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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to our deep dive today. Yeah, it's a fascinating one.

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<v Speaker 1>We're diving deep into the world of cyber warfare and

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<v Speaker 1>hardware trojans.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, very relevant.

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<v Speaker 1>And you have provided us with quite a mix of sources.

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<v Speaker 1>We've got excerpts from books about viruses, hardware software, trojans,

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<v Speaker 1>and some potential countermeasures, and then also some articles, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>research papers as well.

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<v Speaker 2>So it seems like you're really trying to get a

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<v Speaker 2>good grasp of this whole thing.

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<v Speaker 1>You're looking to understand this complex topic, right, not just

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<v Speaker 1>what these threats are, but how vulnerable our everyday tech

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<v Speaker 1>really is exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And it's a really good question to be asking. You know,

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<v Speaker 2>most people when they think of cyberwarfare, they maybe think

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<v Speaker 2>of something out of a movie, right, But the reality

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<v Speaker 2>is it's a lot more complex and a lot closer

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<v Speaker 2>to home than we might like to think.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh. Absolutely. And you know what's so interesting to me

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<v Speaker 1>is how this all evolved. Yeah. Well, we think about

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<v Speaker 1>cyber warfare, right, think about you know, nation states and

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<v Speaker 1>shadowy government agencies. But our sources suggest a very different

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<v Speaker 1>origin story.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah they do. It's it's not what you would expect. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>what do you think it's really interesting, Yeah, tell me more.

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<v Speaker 2>Criminal organizations were actually some of the earliest innovators in

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<v Speaker 2>this space.

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<v Speaker 1>So they were using software exactly and hardware trojans to

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<v Speaker 1>commit crimes way before, way before government's caught on. Governments

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<v Speaker 1>even knew it was going on.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah it was.

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<v Speaker 1>That's so interesting. Wow, what kind of crimes are we

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<v Speaker 1>talking about?

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<v Speaker 2>Give you an example, early days of online banking, there

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<v Speaker 2>was this group they developed a hardware trojan. It was

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<v Speaker 2>disguised as a simple USB card reader. Oh wow, So

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<v Speaker 2>you can imagine these unsuspecting customers. They plug it into

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<v Speaker 2>their just to check their balances, you know, and bam,

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<v Speaker 2>this trojan stealing their credentials, steals their login credentials.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh my gosh, gives.

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<v Speaker 2>The criminals access to their accounts. That's really, of course illegal, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>but a brilliant use of this technology.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah wow. So how did this jump from stealing a

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<v Speaker 1>few bucks to becoming full blown cyber weapons.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, intelligence agencies and militaries, Oh, they saw the potential

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<v Speaker 2>of these techniques. They quickly recognize the power of what

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<v Speaker 2>we call information weapons.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so information weapon, Yeah, how is that different from

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<v Speaker 1>a traditional weapon?

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<v Speaker 2>Let me try and break that down. So, think of

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<v Speaker 2>a traditional weapon like a bomb causes physical damage, right,

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<v Speaker 2>an information weapon it targets data, software, and hardware with

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<v Speaker 2>the aim to disrupt, manipulate, or destroy.

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<v Speaker 1>So the goal is to undermine Yeah, the target's capabilities,

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<v Speaker 1>that's right, And that can have real world consequences very

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<v Speaker 1>much so. So it's like a virtual attack, yeah, but

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<v Speaker 1>with real world cost. Yes.

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<v Speaker 2>And just like with traditional weapons, information weapons can be

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<v Speaker 2>offensive to attack or defensive to protect.

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<v Speaker 1>So give me an example.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, so what does a real world cyber attack look like.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>One of the most notorious examples is the stuxnetworm. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>this is back in twenty ten. This targeted Iran's nuclear program.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, I've heard of this one.

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<v Speaker 2>It is a fascinating case study.

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<v Speaker 1>So this is the one that actually caused physical damage. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>I remember reading about this. This is crazy.

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<v Speaker 2>So Stucksnet specifically targeted these centrifuges that are used to

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<v Speaker 2>enrich uranium. It manipulated the programmable logic controllers Okay, which

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<v Speaker 2>basically are the computers that control the centrifuges.

