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Everything's there. I want to welcome everyone back to the
Peak and Yona show. Thomas's back and we're still taking
a break from the Continental philosophy. We'll be getting back
into that soon. But I asked Thomas to cover a
topic that I've been wanting to cover for a while,
and yeah, I saw them. You can take as many
episodes as he wants to cover this, because I think
this is real important for from the revisionist perspective when
World War according to World War Two, and it's also
from podcasts I've heard in the past talking about it.
It's quite controversial, and maybe I'll ask you some questions
about that at the end. Thomas h even controversial amongst
our guys, and I have I have a reason why
I think it is. But why don't you tell us
what we're going to talk about today?
Speaker 2: Well, in broad causal terms, we're going to talk about
the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War.
That's an issue that's mischaracterized.
Speaker 3: The main.
Speaker 2: Minority view is presented by Victor Suvarov's Icebreaker. Suvarov is
a pseudonym for the Soviet defector who was deeply insinuated
in the GRU.
Speaker 3: Which was.
Speaker 2: The military's the Red Army's counterpart to KGB KGB was
technically a branch of the Soviet military, but gru was
literally army intelligence because it may insisted well, most people
in addressing Suverov, they've got to discrete and narrow focus.
Essentially when they begin their analysis is on the eve
of Operation Barbarossa, and they get bogged down in them
nutia of what were Soviet deployments, how are they arrayed?
Speaker 3: Were they offensively arrayed?
Speaker 2: What were the comparative forest levels and capabilities of the
Wehrmacht and the Red Army. Now these things are relevant,
and I'll address those things, but that's not an adequate analysis,
and Suvarov didn't begin as analysis there either. Suvarov's claim
is that the Soviet Union literally started World War Two,
and I accept that, and it's not strictly military analysis.
Everything about the Second World War was in dialogue with
Soviet power in the Soviet Union. The entire twentieth century
was in dialogue with the Soviet Union and its existence,
the ideology that animated its structure, activity, decision making, and
you know, every imperative related to power, political activity, they're
in So other people, there's a subset of people just
don't really understand the issues presented, and they essentially accept
what court historians claim. But then they diverge or they
think that the question is should there you know, should
there be a deeper analysis at this key juncture in
the summer of nineteen forty one, they're looking at it
the wrong way, you know, either out of ignorance or
because they're cowed by what they view as political consensus
among academ and they don't want to be availed a
kind of punitive scrutiny. And I'll get into what I
mean by that, you know, I if you if you
accept the if you accept Suberov's perspective, which was also
shared by Jakam Hoffman. Jackham Hoffman was a military historian.
Speaker 3: He was when he was alive.
Speaker 2: He died in middle age in the nineteen nineties early
two thousands. But he wrote this exhaustive book called Stalin's
War of Extermination, and he was essentially a Bundesla archivist.
And he wrote this exhaustive book about the origins of
the Second World War. And you know, about half of
it is dedicated to the political conditions that gave rise
to the conflict, and about half of it deals with
kind of hard and fast military subject matter. But I
think that's the best book written on the topic, and
he agreed very much with with Suvarov's analysis, but also myself,
especially being somebody who favors direct evidence and the testimony
of parties to the events in question. You know, if
you look at what Stalin said, and if you examine
the sort of ontological aspects the political ontology of Marxist Leninism,
that there should be something of a no brainer.
Speaker 3: You know, this this.
Speaker 2: Idea that the Soviet Union didn't have ambitions of an
imperialistic nature, that it had no interest in exporting its
ideology to the rest of the developed world, that it
wasn't possessed of an expansionist sensibility. That's laughable. I mean,
it's laughable because the only thing that sustains the revolutionary
political cultures such as that that was characteristic of the
Soviet Union is this kind of dynamic revolutionary violence that's
got to be exported once the revolution is consolidated within.
But also, you know, the Soviet Union between nineteen twenty
two in nineteen thirty nine, it conquered a land mass
of uh that was equivalent to the size of the
German Reich in nineteen nineteen something like four hundred thousand
square kilometers. This was a massively aggressive, expansion ist, burgaining superpower.
