Speaker 1: If you want to get the show early and ad free,
Speaker 1: head on over to the Peak Kinyonas show dot com.
Speaker 1: There you can choose from where you wish to support me.
Speaker 1: Now listen very carefully. I've had some people ask me
Speaker 1: about this, even though I think on the last ad
Speaker 1: I stated it pretty clearly. If you want an RSS feed,
Speaker 1: you're going to have to subscribe yourself Stack or through Patreon.
Speaker 1: You can also subscribe on my website which is right there,
Speaker 1: gum Road and what's the other one, subscribe Star and
Speaker 1: if you do that, you will get access to the
Speaker 1: audio file. So head on over to the pekan Yonashow
Speaker 1: dot com. You'll see all the ways that you can
Speaker 1: support me there. And I just want to thank everyone.
Speaker 1: It's because of you that I can put out the
Speaker 1: amount of material that I do. I can do what
Speaker 1: I'm doing with doctor Johnson on two hundred Years Together
Speaker 1: and everything else, the things that Thomas and I are
Speaker 1: doing together on Continental Philosophy, it's all because of you.
Speaker 1: And yeah, I mean, I'll never be able to thank
Speaker 1: you enough. So thank you. The pekan Yonashow dot com.
Speaker 1: Everything's there. I want to welcome everyone back to the
Speaker 1: Peak and Yona show. Thomas's back and we're still taking
Speaker 1: a break from the Continental philosophy. We'll be getting back
Speaker 1: into that soon. But I asked Thomas to cover a
Speaker 1: topic that I've been wanting to cover for a while,
Speaker 1: and yeah, I saw them. You can take as many
Speaker 1: episodes as he wants to cover this, because I think
Speaker 1: this is real important for from the revisionist perspective when
Speaker 1: World War according to World War Two, and it's also
Speaker 1: from podcasts I've heard in the past talking about it.
Speaker 1: It's quite controversial, and maybe I'll ask you some questions
Speaker 1: about that at the end. Thomas h even controversial amongst
Speaker 1: our guys, and I have I have a reason why
Speaker 1: I think it is. But why don't you tell us
Speaker 1: what we're going to talk about today?
Speaker 2: Well, in broad causal terms, we're going to talk about
Speaker 2: the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War.
Speaker 2: That's an issue that's mischaracterized.
Speaker 3: The main.
Speaker 2: Minority view is presented by Victor Suvarov's Icebreaker. Suvarov is
Speaker 2: a pseudonym for the Soviet defector who was deeply insinuated
Speaker 2: in the GRU.
Speaker 3: Which was.
Speaker 2: The military's the Red Army's counterpart to KGB KGB was
Speaker 2: technically a branch of the Soviet military, but gru was
Speaker 2: literally army intelligence because it may insisted well, most people
Speaker 2: in addressing Suverov, they've got to discrete and narrow focus.
Speaker 2: Essentially when they begin their analysis is on the eve
Speaker 2: of Operation Barbarossa, and they get bogged down in them
Speaker 2: nutia of what were Soviet deployments, how are they arrayed?
Speaker 3: Were they offensively arrayed?
Speaker 2: What were the comparative forest levels and capabilities of the
Speaker 2: Wehrmacht and the Red Army. Now these things are relevant,
Speaker 2: and I'll address those things, but that's not an adequate analysis,
Speaker 2: and Suvarov didn't begin as analysis there either. Suvarov's claim
Speaker 2: is that the Soviet Union literally started World War Two,
Speaker 2: and I accept that, and it's not strictly military analysis.
Speaker 2: Everything about the Second World War was in dialogue with
Speaker 2: Soviet power in the Soviet Union. The entire twentieth century
Speaker 2: was in dialogue with the Soviet Union and its existence,
Speaker 2: the ideology that animated its structure, activity, decision making, and
Speaker 2: you know, every imperative related to power, political activity, they're
Speaker 2: in So other people, there's a subset of people just
Speaker 2: don't really understand the issues presented, and they essentially accept
Speaker 2: what court historians claim. But then they diverge or they
Speaker 2: think that the question is should there you know, should
Speaker 2: there be a deeper analysis at this key juncture in
Speaker 2: the summer of nineteen forty one, they're looking at it
Speaker 2: the wrong way, you know, either out of ignorance or
Speaker 2: because they're cowed by what they view as political consensus
Speaker 2: among academ and they don't want to be availed a
Speaker 2: kind of punitive scrutiny. And I'll get into what I
Speaker 2: mean by that, you know, I if you if you
Speaker 2: accept the if you accept Suberov's perspective, which was also
Speaker 2: shared by Jakam Hoffman. Jackham Hoffman was a military historian.
Speaker 3: He was when he was alive.
Speaker 2: He died in middle age in the nineteen nineties early
Speaker 2: two thousands. But he wrote this exhaustive book called Stalin's
Speaker 2: War of Extermination, and he was essentially a Bundesla archivist.
Speaker 2: And he wrote this exhaustive book about the origins of
Speaker 2: the Second World War. And you know, about half of
Speaker 2: it is dedicated to the political conditions that gave rise
Speaker 2: to the conflict, and about half of it deals with
Speaker 2: kind of hard and fast military subject matter. But I
Speaker 2: think that's the best book written on the topic, and
Speaker 2: he agreed very much with with Suvarov's analysis, but also myself,
Speaker 2: especially being somebody who favors direct evidence and the testimony
Speaker 2: of parties to the events in question. You know, if
Speaker 2: you look at what Stalin said, and if you examine
Speaker 2: the sort of ontological aspects the political ontology of Marxist Leninism,
Speaker 2: that there should be something of a no brainer.
Speaker 3: You know, this this.
