Speaker 1: Welcome to our deep dive. Today. We're going to be
Speaker 1: looking at something that's both fascinating and a little bit unnerving,
Speaker 1: the security of Apple's operating systems.
Speaker 2: And to guide us through this intricate landscape, we've got
Speaker 2: Jonathan Levin's book OS Internal's Volume three, Security and Insecurity.
Speaker 2: This book is like a masterclass in how Apple builds
Speaker 2: those defenses, and equally important, how those defenses have been tested, challenged,
Speaker 2: and sometimes even broken.
Speaker 1: It's like getting a backstage pass to the world of
Speaker 1: digital security, a peak behind the curtain to see how
Speaker 1: the wizards at Apple try to keep our Max and
Speaker 1: iPhones safe exactly.
Speaker 2: And what Levin does so brilliantly is he takes us
Speaker 2: through both sides of the story, the security and the insecurity.
Speaker 2: It's not just about how things are supposed to work,
Speaker 2: it's about how they can be made to work differently,
Speaker 2: sometimes with unintended consequences.
Speaker 1: Okay, so let's start unpacking all of this. Where do
Speaker 1: you think we should begin. What's the foundation of all
Speaker 1: of the security stuff.
Speaker 2: Well, like any good fortress, it all starts with authentication.
Speaker 2: How your device knows it's really you trying to get.
Speaker 1: In right, So beyond the usual username and password. What's
Speaker 1: going on behind the scenes.
Speaker 2: You'd think it's just a simple check but Apple actually
Speaker 2: uses a multi layered approach that goes beyond those traditional methods.
Speaker 2: Think of it like a series of checkpoints, each with
Speaker 2: its own set of guards and protocols.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm intrigued. Walk me through these checkpoints.
Speaker 2: So you have the familiar login screen, But behind that,
Speaker 2: there's a process called open direct read, which uses a
Speaker 2: Skellite database to manage user configurations.
Speaker 1: And data hold on scale. That's a pretty standard database format,
Speaker 1: isn't it the kind that anyone with a little know
Speaker 1: how can access.
Speaker 2: That's the interesting part. This database isn't locked away in
Speaker 2: some impenetrable vault. With the right tools and knowledge, you
Speaker 2: can actually pick inside and see what's going on. You
Speaker 2: can even manipulate certain user properties.
Speaker 1: Wait, are you saying that just by accessing this database,
Speaker 1: someone could potentially tinker with user accounts.
Speaker 2: Potentially. Yes, It's important to note that there are likely
Speaker 2: other security measures in place to prevent unauthorized modifications, but
Speaker 2: the fact that this database is relatively accessible highlights a
Speaker 2: key concept in security. It's all about layers.
Speaker 1: Like an Onion feel back one layer and there's another
Speaker 1: one underneath exactly.
Speaker 2: No single mechanism is fool proof. Security relies on a
Speaker 2: combination of interlocking defenses, each providing a different level of protection.
Speaker 1: Okay, so we've got this squarelight database managing user info.
Speaker 1: What else is involved in this multi layered authentication system.
Speaker 2: Well, in addition to those traditional mechanisms, Apple also introduce
Speaker 2: something called the Local Authentication Framework.
Speaker 1: What's the purpose of that? Is it like a more
Speaker 1: advanced form of authentication.
Speaker 2: You could say that it's designed to provide a standardized
Speaker 2: and secure way for developers to build authentication features into
Speaker 2: their apps. I think touch, id, face, ID, those kinds
Speaker 2: of things.
Speaker 1: Ah, So it's about streamlining the process for both developers
Speaker 1: and users while also making it more secure.
Speaker 2: Right, and it aims to create a more concert experience
Speaker 2: across all Apple devices. So whether you're using your iPhone,
Speaker 2: your iPad, or your Mac, the authentication process feels familiar
Speaker 2: and reliable.
Speaker 1: That makes sense. So we've got this multi layered system
Speaker 1: in place to verify our identity. What happens once we're
Speaker 1: in How does the system keep track of what we're doing,
Speaker 1: especially from a security standpoint?
Speaker 2: That's where auditing comes in. Think of it as a
Speaker 2: digital trail of breadcrumbs that records security related events on
Speaker 2: your Mac.
Speaker 1: So every time something important happens, like accessing a protected
Speaker 1: file or changing a system setting, it gets logged.
