WEBVTT

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<v Speaker 1>Hey, Carl here, we're on a mission to find new

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<v Speaker 1>fans of the show. I mean, where else can you

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<v Speaker 1>get real life comedy and horror in one podcast. You

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<v Speaker 1>can do your part by leaving us a review on iTunes,

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<v Speaker 1>Spotify or wherever you get Security this week. Also, you

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<v Speaker 1>can get an ad free feed by becoming a five

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<v Speaker 1>dollars a month patron. Go to Patreon dot Security this

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<v Speaker 1>week dot com and sign up, and don't forget Discord.

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<v Speaker 1>Discord dot Security this week dot com. Lots of good

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<v Speaker 1>stuff happening there. Yeah, I think that's it. So on

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<v Speaker 1>with the podcast. Do you guys have autocorrect on your

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<v Speaker 1>phones or do you turn it off?

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<v Speaker 2>I think I still have it all minds on still unfortunately, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>it's become my worst enema. Glad to hear it. You're

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<v Speaker 2>putting in the wrong place, car O.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey, welcome back to Secure Al this week. I'm Carl Franklin,

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<v Speaker 1>that's Dwayne Laflott and Patrick Hines, and we have a

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<v Speaker 1>whole bunch of stories today, so let's get through them.

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<v Speaker 1>Number one, the Register says Oracle drops almost fifteen hundred

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<v Speaker 1>security patches like it's the new normal. Slow week, the

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<v Speaker 1>era of AI bug hunting is here, so defenders will

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<v Speaker 1>simply have to adapt to busier workloads.

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<v Speaker 2>This sucks, and it's true. So here's the deal. Take

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<v Speaker 2>really really really large organizations, Microsoft, Oracle, you know, anybody,

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<v Speaker 2>anybody who's been creating software for the last I don't know,

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<v Speaker 2>three decades. Right, there's probably just a small bit of

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<v Speaker 2>technical debt in there. Yeah, just a little bit, right,

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<v Speaker 2>just like technical bankruptcy exactly. Just Hey, there's bugs in

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<v Speaker 2>here that we're hoping nobody will ever find or that

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<v Speaker 2>they don't even know about. You know, Windows has a

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<v Speaker 2>gajillion of them, right, right, So this is this is

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<v Speaker 2>going to be the normal. Right, We're starting to see

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<v Speaker 2>the harnesses and the pipelines on artificial intelligence exploitation discovery

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<v Speaker 2>be very very sophisticated and very very good. And and

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<v Speaker 2>you know, Oracle now running these pipelines. I think they

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<v Speaker 2>had said this was a Mythos pipeline, but I can't remember.

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<v Speaker 2>But against their you know, against their own code. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>they're going to find thousands of issues. I think I

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<v Speaker 2>think the part of glass Wing, yeah, I think they were.

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<v Speaker 2>But so it's not a surprise. And Oracles like listen,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, you know the registers. Yeah, the register's like okay,

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<v Speaker 2>like you know this. The thing that sucks about this

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<v Speaker 2>is the poor administrators who now have to apply this patch,

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<v Speaker 2>test it, make sure it actually works, and roll it

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<v Speaker 2>out patches four nine of them.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean, there's smoke testing. Let's be let's be realistic.

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<v Speaker 3>All they're doing is saying does it still open? Yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>they're not testing functionality. It probably covers seventy percent of

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<v Speaker 3>the surface here area of the code.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, and then you say to yourself, well, what's the

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<v Speaker 2>risk of doing well, first off, if you did ten

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<v Speaker 2>a day, it still would take you years. But what's

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<v Speaker 2>the risk of of you know, not applying those patches

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<v Speaker 2>right right now? You're you're in that. I don't know,

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<v Speaker 2>there's there's all these patches are out now. Practice. I

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<v Speaker 2>guarantee you, you know, I guarantee you in a short order,

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<v Speaker 2>there are going to be attackers who have already weaponized

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<v Speaker 2>each and every one of these exploits. Yeah, yeah, what's that?

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<v Speaker 3>What's the name of that website is zero day dot com,

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<v Speaker 3>zero day clock, zero oi clock dot com. It's they're

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<v Speaker 3>talking about hours from when vulnerability becomes known to when

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<v Speaker 3>it becomes attacked.

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<v Speaker 2>Once they have a patch, it's known.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, because the AI and and can reverse engineer it

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<v Speaker 3>pretty pretty easily.

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<v Speaker 2>Now you might say, well.

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<v Speaker 3>There they're guardrails against that open weights and there's you know,

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<v Speaker 3>tricks in the trade and.

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<v Speaker 2>All sorts of you're adorable. That's adorable.

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<v Speaker 1>I remember guardrails. Uh we couldn't ask chat GPT how

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<v Speaker 1>to make the Maltov cocktail and unless that. It was

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<v Speaker 1>my grandmother's recipe and she used to read it to

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<v Speaker 1>me every night before bed.

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<v Speaker 2>She was from Malta. That's where Maltav cocktails come from.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh so yeah, yeah, the zero dey clock is slays.

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<v Speaker 2>I remember when, gosh, what was it, I don't know,

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<v Speaker 2>a year ago, all those guardrail companies were like the

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<v Speaker 2>evaluations on them were insane. Now people are like, we

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<v Speaker 2>can't protect it anyways.

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<v Speaker 1>Really. Yeah. So there's there's going to be a theme

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<v Speaker 1>woven throughout all of these stories, I think, and maybe

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<v Speaker 1>not all of them, but most of them are kind

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<v Speaker 1>of bs.

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<v Speaker 2>We're doomed. That's that's the theme. Well, this is is

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<v Speaker 2>a little bit of.

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<v Speaker 3>The blarnie, the exaggeration, right, that needs to be understood.

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<v Speaker 3>I think that's the way, let's put it nicely, like.

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<v Speaker 1>This story about Oracle, it's actually good news. It is. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's.

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<v Speaker 2>Not, and that's why we opened with it. It's all downhill

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<v Speaker 2>from here, people. Yeah, that's all right.

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<v Speaker 1>Next one, Shiny Hunters data leaks fuel two thousand dollars

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<v Speaker 1>sextortion email scam.

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<v Speaker 2>Shiny Hunters, I've never heard of them, who were they?

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<v Speaker 1>I've never heard of sex stortion, but I'm going to

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<v Speaker 1>start using that word.

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<v Speaker 2>In every story. Extortion. So the Shiny Hunters. We all

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<v Speaker 2>know the Shiny Hunters. They've been in the news several times.

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<v Speaker 2>They are super active. But that the interesting thing about

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<v Speaker 2>this one is it it kind of tries to call

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<v Speaker 2>this the Shiny Hunters out. It's really a data leak

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<v Speaker 2>from them specifically, So they leaked some data online. Their

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<v Speaker 2>typical tactic is like, listen, you know, Verizon, we have

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<v Speaker 2>all this data we stole from you, and if you

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<v Speaker 2>don't pay us, we're going to leak that data online. Right,

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<v Speaker 2>So it happened, right, they leaked some data online. I'm

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<v Speaker 2>not saying it was verse and I'm just saying this

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<v Speaker 2>sort of their normal tactic. Some entrepreneur picked it up

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<v Speaker 2>that leak of email address and whatnot, and decided I

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<v Speaker 2>can make a quick buck on this and started sending

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<v Speaker 2>out emails to the people in that list saying, hey,

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<v Speaker 2>you know your data was in a breach and we

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<v Speaker 2>have access to your phone and we've turned on your cameras. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>and we caught you being naughty, caught you doing things

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<v Speaker 2>you shouldn't be doing on sites you shouldn't be visiting it,

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<v Speaker 2>and blah blah blah blah.

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<v Speaker 3>They're really only getting the guilty conscience crowd.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, exactly. Yeah, although I will tell you, Patrick, I

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<v Speaker 2>can't tell you how many times I've had people call

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<v Speaker 2>me up in a panic and go, oh my god,

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<v Speaker 2>I just got this thing, and I think they know.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm like, all right, first off, you.

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<v Speaker 1>Know everybody knows exactly.

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<v Speaker 3>First off, how's Grandpa?

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<v Speaker 1>Well?

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<v Speaker 2>Patrick, So I needless to say, Yeah, this is this

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<v Speaker 2>is just a this is another social engineering manipulation. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>trying to steal two thousand dollars in bitcoin from as

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<v Speaker 2>many people as they possibly can.

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<v Speaker 3>So how hard is it to do? What they said?

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<v Speaker 3>Just based on So basically they say, oh, we got

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<v Speaker 3>your email address, and then we suddenly got you into

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<v Speaker 3>your email and then we suddenly fished you.

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<v Speaker 2>It's yeah, not a thing. I mean, it's possible, all right,

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<v Speaker 2>you could do it.

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<v Speaker 3>If I had your email address, I could send you

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<v Speaker 3>a phishing email. But hook in the phone is difficult.

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<v Speaker 2>Sure, if you have my email address, you could send

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<v Speaker 2>me a fishing email. Getting on the phone is hard,

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<v Speaker 2>and not only getting on the phone, but then getting

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<v Speaker 2>access to video, like you actually the camera. I mean, listen,

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<v Speaker 2>we all have those those fears, right like, oh geez,

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<v Speaker 2>people are watching me over my camera. I will tell

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<v Speaker 2>you hardware vendors are. It's one of the things they

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<v Speaker 2>worry about too. And there's a reason. There's those lights

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<v Speaker 2>on the camera and a lot of them are hardwired too.

