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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the deep dive. We're here to unpack the

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<v Speaker 1>most vital insights from a stack of sources. Just for you.

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<v Speaker 1>Think about the digital world we live in every single day.

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<v Speaker 1>It's huge, complex, It feels like a fortress sometimes right,

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<v Speaker 1>but well, sometimes a door just swings open if you

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<v Speaker 1>know where to look. That is, today we're stepping through

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<v Speaker 1>one of those doors. We're exploring the art and maybe

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<v Speaker 1>the science of ethical hacking, or the more formal term

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<v Speaker 1>penetration testing.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and this deep dive it's really your shortcut to

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<v Speaker 2>understanding this whole fascinating field. We're pulling our insights today

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<v Speaker 2>from a really practical guide, Penetration Testing step by step Guide,

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<v Speaker 2>the second edition by Roddy Chataub. And it's not just theory,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, it's very hands on. It explores the actual

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<v Speaker 2>techniques the tools that hackers use, but for good reasons

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<v Speaker 2>for defense exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>So our goal for you today it's pretty simple. We

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<v Speaker 1>want you to walk away understanding not just what system

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<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities are or even how they get attacked, but crucially

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<v Speaker 1>how to defend against them. So, whether you're maybe new

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<v Speaker 1>to information security, or perhaps you're a manager who needs

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<v Speaker 1>to get a handle on modern threats. This deep dive,

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<v Speaker 1>it's really designed to give you those aha moments, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, without just drowning you in information.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, and before we jump right in, there's a really

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<v Speaker 2>critical point we need to make everything we talk about today,

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<v Speaker 2>it's all framed within the ethics of being a white

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<v Speaker 2>hat hacker, an ethical hacker. All these techniques they're meant

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<v Speaker 2>for authorized testing. You need explicit permission. The goal is

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<v Speaker 2>always to find vulnerabilities and report them, not for anything

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<v Speaker 2>malicious or illegal. It's really about building stronger defenses because

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<v Speaker 2>you understand.

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<v Speaker 1>The offense right makes sense. So, okay, we've had a

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<v Speaker 1>little glimpse into this digital underworld. Let's get to the

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<v Speaker 1>heart of it. How do the good guys actually fight back?

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<v Speaker 1>What is penetration testing really and how does this proactive

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<v Speaker 1>defense work for businesses?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, think of it like this penetration testing. It's like

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<v Speaker 2>hiring a professional burglar to test your home security system. Seriously,

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<v Speaker 2>you give them permission right to try and break into

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<v Speaker 2>your networks, your systems, your applications, specifically to find those

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<v Speaker 2>weak spots, the vulnerabilities that a malicious hacker, a black

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<v Speaker 2>hat might use to get in and cause real damage.

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<v Speaker 2>It's proactive. You're trying to find those holes and patch

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<v Speaker 2>them before the bad guys do beat them to the punch.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, and why is this so critical for businesses these days?

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<v Speaker 1>Is it just, you know, a good practice or is

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<v Speaker 1>there something more driving it?

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, it's way beyond just a good idea. Often it's

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<v Speaker 2>actually a necessity or requirement. Many businesses, especially if they

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<v Speaker 2>handle payments, they're requiring to do regular pen tests to

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<v Speaker 2>meet security standards like the Payment Card Industry Data Security

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<v Speaker 2>Standard PCIDSS that requires a yearly pen test for certification.

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<v Speaker 2>And because of things like that, the demand for skilled

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<v Speaker 2>pen testers is just huge, it's booming. So understanding this

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<v Speaker 2>stuff is really valuable.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So who's this deep dive really for them? Who

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<v Speaker 1>benefits most from digging into this book's insights with us?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, I think it's perfect for anyone who wants to

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<v Speaker 2>understand the mechanic of ethical hacking. Maybe you're just starting

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<v Speaker 2>out in cybersecurity, or maybe you're an IT manager an

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<v Speaker 2>INFOSEC manager, and you need practical insights. You want to

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<v Speaker 2>understand the threats, the tools attackers use, and importantly, the

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<v Speaker 2>protective measures you need. To put in place. Is designed

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<v Speaker 2>to be really practical, you know, not get bogged down

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<v Speaker 2>in just academic theory.

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<v Speaker 1>Gotcha, and the book we're using. It breaks the whole

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<v Speaker 1>process down into five core phases for a pen test.

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<v Speaker 1>Can you give us a quick roadmap?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a pretty logical flow. Think of it like steps. First,

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<v Speaker 2>there's reconnaissance that's just gathering info about your target, like

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<v Speaker 2>detective work, finding out everything you can. Then comes scanning.

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<v Speaker 2>That's when you actively probe the target looking for actual vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>After that, the goal is gaining access, the actual exploitation part,

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<v Speaker 2>getting in. Once you're in, it's about maintaining access, making

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<v Speaker 2>sure you can stay in or get back in later,

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<v Speaker 2>and finally covering tracks, hiding the evidence that you were

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<v Speaker 2>ever there.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, reconnaissance, scanning, gaining access, maining covering tracks. Got it.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's dive into the first big area then, Wi Fi vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 1>Wireless is huge, right, It's often that first digital connection

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<v Speaker 1>when you walk into a place.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, absolutely critical because a compromised Wi Fi network that

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<v Speaker 2>isn't just a small problem. It puts your entire internal

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<v Speaker 2>network at risk. For companies, insecure Wi Fi is often Honestly,

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<v Speaker 2>the path of least resistance for an attacker makes it

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<v Speaker 2>a prime target.

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<v Speaker 1>And thinking about vulnerabilities, I remember WEP encryption from wayback.

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<v Speaker 1>Is that still a thing we need to worry about?

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<v Speaker 1>It seems ancient.

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<v Speaker 2>We'd be surprised WEP is old. It is weak, but yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>you still find it out there. Sometimes it uses this

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<v Speaker 2>algorithm RC four. And here's the problem. Each packet is

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<v Speaker 2>encrypted using a key stream generated partly by something called

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<v Speaker 2>an initializing factor or five E. It's only twenty four

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<v Speaker 2>bits long. And the real killer is this IV is

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<v Speaker 2>sent in plain text right there in the packet, plaintext.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that sounds like a huge red flag immediately, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>the IV is just out there. How to attackers actual

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<v Speaker 1>use that flaw? How do they crack the key?

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<v Speaker 2>Right? That's the fundamental flaw Because that twenty four bit

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<v Speaker 2>IV is so short, and it's sent unencrypted, it has

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<v Speaker 2>to repeat eventually, especially on a busy network. So a

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<v Speaker 2>tool like air cracking it doesn't even need the password itself.

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<v Speaker 2>It just listens. It collects enough of these packets, enough

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<v Speaker 2>of these repeating ivs, and by doing statistical analysis on

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<v Speaker 2>how those ivs repeat, it can literally figure out the

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<v Speaker 2>entire WEP key. It's not magic, just math exploiting that weakness.

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<v Speaker 2>It can crack it surprisingly quickly, and attackers can even

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<v Speaker 2>speed it up using things like a fake authentication procedure

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<v Speaker 2>to inject packets.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that makes total sense. Why WEP is considered broken. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so then WPA and WPA two came along to fix

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<v Speaker 1>all that. They sound much more secure, unique keys, this

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<v Speaker 1>four way handshake. But you know in hacking there's always

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<v Speaker 1>a butt, isn't There are there still ways attackers get

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<v Speaker 1>around WPA two.

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<v Speaker 2>You hit it right on the head. There's always a butt.

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<v Speaker 2>WPA and WPA two definitely a massive improvement over WEP,

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<v Speaker 2>fix that exposed IVP problem. They use unique temporary keys

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<v Speaker 2>for every packet and this robust four way handshake. Think

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<v Speaker 2>of the handshake like a secret conversation. Your device and

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<v Speaker 2>the router securely agree on unique keys. There's the pairwise

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<v Speaker 2>master key, the PMK, and the paralyzed transient KEYPTK. They're

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<v Speaker 2>derived from your WiFi password, the pre shared key or PSK.

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<v Speaker 2>It means the encryption is constantly changing.

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<v Speaker 1>Much harder to crack, okay, much harder, but not impossible.

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<v Speaker 1>So even with those upgrades, how do attackers actually bypass

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<v Speaker 1>WPA two. What are the main approaches?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, still not impossible. There are really two main ways

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<v Speaker 2>attackers go after w POPA two. First, exploiting the WPS

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<v Speaker 2>feature Wi Fi protected setup. Remember that button on routers

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<v Speaker 2>or at the PN. It was meant for convenience, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>easily connecting printers and stuff, but it turned into a

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<v Speaker 2>huge security hole. That eight digit PN. A tool called

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<v Speaker 2>Reaver can basically brute force it. It attacks it in two halves,

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<v Speaker 2>the first four digits, then the next four. So even

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<v Speaker 2>with a super complex WPA two password, Reaver can often

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<v Speaker 2>crack that eight digit PN in maybe ten hours or so.

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<v Speaker 2>Get your password?

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<v Speaker 1>Wow? Okay, so a convenience feature became a major vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 1>What's the second method?

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<v Speaker 2>Then? The second way involves capturing that four way handshake directly.

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<v Speaker 2>An attacker can actually force the connected device like your laptop,

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<v Speaker 2>to disconnect from the Wi Fi. It's called a de

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<v Speaker 2>authentication attack. Then, when your laptop automatically tries to reconnect,

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<v Speaker 2>that four way handshake happens again. The attacker listens and

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<v Speaker 2>captures it. Once they have that captured handshake, they use

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<v Speaker 2>tools like air cracking again, but this time they need

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<v Speaker 2>a huge list of possible passwords, a word list. They

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<v Speaker 2>might generate one with a tool like crunch, or download

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<v Speaker 2>massive lists from places like seek lists online. Then they

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<v Speaker 2>just try every password in the list against the handshake.

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<v Speaker 2>If your password is in that list, they've got it.

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<v Speaker 2>If not, this method.

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<v Speaker 1>Fails, right the dictionary attack. That makes sense. Okay, that

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<v Speaker 1>brings us to another really sneaky tactic, one that plays

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<v Speaker 1>on our desire for free stuff. Fake access points classic lure,

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<v Speaker 1>isn't it?

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<v Speaker 2>Oh? Absolutely classic and effective. Hackers set up fake Wi

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<v Speaker 2>Fi hotspots often give them ten names like free coffee

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<v Speaker 2>shop WiFi or airport guest, especially in public places. You

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<v Speaker 2>connect thinking it's legitimate, but now all your unencrypted traffic

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<v Speaker 2>it's flowing right through the attacker's computer. They can see

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<v Speaker 2>websites you visit, maybe present fake logging pages to seal

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<v Speaker 2>your passwords, re emails if they're not encrypted, and tools

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<v Speaker 2>like WiFi Pumpkin three makes setting these up surprisingly easy

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<v Speaker 2>for an attacker.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So, hearing all this, what's the bottom line for

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<v Speaker 1>securing our own wireless networks? What are the absolute must dos?

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<v Speaker 2>The takeaways are pretty clear. Yeah. First, never ever use

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<v Speaker 2>wp just don't. It's completely broken. Second, always use WPA

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<v Speaker 2>two and use a really strong complex password, think long passphrase,

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<v Speaker 2>mix of uppercase, lowercase symbols. Numbers don't make it easy

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<v Speaker 2>to guess. For businesses, integrating Wi Fi access with something

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<v Speaker 2>like active directory is great. Avoids shared passwords, and for

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<v Speaker 2>everyone that WPS feature we talked about, if your router

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<v Speaker 2>has it, disable it, turn it off. That convenience just

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<v Speaker 2>isn't worth the security.

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<v Speaker 1>Risk disabled WPS got it? Okay? So let's say a

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<v Speaker 1>hacker has gotten onto the network, maybe through weak Wi Fi.

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<v Speaker 1>What's next? Our next deep dive is into post connection attacks,

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<v Speaker 1>particularly this man in the middle stuff. Once they have

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<v Speaker 1>that foothold, what's the first move right?

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<v Speaker 2>Once they're inside, The very next step is discovery, like

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<v Speaker 2>mapping out the territory. You need to figure out what

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<v Speaker 2>else is on this network, what other devices are connected,

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<v Speaker 2>what are their IP addresses. Tools like net discover or

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<v Speaker 2>ARP scan are good for quickly finding other machines. But

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<v Speaker 2>then the real workhorse is en map or its graphical version,

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<v Speaker 2>zen map. N map is incredibly powerful. It scans targets

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<v Speaker 2>and gives you detailed info, open ports, operating systems, what

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<v Speaker 2>services are running that detailed scan. That's really the starting

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<v Speaker 2>point for finding specific exploitable vulnerabilities on those machines, and.

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<v Speaker 1>That leads us right into a man in the middle attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>Then TM sounds kind of spy like, how do you

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<v Speaker 1>define that?

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<v Speaker 2>It pretty much is like spy stuff. A man in

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<v Speaker 2>the middle attack or NATM is when an attacker secretly

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<v Speaker 2>positions themselves between two communicating parties. Imagine you're talking to

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<v Speaker 2>your bank online. The attacker gets in the middle. They

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<v Speaker 2>intercept your messages to the bank and the bank's messages

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<v Speaker 2>back to you. Both sides think they're talking directly, but

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<v Speaker 2>they're actually talking through the attacker. It's like sophisticated eavesdropping,

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<v Speaker 2>but worse because the attacker can potentially change the messages.