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<v Speaker 1>Got it.

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<v Speaker 2>The worm caused them to spin out of control. Oh wow,

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<v Speaker 2>damaging the equipment.

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<v Speaker 1>So it set back Uron's nuclear program significantly.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, significantly.

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<v Speaker 1>That is incredible.

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<v Speaker 2>It really highlights I mean, not incredible in a good way, right,

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<v Speaker 2>of course not.

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<v Speaker 1>But it just shows how powerful these things are. But

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<v Speaker 1>we're here to talk about hardware trojans.

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<v Speaker 2>Right right, specific So.

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<v Speaker 1>Why are those considered such a big deal in this

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<v Speaker 1>whole cyber warfare landscape.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, hardware trojans are especially concerning because of how stealthy

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<v Speaker 2>they are. Okay, they are literally embedded within the hardware itself,

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<v Speaker 2>making them incredibly difficult to detect.

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<v Speaker 1>So like if traditional software like anti virus can't catch them, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>what can?

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<v Speaker 2>A good question.

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<v Speaker 1>You almost need to know exactly what you're looking for.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you really do.

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<v Speaker 1>And even then, it's a needle in a haystack, it

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<v Speaker 1>really is.

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<v Speaker 2>It's finding these tiny pieces of malicious circuitry hidden inside

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<v Speaker 2>legitimate hardware, right, it's a huge challenge.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>They're designed to blend in Oh wow, often disguised as

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<v Speaker 2>harmless components.

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<v Speaker 1>So give me an example, like a.

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<v Speaker 2>Phone charger, okay that secretly records your conversations. Oh my gosh, Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>that's the level of threat that we're talking about here.

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<v Speaker 1>Hold on back up for a second. Yeah, how does

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<v Speaker 1>it you can even get into a phone charger in

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<v Speaker 1>the first place. Well, that's the thing, Like, isn't that

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<v Speaker 1>all made in like these really high tech factories. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you'd need access to the manufacturing process to do something

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<v Speaker 1>like that.

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<v Speaker 2>That's exactly right.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's an inside job.

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<v Speaker 2>You could say that hardware trojans are typically inserted during

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<v Speaker 2>the manufacturing process. It could be like a tiny, almost

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<v Speaker 2>invisible modification to a chip's design, a few lines of

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<v Speaker 2>code added to the firmware, or even like a completely separate,

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<v Speaker 2>malicious circuit added during assembly.

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<v Speaker 1>That's scary. It is a concerned like almost any device

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<v Speaker 1>could be compromised.

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<v Speaker 2>Then, Yeah, that's the scary part.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like a ticking time bomb waiting to.

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<v Speaker 2>Go off, you could think of it that way.

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<v Speaker 1>And they're everywhere.

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<v Speaker 2>And that's what makes it even scarier, is this potential pervasiveness. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>we're talking vulnerabilities in everything from smartphones and laptops to cars, airplanes,

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<v Speaker 2>critical infrastructure. Wow, it's a big problem.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, I am officially freaked out now. Yeah, we've got

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<v Speaker 1>these tiny little trojans lurking in all of our devices.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, potentially everywhere.

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<v Speaker 1>They could do all sorts of an anti things.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a big problem.

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<v Speaker 1>But how do they actually work?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah?

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<v Speaker 1>How do you technically speaking.

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<v Speaker 2>Hide something like that in a chip?

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<v Speaker 1>How do you hide it?

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<v Speaker 2>It's incredibly complex. Yeah, it really speaks to the ingenuity

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<v Speaker 2>of the attackers. You know, these chips that we have

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<v Speaker 2>today are so complex, billions of transistors interconnected in ways

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<v Speaker 2>that are almost impossible to fully comprehend.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah. You've got engineers who designed these things, and even

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<v Speaker 1>they even.

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<v Speaker 2>They don't always understand every single detail how it works. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's like hiding a single altered pixel in a

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<v Speaker 2>massive high resolution image.

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<v Speaker 1>Yes, that's a great analogy.