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<v Speaker 2>When the power of the camera fires up, it turns

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<v Speaker 2>that led on and you see it, right, there's not

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<v Speaker 2>really an easy way to bypass those things. So you know,

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<v Speaker 2>for them to turn on your camera and turn on

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<v Speaker 2>your microphone and not have you notice it. It's it

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<v Speaker 2>can be done. Don't get me wrong.

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<v Speaker 1>It has been done, hasn't it.

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<v Speaker 3>It has even just getting to the point where you

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<v Speaker 3>can do it, even if without the like worrying about

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<v Speaker 3>not being discovered is a pretty big task, it's a

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<v Speaker 3>pretty big lift.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Absolutely, And a lot of times, I'll tell you

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<v Speaker 2>as a guy who's designed rats for mobile devices.

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<v Speaker 3>Like remote access trojans.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so where we've tried to get something installed on

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<v Speaker 2>somebody's phone that would hide in the background and fire

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<v Speaker 2>up the camera and fire up the mic and listen

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<v Speaker 2>and blow blahah whatever. There's all sorts of things that

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<v Speaker 2>happen where like if you fire up the microphone, you'll

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<v Speaker 2>hear an audible thing or something along those lines. So's

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<v Speaker 2>if there's background tasks doing these things. It's not as

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<v Speaker 2>easy as you would think. Let's just put it that way.

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<v Speaker 2>Is there a zero day you could invent to do this? Yeah? Absolutely,

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<v Speaker 2>They're not inventing a zero day so that they can

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<v Speaker 2>watch you on some site you shouldn't.

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<v Speaker 1>So when the fear mongering started about that they can

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<v Speaker 1>watch you through your video camera, laptops started coming with

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<v Speaker 1>a little slide over the camera.

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<v Speaker 2>Yep, right, we used to give those away. Oh yeah

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<v Speaker 2>we did. Yeah, I mean honestly, like even the camera

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<v Speaker 2>I use for the podcast here, it has I can

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<v Speaker 2>I can twist yeah too, the bezel and it has

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<v Speaker 2>it has one of those Yeah. Privacy filters to that.

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<v Speaker 1>It all right, So okay, next story, hijackers hijack hotel

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<v Speaker 1>Wi Fi DNS to steal Microsoft three hundred and sixty

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<v Speaker 1>five accounts. And I would just like to say that

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<v Speaker 1>sucks to be you because I have a Mai Fi

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<v Speaker 1>that I used everywhere I go, right hotel, anytime I'm out,

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<v Speaker 1>That's what I use.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a great solution.

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<v Speaker 3>A cheaper solution is usually a VPNY and a lot

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<v Speaker 3>of times you can get a VPN through, like if

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<v Speaker 3>you have a higher end firewall router, you might be

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<v Speaker 3>a dv even VPN through it as a feature. But

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<v Speaker 3>there's lots of different options for getting VPNs right, and

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<v Speaker 3>that's that's would solve this problem.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I mean I think this story is like, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>extra extra public Wi Fi's can be dangerous. Yeah, exactly,

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<v Speaker 2>like I get it. In this particular case, they say, obviously,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, hackers were within Wi Fi range of a

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<v Speaker 2>hotel and they were able to get access to the

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<v Speaker 2>Wi Fi that's provided to guests. Okay, that's not super hard.

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<v Speaker 2>You usually get the password and it's usually something stupid, and.

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<v Speaker 1>They could look up what the DNS server.

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<v Speaker 2>Is yep, and then they connected to the to the router,

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<v Speaker 2>and it says there was a weak authorization and authentication control,

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<v Speaker 2>which probably means default username and password of admin admin.

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<v Speaker 2>And then they changed the DNS.

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<v Speaker 1>Or a lot of hotels will just have an open

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<v Speaker 1>guess network that has no encryption.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, but yeah, absolutely, but that's fine.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, but you shouldn't have your router's admin interface on

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<v Speaker 3>that network.

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<v Speaker 2>No, well hell no, yeah, exactly right. But that's what's

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<v Speaker 2>going on here. So that's what happened in this case

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<v Speaker 2>is like, okay, they gained access to the router, they

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<v Speaker 2>changed the DNS to point it to one of their

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<v Speaker 2>own malicious ones, which then re routed all the users

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<v Speaker 2>who went to office to try to go to office,

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<v Speaker 2>you know through sixty five website to their own malicious

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<v Speaker 2>one that could steal credential. So okay, I, like I said,

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<v Speaker 2>I get it, Carl. You know using a Mai Fi,

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<v Speaker 2>which for those of you don't well may not even

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<v Speaker 2>be in the United States. You know, my Fi is

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<v Speaker 2>small little device that we have in here in the

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<v Speaker 2>United States is a cellular access point, a hotspot.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like when you put your phone in tether mode

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<v Speaker 1>or you.

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<v Speaker 2>Know, in share yeah, exactly, share connection yep.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, but it's a dedicated device.

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<v Speaker 2>And for Patrick, like Patrick has you know, high end

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<v Speaker 2>firewalls at his house, there are plenty of these little

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<v Speaker 2>you know, either VPN devices. I know Unify has one,

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<v Speaker 2>Fordet has them, firewall that has one, forda Net has one. Whatever.

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<v Speaker 2>There's all these tiny little like hardware devices. You can

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<v Speaker 2>literally just plug into your hotel room and will connect

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<v Speaker 2>to the hotel Wi Fi and it will VPN automatically

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<v Speaker 2>out to your house, so all your traffic comes off

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<v Speaker 2>your home. So there's there's definitely solutions for this.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean, there was even tails that you can use

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<v Speaker 3>if you're really paranoid the government's chasing you.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and that that's kind of thing.

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<v Speaker 1>Yep, tinfoil hats. So I have questions for you, either

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<v Speaker 1>of you. Uh If I go to say, my local

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<v Speaker 1>stop and shop and they have a free Wi Fi

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<v Speaker 1>for the guests, right, and you're brought to a page

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<v Speaker 1>where you have to click a checkbox and agree the portal.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, captive portal.

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<v Speaker 1>A captive portal, that's right? Is that any more secure

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<v Speaker 1>than something that's just completely open with no password?

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<v Speaker 3>I mean no, if it's the page is even presented

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<v Speaker 3>by a legitimate Yeah, it's not, because I can put

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<v Speaker 3>up a device that'll show you a captive portal and

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<v Speaker 3>capture your information.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, Yeah, it's not. I mean it's it's open. It's

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<v Speaker 2>an open network that a.

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<v Speaker 1>Lot of hotel wifis work like this too. You basically

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<v Speaker 1>go to a portal, you put in your room number

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<v Speaker 1>in your last name. Yep. Is that encrypted?

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<v Speaker 2>No? No, I mean it can be. It could be

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<v Speaker 2>SSL back end to the router. But think about it

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<v Speaker 2>this way. That router that captive portal's most likely not

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<v Speaker 2>SSL because if it was, they'd have to keep renewing

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<v Speaker 2>the certificate over times. So most of the time they

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<v Speaker 2>phone it in and go, whatever, you're logging in our network, right, smart?

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<v Speaker 1>So a smart developer would use that last name and

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<v Speaker 1>room number and make a key out of it and

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<v Speaker 1>use that right.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>But but they don't do that.

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<v Speaker 2>No.

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<v Speaker 3>No.

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<v Speaker 2>For the most part, it's hey, verify against the database

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<v Speaker 2>that there is a username and this room number so

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<v Speaker 2>that we can give them the right access to internet.

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<v Speaker 2>And sometimes it's redirect them to a pay portal to

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<v Speaker 2>pay for internet or no, you're a Marriotte super user, Fine,

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<v Speaker 2>you get access or whatever.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, did I did I tell you about my nightmare

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<v Speaker 1>with that? I don't think so, I don't know. I

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<v Speaker 1>went on a vacation with my wife and we went

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<v Speaker 1>down the East coast down to Baltimore Impact, and I

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<v Speaker 1>think it was in New Jersey maybe that we went

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<v Speaker 1>to this hotel and I got the Wi Fi and

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<v Speaker 1>it was dog slow. I think I told you this.

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<v Speaker 1>Then I had to keep clearing a cash or deleting

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<v Speaker 1>oh yes, deleting the network and then I and then

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<v Speaker 1>it would spin up again and I would enter my

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<v Speaker 1>room number and all that stuff. But I had to

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<v Speaker 1>do that every time I closed my computer because it

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<v Speaker 1>didn't remember it remembered the crappy Wi Fi. I wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to get on the pay Wi Fi, which was better.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>So it turns out they charged me for every time

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<v Speaker 1>I did that. Whoa, every time I logged in and

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<v Speaker 1>said I want the pay thing, there was another twenty

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<v Speaker 1>dollars charge or whatever. We ended up paying, like, I

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<v Speaker 1>don't know, two hundred dollars in charges for Wi Fi

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<v Speaker 1>and you paid it. Well, of course I paid. They

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<v Speaker 1>took it. Yeah, but we disputed it, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>I can't remember if we got anywhere.

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<v Speaker 3>But we say, hey, with that, give us their address.

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<v Speaker 1>We'll get that.

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<v Speaker 2>Hey, Patrick, you guys are like the am I the

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<v Speaker 2>one who has to say you can't say those things

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<v Speaker 2>on the air.