Speaker 2: Idea that the Soviet Union didn't have ambitions of an
Speaker 2: imperialistic nature, that it had no interest in exporting its
Speaker 2: ideology to the rest of the developed world, that it
Speaker 2: wasn't possessed of an expansionist sensibility. That's laughable. I mean,
Speaker 2: it's laughable because the only thing that sustains the revolutionary
Speaker 2: political cultures such as that that was characteristic of the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union is this kind of dynamic revolutionary violence that's
Speaker 2: got to be exported once the revolution is consolidated within.
Speaker 2: But also, you know, the Soviet Union between nineteen twenty
Speaker 2: two in nineteen thirty nine, it conquered a land mass
Speaker 2: of uh that was equivalent to the size of the
Speaker 2: German Reich in nineteen nineteen something like four hundred thousand
Speaker 2: square kilometers. This was a massively aggressive, expansion ist, burgaining superpower.
Speaker 2: You know, it's indisputable. And this idea that the world
Speaker 2: where you're talking about the United Kingdom, which had conquered
Speaker 2: twenty three percent of this planet and lorded over five
Speaker 2: hundred million people. You got the Soviet Union, which constitutes
Speaker 2: one sixth of this plan in it, and it's animated
Speaker 2: by this revolutionary imperative that it calls for the the
Speaker 2: bolshivization of the entire developed world. You have the United States,
Speaker 2: which is in controls as a nineteen thirty nine of
Speaker 2: fully half of this planets remaining resources. The idea that
Speaker 2: the world was terrified of this comparatively tiny country in Germany,
Speaker 2: that's a laugh, you know, I mean, that's that's ridiculous.
Speaker 2: I don't know how else to characterize it. And the
Speaker 2: fact that you know, people suggest that is.
Speaker 3: You know, is is insane.
Speaker 2: I'd say it's comical, but there's nothing funny about it,
Speaker 2: because this kind of garbage inform's decision making, and it
Speaker 2: you know, it's a it was a kind of mass
Speaker 2: delusion of in the public mind. But you know, first
Speaker 2: and foremost. It often makes his point really at the
Speaker 2: beginning of his study. You know, the imperialistic I don'ant
Speaker 2: imperialist in the sense Lenin has talked about it. I mean,
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union was an empire in the ideological sense
Speaker 2: make a mistake, and this sort of violent imperialistic power,
Speaker 2: political sensibility.
Speaker 3: It was.
Speaker 2: This kind of relatory practice. It was baked into every
Speaker 2: aspect of the Soviet political system, even even the heraldic
Speaker 2: standard of the Soviet Union, which endured until the final
Speaker 2: days in nineteen ninety one. It was literally the globe
Speaker 2: with the overlaid on the planet Earth is this giant
Speaker 2: hammer and sickle, you know. That was that was the
Speaker 2: Soviet coat of arms. The symbolism is obvious, you know,
Speaker 2: Communism will encircle the whole world, you know, And the
Speaker 2: motto of the Soviet Union similarly until the end translates
Speaker 2: to proletarians of all countries unite. Yeah, it can't really
Speaker 2: be more on the nose than it, you know, but
Speaker 2: again intrinsic to intrinsic to the Marxist Leninist ethos as
Speaker 2: a globalist perspective, That's one of the reasons why the
Speaker 2: twentieth century belongs so much to the communists because it
Speaker 2: was uniquely it was an ideology that was uniquely suited
Speaker 2: to the then present and it was fundamentally forward looking.
Speaker 2: They can't be denied, you know, it's it's obsolescence.
Speaker 3: Oh do you know the fact that it became a staid.
Speaker 2: The form of of organization and it was it was,
Speaker 2: it became an obsolescent psychological artifact. But at at Zena
Speaker 2: that it was very much u astride the zeitguys, So
Speaker 2: they can't be denied. And even it was animated by
Speaker 2: a uniquely expansionist sensibility. But even had it not then
Speaker 2: everybody was. It was everybody who was uh, you know,
Speaker 2: of participating in velt politique at scale had a global person.
Speaker 2: I mean, that was the reality. The twentieth century was
Speaker 2: decided what configuration globalism would take. Okay, it's just this
Speaker 2: idea of a kind of insular communism that was narrowly
Speaker 2: status that in inward looking. I mean, that's that's ridiculous.
Speaker 2: And beyond that Stalin Stalin himself came to characterize the
Speaker 2: ideological culture of Marcis Leninism for an entire generation. It's
Speaker 2: not accidentally. You know, he reigned for over thirty years,
Speaker 2: and I believe he was the single most powerful man
Speaker 2: on earth, and that is incredible for all kinds of reasons.
Speaker 2: But you know, he very much set the tenor of
Speaker 2: you know, the revolutionary culture characteristic of the socialist community
Speaker 2: and nations as it was called. And he he was
Speaker 2: a confidant of Lenin, and Lenin said repeatedly and often,
Speaker 2: but most notably Lenin's famous December sixth, nineteen twenty speech,
Speaker 2: which was dedicated to Communist practis and the vision for
Speaker 2: a velt Politique, a Soviet Velt's politique.
Speaker 3: He said that.
Speaker 2: To incite the capitalist states against each other is the
Speaker 2: main stratagem of communism. In his words, he said, quote
Speaker 2: of using the knives of scoundrels like the capitalist thieves
Speaker 2: against each other, on grounds that when quote when two
Speaker 2: thieves fall out and fight, the honest man laughs. As
Speaker 2: soon as we are strong enough to overthrow capitalism completely,
Speaker 2: we will grab him by the throat. Victory of the
Speaker 2: communist revolution in all countries is inevitable, and that encapsulates
Speaker 2: Marxist learniness of els politique, and that defined it until
Speaker 2: the very end. This was uh This was still the
Speaker 2: ambition when even amiss the strategic nuclear stalemate, you know,
Speaker 2: in the late eighties, they were still challenging in Latin
Speaker 2: America to try and rectify the strategic imbalance owing the
Speaker 2: you know, the advantage conferred the United States and.