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<v Speaker 2>Not just listen, they control the conversation. They might capture logins,

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<v Speaker 2>manipulate transactions. It's really dangerous. Modern encryption like TLS tries

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<v Speaker 2>to stop this, but attackers find ways around it sometimes.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that's pretty scary. What are some common types of

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<v Speaker 1>these my TM attacks?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, the book mentions several key ones, things like ARP spoofing,

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<v Speaker 2>DNS poofing, STP mangling, DHGP, spuefing, ICMP redirection. They all

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<v Speaker 2>work slightly differently to trick network devices.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's dig into ARP spoofing. How does that one exploit

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<v Speaker 1>trust on a network? Why is it so effective?

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<v Speaker 2>Okay? ARP Address resolution protocol. It's fundamental for local networks.

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<v Speaker 2>Basically how your computer finds the physical MC address of

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<v Speaker 2>another when it only knows the IP address, like asking

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<v Speaker 2>who has this IP? The massive problem ARP is built

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<v Speaker 2>on trust. It's incredibly insecure by design. Any computer on

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<v Speaker 2>the network can just accept an ARP reply, even if

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<v Speaker 2>it's fake. So arpspoof exploits this perfectly. It sends out

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<v Speaker 2>fake AIRP messages. It tells your computer, hey, I'm the router,

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<v Speaker 2>and it tells the router, hey I'm your computer. Suddenly,

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<v Speaker 2>all the traffic between you and the router flows through

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<v Speaker 2>the attacker's machine. For this to work seamlessly, the attacker

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<v Speaker 2>needs to enable IP four in on their machine, so

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<v Speaker 2>the traffic just passes through. Once that's set up, tools

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<v Speaker 2>like wireshark running on the attacker's machine can see everything, logins, browsing,

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<v Speaker 2>you name it. If it's unencrypted. It's disturbingly simple. Wow.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, disturbingly simple, is right, just exploiting that basic trust.

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<v Speaker 1>But what if the attacker wants to do more than

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<v Speaker 1>just listen? What if they want to actively mess with

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<v Speaker 1>the traffic. That's where tools like better cap come in. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>What makes it such a powerful network tool?

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly? Better Cap is like a Swiss army knife for

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<v Speaker 2>network attacks, especially my TM. It's incredibly powerful and versatile.

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<v Speaker 2>It lets an attacker manipulate HTTP, HTTPS, sometimes and TCP

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<v Speaker 2>traffic in real time, sniff credentials, inject code, modify pages

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<v Speaker 2>on the fly, for instance, using its arc dot spoof

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<v Speaker 2>module to become the man in the middle and then

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<v Speaker 2>dot sniff to capture data. It can easily grab unencrypted

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<v Speaker 2>HTTP log in, say from a test website, and a

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<v Speaker 2>really powerful feature caplets. These are like scripts for better Cap.

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<v Speaker 2>Automating sequences of commands makes complex attacks much easier to execute.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, but what about ng GTPs. We always here look

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<v Speaker 1>for the lock. HTTPS is secure? How does something like

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<v Speaker 1>SSL stripping try to defeat that?

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<v Speaker 2>Right? HTTPS is much more secure. SSL stripping is a

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<v Speaker 2>technique attackers used to try and downgrade that security. The

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<v Speaker 2>attacker acts as a proxy during the initial connection When

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<v Speaker 2>your browser tries to connect via HTTPS, the attacker intercepts

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<v Speaker 2>it talks HGTPS to the real server, but talks plane

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<v Speaker 2>unencrypted HTTP back to your browser. So you think you

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<v Speaker 2>might be secure, or maybe you don't notice THES is missing,

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<v Speaker 2>but your connection is actually in the clear. But there's

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<v Speaker 2>a crucial defense HSTS HTTP strict transport security. It's a

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<v Speaker 2>header a website sends that tells your browser, Hey, for

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<v Speaker 2>this site, only ever use HTTPS, no exceptions, so that

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<v Speaker 2>parameters like maxage how long the browser should remember this

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<v Speaker 2>rule include subdomains and preload.

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<v Speaker 1>HSTS sounds like a solid defense, but you mentioned dynamic

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<v Speaker 1>versus static HSTS. Does that distinction matter much?

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<v Speaker 2>Oh? It matters hugely for security. Dynamic HSTS is where

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<v Speaker 2>your browser learns about HSTS after the very first time

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<v Speaker 2>it visits the site it gets the header. Then that

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<v Speaker 2>leaves a tiny window on that very first connection where

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<v Speaker 2>an SSL stripping attack could potentially work before the browser

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<v Speaker 2>knows it must use HTPS. Static HSTS closes that gap.

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<v Speaker 2>Websites can submit themselves to be included in a preload

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<v Speaker 2>list that's built right into browsers like Chrome, Firefox, etc.

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<v Speaker 2>So if a site is on that pre load list.

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<v Speaker 2>Your browser already knows it must use HTTPS, even if

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<v Speaker 2>you've never visited it before. That makes us a CEL

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<v Speaker 2>stripping completely and effective. Against those sites the browser just

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<v Speaker 2>won't connect insecurely.

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<v Speaker 1>Got it. Preloading is key and DNS spoofing is another mitmtrick,

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<v Speaker 1>basically lying about website.

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<v Speaker 2>Addresses exactly your computer uses DNS, the domain name system

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<v Speaker 2>to turn website names like www dot Google dot com

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<v Speaker 2>into IP addresses. In DNS spoofing, the ITM attacker runs

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<v Speaker 2>their own fake DNS server on the local network. When

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<v Speaker 2>your computer asks what's the IP for www dot my

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<v Speaker 2>bank dot com, The attacker's fakeserver answers with an IP

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<v Speaker 2>address they control, maybe a phishing site that looks real,

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<v Speaker 2>so you get redirected to the wrong place. But again,

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<v Speaker 2>like s is all stripping, this generally doesn't work against

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<v Speaker 2>sites using HTTPS. With HSTS enabled and preloaded, the browser

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<v Speaker 2>will refuse to connect to a fake HTTP version. You

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<v Speaker 2>can demo this with tools like an apatche webserver for

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<v Speaker 2>the fake site and BETTERCAPS. DNS dot spoof module.

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<v Speaker 1>And BETTERCAP can even inject code like JavaScript into the

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<v Speaker 1>websites you're visiting.

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<v Speaker 2>That's right. If the connection is HTTP or HTT without

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<v Speaker 2>strong hsts, better cap can inject custom JavaScript into the

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<v Speaker 2>pages as they pass through. This is incredibly dangerous. JavaScript

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<v Speaker 2>running in your browser can do a lot of malicious

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<v Speaker 2>things steal cookies, lug keystrokes, redirect you, pop up fake logins,

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<v Speaker 2>all controlled by the attacker.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so, after hearing about ARP spoofing, dnspoofing, SSL stripping,

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<v Speaker 1>how do we actually detect and more importantly, prevent ARP

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<v Speaker 1>poisoning which seems to underpin a lot of this.

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<v Speaker 2>Detecting it tools like wireshark are invaluable. It can spot

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<v Speaker 2>unusual network chatter like an ARP storm tons of AIRP

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<v Speaker 2>requests which might indicate a scan or attack. Wireshot can

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<v Speaker 2>even directly flag potential MITM attacks if it sees duplicate

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<v Speaker 2>IP addresses claiming the same ASC or vice versa. For prevention,

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<v Speaker 2>things like intrusion detection systems or intrusion prevention systems idscs

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<v Speaker 2>are important. Also, modern layer two switches can be configured

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<v Speaker 2>with features like dynamic AARP inspection or the AMSC address

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<v Speaker 2>tracking to block spoofed packets. There are also client side

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<v Speaker 2>tools like ZARP that monitor for suspicious ARP activity. Interestingly,

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<v Speaker 2>while we focus on the bad stuff, airpeacepoofing can be

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<v Speaker 2>used for legitimate reasons, like on public Wi Fi redirecting

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<v Speaker 2>users who haven't logged in yet to a sign up page.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, legitimate uses too, Okay, So moving on. After all

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<v Speaker 1>that scanning and maybe MYTM setup, the real goal for

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<v Speaker 1>an attacker is often gaining access, getting control of devices.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's talk server side attacks first. These are direct assaults,

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<v Speaker 1>right exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Server side attacks target vulnerabilities directly on the server itself.

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<v Speaker 2>They don't need the user to click anything or run anything.

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<v Speaker 2>You just need the server's ike address and an exploitable

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<v Speaker 2>service running zenmap or nmap is key here for that

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<v Speaker 2>initial info gathering, finding open ports identifying services like FTP,

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<v Speaker 2>RSH remote shell or Samba Windows file sharing, so you're.

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<v Speaker 1>Looking for known flaws in those.

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<v Speaker 2>Specific services precisely. Sometimes it's about finding older, unpatched versions

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<v Speaker 2>with well known vulnerabilities. For example, there's a specific version

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<v Speaker 2>of VSFTPD and FTPC version two point three point four

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<v Speaker 2>that famously had a back door baked into it. If

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<v Speaker 2>you find that running boom root access. Another example is

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<v Speaker 2>netkit RSH. If that remote shell service is enabled and

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<v Speaker 2>misconfigured on a Linux box, you might be able to

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<v Speaker 2>execute commands remotely.

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<v Speaker 1>And beyond those simpler known flaws, there are more complex

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<v Speaker 1>code execution vulnerabilities. Tell us about those and this concept

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<v Speaker 1>of a reverse connection that sounds clever.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, code execution vulnerabilities exploit flaws maybe in web applications

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<v Speaker 2>or services like Zomba that let an attacker run their

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<v Speaker 2>own commands on the server. Now the reverse connection. This

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<v Speaker 2>is a really smart way to bypass firewalls. See, most

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<v Speaker 2>firewalls are configured to block incoming connections initiated from the

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<v Speaker 2>outside like a castle wall. Or reverse connection flips that

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<v Speaker 2>the attacker sets up a listener on their machine. Then

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<v Speaker 2>the exploit makes the victim's server initiate an outgoing connection

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<v Speaker 2>back to the attacker. Since the connection started from inside

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<v Speaker 2>the network, the firewall often lets it pass right through.

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<v Speaker 2>It's like the victim opens a secret door outwards. The

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<v Speaker 2>metasplit framework is the go to tool for this. It

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<v Speaker 2>has tons of exploits and payloads. A common payload is

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<v Speaker 2>something like cmdo nix reverse netcat. You just tell it

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<v Speaker 2>your attacker ipe LHST and the port you're listening on

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<v Speaker 2>lpr ort, run the exploit and hope the victim connects back.

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<v Speaker 1>That is clever. Okay. So besides trying these exploits manually,

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<v Speaker 1>there's automated vulnerability scanning. What's the main goal.

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<v Speaker 2>There, right? Automated scanning is about efficiency and coverage. Its

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<v Speaker 2>purpose is to systematically check computers, servers, whole networks for

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<v Speaker 2>known weaknesses. These scanners look for outdated software, misconfigurations, missing patches,

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<v Speaker 2>things that match entries in huge vulnerability databases. Think of

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<v Speaker 2>databases like OSVDB Open Source Vulnerability Database, the NIST, MVD

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<v Speaker 2>National Vulnerability Database, or CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. The

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<v Speaker 2>scanner basically compares what it finds on your systems against

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<v Speaker 2>these lists of known problems. It's like an automated security audit.

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<v Speaker 1>Some of the big names in scanning software, well.

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<v Speaker 2>There are several well known ones. You've got nessis Qualities,

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<v Speaker 2>open vas which is open source, but a really prominent

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<v Speaker 2>commercial one, especially one that integrates well with exploitation tools,

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<v Speaker 2>is rapid seven.

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<v Speaker 1>Nextpos xsoz so it integrates with metasploit. You said, what's

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<v Speaker 1>its role in the bigger picture? The whole vulnerability management

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<v Speaker 1>process and any practical tips for using it.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, nexpos integrates tightly with metasploit. You can find a

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<v Speaker 2>vulnerability in expos and often directly launch and exploit for

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<v Speaker 2>it in metasploit. Its role covers the entire vulnerability management

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<v Speaker 2>life cycle. Discovery, finding assets on your network, detection, finding

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<v Speaker 2>the weaknesses, verification, checking if they're actually exploitable, risk classification, reporting,

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<v Speaker 2>and even helping prioritize fixing things the mitigation part. Practically speaking,

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<v Speaker 2>it's a powerful tool, very comprehensive, but be aware it

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<v Speaker 2>can be a bit of a beast resource wise, needs

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<v Speaker 2>decent RAM like eight GB good disk space, especially in

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<v Speaker 2>a VM, and the first time you start it up

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<v Speaker 2>it might take like thirty minutes to updates data bit.

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<v Speaker 2>Once it's running, it's great. You create sites for your

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<v Speaker 2>scan targets at IP addresses, run the scans, and then

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<v Speaker 2>you get these really detailed reports, audit reports, executive summaries,

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<v Speaker 2>even just the top ten worst vulnerabilities. Very useful.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so those are server side attacks, that's direct, But

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<v Speaker 1>client side attacks they feel different, more personal, maybe because

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<v Speaker 1>they involve the human element.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely. Client side attacks nearly always need the user to

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<v Speaker 2>do something click a link, open a file, install an app,

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<v Speaker 2>and because of that, they rely heavily on social engineering

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<v Speaker 2>tricking the user. Honestly, it's often much much easier to

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<v Speaker 2>exploit human trust or curiosity than it is to find

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<v Speaker 2>a purely technical flaw. In well maintained software, you can

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<v Speaker 2>have the best firewall, the best anti virus, that if

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<v Speaker 2>you trick someone into letting you in the door, none

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<v Speaker 2>of that matters. The human is often the weakest link.