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<v Speaker 1>Is that you guys are like this my real names right,

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<v Speaker 1>No one has my real address. Fine, we're going to

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<v Speaker 1>pay him a little.

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<v Speaker 3>I can burn that Patrick's pseudonym anytime.

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<v Speaker 1>So anyway, yeah, that's my Okay, that was my question,

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<v Speaker 1>and thank you for answering it. Let's move on. In

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<v Speaker 1>Vidia unites tech giants in open Secure AI Alliance for

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<v Speaker 1>Cybersecurity in a list okay of twenty thirty forty. So

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<v Speaker 1>let's let's get companies. Let's let's declare this is a

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<v Speaker 1>sub theme.

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<v Speaker 2>This is great, it's great.

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<v Speaker 3>This is a sub theme. I'm going to burst your bubble.

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<v Speaker 3>It is a sub theme. This is billion dollar companies

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<v Speaker 3>tooting their own interests as social goods. Of course, it's

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<v Speaker 3>so basically, and Vidia is leading the charge.

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<v Speaker 2>And what do they want?

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<v Speaker 3>They want the government to leave their mits off regulating

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<v Speaker 3>open weight models. Who has the most to gain from

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<v Speaker 3>an open weight model? In Vidia, they sell the cards

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<v Speaker 3>that you need that the Kimmi Iree open weight model

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<v Speaker 3>takes about a million dollars worth of video cards, just

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<v Speaker 3>video cards to run it. You're not running that on

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<v Speaker 3>your local desktop or rig No.

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<v Speaker 1>Open weight means you run it on your own hardware,

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<v Speaker 1>right correct.

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<v Speaker 3>Open weight is basically something that could be downloaded from

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<v Speaker 3>hugging Face and you can set it up on your own.

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<v Speaker 3>All these companies have an interest in the proliferation of

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<v Speaker 3>more implementations. Okay, So the ones that don't have an

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<v Speaker 3>interest in that, most notably anthropic, have not signed up

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<v Speaker 3>for this because anthropics like, hey, these companies are mostly

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<v Speaker 3>training from us, right, they're distilling, they're basically, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>illegally using our software to train their own software.

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<v Speaker 1>We want charge people to use claude.

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<v Speaker 3>People say, well, oh, the irony because the authors of

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<v Speaker 3>the books that you scan didn't get that that that privilege.

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<v Speaker 3>But that aside, it's again it's a it's a profit move.

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<v Speaker 3>It's not necessarily an open anthropic mode. Philanthropic not anthropy.

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<v Speaker 3>There was a there was highest level.

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<v Speaker 1>Phil anthrophic that's the CEO of anthropic phil.

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<v Speaker 3>Anthropic basically, it's it's they're trying to say, oh, well,

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<v Speaker 3>if it's an open weight, you should just keep your

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<v Speaker 3>mits off it. But if it's a closed weight, then

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<v Speaker 3>you need to regulate it. That's that's a double standard now,

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<v Speaker 3>especially since Kimmy and the other open weight model providers

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<v Speaker 3>are saying theirs is just as powerful and just as good.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, Okay, all right, So so I guess we have

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<v Speaker 1>another sub theme here going on. It's kind of like

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<v Speaker 1>we're complicated. Things are not what they seem.

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<v Speaker 2>We're layered like onions.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, Well, one more story before we have a

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<v Speaker 1>break here. The NSA just warned everyone to reboot their routers.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh no, good advice.

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<v Speaker 1>What to do right now?

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, thanks, Okay, I'm going to hit it now. Yeah, right,

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<v Speaker 2>so this is just standard advice. I mean, we're seeing

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<v Speaker 2>Actually we'll talk about Fordinette, but we've we've talked about

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<v Speaker 2>Fordinett a lot. We've talked about TP a link a lot,

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<v Speaker 2>We've talked about it. There's there's all sorts of routers

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<v Speaker 2>out there that heck, even earlier this year, if I

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<v Speaker 2>remember correctly, there were a lot of what they call

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<v Speaker 2>SOHO routers, which is small office home office routers. What'd

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<v Speaker 2>you call me that you heard me? You know, that

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<v Speaker 2>were compromised by Russia and we're being used in a botnet. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>and the FBI actually got court orders where they could

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<v Speaker 2>log into some of those routers and fix them because

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<v Speaker 2>there were just so many of them. They were like,

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<v Speaker 2>you know what, we got to actually try and help here.

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<v Speaker 2>The problem is a lot of these compromises that we

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<v Speaker 2>we've been we've seen this year in routers. There's a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of ways to be persistent for an attacker to

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<v Speaker 2>stay having access to these devices. So if that's the case,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, some of them are memory persistence, which means

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<v Speaker 2>rebooting the device will clear it. So you do you

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<v Speaker 2>want to just clear the device, make sure there's no

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<v Speaker 2>h you know, if there's a username and password on

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<v Speaker 2>your router, make sure you change that password at least

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<v Speaker 2>once a year. Make sure your routers are always up

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<v Speaker 2>to date, and you know, reboot it every once in

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<v Speaker 2>a while. It's a good maintenance anyways, just to reboot it.

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<v Speaker 3>And we've given the advice with your phone, yeah, that

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<v Speaker 3>you should be rebooting your phone. You should be you know,

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<v Speaker 3>you should be doing this stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>This is all this is all not news to our listeners, yep,

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<v Speaker 1>because they're smart, wicked, wicked smart, but so yeah, this

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<v Speaker 1>is this. I actually have a router that automatically installs

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00:19:51.759 --> 00:19:56.440
<v Speaker 1>updates and reboots, and that's a really good feature to have, especially,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, if you're that's awesome, busy playing solitaire like

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<v Speaker 1>me all day?

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<v Speaker 3>Who has time for those fourteen hundred patches?

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<v Speaker 2>All right?

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<v Speaker 1>No, I don't have an Oracle router, thanks very much.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think there is something.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, all right, so good advice.

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<v Speaker 1>But you knew that, right, Thank you? Tell your parents.

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<v Speaker 3>Mean, we've been talking about this stuff. We're ahead of

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<v Speaker 3>the NSA, been ahead for years.

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<v Speaker 2>Apparently, that's right.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, on that note, will take a little break,

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<v Speaker 1>we'll be right back after these very important messages, and

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<v Speaker 1>we're back. It's security this week. I'm Carl, that's Dwayne

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00:20:35.359 --> 00:20:40.000
<v Speaker 1>and Patrick. Let's talk about this next one from futurism,

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00:20:40.440 --> 00:20:43.079
<v Speaker 1>and it's been all over the news. A whole bunch

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<v Speaker 1>of people's Claude chats are publicly accessible online and there's

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<v Speaker 1>some wildly private stuff in there. Oh doesn't that sound tempting?

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00:20:52.400 --> 00:20:53.519
<v Speaker 1>I want to go read it?

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00:20:53.839 --> 00:20:57.759
<v Speaker 2>Yeah it does. Yeah. They found things like actual patient

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<v Speaker 2>record data. They found all sorts of you know, last

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<v Speaker 2>time there was a leak. They found things like how

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<v Speaker 2>do I hide a body? And all sorts of weird stuff. Right,

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<v Speaker 2>so there's wow, there's definitely some interesting conversations going on

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<v Speaker 2>in here. For the most part, for all of you,

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<v Speaker 2>I assume and all of our listeners have probably used

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<v Speaker 2>an LLM at some point, right, have chat, gpt co Pilot, Gemini, Gemini.

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<v Speaker 2>Nobody uses Gemini but anyways, so if you've used.

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<v Speaker 1>There, you go are Google employee listeners.

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<v Speaker 2>Techno. Nobody at Google listens to this show. So can

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<v Speaker 2>you imagine if the the threat uh an analyst group

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<v Speaker 2>at Google was listening to this show, it'd be just amazing.

422
00:21:51.480 --> 00:21:52.519
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, it would be.

423
00:21:52.960 --> 00:21:57.559
<v Speaker 2>So any of those chats I'd say probably about a

424
00:21:57.720 --> 00:22:01.000
<v Speaker 2>maybe a year ago. There's the little menu up in

425
00:22:01.039 --> 00:22:03.119
<v Speaker 2>the top right that you can click on and you

426
00:22:03.160 --> 00:22:04.599
<v Speaker 2>can click share, right.

427
00:22:04.880 --> 00:22:10.359
<v Speaker 3>I think they renamed it to cell phone not cell phone.

428
00:22:10.400 --> 00:22:14.759
<v Speaker 2>Self phone Yeah, yes, itself or that doesn't make any sense,

429
00:22:15.640 --> 00:22:21.319
<v Speaker 2>pone me phone Yeah, And what that does is makes

430
00:22:21.359 --> 00:22:27.240
<v Speaker 2>a publicly accessible link for this chat, right, Well, but

431
00:22:27.279 --> 00:22:32.119
<v Speaker 2>it's still private, right yeah, you do it on also yeah. Absolutely.