Speaker 3: They're uh.
Speaker 2: And its allies, you know, by the energerment border. You know, again,
Speaker 2: this shouldn't be This shouldn't be mysterious or controversial. Rather,
Speaker 2: now what I think of is literally the Stalin doctrine.
Speaker 2: This was presented and articulated during a speech Stalin made
Speaker 2: to the Central Committee of the All Communist Party in
Speaker 2: July nineteen twenty five, and for the Soviets denied that
Speaker 2: this speech happened for decades and it was authenticated that
Speaker 2: the speech was made. And I'll get into how this
Speaker 2: came about as we continue, but we're not there yet.
Speaker 2: But what Stalin declared at this speech was quote, should
Speaker 2: the war begin, we will not stand by inactively. We
Speaker 2: will enter the war, but we will enter as the
Speaker 2: last belligerent. We will throw a weight on the scales
Speaker 2: that should be decisive. The historian named Alexander Neckridge, he's
Speaker 2: he he characterized this as the Stalin doctrine, you know,
Speaker 2: and he insisted that this was never abandoned. And that's true.
Speaker 2: And subsequent events and Stalin's decision making in a command
Speaker 2: role as well as his you know, in Warren peace terms,
Speaker 2: as well as in his role as General secretary, bear
Speaker 2: that out.
Speaker 3: You know, Stalin's last power political act was you know, giving.
Speaker 2: Mao and Kimmel Sung a green light to assault on
Speaker 2: the Korean peninsula, Okay, and.
Speaker 3: This this led to.
Speaker 2: A crisis on order of the Cuba crisis, you know,
Speaker 2: less than a decade later. It's a tangent, but I
Speaker 2: about every decade subsequent nineteen fifty, nineteen sixty two, nineteen
Speaker 2: seventy three, nineteen eighty three, there was a.
Speaker 3: General crisis.
Speaker 2: Wrought by the traversing of a conflict diad in what
Speaker 2: was a peripheral theater, but that you know, nonetheless had
Speaker 2: the potential for escalation to it's a general nuclear war.
Speaker 2: And but my point being that it's it's not as if,
Speaker 2: you know, Stalin literally at the end of his life
Speaker 2: was still making decisions pursuant to.
Speaker 3: This sort of doctrinaire you know.
Speaker 2: Program the UH and it's just became a fixation of
Speaker 2: Stalin's as the uh as a situation in Europe became
Speaker 2: characterized by punctuated crises, you know, for the next decade
Speaker 2: and a half, subsequent culimbating. Obviously, in nineteen thirty nine
Speaker 2: and throughout the nineteen thirties, Stalin undertook a massive armaments
Speaker 2: program that was unprecedented, you know, and based on his
Speaker 2: rhetoric not just too you know, the poet Borrow and
Speaker 2: to the assembled nomenclature of the All Communist Party, but
Speaker 2: also these public speeches that he made for the consumption
Speaker 2: not just of the Soviet people, but you know, as
Speaker 2: a way of signaling to the rest of the world.
Speaker 2: It was clear that he was convinced that a general
Speaker 2: crisis had arrived, you know, in global capitalism, was was
Speaker 2: on its way out, you know, and it was a
Speaker 2: ninety thirty nine early on thirty nine. The British ambassador
Speaker 2: to the Soviet Union, Stafford Cripps, and the American ambassador,
Speaker 2: Lawrence F. Steinhardt, they both were adamant that Stalin intended
Speaker 2: to bring about a war not only in Europe but
Speaker 2: in East Asia, and that this was a grave threat
Speaker 2: facing the British Empire. In the United States of America.
Speaker 2: And this is important, especially the fact of Stalin's attention
Speaker 2: to the developing situation in the Far East. I'd argue
Speaker 2: that this was an essential aspect of what became his
Speaker 2: strategic vision. And we'll get into what I mean by
Speaker 2: that in a moment. When around between about nineteen ninety
Speaker 2: one and nineteen ninety five, a lot of documents briefly
Speaker 2: became available from the Soviet archives. That's how David Irving
Speaker 2: got Gerbels the microfilm, the Gerbels diaries. That wouldn't be
Speaker 2: possible anymore obviously today and now if you even even
Speaker 2: if the Russian government viewed you as basically friendly your
Speaker 2: view to as a dissident from the United States, they're
Speaker 2: not going to give you access to anything the FSB has,
Speaker 2: and I mean even something of exclusively historical interest, you know,
Speaker 2: from the warriors. They're they're not going to let anybody
Speaker 2: see that, you know, from without. But there's this brief
Speaker 2: period of openness in the nineteen nineties, and during that
Speaker 2: period a bunch of documents that have been corralled by
Speaker 2: the People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs, you know, uh that uh,
Speaker 2: in the form of internal memorandum as well as literally
Speaker 2: UH directives from you know, the desk of Stalin. You know,
Speaker 2: obviously it's it's not indicated as such, but reading between
Speaker 2: the lines, you know, these are obviously these are obviously
Speaker 2: statements from the General Secretary, most notably the People's Commissaria
Speaker 2: delegation to Japan, the telegram from Moscow that UH suggests
Speaker 2: that this Soviet diplomatic mission in Japan should agree to
Speaker 2: any treaty that tends to bring about hostility between Japan
Speaker 2: and the United States. You know, it's very undisguised, all
Speaker 2: of these communications are you know, throughout the nineteen thirties
Speaker 2: that anything that brings about a Japanese American war should
Speaker 2: be cultivated. And this is this is imperative to Soviet ambitions,
Speaker 2: you know, the way it was described by one of