You know, it's indisputable. And this idea that the world
where you're talking about the United Kingdom, which had conquered
twenty three percent of this planet and lorded over five
hundred million people. You got the Soviet Union, which constitutes
one sixth of this plan in it, and it's animated
by this revolutionary imperative that it calls for the the
bolshivization of the entire developed world. You have the United States,
which is in controls as a nineteen thirty nine of
fully half of this planets remaining resources. The idea that
the world was terrified of this comparatively tiny country in Germany,
that's a laugh, you know, I mean, that's that's ridiculous.
I don't know how else to characterize it. And the
fact that you know, people suggest that is.
Speaker 3: You know, is is insane.
Speaker 2: I'd say it's comical, but there's nothing funny about it,
because this kind of garbage inform's decision making, and it
you know, it's a it was a kind of mass
delusion of in the public mind. But you know, first
and foremost. It often makes his point really at the
beginning of his study. You know, the imperialistic I don'ant
imperialist in the sense Lenin has talked about it. I mean,
the Soviet Union was an empire in the ideological sense
make a mistake, and this sort of violent imperialistic power,
political sensibility.
Speaker 3: It was.
Speaker 2: This kind of relatory practice. It was baked into every
aspect of the Soviet political system, even even the heraldic
standard of the Soviet Union, which endured until the final
days in nineteen ninety one. It was literally the globe
with the overlaid on the planet Earth is this giant
hammer and sickle, you know. That was that was the
Soviet coat of arms. The symbolism is obvious, you know,
Communism will encircle the whole world, you know, And the
motto of the Soviet Union similarly until the end translates
to proletarians of all countries unite. Yeah, it can't really
be more on the nose than it, you know, but
again intrinsic to intrinsic to the Marxist Leninist ethos as
a globalist perspective, That's one of the reasons why the
twentieth century belongs so much to the communists because it
was uniquely it was an ideology that was uniquely suited
to the then present and it was fundamentally forward looking.
They can't be denied, you know, it's it's obsolescence.
Speaker 3: Oh do you know the fact that it became a staid.
Speaker 2: The form of of organization and it was it was,
it became an obsolescent psychological artifact. But at at Zena
that it was very much u astride the zeitguys, So
they can't be denied. And even it was animated by
a uniquely expansionist sensibility. But even had it not then
everybody was. It was everybody who was uh, you know,
of participating in velt politique at scale had a global person.
I mean, that was the reality. The twentieth century was
decided what configuration globalism would take. Okay, it's just this
idea of a kind of insular communism that was narrowly
status that in inward looking. I mean, that's that's ridiculous.
And beyond that Stalin Stalin himself came to characterize the
ideological culture of Marcis Leninism for an entire generation. It's
not accidentally. You know, he reigned for over thirty years,
and I believe he was the single most powerful man
on earth, and that is incredible for all kinds of reasons.
But you know, he very much set the tenor of
you know, the revolutionary culture characteristic of the socialist community
and nations as it was called. And he he was
a confidant of Lenin, and Lenin said repeatedly and often,
but most notably Lenin's famous December sixth, nineteen twenty speech,
which was dedicated to Communist practis and the vision for
a velt Politique, a Soviet Velt's politique.
Speaker 3: He said that.
Speaker 2: To incite the capitalist states against each other is the
main stratagem of communism. In his words, he said, quote
of using the knives of scoundrels like the capitalist thieves
against each other, on grounds that when quote when two
thieves fall out and fight, the honest man laughs. As
soon as we are strong enough to overthrow capitalism completely,
we will grab him by the throat. Victory of the
communist revolution in all countries is inevitable, and that encapsulates
Marxist learniness of els politique, and that defined it until
the very end. This was uh This was still the
ambition when even amiss the strategic nuclear stalemate, you know,
in the late eighties, they were still challenging in Latin
America to try and rectify the strategic imbalance owing the
you know, the advantage conferred the United States and.
Speaker 3: They're uh.
Speaker 2: And its allies, you know, by the energerment border. You know, again,
this shouldn't be This shouldn't be mysterious or controversial. Rather,
now what I think of is literally the Stalin doctrine.
This was presented and articulated during a speech Stalin made
to the Central Committee of the All Communist Party in
July nineteen twenty five, and for the Soviets denied that
this speech happened for decades and it was authenticated that
the speech was made. And I'll get into how this
came about as we continue, but we're not there yet.
