WEBVTT 1 00:00:01.320 --> 00:00:07.440 It's Night Side with Dan Ray on WBZY, Boston's news radio. 2 00:00:08.000 --> 00:00:11.839 Thanks Nicole Yikes four to one. His team has been 3 00:00:11.880 --> 00:00:14.400 a role in the last couple of nights, and tonight 4 00:00:14.400 --> 00:00:16.879 they hit a stone wall. Well, we'll see how that transpires. 5 00:00:16.920 --> 00:00:19.399 If you're watching the game, you can turn the audio 6 00:00:19.440 --> 00:00:21.600 down of the television and you could listen to us 7 00:00:21.600 --> 00:00:24.239 here on Nightside. My name is Dan Ray. Rob Brooks, 8 00:00:24.280 --> 00:00:27.760 the producer of this program, is back in the broadcast 9 00:00:27.920 --> 00:00:31.600 central headquarters. He's gonna set us up with all your 10 00:00:31.600 --> 00:00:34.880 phone calls beginning after nine o'clock. We will, as the 11 00:00:34.920 --> 00:00:38.359 evening goes on, get onto some subjects where phone calls 12 00:00:38.359 --> 00:00:41.240 will be welcome. I'm going to talk about Boycott's are 13 00:00:41.240 --> 00:00:44.439 the effective, going to talk about this looming government shutdown, 14 00:00:45.079 --> 00:00:47.880 and maybe talk a little about what the peace prospects 15 00:00:47.920 --> 00:00:50.640 are in Ukraine. So we have some pretty heavy topics 16 00:00:51.000 --> 00:00:53.880 later on tonight, and we have some very interesting topics 17 00:00:53.880 --> 00:00:56.200 in this first hour. We're going to talk about the 18 00:00:56.240 --> 00:00:59.320 push for office returns, going to talk about that Twitter outage, 19 00:00:59.359 --> 00:01:02.119 on the Twitter outages of earlier this week. I'm going 20 00:01:02.119 --> 00:01:05.280 to talk about the impact that the Trump tariffs may 21 00:01:05.319 --> 00:01:09.599 have on farmers across the country and also a troubling 22 00:01:09.760 --> 00:01:15.040 report about children developing body image issues starting as young 23 00:01:15.239 --> 00:01:19.560 as seven. But first wanted to introduce Clark Lowe Clark as 24 00:01:19.560 --> 00:01:24.159 the president and CEO of O'Connor Company. Clark, first of all, 25 00:01:24.200 --> 00:01:28.680 what is O'Connor company? What do you folks do? Hey? 26 00:01:28.760 --> 00:01:28.920 Dan? 27 00:01:28.959 --> 00:01:29.400 How are you? 28 00:01:29.719 --> 00:01:29.879 Well? 29 00:01:29.920 --> 00:01:33.560 We're a national life Thank you so much. We're a 30 00:01:33.920 --> 00:01:38.359 national commercial general contractor. We do work coast to coast, 31 00:01:38.400 --> 00:01:42.640 and we're most known for a remote first workforce. 32 00:01:44.280 --> 00:01:48.760 Remote first workforce. Okay, if you could explain that one 33 00:01:48.760 --> 00:01:51.200 to me, I think I know what it means, but 34 00:01:51.480 --> 00:01:53.120 I want to make sure I do before we start 35 00:01:53.159 --> 00:01:54.000 asking questions. 36 00:01:55.040 --> 00:01:59.799 Yeah, so are a majority of our workforce it works remote, 37 00:01:59.799 --> 00:02:03.719 work from home, and we have a number of employees 38 00:02:03.760 --> 00:02:08.120 that also travel. So unlike most general most general contractors, 39 00:02:08.159 --> 00:02:12.479 we are a workforce that works mostly out of our 40 00:02:12.479 --> 00:02:14.639 houses or through traveling. Means. 41 00:02:14.960 --> 00:02:17.479 Yeah. When I when I think about general contractors are 42 00:02:17.599 --> 00:02:21.280 gcs as they're called, I assume that you're on site 43 00:02:21.439 --> 00:02:27.080 and you're watching whatever construction is underway. Explain to me 44 00:02:27.520 --> 00:02:29.280 how you can do that job remotely. 45 00:02:30.520 --> 00:02:34.199 Yeah, so we do have site supervision that is on 46 00:02:34.319 --> 00:02:36.879 site at all of our jobs, so that from that sense, 47 00:02:36.879 --> 00:02:40.360 we're traditional from the office sense where we don't have 48 00:02:40.439 --> 00:02:44.280 the traditional regional platform that most other general contractors have. 49 00:02:44.680 --> 00:02:47.000 So all of our support staff, all of our back 50 00:02:47.080 --> 00:02:50.639 end staff, all of our project managers, et cetera, are 51 00:02:50.759 --> 00:02:55.159 all remote remote workforce, and all of our site supervisors 52 00:02:56.000 --> 00:02:57.719 that those those folks all travel. 