Speaker 2: the archivists who was involved in this NNGO, which I
Speaker 2: think still exists. There's this NGO that was corralled or
Speaker 2: incorporated rather in January nineteen eighty nine. You know this
Speaker 2: once before they enduring border fell like littlest in a
Speaker 2: year that was dedicated to documenting human rights abuses as
Speaker 2: they called it and other things. During the Stalin era,
Speaker 2: and there's interesting data relating to the power political situation,
Speaker 2: you know, in the years prior to nineteen thirty nine
Speaker 2: that they corralled as well, and of particular significance, there's
Speaker 2: this transcribed memo from years subsequent by a man who
Speaker 2: served in the the Chinese or Japanese diplomatic mission Soviet
Speaker 2: diplomatic mission in the nineteen thirties, and he said, quote
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union, for its part, was interested in distracting
Speaker 2: British and American tension from European problems and in Japanese
Speaker 2: neutrality during the period of the destruction of Germany and
Speaker 2: the liberation of Europe from capitalism. And then, of course
Speaker 2: it became clear that Japan was not going to remain
Speaker 2: neutral or America was not going to allow it to
Speaker 2: strike a position in neutrality. You know, it became imperative
Speaker 2: to do everything possible to bring the United States and
Speaker 2: Japan into collision, which once it became clear what the
Speaker 2: you know, the New Dealer's ambitions were that that that
Speaker 2: sort of resolved itself from the Soviet perspective, but nevertheless,
Speaker 2: Japan was at the top of Stalin's mind. And we'll
Speaker 2: get into what I mean by that in a minute. Now,
Speaker 2: this is really what's critical to sub hypothesis and mine
Speaker 2: own as well as what Suvarov posited. And again I
Speaker 2: echo this sentiment. I the Soviet Union started World War
Speaker 2: Two in August nineteen thirty nine when they launched a
Speaker 2: massive surprise attack at calcin Gole and knocked out the
Speaker 2: Japanese Imperial Army okay, and that changed everything, and that
Speaker 2: also was literally the start of World War two. If
Speaker 2: you look at hostilities in nineteen thirty nine and nineteen
Speaker 2: forty five as a singular conflict, which I think in
Speaker 2: broad conceptual terms is is useful, you know, especially because
Speaker 2: that's court history claims that War two began, you know,
Speaker 2: in September of nineteen thirty nine, and bizarrely they claim that,
Speaker 2: you know, Polish borders were somehow inviolable and any any
Speaker 2: traversing of them was an act of global war. But
Speaker 2: if we examined the ambitions and strategic orientations and objectives
Speaker 2: of why the Soviet Union assaulted Japan, it becomes clear
Speaker 2: that this was the start of the Second World War,
Speaker 2: and what the reasons why they did that, what this
Speaker 2: set in motion, It was truly an aspect of a
Speaker 2: global campaign of revolutionary quest. But in the days before that,
Speaker 2: and this is important too, because, like the nineteen twenty
Speaker 2: five speech, the Soviet Union later claimed this never happened,
Speaker 2: and it's interesting how the Allies dealt with it in
Speaker 2: subsequent years. But on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, Stalin
Speaker 2: called a surprise secret meeting of the Central Committee of
Speaker 2: the Politburo. During the meeting, Stalin announced that the time
Speaker 2: had now come to quote apply the torch of war
Speaker 2: to the European powder kig. Now, of course, this was
Speaker 2: also as the non aggression pack was being you know,
Speaker 2: negotiated with the German Reich. What Stalin said to the
Speaker 2: assembled Central Committee quote, if we accept the German proposal
Speaker 2: of the conclusion of a non aggression pact with them,
Speaker 2: they would naturally attack Poland and the intervention of France
Speaker 2: and England in this war would be inevitable. The resulting
Speaker 2: unrest and disorder will lead to the a destabilization of
Speaker 2: Western Europe without US us being the Soviet Union being
Speaker 2: initially drawn into the conflict. And again, you know, since
Speaker 2: nineteen twenty five, this had been what the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: was waiting for according to the Stalin doctrine, as a
Speaker 2: catalyst for you know, exporting the revolution too Western Europe,
Speaker 2: you know, and Stalin continued saying, quote we can hope
Speaker 2: for an advantageous entry into the war, and a typical
Speaker 2: Stalin euphemistic language, he said, quote a broad field of activity,
Speaker 2: A broad field of activity was now opening for the
Speaker 2: development of the world revolution. In other words, for the
Speaker 2: accomplishments which had never you know, been abandoned, for the
Speaker 2: sovietization of Europe and communist domination. He concluded this speech
Speaker 2: by saying, comrades, in the interest of the Soviet Union,
Speaker 2: the homeland of the workers, get busy in work, so
Speaker 2: warm me break out between the Reich and the capitalistic
Speaker 2: Anglo French bloc. This was the first stage of the
Speaker 2: plan for Bolshevik domination.
Speaker 3: And you know.
Speaker 2: It then the non aggression packed of course, was finalized
Speaker 2: four days subsequent, and it becomes clear, you know, I
Speaker 2: don't want to take us down another tangent. But it
Speaker 2: was really Gearing who pushed really hard for a firm
Speaker 2: alliance with the Japanese. I mean, Hitler was already sort
Speaker 2: of disposed that way.
Speaker 3: Anyway.