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<v Speaker 2>No one would ever notice.

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<v Speaker 1>Nobody would notice.

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<v Speaker 2>It's just one little, tiny pixel.

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<v Speaker 1>So the attackers might make these subtle changes, okay, to

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<v Speaker 1>the physical layout of the transistors, or introduced tiny little

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<v Speaker 1>delays in the way.

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<v Speaker 2>That the signals travel through the chip.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're messing with the timing exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And these modifications are so small that they can't be

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<v Speaker 2>detected through visual inspection.

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<v Speaker 1>You can't even see it.

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<v Speaker 2>You can't see it. Wow, it's like trying to find

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<v Speaker 2>a single misspelling in a library full of books.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a good analogy, right, Okay, so that's one technique.

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<v Speaker 2>That's one.

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<v Speaker 1>What are some other ways?

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<v Speaker 2>There are a number of other ways.

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<v Speaker 1>That they hide these things.

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<v Speaker 2>One clever tactic is to exploit what's called unused or

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<v Speaker 2>redundant circuitry. Redundant circuitry, So what is that Modern ships

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<v Speaker 2>today they often have these sections of circuitry that are

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<v Speaker 2>designed for testing purposes or as backups in case of

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<v Speaker 2>a component failure.

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<v Speaker 1>It says, like a spare room in a house.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, exactly, like a spare room.

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<v Speaker 1>You don't use it every day.

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<v Speaker 2>You don't use it, but it's there. If you need it,

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<v Speaker 2>you got it. So attackers they can repurpose, okay, this

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<v Speaker 2>unused circuitry for malicious.

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<v Speaker 1>Purposes, so they can hide their trojan in these like

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<v Speaker 1>inactive areas exactly. So it makes it harder.

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<v Speaker 2>To detect, much harder to detect.

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<v Speaker 1>Because it's not actually interfering with the normal function of

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<v Speaker 1>the chip exactly. So you wouldn't even know.

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<v Speaker 2>It's there unless you knew where to look.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like a secret passage hidden behind a bookcase.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a great way to put it.

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<v Speaker 1>You wouldn't know it was there unless you knew where

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<v Speaker 1>to look exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And then there's another technique called logic obfuscation.

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<v Speaker 1>Logic obfuscation, This one's a little bit more technical, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>break down for me.

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<v Speaker 2>But essentially it involves scrambling the logic of a circuit, okay,

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<v Speaker 2>making it very difficult to understand without the right key.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like you're encrypting a message.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, it's like encrypting a message.

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<v Speaker 1>You take a readable message, you scramble it with a

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<v Speaker 1>secret code exactly, and then you send it.

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<v Speaker 2>To someone, right, and only the person who has.

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<v Speaker 1>The key with the key can decipher it, can read it.

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<v Speaker 1>Got it.

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<v Speaker 2>So logic obfuscation does.

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<v Speaker 1>Something similar with circuits. Okay. The attacker will take the

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<v Speaker 1>malicious code and they will rewrite it in a way

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<v Speaker 1>that just looks like gibberish okay to anyone who doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>have the key.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's like hiding a message in plain sight. Yes, exactly,

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<v Speaker 2>the code is there. The code is there, but it's disguised.

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<v Speaker 1>It's disguised to look like something else, to look like

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<v Speaker 1>something else, so it just blends in with the rest

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<v Speaker 1>of the circuitry, is.

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<v Speaker 2>Just part of the background noise.

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<v Speaker 1>Exactly and it makes it extremely difficult to identify.

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<v Speaker 2>Wow, that's so sophisticated. And to make matters worse, they

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<v Speaker 2>can have all sorts of crazy activation mechanisms. It's not

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<v Speaker 2>like they just switch on as soon as you plug

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<v Speaker 2>in your phone charger.

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<v Speaker 1>Not necessarily, right, So the activation mechanisms can be very specific.

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<v Speaker 1>Some are triggered by a particular date or time, others

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<v Speaker 1>by a specific signal or sequence of events.

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<v Speaker 2>Wow.