Speaker 2: Exactly. It's like having a security camera that's always watching,
Speaker 2: but instead of video footage, it records a log of
Speaker 2: actions and events. This information can be invaluable for forensic
Speaker 2: analysis if there's ever a security breach.
Speaker 1: That makes sense, like being able to retrace your steps
Speaker 1: if something goes wrong. But how does the system decide
Speaker 1: what to audit in the first place. It can't possibly
Speaker 1: log everything we do, right.
Speaker 2: That's where another key player enters the scene. KATHUUF, Apple's
Speaker 2: kernel level authorization system KAUF.
Speaker 1: Never heard of it. What's its role in all of this?
Speaker 2: KUF is one of those behind the scenes mechanisms that
Speaker 2: most users never interact with directly, but it plays a
Speaker 2: crucial role in deciding which actions are allowed and which
Speaker 2: ones aren't. Think of it like a security checkpoint within
Speaker 2: the core of the operating system.
Speaker 1: So it's like a bouncer at a club deciding who
Speaker 1: gets in and who stays out.
Speaker 2: That's a good analogy. But instead of looking at IDs,
Speaker 2: CAUTH uses something called scopes to define areas of interest
Speaker 2: for authorization scopes.
Speaker 1: Okay, now you're losing me. What exactly is a scope
Speaker 1: in this context?
Speaker 2: Imagine you have different security zones within a building. Some
Speaker 2: areas are open to everyone, while others require special clearance
Speaker 2: to enter. Scopes in CAUTH work in a similar way.
Speaker 2: They define different categories of actions or resources that require authorization.
Speaker 1: So different scopes for different levels of sensitivity. Can you
Speaker 1: give me a concrete example?
Speaker 2: Absolutely? One example is the coth scope of generic scope,
Speaker 2: which covers a wide range of actions. Then you have
Speaker 2: more specific scopes like cost co process, which focuses specifically
Speaker 2: on actions related to processes like launching a new app
Speaker 2: or terminating an existing one.
Speaker 1: Interesting. So each scope is like a specific security domain
Speaker 1: with its own set of rules and permissions.
Speaker 2: Precisely, and here's where it gets really clever. Whenever an
Speaker 2: action falls under a particular scope, coth triggers a corresponding
Speaker 2: callback function.
Speaker 1: A callback function, what does that do?
Speaker 2: Think of it like an alarm that goes off when
Speaker 2: something specific happens. In this case, the alarm triggers a
Speaker 2: piece of code that checks whether the action is allowed
Speaker 2: based on predefined rules and policies.
Speaker 1: So it's like having a security guard stationed at each
Speaker 1: checkpoint who checks your credentials before letting.
Speaker 2: You through, exactly, And it's all happening at the kernel level,
Speaker 2: which is the heart of the operating system. This means
Speaker 2: that COTH has a very low level and fundamental role
Speaker 2: in enforcing security.
Speaker 1: So code is like the gatekeeper, checking credentials and making decisions.
Speaker 1: But where do those credentials come from in the first place?
Speaker 1: Are we still talking about user names and passwords?
Speaker 2: Actually, this is where things get even more interesting. COTH
Speaker 2: uses its own system of credentials that are distinct from
Speaker 2: traditional POSXX credentials, which are the ones associated with usernames
Speaker 2: and passwords.
Speaker 1: Wait, different credentials. Why would they do that? Isn't that
Speaker 1: making things unnecessarily complicated?
Speaker 2: It might seem that way at first, but there's a
Speaker 2: good reason for this separation. It ties into Apple's Mandatory
Speaker 2: Access Control MAAC framework, which is another crucial layer of
Speaker 2: security that will dive into in a moment.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm starting to see how all of these pieces
Speaker 1: are connected. It's like a chain reaction. One security mechanism leading.
Speaker 2: To the next exactly, and MAAC relies on these KUTH
Speaker 2: credentials to enforce its security policies. So understanding how cualth
Speaker 2: works is essential for grapping the bigger picture of how
Speaker 2: Apple secures its operating systems.
Speaker 1: All right, you've peaked my curiosity. Let's talk about this
Speaker 1: MAAC framework. What is it and how does it fit
Speaker 1: into this whole security puzzle.
Speaker 2: Think of MSS as the judge and jury in the
Speaker 2: court of your operating system. It's responsible for evaluating whether
Speaker 2: an action should be permitted based on a system of
Speaker 2: labels and policies, and it's deeply integrated with the kernel,
Speaker 2: which means it's very difficult to bypass or tamper.
