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And if you're 38 00:01:50.319 --> 00:01:52.400 not in the market for a mattress, check out their pillows. 39 00:01:52.400 --> 00:01:54.760 They're betting they have all kinds of great stuff there. 40 00:01:54.799 --> 00:01:57.000 So thanks to ghost Bed and check them out. 41 00:01:58.319 --> 00:02:05.239 Special Operation Cobert Asdi and. 42 00:02:06.920 --> 00:02:13.680 The Team House with your hopes Jack Murphy and David Park. 43 00:02:18.360 --> 00:02:21.159 Hi everyone, Welcome to episode three and twenty nine of 44 00:02:21.199 --> 00:02:23.439 The Team House. I'm Jack Murphy here with David Park 45 00:02:23.879 --> 00:02:27.159 and our guest on tonight's show is Kyle Hanslovan. Kyle 46 00:02:27.319 --> 00:02:30.560 served in the military with the National Security Agency and 47 00:02:30.599 --> 00:02:34.599 now he works in the cybersecurity realm with Huntress. We're 48 00:02:34.639 --> 00:02:36.479 really excited to have him on the show. As I 49 00:02:36.520 --> 00:02:39.000 was telling him beforehand, You're somebody who's been on our 50 00:02:39.039 --> 00:02:41.240 list for like four or five years, so we're really 51 00:02:41.240 --> 00:02:43.319 happy to finally have you here. 52 00:02:44.759 --> 00:02:45.960 Absolutely stoked to be here. 53 00:02:45.960 --> 00:02:48.000 It's one of those funny things, right of how long 54 00:02:48.039 --> 00:02:49.919 sometimes it just takes for good things to go down. 55 00:02:50.439 --> 00:02:53.599 It's totally my fault, you know, just sitting on it 56 00:02:53.759 --> 00:02:56.000 not not doing anything about it. 57 00:02:56.520 --> 00:03:00.000 But so, Kyle, let's start off at the beginning. 58 00:03:00.000 --> 00:03:01.680 I think tell us a little bit about how you 59 00:03:01.719 --> 00:03:05.719 grew up and what took you towards military service initially. 60 00:03:06.080 --> 00:03:08.159 Got you well, I'll try not to like cut onions 61 00:03:08.240 --> 00:03:10.960 or anything, but definitely grew up on the poor side 62 00:03:10.960 --> 00:03:14.360 of life, right, so think of like single mom. I 63 00:03:14.520 --> 00:03:17.120 never hungry, poor, but like we always lived with whoever 64 00:03:17.120 --> 00:03:18.960 mom was dating at the moment, you know, that type 65 00:03:19.000 --> 00:03:21.879 of situation, and you know, so I got to go 66 00:03:22.000 --> 00:03:24.719 bounce between Oregon, which was kind of great for outdoors life, 67 00:03:24.719 --> 00:03:26.199 and I eventually moved to Florida, so. 68 00:03:26.639 --> 00:03:27.240 It was good. 69 00:03:27.360 --> 00:03:30.639 But come seventeen, it was enlistment time. I kind of 70 00:03:30.680 --> 00:03:32.840 skipped college. I did really well in high school, but 71 00:03:33.319 --> 00:03:34.840 it was a little bit of like a you know, 72 00:03:35.240 --> 00:03:38.039 computer thug, I guess at that time, and it was 73 00:03:38.039 --> 00:03:39.680 one of those things that never had a brush in 74 00:03:39.719 --> 00:03:42.719 with the law, but it was pretty clear that if 75 00:03:42.719 --> 00:03:43.280 I stayed at. 76 00:03:43.199 --> 00:03:44.840 Home, I was probably going to get in trouble. 77 00:03:44.919 --> 00:03:49.000 So yeah, joined up because you had an early interest 78 00:03:49.039 --> 00:03:51.360 in computers from the get go, and we're doing some 79 00:03:51.479 --> 00:03:52.960 things that were a little shady. 80 00:03:53.599 --> 00:03:56.159 I was a super nerd, right, So it wasn't cool 81 00:03:56.199 --> 00:03:58.479 back then like now, like my kid's kind of like Marvel, 82 00:03:58.639 --> 00:03:59.719 Like my dad's a hacker. 83 00:04:00.520 --> 00:04:02.439 That was not cool in the late nineties. 84 00:04:02.479 --> 00:04:04.680 But yeah, a lot of aol, a lot of I 85 00:04:04.680 --> 00:04:08.000 mean when you're poor, like I hacked myself to free 86 00:04:08.000 --> 00:04:11.000 internet probably most of my childhood, all the way through 87 00:04:11.000 --> 00:04:14.479 probably like the very early two thousands. So yeah, a 88 00:04:14.479 --> 00:04:18.199 lot of unscru unscrupulous, but maybe not quite you know, 89 00:04:18.279 --> 00:04:19.639 jail time worthy offenses. 90 00:04:19.920 --> 00:04:23.480 Yeah, so late you said late nineties or late nineties 91 00:04:23.480 --> 00:04:25.319 is around that time, like what was. 92 00:04:25.240 --> 00:04:27.480 Your probably ninety seven all the way to probably two 93 00:04:27.480 --> 00:04:28.199 thousand and three. 94 00:04:28.680 --> 00:04:30.560 What was your first computer or what was the first 95 00:04:30.600 --> 00:04:32.680 computer you had access to, whether it was a public 96 00:04:32.680 --> 00:04:33.399 computer or whatever. 97 00:04:33.879 --> 00:04:36.480 Yeah, a lot of public computer. I remember I built 98 00:04:36.519 --> 00:04:39.040 like a broke down commodore once. That kind of got 99 00:04:39.040 --> 00:04:40.920 me in, taught me a lot of the basics. So 100 00:04:40.959 --> 00:04:43.199 I'm in this like weird generation for the geeks out 101 00:04:43.199 --> 00:04:45.759 there from like I can go as old school as 102 00:04:45.839 --> 00:04:50.600 like seventies style tech, very analog, all that old school programming, yeah, 103 00:04:50.639 --> 00:04:52.879 all the way to the most modern like technical stuff. 104 00:04:52.920 --> 00:04:55.920 So I'm kind of like this tweener, right, late millennial 105 00:04:56.600 --> 00:04:58.040 aged kind of just like this. 106 00:04:58.360 --> 00:05:00.800 Bourbon right yeah, like and bourbon. 107 00:05:00.720 --> 00:05:03.920 Yeah, yeah that is you know that is. 108 00:05:03.839 --> 00:05:07.519 Because it's it's it's post like common R sixty four 109 00:05:07.720 --> 00:05:10.639 BB the bbs right all the like that. 110 00:05:10.879 --> 00:05:12.879 It's yeah. 111 00:05:13.439 --> 00:05:16.199 Yeah, I had probably the bulletin board days, but immediately 112 00:05:16.199 --> 00:05:19.000 went to I R C and then it became AOL 113 00:05:19.199 --> 00:05:21.600 and a lot of those like it's just really lucky, 114 00:05:21.720 --> 00:05:22.959 you know, it's because I was so poor. 115 00:05:23.000 --> 00:05:24.519 I got to do the old stuff because that's all 116 00:05:24.560 --> 00:05:25.199 I could afford. 117 00:05:25.360 --> 00:05:27.120 Yeah, and then. 118 00:05:27.040 --> 00:05:29.439 Obviously the world kind of changed when like dial up, 119 00:05:29.480 --> 00:05:32.079 cable modems and then everything became available. 120 00:05:32.120 --> 00:05:33.360 So yeah, it was a good time. 121 00:05:33.680 --> 00:05:36.920 And was there like there was an online community. 122 00:05:36.920 --> 00:05:37.680 I'm sure that. 123 00:05:38.160 --> 00:05:41.600 Did you know other people in person that were like you? 124 00:05:42.519 --> 00:05:45.120 Not so much in person, right, everybody like back in 125 00:05:45.160 --> 00:05:47.319 those days, I r C kind is like a modern 126 00:05:47.360 --> 00:05:50.319 day chat group, right, a slack a discord server. Yeah, 127 00:05:50.360 --> 00:05:52.160 and so I spent most of my time back there 128 00:05:52.199 --> 00:05:55.560 like reverse engineering software, you know, getting around like the 129 00:05:55.680 --> 00:05:58.720 activation codes, getting around, you know, kind of piracy type things. 130 00:05:59.040 --> 00:05:59.519 Yeah. 131 00:05:59.639 --> 00:06:01.879 Also allegen. 132 00:06:02.079 --> 00:06:04.920 I mean, I think what's nice is when I joined 133 00:06:04.920 --> 00:06:07.120 the military the polygraph, they said you got to answer 134 00:06:07.160 --> 00:06:10.079 all the questions, but only go to your eighteenth birthday. 135 00:06:10.120 --> 00:06:13.199 And I was seventeen, So it made the polygraph really easy. 136 00:06:14.639 --> 00:06:15.360 That's funny. 137 00:06:15.519 --> 00:06:20.279 SOH time to enlist before he get into too much trouble. 138 00:06:21.360 --> 00:06:23.160 What branch did you join? MS? 139 00:06:23.519 --> 00:06:24.079 Where did you go? 140 00:06:24.800 --> 00:06:27.519 Yeah? So even though I was Navy junior ROTC and 141 00:06:27.600 --> 00:06:29.839 I had a ride to Annapolis, there was no way 142 00:06:29.879 --> 00:06:31.600 I was going to make it like I graduated really 143 00:06:31.639 --> 00:06:33.800 early out of high school and you had to be 144 00:06:34.000 --> 00:06:36.199 you roughly, you know, seventeen and a half or so 145 00:06:36.240 --> 00:06:38.000 by the time my birthday fell for me to be 146 00:06:38.040 --> 00:06:39.360 able to start the year. 147 00:06:39.439 --> 00:06:41.000 And so I changed and I went. 148 00:06:41.600 --> 00:06:43.240 I got an uncle that was in the Marines, and 149 00:06:43.279 --> 00:06:45.560 he said, look, Kyle, you're too damn soft for any 150 00:06:45.560 --> 00:06:46.160 other service. 151 00:06:46.160 --> 00:06:46.879 You need to go there. 152 00:06:48.439 --> 00:06:49.000 And I did. 153 00:06:49.120 --> 00:06:51.720 I scored good on the ASBAB, so I got guaranteed. 154 00:06:51.759 --> 00:06:55.480 At the time, I think they it was communication systems. 155 00:06:55.680 --> 00:06:59.040 I COX one was my first AFSC in the you know, 156 00:06:59.199 --> 00:06:59.920 in the Air Force. 