But what Stalin declared at this speech was quote, should
the war begin, we will not stand by inactively. We
will enter the war, but we will enter as the
last belligerent. We will throw a weight on the scales
that should be decisive. The historian named Alexander Neckridge, he's
he he characterized this as the Stalin doctrine, you know,
and he insisted that this was never abandoned. And that's true.
And subsequent events and Stalin's decision making in a command
role as well as his you know, in Warren peace terms,
as well as in his role as General secretary, bear
that out.
Speaker 3: You know, Stalin's last power political act was you know, giving.
Speaker 2: Mao and Kimmel Sung a green light to assault on
the Korean peninsula, Okay, and.
Speaker 3: This this led to.
Speaker 2: A crisis on order of the Cuba crisis, you know,
less than a decade later. It's a tangent, but I
about every decade subsequent nineteen fifty, nineteen sixty two, nineteen
seventy three, nineteen eighty three, there was a.
Speaker 3: General crisis.
Speaker 2: Wrought by the traversing of a conflict diad in what
was a peripheral theater, but that you know, nonetheless had
the potential for escalation to it's a general nuclear war.
And but my point being that it's it's not as if,
you know, Stalin literally at the end of his life
was still making decisions pursuant to.
Speaker 3: This sort of doctrinaire you know.
Speaker 2: Program the UH and it's just became a fixation of
Stalin's as the uh as a situation in Europe became
characterized by punctuated crises, you know, for the next decade
and a half, subsequent culimbating. Obviously, in nineteen thirty nine
and throughout the nineteen thirties, Stalin undertook a massive armaments
program that was unprecedented, you know, and based on his
rhetoric not just too you know, the poet Borrow and
to the assembled nomenclature of the All Communist Party, but
also these public speeches that he made for the consumption
not just of the Soviet people, but you know, as
a way of signaling to the rest of the world.
It was clear that he was convinced that a general
crisis had arrived, you know, in global capitalism, was was
on its way out, you know, and it was a
ninety thirty nine early on thirty nine. The British ambassador
to the Soviet Union, Stafford Cripps, and the American ambassador,
Lawrence F. Steinhardt, they both were adamant that Stalin intended
to bring about a war not only in Europe but
in East Asia, and that this was a grave threat
facing the British Empire. In the United States of America.
And this is important, especially the fact of Stalin's attention
to the developing situation in the Far East. I'd argue
that this was an essential aspect of what became his
strategic vision. And we'll get into what I mean by
that in a moment. When around between about nineteen ninety
one and nineteen ninety five, a lot of documents briefly
became available from the Soviet archives. That's how David Irving
got Gerbels the microfilm, the Gerbels diaries. That wouldn't be
possible anymore obviously today and now if you even even
if the Russian government viewed you as basically friendly your
view to as a dissident from the United States, they're
not going to give you access to anything the FSB has,
and I mean even something of exclusively historical interest, you know,
from the warriors. They're they're not going to let anybody
see that, you know, from without. But there's this brief
period of openness in the nineteen nineties, and during that
period a bunch of documents that have been corralled by
the People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs, you know, uh that uh,
in the form of internal memorandum as well as literally
UH directives from you know, the desk of Stalin. You know,
obviously it's it's not indicated as such, but reading between
the lines, you know, these are obviously these are obviously
statements from the General Secretary, most notably the People's Commissaria
delegation to Japan, the telegram from Moscow that UH suggests
that this Soviet diplomatic mission in Japan should agree to
any treaty that tends to bring about hostility between Japan
and the United States. You know, it's very undisguised, all
of these communications are you know, throughout the nineteen thirties
that anything that brings about a Japanese American war should
be cultivated. And this is this is imperative to Soviet ambitions,
you know, the way it was described by one of
the archivists who was involved in this NNGO, which I
think still exists. There's this NGO that was corralled or
incorporated rather in January nineteen eighty nine. You know this
once before they enduring border fell like littlest in a
year that was dedicated to documenting human rights abuses as
they called it and other things. During the Stalin era,
and there's interesting data relating to the power political situation,
you know, in the years prior to nineteen thirty nine
that they corralled as well, and of particular significance, there's
this transcribed memo from years subsequent by a man who
served in the the Chinese or Japanese diplomatic mission Soviet
diplomatic mission in the nineteen thirties, and he said, quote
the Soviet Union, for its part, was interested in distracting