Speaker 1: With labels and policies. This sounds very official. Can you
Speaker 1: break it down for me?
Speaker 2: Sure, every object in the system, whether it's a file,
Speaker 2: a process, or even a network socket, can be tagged
Speaker 2: with an a mass label. Think of it like a security
Speaker 2: clearance level for digital objects.
Speaker 1: So some files might be marked as top secret while
Speaker 1: others are public exactly.
Speaker 2: And then you have policies, which are essentially rules that
Speaker 2: determine how objects with different labels can interact.
Speaker 1: So a top secret file can't be accessed by someone
Speaker 1: with a public clearance level.
Speaker 2: You got it. It's all about controlling access based on
Speaker 2: these labels and policies, ensuring that sensitive information and resources
Speaker 2: are protected from unauthorized access.
Speaker 1: This is fascinating. It's like a whole security ecosystem operating
Speaker 1: beneath the surface of our max. Now, the book also
Speaker 1: mentioned something called texts in relation to M SICK. What
Speaker 1: are those?
Speaker 2: Texts? Are kernel extensions. They're basically little pieces of code
Speaker 2: that extend the kernel's functionality, and some texts are dependent
Speaker 2: on MAC for their operation.
Speaker 1: Meaning they rely on MAS for security checks and enforcement.
Speaker 2: That's right. The book even shows you how to use
Speaker 2: a simple command line tool to identify these MAC dependent texts.
Speaker 2: It's a good example of how Levin provides not just
Speaker 2: theoretical knowledge, but also practical insights into how these mechanisms work.
Speaker 1: That's really cool. So we've covered authentication, auditing, COTH, and MA.
Speaker 1: It seems like we're building up a pretty solid understanding
Speaker 1: of Apple's security layers. What's next on our journey.
Speaker 2: Let's talk about code signing, Apple's way of guaranteeing the
Speaker 2: integrity and origin of executable code. Think of it like
Speaker 2: a digital signature that verifies the authenticity of an app
Speaker 2: or software.
Speaker 1: So it's how Apple ensures the apps were downloading and
Speaker 1: running are legitimate and haven't been tampered with, like a
Speaker 1: seal of approval.
Speaker 2: Exactly, every piece of software that runs on mac os
Speaker 2: and iOS has a code signature attached to it. This
Speaker 2: signature is cryptographically generated, which means it's very difficult to forge.
Speaker 1: Okay, but what does this signature actually look like? How
Speaker 1: does it work on a technical level?
Speaker 2: Well, get ready to dive a bit deeper, because it
Speaker 2: involves something called the superblob.
Speaker 1: Superblob sounds a bit intimidating.
Speaker 2: Don't worry, it's not as scary as it sounds. It's
Speaker 2: basically a container that holds various pieces of information, including
Speaker 2: the actual signature itself, which is based on something called
Speaker 2: CMS Cryptographic Message syntax. And then there are these special
Speaker 2: slots within the superblob for storing additional metadata metadata.
Speaker 1: What kind of information are we talking about here?
Speaker 2: This is where things get really interesting. These special slots
Speaker 2: can contain things like entitlements, which we'll discuss later, but
Speaker 2: for now, just know that they add an extra layer
Speaker 2: of control over what an app can do.
Speaker 1: Okay, entitlements sound intreating, But first, tell me more about
Speaker 1: this superblob. Can we actually see it? Can we examine
Speaker 1: its contents?
Speaker 2: Absolutely? The book walks you through how to extract and
Speaker 2: inspect code signatures using the command line tools. You can
Speaker 2: actually see the structure of the superblob in its different components.
Speaker 1: So we can peek under the hood and see how
Speaker 1: this digital signature is constructed. Very cool. What else is
Speaker 1: important about these code signatures?
Speaker 2: They also include flags that influence how the code can
Speaker 2: be executed. These flags control things like whether the code
Speaker 2: can be debugged or injected into other processes, So another
Speaker 2: way Apple tries to limit what malicious actors can do.
Speaker 1: So it's not just about verifying the integrity of the
Speaker 1: code itself, it's also about controlling how that code behaves
Speaker 1: once it's running on the system. Another layer of security.
Speaker 2: You've got it. It's all about making it as difficult
Speaker 2: as possible for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities and compromise the system.
Speaker 1: Well, it seems like Apple has put a lot of
Speaker 1: thought and effort into securing its operating systems. We've only
Speaker 1: just scratched the surface, and I'm already impressed by the
Speaker 1: complexity and depth of these security mechanisms, and.