Speaker 2: Gearing respected the Japanese a lot, and Gearing was something
Speaker 2: of a terrible snob, and he thought that Japan was
Speaker 2: like a high culture. I mean, we're just but beyond
Speaker 2: the aesthetical attraction, you know, the understanding was that Japan
Speaker 2: was a great power in its own right, and they'd
Speaker 2: smashed the Imperial Russian Navy in nineteen o five, and
Speaker 2: you know, Japan was just you know, the ideal hedge
Speaker 2: they have against the Soviet Union the east. So when
Speaker 2: the Red Army launched this blitz assault of the Japanese
Speaker 2: Army in the Far East and utterly annihilated them, this
Speaker 2: terrified people. And it also it really meant that, you know,
Speaker 2: the Reich had no choice but to sue for temporary
Speaker 2: peace with the Soviet Union because then they had no hedge,
Speaker 2: you know, and it was clear that any moved westward,
Speaker 2: you know, and uh Hitler was confident that the war,
Speaker 2: a war with France, wouldn't be a quagmire, but just
Speaker 2: the same, you know, he knew there weren't the forces
Speaker 2: in being to fight off as Soviet assault through Poland
Speaker 2: as the Reich was you know, fighting in France. So
Speaker 2: this was a this was very much a conspiratorial master
Speaker 2: stroke of Stalin.
Speaker 3: I mean, I'm gonna be wrong.
Speaker 2: Stalin wanted to conquer the Far East anyway, but that
Speaker 2: timing was ideal, you know. And uh, there was the
Speaker 2: forces in being arrayed such that it was a sort
Speaker 2: of a perfect opportunity not just to humiliate the Japanese
Speaker 2: Imperial Army, but to telegraph a mess into the world
Speaker 2: about Soviet military might, you know. And it was highly
Speaker 2: effective in that regard. Now, the speech that Stalin made
Speaker 2: where he outlined his plan for the conquest of Europe
Speaker 2: in the midst of you know, a Western European civil war.
Speaker 2: The French national news agency HAVAS, they obtained a copy
Speaker 2: of this by way of Geneva, presumably from you know,
Speaker 2: their own spies are from a friendly intelligence service, and
Speaker 2: it was published in early nineteen thirty nine throughout France and.
Speaker 3: Moscow.
Speaker 2: Claimed it was fake and it was a forgery, and
Speaker 2: right up to the present day, incredibly you'll find these
Speaker 2: dummy court historians and they're apologists claiming that this this
Speaker 2: this was somehow a forgery by the French Havas agency
Speaker 2: and French intelligence by by by anti communists. I mean,
Speaker 2: it's ridiculous. In the official party paper UH Pravda November thirty,
Speaker 2: ninety thirty nine, Stalin himself finally came out and officially
Speaker 2: denied UH that the speech was uh was made and
Speaker 2: and and reiterated this preposterous claim that it was some
Speaker 2: forgery by ant Bye, by fascists. You know, this was demonstrated, UH.
Speaker 3: It was.
Speaker 2: Confirmed to have been a real speech by Stalin's official biographer,
Speaker 2: who died only around nineteen ninety five. Even in nineteen
Speaker 2: ninety three he gave an interview where he confirmed for
Speaker 2: all time that.
Speaker 3: This speech happened.
Speaker 2: The language of it was in fact transcribed perfectly in
Speaker 2: the you know, a document that was rendered by French
Speaker 2: of us, and that should have settled it for all time.
Speaker 2: But like I said, regime historians will simply argue by
Speaker 2: assertion and repeat lies over and over and over and
Speaker 2: over again, and they'll simply then the evidence in rebuttal.
Speaker 2: But that's UH. This is important because it became a
Speaker 2: major This is there was a major stumbling block for
Speaker 2: the New Dealers obviously as well as UH the War
Speaker 2: Party in the UK. You know, it was beyond an
Speaker 2: embarrassment that it stood the represent a real crisis with
Speaker 2: regards to their mandate. But uh, it goes to show
Speaker 2: you what kind of bully pulpit had been devised and
Speaker 2: erected in uh, you know, the US and the UK.
Speaker 2: I mean, part of it was because it was the
Speaker 2: it was it was a French news release. But even
Speaker 2: so it the ability to lock out and describe that
Speaker 2: conflicting information and facts that had a tended to impeach
Speaker 2: official narratives is pretty remarkable. And in the case of
Speaker 2: the in the case of the focus in the UK
Speaker 2: and the New Deal in America.
Speaker 3: But you know, uh, and.
Speaker 2: Super Off, to his credit, took up the issue of
Speaker 2: the August nineteenth speech, but.
Speaker 3: It was uh. Vokoganov.
Speaker 2: Volkoganov was the biographer in question who attested at the
Speaker 2: end of his life to the.
Speaker 3: Voracity of the speech. But you know, the.
Speaker 2: It was on January the sixteenth, nineteen ninety three. And
Speaker 2: again this was that period of approximately summer fall nineteen
Speaker 2: ninety one until probably very early nineteen ninety six where
Speaker 2: there was open access to Stalin era archives and data
Speaker 2: in the Soviet Union.
Speaker 1: Can we address something right there?
Speaker 3: Yeah, go ahead, Yeah.
Speaker 1: A lot of people will say that, like the Goebels
Speaker 1: draw diaries or forgeries. So you know, why is it
Speaker 1: all of this forgeries as well?
Speaker 2: Because it's a non argument. It's like saying who forged
Speaker 2: the Gerbel diaries? So what the Soviets did was they
Speaker 2: went to Berlin, they forged a bunch of documents. They
Speaker 2: put it in a Berlin bank vault, they pretended to
Speaker 2: discover it. They took it back to the Soviet Union,
Speaker 2: the NKVD, later the KGB. They continued to pretend that
Speaker 2: Gerbels had written dreams of diary material for fifty years.