British and American tension from European problems and in Japanese
neutrality during the period of the destruction of Germany and
the liberation of Europe from capitalism. And then, of course
it became clear that Japan was not going to remain
neutral or America was not going to allow it to
strike a position in neutrality. You know, it became imperative
to do everything possible to bring the United States and
Japan into collision, which once it became clear what the
you know, the New Dealer's ambitions were that that that
sort of resolved itself from the Soviet perspective, but nevertheless,
Japan was at the top of Stalin's mind. And we'll
get into what I mean by that in a minute. Now,
this is really what's critical to sub hypothesis and mine
own as well as what Suvarov posited. And again I
echo this sentiment. I the Soviet Union started World War
Two in August nineteen thirty nine when they launched a
massive surprise attack at calcin Gole and knocked out the
Japanese Imperial Army okay, and that changed everything, and that
also was literally the start of World War two. If
you look at hostilities in nineteen thirty nine and nineteen
forty five as a singular conflict, which I think in
broad conceptual terms is is useful, you know, especially because
that's court history claims that War two began, you know,
in September of nineteen thirty nine, and bizarrely they claim that,
you know, Polish borders were somehow inviolable and any any
traversing of them was an act of global war. But
if we examined the ambitions and strategic orientations and objectives
of why the Soviet Union assaulted Japan, it becomes clear
that this was the start of the Second World War,
and what the reasons why they did that, what this
set in motion, It was truly an aspect of a
global campaign of revolutionary quest. But in the days before that,
and this is important too, because, like the nineteen twenty
five speech, the Soviet Union later claimed this never happened,
and it's interesting how the Allies dealt with it in
subsequent years. But on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, Stalin
called a surprise secret meeting of the Central Committee of
the Politburo. During the meeting, Stalin announced that the time
had now come to quote apply the torch of war
to the European powder kig. Now, of course, this was
also as the non aggression pack was being you know,
negotiated with the German Reich. What Stalin said to the
assembled Central Committee quote, if we accept the German proposal
of the conclusion of a non aggression pact with them,
they would naturally attack Poland and the intervention of France
and England in this war would be inevitable. The resulting
unrest and disorder will lead to the a destabilization of
Western Europe without US us being the Soviet Union being
initially drawn into the conflict. And again, you know, since
nineteen twenty five, this had been what the Soviet Union
was waiting for according to the Stalin doctrine, as a
catalyst for you know, exporting the revolution too Western Europe,
you know, and Stalin continued saying, quote we can hope
for an advantageous entry into the war, and a typical
Stalin euphemistic language, he said, quote a broad field of activity,
A broad field of activity was now opening for the
development of the world revolution. In other words, for the
accomplishments which had never you know, been abandoned, for the
sovietization of Europe and communist domination. He concluded this speech
by saying, comrades, in the interest of the Soviet Union,
the homeland of the workers, get busy in work, so
warm me break out between the Reich and the capitalistic
Anglo French bloc. This was the first stage of the
plan for Bolshevik domination.
Speaker 3: And you know.
Speaker 2: It then the non aggression packed of course, was finalized
four days subsequent, and it becomes clear, you know, I
don't want to take us down another tangent. But it
was really Gearing who pushed really hard for a firm
alliance with the Japanese. I mean, Hitler was already sort
of disposed that way.
Speaker 3: Anyway.
Speaker 2: Gearing respected the Japanese a lot, and Gearing was something
of a terrible snob, and he thought that Japan was
like a high culture. I mean, we're just but beyond
the aesthetical attraction, you know, the understanding was that Japan
was a great power in its own right, and they'd
smashed the Imperial Russian Navy in nineteen o five, and
you know, Japan was just you know, the ideal hedge
they have against the Soviet Union the east. So when
the Red Army launched this blitz assault of the Japanese
Army in the Far East and utterly annihilated them, this
terrified people. And it also it really meant that, you know,
the Reich had no choice but to sue for temporary
peace with the Soviet Union because then they had no hedge,
you know, and it was clear that any moved westward,
you know, and uh Hitler was confident that the war,
a war with France, wouldn't be a quagmire, but just
the same, you know, he knew there weren't the forces
in being to fight off as Soviet assault through Poland
as the Reich was you know, fighting in France. So
this was a this was very much a conspiratorial master
stroke of Stalin.