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<v Speaker 1>There are even trojans that are designed to activate randomly, so.

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<v Speaker 2>They're totally unpredictable, incredibly unpredictable.

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<v Speaker 1>So they could be lying dormant free years.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, potentially just waiting for the right moment to strike.

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<v Speaker 2>That is a concern.

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<v Speaker 1>That's terrifying.

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<v Speaker 2>It is a concern, and this is why detecting hardware

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<v Speaker 2>trojans is such a challenge. Yeah, it's not just about

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<v Speaker 2>finding a physical piece of hardware, right, but it's about

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<v Speaker 2>understanding how it's programmed and.

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<v Speaker 1>What triggers it, what might trigger it. Okay, so this

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<v Speaker 1>is where the detective work comes in. Yeah, are there

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<v Speaker 1>any telltale signs? There are some any clues that researchers

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<v Speaker 1>look for.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there are some subtle things when.

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<v Speaker 1>They're trying to find these potential trojans.

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<v Speaker 2>One common red flag is unusual delays in the chips operation. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>so if a chip is taking longer than expected to

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<v Speaker 2>perform certain tasks, that could be a sign that a

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<v Speaker 2>hidden circuit is interfering with its normal function.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like you're talking to somebody and they have

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<v Speaker 1>like a slight hesitation, yes, like a little or dropped

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<v Speaker 1>word purple. It might not be obvious at first, but

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<v Speaker 1>it could be a sign that something is wrong exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Another sign is unusual power consumption. Okay, So if a

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<v Speaker 2>chip is drawing more power than it should.

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<v Speaker 1>That could be a sign that something's going on.

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<v Speaker 2>That a hidden circuit is active when it shouldn't be.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like looking at your electricity bill, yeah, and

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<v Speaker 1>noticing a spike even though you haven't been using any

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<v Speaker 1>more appliances.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. Something's using up that extra power.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, what is that?

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<v Speaker 2>And then there's also these side channel emissions Okay, we

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<v Speaker 2>mentioned earlier, things like variations and electromagnetic radiation. These emissions

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<v Speaker 2>can actually reveal these subtle patterns of activity within the chip,

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<v Speaker 2>and they could potentially exposing the presence of hidden circuitry.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow. So it really is like forensic science.

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<v Speaker 2>It really is.

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<v Speaker 1>You're looking for tiny little clues, tiny little clues that

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<v Speaker 1>tell a bigger story exactly. It's a good analogy.

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<v Speaker 2>Require specialized equipment, yeah, sophisticated analysis techniques, and a healthy

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<v Speaker 2>dose of intuition.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, this has been a fascinating if a little terrifying.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, deep dive thick a complex topic.

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<v Speaker 1>Into this world of hardware trojans. But I want to

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<v Speaker 1>shift gears a little bit and talk about solutions.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>We've talked about some countermeasures, sure, like secure design practices

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<v Speaker 1>and trusted manufacturing. Are there any other strategies.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, there are actions.

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<v Speaker 1>They are being developed to combat this.

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<v Speaker 2>There's a lot of research and development going on in

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<v Speaker 2>this area, Okay, some promising advancements, Like what so one

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<v Speaker 2>area that's particularly exciting is the development of what's called

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<v Speaker 2>specialized hardware security modules. Hardware security hardware security modules.

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<v Speaker 1>What are those?

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<v Speaker 2>So? These are essentially separate chips that are designed with

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<v Speaker 2>security as their primary function.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're like a watchdog.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, they act as a sort of watchdog. They're monitoring

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<v Speaker 2>the activity of the other chips within a.

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<v Speaker 1>System, looking for anything suspicious.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. So if they detect something fishy, they can take

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<v Speaker 2>various actions to prevent or mitigate attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like a security guard station inside your computer.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's a good way to think about it. Just

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<v Speaker 2>watching everything, watching everything.

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<v Speaker 1>So they can isolate compromised chips. Yeah, they can do that,

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<v Speaker 1>prevent unauthorized access to data, or even shut down the

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<v Speaker 1>entire system.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, if an attack is detected.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh wow, that's powerful stuff.