157 00:07:00.240 --> 00:07:04.680 So in the late nineties, uh was communications systems? Was 158 00:07:04.720 --> 00:07:07.800 that still just was it just radio tech? Was it 159 00:07:07.839 --> 00:07:10.319 like setting up communication packages and stuff like that? 160 00:07:11.000 --> 00:07:13.120 So I had both. I had both the analog side 161 00:07:13.160 --> 00:07:13.519 of the house. 162 00:07:13.519 --> 00:07:15.360 So I actually got to do like combat com and 163 00:07:15.399 --> 00:07:18.120 do some more of the like proper encrypted radio, a 164 00:07:18.160 --> 00:07:20.160 lot of point to point systems. But I also got 165 00:07:20.199 --> 00:07:22.160 to do it. And so there was job was like 166 00:07:22.399 --> 00:07:26.480 regular base comm. So think about maintaining the email servers. 167 00:07:26.600 --> 00:07:28.800 I had to do a BlackBerry server, Like I don't 168 00:07:28.800 --> 00:07:30.959 even know those things, you know, I'm sure they don't exist. 169 00:07:30.959 --> 00:07:33.480 Anymore. But it was a good time. 170 00:07:33.519 --> 00:07:35.839 And like I said, my first duty station was all 171 00:07:36.079 --> 00:07:37.680 regular just comms. 172 00:07:37.920 --> 00:07:38.439 Yeah. 173 00:07:38.639 --> 00:07:41.720 No, that's fascinating because you know where cyber is a 174 00:07:41.879 --> 00:07:45.720 career field now. Back then, you know, it was like 175 00:07:46.519 --> 00:07:50.240 it the military needed it, but didn't. 176 00:07:50.040 --> 00:07:51.279 Really have that. Yeah. 177 00:07:51.759 --> 00:07:54.240 When you said cyber back in like the early two thousands, 178 00:07:54.240 --> 00:07:55.560 that meant like something dirty. 179 00:07:55.399 --> 00:07:57.199 Or doing in that chain right room. It dely didn't 180 00:07:57.240 --> 00:07:58.000 mean what it means that. 181 00:07:58.399 --> 00:08:00.240 Yeah, I mean for me, it's still me is the 182 00:08:00.240 --> 00:08:01.560 dirty stuff and chatman is it? 183 00:08:02.160 --> 00:08:04.879 Yeah? Yeah, old have his diehard right yeah. 184 00:08:04.800 --> 00:08:07.680 Yeah, yeah yeah cyber yeah yeah exactly. 185 00:08:08.839 --> 00:08:11.000 So how is how is the Air Force treating you 186 00:08:11.040 --> 00:08:13.680 at that point? I mean sounds like you're probably enjoying it. 187 00:08:14.879 --> 00:08:18.319 Yeah, you could imagine, like being seventeen, I did real 188 00:08:18.360 --> 00:08:20.160 well in like basics, since I had already done like 189 00:08:20.240 --> 00:08:22.879 years of ROTC or junior ROTC, and so that part 190 00:08:22.959 --> 00:08:25.800 was kind of a breeze. And what was really lucky 191 00:08:25.879 --> 00:08:29.279 is that this was right at the cusp that you know, 192 00:08:29.399 --> 00:08:32.720 people were already doing offensive cyber operations. They weren't calling 193 00:08:32.759 --> 00:08:34.919 it that. It was called a lot of like you know, 194 00:08:35.639 --> 00:08:39.879 info security. There was information operations, but really nobody knew 195 00:08:39.919 --> 00:08:41.960 what that meant. And it kind of gave me the 196 00:08:41.960 --> 00:08:46.000 benefit of because my rank was enlisted and I had 197 00:08:46.039 --> 00:08:48.639 a lot of technical potential. It kind of had a 198 00:08:48.639 --> 00:08:52.919 lot of parallels where nobody really held you down because 199 00:08:52.960 --> 00:08:55.399 of your rank. It was your ability to execute kind 200 00:08:55.399 --> 00:08:57.279 of was like where they would cap you. 201 00:08:57.440 --> 00:08:59.879 So for me, that first duty station was in A. 202 00:09:00.440 --> 00:09:01.720 I actually did in A two. 203 00:09:01.519 --> 00:09:05.080 Tours in England and that was just great because it 204 00:09:05.120 --> 00:09:07.759 opened up my whole life from moving from just basic 205 00:09:07.799 --> 00:09:10.600 security and that's what I started getting to work with 206 00:09:10.679 --> 00:09:12.279 GHQ and NSA. 207 00:09:12.480 --> 00:09:14.200 So it was like really good timing. 208 00:09:14.720 --> 00:09:20.679 And and you know, for like NSA was like singing 209 00:09:20.840 --> 00:09:23.159 like that was their and they start, but but that 210 00:09:23.200 --> 00:09:25.679 was their bread. You know, everybody's sitting there wearing their cans. 211 00:09:26.600 --> 00:09:30.080 Was the NSA sort of on the cutting edge of 212 00:09:30.720 --> 00:09:33.559 what was going on in you know, in this kind 213 00:09:33.600 --> 00:09:36.720 of cyber space or were they trying to catch up 214 00:09:36.720 --> 00:09:39.200 with kids reading twenty six hundred every month? 215 00:09:39.879 --> 00:09:42.919 Yeah, So General Hayden at the time, running you know, 216 00:09:43.000 --> 00:09:45.919 as the UH director of NSA was definitely on the 217 00:09:45.919 --> 00:09:49.240 cutting edge of realizing that like these basic things that 218 00:09:49.279 --> 00:09:52.799 we were already you know, listening in on just about anything, right, 219 00:09:52.960 --> 00:09:56.000 is it a cable, is it you know, overhead anything 220 00:09:56.039 --> 00:09:59.120 along those lines. We really started realizing there was this 221 00:09:59.159 --> 00:10:02.039 whole new domain that if we couldn't master it quick, 222 00:10:02.159 --> 00:10:06.320 somebody else was, especially like nation state adversaries. So early 223 00:10:06.320 --> 00:10:08.519 two thousands, all of a sudden blossomed even though nobody 224 00:10:08.559 --> 00:10:10.840 knew what these names were, right, they were trying to 225 00:10:10.879 --> 00:10:14.440 figure out, like, how do we stand up organizations that 226 00:10:14.559 --> 00:10:17.279 aren't really because at that time my MOS was a 227 00:10:17.399 --> 00:10:19.600 three series, right, it wasn't a one, it wasn't an 228 00:10:19.600 --> 00:10:23.440 operator AFSC, and it kind of mimics you know, MOSS 229 00:10:23.519 --> 00:10:26.679 and other ratings where we were looked at as support 230 00:10:27.440 --> 00:10:29.399 and so you can imagine there was a lot of 231 00:10:29.440 --> 00:10:32.960 folks on the outside that actually had substantially better skills. 232 00:10:32.960 --> 00:10:36.919 On the inside, however, there was pockets always from the beginning, 233 00:10:36.960 --> 00:10:41.399 like Navy postgraduate school, they have always had amazing offensive 234 00:10:41.480 --> 00:10:44.000 cybersecurity talent, and they kind of had both like that 235 00:10:44.080 --> 00:10:48.159 twenty six hundred early hacking vibe. Yeah, but definitely with 236 00:10:48.240 --> 00:10:50.440 the government, you know, espionage flair. 237 00:10:50.519 --> 00:10:51.480 So it's pretty cool. 238 00:10:52.360 --> 00:11:00.200 It's fascinating, was how did these commands overall command as 239 00:11:00.480 --> 00:11:03.159 because hacker at the time was a bad word, right, 240 00:11:03.200 --> 00:11:03.679 and so. 241 00:11:05.720 --> 00:11:07.799 I wouldn't call myself a hacker, but people kind of 242 00:11:07.840 --> 00:11:10.399 like shame. There was no concept of ethical hacker. 243 00:11:10.399 --> 00:11:12.240 It's just like, oh, you know. 244 00:11:12.559 --> 00:11:14.919 Immediately it's like, you know, some skinny dude in his 245 00:11:14.960 --> 00:11:17.440 basement and with a hacker hoodie. Right, that's what it invokes. 246 00:11:17.480 --> 00:11:20.159 It doesn't invoke military at all. 247 00:11:20.240 --> 00:11:23.519 Right, Right, So like, how would you know this is 248 00:11:23.559 --> 00:11:25.960 a new technology, this new space that you know, a 249 00:11:25.960 --> 00:11:27.679 bunch of old fuddies don't understand. 250 00:11:27.759 --> 00:11:30.360 You know, we're going to drop bombs or we're gonna. 251 00:11:30.120 --> 00:11:34.080 You know, you know, send tanks and and how are 252 00:11:34.120 --> 00:11:35.039 you guys selling this? 253 00:11:35.200 --> 00:11:37.320 There is a new domain that needs to. 254 00:11:39.080 --> 00:11:42.120 Yeah, you could you could imagine the human world has 255 00:11:42.200 --> 00:11:45.080 been vibrants since humans were humans, right, just try to 256 00:11:45.120 --> 00:11:46.879 be able to gather and all of a sudden this 257 00:11:47.000 --> 00:11:50.120 world that de risks. Wait, you could gather intelligence from 258 00:11:50.159 --> 00:11:53.279 somebody completely remote. And remember we've always been doing you know, 259 00:11:53.360 --> 00:11:55.960 whether it's radio, just good old bash and RF. So 260 00:11:56.000 --> 00:11:59.159 there was a lot of these parallel analogies that from 261 00:11:59.240 --> 00:12:02.320 my interpretation, is a very young airman. I don't think 262 00:12:02.360 --> 00:12:06.519 I appreciated how many of those parallels that some of 263 00:12:06.559 --> 00:12:10.039 these real early you know early sorry, late nineties, early 264 00:12:10.080 --> 00:12:14.159 two thousand's officers that at that time the military, right, 265 00:12:14.240 --> 00:12:16.919 if you think about the Air Force, they were run 266 00:12:16.960 --> 00:12:17.960 by pilots. 267 00:12:18.279 --> 00:12:20.480 The Navy admirals. 