Speaker 2: We've only just begun. There's much more to explore in
Speaker 2: the world of Apple security, so stay tuned for more
Speaker 2: insights as we continue our deep dive.
Speaker 1: Welcome back. It's amazing to think about all the security
Speaker 1: measures working behind the scenes every time we use our
Speaker 1: Apple devices. It's like having a whole team of digital
Speaker 1: bodyguards protecting us from unseen threats.
Speaker 2: And like any good security team, they've got multiple layers
Speaker 2: of defense. It's not just about keeping the bad guys out,
Speaker 2: it's also about limiting the damage they can do if
Speaker 2: they manage to slip through the cracks.
Speaker 1: Okay, that makes sense. So what kind of damage control
Speaker 1: measures are we talking about here? What else does Apple
Speaker 1: have up its sleeve?
Speaker 2: Well, let's talk about software restrictions, specifically, how even Apple's
Speaker 2: own apps have limits on what they can do.
Speaker 1: Wait a minute, even Apple's apps. I thought they had
Speaker 1: free rein of the system.
Speaker 2: Not quite. Even Apple recognizes that some operations are just
Speaker 2: too sensitive to allow unrestricted access.
Speaker 1: Like, what kind of things are we talking about?
Speaker 2: Think about accessing your keychain, where all your passwords and
Speaker 2: sensitive data are stored, or modifying critical system files. Those
Speaker 2: are actions that shouldn't be taken lightly.
Speaker 1: Right, That makes sense. You don't want just any app
Speaker 1: messing around with that kind of stuff. So how does
Speaker 1: macOS keep things in check?
Speaker 2: It uses something called the authorizations mechanism, which relies on
Speaker 2: you guessed it, another Scoli database.
Speaker 1: Cerusly, another Scualae database. They seem to be everywhere.
Speaker 2: They're just really good at what they do. This particular
Speaker 2: database stores rules that is, termine which operations require special
Speaker 2: authorization and under what conditions that authorization can be granted.
Speaker 1: So it's like a set of bylaws for apps, defining
Speaker 1: what they can and can't do exactly.
Speaker 2: And what's really interesting is that you can actually examine
Speaker 2: this authorization database yourself using the command line.
Speaker 1: Wait, you mean we can see the actual rules that
Speaker 1: govern what apps can do?
Speaker 2: You can. The book even gives examples of how to
Speaker 2: extract specific rules from the database using this quad three tool.
Speaker 2: It's a fascinating way to see how these restrictions are implemented.
Speaker 1: I can see how that would be useful for developers
Speaker 1: and security researchers. But is there any risk in making
Speaker 1: this information accessible. Could someone with bad intentions manipulate these rules?
Speaker 2: It's definitely a possibility, although Apple has implemented various safeguards
Speaker 2: to make it more difficult. But it highlights the constant
Speaker 2: cat and mouse game between security and those who seek
Speaker 2: to circumvent it.
Speaker 1: Right, because if you can change the rules of the game,
Speaker 1: you can potentially change the outcome exactly.
Speaker 2: And that brings us to another important player in Apple's
Speaker 2: security lineup, Gatekeepers.
Speaker 1: Gatekeepers is that like a bouncer for apps, checking IDs
Speaker 1: at the door.
Speaker 2: You could say that it's Apple's first line of defense
Speaker 2: against untrusted software. When you download an application from the Internet,
Speaker 2: Gatekeeper steps in to verify its credentials.
Speaker 1: Credentials, so is it looking for a code signature like
Speaker 1: we talked about earlier, that's.
Speaker 2: A big part of it. If an app isn't signed
Speaker 2: by a trusted developer, Gatekeepers will raise a red flag
Speaker 2: and prevent you from running it without explicit confirmation.
Speaker 1: I've definitely seen those warnings pop up before, especially when
Speaker 1: I try to run something I've downloaded from a less
Speaker 1: and reputable source.
Speaker 2: That's exactly when Gatekeeper is doing its job, protecting you
Speaker 2: from potentially a harmful software. But you might be wondering
Speaker 2: how Gatekeeper knows that a file was downloaded from the
Speaker 2: Internet in the first place.
Speaker 1: Yeah, how does it tell the difference between something I
Speaker 1: downloaded and something that's always been on my computer?
Speaker 2: It uses a clever trick called quarantine attributes. When you
Speaker 2: download a file, the system automatically tags it with these attributes,
Speaker 2: marking it as potentially untrusted.