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<v Speaker 1>It really is amazing how effective that can be. I

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<v Speaker 1>remember getting a phishing email once. It looked so real SII.

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<v Speaker 1>So there's a tool called the veiled Evasion framework that

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<v Speaker 1>helps create malware that gets past security.

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<v Speaker 2>That's exactly what veil evasion is designed for. It helps

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<v Speaker 2>generate backdoors, malicious payloads that are specifically crafted to try

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<v Speaker 2>and bypass common antivirus software. It often uses something called

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<v Speaker 2>Interpreter payloads from Metasplay. Interpreter is really advanced. Instead of

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<v Speaker 2>just dropping a simple executable file, it often works by

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<v Speaker 2>injecting itself directly into the memory of another process using

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<v Speaker 2>DLL injection. This makes it much harder to detect because

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<v Speaker 2>there might not be a malicious file sitting on the

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<v Speaker 2>hard drive. It runs in memory and gives the attacker

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<v Speaker 2>incredible control keylogger, screen capture, filesystem access, pivoting, all without

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<v Speaker 2>easily being traced on the disc at least until a reboot.

415
00:21:39.240 --> 00:21:42.240
<v Speaker 1>Wow, running in memory. That's sneaky. So how does anti

416
00:21:42.279 --> 00:21:44.599
<v Speaker 1>malware software even try to catch threads like that? What

417
00:21:44.599 --> 00:21:45.480
<v Speaker 1>are the main methods?

418
00:21:45.799 --> 00:21:49.160
<v Speaker 2>Anti malware uses a few main strategies. The classic one

419
00:21:49.200 --> 00:21:53.960
<v Speaker 2>is signatures, basically a database of known malware fingerprints. If

420
00:21:53.960 --> 00:21:58.160
<v Speaker 2>a file matches a known signature, it's flagged. Then there's heuristics.

421
00:21:58.640 --> 00:22:01.839
<v Speaker 2>This is more behavior based. It looks for suspicious actions

422
00:22:01.920 --> 00:22:04.759
<v Speaker 2>or characteristics even if the file doesn't match a known signature.

423
00:22:05.160 --> 00:22:07.720
<v Speaker 2>This can catch new threats, but it can also sometimes

424
00:22:07.799 --> 00:22:11.839
<v Speaker 2>lead to false positives, flagging legitimate software by mistake. Third,

425
00:22:12.279 --> 00:22:16.519
<v Speaker 2>sandboxing running a suspicious program in a safe, isolated environment

426
00:22:16.559 --> 00:22:18.279
<v Speaker 2>to see what it does without letting it harm the

427
00:22:18.279 --> 00:22:23.519
<v Speaker 2>main system. An interesting detail here. Some sophisticated malware can

428
00:22:23.559 --> 00:22:26.000
<v Speaker 2>actually detect when it's running in a sandbox, and if

429
00:22:26.079 --> 00:22:28.079
<v Speaker 2>detects that, it might just sit there and do nothing,

430
00:22:28.119 --> 00:22:30.599
<v Speaker 2>only activating its malicious code when it thinks it's on

431
00:22:30.640 --> 00:22:33.960
<v Speaker 2>a real user's machine. And finally, if malware is detected,

432
00:22:34.000 --> 00:22:37.759
<v Speaker 2>the usual action is removal, deleting it or quarantining it,

433
00:22:38.039 --> 00:22:39.960
<v Speaker 2>moving it to a safe place where it can't run.

434
00:22:40.079 --> 00:22:43.799
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so veil creates the evasive malware, then the attacker

435
00:22:43.839 --> 00:22:45.440
<v Speaker 1>needs to set up a way to listen for that

436
00:22:45.480 --> 00:22:47.559
<v Speaker 1>malware calling home right correct.

437
00:22:48.079 --> 00:22:51.720
<v Speaker 2>That's where the metaspolate handler comes in. It's essentially the listener.

438
00:22:52.079 --> 00:22:54.400
<v Speaker 2>You can figure it to expect a connection from the

439
00:22:54.440 --> 00:22:57.799
<v Speaker 2>specific type of backdoor you created on a specific port.

440
00:22:58.119 --> 00:23:01.200
<v Speaker 2>It just sits there waiting. The common headache when setting

441
00:23:01.240 --> 00:23:03.759
<v Speaker 2>this up is the port might already be in use

442
00:23:03.839 --> 00:23:07.279
<v Speaker 2>by another application on your attacker machine. You can use

443
00:23:07.279 --> 00:23:10.839
<v Speaker 2>commands like netstat a or LSoft in Linux to check

444
00:23:10.880 --> 00:23:13.119
<v Speaker 2>which process is using the port, and then you might

445
00:23:13.160 --> 00:23:15.400
<v Speaker 2>need to kill that process. So the handley combined to

446
00:23:15.440 --> 00:23:15.799
<v Speaker 2>the port.

447
00:23:15.960 --> 00:23:18.519
<v Speaker 1>Right, gotta free up the port so the listener is ready.

448
00:23:18.640 --> 00:23:20.880
<v Speaker 1>How does the malware actually get to the victim? What

449
00:23:20.920 --> 00:23:22.440
<v Speaker 1>are the common delivery methods?

450
00:23:22.759 --> 00:23:25.319
<v Speaker 2>Well, the simplest way is just putting the malicious file

451
00:23:25.480 --> 00:23:27.960
<v Speaker 2>on a web server, maybe your Collie Linux machine running

452
00:23:27.960 --> 00:23:31.799
<v Speaker 2>apatche too, and tricking the user into downloading and running it. Directly,

453
00:23:32.400 --> 00:23:34.880
<v Speaker 2>but more common and often more effective are things like

454
00:23:35.000 --> 00:23:40.000
<v Speaker 2>phishing emails, emails with malicious links or attachments. A really

455
00:23:40.039 --> 00:23:43.599
<v Speaker 2>effective and quite devious method is embedding the malware inside

456
00:23:43.599 --> 00:23:46.759
<v Speaker 2>a seemingly harmless file like a PDF or a JPG.

457
00:23:47.559 --> 00:23:50.880
<v Speaker 2>You can use SFX archives, which are self extracting archives

458
00:23:50.920 --> 00:23:53.519
<v Speaker 2>created with tools like wind raar. The victim thinks they're

459
00:23:53.599 --> 00:23:55.920
<v Speaker 2>just opening a document or a picture, clicks it, the

460
00:23:55.920 --> 00:23:59.480
<v Speaker 2>document opens, but silently in the background. The malware also

461
00:23:59.559 --> 00:24:04.039
<v Speaker 2>extremes and executes very sneaky, and attackers often set at

462
00:24:04.039 --> 00:24:07.160
<v Speaker 2>persistence too, configuring the malware so it automatically starts up

463
00:24:07.160 --> 00:24:10.079
<v Speaker 2>again if the victim reboots their computer, maybe by inchecking

464
00:24:10.079 --> 00:24:12.200
<v Speaker 2>it as a Windows service or adding a registry key

465
00:24:12.240 --> 00:24:13.480
<v Speaker 2>to run a script on startup.

466
00:24:13.599 --> 00:24:16.160
<v Speaker 1>And there's a tool called Cage to help manage all

467
00:24:16.160 --> 00:24:17.359
<v Speaker 1>these compromised machines.

468
00:24:17.640 --> 00:24:20.480
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, Cage is basically a graphical front end for managing

469
00:24:20.519 --> 00:24:24.680
<v Speaker 2>metasplit sessions. If an attacker has multiple compromise machines connecting

470
00:24:24.720 --> 00:24:28.680
<v Speaker 2>back via interpreter, Cage provides a guy to easily interact

471
00:24:28.759 --> 00:24:32.759
<v Speaker 2>with them, run commands, take screenshots, organize the sessions. Makes

472
00:24:32.759 --> 00:24:34.359
<v Speaker 2>managing multiple victims simpler.

473
00:24:34.640 --> 00:24:37.319
<v Speaker 1>So with all these clever delivery methods, especially the ones

474
00:24:37.359 --> 00:24:41.240
<v Speaker 1>embedding malware, what are the best ways to protect ourselves?

475
00:24:41.319 --> 00:24:44.559
<v Speaker 2>Good question. There are a few key layers of defense. First,

476
00:24:44.960 --> 00:24:47.480
<v Speaker 2>man in the middle prevention. Be careful about the networks

477
00:24:47.480 --> 00:24:50.480
<v Speaker 2>you connect to. Use trusted networks, maybe a VPN on

478
00:24:50.559 --> 00:24:53.480
<v Speaker 2>public Wi Fi. Tools like ZARP can also help detect

479
00:24:53.480 --> 00:24:56.880
<v Speaker 2>AARP poisoning attempts on your local network. Second, always look

480
00:24:56.920 --> 00:25:00.400
<v Speaker 2>for HTTPS connections. Encrypted traffic is much hard for an

481
00:25:00.440 --> 00:25:03.400
<v Speaker 2>attacker to tamper with or inject things into. Use browser

482
00:25:03.440 --> 00:25:08.480
<v Speaker 2>extensions like HTTPS everywhere. Third hashing. This is really important

483
00:25:08.480 --> 00:25:11.720
<v Speaker 2>for downloads. If a software publisher provides a hash like

484
00:25:11.880 --> 00:25:14.319
<v Speaker 2>MT five or SAHA two five six for their file,

485
00:25:14.559 --> 00:25:16.799
<v Speaker 2>you can calculate the hash of the file you downloaded.

486
00:25:16.920 --> 00:25:19.359
<v Speaker 2>If the hash is match, the file is almost certainly

487
00:25:19.400 --> 00:25:22.039
<v Speaker 2>authentic and hasn't been tampered with. If they don't match,

488
00:25:22.240 --> 00:25:23.400
<v Speaker 2>don't want it okay.

489
00:25:23.559 --> 00:25:25.720
<v Speaker 1>Hashing is a good practical tip. So let's say the

490
00:25:25.720 --> 00:25:28.759
<v Speaker 1>attacker is successful. They've gained access, the work isn't over.

491
00:25:29.200 --> 00:25:33.559
<v Speaker 1>Our next deem dive is post exploitation and social engineering tactics.

492
00:25:34.200 --> 00:25:37.160
<v Speaker 1>What exactly happens in post exploitation. What's the goal?

493
00:25:37.759 --> 00:25:41.400
<v Speaker 2>Post exploitation is everything that happens after you've successfully compromised

494
00:25:41.400 --> 00:25:44.920
<v Speaker 2>a system. Gaining that initial access is just the first step.

495
00:25:45.359 --> 00:25:49.039
<v Speaker 2>The goal now is to maximize your control, gather valuable information,

496
00:25:49.119 --> 00:25:52.079
<v Speaker 2>potentially move laterally to other systems on the network, and

497
00:25:52.240 --> 00:25:56.920
<v Speaker 2>ensure you can maintain access persistently. The metasploit Interpreter shell

498
00:25:57.039 --> 00:26:00.799
<v Speaker 2>is packed with post exploitation commands, shows you everything you

499
00:26:00.839 --> 00:26:03.440
<v Speaker 2>can do. Background lets you hide the session but keep

500
00:26:03.480 --> 00:26:07.000
<v Speaker 2>it active. Sessions list all your active connections. Since info

501
00:26:07.079 --> 00:26:09.640
<v Speaker 2>gives you basic info about the victims OS.

502
00:26:09.559 --> 00:26:13.079
<v Speaker 1>And the book mentions something intriguing. Process impersonation. How does

503
00:26:13.119 --> 00:26:15.000
<v Speaker 1>that work? Why is it useful for an attacker?

504
00:26:15.160 --> 00:26:19.599
<v Speaker 2>Ah? Yeah, process migration or impersonation. It's a stealth technique.

505
00:26:20.200 --> 00:26:23.319
<v Speaker 2>Materpreter allows you to take your malicious process and migrate

506
00:26:23.359 --> 00:26:26.640
<v Speaker 2>it so it runs inside a legitimate common Windows process

507
00:26:27.119 --> 00:26:30.279
<v Speaker 2>like explore dot exx, or maybe a browser process like

508
00:26:30.359 --> 00:26:34.400
<v Speaker 2>Microsoft Edge. Why because if someone opens task Manager and

509
00:26:34.440 --> 00:26:37.160
<v Speaker 2>looks at the running processes, they're less likely to spot

510
00:26:37.240 --> 00:26:40.839
<v Speaker 2>explore dot ex as being suspicious compared to some weirdly

511
00:26:40.920 --> 00:26:44.559
<v Speaker 2>named malware dot ex It helps the back door blend

512
00:26:44.599 --> 00:26:46.319
<v Speaker 2>in making it harder to detect and.

513
00:26:46.359 --> 00:26:49.200
<v Speaker 1>Kill blend in dot clever. And once you have that

514
00:26:49.240 --> 00:26:52.079
<v Speaker 1>materpreter session, you basically have full control over the victims

515
00:26:52.119 --> 00:26:52.960
<v Speaker 1>files pretty much.

516
00:26:53.039 --> 00:26:55.240
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you have full control over their filesystem. You can

517
00:26:55.279 --> 00:27:00.400
<v Speaker 2>browse directories ALSPWDCD, download files from the victim machine, download

518
00:27:00.440 --> 00:27:03.880
<v Speaker 2>upload file to upload, delete files, even modify them. You

519
00:27:03.880 --> 00:27:06.400
<v Speaker 2>can also drop into a standard Windows command shell through

520
00:27:06.440 --> 00:27:09.279
<v Speaker 2>the interpreter session for even more direct control. It's like

521
00:27:09.319 --> 00:27:11.240
<v Speaker 2>sitting at their computer remotely.