268 00:12:19.879 --> 00:12:22.399 Were commanding you know, a fleet, right, and of course 269 00:12:23.039 --> 00:12:25.399 you know instead of regular legs, there are stuff like that. 270 00:12:25.480 --> 00:12:27.279 In the army, you actually had folks that might have 271 00:12:27.320 --> 00:12:30.559 been tank commanders also now thrust into this brand new domain. 272 00:12:31.080 --> 00:12:35.120 And I just totally missed how far ahead some of 273 00:12:35.159 --> 00:12:36.919 these people were. But I'm on to bet that, like 274 00:12:37.000 --> 00:12:40.320 finances came into it, do a really expensive human operation 275 00:12:40.440 --> 00:12:43.120 doing all this crazy stuff, or put some geeks in 276 00:12:43.159 --> 00:12:45.200 the basement with some shady software and get it a 277 00:12:45.200 --> 00:12:47.480 lot cheaper at low risk. That had to be part 278 00:12:47.519 --> 00:12:49.720 of it. I don't know for certain, but it had 279 00:12:49.720 --> 00:12:50.440 to play it into it. 280 00:12:50.639 --> 00:12:54.240 Yeah, yeah that co read mountain and co or like 281 00:12:54.320 --> 00:12:57.840 mountain dew and pizza or yeah, to get the job done. 282 00:12:58.519 --> 00:13:01.759 Or sure definitely was that I was the skinny nerd 283 00:13:01.799 --> 00:13:03.559 that give me pizza get that code. 284 00:13:03.759 --> 00:13:05.000 Yeah that's funny. 285 00:13:05.480 --> 00:13:07.960 So it sounds like you started off your military career 286 00:13:08.279 --> 00:13:11.559 more unlike the IT side, but then you got exposed 287 00:13:11.720 --> 00:13:15.519 to some of these other career fields. What was that 288 00:13:15.600 --> 00:13:18.320 sort of like as you you know, progressed in your 289 00:13:18.360 --> 00:13:19.159 Air Force career. 290 00:13:19.840 --> 00:13:23.679 Yeah, my first pivot was not straight into cyber writing 291 00:13:23.759 --> 00:13:25.039 software for espionage. 292 00:13:25.080 --> 00:13:28.039 It was actually a mission security. So think about gathering 293 00:13:28.120 --> 00:13:30.919 like signals that would you know, leak from those big 294 00:13:30.919 --> 00:13:33.720 old monitors, right, they would ride over top of cables. 295 00:13:34.240 --> 00:13:36.799 That type of stuff was a real big threat, right, 296 00:13:36.919 --> 00:13:40.639 especially when we had, for instance, like embassies in other countries. 297 00:13:41.120 --> 00:13:43.120 So I got exposed to that. I got to do 298 00:13:43.200 --> 00:13:44.759 a lot of that work and a lot of stuff 299 00:13:44.759 --> 00:13:47.919 that was overhead related too, right, think of like satellite things. 300 00:13:48.519 --> 00:13:50.159 But it wasn't really for me. 301 00:13:50.559 --> 00:13:53.440 The real cyber side of my career didn't really take 302 00:13:53.759 --> 00:13:57.240 off till probably two thousand and eight, two thousand and nine, 303 00:13:57.240 --> 00:13:57.879 I happened. 304 00:13:57.639 --> 00:14:00.960 To be deployed when you know that it's now very. 305 00:14:00.919 --> 00:14:04.320 Much publicly talked about the Buckshot Yankee incident, and I 306 00:14:04.360 --> 00:14:07.559 happened to be in theater. I was attached to third Group, 307 00:14:07.799 --> 00:14:10.559 being just support. You know, I'm the furthest thing from 308 00:14:10.559 --> 00:14:14.320 an operator, But it was just kind of a wild 309 00:14:14.360 --> 00:14:16.519 time where all of a sudden, these whole worlds collide 310 00:14:16.559 --> 00:14:19.480 of very physical everybody's in the AOAR and the area 311 00:14:19.600 --> 00:14:22.799 responsibility and now all of a sudden cybers being used 312 00:14:22.799 --> 00:14:26.840 to gather intelligence on like some of our highest, you know, 313 00:14:26.879 --> 00:14:27.720 sensitive assets. 314 00:14:28.240 --> 00:14:31.080 Was a wild shot Yankee for the squares out there 315 00:14:31.360 --> 00:14:31.919 like myself. 316 00:14:32.000 --> 00:14:35.080 Yeah, so if you go read Wikipedia, well we'll use 317 00:14:35.120 --> 00:14:36.159 that as our official source. 318 00:14:36.200 --> 00:14:37.039 The inside scoop. 319 00:14:37.559 --> 00:14:42.279 Buckshot Yankee is acclaimed Nation State actor developed some software 320 00:14:42.519 --> 00:14:45.039 that rumor had it got into not only systems in 321 00:14:45.080 --> 00:14:49.039 the military that were unclassified, but even to classified networks 322 00:14:49.080 --> 00:14:51.799 as somebody was there on ground and one of the 323 00:14:51.840 --> 00:14:54.320 only offensive cyber guys on ground. 324 00:14:54.960 --> 00:14:56.080 It was just kind of a. 325 00:14:56.080 --> 00:14:59.879 Really cool moment, a luck purely by luck to during 326 00:14:59.919 --> 00:15:01.480 the first days of this to get to be able 327 00:15:01.480 --> 00:15:03.200 to do the forensics, and it kind of was some 328 00:15:03.279 --> 00:15:07.240 of the first truly tying what other adversaries could do 329 00:15:07.320 --> 00:15:10.639 to our war fighting capability and the importance of cybers. 330 00:15:10.639 --> 00:15:14.200 So was was this who in the whole USB controversy, 331 00:15:14.279 --> 00:15:17.759 Like when they started taking away our USB's was that timeframe? 332 00:15:18.399 --> 00:15:21.080 So you're nailing it there, You're absolutely nailing the USB 333 00:15:21.240 --> 00:15:24.039 drives themselves were definitely one of these things of like 334 00:15:24.320 --> 00:15:27.399 where did they come from? The software they called it 335 00:15:27.559 --> 00:15:30.600 Agent BTZ is the malware name for any of the 336 00:15:30.679 --> 00:15:33.200 super nerds. But it's just a piece of software that 337 00:15:33.240 --> 00:15:35.519 when you put a USB or put a CD in 338 00:15:35.559 --> 00:15:38.799 a drive, it would auto run, right, it would literally 339 00:15:38.879 --> 00:15:42.679 automatically start running and next thing, you know, bad stuff. 340 00:15:42.720 --> 00:15:45.279 And so that was a kind of wild time for 341 00:15:45.480 --> 00:15:46.360 the US military. 342 00:15:46.639 --> 00:15:50.679 Yeah yeah, and you know, I you know, not too 343 00:15:51.159 --> 00:15:54.720 like whoever the Nation State Actor was, but when you 344 00:15:54.759 --> 00:15:56.720 consider like all the SSC that was going on in 345 00:15:56.720 --> 00:16:00.679 people throwing you know, taking CD ROMs or US off 346 00:16:00.720 --> 00:16:03.360 targets and you know, throwing them in like we were 347 00:16:03.440 --> 00:16:07.039 exposing ourselves for that stuff all the time. Uh, just 348 00:16:07.120 --> 00:16:08.960 from our everyday activities. 349 00:16:10.039 --> 00:16:12.360 Yeah, I mean it was it was It was life right. 350 00:16:12.440 --> 00:16:14.480 There is a process by the way, like when you 351 00:16:14.519 --> 00:16:17.559 go from these low systems to high just like anything, 352 00:16:17.919 --> 00:16:19.200 you know, it's just like a clearing barrel. 353 00:16:19.240 --> 00:16:21.240 You got to be able to, you know, clear your gun. 354 00:16:21.279 --> 00:16:23.039 You got to be able to follow these processes to 355 00:16:23.080 --> 00:16:25.559 make sure you don't accidentally, you know, bring something nasty. 356 00:16:26.240 --> 00:16:28.200 But this is the first time that for instance, people 357 00:16:28.240 --> 00:16:31.120 didn't think that maybe the clearing barrel wasn't enough so 358 00:16:31.759 --> 00:16:33.720 to be able to find something that you're just doing 359 00:16:33.759 --> 00:16:36.480 your job and think about when you gather intelligence, like 360 00:16:36.519 --> 00:16:39.200 my deployments in Afghanistan were all you know, a team 361 00:16:39.279 --> 00:16:45.159 related oda work gathering human intelligence. Human intelligence doesn't start classified, 362 00:16:45.159 --> 00:16:48.679 it starts unclassified, right, right, and then you bring it 363 00:16:48.759 --> 00:16:52.120 up to the systems appropriately right. And this threat actor 364 00:16:52.279 --> 00:16:56.000 just really seemed to understand how that system worked and 365 00:16:56.039 --> 00:16:57.159 how they could exploit it. 366 00:16:58.039 --> 00:17:02.759 So I'm curious because you know, you you are you're 367 00:17:02.799 --> 00:17:03.879 an offensive guy. 368 00:17:04.519 --> 00:17:06.160 Now you're not offensive guy. 369 00:17:06.400 --> 00:17:10.000 I would be offensive, yeah, but also offensive. 370 00:17:09.480 --> 00:17:12.519 Right yeah? Yeah, but but you were you know, so 371 00:17:12.599 --> 00:17:16.599 you're in this cyber space before you even joined the military. 372 00:17:16.599 --> 00:17:18.359 You joined the military, you. 373 00:17:18.279 --> 00:17:21.839 Get into the sort of the IT track, do you know, 374 00:17:22.519 --> 00:17:26.400 uh like, are you aware that sort of there is 375 00:17:26.880 --> 00:17:29.319 or isn't a cyber capability? You know how to get there? 