Speaker 3: I mean, I'm gonna be wrong.
Speaker 2: Stalin wanted to conquer the Far East anyway, but that
timing was ideal, you know. And uh, there was the
forces in being arrayed such that it was a sort
of a perfect opportunity not just to humiliate the Japanese
Imperial Army, but to telegraph a mess into the world
about Soviet military might, you know. And it was highly
effective in that regard. Now, the speech that Stalin made
where he outlined his plan for the conquest of Europe
in the midst of you know, a Western European civil war.
The French national news agency HAVAS, they obtained a copy
of this by way of Geneva, presumably from you know,
their own spies are from a friendly intelligence service, and
it was published in early nineteen thirty nine throughout France and.
Speaker 3: Moscow.
Speaker 2: Claimed it was fake and it was a forgery, and
right up to the present day, incredibly you'll find these
dummy court historians and they're apologists claiming that this this
this was somehow a forgery by the French Havas agency
and French intelligence by by by anti communists. I mean,
it's ridiculous. In the official party paper UH Pravda November thirty,
ninety thirty nine, Stalin himself finally came out and officially
denied UH that the speech was uh was made and
and and reiterated this preposterous claim that it was some
forgery by ant Bye, by fascists. You know, this was demonstrated, UH.
Speaker 3: It was.
Speaker 2: Confirmed to have been a real speech by Stalin's official biographer,
who died only around nineteen ninety five. Even in nineteen
ninety three he gave an interview where he confirmed for
all time that.
Speaker 3: This speech happened.
Speaker 2: The language of it was in fact transcribed perfectly in
the you know, a document that was rendered by French
of us, and that should have settled it for all time.
But like I said, regime historians will simply argue by
assertion and repeat lies over and over and over and
over again, and they'll simply then the evidence in rebuttal.
But that's UH. This is important because it became a
major This is there was a major stumbling block for
the New Dealers obviously as well as UH the War
Party in the UK. You know, it was beyond an
embarrassment that it stood the represent a real crisis with
regards to their mandate. But uh, it goes to show
you what kind of bully pulpit had been devised and
erected in uh, you know, the US and the UK.
I mean, part of it was because it was the
it was it was a French news release. But even
so it the ability to lock out and describe that
conflicting information and facts that had a tended to impeach
official narratives is pretty remarkable. And in the case of
the in the case of the focus in the UK
and the New Deal in America.
Speaker 3: But you know, uh, and.
Speaker 2: Super Off, to his credit, took up the issue of
the August nineteenth speech, but.
Speaker 3: It was uh. Vokoganov.
Speaker 2: Volkoganov was the biographer in question who attested at the
end of his life to the.
Speaker 3: Voracity of the speech. But you know, the.
Speaker 2: It was on January the sixteenth, nineteen ninety three. And
again this was that period of approximately summer fall nineteen
ninety one until probably very early nineteen ninety six where
there was open access to Stalin era archives and data
in the Soviet Union.
Speaker 1: Can we address something right there?
Speaker 3: Yeah, go ahead, Yeah.
Speaker 1: A lot of people will say that, like the Goebels
draw diaries or forgeries. So you know, why is it
all of this forgeries as well?
Speaker 2: Because it's a non argument. It's like saying who forged
the Gerbel diaries? So what the Soviets did was they
went to Berlin, they forged a bunch of documents. They
put it in a Berlin bank vault, they pretended to
discover it. They took it back to the Soviet Union,
the NKVD, later the KGB. They continued to pretend that
Gerbels had written dreams of diary material for fifty years.
They lied about this for no reason. Then David Irving
also lied about this, that he could capture clouts. Like what,
there's there's this kind of stock in trade of simpletons
and idiots to just go around saying things are fake.
You know, Hitler's second book is fake. General Patten's personal
diaries are fake, Gerbel's diaries are fake. Everything is fake, Okay,
I mean, I it's like me saying Donald Trump is
actually of Jewish parentage. I can't prove that. There's no
evidence to that, there's no reason to believe that, but
I'm just gonna keep saying that over and over again.