53 00:02:58.719 --> 00:03:01.439 Okay, So we're going to talk about the push for 54 00:03:01.639 --> 00:03:04.719 office returns and the question is, but is it the 55 00:03:04.800 --> 00:03:08.800 right move now? I have worked remotely since COVID hit 56 00:03:08.840 --> 00:03:14.919 about five years ago. I was told by my team, 57 00:03:13.159 --> 00:03:17.520 my superiors that they wanted me out of the office 58 00:03:17.599 --> 00:03:21.319 so that I could be somewhat more safe and do 59 00:03:21.919 --> 00:03:25.560 my job remotely, which I've done successfully for five years. 60 00:03:26.319 --> 00:03:28.719 But I guess a lot of companies are pushing people 61 00:03:28.840 --> 00:03:32.240 come on back into the office because I guess some 62 00:03:32.280 --> 00:03:35.479 people have maybe taken advantage and when they say they've 63 00:03:35.520 --> 00:03:39.360 worked remotely, they're in Pago pago or a bally bally 64 00:03:39.520 --> 00:03:43.319 or something like that. And what's going on? Is this 65 00:03:43.400 --> 00:03:45.159 a good trend or a bad trend in your opinion? 66 00:03:46.280 --> 00:03:50.479 Well, in my opinion, I think it's a little short sighted. Trend. 67 00:03:51.919 --> 00:03:55.719 If you look at the workforce. When the DoD called 68 00:03:55.759 --> 00:03:59.719 remote employees back recently, the funny thing is when the 69 00:04:00.000 --> 00:04:02.439 empolies went back to work, there wasn't even enough office 70 00:04:02.439 --> 00:04:05.240 space for them to go back because there'd been so 71 00:04:05.319 --> 00:04:08.759 much hiring done over the time that when they so, 72 00:04:08.800 --> 00:04:10.560 then they had to go to these weird swing shifts 73 00:04:10.560 --> 00:04:14.199 where employees were working four hours remote, four hours in 74 00:04:14.280 --> 00:04:17.480 the office, and they had some weird commute and schedules. 75 00:04:18.160 --> 00:04:20.399 I think just the world. One of the things that 76 00:04:20.439 --> 00:04:23.240 we talk about within our company is we feel like 77 00:04:23.720 --> 00:04:27.879 the gravity of the household is starting to take shape, 78 00:04:28.240 --> 00:04:31.120 meaning that the people's homes are starting to become the 79 00:04:31.160 --> 00:04:34.199 gravity of the world. And you know, a lot of 80 00:04:34.519 --> 00:04:37.759 this is like a generational trend as well. Gen Z 81 00:04:37.920 --> 00:04:42.480 our newest work generation in the workforce. That generation spent 82 00:04:42.560 --> 00:04:45.759 a lot of time with parents who were outside the 83 00:04:45.759 --> 00:04:49.920 household because many of the millennial and Gen X parents 84 00:04:50.000 --> 00:04:53.319 were two income households, and so many of these new 85 00:04:53.399 --> 00:04:56.720 generation generational parents. So at least what we see at 86 00:04:56.720 --> 00:05:00.000 O'Connor is there, you know, moms and dads looking for 87 00:05:00.079 --> 00:05:03.399 were one position to be remote so they can maintain 88 00:05:03.519 --> 00:05:04.959 that family element as well. 89 00:05:06.319 --> 00:05:12.079 So you talk about the various federal workers who have 90 00:05:12.160 --> 00:05:14.639 been called back to work and not enough office space. 91 00:05:15.000 --> 00:05:17.519 I suspect Dolge will have something to say about that. 92 00:05:18.000 --> 00:05:21.480 But I understood that there was so much office space 93 00:05:22.040 --> 00:05:24.839 available in Washington that a lot of buildings now are 94 00:05:24.839 --> 00:05:27.759 going to be sold. We have in Boston a lot 95 00:05:27.800 --> 00:05:31.040 of empty buildings downtown, and many people are saying, how 96 00:05:31.040 --> 00:05:35.319 can we repurpose those buildings? So I guess to repurpose 97 00:05:35.360 --> 00:05:40.279 those buildings to condominiums or rental properties. Maybe people would 98 00:05:40.319 --> 00:05:44.920 have to stay. Let me ask you this before before COVID, 99 00:05:45.560 --> 00:05:49.800 I would say that probably ninety five percent of people 100 00:05:50.279 --> 00:05:53.839 worked out of some sort of office location somewhere other 101 00:05:53.879 --> 00:05:56.160 than their home. Fair enough, if I said that, it 102 00:05:56.240 --> 00:05:57.519 was that to be a fair calculation. 