Speaker 2: They lied about this for no reason. Then David Irving
Speaker 2: also lied about this, that he could capture clouts. Like what,
Speaker 2: there's there's this kind of stock in trade of simpletons
Speaker 2: and idiots to just go around saying things are fake.
Speaker 2: You know, Hitler's second book is fake. General Patten's personal
Speaker 2: diaries are fake, Gerbel's diaries are fake. Everything is fake, Okay,
Speaker 2: I mean, I it's like me saying Donald Trump is
Speaker 2: actually of Jewish parentage. I can't prove that. There's no
Speaker 2: evidence to that, there's no reason to believe that, but
Speaker 2: I'm just gonna keep saying that over and over again.
Speaker 2: See Donald Donald Trump is Jewish. Oh you don't think so. Yeah,
Speaker 2: well you don't know anything. He's Jewish, I say so.
Speaker 2: I mean I I can do that too. Okay, you know,
Speaker 2: the onus is on the declarant.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: And again I what so the Soviets are in the
Speaker 2: business of just pretending that Gorbals wrote these diaries. I
Speaker 2: you know, I don't accept that because it's stupid. But
Speaker 2: Loo Kalganov, he was Stalin's official biographer.
Speaker 3: He confirmed in.
Speaker 2: Is Vestia, which was an organ of uh that constellation
Speaker 2: of NGOs as I indicated a moment ago dedicated to
Speaker 2: you know, kind of truth and reconciliation about the Stalin era.
Speaker 2: He went public in Russian and European media, and he
Speaker 2: was adamant that the minutes of the August nineteen, nineteen
Speaker 2: thirty nine speech that have been published in France were legitimate.
Speaker 3: That speech happened, you know.
Speaker 2: And again I'm sure, I'm sure these same defectors are
Speaker 2: gonna claim, well that's fake. Okay, fine, everything is fake.
Speaker 2: I'm an adult and I'm a white person.
Speaker 3: I'm not. I'm not.
Speaker 2: I'm not I'm not a white in worder like developmently disabled.
Speaker 2: So I don't entertain that kind of stuff. But you know,
Speaker 2: the and there's a historian, this lady historian, Russian historian
Speaker 2: ts Busueva. She undertook this broad scholarly evaluation of Suvarov's books,
Speaker 2: not just Icebreaker, kind of his entire body of work.
Speaker 2: And her account of his work product was mixed. She
Speaker 2: was somewhat critical in acumtive way. She praised other stuff.
Speaker 2: But she was adamant that the August nineteenth, ninety thirty
Speaker 2: nine speech was legitimate, and she claimed that copies of
Speaker 2: the speech were known to exist in the special archives
Speaker 2: of the Central Committee and the USSR, and she made
Speaker 2: excerpts of it available to the public in December nineteen
Speaker 2: ninety four, and there was this big deal. The publication
Speaker 2: was a big deal, and it was unveiled at this
Speaker 2: conference of the quote Memorial Society. That's the need, that's
Speaker 2: the umbrella name of that constellation of NGOs I was
Speaker 2: talking about. And this is on August sixteenth, nineteen ninety five.
Speaker 2: That was this kind of grand unveiling, you know, but
Speaker 2: they they and this might seem silly to make such
Speaker 2: a big deal about the release of historical documents, but
Speaker 2: if you know about the soul be its system. I
Speaker 2: mean that it's it was this is a special case,
Speaker 2: you know, it's it wasn't an ordinary political system. And
Speaker 2: this this document changed everything, or it should have in
Speaker 2: the public mind, you know, because it's essentially uh a
Speaker 2: standing rebuttal to.
Speaker 3: The entire court narrative of the war and its origins.
Speaker 3: You know. So there's that too.
Speaker 2: So I mean again, I where where where's where's the
Speaker 2: evidence that all this is being faked? Like I guarantee
Speaker 2: you the Russian government wasn't happy about this, you know,
Speaker 2: I mean I and that they still aren't any anybody
Speaker 2: who is fluent into Russian and I they're they're welcome
Speaker 2: to proper evidence that this is all legered me in
Speaker 2: and it's fake. But obviously that won't be forthcoming, you know.
Speaker 2: And Thou's getting to the kind of meat of the
Speaker 2: honest of hostilities, you know again, suber Ov's the core
Speaker 2: of his theory.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: Again, it's it's not just a matter of a discreete
Speaker 2: revisionist analysis of Operation Barbarossa and which party combatant or
Speaker 2: combatants were you know, the aggressor. It's far more of
Speaker 2: a broad spectrum analysis and that and Jack and Hoffman
Speaker 2: agreed with this perspective, and I agree with it.
Speaker 3: Two.
Speaker 2: Not only was Stalin the progenitor of World War two,
Speaker 2: but World War two began on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine,
Speaker 2: because that's the date when Stalin ordered the assault on
Speaker 2: Calcan Goal. Japanese sixth Army was deployed there. Stalin ordered
Speaker 2: a massive assault. The Japanese were soundly defeated and routed.
Speaker 2: Marshal Zukoff stated on August twenty third, nineteen thirty nine,
Speaker 2: you know, in a reference to the Chalcan Goal assault
Speaker 2: as well as the non Aggression Pact with the Reich
Speaker 2: which had just been you know, signed Zukoff.
Speaker 3: Said.
Speaker 2: Quote Stalin was convinced that the non aggression pack would
Speaker 2: enable him to rap Hitler around his little finger. Quote
Speaker 2: we have tricked Hitler for the moment end quote with
Speaker 2: Stalin's opinion. According to Nikita Krushchiev, Suvarov's take, which should
Speaker 2: be obvious to those familiar with the historical record, the
Speaker 2: non Aggression packed on the heels of Japan being crushed
Speaker 2: on land in the Far East. Hitler believed then that
Speaker 2: he had to attack Poland to protect the frontier of
Speaker 2: the German Reich. He would not have acted without a
Speaker 2: guarantee of non aggression because Germany wasn't in a position
Speaker 2: to go to war with the Soviet Union at that moment.