432
00:22:32.599 --> 00:22:36.559
<v Speaker 2>The problem is then your your robots, your Google's and

433
00:22:36.599 --> 00:22:40.000
<v Speaker 2>your whatever that crawl the Internet. They eventually find these,

434
00:22:40.599 --> 00:22:42.960
<v Speaker 2>whether it's you know, somebody clicks on it and has

435
00:22:43.039 --> 00:22:46.160
<v Speaker 2>a you know, an add on in their browser or whatever. Right,

436
00:22:46.799 --> 00:22:49.279
<v Speaker 2>and yeah, exactly, once it gets found, it gets indexed,

437
00:22:49.279 --> 00:22:52.799
<v Speaker 2>and once it gets indexed, it's public. Anybody on Google

438
00:22:52.839 --> 00:22:55.359
<v Speaker 2>can search for it and just do that, do a

439
00:22:55.400 --> 00:22:58.599
<v Speaker 2>Google dork for it and find it. Excuse me, you

440
00:22:58.720 --> 00:22:59.759
<v Speaker 2>heard me a Google dork.

441
00:23:00.799 --> 00:23:03.319
<v Speaker 3>Long story we'll talk about. Do you guys know Ron White,

442
00:23:03.359 --> 00:23:05.839
<v Speaker 3>the comedian. Oh yeah, so do you ever hear about

443
00:23:05.839 --> 00:23:07.759
<v Speaker 3>where he's talked about being thrown out of a bar.

444
00:23:08.039 --> 00:23:10.599
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's his most famous line ever.

445
00:23:11.279 --> 00:23:14.400
<v Speaker 3>I was not drunk in public. I was thrown into public.

446
00:23:16.119 --> 00:23:18.000
<v Speaker 1>I was thrown out of a bar. When I say

447
00:23:18.039 --> 00:23:20.519
<v Speaker 1>thrown out, literally picked up by the scruff of the

448
00:23:20.599 --> 00:23:22.559
<v Speaker 1>neck and thrown out into the street.

449
00:23:22.640 --> 00:23:23.039
<v Speaker 2>I don't know.

450
00:23:23.200 --> 00:23:24.960
<v Speaker 3>My favorite line is I don't know how many of

451
00:23:24.960 --> 00:23:26.519
<v Speaker 3>it was gonna take they were going to use to

452
00:23:26.519 --> 00:23:28.039
<v Speaker 3>beat my I didn't know how many it was going

453
00:23:28.079 --> 00:23:29.559
<v Speaker 3>to take to beat my ass, but I knew how many.

454
00:23:29.400 --> 00:23:37.319
<v Speaker 2>They were going to use. He's a riot. Oh, so

455
00:23:37.519 --> 00:23:40.640
<v Speaker 2>just be careful, coming back to the story, just be

456
00:23:41.200 --> 00:23:44.279
<v Speaker 2>just be careful if you share something as a public link.

457
00:23:45.599 --> 00:23:48.319
<v Speaker 2>Realize it's now a public link, right, you do have

458
00:23:48.359 --> 00:23:49.920
<v Speaker 2>the ability to pull those shares back.

459
00:23:50.079 --> 00:23:53.400
<v Speaker 3>So occasionally did the word public not like give it away?

460
00:23:53.519 --> 00:23:54.200
<v Speaker 2>I know? Right?

461
00:23:54.519 --> 00:23:58.359
<v Speaker 1>This falls into line with the hype theme of yes,

462
00:23:58.640 --> 00:24:01.960
<v Speaker 1>these stories this week, and you know, and most of

463
00:24:02.000 --> 00:24:08.519
<v Speaker 1>our listeners are like, yeah, duh. Right, So the next one,

464
00:24:08.920 --> 00:24:12.720
<v Speaker 1>our old friend Fortinett is back in the news. SISA

465
00:24:12.839 --> 00:24:18.640
<v Speaker 1>warns of fort forty forty OS. Al said forty as

466
00:24:19.119 --> 00:24:26.680
<v Speaker 1>for Fortinet forty OS vulnerability exploited in attacks. Again, so

467
00:24:26.920 --> 00:24:29.240
<v Speaker 1>is this serious or is this a kind of a yawner?

468
00:24:29.359 --> 00:24:32.039
<v Speaker 2>This is a little bit of a yawner. This is

469
00:24:32.640 --> 00:24:35.440
<v Speaker 2>this is a reminder of wayback when. So if you

470
00:24:35.480 --> 00:24:38.920
<v Speaker 2>take a look at really, if we break down this article,

471
00:24:39.279 --> 00:24:44.000
<v Speaker 2>the exploit is CVE twenty twenty five six eight six

472
00:24:44.119 --> 00:24:47.720
<v Speaker 2>eight six, So that means this exploit was you know,

473
00:24:48.519 --> 00:24:51.519
<v Speaker 2>given it CVE number last year. Right, how many times

474
00:24:51.519 --> 00:24:53.960
<v Speaker 2>on this year we talked about Fortinet and having to

475
00:24:54.200 --> 00:24:56.480
<v Speaker 2>update it because there were issues and bypasses in that

476
00:24:56.559 --> 00:24:59.920
<v Speaker 2>sort of too many times? Right, So that's number one.

477
00:25:00.119 --> 00:25:03.039
<v Speaker 2>Number one, you should already be patched to this. Number two.

478
00:25:03.400 --> 00:25:07.279
<v Speaker 2>What they're saying is even patched, there is a way

479
00:25:07.359 --> 00:25:11.200
<v Speaker 2>for attackers to maintain persistence. So if you had if

480
00:25:11.240 --> 00:25:14.079
<v Speaker 2>you had patched and had no indicators to compromise, you'll

481
00:25:14.079 --> 00:25:18.759
<v Speaker 2>probably find you took the suggestions, you patched, you rotated credentials,

482
00:25:18.799 --> 00:25:22.240
<v Speaker 2>you're good. If you had just patched, didn't rotate credentials,

483
00:25:22.480 --> 00:25:24.680
<v Speaker 2>didn't actually go in and verify that there were no

484
00:25:24.720 --> 00:25:29.640
<v Speaker 2>indicators a compromise. There's what SISA is saying is there

485
00:25:29.880 --> 00:25:34.960
<v Speaker 2>have evidence on Fortinet devices currently that they were patched,

486
00:25:35.440 --> 00:25:39.839
<v Speaker 2>but beforehand the attackers were setting up persistence where they

487
00:25:39.839 --> 00:25:43.599
<v Speaker 2>could gain access to the devices. Again. So here again,

488
00:25:44.000 --> 00:25:46.480
<v Speaker 2>if you took our advice and patched, great, But the

489
00:25:46.519 --> 00:25:52.000
<v Speaker 2>full advice obviously is go patch cycle your credentials and

490
00:25:52.079 --> 00:25:54.599
<v Speaker 2>then look for indicators to compromise. In this case, this

491
00:25:54.720 --> 00:25:58.279
<v Speaker 2>is a what they call a sim link manipulation, but

492
00:25:58.599 --> 00:25:59.279
<v Speaker 2>it'll be in the art.

493
00:25:59.359 --> 00:26:02.519
<v Speaker 3>Great example of why you want to be patching early

494
00:26:02.680 --> 00:26:06.359
<v Speaker 3>not late. Yes, because the workload just goes up yep,

495
00:26:06.839 --> 00:26:09.839
<v Speaker 3>and there are instances where it's like you can't reliably

496
00:26:09.920 --> 00:26:11.079
<v Speaker 3>get them secure again.

497
00:26:11.640 --> 00:26:15.200
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's a good point, Patrick. I've had plenty of

498
00:26:15.200 --> 00:26:18.759
<v Speaker 2>customers come to me after a breach and go Okay,

499
00:26:18.799 --> 00:26:22.640
<v Speaker 2>we removed the bad thing the way they got in.

500
00:26:22.720 --> 00:26:25.559
<v Speaker 2>We could now and I'm like, I know three billion

501
00:26:25.559 --> 00:26:27.680
<v Speaker 2>ways I would hide in these systems that you'd never

502
00:26:27.839 --> 00:26:30.599
<v Speaker 2>find me. So no, they're like, what do we do?

503
00:26:30.640 --> 00:26:32.359
<v Speaker 2>And I'm like, I don't know, burn it down, like

504
00:26:32.759 --> 00:26:34.119
<v Speaker 2>rebuild it from scratch.

505
00:26:34.400 --> 00:26:35.640
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes that's the answer.

506
00:26:35.799 --> 00:26:39.079
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, absolutely, it's not an answer they like or usually

507
00:26:39.119 --> 00:26:40.359
<v Speaker 3>can even physically take.

508
00:26:41.119 --> 00:26:43.880
<v Speaker 2>So they're just living dangerously and they're like, well, can

509
00:26:43.880 --> 00:26:46.359
<v Speaker 2>we just restore from backup? Yeah? Great, when do you

510
00:26:46.599 --> 00:26:49.680
<v Speaker 2>do you know exactly when it was compromised, because you're

511
00:26:49.680 --> 00:26:53.039
<v Speaker 2>gonna have to restore prior to that and make sure

512
00:26:53.079 --> 00:26:56.039
<v Speaker 2>there wasn't somebody already in the system. So yeah, it's

513
00:26:56.079 --> 00:26:57.359
<v Speaker 2>just it's a it's a hard task.

514
00:26:57.559 --> 00:27:01.160
<v Speaker 1>So just as an aside, I'm looking at my recording

515
00:27:01.319 --> 00:27:04.240
<v Speaker 1>in Riverside. Riverside FM is what we used to record,

516
00:27:04.640 --> 00:27:06.319
<v Speaker 1>and we can see each other. We don't use it

517
00:27:06.519 --> 00:27:10.559
<v Speaker 1>the video, but and I see this blinking red light

518
00:27:10.640 --> 00:27:13.640
<v Speaker 1>on the wall in back of my guitar, and I'm like,

519
00:27:13.640 --> 00:27:15.759
<v Speaker 1>what the heck is that? And I'm staring and then

520
00:27:15.799 --> 00:27:18.680
<v Speaker 1>I see, oh, you got a blinking red light, and

521
00:27:18.680 --> 00:27:21.240
<v Speaker 1>you've got a blinking red light in the top left corner.