See Donald Donald Trump is Jewish. Oh you don't think so. Yeah,
well you don't know anything. He's Jewish, I say so.
I mean I I can do that too. Okay, you know,
the onus is on the declarant.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: And again I what so the Soviets are in the
business of just pretending that Gorbals wrote these diaries. I
you know, I don't accept that because it's stupid. But
Loo Kalganov, he was Stalin's official biographer.
Speaker 3: He confirmed in.
Speaker 2: Is Vestia, which was an organ of uh that constellation
of NGOs as I indicated a moment ago dedicated to
you know, kind of truth and reconciliation about the Stalin era.
He went public in Russian and European media, and he
was adamant that the minutes of the August nineteen, nineteen
thirty nine speech that have been published in France were legitimate.
Speaker 3: That speech happened, you know.
Speaker 2: And again I'm sure, I'm sure these same defectors are
gonna claim, well that's fake. Okay, fine, everything is fake.
I'm an adult and I'm a white person.
Speaker 3: I'm not. I'm not.
Speaker 2: I'm not I'm not a white in worder like developmently disabled.
So I don't entertain that kind of stuff. But you know,
the and there's a historian, this lady historian, Russian historian
ts Busueva. She undertook this broad scholarly evaluation of Suvarov's books,
not just Icebreaker, kind of his entire body of work.
And her account of his work product was mixed. She
was somewhat critical in acumtive way. She praised other stuff.
But she was adamant that the August nineteenth, ninety thirty
nine speech was legitimate, and she claimed that copies of
the speech were known to exist in the special archives
of the Central Committee and the USSR, and she made
excerpts of it available to the public in December nineteen
ninety four, and there was this big deal. The publication
was a big deal, and it was unveiled at this
conference of the quote Memorial Society. That's the need, that's
the umbrella name of that constellation of NGOs I was
talking about. And this is on August sixteenth, nineteen ninety five.
That was this kind of grand unveiling, you know, but
they they and this might seem silly to make such
a big deal about the release of historical documents, but
if you know about the soul be its system. I
mean that it's it was this is a special case,
you know, it's it wasn't an ordinary political system. And
this this document changed everything, or it should have in
the public mind, you know, because it's essentially uh a
standing rebuttal to.
Speaker 3: The entire court narrative of the war and its origins.
You know. So there's that too.
Speaker 2: So I mean again, I where where where's where's the
evidence that all this is being faked? Like I guarantee
you the Russian government wasn't happy about this, you know,
I mean I and that they still aren't any anybody
who is fluent into Russian and I they're they're welcome
to proper evidence that this is all legered me in
and it's fake. But obviously that won't be forthcoming, you know.
And Thou's getting to the kind of meat of the
honest of hostilities, you know again, suber Ov's the core
of his theory.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: Again, it's it's not just a matter of a discreete
revisionist analysis of Operation Barbarossa and which party combatant or
combatants were you know, the aggressor. It's far more of
a broad spectrum analysis and that and Jack and Hoffman
agreed with this perspective, and I agree with it.
Speaker 3: Two.
Speaker 2: Not only was Stalin the progenitor of World War two,
but World War two began on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine,
because that's the date when Stalin ordered the assault on
Calcan Goal. Japanese sixth Army was deployed there. Stalin ordered
a massive assault. The Japanese were soundly defeated and routed.
Marshal Zukoff stated on August twenty third, nineteen thirty nine,
you know, in a reference to the Chalcan Goal assault
as well as the non Aggression Pact with the Reich
which had just been you know, signed Zukoff.
Speaker 3: Said.
Speaker 2: Quote Stalin was convinced that the non aggression pack would
enable him to rap Hitler around his little finger. Quote
we have tricked Hitler for the moment end quote with
Stalin's opinion. According to Nikita Krushchiev, Suvarov's take, which should
be obvious to those familiar with the historical record, the
non Aggression packed on the heels of Japan being crushed
on land in the Far East. Hitler believed then that
he had to attack Poland to protect the frontier of
the German Reich. He would not have acted without a
guarantee of non aggression because Germany wasn't in a position
to go to war with the Soviet Union at that moment.