522
00:27:10.920 --> 00:27:13.440
<v Speaker 1>But that connection might die if they reboot. Right, how

523
00:27:13.480 --> 00:27:16.359
<v Speaker 1>do attackers achieve persistence? Making sure they can get back

524
00:27:16.400 --> 00:27:17.720
<v Speaker 1>in after a restart right?

525
00:27:17.880 --> 00:27:21.119
<v Speaker 2>Persistence is key for long term access. A simple interpreter

526
00:27:21.200 --> 00:27:25.240
<v Speaker 2>session in memory usually dies on reboot, so post exploitation

527
00:27:25.480 --> 00:27:29.000
<v Speaker 2>often involves setting up persistence mechanisms. The book talks about

528
00:27:29.039 --> 00:27:31.839
<v Speaker 2>methods like injecting the back door as a Windows service

529
00:27:31.839 --> 00:27:35.920
<v Speaker 2>that starts automatically, or creating Windows Registry keys that tell

530
00:27:35.920 --> 00:27:38.799
<v Speaker 2>the system to run a script, maybe a Visual Basic

531
00:27:38.880 --> 00:27:42.279
<v Speaker 2>Script jvbscript as mentioned. When the user logs in or

532
00:27:42.279 --> 00:27:45.200
<v Speaker 2>the system boots up, that script then connects back to

533
00:27:45.240 --> 00:27:48.839
<v Speaker 2>the attackers listener re establishing the connection automatically, and.

534
00:27:48.799 --> 00:27:53.079
<v Speaker 1>Maybe the most chilling part, keyloggers and screenshots. That's actual

535
00:27:53.160 --> 00:27:54.039
<v Speaker 1>real time spying.

536
00:27:54.160 --> 00:27:56.640
<v Speaker 2>It is Interpreter has modules for both. You can start

537
00:27:56.680 --> 00:28:01.519
<v Speaker 2>a keylogger that captures every single keystroke the victim type, passwords, emails,

538
00:28:01.559 --> 00:28:04.440
<v Speaker 2>chat messages, everything. You can also take screenshots at their

539
00:28:04.440 --> 00:28:07.039
<v Speaker 2>desktop in real time, seeing exactly what they're doing. It

540
00:28:07.079 --> 00:28:10.799
<v Speaker 2>gives the attacker complete invasive visibility into the victims' activities

541
00:28:10.799 --> 00:28:12.160
<v Speaker 2>on the compromised machine.

542
00:28:12.359 --> 00:28:16.319
<v Speaker 1>Okay, shifting from the purely technical, let's talk social engineering.

543
00:28:16.599 --> 00:28:19.359
<v Speaker 1>The book says it's often easier to exploit human trust

544
00:28:19.599 --> 00:28:22.720
<v Speaker 1>than hack software. Why is that still so true with

545
00:28:22.839 --> 00:28:23.440
<v Speaker 1>all our tech?

546
00:28:23.759 --> 00:28:27.920
<v Speaker 2>It boils down to psychology. Really, security fundamentally relies on

547
00:28:28.039 --> 00:28:31.839
<v Speaker 2>knowing who and what to trust. Social engineers exploit our

548
00:28:31.880 --> 00:28:35.759
<v Speaker 2>basic human nature, our desire to be helpful, our curiosity,

549
00:28:35.799 --> 00:28:39.480
<v Speaker 2>our fear, sometimes just being busy or distracted. It's often

550
00:28:39.559 --> 00:28:42.359
<v Speaker 2>far less work to craft a convincing email that tricks

551
00:28:42.359 --> 00:28:44.680
<v Speaker 2>someone into clicking a link or giving up a password

552
00:28:45.079 --> 00:28:47.319
<v Speaker 2>than it is to find and exploit a zero day

553
00:28:47.400 --> 00:28:51.559
<v Speaker 2>vulnerability in software. Technology can build high walls, but social

554
00:28:51.599 --> 00:28:53.680
<v Speaker 2>engineer and just walks up to the gate and asks

555
00:28:53.720 --> 00:28:56.839
<v Speaker 2>to be let in, often successfully. The human is the variable.

556
00:28:57.039 --> 00:28:59.640
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that makes sense. It targets our instincts. So, like

557
00:28:59.680 --> 00:29:03.079
<v Speaker 1>any attack, social engineering starts with information gathering. What tools

558
00:29:03.079 --> 00:29:03.559
<v Speaker 1>help with that?

559
00:29:03.960 --> 00:29:08.279
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely? Good recon is crucial for effective social engineering. You

560
00:29:08.359 --> 00:29:11.519
<v Speaker 2>need to know your target. Tools like Google dorcs are

561
00:29:11.559 --> 00:29:16.119
<v Speaker 2>surprisingly powerful for finding publicly exposed information online. Recon is

562
00:29:16.160 --> 00:29:20.279
<v Speaker 2>a great framework specifically for open source intelligence gathering. And

563
00:29:20.319 --> 00:29:22.799
<v Speaker 2>while Tago is really interesting, it's a visual tool. It

564
00:29:22.839 --> 00:29:26.039
<v Speaker 2>helps map out relationships between different pieces of information people,

565
00:29:26.200 --> 00:29:30.720
<v Speaker 2>email addresses, companies, websites, network infrastructure. It pulls data from

566
00:29:30.759 --> 00:29:33.960
<v Speaker 2>tons of public sources and creates these visual link analysis charts.

567
00:29:34.160 --> 00:29:36.759
<v Speaker 2>Helps an attacker build a really detailed picture of their

568
00:29:36.759 --> 00:29:38.000
<v Speaker 2>target and potential attacking.

569
00:29:38.240 --> 00:29:42.079
<v Speaker 1>In the classic delivery email spoofing, how do attackers make

570
00:29:42.119 --> 00:29:44.799
<v Speaker 1>fake emails look real enough to bypass spam filters.

571
00:29:45.119 --> 00:29:47.759
<v Speaker 2>Email spoofing is definitely the most common way to deliver

572
00:29:47.880 --> 00:29:51.759
<v Speaker 2>social engineering attacks like phishing links or malware attachments. The

573
00:29:51.880 --> 00:29:55.079
<v Speaker 2>challenge for attackers is that modern spam blockers are pretty

574
00:29:55.079 --> 00:29:58.480
<v Speaker 2>good at spotting emails sent from dodgy free spoofing services.

575
00:29:58.839 --> 00:30:02.200
<v Speaker 2>They often end up in junk folds. So attackers get smarter,

576
00:30:02.640 --> 00:30:06.720
<v Speaker 2>they might use reputable SMTP relay servers. These are legitimate

577
00:30:06.920 --> 00:30:09.440
<v Speaker 2>email sending services like send and Blue is mentioned as

578
00:30:09.480 --> 00:30:12.559
<v Speaker 2>an example. Using those can help bypass some filters. Or

579
00:30:12.599 --> 00:30:14.839
<v Speaker 2>they might set up their own customer email servers, or

580
00:30:14.839 --> 00:30:18.599
<v Speaker 2>compromise existing ones, or even just create very convincing fake

581
00:30:18.640 --> 00:30:21.640
<v Speaker 2>accounts on real services. But even then you might see

582
00:30:21.680 --> 00:30:24.519
<v Speaker 2>clues like the email landing in your promotions tab or

583
00:30:24.599 --> 00:30:27.799
<v Speaker 2>seeing a via sendeblue dot com tag in the sender details.

584
00:30:28.000 --> 00:30:29.799
<v Speaker 2>Those are potential red flags to watch for.

585
00:30:30.240 --> 00:30:32.480
<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's move into our fift deep dive web and

586
00:30:32.559 --> 00:30:36.519
<v Speaker 1>mobile application penetration testing. Starting with web browsers, there's a

587
00:30:36.559 --> 00:30:38.880
<v Speaker 1>tool called BEEF. What's special about it?

588
00:30:39.160 --> 00:30:42.960
<v Speaker 2>Right? BEEF the Browser Exploitation framework. What makes it unique

589
00:30:43.000 --> 00:30:45.319
<v Speaker 2>is it's laser focus on the web browser itself as

590
00:30:45.319 --> 00:30:48.440
<v Speaker 2>the attack platform. Most tools target the network or the

591
00:30:48.440 --> 00:30:51.759
<v Speaker 2>servers OS or the client OS. BEEF says, forget that

592
00:30:51.799 --> 00:30:54.559
<v Speaker 2>for a minute. Let's attack the user directly through their browser.

593
00:30:54.640 --> 00:30:57.400
<v Speaker 1>It hooks the browser, hooks the browser. How does that work?

594
00:30:57.440 --> 00:30:58.759
<v Speaker 1>How does it actually gain control?

595
00:30:59.039 --> 00:31:01.559
<v Speaker 2>It works by general creating a small piece of JavaScript

596
00:31:01.559 --> 00:31:04.440
<v Speaker 2>code called the hook. The attacker needs to get this

597
00:31:04.559 --> 00:31:07.920
<v Speaker 2>hook code to run in the victim's browser. This usually

598
00:31:08.000 --> 00:31:10.480
<v Speaker 2>happens if the attacker can inject it into a website

599
00:31:10.480 --> 00:31:13.640
<v Speaker 2>the victim visits, maybe a site the attacker controls or

600
00:31:13.680 --> 00:31:16.599
<v Speaker 2>a legitimate site they've compromised with the vulnerability. When the

601
00:31:16.680 --> 00:31:20.200
<v Speaker 2>victim's browser loads the page with the hook, that JavaScript

602
00:31:20.279 --> 00:31:22.799
<v Speaker 2>runs and makes the browser secretly connect back to the

603
00:31:22.839 --> 00:31:26.160
<v Speaker 2>attacker's beef server. Once that connection is made, the browser

604
00:31:26.200 --> 00:31:28.799
<v Speaker 2>is hooked and the attacker can send commands to it

605
00:31:28.880 --> 00:31:30.000
<v Speaker 2>through the beef interface.

606
00:31:30.160 --> 00:31:32.480
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so getting that hook onto a website sounds like

607
00:31:32.480 --> 00:31:37.000
<v Speaker 1>it involves cross site SCRIPTINGXSS. What exactly is XSS and

608
00:31:37.000 --> 00:31:38.200
<v Speaker 1>how does it enable beef?

609
00:31:38.400 --> 00:31:41.319
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, XSS is a very common way to deliver the beefook.

610
00:31:41.759 --> 00:31:44.920
<v Speaker 2>Cross site scripting is a type of injection attack. Basically,

611
00:31:45.000 --> 00:31:48.359
<v Speaker 2>the attacker manages to inject malicious JavaScript code into a

612
00:31:48.359 --> 00:31:52.440
<v Speaker 2>website that other users trust. When another user visits that page,

613
00:31:52.480 --> 00:31:55.400
<v Speaker 2>their browser executes the attacker's script because it thinks the

614
00:31:55.400 --> 00:31:58.079
<v Speaker 2>script is part of the legitimate website, like a trojan

615
00:31:58.119 --> 00:32:00.720
<v Speaker 2>horse delivered by the website itself. There are a few

616
00:32:00.759 --> 00:32:05.079
<v Speaker 2>main types stored XSS or persistent, where the malicious script

617
00:32:05.079 --> 00:32:07.680
<v Speaker 2>is saved permanently on the website, maybe in a comment field,

618
00:32:07.839 --> 00:32:10.839
<v Speaker 2>and affects everyone who've used it. Reflected EXSS, where the

619
00:32:10.880 --> 00:32:13.079
<v Speaker 2>script is part of a link the attacker tricks the

620
00:32:13.119 --> 00:32:15.480
<v Speaker 2>victim into clicking it, reflects off the web server and

621
00:32:15.559 --> 00:32:18.039
<v Speaker 2>runs in the victim's browser just that one time, and

622
00:32:18.119 --> 00:32:21.279
<v Speaker 2>DOM based EXSS, which is a bit trickier exploiting how

623
00:32:21.319 --> 00:32:24.160
<v Speaker 2>the browser itself processes data on the client side, sometimes

624
00:32:24.160 --> 00:32:25.559
<v Speaker 2>without even talking to the server.

625
00:32:26.279 --> 00:32:29.640
<v Speaker 1>How would a pen tester even find an EXSS vulnerability

626
00:32:30.240 --> 00:32:32.079
<v Speaker 1>and then use it to inject that beef hook.

627
00:32:32.319 --> 00:32:35.119
<v Speaker 2>Finding EXSS often starts by looking for places on a

628
00:32:35.160 --> 00:32:38.000
<v Speaker 2>website where user input is displayed back on the page.

629
00:32:38.400 --> 00:32:42.799
<v Speaker 2>Think search results, comment sections, user profiles. You try injecting

630
00:32:42.880 --> 00:32:47.119
<v Speaker 2>simple test scripts like script alert excess script. If you

631
00:32:47.160 --> 00:32:49.960
<v Speaker 2>see that alert box pop up when the page loads BINGO,

632
00:32:50.400 --> 00:32:53.640
<v Speaker 2>you've likely found an EXSS flaw. Once you find one,

633
00:32:53.839 --> 00:32:57.160
<v Speaker 2>especially a stored EXSS vulnerability, you can then inject the

634
00:32:57.160 --> 00:33:00.400
<v Speaker 2>beef hook script instead of just the alert. Because it's stored,

635
00:33:00.680 --> 00:33:03.240
<v Speaker 2>every user who visits that compromise page from then on

636
00:33:03.319 --> 00:33:06.599
<v Speaker 2>will automatically get hooked by BEEF, connecting their browser back

637
00:33:06.640 --> 00:33:07.319
<v Speaker 2>to the attacker.

