was the lone star tick,

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a particularly aggressive species.

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Speaker 2: The lone star tick. Isn't that the one that's been

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spreading like crazy, yep all.

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Speaker 1: Over the eastern half of the US, and with it

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a surge in line disease and other tick born.

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Speaker 2: Illnesses like alpha gool syndrome.

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Speaker 1: Right, the meat allergy triggered by tick bites.

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Speaker 2: Crazy stuff.

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Speaker 1: Right, It's all pretty unsettling. It sounds like we're dealing

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with the biowarfare facility with potential ties to human experimentation,

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Nazi scientists, weaponized tics, and a possible connection to the

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emergence of lime disease. It's a lot to take in, it.

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Speaker 2: Is, and we're just getting started. Plumb Island.

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Speaker 3: It's like this Pandora's Box of secrets and we're about

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to open it up.

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Speaker 2: And you know, Plum Island they're actually shutting it down soon.

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Speaker 3: Really yeah, but get this, they're moving all the research

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to a new facility in Kansas.

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Speaker 1: That's interesting, but okay, So getting back to it, it

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makes you wonder though, right, if things could go wrong

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at Plumb Island, Oh yeah, for sure, then what about

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other biolabs? I mean, are they really as secure as

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we think they are.

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Speaker 2: You'd like to think so, right, top scientists, strict protocols.

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Speaker 1: All that, right, exactly, But even the best systems can

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have flaws.

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Speaker 3: You know, absolutely, human error, equipment failures, you name it.

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And sometimes those mistakes they can have really serious consequences.

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Speaker 1: Like what kind of consequences are we talking about here?

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Speaker 3: Well, there's this case from a few years back, twenty twelve.

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I think it was this young woman, Amy Copeland down

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in Georgia.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I remember that.

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Speaker 3: She was in the ziplining accident, got injured pretty badly, right,

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I remember that, And she ended up contracting this flesh

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eating bacteria Arimona's hydrophola.

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Speaker 1: It's called Oh wow, that's aboutful.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and it's nasty stuff. She ended up losing both

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her hands in both her feet.

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Speaker 1: Oh, it's just horrible.

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Speaker 2: It was a terrible tragedy.

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Speaker 3: But what makes it even more disturbing is that around

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the same time, there were all these other cases of

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this same bacteria popping up really yeah, in Georgia, South Carolina, Florida,

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And when you map it out, it kind of looks

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like they were clustered around the CDC headquarters in Atlanta.

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Speaker 1: Hold on, are you saying there might be a connection

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between this flesh eating bacteria and the CDC.

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Speaker 2: It's certainly a possibility.

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Speaker 3: And get this right, after Amy's accident, they discovered that

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the CDC building in Atlanta had this major airflow problem.

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Speaker 1: An airflow problem, What.

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Speaker 3: Do you mean instead of drawing clean air into the labs,

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you know, where they're working with all these dangerous pathogens, right,

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the system was actually blowing contaminated air out into the

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surrounding environment.

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Speaker 1: No way, So they were potentially releasing dangerous bacteria into

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the air.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it was a pretty big deal, and it really

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raises questions about the safety protocols at these high level biolabs.

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Speaker 1: And this wasn't the only problem that the CDC around

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that time was.

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Speaker 2: It not even close. They also had this whole thing

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with anthrax anthrax.

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Speaker 3: Seriously, they were improperly handling and shipping live anthrax samples

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to labs all over the country.

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Speaker 1: Live anthrax. How do you even mess that up?

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Speaker 3: It was a major lapse in safety protocol, no doubt

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about it. And as if that wasn't bad enough, they

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also found vials of smallpox just sitting in an unsecured

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refrigerator in one of their labs.

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Speaker 1: Wallpox. I thought that was eradicated, it's supposed.

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Speaker 2: To be, but there it was, just hanging out in

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a fridge at the CDC.

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Speaker 1: I mean, come on, that's some scary stuff right there.

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Speaker 2: It really is.

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Speaker 3: I mean, if these kinds of mistakes can happen at

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the CDC, a place that's supposed to be the gold

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standard for biosecurity, then where does.

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Speaker 1: That leave us? Makes you wonder, doesn't it what's going

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on in other labs around the world that might not

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have the same level of oversight Exactly.