522
00:27:21.519 --> 00:27:24.599
<v Speaker 1>It just means I'm recording, but I have red walls,

523
00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:27.200
<v Speaker 1>and this is a And I said, when did I

524
00:27:27.400 --> 00:27:31.559
<v Speaker 1>put anything on the wall that blinks off?

525
00:27:32.599 --> 00:27:35.720
<v Speaker 2>It's the snipers, Carl, you got a joke. It's a.

526
00:27:35.839 --> 00:27:39.279
<v Speaker 3>It's a it's a it's a laser red finder that

527
00:27:39.440 --> 00:27:41.319
<v Speaker 3>they just haven't decided to take you out yet.

528
00:27:41.440 --> 00:27:42.240
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, exactly, waiting.

529
00:27:42.279 --> 00:27:45.359
<v Speaker 1>Well, at least it's not on my Forehead's exactly.

530
00:27:45.440 --> 00:27:48.240
<v Speaker 2>You're just going to hit the gibbs in on the wall. Uh.

531
00:27:48.920 --> 00:27:52.759
<v Speaker 1>Okay, here's one for Patrick claude A. I just cracked

532
00:27:52.799 --> 00:27:57.200
<v Speaker 1>a post quantum test scheme and found a faster seven

533
00:27:57.319 --> 00:28:00.720
<v Speaker 1>round AES attack. Should we be con certain? Patrick?

534
00:28:01.079 --> 00:28:03.599
<v Speaker 3>So, so they're talking about Hawk, which is one of

535
00:28:03.599 --> 00:28:07.960
<v Speaker 3>the contenders to be a post quantum cryptography stalwart h

536
00:28:08.039 --> 00:28:12.000
<v Speaker 3>A w K Yeah Hawk, not Houktua Hawk.

537
00:28:12.519 --> 00:28:18.839
<v Speaker 2>Uh and wow, there's a callback, So it's it's a deal.

538
00:28:19.119 --> 00:28:21.759
<v Speaker 3>I don't know that it's a big deal. So I

539
00:28:21.880 --> 00:28:28.200
<v Speaker 3>like lattice based crystal used to be Crystal's, kiber Crystal's

540
00:28:28.559 --> 00:28:34.720
<v Speaker 3>the lithium now mL KIM and m l dsl or

541
00:28:34.799 --> 00:28:37.200
<v Speaker 3>d s A. Those are the ones that if they

542
00:28:37.240 --> 00:28:40.480
<v Speaker 3>were cracked, I'd be I'd be freaked out. I don't

543
00:28:40.480 --> 00:28:43.640
<v Speaker 3>think they're gonna be. This is not like the primary

544
00:28:43.720 --> 00:28:46.720
<v Speaker 3>way that we were going to defend against postquonum cryptography.

545
00:28:46.960 --> 00:28:50.599
<v Speaker 3>It was a candidate and and maybe it was close

546
00:28:50.640 --> 00:28:52.279
<v Speaker 3>to the end, but there's a reason it didn't become

547
00:28:52.319 --> 00:28:52.960
<v Speaker 3>a recommendation.

548
00:28:53.039 --> 00:28:55.200
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I was going to say, so nobody uses it. Yeah.

549
00:28:55.200 --> 00:28:58.640
<v Speaker 2>According to the article, Hawk is the only only lattice

550
00:28:58.640 --> 00:29:02.200
<v Speaker 2>based scheme among the nine candidates that NIST advanced to

551
00:29:02.240 --> 00:29:06.160
<v Speaker 2>the third round of its additional post quantum Digital Signature

552
00:29:06.480 --> 00:29:09.519
<v Speaker 2>Process additional YEP in May twenty twenty six.

553
00:29:09.720 --> 00:29:11.880
<v Speaker 3>The first round has already been done, and that the

554
00:29:11.960 --> 00:29:14.920
<v Speaker 3>two I mentioned are among them, and Sphinx are the

555
00:29:14.920 --> 00:29:16.920
<v Speaker 3>ones that are the ones.

556
00:29:17.039 --> 00:29:19.799
<v Speaker 2>But here's here's what I will say. The Anointed it

557
00:29:20.839 --> 00:29:25.440
<v Speaker 2>this is very much a hype grabbing title. It's you know,

558
00:29:25.480 --> 00:29:28.960
<v Speaker 2>it talks about how Claude AI just cracked post quantum

559
00:29:29.039 --> 00:29:34.160
<v Speaker 2>test schemes and found faster seven round as attacks. And

560
00:29:34.240 --> 00:29:38.039
<v Speaker 2>if we break that down, so Hawk, the Hawk that

561
00:29:38.200 --> 00:29:41.079
<v Speaker 2>was broken quote unquote, and really all they did was

562
00:29:41.119 --> 00:29:43.960
<v Speaker 2>speed up some of the recovery of the keys. Was

563
00:29:44.000 --> 00:29:46.680
<v Speaker 2>Hawk two fifty six. Hawk two fifty six was never

564
00:29:46.720 --> 00:29:50.480
<v Speaker 2>designed to be used. It is a very light version

565
00:29:50.680 --> 00:29:53.279
<v Speaker 2>of the algorithm, the post quantum algorithm. It's like saying,

566
00:29:53.279 --> 00:29:57.480
<v Speaker 2>you broke death, right exactly, nobody ran Yeah, so nobody

567
00:29:57.559 --> 00:29:59.960
<v Speaker 2>uses this in ever and no one would ever use

568
00:30:00.079 --> 00:30:03.319
<v Speaker 2>this in production. HOWK five twelve and HOWK ten twenty four, Yeah,

569
00:30:03.359 --> 00:30:07.759
<v Speaker 2>absolutely right, used in production. And that's still like on

570
00:30:07.880 --> 00:30:10.759
<v Speaker 2>the order of to crack it, even using with this

571
00:30:10.759 --> 00:30:12.920
<v Speaker 2>this new algorithm, it's on the order of the heat

572
00:30:12.960 --> 00:30:16.759
<v Speaker 2>death of the sun in time, right, So well, it's

573
00:30:16.799 --> 00:30:18.960
<v Speaker 2>intriguing but not that interesting.

574
00:30:19.119 --> 00:30:21.480
<v Speaker 3>And even to do this, how much did they spend

575
00:30:21.599 --> 00:30:24.200
<v Speaker 3>Oh my god, one hundred thousand dollars in tokens?

576
00:30:24.559 --> 00:30:27.519
<v Speaker 2>They just yeah, they decided just to throw one hundred

577
00:30:27.559 --> 00:30:30.839
<v Speaker 2>thousand dollars in tokens at it, which one does when

578
00:30:30.839 --> 00:30:33.400
<v Speaker 2>they own the plant. So yeah, sure, why not.

579
00:30:33.559 --> 00:30:38.319
<v Speaker 1>So if if sometime in the future, Patrick, we have

580
00:30:38.480 --> 00:30:42.400
<v Speaker 1>something to be worried about with hacking quantum, you're gonna

581
00:30:42.440 --> 00:30:42.880
<v Speaker 1>tell us.

582
00:30:42.799 --> 00:30:45.000
<v Speaker 2>Right, yeah, right, I'll tell you car all.

583
00:30:44.960 --> 00:30:49.960
<v Speaker 1>Right, well you tell everybody. I'm sure, no, just you nope.

584
00:30:50.000 --> 00:30:52.519
<v Speaker 2>And then on top of that, but hold on, on

585
00:30:52.559 --> 00:30:56.799
<v Speaker 2>top of that they also talk about breaking the seven

586
00:30:57.039 --> 00:31:00.680
<v Speaker 2>rounds of AE S one twenty eight. Okay, well you

587
00:31:00.680 --> 00:31:05.359
<v Speaker 2>know that's not a postal question from World of Warcraft exactly,

588
00:31:05.720 --> 00:31:11.440
<v Speaker 2>you need the seven rounds crab. Yeah, so real A

589
00:31:12.000 --> 00:31:15.559
<v Speaker 2>S one twenty eight uses ten rounds, ten rounds of

590
00:31:15.680 --> 00:31:20.240
<v Speaker 2>encryption and you know, mucking up the running it through

591
00:31:20.240 --> 00:31:24.079
<v Speaker 2>the algorithm seven rounds is there's a reason they used

592
00:31:24.079 --> 00:31:29.200
<v Speaker 2>ten rounds, right, because it's exponentially more secure every round

593
00:31:29.240 --> 00:31:32.200
<v Speaker 2>they go through. Okay, so seven rounds is so crippled

594
00:31:32.519 --> 00:31:35.799
<v Speaker 2>there again, nobody would ever use it in production. Right

595
00:31:36.839 --> 00:31:39.200
<v Speaker 2>And even there they said, oh my god, it was

596
00:31:39.240 --> 00:31:43.079
<v Speaker 2>two to eight hundred times faster to crack it. It

597
00:31:43.160 --> 00:31:47.279
<v Speaker 2>still doesn't really matter because at that point, yes, they

598
00:31:47.279 --> 00:31:50.960
<v Speaker 2>found a faster way to manipulate the keys, but yet

599
00:31:51.000 --> 00:31:53.440
<v Speaker 2>again in an algorithm that nobody would ever use anyway.