638
00:33:07.440 --> 00:33:09.160
<v Speaker 1>And once a browser is hooked with BEEF, you can

639
00:33:09.160 --> 00:33:12.359
<v Speaker 1>actually use that to hack the underlying machine like Windows

640
00:33:12.640 --> 00:33:13.640
<v Speaker 1>or even mobile phones.

641
00:33:13.960 --> 00:33:17.359
<v Speaker 2>Yes, that's where BEEF gets really powerful. It's not just

642
00:33:17.400 --> 00:33:20.559
<v Speaker 2>about controlling the browser. It's a launch pad. From the

643
00:33:20.559 --> 00:33:23.240
<v Speaker 2>BEEF control panel, the attacker can send commands to the

644
00:33:23.240 --> 00:33:27.200
<v Speaker 2>hooked browser. One common tactic is using social engineering modules,

645
00:33:27.640 --> 00:33:30.720
<v Speaker 2>for example, sending a fake update notification that looks like

646
00:33:30.759 --> 00:33:34.359
<v Speaker 2>it's from Firefox or Adobe Flash Player. If the victim

647
00:33:34.359 --> 00:33:37.519
<v Speaker 2>clicks install update, what they actually download and run could

648
00:33:37.519 --> 00:33:40.440
<v Speaker 2>be a metaspoint interpreter back door generated by the attacker.

649
00:33:40.720 --> 00:33:42.799
<v Speaker 2>If they run it, boom, the attacker gets a full

650
00:33:42.839 --> 00:33:46.279
<v Speaker 2>remote control session on their Windows machine and worryingly, yes,

651
00:33:46.400 --> 00:33:50.119
<v Speaker 2>BEEF works just fine on mobile browsers too, Android iOS

652
00:33:50.200 --> 00:33:52.839
<v Speaker 2>hooking the mobile browser can lead to similar kinds of attacks.

653
00:33:52.880 --> 00:33:55.799
<v Speaker 1>Okay, that's concerning. So what are the best defenses against

654
00:33:55.799 --> 00:33:57.759
<v Speaker 1>excess is? How do websites prevent this?

655
00:33:58.039 --> 00:34:02.799
<v Speaker 2>Preventing XSS requires dillas from web developers. Key techniques include

656
00:34:03.160 --> 00:34:07.839
<v Speaker 2>escaping user input. This means converting potentially harmful characters like

657
00:34:07.880 --> 00:34:11.679
<v Speaker 2>anelo into safe entities like NELT and ENEGEL, so the

658
00:34:11.719 --> 00:34:16.679
<v Speaker 2>browser treats them as text, not code, validating input being

659
00:34:16.800 --> 00:34:18.960
<v Speaker 2>very strict about what kind of data is allowed in

660
00:34:19.000 --> 00:34:22.000
<v Speaker 2>different fields. If a field should only contain numbers, don't

661
00:34:22.000 --> 00:34:25.679
<v Speaker 2>allow letters or symbols. Using whitelists is better than blacklists,

662
00:34:26.199 --> 00:34:30.679
<v Speaker 2>sanitizing user input, actively removing or cleaning up any potentially

663
00:34:30.800 --> 00:34:34.599
<v Speaker 2>dangerous HTML or script tags from user submissions, and on

664
00:34:34.639 --> 00:34:38.760
<v Speaker 2>top of that, using a Web application firewall. Wf ws

665
00:34:38.800 --> 00:34:41.239
<v Speaker 2>sit in front of the web server and inspect incoming traffic,

666
00:34:41.360 --> 00:34:44.320
<v Speaker 2>trying to detect and block EXSS attacks and other common

667
00:34:44.320 --> 00:34:46.960
<v Speaker 2>web threats before they even reach the application code.

668
00:34:47.039 --> 00:34:50.400
<v Speaker 1>Right defense and depth. Okay, Moving beyond browser exploits, let's

669
00:34:50.400 --> 00:34:53.599
<v Speaker 1>talk general website penetration testing. What's the typical stack of components?

670
00:34:53.599 --> 00:34:56.440
<v Speaker 2>A tester looks at sure, A typical web application has

671
00:34:56.519 --> 00:35:00.599
<v Speaker 2>multiple layers. There's the server hardware itself or VM, the

672
00:35:00.679 --> 00:35:03.760
<v Speaker 2>operating system running on it, the web server software like

673
00:35:03.760 --> 00:35:09.039
<v Speaker 2>Apatchee or Microsoft ISA, the database backing the application, maybe Myschool, Postgress,

674
00:35:09.039 --> 00:35:11.719
<v Speaker 2>wiel Segle server, and then the actual web application code

675
00:35:11.840 --> 00:35:16.159
<v Speaker 2>written in languages like PHP, Python, Java, NOJS, etc. The

676
00:35:16.199 --> 00:35:19.480
<v Speaker 2>first step in testing is always information gathering, figuring out

677
00:35:19.519 --> 00:35:21.679
<v Speaker 2>as much as possible about each of these components.

678
00:35:21.880 --> 00:35:24.880
<v Speaker 1>What are some good tools for that initial information gathering

679
00:35:24.880 --> 00:35:27.320
<v Speaker 1>phase on websites to understand that stack?

680
00:35:27.559 --> 00:35:30.000
<v Speaker 2>There are lots of great tools whose lookups give you

681
00:35:30.039 --> 00:35:35.000
<v Speaker 2>domain registration details. Netcraft provides incredibly detailed reports on websites.

682
00:35:35.039 --> 00:35:40.239
<v Speaker 2>The technologies they use, webserver os, frameworks, hosting provider known history,

683
00:35:40.280 --> 00:35:43.159
<v Speaker 2>sometimes even vulnerabilities. It's amazing what you can find there.

684
00:35:43.760 --> 00:35:47.119
<v Speaker 2>Robtext is good for DNS information finding related domains, seeing

685
00:35:47.119 --> 00:35:49.079
<v Speaker 2>what other sites might be hosted on the same server.

686
00:35:49.679 --> 00:35:54.039
<v Speaker 2>Knock Pi or similar tools helps discover hidden subdomains associated

687
00:35:54.039 --> 00:35:56.880
<v Speaker 2>with a main domain which might host less secure applications,

688
00:35:57.360 --> 00:36:00.280
<v Speaker 2>and DRB or tools like gobuster or a fun uf

689
00:36:00.280 --> 00:36:03.719
<v Speaker 2>are essential. They brute force common directory and file names

690
00:36:03.800 --> 00:36:06.840
<v Speaker 2>using word lists. You'd be surprised how often they uncover

691
00:36:06.920 --> 00:36:10.880
<v Speaker 2>sensitive files left accessible, like configuration files, backup files, or

692
00:36:10.880 --> 00:36:13.480
<v Speaker 2>even things like robots dot txt or maybe an accounts

693
00:36:13.519 --> 00:36:15.119
<v Speaker 2>dot txt file that shouldn't be there.

694
00:36:15.199 --> 00:36:18.039
<v Speaker 1>Finding lift or files, Yeah, it happens more than you'd think.

695
00:36:18.239 --> 00:36:20.880
<v Speaker 1>What about file upload vulnerabilities? How are those exploited?

696
00:36:21.079 --> 00:36:24.239
<v Speaker 2>File upload features are a common source of vulnerabilities. If

697
00:36:24.239 --> 00:36:27.159
<v Speaker 2>a site lets you upload, say a profile picture, it

698
00:36:27.199 --> 00:36:30.039
<v Speaker 2>needs to strictly check that the uploaded file actually is

699
00:36:30.079 --> 00:36:33.360
<v Speaker 2>an image. If the checks are weak rejeff only looking

700
00:36:33.360 --> 00:36:36.679
<v Speaker 2>at the filename extension, an attacker might try uploading something

701
00:36:36.719 --> 00:36:40.840
<v Speaker 2>malicious instead. A common attack is uploading a PHP webshell.

702
00:36:41.239 --> 00:36:43.599
<v Speaker 2>This is a small script, often created with a tool

703
00:36:43.679 --> 00:36:46.760
<v Speaker 2>like Weaveley, that gives the attacker command execution on the server.

704
00:36:47.440 --> 00:36:49.920
<v Speaker 2>If the server accepts the upload and the attacker can

705
00:36:49.920 --> 00:36:52.800
<v Speaker 2>then access that uploaded file via their browser, the PHP

706
00:36:52.920 --> 00:36:56.199
<v Speaker 2>code executes, and the attacker effectively gets a remote shell

707
00:36:56.199 --> 00:36:58.000
<v Speaker 2>on the web server. Full control.

708
00:36:58.159 --> 00:37:02.000
<v Speaker 1>Okay, webshells are bad. What about direct code execution vulnerabilities

709
00:37:02.039 --> 00:37:03.159
<v Speaker 1>in the web app itself.

710
00:37:03.360 --> 00:37:05.920
<v Speaker 2>These happen when the web application takes input from the

711
00:37:06.000 --> 00:37:08.280
<v Speaker 2>user and improperly uses it as part of a command

712
00:37:08.280 --> 00:37:11.440
<v Speaker 2>that gets executed on the server's operating system. A classic

713
00:37:11.480 --> 00:37:13.840
<v Speaker 2>example is a website feature that lets you say ping

714
00:37:13.880 --> 00:37:16.840
<v Speaker 2>and IP address to test connectivity. If the website just

715
00:37:16.880 --> 00:37:19.079
<v Speaker 2>takes the IP address you provide and plugs it directly

716
00:37:19.159 --> 00:37:22.760
<v Speaker 2>into a system ping command without cleaning it first sanitizing it,

717
00:37:23.119 --> 00:37:26.039
<v Speaker 2>an attacker could inject extra commands instead of just an IP.

718
00:37:26.079 --> 00:37:28.039
<v Speaker 2>They might enter something like eight eight point eight point

719
00:37:28.079 --> 00:37:31.800
<v Speaker 2>eight and ce binge attacker IP attach report. The semicolon

720
00:37:31.840 --> 00:37:34.400
<v Speaker 2>separates commands and Linux umix, so the server ping's eight

721
00:37:34.440 --> 00:37:36.840
<v Speaker 2>point eight point eight point eight, and then it executes

722
00:37:36.880 --> 00:37:40.639
<v Speaker 2>the netcat command, which launches a reverse shell connecting back

723
00:37:40.639 --> 00:37:41.760
<v Speaker 2>to the attacker's machine.

724
00:37:41.840 --> 00:37:45.239
<v Speaker 1>Game over combining comm the panston infony. Then there are

725
00:37:45.360 --> 00:37:48.960
<v Speaker 1>file inclusion vulnerabilities LFI and RFI. What's the difference in

726
00:37:49.000 --> 00:37:49.639
<v Speaker 1>How do they work?

727
00:37:49.800 --> 00:37:54.400
<v Speaker 2>Right? LFI and RFI. Local file inclusion LiFi exploits flaws

728
00:37:54.639 --> 00:37:57.519
<v Speaker 2>where a web application includes files based on user input

729
00:37:57.719 --> 00:38:01.280
<v Speaker 2>but doesn't properly restrict which files can be included. An

730
00:38:01.280 --> 00:38:04.440
<v Speaker 2>attacker might manipulate a URL parameter like dot page dot

731
00:38:04.440 --> 00:38:08.639
<v Speaker 2>et setsia passwd the dot traverss directories upwards. If the

732
00:38:08.679 --> 00:38:11.360
<v Speaker 2>app is vulnerable, it might actually include and display the

733
00:38:11.400 --> 00:38:13.880
<v Speaker 2>contents of the stead of pass weed file, which contains

734
00:38:13.960 --> 00:38:17.119
<v Speaker 2>user account info. On Linux, let's then read arbitrary files

735
00:38:17.119 --> 00:38:20.119
<v Speaker 2>on the server. Remote file inclusion RFI is similar, but

736
00:38:20.159 --> 00:38:23.199
<v Speaker 2>potentially even more dangerous. It occurs that the application can

737
00:38:23.239 --> 00:38:25.519
<v Speaker 2>be tricked into including a file from a remote URL

738
00:38:25.639 --> 00:38:28.760
<v Speaker 2>one controlled by the attacker. This usually requires a specific

739
00:38:28.840 --> 00:38:32.079
<v Speaker 2>PHP configuration setting allow er and clude to be enabled.

740
00:38:32.119 --> 00:38:34.920
<v Speaker 2>It's off by default now, thankfully. If RFI is possible,

741
00:38:34.960 --> 00:38:37.679
<v Speaker 2>the attacker can host a malicious script like a webshell

742
00:38:37.719 --> 00:38:39.920
<v Speaker 2>on their own server and trick the victim server into

743
00:38:39.960 --> 00:38:42.480
<v Speaker 2>downloading and executing it instant backdoor.

744
00:38:42.639 --> 00:38:46.199
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so LiFi reads local files, RFI executes for remote files.

745
00:38:46.519 --> 00:38:49.119
<v Speaker 1>What are the key ways to prevent all these webvolms? Uploads?

746
00:38:49.119 --> 00:38:51.239
<v Speaker 1>Code execution, file inclusion.

747
00:38:51.000 --> 00:38:54.920
<v Speaker 2>Several key defenses for file uploads. Implement strict checks on

748
00:38:54.960 --> 00:38:57.679
<v Speaker 2>file types, not just based on the filename extension, but

749
00:38:57.760 --> 00:39:01.000
<v Speaker 2>by inspecting the file content mime type match bytes. Also

750
00:39:01.159 --> 00:39:03.920
<v Speaker 2>store uploaded files outside the webroot if possible, or in

751
00:39:03.960 --> 00:39:06.760
<v Speaker 2>a location where they cannot be executed for code execution.