103 00:05:58.560 --> 00:05:59.959 Yeah, I would agree with that. 104 00:06:01.040 --> 00:06:03.959 So at the height of COVID, let's say, in twenty 105 00:06:04.040 --> 00:06:09.399 twenty and twenty twenty one, what was the at home 106 00:06:09.680 --> 00:06:13.879 or remote percentage of the workforce. I'm going to suggest 107 00:06:14.439 --> 00:06:15.600 seventy five percent. 108 00:06:17.040 --> 00:06:21.639 Yeah, that is hard to tell because you have so 109 00:06:21.759 --> 00:06:24.279 much you know, right, like the truckers couldn't be remote. 110 00:06:24.279 --> 00:06:27.879 But I would guess the percentage was precipitously higher, right, 111 00:06:27.920 --> 00:06:29.920 I would guess north of fifty sixty percent. 112 00:06:31.160 --> 00:06:34.480 And of course there are people who, you know, professional 113 00:06:34.519 --> 00:06:40.040 athletes can't work from home. People in hospitals, nurses and 114 00:06:40.079 --> 00:06:43.240 doctors and surgeons, they can't work from home. So what 115 00:06:43.279 --> 00:06:46.360 do you think the new balance will eventually settle at. 116 00:06:47.079 --> 00:06:49.639 It's not going to be ninety five percent from home 117 00:06:49.680 --> 00:06:51.600 if that's what it was at the height of COVID. 118 00:06:52.079 --> 00:06:55.160 Where do you see it settling at, you know, fifty 119 00:06:55.199 --> 00:06:56.439 to fifty What do you think? 120 00:06:57.639 --> 00:07:01.920 I believe what I see remote work as is almost 121 00:07:01.959 --> 00:07:05.759 an extension of technology. So what I believe is people 122 00:07:05.800 --> 00:07:09.879 will start to look for cultures within companies that accept 123 00:07:09.959 --> 00:07:12.759 some level of remote work, right because that will that 124 00:07:12.800 --> 00:07:16.920 will mean the company is a modernized, more forward thinking company. 125 00:07:17.439 --> 00:07:20.959 And then the real problem with remote work is as 126 00:07:20.959 --> 00:07:25.120 it gets as remote work catches on those companies that 127 00:07:25.160 --> 00:07:29.040 refuse to go remote work, they're they're they're hiring pool 128 00:07:29.079 --> 00:07:32.480 gets smaller and smaller and smaller because those folks say 129 00:07:32.480 --> 00:07:35.519 in the Boston area that they can find a job 130 00:07:35.600 --> 00:07:38.319 anywhere in the US, and then the companies looking for 131 00:07:38.680 --> 00:07:41.279 those employees to come in they have less and less 132 00:07:41.319 --> 00:07:45.240 the less to choose from and allows them. This gives 133 00:07:45.240 --> 00:07:48.319 companies larger recruiting pools as well. 134 00:07:49.000 --> 00:07:52.519 Interesting, very interesting, So give me your number. Let us 135 00:07:52.519 --> 00:07:56.720 assume that this settles down. I assume at some point, 136 00:07:57.079 --> 00:08:00.639 depending upon circumstances, these percentages just can all change a 137 00:08:00.639 --> 00:08:02.959 little bit. But where do you think it's going to settle. 138 00:08:03.000 --> 00:08:05.720 Do you think it's going to be forty percent remote 139 00:08:06.040 --> 00:08:08.279 or more? You know, five years out? 140 00:08:09.399 --> 00:08:11.319 I think I think in the next five to ten 141 00:08:11.360 --> 00:08:13.680 years you could see a workforce that's somewhere to be 142 00:08:13.680 --> 00:08:17.519 between fifty to sixty percent remote, especially if you remove 143 00:08:17.920 --> 00:08:20.800 all of the obvious jobs, right, you know, construction framers, 144 00:08:21.079 --> 00:08:23.120 those working on the highways. If you remove out all 145 00:08:23.160 --> 00:08:25.759 those jobs, I think you could see numbers and even 146 00:08:25.839 --> 00:08:31.560 higher upwards than to fifty sixty seventy percent with remote work. 147 00:08:32.440 --> 00:08:36.799 All right, well, interesting, very interesting analysis. I enjoyed this 148 00:08:36.879 --> 00:08:40.039 conversation because the best part about it, I say, it's 149 00:08:40.080 --> 00:08:42.080 made me think, and it probably has made most of 150 00:08:42.120 --> 00:08:45.559 our audience think. So Clark, thanks for your input. Your 151 00:08:45.559 --> 00:08:49.519 company is O'Connor company, where you're located everywhere? 