Speaker 2: People were terrified of the Soviet Union after it had
Speaker 2: just crushed the mighty Japanese Army. So again, I mean,
Speaker 2: this is laughable, this idea that this idea that Stalin,
Speaker 2: who had who had just crushed the Japanese Army, who
Speaker 2: was sitting on the throne of a Burgining superpower that
Speaker 2: concluded one six of this planet. The idea that Stalin
Speaker 2: was terrified of Hitler and comparatively tiny Germany, that's preposterous.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: Molotov, you know, obviously was you know, chief diplomat. His
Speaker 2: official title was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
Speaker 2: Molotov spoke for the Supreme Soviet on October thirty first,
Speaker 2: nineteen thirty nine. He said, quote, a single blow against Poland,
Speaker 2: first by the Germans and then by the Red Army,
Speaker 2: and nothing, nothing will remain of this misbegotten little child
Speaker 2: of the Versailles Treaty, which owed its existence the repression
Speaker 2: of non Polish nationalities.
Speaker 3: You know. So again to.
Speaker 2: The Soviet nomenclature and especially Stalin, they wanted to they
Speaker 2: wanted to crush Poland, you know, among other things the
Speaker 2: polls were at the Polish Munta was ethnically cleansing Russians,
Speaker 2: you know, the Russians hated the Poles, you know. Interestingly,
Speaker 2: you know again this this this supposedly sacro stamic Polish democracy,
Speaker 2: It didn't bother the UK when when when the Soviets
Speaker 2: assaulted That's interesting, isn't it.
Speaker 3: But so.
Speaker 2: And then of course two within months, the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: assaulted Finland, you know, so uh the uh if if
Speaker 2: Stalin was this uh.
Speaker 3: Isolationist. Oh.
Speaker 2: And of course meanwhile too, uh, you know, they the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union was funding, equipping, arming, and facilitating the Communist
Speaker 2: revolution in Spain, which obviously had profound, you, strategic significance.
Speaker 2: You know, in the same period the Soviets had assaulted
Speaker 2: and conquered Poland, you know, Uh, They'd assaulted Finland and
Speaker 2: conquered uh archangel you know, and through the UH, the
Speaker 2: the waging of these aggressive wars against Poland and Finland,
Speaker 2: and then essentially the extortionate annexation of the Baltic you know,
Speaker 2: and threatening to assault Romania, which all of which gained
Speaker 2: territorial concessions out of shopping fire. Because again, every the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union's neighbors were incapable of standing up to its might,
Speaker 2: you know.
Speaker 3: So by this time, by.
Speaker 2: The eve of Barbarossa, the Soviet Union had expanded its
Speaker 2: territory by four hundred and twenty six thousand square kilometers.
Speaker 2: That was equivalent to the service of the entire German
Speaker 2: Reich in nineteen nineteen. And in so doing, as the
Speaker 2: Alkahafman points out, Stalin had ripped away and you know,
Speaker 2: buffer states on Germany's frontier. So I mean Europe was defenseless,
Speaker 2: you know, in the East.
Speaker 3: You know, and.
Speaker 2: Obviously the time was nigh for a for an assault
Speaker 2: on Europe and where Germany was as of nineteen forty.
Speaker 2: Despite Germany's initial military successes, you know, there wasn't anything
Speaker 2: Germany had done that Moscow considered particularly impressive or critical,
Speaker 2: you know, that would have changed or altered Stalin's ambition.
Speaker 2: It's quite the contrary. There was no longer a chance
Speaker 2: a decisive victory against the UK because you know, Sea
Speaker 2: Lion was a strategic ruse, the purpose of which was
Speaker 2: to deceive Stalin, by the way, not that not Churchill,
Speaker 2: which I mean, that's that's interesting in its.
Speaker 3: Own right, but the uh, you know.
Speaker 2: And as Stalin, who was already by that time had
Speaker 2: hundreds of spies in the roseveltminstrations, and he knew exactly
Speaker 2: what America was thinking, and he knew that the United
Speaker 2: States was going to stand behind the UK. German forces
Speaker 2: were scattered piece meal all over Europe. The German army
Speaker 2: was still dependent on, you know, on horse drawn transportation.
Speaker 2: Germany wasn't even.
Speaker 3: Close to.
Speaker 2: Being able to realize a full mobilization on the order
Speaker 2: of you know, nineteen fourteen, nineteen fifteen, even if there'd
Speaker 2: been the political will to do so. You know, the
Speaker 2: minute Germany was cut off from Romania, they their army
Speaker 2: would stop in its tracks because that was, you know,
Speaker 2: their only source of vital petroleum. I mean, what would
Speaker 2: would even a layman, looking at all relevant criteria and
Speaker 2: variables as of you know, nineteen forty nineteen forty one,
Speaker 2: sees Germany and his position a catastrophic vulnerability. So I
Speaker 2: mean the idea that the idea that you know, again,
Speaker 2: the idea that Stalin was afraid of Germany and afraid
Speaker 2: of its armed forces. I mean, that's that's preposterous, beyond belief,
Speaker 2: you know, and just for just for comparative purposes. Between
Speaker 2: November nineteen forty in the day Barbarossa June twenty second,
Speaker 2: nineteen forty one, there'd been a massive arms build up
Speaker 2: underway since nineteen twenty five, but this year and a
Speaker 2: half or this half the year, I mean, between you know,
Speaker 2: the winner in nineteen forty and summer forty one, this
Speaker 2: was an unprecedented military build up in terms of scale,
Speaker 2: scope and rapidity. On June twenty second, nineteen forty one,
Speaker 2: the Soviet Army possessed twenty four thousand tanks, almost two
Speaker 2: thousand of which were T thirty four's, which were technically
Speaker 2: classed as a medium tank, but they were probably the
Speaker 2: best overall tank of the entire war. They The Air
Speaker 2: force of the Red Army since nineteen thirty eight had
Speaker 2: acquired twenty three thousand, two hundred and forty five military aircraft,
Speaker 2: including three thousand, seven hundred that were of the most
Speaker 2: recent design. The Red Army had one hundred and forty
Speaker 2: eight thousand artillery pieces and mortars the inventory of the
Speaker 2: Royal Navy. In addition to its surface fleet, it had
Speaker 2: two hundred and ninety one submarines, which were an exclusively
Speaker 2: offensive platform. This meant that the Soviet Union had more
Speaker 2: submarines than any other country on this planet. They had
Speaker 2: more than four times the number of submarines that the
Speaker 2: Royal Navy did, which was the world's leading maritime state.