People were terrified of the Soviet Union after it had
just crushed the mighty Japanese Army. So again, I mean,
this is laughable, this idea that this idea that Stalin,
who had who had just crushed the Japanese Army, who
was sitting on the throne of a Burgining superpower that
concluded one six of this planet. The idea that Stalin
was terrified of Hitler and comparatively tiny Germany, that's preposterous.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: Molotov, you know, obviously was you know, chief diplomat. His
official title was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
Molotov spoke for the Supreme Soviet on October thirty first,
nineteen thirty nine. He said, quote, a single blow against Poland,
first by the Germans and then by the Red Army,
and nothing, nothing will remain of this misbegotten little child
of the Versailles Treaty, which owed its existence the repression
of non Polish nationalities.
Speaker 3: You know. So again to.
Speaker 2: The Soviet nomenclature and especially Stalin, they wanted to they
wanted to crush Poland, you know, among other things the
polls were at the Polish Munta was ethnically cleansing Russians,
you know, the Russians hated the Poles, you know. Interestingly,
you know again this this this supposedly sacro stamic Polish democracy,
It didn't bother the UK when when when the Soviets
assaulted That's interesting, isn't it.
Speaker 3: But so.
Speaker 2: And then of course two within months, the Soviet Union
assaulted Finland, you know, so uh the uh if if
Stalin was this uh.
Speaker 3: Isolationist. Oh.
Speaker 2: And of course meanwhile too, uh, you know, they the
Soviet Union was funding, equipping, arming, and facilitating the Communist
revolution in Spain, which obviously had profound, you, strategic significance.
You know, in the same period the Soviets had assaulted
and conquered Poland, you know, Uh, They'd assaulted Finland and
conquered uh archangel you know, and through the UH, the
the waging of these aggressive wars against Poland and Finland,
and then essentially the extortionate annexation of the Baltic you know,
and threatening to assault Romania, which all of which gained
territorial concessions out of shopping fire. Because again, every the
Soviet Union's neighbors were incapable of standing up to its might,
you know.
Speaker 3: So by this time, by.
Speaker 2: The eve of Barbarossa, the Soviet Union had expanded its
territory by four hundred and twenty six thousand square kilometers.
That was equivalent to the service of the entire German
Reich in nineteen nineteen. And in so doing, as the
Alkahafman points out, Stalin had ripped away and you know,
buffer states on Germany's frontier. So I mean Europe was defenseless,
you know, in the East.
Speaker 3: You know, and.
Speaker 2: Obviously the time was nigh for a for an assault
on Europe and where Germany was as of nineteen forty.
Despite Germany's initial military successes, you know, there wasn't anything
Germany had done that Moscow considered particularly impressive or critical,
you know, that would have changed or altered Stalin's ambition.
It's quite the contrary. There was no longer a chance
a decisive victory against the UK because you know, Sea
Lion was a strategic ruse, the purpose of which was
to deceive Stalin, by the way, not that not Churchill,
which I mean, that's that's interesting in its.
Speaker 3: Own right, but the uh, you know.
Speaker 2: And as Stalin, who was already by that time had
hundreds of spies in the roseveltminstrations, and he knew exactly
what America was thinking, and he knew that the United
States was going to stand behind the UK. German forces
were scattered piece meal all over Europe. The German army
was still dependent on, you know, on horse drawn transportation.
Germany wasn't even.
Speaker 3: Close to.
Speaker 2: Being able to realize a full mobilization on the order
of you know, nineteen fourteen, nineteen fifteen, even if there'd
been the political will to do so. You know, the
minute Germany was cut off from Romania, they their army
would stop in its tracks because that was, you know,
their only source of vital petroleum. I mean, what would
would even a layman, looking at all relevant criteria and
variables as of you know, nineteen forty nineteen forty one,
sees Germany and his position a catastrophic vulnerability. So I
mean the idea that the idea that you know, again,
the idea that Stalin was afraid of Germany and afraid
of its armed forces. I mean, that's that's preposterous, beyond belief,
you know, and just for just for comparative purposes. Between
November nineteen forty in the day Barbarossa June twenty second,
nineteen forty one, there'd been a massive arms build up
underway since nineteen twenty five, but this year and a
half or this half the year, I mean, between you know,
the winner in nineteen forty and summer forty one, this
was an unprecedented military build up in terms of scale,
scope and rapidity. On June twenty second, nineteen forty one,
the Soviet Army possessed twenty four thousand tanks, almost two
thousand of which were T thirty four's, which were technically
classed as a medium tank, but they were probably the
best overall tank of the entire war. They The Air
force of the Red Army since nineteen thirty eight had
acquired twenty three thousand, two hundred and forty five military aircraft,
including three thousand, seven hundred that were of the most
recent design. The Red Army had one hundred and forty
eight thousand artillery pieces and mortars the inventory of the
Royal Navy. In addition to its surface fleet, it had
two hundred and ninety one submarines, which were an exclusively
offensive platform. This meant that the Soviet Union had more
submarines than any other country on this planet. They had
more than four times the number of submarines that the
Royal Navy did, which was the world's leading maritime state.