152 00:08:50.440 --> 00:08:53.320 Yes, sir, we got work going on the coast, but 153 00:08:53.320 --> 00:08:57.120 we are headquartered in Pinehurst, North Carolina and the national 154 00:08:57.159 --> 00:08:58.039 General contractor. 155 00:08:59.080 --> 00:09:02.080 Nice part of the country. Clark, appreciate your time talking 156 00:09:02.120 --> 00:09:04.159 to everybody up here in New England. Thank you, and 157 00:09:04.279 --> 00:09:07.320 perhaps we'll check in with you a few months from 158 00:09:07.360 --> 00:09:09.639 now and see what the trend is. Thank you so much. 159 00:09:10.399 --> 00:09:11.559 Thanks Dan, have a good one. 160 00:09:12.080 --> 00:09:14.399 You're very welcome. When we get back, we're going to 161 00:09:14.440 --> 00:09:18.080 talk about those Twitter outages. I believe that there were 162 00:09:18.159 --> 00:09:21.679 three that attributed to a massive cyber attack. We're going 163 00:09:21.759 --> 00:09:25.639 to talk with the vice president of Global Cyber Advocacy, 164 00:09:25.639 --> 00:09:29.600 a worldwide technology and expert in information security risk. Her 165 00:09:29.679 --> 00:09:32.720 name is Kate Keen, and we will talk with her 166 00:09:32.720 --> 00:09:35.440 and maybe get some idea if we know where that 167 00:09:35.519 --> 00:09:39.519 cyber attack came from. My name's Dan Ray. This is Nightside. 168 00:09:39.600 --> 00:09:42.279 You're listening to WBZ in Boston ten thirty or on 169 00:09:42.320 --> 00:09:46.399 your AM dial. We have Boston's news radio. 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We'll be back on Nightside 178 00:10:11.960 --> 00:10:12.519 right after this. 179 00:10:13.360 --> 00:10:16.559 Now back to Dan Ray live from the Window World 180 00:10:16.639 --> 00:10:19.799 Nightside Studios on WBZ News Radio. 181 00:10:21.039 --> 00:10:23.679 Well, for those of you who followed these sorts of things, 182 00:10:23.960 --> 00:10:26.759 Twitter had some bumps in the road earlier this week. 183 00:10:27.080 --> 00:10:30.279 Apparently they were subjected to a massive cyber attack, and 184 00:10:30.320 --> 00:10:34.759 I think they had outages three times. I know a 185 00:10:34.840 --> 00:10:36.919 little bit about it, but I'll tell you Kate Keen 186 00:10:37.039 --> 00:10:38.960 knows a lot about it. She's a vice president of 187 00:10:39.000 --> 00:10:43.279 Global cyber Advocacy in Worldwide Technology and expert and information 188 00:10:43.399 --> 00:10:46.399 security risk Kate Keen, Welcome to Nightside in Boston. 189 00:10:46.399 --> 00:10:48.120 How are you hey? 190 00:10:48.200 --> 00:10:51.120 Good, Thanks for having me, Thank you very much. 191 00:10:51.159 --> 00:10:58.399 So what's going on here? Twitter? Worldwide phenomenon? It wasn't 192 00:10:58.519 --> 00:11:00.840 taken down, but it was inter up to what three 193 00:11:00.919 --> 00:11:02.120 times earlier this week? 194 00:11:03.279 --> 00:11:06.039 It's gone up and down a couple of times, three 195 00:11:06.200 --> 00:11:10.279 that were documented as larger outages. But they've been stating 196 00:11:10.320 --> 00:11:12.919 that they've been under attack for most of this week. 197 00:11:13.200 --> 00:11:16.279 What's going on is called a DDoS attack, which stands 198 00:11:16.320 --> 00:11:19.759 for distributed denial of service attack, And basically, it's a 199 00:11:19.759 --> 00:11:23.559 bad guy that overwhelms a website or a network, flooding 200 00:11:23.559 --> 00:11:26.399 a lot of Internet traffic at it, which prevents users, 201 00:11:26.519 --> 00:11:29.440 legitimate users like the people that want to use extra Twitter, 202 00:11:29.919 --> 00:11:32.159 from accessing the service. So that's what's going on. 203 00:11:32.840 --> 00:11:38.840 So how can anyone or any group so massively overwhelm 204 00:11:39.080 --> 00:11:43.120 something like Twitter, which Micheur has I assume has such 205 00:11:43.279 --> 00:11:48.320 bandwidth it would be virtually impossible to overwhelm it. I 206 00:11:48.360 --> 00:11:51.559 mean it's