Speaker 1: So it's like a little sticky note that says handle.
Speaker 2: With care exactly. And what's really interesting is that you
Speaker 2: can actually manipulate these quarantine attributes yourself using the zatri
Speaker 2: command line tool.
Speaker 1: Hold on, are you saying I could potentially remove these
Speaker 1: attributes and trick Gatekeepers into thinking a downloaded file is safe.
Speaker 2: It's possible, but Apple has implemented additional measures to make
Speaker 2: it more difficult. For example, Keeper's also checks for a
Speaker 2: special extended attribute called comm dot apple dot quarantine, which
Speaker 2: stores more detailed information about the file's origin.
Speaker 1: So even if you remove the basic quarantine attributes, there's
Speaker 1: still this extra layer of information that could trip you
Speaker 1: up exactly.
Speaker 2: Apple clearly thought about this and built in some redundancy
Speaker 2: to make it harder for attackers to circumvent gatekeepers.
Speaker 1: Speaking of redundancy, the book mentions something called lib quarantine
Speaker 1: and a rather oddly named system demon called SIPOILCID. What
Speaker 1: do those have to do with gatekeeper good catch?
Speaker 2: Lib quarantine is basically the toolbox for managing these quarantine attributes.
Speaker 2: It provides the functions that apps can use to interact
Speaker 2: with these flags.
Speaker 1: So it's the behind the scenes worker bee that makes
Speaker 1: the whole quarantine system tick. And what about sipoil sid.
Speaker 2: That's the enforcer. Sipoil said, is a system demon that
Speaker 2: runs in the background and constantly monitors for new files
Speaker 2: and downloads.
Speaker 1: So it's like a digital security guard patrolling the system,
Speaker 1: making sure nothing suspicious gets through exactly.
Speaker 2: It works in conjunction with other components like the kernel
Speaker 2: and the authorization database to enforce gatekeepers policies.
Speaker 1: Wow, it's amazing how much is going on behava scenes
Speaker 1: to keep our macs safe from harm. But I'm sensing
Speaker 1: a theme here. Apple seems to really like this layered
Speaker 1: approach to security.
Speaker 2: You're absolutely right, it's all about defense and depth. Yeah,
Speaker 2: no single mechanism is perfect, so they combine multiple layers
Speaker 2: to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to
Speaker 2: exploit any weaknesses.
Speaker 1: And that brings us to what might be the most
Speaker 1: important layer of all sandboxing.
Speaker 2: Ah. Yes, sandboxing. It's one of Apple's most powerful security
Speaker 2: mechanisms and a cornerstone of both mac os and iOS.
Speaker 1: I've heard the term before, but I'm not exactly sure
Speaker 1: what it means. Can you break it down for me?
Speaker 2: Think of sandboxing like a playpen for apps. Instead of
Speaker 2: letting an app have free rein of the system, it
Speaker 2: confines it to a specific area with limited permissions.
Speaker 1: So even if an app is militia or compromised, sandboxing
Speaker 1: prevents it from doing too much damage.
Speaker 2: That's the idea. It's like containing a potentially dangerous experiment
Speaker 2: to a controlled environment.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm starting to see how this fits into the
Speaker 1: layered security model, But how does sandboxing actually work? What's
Speaker 1: the magic behind it?
Speaker 2: The magic, or rather the technology behind it, is AMAC
Speaker 2: the mandatory Access control framework we discussed earlier. Each sandboxed
Speaker 2: app is given a set of Mac labels and policies
Speaker 2: that define what it's allowed to do.
Speaker 1: AH. So it's back to those labels and policies, but
Speaker 1: this time they're being used to restrict what an app
Speaker 1: can do, rather than just controlling access to files.
Speaker 2: Exactly, and the sandboxes evolved significantly over the years. In
Speaker 2: the early days, it used a blacklist approach.
Speaker 1: Blacklist meaning they had a list of specific things that
Speaker 1: apps weren't allowed to do and everything else was permitted.
Speaker 2: You got it. But this approach proved to be too
Speaker 2: limiting and difficult to maintain. As the threat landscape changed,
Speaker 2: Apple realized they needed a more flexible and robut.
Speaker 1: So they switched to a whitelist approach.
Speaker 2: Precisely, instead of focusing on what apps can't do, they
Speaker 2: shifted to defining what apps can do. This means everything
Speaker 2: is forbidden by default unless explicitly allowed by the sandbox rules.