376 00:17:29.359 --> 00:17:31.200 And how are you spending your evenings? Are you like 377 00:17:31.519 --> 00:17:33.359 sweating bullets every morning when you go into work? 378 00:17:33.359 --> 00:17:34.839 One boy, I hope nobody heard about this. 379 00:17:35.720 --> 00:17:38.680 So it was already in the IT world, like everyday 380 00:17:38.720 --> 00:17:41.440 tech was already changing, right right, we were moving from 381 00:17:41.440 --> 00:17:45.200 these old novel systems into early Windows and T and 382 00:17:45.279 --> 00:17:48.160 Windows two thousand systems. So I was already used to 383 00:17:48.160 --> 00:17:50.839 that grind of like every day something was different, huh. 384 00:17:51.000 --> 00:17:54.400 But at this time it and cyber what we call 385 00:17:54.400 --> 00:17:56.039 it now were largely blended. 386 00:17:56.119 --> 00:17:58.440 Like most folks wouldn't have called a cyber. 387 00:17:58.880 --> 00:18:01.200 It was this maturing and if you got lucky that 388 00:18:01.279 --> 00:18:04.000 you were stationed at a place that only did offense. 389 00:18:04.440 --> 00:18:06.680 But my job at a time was just as much 390 00:18:06.720 --> 00:18:08.160 defense as it was often it. 391 00:18:08.079 --> 00:18:09.079 Was really odd. 392 00:18:09.559 --> 00:18:11.319 And then of course we got a lot better when 393 00:18:11.400 --> 00:18:15.519 some of this started increasing and Nation States right started 394 00:18:15.519 --> 00:18:17.920 really going after us. We had to get much better 395 00:18:17.920 --> 00:18:20.200 and mature because we could see that if not, we 396 00:18:20.200 --> 00:18:21.599 were going to be left in the dust. 397 00:18:21.480 --> 00:18:25.039 Right right, No, it'sentially because like the military is running 398 00:18:25.039 --> 00:18:27.720 like most mom and pop businesses right now, right, we 399 00:18:28.319 --> 00:18:31.799 need an it guy to make sure our computers were secure. 400 00:18:32.559 --> 00:18:32.759 Yeah. 401 00:18:32.960 --> 00:18:34.720 Yeah, So at the sum of the work, I was 402 00:18:34.759 --> 00:18:37.240 literally the it guy unlocking accounts and stuff in the 403 00:18:37.279 --> 00:18:39.599 early like two thousand and three, two thousand and five days. 404 00:18:40.039 --> 00:18:41.920 By two thousand and seven, two thousand and eight. 405 00:18:41.759 --> 00:18:43.880 I was usually only doing the upper end. But that's 406 00:18:43.880 --> 00:18:45.960 how quick it happened only in about three years. I 407 00:18:45.960 --> 00:18:47.440 would say my whole life changed. 408 00:18:47.519 --> 00:18:50.599 Were they were they sort of were they splitting that off? 409 00:18:50.599 --> 00:18:54.279 Were they making the commands? Were they making that distinction? 410 00:18:54.400 --> 00:18:58.960 Did they see that the security was not it? 411 00:19:00.079 --> 00:19:03.079 The career fields hadn't updated yet, but you could get 412 00:19:03.119 --> 00:19:05.279 to certain places that were like and I know it's 413 00:19:05.319 --> 00:19:08.759 acron and souit nobody likes that military stuff, but JTFG 414 00:19:08.960 --> 00:19:11.319 and O, right, the Joint Task Force for doing this 415 00:19:11.599 --> 00:19:15.160 started like huddling together some of these offensive minded and 416 00:19:15.200 --> 00:19:17.000 the way I would actually describe it, in a lot 417 00:19:17.000 --> 00:19:20.559 of ways, it was purely you know, for those that 418 00:19:20.640 --> 00:19:26.559 follow us, it was title fifty Intelligence and Espionage Gathering Activity. 419 00:19:26.599 --> 00:19:29.079 It wasn't title ten War Powers types. 420 00:19:29.200 --> 00:19:29.319 Right. 421 00:19:29.400 --> 00:19:33.119 This is still very very early, let alone the modern 422 00:19:33.160 --> 00:19:36.559 world where it's our offense and support of defense. 423 00:19:36.640 --> 00:19:38.680 So you can imagine this timeframe. 424 00:19:38.839 --> 00:19:41.480 Us doctor in all on the unclassified side of the 425 00:19:41.480 --> 00:19:44.200 house is all about just trying to figure out, like 426 00:19:44.279 --> 00:19:46.599 how do I enable espionage. 427 00:19:48.000 --> 00:19:49.680 So I want to take a minute today to tell 428 00:19:49.720 --> 00:19:52.599 you guys about the perfect gene. I've been wearing them 429 00:19:52.640 --> 00:19:55.039 for a few weeks now and really enjoy them, and 430 00:19:55.039 --> 00:19:57.920 I just want to share it with our audience. You know, 431 00:19:58.039 --> 00:20:01.400 sometimes genes have this problem where you know, you guys 432 00:20:01.440 --> 00:20:04.119 all have seen these skinny jeans that they like crush 433 00:20:04.160 --> 00:20:06.839 your balls and you know it's just not comfortable. 434 00:20:06.440 --> 00:20:08.599 To wear or the other way around. The jeans are 435 00:20:08.599 --> 00:20:09.400 like too baggy. 436 00:20:09.640 --> 00:20:11.440 You know, you have the sort of like diaper in 437 00:20:11.480 --> 00:20:15.440 your ass area looks like. So there are these problems 438 00:20:15.440 --> 00:20:18.279 that you know, different fits of different types of genes 439 00:20:18.359 --> 00:20:22.200 have and the perfect gene strives to fix that both 440 00:20:22.240 --> 00:20:27.559 the fit but also the mobility, the maneuverability. It has 441 00:20:27.599 --> 00:20:30.759 a stretchy fabric, like they say it's like yoga ready, 442 00:20:31.400 --> 00:20:35.039 but you know I would say it's athletics ready. You know, 443 00:20:35.279 --> 00:20:38.680 moving furniture, doing things around the house. You're not going 444 00:20:38.759 --> 00:20:42.440 to have that like super tight, like constricted fit that 445 00:20:42.480 --> 00:20:43.200 you feel like you're. 446 00:20:43.039 --> 00:20:44.279 Not gonna be able to move around in. 447 00:20:44.880 --> 00:20:48.079 And there are over four hundred thousand people out there 448 00:20:48.079 --> 00:20:50.680 wearing these jeans at this point, so not all of 449 00:20:50.759 --> 00:20:53.400 them can be wrong. I hope you guys will go 450 00:20:53.440 --> 00:20:56.480 and check them out. So a few scenarios where you 451 00:20:56.480 --> 00:20:59.200 can wear these jeans and where they really come together. 452 00:21:00.200 --> 00:21:03.640 Everything from you know, doing yard work, or doing things 453 00:21:03.680 --> 00:21:06.079 around your house, if you have to move furniture around 454 00:21:06.240 --> 00:21:10.599 or you have to do handiwork. 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That's fifteen percent off for new customers at 465 00:21:41.279 --> 00:21:46.720 the Perfect Gene dot nyc with promo code House fifteen. 466 00:21:47.400 --> 00:21:49.880 After you purchase, they'll ask you where you heard about them. 467 00:21:49.960 --> 00:21:52.440 Please support our show and tell them we sent you. 468 00:21:52.759 --> 00:21:55.799 So fuck your takis and get the Perfect Gene. 469 00:21:57.599 --> 00:21:59.759 Well that messages anything that ain't good. 470 00:22:00.160 --> 00:22:05.319 You said you did some deployments overseas supporting soft I'd 471 00:22:05.319 --> 00:22:07.799 be interested to hear a bit more about about that, 472 00:22:07.880 --> 00:22:12.079 and like how this like it security field kind of 473 00:22:12.079 --> 00:22:12.960 interfaces with that. 474 00:22:14.279 --> 00:22:17.000 Yep, So for any of the other fans of silent 475 00:22:17.079 --> 00:22:20.680 professionals out there. They don't just exist in espionage or 476 00:22:21.000 --> 00:22:24.599 you know, they exist in special forces, right, human intelligence. 477 00:22:24.599 --> 00:22:28.319 And it turned out these A teams were all about 478 00:22:28.519 --> 00:22:31.799 how do I gather intelligence right the old school ways, 479 00:22:31.880 --> 00:22:36.200 local building relationships, things like that, ha, humanitarian assistance. 480 00:22:37.000 --> 00:22:39.519 But they need a geek like me to keep some. 481 00:22:39.480 --> 00:22:42.720 Of the systems up, whether it's classified systems, being able 482 00:22:42.720 --> 00:22:44.599 to be able to keep the data you can imagine 483 00:22:44.640 --> 00:22:47.559 for how do you covertly record, how do we make 484 00:22:47.599 --> 00:22:50.359 sure things aren't bugged. All of that stuff is normal 485 00:22:50.519 --> 00:22:53.680 parts of just any sort of espionage doctrine all the 486 00:22:53.720 --> 00:22:56.920 way back to the fifties. It's not unique, but there 487 00:22:56.960 --> 00:22:59.799 is definitely shortage. And so folks like me who are 488 00:23:00.440 --> 00:23:05.599 cyber warfare operators completely different than special forces operators, got 489 00:23:05.599 --> 00:23:07.720 attached on the same teams, and I was like super 490 00:23:07.720 --> 00:23:08.559 grateful to get that. 491 00:23:10.759 --> 00:23:13.799 Did you basically have to teach them how to utilize you? 492 00:23:15.160 --> 00:23:16.480 I think in a way and a lot of it. 493 00:23:16.559 --> 00:23:18.599 Like when I first got there, the team was actually 494 00:23:18.880 --> 00:23:21.799 pretty clear like reminding me, hey, you know, hey, turd, 495 00:23:22.359 --> 00:23:25.279 keep the systems up, make sure the morale drive is running, 496 00:23:25.319 --> 00:23:29.880 but right, right, very similarly, you know, very similar though 497 00:23:29.960 --> 00:23:33.920 you could imagine like their careers is often defined by 498 00:23:34.000 --> 00:23:37.000 their capabilities, which was identical to mine. And so in 499 00:23:37.039 --> 00:23:39.279 a lot of ways, I got lucky that my team 500 00:23:39.440 --> 00:23:42.319 treated me pretty darnfair. I won't say that there wasn't azing. 