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<v Speaker 2>It is.

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<v Speaker 1>Are there any other promising approaches?

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<v Speaker 2>There are? So Another area of active research is called

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<v Speaker 2>split manufacturing.

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<v Speaker 1>Split manufacturing, what's that?

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<v Speaker 2>So this involves dividing up the manufacturing process of a

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<v Speaker 2>chip among multiple trusted parties.

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<v Speaker 1>So instead of one company having control over the whole

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<v Speaker 1>thing exactly, different companies are responsible for different.

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<v Speaker 2>Stages, different stages, and each company only has access to

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<v Speaker 2>the information, got it, that's necessary for their specific part

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<v Speaker 2>of the process.

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<v Speaker 1>So they don't see the whole picture.

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<v Speaker 2>They don't see the whole picture. So it makes it

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<v Speaker 2>much more difficult for an attacker.

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<v Speaker 1>So they can't just sneak something in there.

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<v Speaker 2>To compromise the chip without being detected.

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<v Speaker 1>That's really smart.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a clever way to minimize the risk of a

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<v Speaker 2>point of failure.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you're spreading it out exactly. It seems like there

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<v Speaker 1>are a lot of smart people working on this problem.

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<v Speaker 2>There are a lot of very smart people.

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<v Speaker 1>That's good to hear.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a top priority for governments, militaries, and technology companies

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<v Speaker 2>all over the world.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, because the stakes are high.

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<v Speaker 2>The stakes are incredibly high, and.

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<v Speaker 1>As we talked about the potential consequences, they are.

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<v Speaker 2>Really scary to think about.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it's not good.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's a constant battle. Yeah, a race to stay

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<v Speaker 2>ahead of the curve.

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<v Speaker 1>So what do you think the future holds.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, it's hard to say.

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<v Speaker 1>For sure, but with all this investment.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, with continued investment in research and development and a

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<v Speaker 2>commitment to international collaboration, I think we can make significant

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<v Speaker 2>strides in mitigating this threat.

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<v Speaker 1>Well that's reassuring.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's not all doom and gloom.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it sounds like we're not completely helpless.

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<v Speaker 2>Right. But before we move on to the final part

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<v Speaker 2>of our deep dive, I want to make sure we

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<v Speaker 2>give the listeners some key takeaways sure from this part

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<v Speaker 2>of the conversation.

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<v Speaker 1>So what are the main points?

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<v Speaker 2>What do we want them to remember?

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<v Speaker 1>Hardware trojans are a real and growing threat. Yeah, they

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<v Speaker 1>are not just the stuff of science fiction or spy thrillers.

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<v Speaker 2>This is real life.

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<v Speaker 1>This is real life, This is happening, This is happening.

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<v Speaker 2>And it's a clear and present danger, yes.

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<v Speaker 1>To our national security, economic stability, and personal privacy.

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<v Speaker 2>And as we've discussed, these trojans can be incredibly difficult.

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<v Speaker 1>To detect, very difficult to detect.

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<v Speaker 2>They're often hidden in plain sight. They are disguised as

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<v Speaker 2>legitimate parts of a ship's circuitry exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's why it's so important, Yeah, to be cautious

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<v Speaker 1>about the technology we use.

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<v Speaker 2>We can't just blindly trust that our devices are secure.

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<v Speaker 1>We need to be informed consumers.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, we need to ask questions, ask questions about security

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<v Speaker 2>measures as.

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<v Speaker 1>And demand greater transparency from the manufacturers.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, And even with all these technological advancements, no silver bullet,

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<v Speaker 2>no easy effects, no fool proof solutions.

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<v Speaker 1>So security is an ongoing process.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a constant evolution.

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<v Speaker 1>So we've spent the last two parts of this deep

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<v Speaker 1>dive really getting into the nitty gritty of hardware trojans. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>the detail, how they're made, how they're hidden, the sheer

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<v Speaker 1>scale of the threat.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, it's a lot.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a lot to take in, it really is. But

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<v Speaker 1>now I'm curious about what the future holds, what's coming

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<v Speaker 1>next in this constant battle between those who want to

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<v Speaker 1>exploit these vulnerabilities and those who are trying to defend

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<v Speaker 1>against them.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, you're right, it is this constant back and forth,

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<v Speaker 2>and honestly, predicting the future of cyber warfare it's kind

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<v Speaker 2>of like trying to predict the weather. Things change so quickly.