Speaker 1: That sounds much more secure, but I imagine it also
Speaker 1: makes things more complicated for developers.
Speaker 2: It does, but it's a trade off worth making for
Speaker 2: the increased security and to make things easier for developers,
Speaker 2: Apple introduced sandbox profiles.
Speaker 1: Sandbox profiles what are those?
Speaker 2: They're essentially configuration files that define the allowed actions for
Speaker 2: a specific app.
Speaker 1: So instead of having to manually specify every single permission,
Speaker 1: developers can just use a predefined profile that matches their
Speaker 1: apps needs.
Speaker 2: Exactly, and you can actually inspect these profiles. The book
Speaker 2: gives examples of how to use a command line tool
Speaker 2: called ASTI to do just that.
Speaker 1: Ask TI another cryptogachronym, I take it.
Speaker 2: It stands for Apple Sandbox command Line Interface. It's a
Speaker 2: powerful tool for developers and security researchers.
Speaker 1: Alike can peek into these profiles and see exactly what
Speaker 1: an app is allowed to do.
Speaker 2: You can and you can even modify those permissions for
Speaker 2: testing purposes, although as always, we strongly advise against making
Speaker 2: any unauthorized changes to your system.
Speaker 1: Right We don't want to accidentally unleash any digital monsters.
Speaker 1: But it's fascinating to see how much control and transparency
Speaker 1: Apple provides with its sandboxing system.
Speaker 2: It really is a testament to their commitment to security,
Speaker 2: and it's one of the key reasons why macOS and
Speaker 2: iOS are considered to be among the most secure operating
Speaker 2: systems out there.
Speaker 1: Okay, so we've covered code signing, authorizations, gatekeepers, and now
Speaker 1: sandboxing all working together to protect our devices. Are we
Speaker 1: finally done with our tour of Apple's security measures.
Speaker 2: Quite There's one more big one we need to talk about.
Speaker 2: System Integrity Protection, or SIP for short SIP.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm all ears, what's that all about?
Speaker 2: This is a relatively new addition to Apple's security arsenal,
Speaker 2: introduced in MACOSL CAPITAM. It adds an extra layer of
Speaker 2: protection for critical system file and processes.
Speaker 1: So even if an attacker manages to gain root access,
Speaker 1: SIP prevents them from wreaking havoc on the most sensitive
Speaker 1: parts of the system.
Speaker 2: You got it. SIP restricts root privileges in several ways.
Speaker 2: It prevents modification of certain system directories, limits the loading
Speaker 2: of unsigned kernel extensions, and restricts debugging of certain processes.
Speaker 1: Wow. So it's like putting those critical system components under
Speaker 1: lock and key, even from the most powerful using.
Speaker 2: Exactly and it's made a huge difference in terms of
Speaker 2: knack out security. But as with any security mechanism, attackers
Speaker 2: have been trying to find ways to bypass it.
Speaker 1: That's what I was going to ask. Is SIP truly
Speaker 1: unbreakable or have there been cases where attackers have managed
Speaker 1: to circumvent it?
Speaker 2: Well, no security system is truly unbreakable, but SIP has
Speaker 2: significantly raised the bar for attackers. They've tried different approaches
Speaker 2: like exploiting vulnerabilities in other parts of the system to
Speaker 2: gain control before SIP can kick in.
Speaker 1: So it's like trying to sneak past the guards before
Speaker 1: they can lock down the fortress exactly.
Speaker 2: And they've also tried targeting sip's own configuration and enforcement mechanisms,
Speaker 2: looking for subtle flaws or loopholes.
Speaker 1: So even though SIP is a powerful defense, it's still
Speaker 1: a target for attackers. It's a reminder that security is
Speaker 1: an ongoing arms race, a constant battle between those who
Speaker 1: build walls and those who try to tear them down.
Speaker 2: Well said, and that's one of the key insights from
Speaker 2: os Internal's Volume three. It doesn't just tell you how
Speaker 2: things work, it also shows you how those things can
Speaker 2: be broken, and more importantly, what can be done to
Speaker 2: make them stronger.
Speaker 1: It's like a crash course in both offense and defense
Speaker 1: in the world of cybersecurity exactly.
Speaker 2: And understanding both sides is essential for staying ahead in
Speaker 2: this constantly evolving landscape.
Speaker 1: Welcome back, Deep Divers. We've spent the last two parts
Speaker 1: of this episode building up a pretty solid understanding of
Speaker 1: how Apple tries to keep our Max and iPhones safe.