501 00:23:42.519 --> 00:23:46.720 Like we had an incident that involved diverting a drone 502 00:23:46.759 --> 00:23:49.039 one day, and I'll be darned if they did not. 503 00:23:49.160 --> 00:23:52.559 Only like, after this incident goes down, I get in, 504 00:23:52.599 --> 00:23:54.559 they tell me to pack my stuff. They have me 505 00:23:54.599 --> 00:23:57.839 fill out a you know, incident report. I'm thinking I'm 506 00:23:57.839 --> 00:24:00.599 going to jail. I'm like crying, you know, filling this out. 507 00:24:00.640 --> 00:24:03.240 I get to the last page and it says, remember 508 00:24:03.319 --> 00:24:05.799 you're not a Special Forces operator, You're an Air Force 509 00:24:05.839 --> 00:24:06.319 tech geek. 510 00:24:06.400 --> 00:24:07.279 Sign here puss. 511 00:24:07.680 --> 00:24:09.400 So these guys let me have it. 512 00:24:09.440 --> 00:24:11.759 Even though you know, I got to help them with 513 00:24:11.799 --> 00:24:14.000 a lot of great stuff. I was definitely, though still 514 00:24:14.079 --> 00:24:18.480 support So that type of relationship was actually pretty cool. 515 00:24:18.559 --> 00:24:21.839 And for me, who'd always been very athletic, not the 516 00:24:21.839 --> 00:24:24.880 same style of athleticism, it was a really like kind 517 00:24:24.880 --> 00:24:26.720 of humbling experience to get to spend a couple of 518 00:24:26.720 --> 00:24:27.759 appointments with these guys. 519 00:24:28.440 --> 00:24:32.240 So in addition to like telling people what you can do, like, 520 00:24:32.680 --> 00:24:35.000 did you have to tell people what you couldn't do 521 00:24:35.119 --> 00:24:39.759 based on like misconception, like like enhance a picture, enhance 522 00:24:40.039 --> 00:24:42.839 enhance to Kyle, Yeah, exactly. 523 00:24:43.640 --> 00:24:46.000 Yeah, So you can imagine all the TV shows and 524 00:24:46.079 --> 00:24:49.000 movies ruined it for you know, folks that, for instance, 525 00:24:49.000 --> 00:24:51.799 are like, look, you know I blow things up. I'm 526 00:24:51.799 --> 00:24:54.799 a demo guy, or you know, I'm the combat medic. 527 00:24:55.200 --> 00:24:57.880 Just the same way that people don't understand how transfusions 528 00:24:57.920 --> 00:24:58.680 do and don't work. 529 00:24:58.759 --> 00:25:01.119 They didn't understand some of the time ethnical stuff. 530 00:25:00.799 --> 00:25:03.400 So like Wi Fi hacking, I could do that that 531 00:25:03.440 --> 00:25:04.279 would impress them. 532 00:25:04.920 --> 00:25:07.079 Other things. It's just like, yeah, I took this. 533 00:25:07.079 --> 00:25:09.599 This camera was on a flip phone or some Nokia 534 00:25:09.680 --> 00:25:12.720 on a Roshan network somewhere enhanced this, and I'm like, guys, 535 00:25:12.759 --> 00:25:16.640 there's it's not you know, it's not minority port where 536 00:25:16.680 --> 00:25:18.880 there's not enhanced and hands and hands. So you can 537 00:25:18.920 --> 00:25:23.480 imagine there's definitely some disappointment. I disappointed at times, guys. 538 00:25:23.559 --> 00:25:25.880 Yeah, I mean you can do stuff, there's like literal 539 00:25:25.960 --> 00:25:28.359 magic to them, and then they ask you for something 540 00:25:28.440 --> 00:25:32.240 to them that's basic, hey, and pictures like there's nothing 541 00:25:32.359 --> 00:25:34.680 like nothing. 542 00:25:34.640 --> 00:25:38.000 Yeah, I like, I literally remember some surveillance stuff that 543 00:25:38.039 --> 00:25:40.799 we did that I soldered some kit that was very 544 00:25:41.839 --> 00:25:46.079 simple pinhole camera to like an existing like cable that 545 00:25:46.240 --> 00:25:48.759 was hidden away, very very far away, and they thought 546 00:25:48.759 --> 00:25:51.599 that was magic. And then I'm letting them down on 547 00:25:51.640 --> 00:25:53.480 stuff that they felt it was so basic. 548 00:25:53.759 --> 00:25:55.440 Right, It's just a weird dichotomy. 549 00:25:55.720 --> 00:25:56.039 Yeah. 550 00:25:56.559 --> 00:25:57.920 Yeah, So. 551 00:25:59.400 --> 00:26:02.000 Did you do I mean, were you with them or 552 00:26:02.039 --> 00:26:03.720 did you do multiple trips with. 553 00:26:05.200 --> 00:26:08.640 SF Yeah, yeah, multiple oda's But they were like they 554 00:26:08.640 --> 00:26:11.960 would go and do like twelve thirteen month rotations and 555 00:26:12.000 --> 00:26:14.160 I'd be in and out in like five you know, 556 00:26:14.200 --> 00:26:16.880 by the time I could actually deploy, go back home 557 00:26:16.920 --> 00:26:18.599 and come back in the same team could still be 558 00:26:18.599 --> 00:26:22.519 in place. So it was, uh, it's kind of sad 559 00:26:22.559 --> 00:26:23.640 actually if you think about it. 560 00:26:23.720 --> 00:26:27.000 Yeah, And how do you see, like during this time 561 00:26:27.039 --> 00:26:30.799 where you're doing these deployments, how do you see technology 562 00:26:30.880 --> 00:26:35.160 changing and how the military is or isn't embracing technology. 563 00:26:36.000 --> 00:26:39.240 So the teams were becoming more technical, like the eighteen 564 00:26:39.279 --> 00:26:43.079 echoes right, who had comms roles. Our team actually also 565 00:26:43.119 --> 00:26:46.119 doubled as a team sniper, right, so he was very 566 00:26:46.119 --> 00:26:48.680 different than he could have like encrypted comms, and so 567 00:26:48.880 --> 00:26:50.759 you could imagine as I could take on some of 568 00:26:50.759 --> 00:26:55.119 those responsibilities. It allowed them to take their own specializations 569 00:26:55.160 --> 00:26:56.960 and focus on it. So I actually think in many 570 00:26:56.960 --> 00:27:00.160 ways it was you know, I even like today my 571 00:27:00.200 --> 00:27:03.119 current job, the best thing I can do is focus 572 00:27:03.119 --> 00:27:05.799 on the skills only I can do. And so this 573 00:27:05.920 --> 00:27:09.519 blending started happening in the late like you know late ots, 574 00:27:09.599 --> 00:27:12.160 think of like two thousand and eight to twenty twelve. 575 00:27:12.640 --> 00:27:14.440 All of a sudden you had these geeks that were 576 00:27:14.480 --> 00:27:16.839 taking away some of the I would call it mundane, 577 00:27:16.920 --> 00:27:20.160 monotonous and allowing like real operators to do stuff that 578 00:27:20.240 --> 00:27:23.160 only they're trained on, right, And so that was I 579 00:27:23.160 --> 00:27:25.200 think kind of a true like people use that word 580 00:27:25.200 --> 00:27:29.160 force multiplier lightly, this was an actual case where they're like, whoa, 581 00:27:30.160 --> 00:27:32.440 I have somebody now that can do this, can run this, 582 00:27:32.599 --> 00:27:34.960 is fit enough to do this, and then it enables 583 00:27:35.000 --> 00:27:37.240 you know, an extra body because these again these teams 584 00:27:37.240 --> 00:27:41.119 are very small. So anyways, it was a cool difference 585 00:27:41.200 --> 00:27:44.559 because that from my first time, like even just on 586 00:27:44.640 --> 00:27:48.119 small deployments, think about like catark weight stuff. We were 587 00:27:48.160 --> 00:27:51.079 modernizing it systems, but they weren't impactful, not like this 588 00:27:51.440 --> 00:27:52.319 right right. 589 00:27:52.720 --> 00:27:56.000 Yeah, you're watching people's IP addresses and their MAC addresses 590 00:27:56.039 --> 00:27:58.240 and they're going to pourn shutting them down. 591 00:27:58.400 --> 00:27:59.680 It's really really cool. 592 00:27:59.759 --> 00:28:02.480 Yeah, but you got to see like the blending of 593 00:28:02.519 --> 00:28:04.359 these capabilities pretty early on. 594 00:28:04.519 --> 00:28:05.400 Yeah. 595 00:28:05.640 --> 00:28:08.559 Yeah, and again right place, right time. And if you 596 00:28:08.599 --> 00:28:10.759 fast forward even just a couple of years later, by 597 00:28:10.799 --> 00:28:14.240 twenty eleven, I had left active duty and I started 598 00:28:14.319 --> 00:28:16.880 National Guard time. So the typical one week in a month, 599 00:28:16.920 --> 00:28:19.599 two weeks a year, and that led me at Fort 600 00:28:19.640 --> 00:28:23.119 Meade and that time, no joke. Within two years you 601 00:28:23.160 --> 00:28:26.559 had going from these type of incidents to things that 602 00:28:26.599 --> 00:28:29.160 were like you know, people publicly claimed, you know, the 603 00:28:29.279 --> 00:28:32.359 US and Israel were related to like stucksnet. That's such 604 00:28:32.359 --> 00:28:35.319 a big difference where you're going from four years earlier 605 00:28:35.440 --> 00:28:38.519 scared of like bad USBs to now all said in 606 00:28:38.559 --> 00:28:42.559 the world supposedly some nation state actor made some centerfugion 607 00:28:42.640 --> 00:28:45.319 spend extra fast to prevent enrichment of uranium. 608 00:28:45.599 --> 00:28:48.079 Like that is a crazy difference in four years. 