I mean, this is early insane, you know, and it's
unprecedented like that, nothing approaching this sort of uh scope
scale and character of mobilization had ever been contemplated, let
alone implemented. So you know, again Germany, which is over committed, overstretched, outnumbered,
engaged in a quagmire, not mobilized for war. Like the
idea that the Soviet Union, which again had just succeeded
in stripping away Germany's buffer states in the East, and
that successfully conquered Poland, and you know, the territory had
covetated in the Arctic after you know, an unprovoked assault
on Finland. This idea that the Soviet Union was afraid
of Hitler, I mean, like it's it's so stupid, it
almost doesn't warn't rebuttal because it you know, it's it's
it's an exclusively bad faith.
Speaker 3: Argument. But what a time ago.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm gonna wrap up there because I was about
to get into the some of the testim when you
send the commis ours about the ideological culture of the
Red Army itself. But yeah, I hope this was instructive
to people.
Speaker 1: Sure, Yeah, I can't wait for part two. One thing
that I would say is I think one of the
reasons that the narrative on Spain had to be controlled
after the war is because if the Republicans would have won,
Spain belonged to the Soviet Union, and you know, you
could you can make the argument Germany should have never
left after victory, but the Soviet Union, in no way,
shape or form, would have left. That would have been
a Soviet satellite state, and they would have had Gibraltar.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, well, it's just like the It's just like
when the ideological descendants of these of the traders who
fought for the Communists in Spain, it's like when they
support Islamic it's like when they support al Qaeda and Syria,
they're like, Oh, that's not al Kaido, that's these other
guys who don't actually exist. There were democrats. It's like
this level of it's like this infantile level of delusion.
I don't even think they actually believe that there's insulting
the intelligence of everybody else, like you know, the oh
those were at the communists. There was these imaginary other
guys in Spain who like, what are you talking about?
There was this there was this unusual coalition of syndicolas, fascists, Filangis, Carlos, Uh,
you know, reactionary monarchist types. I'm kind of secular nationalists,
you know that wash who are you know, referred to
with the nationalist side. I mean in anchor as that
may be. This is kind of the umbrella term that's favored.
And uh, there was the common Turn and and and
the Soviet Union and and their proxies. Like there wasn't
this other element there that were uh, like gay feminist
liberals or like Ernest Hemingway's buddies who just love freedom
or whatever whatever delusion normies have. You know, it was
a bunch of it was a bunch of communists like
Eric Milke who were busy shooting priests and nuns in
the face and torturing fascist to death. Then, you know,
preparing to categorically exterminate anybody who wasn't editable, just like
they'd done in the Soviet Union, and just like Bellacoon's
uh brief tyranny did in Hungary, and and just like
the Communists did everywhere that you know, they were victorious
in theater.
Speaker 1: All right, I'll do your plugs for you. Go to
Thomas's substack. That's real Thomas seven seven seven dot com
dot substack dot com. Go to his website that's Thomas
uh Thomas seven seven seven dot com. But the T
is a seven, right, the first T is a seven.
And yeah, you can you can find him sometimes on
x h under under his government name.
Speaker 2: Yeah, can link all that stuff from my you can
read all those links are on my website.
Speaker 1: So yeah, and I'll have the links in the in
the show notes as well.
Speaker 3: So thank you.
Speaker 1: Until part two. I really appreciate you doing this. This
is I think this is important.
Speaker 3: Yeah, likewise, thanks for hosting me.
Speaker 1: Thank you. M m.
Speaker 3: M m h
Speaker 2: Mh