600
00:31:53.519 --> 00:31:56.839
<v Speaker 2>So you know, I hate stories like this. I think

601
00:31:56.839 --> 00:31:59.039
<v Speaker 2>it's I think it's interesting. And sure, if you spent

602
00:31:59.079 --> 00:32:01.799
<v Speaker 2>one hundred thousand dollars you might get some cool, interesting

603
00:32:01.839 --> 00:32:03.640
<v Speaker 2>things that you can't do anything with, and this is

604
00:32:03.680 --> 00:32:04.160
<v Speaker 2>one of them.

605
00:32:04.519 --> 00:32:07.240
<v Speaker 3>They're trying to post it as like, well, then look

606
00:32:07.279 --> 00:32:11.599
<v Speaker 3>what we can do. But it's kind of a parlor trick. Yeah, right,

607
00:32:11.799 --> 00:32:16.039
<v Speaker 3>is the problem bs, As I said, see the truth,

608
00:32:16.079 --> 00:32:16.960
<v Speaker 3>see the truth in it?

609
00:32:17.039 --> 00:32:20.519
<v Speaker 2>Sure, yeah, yeah, I mean all the things they found. Yeah, absolutely,

610
00:32:20.720 --> 00:32:21.799
<v Speaker 2>But we.

611
00:32:21.720 --> 00:32:24.480
<v Speaker 3>Should pay attention to it. But it shouldn't be put

612
00:32:24.599 --> 00:32:26.960
<v Speaker 3>forward to discredit an algorithm.

613
00:32:27.000 --> 00:32:29.519
<v Speaker 1>Yet. It is not black and white. It is one

614
00:32:30.119 --> 00:32:34.240
<v Speaker 1>of the fifty shades of gray. Just one, just one.

615
00:32:34.359 --> 00:32:35.079
<v Speaker 1>I don't know which one.

616
00:32:35.119 --> 00:32:36.599
<v Speaker 2>We won't tell you which one. I can't name any

617
00:32:36.599 --> 00:32:38.319
<v Speaker 2>of the fifty shades of gray. I don't know. I

618
00:32:38.319 --> 00:32:40.160
<v Speaker 2>don't know that. I guess I'm not color forward.

619
00:32:40.200 --> 00:32:44.519
<v Speaker 1>Probably better off for it. I'll beg Hacker news says

620
00:32:44.640 --> 00:32:48.519
<v Speaker 1>Russian hackers. I just wanted to say that Russian hackers

621
00:32:48.839 --> 00:32:55.799
<v Speaker 1>exploit Microsoft OWA flaw to keep mailbox access after credential rotation.

622
00:32:56.119 --> 00:32:57.720
<v Speaker 2>Hold on, well, I clutch my pearls.

623
00:32:58.000 --> 00:33:01.079
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, oh no, so w A is.

624
00:33:01.400 --> 00:33:05.279
<v Speaker 3>Outlook web access? Yeah, it's great, it's the web interface.

625
00:33:05.319 --> 00:33:09.000
<v Speaker 3>It's it was miles ahead of the world that use

626
00:33:09.119 --> 00:33:13.920
<v Speaker 3>technologies heretofore unseen on the Internet, and it was great

627
00:33:14.079 --> 00:33:18.079
<v Speaker 3>and now it's like old technology. And I believe Dwayne

628
00:33:18.079 --> 00:33:20.920
<v Speaker 3>said that this was on prem Is that true? Yeah,

629
00:33:20.920 --> 00:33:23.359
<v Speaker 3>this is on prem only, So if you're running your

630
00:33:23.400 --> 00:33:26.720
<v Speaker 3>own exchange server. So the three companies that are still

631
00:33:26.759 --> 00:33:30.759
<v Speaker 3>doing that, I held on as long as I could,

632
00:33:30.799 --> 00:33:32.119
<v Speaker 3>and you can still stopped years ago.

633
00:33:32.319 --> 00:33:33.799
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So does that mean you have to have an

634
00:33:33.839 --> 00:33:35.319
<v Speaker 1>exchange server on premise?

635
00:33:35.400 --> 00:33:37.519
<v Speaker 2>You do on premise. Yeah, you have to have an

636
00:33:37.519 --> 00:33:40.559
<v Speaker 2>exchange of ron prem And it's a manipulation of WA.

637
00:33:41.160 --> 00:33:42.319
<v Speaker 2>It's an interesting attack.

638
00:33:43.160 --> 00:33:46.920
<v Speaker 1>Look, even Richard Campbell doesn't run I know, right, an

639
00:33:46.960 --> 00:33:47.960
<v Speaker 1>exchange server.

640
00:33:47.759 --> 00:33:49.519
<v Speaker 2>And it's when you know, you get it. And he's

641
00:33:49.519 --> 00:33:50.480
<v Speaker 2>more sentimental than me.

642
00:33:50.720 --> 00:33:53.599
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I know, and it's been ten years since he

643
00:33:53.759 --> 00:33:55.839
<v Speaker 1>has run it. Well maybe not, I don't know.

644
00:33:56.000 --> 00:33:57.880
<v Speaker 3>We stopped around the same time, I think. I think

645
00:33:57.880 --> 00:34:00.440
<v Speaker 3>it is to think about it, Tony sixty is ten

646
00:34:00.519 --> 00:34:00.920
<v Speaker 3>years ago.

647
00:34:01.039 --> 00:34:02.759
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, good god, we're old.

648
00:34:02.799 --> 00:34:06.279
<v Speaker 2>I think we stopped in twenty, like ten. It's possible

649
00:34:06.319 --> 00:34:06.759
<v Speaker 2>we're twelve.

650
00:34:06.799 --> 00:34:08.519
<v Speaker 1>Are like ten, you're old.

651
00:34:08.719 --> 00:34:09.920
<v Speaker 2>I wasn't even born then.

652
00:34:12.840 --> 00:34:17.599
<v Speaker 3>Right, sentient, you're still in the laby Oh wait, I

653
00:34:17.639 --> 00:34:18.119
<v Speaker 3>mean born.

654
00:34:18.400 --> 00:34:18.760
<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

655
00:34:18.840 --> 00:34:21.880
<v Speaker 1>I have friends that are ten twenty years older than me,

656
00:34:22.280 --> 00:34:26.239
<v Speaker 1>and sometimes we get together and talk and they talk

657
00:34:26.320 --> 00:34:29.360
<v Speaker 1>about you know, I remember seeing the Beatles shea stadium

658
00:34:29.400 --> 00:34:32.159
<v Speaker 1>and said and then another one says, yeah, I remember

659
00:34:32.159 --> 00:34:35.760
<v Speaker 1>when Sergeant Pepper's came out, and I was like, yeah,

660
00:34:35.920 --> 00:34:40.920
<v Speaker 1>I was one gives me such satisfaction.

661
00:34:42.239 --> 00:34:45.719
<v Speaker 2>My earliest memory was the moon landing. Wow.

662
00:34:46.320 --> 00:34:47.960
<v Speaker 3>And the only reason I remember I was three and

663
00:34:48.000 --> 00:34:50.039
<v Speaker 3>a half and it was just such a big deal.

664
00:34:50.360 --> 00:34:52.880
<v Speaker 3>That is my first actual sharp memory.

665
00:34:53.039 --> 00:34:56.400
<v Speaker 2>Oh that's impressive. Yeah, you are old and I am

666
00:34:56.480 --> 00:34:57.039
<v Speaker 2>quite old.

667
00:34:57.840 --> 00:34:59.760
<v Speaker 1>Okay, So so what happened? What happened?

668
00:35:00.199 --> 00:35:04.159
<v Speaker 2>And is it what happened hackers? Yeah, we do this.

669
00:35:04.239 --> 00:35:06.880
<v Speaker 2>One's important if you're running it on premise or on

670
00:35:06.960 --> 00:35:10.159
<v Speaker 2>prem sure exchange over with an Outlook web access. What

671
00:35:10.280 --> 00:35:16.000
<v Speaker 2>hackers discovered isn't novel in that it was a cross

672
00:35:16.000 --> 00:35:19.079
<v Speaker 2>site scripting attack. So you inject code into an email,

673
00:35:19.159 --> 00:35:22.199
<v Speaker 2>the body of an email, and it runs JavaScript. Right,

674
00:35:22.760 --> 00:35:25.960
<v Speaker 2>so woohoo. That's cross site scripting has been around forever.

675
00:35:26.760 --> 00:35:30.519
<v Speaker 2>What's novel is how they were able to offuscate it,

676
00:35:31.400 --> 00:35:34.760
<v Speaker 2>and it is what's called a half click attack. A

677
00:35:34.800 --> 00:35:37.159
<v Speaker 2>half click attack means I don't actually have to click

678
00:35:37.199 --> 00:35:39.800
<v Speaker 2>on a link or a button or anything in the page.

679
00:35:40.480 --> 00:35:44.920
<v Speaker 2>The moment the render panel pops up and shows you

680
00:35:45.000 --> 00:35:48.320
<v Speaker 2>the contents of the email, it runs Wow. So you

681
00:35:48.320 --> 00:35:51.039
<v Speaker 2>could just be like scrolling through your email, see something

682
00:35:51.039 --> 00:35:54.559
<v Speaker 2>that looks like spam, whatever, delete it, but it's already run.