609 00:28:48.240 --> 00:28:52.359 Yeah, were there things during this sort of blossoming. Were 610 00:28:52.359 --> 00:28:54.359 there things that like you just wanted to jump on 611 00:28:54.359 --> 00:28:57.039 somebody's desk and tell the like, tell the military you're 612 00:28:57.079 --> 00:29:01.119 missing this like, or the government and general that you're 613 00:29:01.119 --> 00:29:03.359 not paying enough attention to this particular thing. 614 00:29:04.279 --> 00:29:07.160 So twenty twelve was the first time I actually thought, 615 00:29:07.759 --> 00:29:10.640 because we have so many flyers running some of these 616 00:29:10.759 --> 00:29:13.480 you know what a lot of people we call them wings, right, 617 00:29:14.079 --> 00:29:17.079 Air force nonsense. But when you have some of these 618 00:29:17.119 --> 00:29:21.839 flyers making policy decisions, I would say sixty seventy eighty 619 00:29:21.880 --> 00:29:24.839 percent of them just couldn't get the force multiplier. But 620 00:29:24.920 --> 00:29:27.319 there was a rare twenty thirty percent that kind of 621 00:29:27.559 --> 00:29:30.559 at this time had laid the groundwork to create you 622 00:29:30.559 --> 00:29:34.440 could imagine the beginnings of US Cyber Command, some of 623 00:29:34.519 --> 00:29:37.319 even the separation because at this time, like NSA is 624 00:29:37.359 --> 00:29:40.279 doing what they can do to help. But NSA's mission 625 00:29:40.559 --> 00:29:45.759 is foreign adversaries abroad for espionage, And so you could 626 00:29:45.799 --> 00:29:49.000 imagine in the US we're watching all the other nation 627 00:29:49.119 --> 00:29:49.839 state actors. 628 00:29:50.279 --> 00:29:53.079 They're changing their techniques, they're using. 629 00:29:52.920 --> 00:29:57.720 Schools for espionage, they're using commercial entities. So in many ways, 630 00:29:57.759 --> 00:30:01.119 like we were both ahead and learning at the same 631 00:30:01.119 --> 00:30:04.079 time everybody else was. So it was again I can't 632 00:30:04.119 --> 00:30:06.359 tell you like how lucky I am at right place, 633 00:30:06.480 --> 00:30:08.519 right time for all of this stuff to change. 634 00:30:09.200 --> 00:30:11.559 So you joined the Guard, which exposes you. 635 00:30:11.640 --> 00:30:15.920 To me, what's your first impression when you like, when 636 00:30:15.960 --> 00:30:17.240 you're there. 637 00:30:17.559 --> 00:30:19.920 So I wasn't a Guard guy. I had deployed with. 638 00:30:20.119 --> 00:30:22.279 Okay, sorry about that, Okay, oh no, no. 639 00:30:22.279 --> 00:30:24.160 Yeah, you were right, But I wasn't at this time 640 00:30:24.200 --> 00:30:26.400 think about it. I wasn't really a National Guard guy. 641 00:30:26.599 --> 00:30:28.519 I was in the National Guard, but I didn't know 642 00:30:28.599 --> 00:30:32.599 what that meant. I thought at this time Guard were 643 00:30:32.680 --> 00:30:35.079 kind of like, you know, hey, you'd have like sixty 644 00:30:35.119 --> 00:30:37.680 five year old tech sergeants. Right e six is for us, right, 645 00:30:37.759 --> 00:30:40.400 And I thought, oh man, this isn't the tip of 646 00:30:40.400 --> 00:30:40.839 the spear. 647 00:30:41.079 --> 00:30:43.920 But it turned out the National. 648 00:30:43.480 --> 00:30:45.839 Guard and a little bit of the reserves, but really 649 00:30:45.880 --> 00:30:48.839 on the National Guard side of the house, realized there 650 00:30:48.920 --> 00:30:51.480 was going to be They're not talking about the word hemorrhage. 651 00:30:51.519 --> 00:30:52.720 They called it stem ridge. 652 00:30:52.880 --> 00:30:57.200 All the science, technology, engineering, and math folks doing cryptography, 653 00:30:57.799 --> 00:31:02.400 advanced for instance, offensive cyber operations, even defense, they were 654 00:31:02.559 --> 00:31:05.720 racing to go to support. You know, remember Google got 655 00:31:05.720 --> 00:31:08.200 mass hacked in two thousand and nine. So even the 656 00:31:08.279 --> 00:31:11.200 industry is now dropping major dollars. I'm talking like four 657 00:31:11.240 --> 00:31:14.799 hundred five hundred thousand dollars salaries a year, and this 658 00:31:14.920 --> 00:31:18.279 talent was bleeding. But it turned out the National Guard 659 00:31:18.480 --> 00:31:21.160 realized this was going to happen, and our whole goal was, 660 00:31:21.720 --> 00:31:24.720 let me retain the best talent in the world, So 661 00:31:24.839 --> 00:31:27.279 even if we can't have them full time, how do 662 00:31:27.359 --> 00:31:30.079 we have that reserve capacity? And it was brilliant. I 663 00:31:30.160 --> 00:31:32.440 didn't even know that this was going down, and it 664 00:31:32.480 --> 00:31:34.440 didn't become apparent to me for probably two or three 665 00:31:34.480 --> 00:31:38.039 years later that some good flyers realized this was going 666 00:31:38.119 --> 00:31:41.119 to happen. I guess there's some parallels with flyers. This happened, 667 00:31:41.400 --> 00:31:43.920 you know, at the draw down of like Vietnam, and 668 00:31:43.920 --> 00:31:46.359 we didn't necessarily have for a while the flying talent 669 00:31:46.400 --> 00:31:49.279 to be able to do other air superiority. And it 670 00:31:49.359 --> 00:31:51.640 turns out those same type of flyers realized this was 671 00:31:51.680 --> 00:31:53.759 going to happen in cyber and again I just happened 672 00:31:53.759 --> 00:31:56.319 to be part of the right unit. It was trying 673 00:31:56.359 --> 00:31:59.720 to be able to not only like retain talent, but 674 00:31:59.839 --> 00:32:02.359 in case there was ever like a surge capacity we 675 00:32:02.359 --> 00:32:05.480 could step up and support. So you could imagine for me, 676 00:32:05.960 --> 00:32:10.319 my perception of the National Guard went from old kind 677 00:32:10.359 --> 00:32:14.079 of unfit, you know, you know airman to all of 678 00:32:14.079 --> 00:32:17.319 a sudden like whoa. It turned out the National Guard 679 00:32:17.359 --> 00:32:20.519 actually had in many cases better talent in than active 680 00:32:20.559 --> 00:32:21.200 duty head. 681 00:32:21.960 --> 00:32:24.759 Were they were they Was there any process at that 682 00:32:24.880 --> 00:32:29.680 time in formalizing training and devog partnership with like Sands 683 00:32:29.799 --> 00:32:32.200 or any you know, any of the big organizations. 684 00:32:32.480 --> 00:32:33.799 Were they sending you to black hat? 685 00:32:33.880 --> 00:32:38.519 Like how were they you know, working on your professional 686 00:32:38.599 --> 00:32:41.079 skills and things like that, or how were they supporting that? 687 00:32:41.720 --> 00:32:46.279 So you could imagine when this hemorrhaging or stemaging started happening, 688 00:32:46.880 --> 00:32:50.559 everybody started realizing we're going to start losing to commercial 689 00:32:50.839 --> 00:32:53.480 They weren't so worried about overseas. They weren't worrying about 690 00:32:53.559 --> 00:32:55.720 national threats, although there was some of that. You know, 691 00:32:55.799 --> 00:32:58.440 if you think about human there's always a worry somebody's 692 00:32:58.480 --> 00:33:00.519 going to go start, you know, merc in area type 693 00:33:00.519 --> 00:33:02.960 s right, that wasn't really a concern at this time, 694 00:33:03.440 --> 00:33:05.519 but you could imagine they're sitting there going, if we 695 00:33:05.640 --> 00:33:08.559 can't retain, how do we build this cadre? And it 696 00:33:08.640 --> 00:33:13.039 turns out there's a couple epicenters right in the DC area. 697 00:33:13.599 --> 00:33:16.039 You look like the National Guard had a handful of 698 00:33:16.160 --> 00:33:19.000 units that were trying to retain but they also were 699 00:33:19.000 --> 00:33:21.400 smart enough to realize if we don't set up some 700 00:33:21.440 --> 00:33:23.680 sort of commercial training, we are. 701 00:33:23.599 --> 00:33:25.440 Not going to be able to backfill. It was a 702 00:33:25.480 --> 00:33:26.440 pipeline problem. 703 00:33:26.640 --> 00:33:28.440 Yeah. I mean still to. 704 00:33:28.480 --> 00:33:31.279 This day twenty five, I have to build more talent 705 00:33:31.319 --> 00:33:34.799 than I can hire because they're still that rare. So yeah, 706 00:33:34.960 --> 00:33:40.079 companies like Sands and even other like research institutes, think 707 00:33:40.119 --> 00:33:42.400 about the National Labs had to step up and help 708 00:33:42.480 --> 00:33:43.039 grow people. 