like, I don't know, you know, it's like 207 00:11:51.600 --> 00:11:54.759 the difference. You know, Twitter's a fire hose, and how 208 00:11:54.799 --> 00:11:58.159 do you stop a fire hose unless you always got it, 209 00:11:58.279 --> 00:12:02.480 you always have a fire hose. I mean, uh, you're. 210 00:12:02.360 --> 00:12:05.440 Kind of right here. Well I'll talk about who in 211 00:12:05.480 --> 00:12:07.480 a second, but you're right. It kind of is like 212 00:12:07.519 --> 00:12:09.320 thinking about a fire hose and a fire hose. And 213 00:12:09.320 --> 00:12:11.159 remember when you were a little kid, you switch your 214 00:12:11.159 --> 00:12:12.840 finger in the fire hose and you know, in the 215 00:12:12.840 --> 00:12:14.799 hose and then try and back it up exactly. 216 00:12:15.200 --> 00:12:15.919 So what we're. 217 00:12:15.720 --> 00:12:23.120 Dealing with here is what it kid. It was fun though, 218 00:12:23.159 --> 00:12:24.759 and then you were drinking from hoses too. I don't 219 00:12:24.799 --> 00:12:27.879 think that's allowed anymore these days. But what a d 220 00:12:28.039 --> 00:12:31.919 DOS attack is is basically, if you can imagine, it's 221 00:12:32.000 --> 00:12:34.399 it's it's caused by what are called botnets, and so 222 00:12:34.480 --> 00:12:39.000 basically it's a bunch of infected machines that are directing traffic. 223 00:12:39.279 --> 00:12:42.240 They're all infected by a single source, and then they're 224 00:12:42.240 --> 00:12:45.440 all all of those machines. Traffic is directed at the 225 00:12:45.480 --> 00:12:48.120 website or the organization, like we're seeing with Twitter. So 226 00:12:48.600 --> 00:12:50.600 if you can imagine, you hear about these things of 227 00:12:50.639 --> 00:12:52.720 your you know, machine gets infected and then it's being 228 00:12:52.799 --> 00:12:55.519 used by somebody else. Well congrats, that's the kind of 229 00:12:55.559 --> 00:12:58.200 attack we're dealing with. So what we're looking at is 230 00:12:58.200 --> 00:13:02.159 that some single source or some group basically infected you know, 231 00:13:02.279 --> 00:13:05.240 up to millions of different machines and they're directing parts 232 00:13:05.279 --> 00:13:07.639 of the traffic at Twitter. So it's like an army 233 00:13:08.039 --> 00:13:10.679 of corrupted machines attacking all at the same time. 234 00:13:11.759 --> 00:13:14.679 So how do they defend against that. I mean, even 235 00:13:14.720 --> 00:13:17.679 if they get Twitter back up running, I assume they 236 00:13:17.679 --> 00:13:21.919 could activate their army of infected machines and and get 237 00:13:21.919 --> 00:13:23.120 them going later in the day. 238 00:13:24.399 --> 00:13:27.960 Well, there's a lot of different ways to just to 239 00:13:27.960 --> 00:13:30.960 to basically protect against it. One is, as soon as 240 00:13:30.960 --> 00:13:33.039 you know the IP addressed or that you know area 241 00:13:33.080 --> 00:13:35.360 that the traffic is coming from, you can put up 242 00:13:35.360 --> 00:13:38.159 defenses to stop it or mitigate it or not allow 243 00:13:38.200 --> 00:13:40.879 it to get to your website. That's one thing. Two 244 00:13:41.000 --> 00:13:45.200 is to understand, you know, from organization standpoint, what type 245 00:13:45.200 --> 00:13:48.600 of actors, thread actors, whether they be activists, whether they 246 00:13:48.679 --> 00:13:50.720 which are you know, groups like we hear about like 247 00:13:50.759 --> 00:13:54.720 anonymous who are trying to make a social stance, you know, 248 00:13:54.720 --> 00:13:58.080 and that's why they're hacking criminal groups, nation states or 249 00:13:58.120 --> 00:14:00.960 just individuals. Individual thread actors that have something that they're 250 00:14:01.039 --> 00:14:05.480 upset about. Understand who is in you know, finding your 251 00:14:05.720 --> 00:14:08.919 company appealing from a cyber attack perspective, and then you 252 00:14:09.000 --> 00:14:12.480 need to consistently look at your cyber resilience. So what 253 00:14:12.559 --> 00:14:15.759 does your operational plans look like. We're all dependent on technology. 