Speaker 1: Now it's time to flip the script and explore the
Speaker 1: other side of the coin, the insecurity part of the equation.
Speaker 2: Because as as robust as Apple security measures are, they've
Speaker 2: always faced challenges from those who seek to break them,
Speaker 2: bend them, or just plane bypass them.
Speaker 1: It's like that old saying, every lock has its key,
Speaker 1: or in this case, every digital fortress has its potential weakness, right.
Speaker 2: And that's where OS Internal's Volume three really shines. It
Speaker 2: doesn't shy away from the vulnerabilities and exploits that have
Speaker 2: targeted Apples operating systems.
Speaker 1: So we're talking about specific instances where those layers of
Speaker 1: security we discuss were breached or circumvented exactly.
Speaker 2: And it starts with some classic MAGOS vulnerabilities that existed
Speaker 2: in versions ten point two and ten point one to one,
Speaker 2: things like issues with specific system calls, exploits that took
Speaker 2: advantage of race conditions, and even clever tricks involving path manipulation.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm getting a little loss in the technical jargon here.
Speaker 1: Can you break it down for me? What kind of
Speaker 1: impact could these vulnerabilities have?
Speaker 2: Imagine an attacker being able to execute arbitrary code on
Speaker 2: your system? Essentially gaining control of your machine. That's the
Speaker 2: kind of power these vulnerabilities could potentially grant.
Speaker 1: That sounds pretty serious. So these weren't just minor glitches.
Speaker 1: They were potentially major security holes, right.
Speaker 2: And what's fascinating is the variety of these vulnerabilities. They
Speaker 2: highlight the fact that security weaknesses can crop up in
Speaker 2: unexpected places, even in seemingly simple functions or operations.
Speaker 1: It's like a reminder that attackers are always looking for
Speaker 1: those chinks in the armor, no matter how small they
Speaker 1: might seem.
Speaker 2: Exactly, and that's why understanding these vulnerabilities is so important.
Speaker 2: It helps us see how attackers think and how they exploit.
Speaker 2: Even the smallest oversights are inconsistencies encode.
Speaker 1: So it's not just about knowing what the vulnerabilities are,
Speaker 1: it's about understanding how they came to be in the
Speaker 1: first place. Right.
Speaker 2: It's about seeing the bigger picture and recognizing the patterns
Speaker 2: that often lead to security weaknesses.
Speaker 1: Okay, if that makes sense now. The book also delves
Speaker 1: into the world of jail breaking, which is something that's
Speaker 1: been a constant cat and mouse game between Apple and
Speaker 1: a certain segment of its users.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, jail breaking is all about removing the restrictions that
Speaker 2: Apple places on iOS devices, essentially giving users more control
Speaker 2: over their devices.
Speaker 1: So it's like saying, Hey, Apple, I appreciate the security,
Speaker 1: but I want to be able to do whatever I
Speaker 1: want with my own phone.
Speaker 2: You could say that, and os Internal's Volume three provides
Speaker 2: a fascinating history of iOS jail breaks, starting with the
Speaker 2: very first one for the original iPhone all the way
Speaker 2: up to more recent exploits.
Speaker 1: It's like a timeline of how hackers and security researchers
Speaker 1: have been pushing the boundaries of what's possible with iOS devices.
Speaker 2: Right, and each jail break is a testament to the
Speaker 2: creativity and persistence of those who seek to understand and
Speaker 2: sometimes circumvent Apple's security measures.
Speaker 1: Can you give me an example of a particularly clever
Speaker 1: or memorable jailbreak exploit?
Speaker 2: Well, there was Evasin, a jail break for iOS six
Speaker 2: that took advantage of vulnerability in the way iOS handled.
Speaker 1: PDF files BF files. Really that seems like a strange
Speaker 1: place to find a security hole.
Speaker 2: It does, but that's the ingenuity of these exploits. Ye
Speaker 2: Evasian used a carefully crafted PDF document that, when opened,
Speaker 2: would trigger a chain of events that ultimately led to
Speaker 2: a jail break.
Speaker 1: So it's like a trojan horse disguised as something harmless exactly.
Speaker 2: And then there was Pangu, a jail break for iOS
Speaker 2: seven that targeted a vulnerability and a core system component
Speaker 2: called Apple key store.
Speaker 1: And what did that allow attackers to do?