709 00:33:43.640 --> 00:33:51.079 Yeah, and then what what was the relationship with the 710 00:33:51.119 --> 00:33:53.720 government side of this, whether it's military or in it 711 00:33:53.799 --> 00:33:58.640 say whomever, and you know, the kids or the people 712 00:33:59.039 --> 00:34:02.480 who or anti the man or whatever, but still doing 713 00:34:02.519 --> 00:34:04.599 this stuff, you know, and like you. 714 00:34:04.519 --> 00:34:06.480 Know, I think def Con is a funny example, you 715 00:34:06.480 --> 00:34:08.360 know where guys are always like trying to point you know, 716 00:34:08.480 --> 00:34:10.480 pick the fed and you know stuff like that. 717 00:34:10.559 --> 00:34:13.400 Ben right, Yeah, yeah, So like what. 718 00:34:13.119 --> 00:34:17.079 Was that real relationship like and how has that developed 719 00:34:17.079 --> 00:34:17.599 over time? 720 00:34:18.440 --> 00:34:20.320 So for a guy like me who I've been going 721 00:34:20.360 --> 00:34:23.239 to deaf Con since I on early two thousands every 722 00:34:23.320 --> 00:34:26.800 year showing up or black hat I had done presentations, 723 00:34:27.360 --> 00:34:30.760 there was always this irony that those you know, you 724 00:34:30.760 --> 00:34:33.280 know that current statement that the my gen Z kids 725 00:34:33.280 --> 00:34:36.039 will say if you know, you know, all of us 726 00:34:36.079 --> 00:34:39.280 that were sometimes involved in some of these hacking events 727 00:34:39.400 --> 00:34:43.400 by kind of like late oughts, you know, two thousand 728 00:34:43.400 --> 00:34:46.119 and five, thousand and seven, twenty ten. A lot of 729 00:34:46.119 --> 00:34:49.199 people realize spot the FED was ironic because a lot 730 00:34:49.280 --> 00:34:53.039 of people organizing had now become in support of some 731 00:34:53.079 --> 00:34:55.559 of the federal sides. So there was always this irony 732 00:34:55.559 --> 00:34:59.280 of you know, catch the actual active agent. And I'll 733 00:34:59.280 --> 00:35:01.559 be honest, lot of people wanted to pick up FBI. 734 00:35:01.719 --> 00:35:04.280 There's a very big difference between NSA, who is very 735 00:35:04.360 --> 00:35:07.760 much a mission that is going after non US citizens, 736 00:35:07.840 --> 00:35:11.400 right right, FBI that's looking at US citizens. And I 737 00:35:11.440 --> 00:35:14.000 won't lie it wasn't even it's not a lie to 738 00:35:14.000 --> 00:35:16.440 say there wasn't a schism between some folks who are like, 739 00:35:16.519 --> 00:35:18.840 fuck you stay out of my you know, US citizens. 740 00:35:18.880 --> 00:35:22.360 And so even sometimes some of the you know, IC 741 00:35:22.639 --> 00:35:26.039 guys or maybe spot in the more field agent type 742 00:35:26.079 --> 00:35:28.320 guys of like, you know, get out of my, uh 743 00:35:28.599 --> 00:35:29.199 my corner. 744 00:35:29.480 --> 00:35:31.000 Yeah, you know everybody was FEDS. 745 00:35:31.199 --> 00:35:33.760 Yeah yeah, right, yeah, take your five elevens in your 746 00:35:33.800 --> 00:35:34.920 polo shirt and get out here. 747 00:35:35.000 --> 00:35:36.199 Yeah, there, I go. 748 00:35:36.400 --> 00:35:40.360 Yeah, but but that is true because the IC is 749 00:35:40.400 --> 00:35:42.800 the IC and the FBI is the man. 750 00:35:43.440 --> 00:35:45.960 Like, you know, people don't realize that, but you're you're 751 00:35:46.000 --> 00:35:48.679 hitting a culture thing that there will be more books 752 00:35:48.719 --> 00:35:51.440 on this, Like I think, uh, I can't remember that politician. 753 00:35:51.480 --> 00:35:53.440 He was out of maybe Texas, but people found out 754 00:35:53.480 --> 00:35:56.239 he was an early hacker. I'm spacing on his name, 755 00:35:56.840 --> 00:35:59.440 and uh, it blew some people's minds that some of 756 00:35:59.480 --> 00:36:01.679 these people that didn't seem like they could be from 757 00:36:01.719 --> 00:36:04.920 the hacker culture were actually the same guys on bulletin 758 00:36:04.960 --> 00:36:08.559 boards and you know, you know, IRC and stuff like that, 759 00:36:08.800 --> 00:36:12.239 but had now held like actual governor or sorry that's 760 00:36:12.280 --> 00:36:15.920 not correct congressman positions. So it was a weird time 761 00:36:15.960 --> 00:36:19.119 at the you know, kind of twenty ten period where 762 00:36:19.639 --> 00:36:21.280 you're the man but not the man. 763 00:36:21.400 --> 00:36:25.000 Right right, But we're also looking at a time from 764 00:36:25.119 --> 00:36:28.440 the time you started when you were a kid up 765 00:36:28.519 --> 00:36:29.360 until this time. 766 00:36:29.599 --> 00:36:32.679 You know, there wasn't hack the box. There wasn't there were. 767 00:36:34.239 --> 00:36:37.440 I'm pretty sure that people who were good at offensive 768 00:36:37.480 --> 00:36:41.039 stuff at the offense side of the house at some 769 00:36:41.280 --> 00:36:45.559 time may have you know, pushed up against the the 770 00:36:45.719 --> 00:36:48.440 legal system. 771 00:36:47.559 --> 00:36:49.079 There was definitely gray. 772 00:36:49.400 --> 00:36:52.039 And what's weird is a lot of people don't realize 773 00:36:52.360 --> 00:36:55.559 the polygraph is not necessarily to find out who's breaking 774 00:36:55.599 --> 00:36:59.280 the laws, to figure out who has integrity. And so 775 00:36:59.400 --> 00:37:02.480 I remember people that I knew flat out had like 776 00:37:02.840 --> 00:37:06.079 done not crazy hard drugs, but admitted they had done 777 00:37:06.119 --> 00:37:09.480 drugs and made it through polygraphs just or some shady 778 00:37:09.559 --> 00:37:12.679 level of Like Now, even looking back, there's nothing that 779 00:37:12.760 --> 00:37:14.800 I think that as long as I was honest on 780 00:37:14.840 --> 00:37:17.400 my polygraph, if it actually asked me about those questions, 781 00:37:17.800 --> 00:37:20.239 I don't think anything would have precluded me from service. 782 00:37:20.880 --> 00:37:23.400 It wasn't They're not looking for somebody that have you 783 00:37:23.480 --> 00:37:25.800 broken a law or do you, you know, dip into 784 00:37:25.800 --> 00:37:28.679 the gray. They're making sure that when they ask you, 785 00:37:28.840 --> 00:37:31.440 they know you're going to be honest. And integrity's worth 786 00:37:31.440 --> 00:37:33.639 a hell of a lot more than occasional bad judgment. 787 00:37:33.800 --> 00:37:37.360 So I think the actual US government had to changed 788 00:37:37.360 --> 00:37:39.960 their mind a little bit. And for me, I mean, 789 00:37:40.000 --> 00:37:43.119 I've been tiptoeing this line my whole career. You cannot 790 00:37:43.440 --> 00:37:46.440 you know, you have to obey laws period, right, you know, 791 00:37:46.599 --> 00:37:49.159 the intelligence communities, you obey laws if you're you know, 792 00:37:49.239 --> 00:37:52.960 a Ford deployed, you know, a soldier, airman, marine, you know, sailor. 793 00:37:53.440 --> 00:37:57.920 You obey the laws, but there's always this level of 794 00:37:58.000 --> 00:38:02.039 gray that I noticed that the offense of CyberWorld. You know, 795 00:38:02.360 --> 00:38:04.880 even to this day, some people will say, ah, I 796 00:38:05.000 --> 00:38:08.840 use my offense in supportive defense, and somewhere there's a 797 00:38:08.840 --> 00:38:10.840 little lit level of understanding. 798 00:38:11.519 --> 00:38:12.639 Just don't go too far. 799 00:38:12.639 --> 00:38:17.159 Right right, but in order, like I said before, all 800 00:38:17.199 --> 00:38:19.559 these you know, cool little sites that you could go 801 00:38:19.599 --> 00:38:20.719 on and learn this stuff. 802 00:38:22.360 --> 00:38:24.920 You know, when you're thirteen or fourteen. 803 00:38:27.000 --> 00:38:29.239 And there are there aren't sites like hack the box 804 00:38:29.320 --> 00:38:33.079 or whatever you know, or pent testing sites or whatever, like, 805 00:38:33.440 --> 00:38:36.599 how do you learn how to hack into a network? 806 00:38:37.599 --> 00:38:37.840 You know? 807 00:38:37.880 --> 00:38:41.280 For me, it was these capture the Flag of competitions. 808 00:38:41.400 --> 00:38:45.639 You know, they weren't physical capture the flag like the 809 00:38:45.679 --> 00:38:48.519 sports game. They were the hack into other systems. And 810 00:38:48.559 --> 00:38:50.360 it turned out there was a lot of these. They 811 00:38:50.400 --> 00:38:53.039 were actually hacked the box and a lot of these 812 00:38:53.119 --> 00:38:58.119 modern training systems started from kind of war games type events. 813 00:38:58.239 --> 00:39:01.280 And I don't even think people new like the year that, 814 00:39:01.599 --> 00:39:04.480 you know, for those that don't know what I'm talking. 815 00:39:04.199 --> 00:39:06.920 About, these capture the flags, think of. 816 00:39:08.400 --> 00:39:13.800 Possibly fifteen to twenty eight person teams of stinky pasty 817 00:39:13.880 --> 00:39:18.360 nerds creating exploits and hacking each other to steal data. 818 00:39:18.480 --> 00:39:21.519 That's their stealing the flag. They then submit the flag, 819 00:39:21.559 --> 00:39:23.280 bring it back to base, and they get a point. 820 00:39:24.239 --> 00:39:27.440 That's kind of how this worked, and these competitions were 821 00:39:27.519 --> 00:39:29.800 kind of the breeding grounds that at one time I 822 00:39:29.840 --> 00:39:32.679 remember playing Capture the Flag at Defcon where all the 823 00:39:32.719 --> 00:39:36.239 nerds get together in Vegas every year. That I remember 824 00:39:36.280 --> 00:39:40.800 looking and going Nation State Nation State US school that 825 00:39:40.920 --> 00:39:45.679 probably supports offensive cyber operations, defense contractor. We were a 826 00:39:45.719 --> 00:39:47.639 team that were just as guilty. A lot of us 827 00:39:47.679 --> 00:39:51.400 were five Eyes right us and some of our closest allies, 828 00:39:52.119 --> 00:39:55.079 and it was wild. This was almost like, you know, 829 00:39:55.280 --> 00:39:58.400 you can't train publicly, so the next best thing you 830 00:39:58.400 --> 00:39:59.760 could do is make a game out of it, And 831 00:40:00.360 --> 00:40:03.000 kind of what happened for I would say even still 832 00:40:03.000 --> 00:40:05.440 to this date, there's Capture the Flag runs every year 833 00:40:05.480 --> 00:40:06.320 a deaf gun. 834 00:40:06.320 --> 00:40:08.760 So there was Capture the Flag events like as young 835 00:40:08.880 --> 00:40:10.719 for you as young as like seventeen. 