254 00:14:15.799 --> 00:14:18.279 We make plans for everything else in our life. So 255 00:14:18.399 --> 00:14:21.200 making sure that we understand what tech is really important 256 00:14:21.240 --> 00:14:23.960 in your business, What are your critical business functions and 257 00:14:24.000 --> 00:14:27.039 do you have the right safeguards to protect them against 258 00:14:27.039 --> 00:14:29.840 cyber attack. The issue with this attack is, you know 259 00:14:29.919 --> 00:14:32.720 there's been now three different attributions. I'm not sure we'll 260 00:14:32.720 --> 00:14:36.240 ever figure out exactly who. You know, there's been released 261 00:14:36.240 --> 00:14:38.480 out that it was Nation State and that some of 262 00:14:38.480 --> 00:14:42.320 the IP addresses are looking at Ukraine. That is is 263 00:14:42.799 --> 00:14:46.440 I think a bit questionable. We also have had anonymous 264 00:14:46.720 --> 00:14:50.120 take responsibility saying it's part of something called Operation Dreadnought. 265 00:14:50.480 --> 00:14:53.000 And then originally we actually had a different group come 266 00:14:53.039 --> 00:14:58.519 forward called dark Storm, and they are out of Palestine. 267 00:14:58.559 --> 00:15:02.840 They are actually a pro pal Stadian group that's claimed responsibility. 268 00:15:03.279 --> 00:15:05.840 So because it's so high profile, we've got a lot 269 00:15:05.879 --> 00:15:09.399 of people either pointing fingers or raising hands and it's 270 00:15:09.399 --> 00:15:10.840 going to take a while for us to sort this 271 00:15:10.879 --> 00:15:11.759 one out. 272 00:15:12.519 --> 00:15:15.159 Will we eventually be able to figure it out? Or 273 00:15:15.200 --> 00:15:17.679 will this sort of drift into our memory and a 274 00:15:17.720 --> 00:15:20.360 month from now we'll just kind of throw up our 275 00:15:20.360 --> 00:15:23.080 hands and say we have no idea where it came from. 276 00:15:23.720 --> 00:15:26.360 Now we will? I mean, So the good news is 277 00:15:26.360 --> 00:15:28.399 is that, you know the world of cyber from a 278 00:15:28.399 --> 00:15:32.879 forensics standpoint is incredibly sophisticated. But it's hard those first 279 00:15:32.879 --> 00:15:35.159 couple of days, and especially you know, as we're still 280 00:15:35.159 --> 00:15:37.600 trying to clean up and you know, filter traffic and 281 00:15:37.759 --> 00:15:41.200 have Twitter get on the other side, before you know, 282 00:15:41.320 --> 00:15:43.679 we can actually take a look at the forensics, understand 283 00:15:43.679 --> 00:15:46.960 the IP addresses and trace back. It can sometimes takes 284 00:15:46.960 --> 00:15:49.759 months or even years to do proper attribution, but we'll 285 00:15:49.759 --> 00:15:51.600 get it done and then we'll figure out exactly where 286 00:15:51.639 --> 00:15:52.200 it came from. 287 00:15:52.879 --> 00:15:56.519 Now, as a as someone who follows this and certainly 288 00:15:56.679 --> 00:15:59.200 is on Twitter and relies a little bit on Twitter, 289 00:16:00.080 --> 00:16:03.200 would make the assumption, with all of the controversies swirling 290 00:16:03.240 --> 00:16:06.600 around Elon Musk, that that would be my first set 291 00:16:06.639 --> 00:16:09.440 of suspects that I would be looking at. I don't 292 00:16:09.480 --> 00:16:12.080 think it would be the you know, sisters of Maria 293 00:16:12.320 --> 00:16:15.519 and Joseph who are sitting in a convent somewhere, you know, 294 00:16:15.600 --> 00:16:18.759 doing this. I'm thinking it's someone who really wants to 295 00:16:18.799 --> 00:16:24.679 go after Elon Musk. Is that a false suspicion or 296 00:16:24.679 --> 00:16:27.279 do you think there might be some legitimacy to that thought. 297 00:16:28.399 --> 00:16:29.840 I think there is some legitimacy. 