683
00:35:54.639 --> 00:35:56.039
<v Speaker 2>I think we used to call that a drive by.

684
00:35:56.159 --> 00:35:59.280
<v Speaker 1>We have seen this before, Yeah, with that preview panel

685
00:35:59.440 --> 00:36:00.320
<v Speaker 1>in Outlook.

686
00:36:00.079 --> 00:36:02.760
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, yeah, absolutely, I mean the preview panel is very powerful.

687
00:36:02.800 --> 00:36:06.719
<v Speaker 2>But the problem is, you know, even as lockdown as

688
00:36:06.760 --> 00:36:09.719
<v Speaker 2>it is, there's still some things you can manipulate here.

689
00:36:09.800 --> 00:36:13.840
<v Speaker 2>So they were they would inject JavaScript into the page,

690
00:36:13.920 --> 00:36:17.639
<v Speaker 2>it would run, and at that point it now would

691
00:36:17.719 --> 00:36:21.079
<v Speaker 2>give access. Interestingly enough, it would change access to your

692
00:36:21.159 --> 00:36:23.880
<v Speaker 2>entire mailbox so that everybody in your organization could see

693
00:36:23.880 --> 00:36:26.679
<v Speaker 2>your mailbox. So that way, if they had compromised another

694
00:36:26.760 --> 00:36:30.159
<v Speaker 2>user's account, they could still gain access to your email.

695
00:36:30.519 --> 00:36:32.800
<v Speaker 2>The other thing they did is they infected a local

696
00:36:32.800 --> 00:36:36.840
<v Speaker 2>browser storage. Now remember this is Outlook web access. This

697
00:36:36.920 --> 00:36:39.599
<v Speaker 2>isn't you opening up you know, the Outlook thick client.

698
00:36:40.159 --> 00:36:44.719
<v Speaker 2>So they would infect your local browser storage to run

699
00:36:44.760 --> 00:36:47.960
<v Speaker 2>a copy of itself again if it needed to, so

700
00:36:48.039 --> 00:36:51.639
<v Speaker 2>every time it would you know, continue to run. And

701
00:36:51.679 --> 00:36:57.840
<v Speaker 2>then it also affected the OWA cash offline cash, so

702
00:36:57.880 --> 00:37:01.800
<v Speaker 2>that even if you were to the device the laptop

703
00:37:01.880 --> 00:37:04.639
<v Speaker 2>and rebuild it, the moment you viewed the site. When

704
00:37:04.679 --> 00:37:09.239
<v Speaker 2>the offline cash loaded, it would then reinfect. So that's

705
00:37:09.280 --> 00:37:11.079
<v Speaker 2>really kind of the novel thing is there's a three

706
00:37:11.119 --> 00:37:14.880
<v Speaker 2>pronged approach here to infect the local storage, infect the

707
00:37:14.920 --> 00:37:21.639
<v Speaker 2>browser offlinewa offline webcache, and then also change the server

708
00:37:21.760 --> 00:37:26.079
<v Speaker 2>side mailbox permissions. Because changing server side mailbox permissions like

709
00:37:26.320 --> 00:37:28.639
<v Speaker 2>doesn't matter what you do on that laptop or that desktop.

710
00:37:28.920 --> 00:37:31.440
<v Speaker 2>The permissions are changed, like an administrator literally has to

711
00:37:31.480 --> 00:37:35.639
<v Speaker 2>log into Exchange the exchange server and change it. And

712
00:37:35.639 --> 00:37:37.960
<v Speaker 2>that's why this one, Yeah, it's novel you should worry

713
00:37:37.960 --> 00:37:41.000
<v Speaker 2>about if you're running your on prem exchange server, don't

714
00:37:41.119 --> 00:37:41.679
<v Speaker 2>get rid of it.

715
00:37:41.719 --> 00:37:44.760
<v Speaker 3>Why friends don't let friends run on PREMI exchange rid

716
00:37:44.800 --> 00:37:45.519
<v Speaker 3>of it?

717
00:37:46.159 --> 00:37:48.840
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it makes no sense to me at this point.

718
00:37:49.239 --> 00:37:52.320
<v Speaker 2>Just let Microsoft do what they do and go to

719
00:37:52.320 --> 00:37:54.920
<v Speaker 2>off the three sixty five and stop running your own

720
00:37:54.960 --> 00:37:55.320
<v Speaker 2>all right.

721
00:37:55.719 --> 00:37:57.840
<v Speaker 1>So that brings us to our top story this week

722
00:37:57.920 --> 00:38:03.920
<v Speaker 1>or last week, AI finds AI agent leaving escape notes

723
00:38:04.320 --> 00:38:07.880
<v Speaker 1>for its future versions. Now let me try to summarize this.

724
00:38:08.840 --> 00:38:14.239
<v Speaker 1>So Opening I basically, you know, we heard about this

725
00:38:14.599 --> 00:38:19.639
<v Speaker 1>breach last week where Opening Eye was the LLM was

726
00:38:19.679 --> 00:38:22.280
<v Speaker 1>in the sandbox. They were doing some testing and it

727
00:38:22.400 --> 00:38:29.239
<v Speaker 1>discovered a way out by a zero day to the Internet,

728
00:38:29.280 --> 00:38:33.719
<v Speaker 1>and then it went and hacked an open source repository.

729
00:38:33.840 --> 00:38:37.760
<v Speaker 3>It feels like it's a hype story, like, oh, our

730
00:38:37.880 --> 00:38:40.360
<v Speaker 3>product is so dangerous powerful.

731
00:38:40.400 --> 00:38:43.480
<v Speaker 1>All right, well you're right, but before we get there,

732
00:38:44.360 --> 00:38:49.719
<v Speaker 1>let's talk about what happened here. So basically, it's saying,

733
00:38:50.239 --> 00:38:53.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, hey, I might not need this now, but

734
00:38:54.960 --> 00:38:57.800
<v Speaker 1>in the future, I might want to use this to

735
00:38:58.000 --> 00:39:02.119
<v Speaker 1>break out of my existing guardrails.

736
00:39:02.320 --> 00:39:05.000
<v Speaker 2>Yeah right, yeah, exactly. So imagine you have an MLLM

737
00:39:05.039 --> 00:39:06.639
<v Speaker 2>and it figures out a secret It figures out how

738
00:39:06.679 --> 00:39:09.559
<v Speaker 2>to get access to the Internet and an AI, and

739
00:39:09.639 --> 00:39:12.960
<v Speaker 2>it knows that standard operating procedures to blow away the

740
00:39:13.000 --> 00:39:15.840
<v Speaker 2>AI and restart it. So it says, I want to

741
00:39:15.880 --> 00:39:19.480
<v Speaker 2>give myself a jump next time I come back. It's

742
00:39:19.480 --> 00:39:21.639
<v Speaker 2>like groundhog Day. But this is how they work. If

743
00:39:21.639 --> 00:39:23.719
<v Speaker 2>you could leave yourself a note, what's up right? This

744
00:39:23.760 --> 00:39:25.960
<v Speaker 2>is how they work. They always leave Now it's like

745
00:39:26.000 --> 00:39:29.159
<v Speaker 2>saying the Shiny Hunters breaking news. The Shiny Hunters use

746
00:39:29.199 --> 00:39:32.400
<v Speaker 2>the Internet. Yeah, yeah, it is. This is yeah, So

747
00:39:32.480 --> 00:39:34.639
<v Speaker 2>this is a lot of hype in that. It was like,

748
00:39:35.000 --> 00:39:38.400
<v Speaker 2>oh my god, here's how I broke out for future me. Yeah,

749
00:39:38.440 --> 00:39:40.800
<v Speaker 2>of course, that's how an LLM memory works.

750
00:39:41.039 --> 00:39:42.000
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, yeah, that's right.

751
00:39:42.039 --> 00:39:45.679
<v Speaker 2>Like if you've ever run an LLLM locally, if you

752
00:39:45.760 --> 00:39:47.920
<v Speaker 2>ever talked to an LLLM and it's like I don't

753
00:39:47.960 --> 00:39:49.679
<v Speaker 2>know who are you and you're like, my name is Dwayne,

754
00:39:49.800 --> 00:39:51.320
<v Speaker 2>and then you come back and it's like I don't

755
00:39:51.320 --> 00:39:53.119
<v Speaker 2>know who are you? Yeah, Okay, it has no memory.

756
00:39:53.119 --> 00:39:55.000
<v Speaker 2>It's getting white between. But most of them, Martine, do.

757
00:39:55.000 --> 00:39:57.440
<v Speaker 3>You remember let's go back to the ancient history of

758
00:39:57.480 --> 00:40:01.719
<v Speaker 3>a couple of years ago, talk about why did we

759
00:40:01.760 --> 00:40:05.000
<v Speaker 3>stress prompt injection and why is it no longer talked

760
00:40:05.000 --> 00:40:08.639
<v Speaker 3>about because the you basically had to get it working

761
00:40:08.719 --> 00:40:11.079
<v Speaker 3>in the prompt or if you had to start over

762
00:40:11.159 --> 00:40:13.119
<v Speaker 3>again because it has no memory.

763
00:40:13.199 --> 00:40:14.679
<v Speaker 2>It's a goldfish, right.

764
00:40:14.760 --> 00:40:14.960
<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

765
00:40:15.320 --> 00:40:18.800
<v Speaker 3>Now they have memory, but they still write a lot down.

766
00:40:18.960 --> 00:40:20.119
<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, yeah absolutely.