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<v Speaker 2>But there are definitely some key trends and emerging technologies

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<v Speaker 2>that are worth keeping a close eye on. Like one

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<v Speaker 2>that's particularly concerning is the rise of artificial intelligence. Yeah

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<v Speaker 2>a yeah, everyone's talking about AI these days, it seems.

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<v Speaker 1>Like it, but I haven't really thought about it in

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<v Speaker 1>the context of cybersecurity.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, well think about it this way. AI can be

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<v Speaker 2>used to automate a lot of these really complex tasks,

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<v Speaker 2>and that includes tasks related to cyberwarfare.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh.

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<v Speaker 2>So on the offensive side, attackers could use AI to

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<v Speaker 2>identify vulnerabilities, develop much more sophisticated malware, and even launch

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<v Speaker 2>attacks that adapt to changing defenses in real time.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like giving the bad guys a superpowered toolkit.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a good way to think about it. Okay, But

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<v Speaker 2>there's a flip side to this as well.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>Security researchers can also leverage.

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<v Speaker 1>AI right for good for good, Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>AI can be used to analyze massive amounts of data,

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<v Speaker 2>identify patterns of malicious activity.

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<v Speaker 1>So you can see it coming.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and develop countermeasures much more quickly than humans could

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<v Speaker 2>on their own.

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00:17:58.319 --> 00:18:01.839
<v Speaker 1>So it's an arms race. Both sides are using AI.

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00:18:02.079 --> 00:18:03.599
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, it's a constant race.

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00:18:03.640 --> 00:18:05.200
<v Speaker 1>Wow. Okay, so that's AI.

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<v Speaker 2>What about another trend that's worth watching is this increasing

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<v Speaker 2>integration of technology into every aspect of our lives. This

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00:18:16.599 --> 00:18:19.440
<v Speaker 2>Internet of things right where everything is connected, Where everything

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00:18:19.480 --> 00:18:23.559
<v Speaker 2>is connected, This creates a much larger attack surface for

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00:18:23.680 --> 00:18:24.519
<v Speaker 2>cyber criminals.

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00:18:24.559 --> 00:18:26.960
<v Speaker 1>So like my smart toaster could be hacked.

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00:18:28.000 --> 00:18:30.799
<v Speaker 2>Well maybe not your toaster, but you at the idea.

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00:18:31.000 --> 00:18:36.000
<v Speaker 2>As more devices become connected, the potential for vulnerabilities increases,

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00:18:36.480 --> 00:18:38.960
<v Speaker 2>and a lot of these devices aren't really designed with

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<v Speaker 2>security as the.

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00:18:40.279 --> 00:18:42.480
<v Speaker 1>Top priority, so they're easy targets.

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00:18:42.480 --> 00:18:43.480
<v Speaker 2>They're easy targets.

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00:18:43.559 --> 00:18:47.480
<v Speaker 1>Okay, So we've got AI, we've got the Internet of things.

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00:18:48.279 --> 00:18:49.599
<v Speaker 1>What about quantum computing?

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<v Speaker 2>Quantum computing.

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00:18:51.839 --> 00:18:55.400
<v Speaker 1>It's still early days, but I've heard it could really

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<v Speaker 1>change things.

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00:18:56.200 --> 00:18:57.440
<v Speaker 2>It's a game changer.

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00:18:57.400 --> 00:18:59.839
<v Speaker 1>When it comes to cybersecurity.

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<v Speaker 2>It really is. One of the biggest concerns is its

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<v Speaker 2>potential impact on cryptography. So the encryption algorithms that.

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00:19:07.440 --> 00:19:10.279
<v Speaker 1>We use today yet to protect our data.