298 00:16:29.879 --> 00:16:32.159 Like I said, you know, we deal with really four 299 00:16:32.200 --> 00:16:35.320 types of threat actors and the activists, which are the 300 00:16:35.360 --> 00:16:37.440 groups that are looking to make some type of statement, 301 00:16:37.519 --> 00:16:41.279 whether it's politically motivated or socially motivated. You know, this 302 00:16:41.440 --> 00:16:44.159 attack as it's because, as I said, it was what's 303 00:16:44.200 --> 00:16:46.840 called a deed OUs or denial of service attack. They 304 00:16:46.840 --> 00:16:50.320 weren't asking for money, it wasn't ransomware, they weren't going 305 00:16:50.360 --> 00:16:53.320 after bitcoin. It was to make a statement that, you know, 306 00:16:53.360 --> 00:16:56.159 they were able to disrupt something as large and as 307 00:16:56.159 --> 00:16:59.919 important from a social media perspective as Twitter. So whenever 308 00:17:00.080 --> 00:17:02.639 you've got an organization that's dealing with high profile, high 309 00:17:02.639 --> 00:17:05.240 asset individuals, you know, you have to kind of think 310 00:17:05.279 --> 00:17:07.799 about the reputational attacks as well as the ones that 311 00:17:07.839 --> 00:17:10.119 are going to try and hurt your organization from an 312 00:17:10.160 --> 00:17:12.000 operational or financial perspective. 313 00:17:13.960 --> 00:17:17.920 Last question, do we have the federal government, our federal 314 00:17:17.960 --> 00:17:22.039 government looking at this, because obviously what could be done 315 00:17:22.079 --> 00:17:26.119 to Twitter could also be done to our more important, 316 00:17:26.279 --> 00:17:28.079 arguably defense systems. 317 00:17:29.599 --> 00:17:32.119 We absolutely do. I mean, so the good news is 318 00:17:32.359 --> 00:17:34.640 that I don't know a government agency at this point 319 00:17:34.680 --> 00:17:37.359 that doesn't have, you know, some type of a cyber 320 00:17:37.440 --> 00:17:41.559 command or cyber defense. We have SISA, we have the NSA, FBI, 321 00:17:42.000 --> 00:17:45.559 the Office of National Cyber the own CD, the organization 322 00:17:45.640 --> 00:17:47.880 that I work with as well, which is National Technology 323 00:17:47.880 --> 00:17:51.000 Security Coalition, which is kind of the body of sisas 324 00:17:51.039 --> 00:17:55.319 into Washington. Everybody has a part to play, and you 325 00:17:55.359 --> 00:17:58.319 know everyone is seeing right now that public private information 326 00:17:58.440 --> 00:18:01.839 sharing helping under what are the threats out there? What 327 00:18:01.920 --> 00:18:05.720 are considered the critical vulnerabilities, How do we collaborate to 328 00:18:05.839 --> 00:18:09.599 understand what's coming, and how we defend? Should we get 329 00:18:09.640 --> 00:18:12.960 more proactive and offensive in our defenses. These are all 330 00:18:13.000 --> 00:18:15.119 things that we focus and work on. But the good 331 00:18:15.119 --> 00:18:17.440 news is there's a lot of really amazing people in 332 00:18:17.559 --> 00:18:18.640 Washington working through this. 333 00:18:19.960 --> 00:18:24.720 Well. Thank you very much, Kate. Fascinating information. You obviously 334 00:18:24.880 --> 00:18:27.599 know a thousand times more about this than I do, 335 00:18:27.720 --> 00:18:29.680 but I have learned a little bit in this interview, 336 00:18:29.720 --> 00:18:31.920 and I hope my audience says as well. Thank you. 337 00:18:32.480 --> 00:18:35.880 Love to have you back at some point anytime. Would 338 00:18:35.920 --> 00:18:37.640 love to be back. Thanks very much for the time. 339 00:18:38.599 --> 00:18:41.799 You're very welcome, Kate Keen every vice president of Global 340 00:18:42.039 --> 00:18:46.839 Cyber Advocacy. Man, I'll tell you it's a brave new 341 00:18:46.839 --> 00:18:49.759 world out there, folks. Elders Huxley had it right. We'll 342 00:18:49.759 --> 00:18:52.480 be back on night's side right after the news at 343 00:18:52.480 --> 00:18:54.000 the bottom of the hour. We're going to talk with 344 00:18:54.680 --> 00:18:58.480 Arthur Erickson. He's a CEO of a company called Hilo 345 00:18:59.000 --> 00:19:01.680 h yo. We're going to talk about how much of 346 00:19:01.720 --> 00:19:06.759 an impact President Trump's tariffs and his proposed tariffs might 347 00:19:06.839 --> 00:19:11.400 have on American farmers, a very important sector of our economy. 348 00:19:11.400 --> 00:19:12.640 Back on Nightside right. 349 00:19:12.519 --> 00:19:17.440 After this, you're on Nightside with Dan Ray on WBZ, 350 00:19:17.839 --> 00:19:19.039 Boston's news radio. 351 00:19:20.720 --> 00:19:24.599 All right, I want to welcome to the show Arthur Erickson. 