752
00:39:07.360 --> 00:39:11.679
<v Speaker 2>Rigorously sanitize all user input. Never ever trust user input.

753
00:39:12.199 --> 00:39:15.199
<v Speaker 2>Use built in language functions designed for safe command execution

754
00:39:15.239 --> 00:39:18.440
<v Speaker 2>if you absolutely must, but avoid it if possible. Whitelist

755
00:39:18.440 --> 00:39:22.360
<v Speaker 2>allowed inputs for file inclusion. Disable dangerous PHP settings like

756
00:39:22.400 --> 00:39:25.599
<v Speaker 2>allowal fopen and allower include in PHP dot e ne

757
00:39:26.440 --> 00:39:29.559
<v Speaker 2>avoid including files based directly on user input. Use hard

758
00:39:29.559 --> 00:39:32.679
<v Speaker 2>coded pads or map user input to safe allowed filepads

759
00:39:33.000 --> 00:39:35.880
<v Speaker 2>and generally across the board. A well configured web application

760
00:39:36.000 --> 00:39:39.880
<v Speaker 2>firewall WAF acts as an essential safety net catching many

761
00:39:39.960 --> 00:39:40.800
<v Speaker 2>of these attack patterns.

762
00:39:40.840 --> 00:39:43.480
<v Speaker 1>Yes, wfs are important, and let's tackle a huge one.

763
00:39:43.880 --> 00:39:47.519
<v Speaker 1>SQL injection. This sounds incredibly powerful because it targets the

764
00:39:47.599 --> 00:39:48.519
<v Speaker 1>database directly.

765
00:39:48.880 --> 00:39:54.119
<v Speaker 2>It absolutely is powerful. SQL injection or SQL involves injecting

766
00:39:54.199 --> 00:39:58.679
<v Speaker 2>malicious SEQL structured query language code into input fields on

767
00:39:58.719 --> 00:40:03.400
<v Speaker 2>a web page like login forms, search boxes, even URL parameters.

768
00:40:04.039 --> 00:40:06.400
<v Speaker 2>The goal is to manipulate the SQL queries that the

769
00:40:06.400 --> 00:40:10.039
<v Speaker 2>web application sends to its back end database, essentially tricking

770
00:40:10.039 --> 00:40:12.760
<v Speaker 2>the application into running the attacker's SQL code.

771
00:40:12.800 --> 00:40:16.320
<v Speaker 1>And why is SQL considered so critical so powerful compared

772
00:40:16.360 --> 00:40:17.119
<v Speaker 1>to some other web.

773
00:40:17.000 --> 00:40:19.639
<v Speaker 2>Attacks because it gives the attacker a direct line to

774
00:40:19.679 --> 00:40:22.239
<v Speaker 2>the database, and the database is usually where the crown

775
00:40:22.320 --> 00:40:27.199
<v Speaker 2>jewels are kept user credentials, user names, hashed passwords, personal information,

776
00:40:27.480 --> 00:40:32.440
<v Speaker 2>financial records, sensitive company data, everything. A successful sequel attack

777
00:40:32.480 --> 00:40:36.159
<v Speaker 2>can allow an attacker to bypass authentication, entirely read sensitive

778
00:40:36.239 --> 00:40:39.480
<v Speaker 2>data they shouldn't see, modify or delete data, and sometimes

779
00:40:39.519 --> 00:40:42.559
<v Speaker 2>even execute operating system commands on the database server itself,

780
00:40:42.639 --> 00:40:45.440
<v Speaker 2>leading to full server compromise. It cuts right to the core.

781
00:40:45.760 --> 00:40:48.079
<v Speaker 1>How does a pintester even find out if a site

782
00:40:48.119 --> 00:40:49.639
<v Speaker 1>is vulnerable? What's the first step?

783
00:40:49.800 --> 00:40:52.360
<v Speaker 2>It often starts very simply, just trying to input special

784
00:40:52.440 --> 00:40:55.679
<v Speaker 2>characters into web forms, especially the single quote, which is

785
00:40:55.719 --> 00:40:58.599
<v Speaker 2>used to denote strings in SQL. If inputting a single

786
00:40:58.679 --> 00:41:01.280
<v Speaker 2>quote causes the website to throw a weird error message,

787
00:41:01.320 --> 00:41:04.280
<v Speaker 2>maybe revealing parts of in SQL query or database information,

788
00:41:04.880 --> 00:41:08.039
<v Speaker 2>that's a huge red flag. It suggests the application isn't

789
00:41:08.039 --> 00:41:11.360
<v Speaker 2>handling the input properly and is vulnerable. Once a potential

790
00:41:11.400 --> 00:41:15.679
<v Speaker 2>vulnerability is found, attackers try injecting actual SQL code. Common

791
00:41:15.679 --> 00:41:18.480
<v Speaker 2>payloads like or are one year one or or one

792
00:41:18.559 --> 00:41:21.239
<v Speaker 2>one can sometimes bypass log informs entirely because one a

793
00:41:21.320 --> 00:41:23.440
<v Speaker 2>U one is always true. If the input is in

794
00:41:23.440 --> 00:41:27.920
<v Speaker 2>the URL HGPGT request. They need to remember to URL

795
00:41:27.960 --> 00:41:30.920
<v Speaker 2>and code special characters like space becomes per twenty, single

796
00:41:30.960 --> 00:41:32.599
<v Speaker 2>quote becomes per twenty seven, And they.

797
00:41:32.480 --> 00:41:35.679
<v Speaker 1>Can actually pull data out of the database using these injections.

798
00:41:35.719 --> 00:41:36.440
<v Speaker 1>How does that work?

799
00:41:36.760 --> 00:41:39.920
<v Speaker 2>Yes, extracting data is a primary goal. Once they confirm

800
00:41:39.960 --> 00:41:43.280
<v Speaker 2>a vulnerability, they use various techniques. They might use order

801
00:41:43.280 --> 00:41:46.480
<v Speaker 2>by clauses, injecting order by one, order by two, et cetera,

802
00:41:46.920 --> 00:41:49.119
<v Speaker 2>and watching when the page breaks to figure out how

803
00:41:49.119 --> 00:41:53.400
<v Speaker 2>many columns the original query returns. Then they use union select.

804
00:41:53.679 --> 00:41:56.119
<v Speaker 2>This lets them combine the results of the original query

805
00:41:56.119 --> 00:41:58.719
<v Speaker 2>with the results of a new query they inject. Using

806
00:41:58.800 --> 00:42:02.440
<v Speaker 2>union select, they can start a extracting information the database version,

807
00:42:02.480 --> 00:42:06.079
<v Speaker 2>the current database, user names of other databases. Information schema

808
00:42:06.199 --> 00:42:09.199
<v Speaker 2>is key here. It's a database about databases, table names,

809
00:42:09.320 --> 00:42:12.840
<v Speaker 2>column names, and eventually dump the contents of sensitive tables

810
00:42:13.039 --> 00:42:16.320
<v Speaker 2>like the users or accounts table containing usernames and passwords.

811
00:42:16.840 --> 00:42:19.599
<v Speaker 2>In some database configurations, they might even be able to

812
00:42:19.639 --> 00:42:22.199
<v Speaker 2>read files from the server using functions like load file

813
00:42:22.199 --> 00:42:24.360
<v Speaker 2>it sets the road, or write files to the server

814
00:42:24.559 --> 00:42:28.039
<v Speaker 2>using into out file if the database process has sufficient permissions.

815
00:42:28.199 --> 00:42:31.400
<v Speaker 1>That sounds incredibly complex and manual. Is there an automated

816
00:42:31.400 --> 00:42:34.000
<v Speaker 1>way to perform SQL injection attacks?

817
00:42:34.079 --> 00:42:37.960
<v Speaker 2>Oh? Definitely, Manually exploiting SQL it can be tedious and complex.

818
00:42:38.000 --> 00:42:40.800
<v Speaker 2>That's where school map comes in. Stormap is a fantastic

819
00:42:40.880 --> 00:42:44.480
<v Speaker 2>open source penetration testing tool that completely automates the process

820
00:42:44.519 --> 00:42:48.639
<v Speaker 2>of detecting and exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities. You just pointed

821
00:42:48.719 --> 00:42:51.360
<v Speaker 2>at a potentially vulnerable URL, and it does the rest.

822
00:42:51.360 --> 00:42:54.800
<v Speaker 2>It can identify the database type myceql, Oracle, etc. Figure

823
00:42:54.840 --> 00:42:57.519
<v Speaker 2>out the injection techniques, fetch data, dump entire databases or

824
00:42:57.559 --> 00:43:01.320
<v Speaker 2>specific tables, access the underlying files, stem, and even try

825
00:43:01.360 --> 00:43:05.039
<v Speaker 2>to execute operating system commands through the database connection. Practical

826
00:43:05.079 --> 00:43:08.679
<v Speaker 2>commands are simple like sqollmap atch uhtpt dot test, dot com,

827
00:43:08.719 --> 00:43:12.119
<v Speaker 2>school end, dot, php, dot id one, DBS to list databases,

828
00:43:12.639 --> 00:43:15.719
<v Speaker 2>or dump dash you user's dashd web acdb to dump

829
00:43:15.760 --> 00:43:18.480
<v Speaker 2>the user's table from the web ATPDB database. It makes

830
00:43:18.599 --> 00:43:19.920
<v Speaker 2>complex attacks much easier.

831
00:43:20.000 --> 00:43:22.320
<v Speaker 1>Okay, school map sounds powerful. So what is the best

832
00:43:22.400 --> 00:43:25.559
<v Speaker 1>defense against SQL injection? What's the most crucial thing developers

833
00:43:25.599 --> 00:43:25.920
<v Speaker 1>need to do.

834
00:43:26.239 --> 00:43:30.119
<v Speaker 2>The single most important defense, hands down is using prepared statements,

835
00:43:30.480 --> 00:43:34.079
<v Speaker 2>also often called parameterized queries. Think of it this way.

836
00:43:34.519 --> 00:43:37.400
<v Speaker 2>Instead of building a SQL query by just sticking user

837
00:43:37.480 --> 00:43:40.679
<v Speaker 2>input directly into the SQL string, you create the SQL

838
00:43:40.760 --> 00:43:44.639
<v Speaker 2>query with placeholders like dot or dot user name. Then

839
00:43:44.840 --> 00:43:47.760
<v Speaker 2>you separately provide the user's input values, and the database

840
00:43:47.840 --> 00:43:51.559
<v Speaker 2>driver handles safely inserting those values into the placeholders. This

841
00:43:51.719 --> 00:43:55.119
<v Speaker 2>fundamentally separates the SQL code logic from the data. The

842
00:43:55.239 --> 00:43:58.719
<v Speaker 2>user's input is always treated as data, never is executable code,

843
00:43:59.039 --> 00:44:02.400
<v Speaker 2>making injection possible for that query. It's the gold standard.

844
00:44:02.920 --> 00:44:06.519
<v Speaker 2>Other important layers include using least privileged database accounts the

845
00:44:06.559 --> 00:44:09.760
<v Speaker 2>Web Applications database users should only have the absolute minimum

846
00:44:09.800 --> 00:44:13.480
<v Speaker 2>permissions needed to function, definitely not admin rights, using multiple

847
00:44:13.559 --> 00:44:16.000
<v Speaker 2>dB users if you have multiple applications, using the same

848
00:44:16.079 --> 00:44:19.000
<v Speaker 2>database server to keep them isolated, and again, deploying a

849
00:44:19.039 --> 00:44:22.760
<v Speaker 2>Web application firewall WAF can catch many common SQL.

850
00:44:22.480 --> 00:44:26.119
<v Speaker 1>Patterns prepared statements, got it And speaking of automated tools,

851
00:44:26.239 --> 00:44:28.679
<v Speaker 1>OASPZ is another big one for web testing.

852
00:44:29.000 --> 00:44:34.679
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely ZACE the z attack proxy is extremely popular. It's free,

853
00:44:34.880 --> 00:44:39.000
<v Speaker 2>open source and maintained by OAS Open Web Application Security Project.

854
00:44:39.400 --> 00:44:41.920
<v Speaker 2>It acts as a proxy between your browser and the website,

855
00:44:41.960 --> 00:44:44.000
<v Speaker 2>and it can automatically scan the website for a wide

856
00:44:44.119 --> 00:44:46.760
<v Speaker 2>range of vulnerabilities as you browse, or you can launch

857
00:44:46.800 --> 00:44:52.000
<v Speaker 2>active scans. It finds things like exss skewqlay insecure configurations,

858
00:44:52.119 --> 00:44:57.239
<v Speaker 2>information leaks, and it categorizes the findings by severity high, medium, low,

859
00:44:57.440 --> 00:45:01.199
<v Speaker 2>often shown with red orange yellow flags. It gives detailed

860
00:45:01.199 --> 00:45:04.960
<v Speaker 2>alerts and suggests remediation steps. Great tool for both beginners

861
00:45:05.000 --> 00:45:05.679
<v Speaker 2>and experts.

862
00:45:05.800 --> 00:45:08.880
<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's shift gears for our final deep dives mobile

863
00:45:08.920 --> 00:45:10.199
<v Speaker 1>phone penetration testing.

864
00:45:10.480 --> 00:45:12.960
<v Speaker 2>The number of mobile devices out there is just mind boggling.

865
00:45:13.079 --> 00:45:16.079
<v Speaker 1>It really is staggering. They're talking billions and billions globally,

866
00:45:16.159 --> 00:45:20.199
<v Speaker 1>something like fourteen billion now, heading towards maybe seventeen billion soon.