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Speaker 3: It's a sobering thought and it really highlights the need

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for more transparency and accountability when it comes to biolab safety.

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Speaker 1: Couldn't agree more. We need to know that these labs

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are operating safely and responsibly, not just for the sake

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of the people who work there, but for the safety

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of everyone. So where do we go from here? I mean,

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how do we even begin to address this?

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Speaker 3: Well?

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Speaker 2: I think the first step is transparency.

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Speaker 1: Transparency, Yeah, we need to know.

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Speaker 3: What's going on in these labs, what kind of research

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are they doing, what safety protocols are in place?

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Speaker 1: Right, Because if we don't even know what's happening, how

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can we even begin to assess the risks exactly.

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Speaker 3: And this transparency, it can't just be limited to you know,

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government agencies and research institutions.

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Speaker 1: Right, it needs to extend to the public.

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Speaker 2: Absolutely.

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Speaker 3: The public has a right to know what's happening in

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these facilities that could potentially impact their health and safety.

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Speaker 1: And knowledge is power, right, I mean, the more informed

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people are, the more they can hold these institutions accountable.

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Speaker 2: Exactly. But transparency alone isn't.

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Speaker 1: Enough, right, So what else needs to be done?

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Speaker 3: Well, we need to invest in better training for lab personnel,

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more robust security measures, and most importantly, we need to

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have comprehensive emergency response plans in place.

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Speaker 1: So that if something does go wrong, we're prepared.

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Speaker 2: To contain it and minimize the damage and all of this.

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Speaker 1: It requires a real culture shift.

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Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, it's not just about implementing new rules and regulations.

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Speaker 1: It's about fostering a culture of safety and accountability within

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these institutions exactly.

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Speaker 3: Everyone from the scientists to the policy makers to the

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maintenance staff needs to be on board with this idea

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that safety is paramount and.

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Speaker 1: It can't just be a top down solution either, right.

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Speaker 3: Right, It needs to be a collaborative effort. We need scientists,

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policy makers, and the public all working together to ensure

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that these labs are operating as safely and responsibly as possible.

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Speaker 1: So it sounds like we're talking a pretty massive undertaking here.

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Speaker 2: It is, but it's a necessary one.

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Speaker 1: So you know, we've been talking a lot about Plumb Island,

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right and like you said, they're closing it down, moving

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the research to Kansas, YEP.

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Speaker 2: To the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility.

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Speaker 1: What do you think about that? I mean, is that

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a good move?

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Speaker 2: Well, it's a mixed bag really.

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Speaker 3: Some people argue that having a more centralized facility will

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improve efficiency and collaboration but then others worry about the

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risks of having such a facility so close to major

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livestock populations.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I can see that.

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Speaker 2: I mean, if something were to go wrong.

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Speaker 1: The consequences could be devastating, exactly.

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Speaker 2: So it's a tough call. Only time will tell how

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it all plays out.

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Speaker 1: So like we're walking this tightrope, right yea. On one side,

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we have this incredible potential of scientific research, you know,

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to cure diseases, to solve problems, to make the world

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a better place. But on the other side, we have

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these very real risks.

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Speaker 3: The potential for accidents, for outbreaks, for things to go

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terribly wrong.

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Speaker 1: It's a delicate balance, it.

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Speaker 3: Really is, and I think the key is to approach

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this kind of research with both caution and courage.

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Speaker 1: Caution and courage.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, we need to be aware of the risks, but

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we can't let fear paralyze us. We need to keep

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pushing forward, but we need to do it responsibly and ethically.

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Speaker 1: I think that's a great note to end on. This

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has been a fascinating and at times a little bit unsettling,

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deep dive into the world of Plumb Island and biolab security.

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It has We've covered a lot of ground today, but

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I think the main takeaway here is that we all

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have a role to play in ensuring that scientific progress

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is made safely and responsibly. Absolutely, we need to stay informed,

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we need to ask questions, and we need to hold

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our leaders and institutions accountable.

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Speaker 2: Couldn't agree more.

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Speaker 1: Well, thank you for joining us on this episode of

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The Deep Dive. Until next time, stay curious, stay vigilant,

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and stay safe.