Speaker 2: Pangu was a very powerful exploit that gave jail breakers
Speaker 2: almost complete control over the device. It was a major
Speaker 2: breakthrough in the jailbreak community.
Speaker 1: Wow, these exploits sound incredibly complex. It must take a
Speaker 1: deep understanding of iOS internals to pull something like that off.
Speaker 2: It does, and the book goes into detail about the
Speaker 2: technical intricacies of these exploits, showing how they leverage vulnerabilities
Speaker 2: bypassed security checks and ultimately achieved their goal.
Speaker 1: It's like a masterclass in hacking, but from a defensive
Speaker 1: perspective exactly.
Speaker 2: By understanding how these exploits work, we can learn how
Speaker 2: to better protect against them.
Speaker 1: Okay, so we've talked about classic macOS vulnerabilities and iOS
Speaker 1: jail breaks. What other kinds of exploits does the book cover?
Speaker 2: Well? It goes into some specific attacks like Yalu, which
Speaker 2: exploited a kernel memory management vulnerability in iOS ten, and
Speaker 2: then there's asinc Wake, which affected versions eleven point zero
Speaker 2: to eleven point one point two of iOS.
Speaker 1: So it's a pretty comprehensive look at the history of
Speaker 1: iOS security research, both from the perspective of those who
Speaker 1: seek to protect the system and those who seek to
Speaker 1: find its weaknesses.
Speaker 2: It is, and it's important to note that the book
Speaker 2: doesn't just focus on the exploits themselves. It also delves
Speaker 2: into the tools and techniques need to discover and analyze
Speaker 2: these vulnerabilities.
Speaker 1: It's like a toolkit for security researchers and those who
Speaker 1: want to understand how these attacks work exactly.
Speaker 2: Gives you a glimpse into the world of security research
Speaker 2: and the mindset of those who are constantly probing and
Speaker 2: testing the limits of digital security.
Speaker 1: It sounds like an invaluable resource for anyone interested in cybersecurity,
Speaker 1: whether you're on the offensive or defensive side.
Speaker 2: It really is. And one thing that stood out to
Speaker 2: me was the emphasis on understanding the why behind these
Speaker 2: vulnerabilities and exploits.
Speaker 1: What do you mean by that?
Speaker 2: It's not enough to just know how an exploit works.
Speaker 2: You need to understand the underlying design decisions or coding
Speaker 2: practices that made the vulnerability possible in the first place.
Speaker 1: Hum, So it's about going beyond the symptoms and understanding
Speaker 1: the root cause of.
Speaker 2: The problem exactly, because only by understanding the why can
Speaker 2: we hope to prevent similar vulnerabilities from appearing in the future.
Speaker 1: That makes a lot of sense. So as we wrap
Speaker 1: up this deep dive into OS Internals Volume three, what
Speaker 1: are some key takeaways for our listeners?
Speaker 2: Well, first and foremost, it's a reminder that security is
Speaker 2: an ongoing process, a constant evolution. There's no such thing
Speaker 2: as a perfectly secure system, and there will always be
Speaker 2: those who seek to find and exploit weaknesses.
Speaker 1: It's a cat and mouse game, a constant back and
Speaker 1: forth between defenders and attackers.
Speaker 2: Right, And that's why it's so important to stay informed,
Speaker 2: to keep learning, and to adapt to the ever changing
Speaker 2: threat landscape.
Speaker 1: So it needs to be proactive, not reactive when it
Speaker 1: comes to security exactly.
Speaker 2: We can't just wait for vulnerabilities to be discovered and
Speaker 2: exploits to be developed. We need to be constantly thinking
Speaker 2: about security, both as individuals and as a society.
Speaker 1: And books like this one can play a valuable role
Speaker 1: in that process.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, they provide the knowledge and insights. We need to
Speaker 2: understand the complexities of digital security and to make informed
Speaker 2: decisions about how to protect ourselves and our data.
Speaker 1: Well said, so to our listeners, we encourage you to
Speaker 1: delve into OS Internal's Volume three yourself and explore the
Speaker 1: fascinating world of Apple security and insecurity.
Speaker 2: It's a journey that will challenge your assumptions, expand your knowledge,
Speaker 2: and ultimately make you a more informed and security conscious user.
Speaker 1: Thanks for joining us on this deep dive. We hope
Speaker 1: you've enjoyed the exploration and that you'll continue to be curious,
Speaker 1: to question and to learn. Until next time, Stay safe
Speaker 1: out there in the digital world.