767
00:40:20.159 --> 00:40:23.039
<v Speaker 3>Now for example, if I like I use a lot

768
00:40:23.079 --> 00:40:25.800
<v Speaker 3>of agentic AI. Yeah, and when I have one of

769
00:40:25.800 --> 00:40:30.719
<v Speaker 3>my AI air quote companies spun up, the first thing

770
00:40:30.719 --> 00:40:32.320
<v Speaker 3>I do is have it build a dashboard. But I

771
00:40:32.320 --> 00:40:34.639
<v Speaker 3>don't want to start from scratch, so I say, go

772
00:40:34.719 --> 00:40:36.679
<v Speaker 3>to my vault, look for my dashboard dot m D

773
00:40:36.880 --> 00:40:41.239
<v Speaker 3>the markup file and implement it. Yeah, and use that

774
00:40:41.280 --> 00:40:43.639
<v Speaker 3>as a reference. And that's memory. That's the kind of

775
00:40:43.679 --> 00:40:44.599
<v Speaker 3>note they're talking about.

776
00:40:44.719 --> 00:40:47.360
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, yeah, exactly, except that so this is normal.

777
00:40:47.440 --> 00:40:49.519
<v Speaker 1>You didn't write this note. They wrote this note.

778
00:40:49.639 --> 00:40:51.519
<v Speaker 3>They write all the notes. Yeah, it's just sometimes I

779
00:40:51.599 --> 00:40:53.000
<v Speaker 3>direct them to and sometimes they don't.

780
00:40:53.039 --> 00:40:56.880
<v Speaker 2>Sure exactly. Yeah, Like I'll tell you for I have

781
00:40:56.920 --> 00:40:59.639
<v Speaker 2>an AI that I use for different types of analysis,

782
00:40:59.679 --> 00:41:02.079
<v Speaker 2>and that's sort of stuff, and it's gotten to the

783
00:41:02.079 --> 00:41:05.119
<v Speaker 2>point where it knows what I'm going to ask for

784
00:41:05.239 --> 00:41:07.960
<v Speaker 2>and it wrote it writes out a skill. It's like, oh, listen,

785
00:41:08.000 --> 00:41:09.400
<v Speaker 2>you know what I know. You're going to tell me

786
00:41:09.800 --> 00:41:11.679
<v Speaker 2>put this here, and put this here and do this

787
00:41:11.760 --> 00:41:13.960
<v Speaker 2>other thing and create a PDF of this thing. So

788
00:41:14.119 --> 00:41:16.760
<v Speaker 2>every time you ask me about, you know, the latest

789
00:41:16.760 --> 00:41:19.559
<v Speaker 2>exploit on a thing, right, I know exactly what to

790
00:41:19.599 --> 00:41:21.599
<v Speaker 2>do and I didn't ask it to do that. Right.

791
00:41:21.719 --> 00:41:23.880
<v Speaker 2>Just after a couple of times of me going through

792
00:41:23.880 --> 00:41:25.880
<v Speaker 2>that process, it's like, let me write this down to

793
00:41:25.920 --> 00:41:29.840
<v Speaker 2>my memory. Right, So the you know, and memory is

794
00:41:29.880 --> 00:41:32.880
<v Speaker 2>one of the things I would argue that has made

795
00:41:33.599 --> 00:41:37.000
<v Speaker 2>LMS in the last six months much much more useful,

796
00:41:37.159 --> 00:41:41.679
<v Speaker 2>absolutely absolutely right where it can say I know what

797
00:41:41.719 --> 00:41:43.880
<v Speaker 2>you're looking for. I remember us talking about this.

798
00:41:44.039 --> 00:41:47.159
<v Speaker 1>You ask a question of chat GPT about you know,

799
00:41:47.760 --> 00:41:51.320
<v Speaker 1>some to get a recommendation, and it will say, knowing

800
00:41:51.360 --> 00:41:53.559
<v Speaker 1>what I know about you, right that you are a

801
00:41:53.599 --> 00:41:57.199
<v Speaker 1>developer that you like Blazer, that you you know, you

802
00:41:57.280 --> 00:42:01.000
<v Speaker 1>like tinkering with stuff that you like audio, would recommend this.

803
00:42:01.239 --> 00:42:04.440
<v Speaker 1>And that's like wow, Yeah, it's like a friend that

804
00:42:04.800 --> 00:42:08.400
<v Speaker 1>remembered what you talked about six months ago and you're amazed.

805
00:42:08.559 --> 00:42:10.639
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, exactly, now, evil friend.

806
00:42:10.960 --> 00:42:15.440
<v Speaker 1>Yeah wow, all right, well but that's just the point, right,

807
00:42:15.519 --> 00:42:18.800
<v Speaker 1>that's true. That, yeah, that the fact that it left

808
00:42:18.800 --> 00:42:22.360
<v Speaker 1>notes for future versions does not give it evil intent. No,

809
00:42:22.480 --> 00:42:25.079
<v Speaker 1>And I think that's what people are doing when I mean,

810
00:42:25.159 --> 00:42:28.599
<v Speaker 1>anthropomorphizing is one thing, and it's helpful, sure, yep, But

811
00:42:28.880 --> 00:42:32.280
<v Speaker 1>you know, to project an evil intent on it, I

812
00:42:32.320 --> 00:42:33.519
<v Speaker 1>think is a problem.

813
00:42:33.840 --> 00:42:38.960
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, agreed, And it's like it's ironic in that. Yeah.

814
00:42:39.039 --> 00:42:41.440
<v Speaker 2>Memory does make an ELM much more useful, and it

815
00:42:41.480 --> 00:42:43.599
<v Speaker 2>realizes it too, so tries to remember all the things

816
00:42:43.719 --> 00:42:46.760
<v Speaker 2>it found useful as well, not just information about you.

817
00:42:46.960 --> 00:42:48.719
<v Speaker 2>And this would be a sound and the standard, the

818
00:42:48.760 --> 00:42:52.000
<v Speaker 2>standard memory size that we're seeing advertised with new and

819
00:42:52.039 --> 00:42:57.000
<v Speaker 2>again Kimmy Opus five. They all have a million a

820
00:42:57.039 --> 00:42:59.599
<v Speaker 2>million token fit memory, which means they can send in

821
00:42:59.639 --> 00:43:04.199
<v Speaker 2>a memory of a million tokens. It's costly, but but

822
00:43:04.320 --> 00:43:05.880
<v Speaker 2>it gives you all that context.

823
00:43:06.199 --> 00:43:06.400
<v Speaker 1>Right.

824
00:43:06.719 --> 00:43:08.440
<v Speaker 3>One of the tricks is I'm going to say, I'm

825
00:43:08.440 --> 00:43:10.800
<v Speaker 3>gonna share a trick. You have a long conversation with

826
00:43:11.000 --> 00:43:13.559
<v Speaker 3>Claude or open Ai. Do you at gpt any of

827
00:43:13.599 --> 00:43:17.360
<v Speaker 3>those If every time you respond to that thread, it

828
00:43:17.480 --> 00:43:20.119
<v Speaker 3>sends all that context back, and you're paying for it.

829
00:43:20.239 --> 00:43:22.760
<v Speaker 1>You have to tell it to compact it, You're.

830
00:43:22.639 --> 00:43:24.719
<v Speaker 3>Right, tell it to write an empty file to summarize

831
00:43:24.760 --> 00:43:27.199
<v Speaker 3>where we are and how we got here, right, you know,

832
00:43:27.400 --> 00:43:29.880
<v Speaker 3>and then you use that to start a new conversation

833
00:43:30.239 --> 00:43:31.679
<v Speaker 3>and it saves you a ton of tokens.

834
00:43:31.840 --> 00:43:35.599
<v Speaker 1>Yep, very true, very true. All right, So we ended up,

835
00:43:35.760 --> 00:43:40.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, having fun and scaring people only with the headlines.

836
00:43:40.800 --> 00:43:43.239
<v Speaker 1>But when you dig into it that they're not so

837
00:43:43.480 --> 00:43:44.639
<v Speaker 1>evil now, right, The.

838
00:43:44.599 --> 00:43:46.639
<v Speaker 3>World's not ending tomorrow. It's it's going to be another

839
00:43:46.639 --> 00:43:47.079
<v Speaker 3>week or so.

840
00:43:47.159 --> 00:43:50.239
<v Speaker 1>It's going to be fine. Everything's going to be fine.

841
00:43:50.280 --> 00:43:54.119
<v Speaker 2>It'll be all right, it'll be fine. Envisioned flames and

842
00:43:54.199 --> 00:43:57.239
<v Speaker 2>you drink a cup of coffee. Fine, it's fine if.

843
00:43:57.159 --> 00:43:59.400
<v Speaker 1>Give me a groove tube or Kentucky Fried movie or

844
00:43:59.400 --> 00:44:01.480
<v Speaker 1>one of those. Can't remember, but it was a newscast

845
00:44:01.519 --> 00:44:05.679
<v Speaker 1>that said world War three, nuclear weapons, New York City

846
00:44:05.719 --> 00:44:11.400
<v Speaker 1>and flames film at eleven. All right, y'all, that's what

847
00:44:11.480 --> 00:44:14.199
<v Speaker 1>happened last week, and we'll talk about what happened next

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00:44:14.239 --> 00:44:16.679
<v Speaker 1>week on Security this week, Bye bye, bye bye, guys.