Speaker 2: I mean, this is early insane, you know, and it's
Speaker 2: unprecedented like that, nothing approaching this sort of uh scope
Speaker 2: scale and character of mobilization had ever been contemplated, let
Speaker 2: alone implemented. So you know, again Germany, which is over committed, overstretched, outnumbered,
Speaker 2: engaged in a quagmire, not mobilized for war. Like the
Speaker 2: idea that the Soviet Union, which again had just succeeded
Speaker 2: in stripping away Germany's buffer states in the East, and
Speaker 2: that successfully conquered Poland, and you know, the territory had
Speaker 2: covetated in the Arctic after you know, an unprovoked assault
Speaker 2: on Finland. This idea that the Soviet Union was afraid
Speaker 2: of Hitler, I mean, like it's it's so stupid, it
Speaker 2: almost doesn't warn't rebuttal because it you know, it's it's
Speaker 2: it's an exclusively bad faith.
Speaker 3: Argument. But what a time ago.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm gonna wrap up there because I was about
Speaker 2: to get into the some of the testim when you
Speaker 2: send the commis ours about the ideological culture of the
Speaker 2: Red Army itself. But yeah, I hope this was instructive
Speaker 2: to people.
Speaker 1: Sure, Yeah, I can't wait for part two. One thing
Speaker 1: that I would say is I think one of the
Speaker 1: reasons that the narrative on Spain had to be controlled
Speaker 1: after the war is because if the Republicans would have won,
Speaker 1: Spain belonged to the Soviet Union, and you know, you
Speaker 1: could you can make the argument Germany should have never
Speaker 1: left after victory, but the Soviet Union, in no way,
Speaker 1: shape or form, would have left. That would have been
Speaker 1: a Soviet satellite state, and they would have had Gibraltar.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, well, it's just like the It's just like
Speaker 2: when the ideological descendants of these of the traders who
Speaker 2: fought for the Communists in Spain, it's like when they
Speaker 2: support Islamic it's like when they support al Qaeda and Syria,
Speaker 2: they're like, Oh, that's not al Kaido, that's these other
Speaker 2: guys who don't actually exist. There were democrats. It's like
Speaker 2: this level of it's like this infantile level of delusion.
Speaker 2: I don't even think they actually believe that there's insulting
Speaker 2: the intelligence of everybody else, like you know, the oh
Speaker 2: those were at the communists. There was these imaginary other
Speaker 2: guys in Spain who like, what are you talking about?
Speaker 2: There was this there was this unusual coalition of syndicolas, fascists, Filangis, Carlos, Uh,
Speaker 2: you know, reactionary monarchist types. I'm kind of secular nationalists,
Speaker 2: you know that wash who are you know, referred to
Speaker 2: with the nationalist side. I mean in anchor as that
Speaker 2: may be. This is kind of the umbrella term that's favored.
Speaker 2: And uh, there was the common Turn and and and
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union and and their proxies. Like there wasn't
Speaker 2: this other element there that were uh, like gay feminist
Speaker 2: liberals or like Ernest Hemingway's buddies who just love freedom
Speaker 2: or whatever whatever delusion normies have. You know, it was
Speaker 2: a bunch of it was a bunch of communists like
Speaker 2: Eric Milke who were busy shooting priests and nuns in
Speaker 2: the face and torturing fascist to death. Then, you know,
Speaker 2: preparing to categorically exterminate anybody who wasn't editable, just like
Speaker 2: they'd done in the Soviet Union, and just like Bellacoon's
Speaker 2: uh brief tyranny did in Hungary, and and just like
Speaker 2: the Communists did everywhere that you know, they were victorious
Speaker 2: in theater.
Speaker 1: All right, I'll do your plugs for you. Go to
Speaker 1: Thomas's substack. That's real Thomas seven seven seven dot com
Speaker 1: dot substack dot com. Go to his website that's Thomas
Speaker 1: uh Thomas seven seven seven dot com. But the T
Speaker 1: is a seven, right, the first T is a seven.
Speaker 1: And yeah, you can you can find him sometimes on
Speaker 1: x h under under his government name.
Speaker 2: Yeah, can link all that stuff from my you can
Speaker 2: read all those links are on my website.
Speaker 1: So yeah, and I'll have the links in the in
Speaker 1: the show notes as well.
Speaker 3: So thank you.
Speaker 1: Until part two. I really appreciate you doing this. This
Speaker 1: is I think this is important.
Speaker 3: Yeah, likewise, thanks for hosting me.
Speaker 1: Thank you. M m.
Speaker 3: M m h
Speaker 2: Mh