867
00:45:20.559 --> 00:45:23.639
<v Speaker 1>And because we do so much on our phones, banking, communications,

868
00:45:23.679 --> 00:45:26.920
<v Speaker 1>storing photos, accessing work data, mobile security has become this

869
00:45:27.119 --> 00:45:31.320
<v Speaker 1>massive new frontline for cyber attacks. These devices are treasure

870
00:45:31.360 --> 00:45:32.119
<v Speaker 1>troves of data.

871
00:45:32.559 --> 00:45:34.400
<v Speaker 2>So what are the main ways attackers try to get

872
00:45:34.440 --> 00:45:37.719
<v Speaker 2>into phones? The main attack factors? Well, there are several

873
00:45:37.840 --> 00:45:40.800
<v Speaker 2>common vectors for mobile Physical access is one, if someone

874
00:45:40.840 --> 00:45:44.760
<v Speaker 2>gets hold of your unlocked phone. Malware is huge. Malicious

875
00:45:44.760 --> 00:45:49.159
<v Speaker 2>apps often disguised as games or utilities, downloaded from unofficial stores,

876
00:45:49.280 --> 00:45:53.159
<v Speaker 2>or even sometimes sneaking into official ones. Network attacks exploiting

877
00:45:53.199 --> 00:45:56.000
<v Speaker 2>insecure Wi Fi is just as relevant for phones as

878
00:45:56.079 --> 00:46:00.840
<v Speaker 2>for laptops. Social engineering is very effective on mobile phishing, tearmishing,

879
00:46:01.239 --> 00:46:05.440
<v Speaker 2>fake log imprompts, insecure applications themselves, apps that handle data poorly,

880
00:46:05.559 --> 00:46:09.679
<v Speaker 2>don't encrypt traffic, store passwords insecurely, and of course vulnerabilities

881
00:46:09.679 --> 00:46:12.679
<v Speaker 2>in the mobiles itself, though those are rarer for attackers

882
00:46:12.719 --> 00:46:15.840
<v Speaker 2>to exploit widely without zero days. Often it still comes

883
00:46:15.880 --> 00:46:17.599
<v Speaker 2>down to tricking the user, and if.

884
00:46:17.480 --> 00:46:20.239
<v Speaker 1>An attacker does get in, what can they actually do?

885
00:46:20.599 --> 00:46:21.480
<v Speaker 1>What are the outcomes?

886
00:46:21.679 --> 00:46:25.119
<v Speaker 2>The consequences can be really severe. Data loss is a

887
00:46:25.159 --> 00:46:29.159
<v Speaker 2>big one. Contact stolen private messages, read sensitive photos or

888
00:46:29.239 --> 00:46:33.599
<v Speaker 2>documents exfiltrated. Attackers might use your phone's resources silently, using

889
00:46:33.599 --> 00:46:36.199
<v Speaker 2>its processing power for crypto mining, or making it part

890
00:46:36.239 --> 00:46:39.320
<v Speaker 2>of a botnet for dedas attacks. There's reputation loss if

891
00:46:39.320 --> 00:46:42.000
<v Speaker 2>they hijack your social media or email accounts, and the

892
00:46:42.079 --> 00:46:45.280
<v Speaker 2>worst case is often identity theft, grabbing enough personal information

893
00:46:45.360 --> 00:46:48.880
<v Speaker 2>and credentials to impersonate you, open fraudulent accounts, et cetera.

894
00:46:49.199 --> 00:46:51.599
<v Speaker 1>So is there a typical life cycle for a mobile attack?

895
00:46:51.840 --> 00:46:54.559
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it usually fallows a pattern. First, the vice infection.

896
00:46:55.159 --> 00:46:58.199
<v Speaker 2>This often involves tricking the victim. For Android, that might

897
00:46:58.280 --> 00:47:01.599
<v Speaker 2>mean downloading a malicious apka file from a third party source.

898
00:47:02.119 --> 00:47:05.800
<v Speaker 2>For iOS, it's harder, often requiring physical access, exploiting a

899
00:47:05.880 --> 00:47:09.960
<v Speaker 2>rare zero day, or maybe targeting jail broken devices. Second,

900
00:47:10.159 --> 00:47:13.079
<v Speaker 2>backdoor installation. Once the malware is on the device, it

901
00:47:13.159 --> 00:47:16.760
<v Speaker 2>often needs higher privileges. For Android, this might involve trying

902
00:47:16.800 --> 00:47:20.000
<v Speaker 2>to gain root access. For iOS, the device is jailbroken,

903
00:47:20.119 --> 00:47:24.639
<v Speaker 2>the malware has more freedom. Third data exultration. The malware

904
00:47:24.760 --> 00:47:28.119
<v Speaker 2>or backdoor then communicates back to the attacker server, sending

905
00:47:28.159 --> 00:47:32.599
<v Speaker 2>collected data, contacts, SMS messages, location data, photos, banking logins,

906
00:47:32.639 --> 00:47:33.679
<v Speaker 2>whatever it was designed to steal.

907
00:47:33.960 --> 00:47:36.679
<v Speaker 1>What about the official app stores Google Play, Apple App Store?

908
00:47:36.679 --> 00:47:39.480
<v Speaker 1>Are they generally safe or do malicious apps slip through?

909
00:47:40.039 --> 00:47:43.719
<v Speaker 2>Generally? Yes, the official stores Google Play Store, Apple App

910
00:47:43.800 --> 00:47:47.639
<v Speaker 2>Store are much safer than the alternatives. They have vetting processes,

911
00:47:47.880 --> 00:47:52.440
<v Speaker 2>automated scanning, and manual reviews designed to catch malware. However,

912
00:47:52.840 --> 00:47:56.960
<v Speaker 2>they're not perfect. Cleverly disguised malware does occasionally slip through

913
00:47:56.960 --> 00:48:00.199
<v Speaker 2>the cracks. The real danger often comes from third party

914
00:48:00.199 --> 00:48:03.840
<v Speaker 2>app stores or just downloading APK files directly from websites.

915
00:48:04.320 --> 00:48:08.000
<v Speaker 2>Attackers love to take legitimate apps, inject malware into them, repackaging,

916
00:48:08.320 --> 00:48:10.760
<v Speaker 2>and then offer them for free. On these alternative stores,

917
00:48:11.239 --> 00:48:14.360
<v Speaker 2>users download the trojanized version thinking they're getting a deal,

918
00:48:14.440 --> 00:48:16.159
<v Speaker 2>but they're actually installing spyware.

919
00:48:16.320 --> 00:48:18.880
<v Speaker 1>Right stick to official stores where possible. Okay, let's look

920
00:48:18.920 --> 00:48:22.079
<v Speaker 1>at androids specifically. What are the security basics of the

921
00:48:22.119 --> 00:48:23.199
<v Speaker 1>Android OS.

922
00:48:23.320 --> 00:48:26.360
<v Speaker 2>Androids built on Linux, and a key security concept is

923
00:48:26.400 --> 00:48:29.960
<v Speaker 2>the sandbox. Every app runs in its own isolated environment,

924
00:48:30.039 --> 00:48:33.559
<v Speaker 2>its own sandbox. Each app gets a unique user id

925
00:48:34.079 --> 00:48:37.840
<v Speaker 2>ued and the Linux kernel enforces separation. An app basically

926
00:48:37.880 --> 00:48:40.960
<v Speaker 2>can't directly access another app's private data or interfere with

927
00:48:41.000 --> 00:48:44.800
<v Speaker 2>the core system unless specific permissions are granted. Those permissions

928
00:48:44.800 --> 00:48:48.880
<v Speaker 2>are crucial things like accessing contacts, location, camera, Internet. They're

929
00:48:48.920 --> 00:48:52.159
<v Speaker 2>defined in the app's Android manifest dotxml file and the

930
00:48:52.280 --> 00:48:55.280
<v Speaker 2>user typically has to approve them. Android also has built

931
00:48:55.320 --> 00:48:57.960
<v Speaker 2>in features like Google play Protect, which scans apps for

932
00:48:58.079 --> 00:49:01.559
<v Speaker 2>malware and by default it blocked installation from unknown sources

933
00:49:01.639 --> 00:49:04.599
<v Speaker 2>outside the Play Store, though users can disable that protection.

934
00:49:05.280 --> 00:49:09.400
<v Speaker 2>For authentication, you have screen locks, pattern pian password biometrics,

935
00:49:09.639 --> 00:49:12.480
<v Speaker 2>and importantly, offline brute force attacks against the lock screen

936
00:49:12.519 --> 00:49:15.599
<v Speaker 2>are generally infeasible too many failed attempts conrigger a data way.

937
00:49:15.960 --> 00:49:18.440
<v Speaker 2>Plus there's the fine my device feature for remote location

938
00:49:18.559 --> 00:49:19.000
<v Speaker 2>and wiping.

939
00:49:19.159 --> 00:49:22.559
<v Speaker 1>And how does Apple's iOS compare the walled garden approach?

940
00:49:22.719 --> 00:49:22.920
<v Speaker 2>Yeah?

941
00:49:22.960 --> 00:49:24.280
<v Speaker 1>What are its security fundamentals?

942
00:49:24.519 --> 00:49:27.559
<v Speaker 2>iOS is known for its tight control. It's a proprietary

943
00:49:27.639 --> 00:49:30.760
<v Speaker 2>OS and apps primarily come from the heavily vetted app store.

944
00:49:31.280 --> 00:49:36.039
<v Speaker 2>Installing unofficial apps via IPA files is possible, but more restricted,

945
00:49:36.440 --> 00:49:40.880
<v Speaker 2>often requiring developer accounts or enterprise certificates. The iOS sandbox

946
00:49:40.960 --> 00:49:44.519
<v Speaker 2>is generally considered even stricter than androids by default. Jail

947
00:49:44.559 --> 00:49:47.239
<v Speaker 2>braking is the process of removing these restrictions on iOS,

948
00:49:47.360 --> 00:49:50.480
<v Speaker 2>similar to rooting on Android. It allows installing third party

949
00:49:50.519 --> 00:49:54.119
<v Speaker 2>apps and gives root access, but it also significantly weakened security,

950
00:49:54.480 --> 00:49:57.360
<v Speaker 2>voids the warranty and makes the device much more vulnerable

951
00:49:57.400 --> 00:50:01.280
<v Speaker 2>to malware. For authentication, iosu us as passcodes for six

952
00:50:01.320 --> 00:50:05.320
<v Speaker 2>digits face ID or touch ID. The passcode is cryptographically

953
00:50:05.400 --> 00:50:08.679
<v Speaker 2>tied to the device's unique device id UID to protect

954
00:50:08.719 --> 00:50:13.000
<v Speaker 2>data encryption keys like Android ten, failed passcode attempts usually

955
00:50:13.039 --> 00:50:16.280
<v Speaker 2>trigger a data wipe, and in corporate environments, mobile device

956
00:50:16.360 --> 00:50:19.639
<v Speaker 2>management MDM software is widely used to enforce security policies,

957
00:50:19.719 --> 00:50:22.199
<v Speaker 2>distribute apps, and remotely manage iPhones and iPads.

958
00:50:22.280 --> 00:50:24.960
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so both have sandboxes and protections. When pen testing

959
00:50:25.000 --> 00:50:27.559
<v Speaker 1>mobile apps? What are the key risks testers look for?

960
00:50:27.840 --> 00:50:30.239
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned in O Waspy Mobile top ten. Yes.

961
00:50:30.639 --> 00:50:33.719
<v Speaker 2>Similar to the web version, the O was bobol Top

962
00:50:33.840 --> 00:50:38.199
<v Speaker 2>ten lists the most critical security risks specifically for mobile applications.

963
00:50:38.760 --> 00:50:40.880
<v Speaker 2>Instead of just listening them all, let's highlight one that's

964
00:50:40.960 --> 00:50:45.400
<v Speaker 2>really common and dangerous. Insecure data storage. This happens when

965
00:50:45.440 --> 00:50:49.079
<v Speaker 2>an app stores sensitive information, maybe your logging credentials, session tokens,

966
00:50:49.119 --> 00:50:52.159
<v Speaker 2>personal details, even credit card numbers, directly on the phone's

967
00:50:52.159 --> 00:50:55.960
<v Speaker 2>storage without proper encryption or protection. It might store it

968
00:50:56.039 --> 00:50:59.920
<v Speaker 2>in plain text files, easily accessible databases, or preference file.

969
00:51:00.639 --> 00:51:03.280
<v Speaker 2>If an attacker gains even limited access to the device's

970
00:51:03.360 --> 00:51:06.519
<v Speaker 2>file system, maybe via malware or physical access, or even

971
00:51:06.599 --> 00:51:09.199
<v Speaker 2>just another robe app, if permissions are weak, they can

972
00:51:09.280 --> 00:51:12.679
<v Speaker 2>often just read this stored data directly, huge risk. Other

973
00:51:12.760 --> 00:51:17.119
<v Speaker 2>major risks include things like improper platform usage, misusing OS features,

974
00:51:17.239 --> 00:51:22.719
<v Speaker 2>insecure communication, not using HGTPS properly, code tampering, and reverse engineering.

975
00:51:22.280 --> 00:51:24.800
<v Speaker 1>The app into your data storage. Sounds bad, Let's look

976
00:51:24.840 --> 00:51:27.159
<v Speaker 1>at some practical Android hacking examples from the book.