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00:19:09.839 --> 00:19:14.799
<v Speaker 2>To protect our data, they rely on these complex mathematical problems. Okay,

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00:19:14.880 --> 00:19:18.359
<v Speaker 2>that are difficult for traditional computers to solve, right, But

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00:19:18.559 --> 00:19:20.359
<v Speaker 2>quantum computers.

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00:19:19.839 --> 00:19:21.240
<v Speaker 1>They can just blow right through that.

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00:19:21.319 --> 00:19:25.680
<v Speaker 2>They could potentially crack these codes much faster. Wow, which

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00:19:25.720 --> 00:19:28.599
<v Speaker 2>would make our current encryption methods obsolete.

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00:19:28.839 --> 00:19:29.880
<v Speaker 1>Is it like a master key?

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00:19:30.039 --> 00:19:32.680
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, like a master key that can unlock any door.

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00:19:32.839 --> 00:19:35.279
<v Speaker 1>And that's a little scary. It is a concern, and

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00:19:35.319 --> 00:19:36.759
<v Speaker 1>this is something that people are working on.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, security researchers are taking this very seriously. They

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<v Speaker 2>have to, and they're already working on developing new encryption

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<v Speaker 2>algorithms that are resistant to quantum attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>What sounds like we have a lot to look forward to.

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<v Speaker 1>We do both good and bad.

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00:19:50.839 --> 00:19:51.759
<v Speaker 2>It's a mixed bag.

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00:19:51.880 --> 00:19:54.519
<v Speaker 1>So as we wrap up this deep dive, Yeah, what

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<v Speaker 1>are some key takeaways for our listener?

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00:19:56.880 --> 00:19:58.680
<v Speaker 2>So for anyone listening out there.

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00:19:59.400 --> 00:20:01.400
<v Speaker 1>What can they do to stay safe in this world?

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00:20:01.880 --> 00:20:07.279
<v Speaker 2>First and foremost, stay informed. The threat landscape is always changing. Yeah,

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00:20:07.359 --> 00:20:10.160
<v Speaker 2>so it's crucial to keep up with the latest trends.

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00:20:10.440 --> 00:20:14.440
<v Speaker 1>Read articles, listen to podcasts, absolutely ten conferences.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, anything you can do.

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00:20:16.079 --> 00:20:17.279
<v Speaker 1>Stay ahead of the game.

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00:20:17.240 --> 00:20:19.880
<v Speaker 2>To stay ahead of the curve. Yeah, and don't be

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<v Speaker 2>afraid to ask questions. Right, if you're concerned about the

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00:20:23.240 --> 00:20:28.039
<v Speaker 2>security of a particular device or technology, do your research,

448
00:20:28.240 --> 00:20:31.079
<v Speaker 2>do your research, reach out to the manufacturer, talk to

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<v Speaker 2>the experts, talk to experts. Knowledge is power.

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<v Speaker 1>Knowledge is power. And I think a big takeaway for

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<v Speaker 1>me is security is everyone's responsibility.

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<v Speaker 2>It really is.

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00:20:41.759 --> 00:20:44.960
<v Speaker 1>It's not just the job of governments or these big companies.

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<v Speaker 2>We all have a role to play. We all have

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00:20:46.960 --> 00:20:48.960
<v Speaker 2>a role to play in making our digital world a

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<v Speaker 2>safer place.

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00:20:50.279 --> 00:20:54.319
<v Speaker 1>Yeah. Be cautious about the technology we use. Absolutely, practice

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<v Speaker 1>good cybersecurity hygiene.

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00:20:56.039 --> 00:20:58.599
<v Speaker 2>And report any suspicious activity if you.

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00:20:58.559 --> 00:21:01.960
<v Speaker 1>See something, say something exactly. Well, thank you so much

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<v Speaker 1>for taking us on this deep dive.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh it's been my pleasure.

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00:21:04.680 --> 00:21:05.480
<v Speaker 1>It's been eye opening.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a fascinating topic.

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<v Speaker 1>And to our listeners, thank you for joining us. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>thank you stay safe, stay informed, stay curious, and until

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<v Speaker 1>next time, keep exploring, Keep exploring.