352 00:19:24.680 --> 00:19:27.440 He's the CEO of a company called Heilio. I hope 353 00:19:27.440 --> 00:19:30.160 I pronounced that right, h y l Io? Is that 354 00:19:30.160 --> 00:19:33.440 close to the correct pronunciation, Arthur Erickson? I got fined. 355 00:19:33.480 --> 00:19:34.440 But is it heili? 356 00:19:34.519 --> 00:19:38.079 Oh, it's it's Helio, but close enough. I don't blame you. 357 00:19:38.119 --> 00:19:41.039 It looks like it's spelled Hilio. So that's perfectly normal 358 00:19:41.279 --> 00:19:42.240 way to pronounce it. 359 00:19:42.920 --> 00:19:46.640 Yeah, no, I totally get that. So what is Helio? 360 00:19:47.200 --> 00:19:49.039 But what's the company all about? 361 00:19:50.200 --> 00:19:54.839 In a nutshell, we design, build, and then sell drones 362 00:19:55.119 --> 00:20:00.160 or on man aerial systems us that automate precision crop inputs. Know, 363 00:20:01.200 --> 00:20:04.079 anything you could imagine a tractor or a helicopter or 364 00:20:04.079 --> 00:20:08.519 an air airplane doing our zones could typically do better, faster, safer, 365 00:20:08.559 --> 00:20:09.039 and cheaper. 366 00:20:10.480 --> 00:20:14.920 Well that's that's quite an idea. So we're going to 367 00:20:14.960 --> 00:20:17.240 talk about the Trump tariffs and how it's going to 368 00:20:17.680 --> 00:20:22.160 hurt American farmers. I think all of us understand farming, 369 00:20:22.599 --> 00:20:24.920 and none of us we're from New England, I mean, 370 00:20:25.039 --> 00:20:27.039 very few of us are involved in it. But we 371 00:20:27.200 --> 00:20:31.400 understand that you have to plan and play in and 372 00:20:31.440 --> 00:20:35.279 then harvest, and then you've got to get product to market, 373 00:20:35.440 --> 00:20:38.519 which is difficult to do, particularly with the variables of weather. 374 00:20:39.119 --> 00:20:42.680 Now we add another layer of variability, and that is 375 00:20:43.200 --> 00:20:47.519 the tariffs. And just described here as a gut punch 376 00:20:47.640 --> 00:20:51.480 to potential gut punch to farmers, Explain to us, you know, 377 00:20:51.680 --> 00:20:55.000 in terms that all of my audience will understand how 378 00:20:55.079 --> 00:20:59.000 that might adversely affect the farming community, which, of course is, 379 00:20:59.440 --> 00:21:03.640 in my opinion onion, the backbone of America. 380 00:21:03.799 --> 00:21:06.160 Sure, yeah, and that's a very good way to put it. 381 00:21:06.160 --> 00:21:10.799 It's another variable, right, And I'm not an economist, nor 382 00:21:10.839 --> 00:21:13.640 do I have a crystal ball, and farmers don't have 383 00:21:13.640 --> 00:21:17.599 crystal balls either, So it is a big unknown as 384 00:21:17.599 --> 00:21:20.319 to just how much it's going to affect them. But 385 00:21:20.440 --> 00:21:23.920 I think generally, as we've seen in the past, we 386 00:21:24.000 --> 00:21:30.240 can reasonably expect them to have some cost increases on 387 00:21:30.519 --> 00:21:33.359 both things like fertilizers and other chemicals that use to 388 00:21:33.400 --> 00:21:36.160 treat their crops. And then also they're going to have 389 00:21:36.319 --> 00:21:39.319 cost increases on their farm equipment, so that's buying new 390 00:21:39.680 --> 00:21:42.680 equipment and also just spare and repair parts for their 391 00:21:42.720 --> 00:21:46.079 existing equipment, because there are steel and aluminum and other 392 00:21:46.119 --> 00:21:49.400 material tariffs that would affect the physical machines that they utilize. 393 00:21:49.799 --> 00:21:53.000 So I think it's pretty safe to say directionally, they're 394 00:21:53.000 --> 00:21:57.400 going to see increased operational costs and capital costs, which 395 00:21:57.440 --> 00:22:00.279 are of course going to tighten their margins and it's 396 00:22:00.279 --> 00:22:05.519 going to be tougher to profit frankly, and so that's 397 00:22:05.559 --> 00:22:08.720 never something that a farmer wants to hear. But of 398 00:22:08.759 --> 00:22:11.799 course most farmers, especially those that are a bit older, 399 00:22:12.160 --> 00:22:14.799 are used to cycles like this, the ebbs and flows 400 00:22:14.799 --> 00:22:17.680 and the ups and downs of the economy, but also 401 00:22:17.799 --> 00:22:19.839