977
00:51:27.480 --> 00:51:29.679
<v Speaker 2>How do you set up a test environment for testing

978
00:51:29.760 --> 00:51:33.440
<v Speaker 2>Android apps? You typically use Android's studio, which includes emulators

979
00:51:33.639 --> 00:51:38.199
<v Speaker 2>virtual Android devices. You also need the Android SDK Software

980
00:51:38.239 --> 00:51:41.760
<v Speaker 2>Development Kit, which contains essential tools like the Android debug

981
00:51:41.800 --> 00:51:45.280
<v Speaker 2>Bridge ADB, ADB is the crucial command line tool for

982
00:51:45.320 --> 00:51:49.039
<v Speaker 2>communicating with both emulators and physical Android devices connected via

983
00:51:49.119 --> 00:51:53.800
<v Speaker 2>USB with debugging enabled. Common ADB commands include ad devices

984
00:51:54.079 --> 00:51:57.119
<v Speaker 2>to see connected device emulators, ad shell to get a

985
00:51:57.199 --> 00:52:00.280
<v Speaker 2>command line shell directly on the device, adbed pull to

986
00:52:00.360 --> 00:52:02.920
<v Speaker 2>download files from the phone to your computer, and add

987
00:52:03.039 --> 00:52:06.199
<v Speaker 2>push to upload files to the phone. Pen Testers often

988
00:52:06.239 --> 00:52:10.559
<v Speaker 2>install deliberately vulnerable apps like Diva, Damn insecure vulnerable application

989
00:52:11.039 --> 00:52:13.679
<v Speaker 2>onto an emulator or test device to practice finding and

990
00:52:13.800 --> 00:52:16.840
<v Speaker 2>exploiting common flaws in a safe environment, and how might.

991
00:52:16.760 --> 00:52:20.679
<v Speaker 1>An attacker actually grab credentials using ADB leveraging that insecure

992
00:52:20.719 --> 00:52:21.719
<v Speaker 1>storage issue right.

993
00:52:21.760 --> 00:52:24.199
<v Speaker 2>This is where insecure storage becomes a real problem. If

994
00:52:24.239 --> 00:52:27.320
<v Speaker 2>an app foolishly stores, say, the user's log in details

995
00:52:27.360 --> 00:52:30.119
<v Speaker 2>in its shared preferences file, a common way Android apps

996
00:52:30.159 --> 00:52:34.119
<v Speaker 2>store simple settings in plain text. An attacker with ADB

997
00:52:34.280 --> 00:52:37.559
<v Speaker 2>access ABS shell can often navigate to the app's data

998
00:52:37.599 --> 00:52:40.599
<v Speaker 2>directory data Data app package, NAM shared prefs and just

999
00:52:40.719 --> 00:52:43.480
<v Speaker 2>use cat to print the contents of the XML preferences file.

1000
00:52:43.840 --> 00:52:46.320
<v Speaker 2>If the username and password are in there unencrypted, they're

1001
00:52:46.320 --> 00:52:50.599
<v Speaker 2>immediately exposed like catjackcar dot sem dot, Diva preferences dot

1002
00:52:50.719 --> 00:52:53.480
<v Speaker 2>XML might just split up a log in details super simple,

1003
00:52:53.599 --> 00:52:56.880
<v Speaker 2>super bad. And mobile apps can have SQL injection flaws too.

1004
00:52:57.039 --> 00:52:58.360
<v Speaker 2>How does that work on a phone?

1005
00:52:58.440 --> 00:53:01.400
<v Speaker 1>Yeah? Absolutely. Many Android apps use local Squad databases to

1006
00:53:01.440 --> 00:53:04.320
<v Speaker 1>store data. The app takes user input, like from a

1007
00:53:04.360 --> 00:53:06.559
<v Speaker 1>search bar, and puts it dirictly into a SQL query

1008
00:53:06.719 --> 00:53:10.880
<v Speaker 1>for that local database without proper sanitization SQL as possible.

1009
00:53:10.639 --> 00:53:13.320
<v Speaker 2>An attacker might use ad blogcat to watch the apps

1010
00:53:13.360 --> 00:53:15.920
<v Speaker 2>logs and see the SQL queries being made in real time.

1011
00:53:16.679 --> 00:53:20.039
<v Speaker 2>Then they could try injecting classic sequel payloads like R

1012
00:53:20.159 --> 00:53:23.440
<v Speaker 2>one one into an input field within the app. If

1013
00:53:23.519 --> 00:53:25.679
<v Speaker 2>the app is vulnerable, this might trick the query into

1014
00:53:25.760 --> 00:53:29.119
<v Speaker 2>returning all records from a table, potentially revealing all stored

1015
00:53:29.199 --> 00:53:32.599
<v Speaker 2>user names, passwords, credit card details, et cetera, right within

1016
00:53:32.679 --> 00:53:36.880
<v Speaker 2>the app's interface. Alternatively, with ADB access, you can often

1017
00:53:37.000 --> 00:53:40.360
<v Speaker 2>just add pull the entire squide database file eg. Squad

1018
00:53:40.440 --> 00:53:43.360
<v Speaker 2>dot dB from the app's data directory onto your computer.

1019
00:53:43.880 --> 00:53:45.960
<v Speaker 2>Then you can open it with a standard squite three

1020
00:53:46.039 --> 00:53:48.519
<v Speaker 2>tool and browse all the tables and data offline at

1021
00:53:48.559 --> 00:53:49.039
<v Speaker 2>your leisure.

1022
00:53:49.159 --> 00:53:51.719
<v Speaker 1>Wow. Okay, so pulling the whole database and what about

1023
00:53:51.760 --> 00:53:54.800
<v Speaker 1>hacking a real Android phone not just an emulator getting

1024
00:53:54.840 --> 00:53:55.639
<v Speaker 1>that remote control.

1025
00:53:55.920 --> 00:53:59.079
<v Speaker 2>That's the more realistic attack scenario. It usually involves creating

1026
00:53:59.360 --> 00:54:03.000
<v Speaker 2>a malicious APK file. First, you'd use a tool like

1027
00:54:03.280 --> 00:54:07.360
<v Speaker 2>msfinom part of metasploit, to generate an APK payload, often

1028
00:54:07.440 --> 00:54:09.760
<v Speaker 2>a reverse blate payload, which will connect back to the

1029
00:54:09.800 --> 00:54:12.159
<v Speaker 2>t attacker. You might even try to bin in this

1030
00:54:12.239 --> 00:54:15.360
<v Speaker 2>payload to a legitimate looking app to disguise it. Then

1031
00:54:15.519 --> 00:54:17.360
<v Speaker 2>you need a way for the victim's phone to connect

1032
00:54:17.400 --> 00:54:20.320
<v Speaker 2>back to you, since you're likely behind routers and firewalls.

1033
00:54:20.400 --> 00:54:22.920
<v Speaker 2>You typically set up a cloud server like a cheap

1034
00:54:23.000 --> 00:54:26.599
<v Speaker 2>Google Cloud or AWS instance running a Buntu. You'd host

1035
00:54:26.639 --> 00:54:29.000
<v Speaker 2>the malicious ABK on a web server on that cloud

1036
00:54:29.039 --> 00:54:31.679
<v Speaker 2>instance for the victim to download, and you'd run your

1037
00:54:31.719 --> 00:54:34.599
<v Speaker 2>metasplit listener on that same cloud server, waiting for the

1038
00:54:34.639 --> 00:54:38.079
<v Speaker 2>connection on its public IP address. The hardest part is

1039
00:54:38.320 --> 00:54:41.840
<v Speaker 2>social engineering convincing the victim to download and install that APK.

1040
00:54:42.519 --> 00:54:45.320
<v Speaker 2>They'd likely have to disable the install Unknown Apps security

1041
00:54:45.360 --> 00:54:47.760
<v Speaker 2>setting on their phone first, which is a hurdle, but

1042
00:54:47.840 --> 00:54:49.559
<v Speaker 2>if they do install it and run it, the payload

1043
00:54:49.559 --> 00:54:51.960
<v Speaker 2>connects back to your listener, giving you a interpreter session.

1044
00:54:52.360 --> 00:54:56.119
<v Speaker 2>From there, you have significant control SEMPS info check root,

1045
00:54:56.280 --> 00:55:00.000
<v Speaker 2>see if the phone is rooted, geolocate, get GPS coordinated

1046
00:55:00.000 --> 00:55:02.559
<v Speaker 2>it's dump contacts, dump SEMs, take pictures with the camera,

1047
00:55:02.679 --> 00:55:06.320
<v Speaker 2>record audio, lots of possibilities. Tools like evil droid are

1048
00:55:06.360 --> 00:55:09.599
<v Speaker 2>also popular for generating these malicious APKs, sometimes offering more

1049
00:55:09.639 --> 00:55:12.800
<v Speaker 2>evasion features or easier ways to inject backdoors into existing

1050
00:55:12.880 --> 00:55:13.920
<v Speaker 2>legitimate APKs.

1051
00:55:14.119 --> 00:55:16.599
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so connecting all this back, We've talked a lot

1052
00:55:16.599 --> 00:55:20.360
<v Speaker 1>about labs and testing. What's the main practical difference when

1053
00:55:20.679 --> 00:55:23.719
<v Speaker 1>trying to gain access in a real network like out

1054
00:55:23.760 --> 00:55:25.880
<v Speaker 1>in the wild compared to a controlled lab environment.

1055
00:55:25.960 --> 00:55:28.400
<v Speaker 2>The biggest practical difference, especially when you need the victim

1056
00:55:28.440 --> 00:55:30.840
<v Speaker 2>machine to connect back to you, like with reverse shells,

1057
00:55:30.960 --> 00:55:35.559
<v Speaker 2>interpreter listeners b fooks, is dealing with network address translation,

1058
00:55:36.000 --> 00:55:39.760
<v Speaker 2>net and firewalls. In a lab, your attacker machine and

1059
00:55:39.840 --> 00:55:42.880
<v Speaker 2>victim machine might be on the same simple network easy

1060
00:55:43.360 --> 00:55:46.119
<v Speaker 2>In the real world, your attacker machine, say your Collie

1061
00:55:46.159 --> 00:55:48.800
<v Speaker 2>box at home or on that cloud server, is behind

1062
00:55:48.840 --> 00:55:52.199
<v Speaker 2>a router. The victim is somewhere else, also behind a router.

1063
00:55:52.639 --> 00:55:55.280
<v Speaker 2>For that victim machine to connect back to your listener,

1064
00:55:55.639 --> 00:55:58.119
<v Speaker 2>you need to configure port forwarding on your router or

1065
00:55:58.199 --> 00:56:01.199
<v Speaker 2>the cloud server's firewall. I need to tell your router, hey,

1066
00:56:01.400 --> 00:56:04.719
<v Speaker 2>any incoming connection attempt on port, say forty four four

1067
00:56:04.719 --> 00:56:07.639
<v Speaker 2>to four should be forwarded to the internal IP address

1068
00:56:07.639 --> 00:56:11.039
<v Speaker 2>of my Collie machine. Without port forwarding, your router would

1069
00:56:11.079 --> 00:56:14.400
<v Speaker 2>just block those incoming connection attempts and your listener would

1070
00:56:14.440 --> 00:56:17.519
<v Speaker 2>never receive the connection from the victim. It's a crucial

1071
00:56:17.559 --> 00:56:20.280
<v Speaker 2>step for making reverse connections work across the Internet.

1072
00:56:20.519 --> 00:56:23.679
<v Speaker 1>Port forwarding right, That makes sense. What we have certainly

1073
00:56:23.760 --> 00:56:27.039
<v Speaker 1>covered a lot of ground today, an incredible journey through

1074
00:56:27.199 --> 00:56:31.320
<v Speaker 1>the intricate world of penetration testing. We went from cracking

1075
00:56:31.400 --> 00:56:34.440
<v Speaker 1>Wi Fi doing those sneaky man in the middle attacks

1076
00:56:35.039 --> 00:56:38.480
<v Speaker 1>all the way to exploiting servers clients using social engineering

1077
00:56:38.599 --> 00:56:41.199
<v Speaker 1>and digging into web and mobile security.

1078
00:56:41.400 --> 00:56:45.360
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a broad field, but hopefully by understanding these techniques,

1079
00:56:45.400 --> 00:56:47.840
<v Speaker 2>you're not just learning how the bad guys operate. You're

1080
00:56:47.880 --> 00:56:50.400
<v Speaker 2>really gaining that critical insight you need to build better

1081
00:56:50.480 --> 00:56:53.960
<v Speaker 2>defenses to spot weaknesses and the systems you use or manage.

1082
00:56:54.280 --> 00:56:58.119
<v Speaker 2>It's about turning that curiosity about how things break into

1083
00:56:58.199 --> 00:57:01.360
<v Speaker 2>a real capability to make things strong. That's the power here.

1084
00:57:01.480 --> 00:57:04.599
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, So the final question for you listening in this

1085
00:57:04.719 --> 00:57:07.559
<v Speaker 1>world is just increasingly connected, relying on all these systems,

1086
00:57:08.039 --> 00:57:11.079
<v Speaker 1>What hidden vulnerabilities might be lurking in the digital services

1087
00:57:11.239 --> 00:57:14.599
<v Speaker 1>use every single day, and maybe, just maybe, how could

1088
00:57:14.599 --> 00:57:18.440
<v Speaker 1>you potentially contribute ethically, of course, to finding them and

1089
00:57:18.599 --> 00:57:20.920
<v Speaker 1>making our shared digital world just a little bit safer.

1090
00:57:21.239 --> 00:57:25.719
<v Speaker 2>Keep asking questions, keep learning, keep exploring, and just remember

1091
00:57:25.760 --> 00:57:28.880
<v Speaker 2>that real, true security, it starts with really understanding how

1092
00:57:29.000 --> 00:57:30.559
<v Speaker 2>things work and how they can be broken