836 00:40:10.840 --> 00:40:13.440 I thought that was a more recent type of thing. 837 00:40:14.159 --> 00:40:17.320 So back then they were called crack mes or rehearse mees, 838 00:40:17.480 --> 00:40:21.000 so people would make fake software to teach reverse engineering. 839 00:40:21.280 --> 00:40:23.360 So they would make like a fake software that had 840 00:40:23.400 --> 00:40:26.079 like a fake digital rights or like key code that 841 00:40:26.119 --> 00:40:28.440 you had to pay for, and so they would actually 842 00:40:28.480 --> 00:40:30.159 teach you. And that's what I grew up on with 843 00:40:30.320 --> 00:40:33.000 interesting learning how to reverse engineer so I could get 844 00:40:33.039 --> 00:40:34.840 free software back to my broke days. 845 00:40:35.320 --> 00:40:36.320 But that's how it started. 846 00:40:36.360 --> 00:40:40.239 People then started training by creating fake software and fake 847 00:40:40.280 --> 00:40:43.679 activations and giving these tutorials too. This is what they 848 00:40:43.719 --> 00:40:46.119 were called, right, and you would actually use these tutorials 849 00:40:46.519 --> 00:40:47.840 to reverse engineer, and that. 850 00:40:47.840 --> 00:40:49.079 Turned into a whole game. 851 00:40:49.199 --> 00:40:49.760 So you're right. 852 00:40:50.039 --> 00:40:53.719 It didn't just go straight from the IRC channels into 853 00:40:53.719 --> 00:40:56.280 this full on war games. There was these kind of 854 00:40:56.400 --> 00:41:00.360 minor trainings that kept getting bigger, yeah, and bigger, all 855 00:41:00.360 --> 00:41:02.159 the way to hundreds person events. 856 00:41:02.239 --> 00:41:02.440 Right. 857 00:41:02.920 --> 00:41:06.000 Yeah, so let's jump into you know, you're in the 858 00:41:06.079 --> 00:41:09.519 National Guard. And now it sounded like at a certain 859 00:41:09.519 --> 00:41:11.920 point you make the jump over to the three letter 860 00:41:12.039 --> 00:41:14.639 side of the house or actually have a foot in both. 861 00:41:14.880 --> 00:41:16.880 I explained to us a little bit about like how 862 00:41:16.920 --> 00:41:18.440 that comes about and how that works. 863 00:41:18.800 --> 00:41:20.519 Yeah, so a lot of my life, you can tell, 864 00:41:21.559 --> 00:41:24.400 is still kind of recovering from you know, it's hard 865 00:41:24.440 --> 00:41:27.000 growing up broke right, and so you turn to you know, 866 00:41:27.079 --> 00:41:29.719 you make decisions based on money and what you know 867 00:41:29.800 --> 00:41:33.800 gives fun. And I realized, as you know, an e six, 868 00:41:34.840 --> 00:41:37.000 I was not going to have the stability for my 869 00:41:37.039 --> 00:41:40.199 family at this time. I have two kids, you know, 870 00:41:40.239 --> 00:41:42.280 I had my first one at eighteen years old, so 871 00:41:42.440 --> 00:41:44.199 you can imagine like a little bit of my psyche 872 00:41:44.199 --> 00:41:46.679 of trying to learn while graising kids, while being a kid, 873 00:41:47.400 --> 00:41:50.159 and I needed that. So I'm now six seven, eight 874 00:41:50.199 --> 00:41:53.000 years into the military, and I decide I'm going to 875 00:41:53.039 --> 00:41:56.119 become a contractor, and so I'm using my skills full 876 00:41:56.159 --> 00:42:00.000 time at NSA as a contractor for most of my time. 877 00:42:00.199 --> 00:42:02.679 That just means I can do most of the stuff 878 00:42:02.840 --> 00:42:05.599 that a government civilian can do, but there is some 879 00:42:05.760 --> 00:42:08.159 rules that they wouldn't let me do. And at this 880 00:42:08.280 --> 00:42:12.079 time my job turned into creating. They called it computer 881 00:42:12.119 --> 00:42:15.960 network operations. It's creating these things called implants that gather software. 882 00:42:16.039 --> 00:42:17.880 If you were on the receiving end of an implant, 883 00:42:17.920 --> 00:42:20.599 you'd call it malware. So that was my job at 884 00:42:20.719 --> 00:42:24.239 night or sorry, during the day. I'm creating malware professionally 885 00:42:24.320 --> 00:42:27.960 to support intelligence gathering. And one week in a month, 886 00:42:28.039 --> 00:42:32.039 two weeks a year. I'm using those cyber capabilities to 887 00:42:32.159 --> 00:42:36.400 actually gather intelligence or to support offensive cyber operations. 888 00:42:38.039 --> 00:42:40.800 That's pretty interesting. So I mean literally dual had it 889 00:42:40.840 --> 00:42:41.400 in a sense. 890 00:42:42.199 --> 00:42:45.360 I remember some meetings where again you're limited as a contractor, 891 00:42:45.360 --> 00:42:47.280 you're getting paid better, so you kind of like it. 892 00:42:47.480 --> 00:42:51.159 But with me having both feet in this world, there 893 00:42:51.159 --> 00:42:53.400 were times where I would actually have to remove myself 894 00:42:53.440 --> 00:42:55.840 because it wasn't appropriate being a contractor. And there were 895 00:42:55.880 --> 00:42:58.199 some times I'd have to literally flip my badge to 896 00:42:58.199 --> 00:43:01.159 have the right badge color up in and say, I 897 00:43:01.199 --> 00:43:03.039 want to tell you this on behalf of me in 898 00:43:03.079 --> 00:43:05.800 this role. I'm no longer a contractor, Kyle, but this 899 00:43:05.840 --> 00:43:09.199 is how we're going to use this for not espionage 900 00:43:09.199 --> 00:43:12.440 but attack computer network attack. And that was a real 901 00:43:12.559 --> 00:43:16.719 different role that I could actually use my National Guard 902 00:43:16.760 --> 00:43:20.360 time to often now benefit people who were only able 903 00:43:20.400 --> 00:43:23.719 to do espionage. So if I won't bore the audience 904 00:43:23.760 --> 00:43:26.599 with like all the laws, there's a big difference between 905 00:43:26.599 --> 00:43:30.039 Title fifty espionage in Title ten, which allows you to 906 00:43:30.119 --> 00:43:32.039 truly do attack. 907 00:43:32.400 --> 00:43:33.480 Deny degrade. 908 00:43:33.880 --> 00:43:34.599 Yeah, destroyed. 909 00:43:34.719 --> 00:43:35.599 I didn't use the face. 910 00:43:35.679 --> 00:43:40.000 It was destroyed disrupt but that type of actual effects 911 00:43:40.079 --> 00:43:43.199 and I will tell you being able to have both badges, 912 00:43:44.280 --> 00:43:48.199 it was a again I used this word earlier, force multipliers, 913 00:43:48.239 --> 00:43:52.039 seeking these opportunities to use my experience and again right place, 914 00:43:52.320 --> 00:43:52.840 right time. 915 00:43:53.000 --> 00:43:53.639 Super thankful. 916 00:43:53.639 --> 00:43:55.760 Well you spoke a little bit earlier about like these 917 00:43:55.800 --> 00:43:58.559 blended teams and blending these capabilities, and I mean you 918 00:43:58.599 --> 00:44:01.039 continue doing that. I mean I think that is that 919 00:44:01.159 --> 00:44:04.880 something that this line of work is sort of institutionalized 920 00:44:05.000 --> 00:44:07.920 or is it still sort of like a stovepipe there. 921 00:44:08.480 --> 00:44:09.559 I think it's getting better. 922 00:44:09.840 --> 00:44:12.039 This is the stuff that like if you hear people 923 00:44:12.159 --> 00:44:15.840 in the deployments in the AOAR saying we're going to 924 00:44:15.920 --> 00:44:18.400 use total forces, that means usually they're secure in the 925 00:44:18.440 --> 00:44:21.880 sky right with air power, they're maybe jamming the signals 926 00:44:21.880 --> 00:44:25.480 with electronic warfare. They've got human intelligence on the ground, 927 00:44:25.519 --> 00:44:28.559 they've got infantry pushing up, you know, doing the hard work, 928 00:44:28.800 --> 00:44:30.719 and then all the support that goes into it when 929 00:44:30.719 --> 00:44:34.599 you use total force. We've known that using all domain 930 00:44:34.639 --> 00:44:37.800 warfare is very powerful if you can coordinate it. At 931 00:44:37.840 --> 00:44:41.000 this time, people are trying to figure out not only 932 00:44:41.039 --> 00:44:44.199 how to add cyber to that story, they're trying to 933 00:44:44.199 --> 00:44:46.719 figure out, Oh my gosh, even within cyber there's all 934 00:44:46.719 --> 00:44:49.000 these different domains, right, it's an inch deep. 935 00:44:48.760 --> 00:44:50.400 And a mile wide of skill sets. 936 00:44:50.679 --> 00:44:53.880 So i'll tell you by this time, probably twenty thirteen, 937 00:44:53.960 --> 00:44:57.400 twenty fifteen, they're just starting to figure out what are 938 00:44:57.400 --> 00:44:58.840 all the blended skill sets. 939 00:44:59.199 --> 00:45:00.800 And they're learning this by accident. 940 00:45:01.000 --> 00:45:01.239 Right. 941 00:45:01.360 --> 00:45:05.199 The civilian world, by the way, starts calling this purple teaming. 942 00:45:05.599 --> 00:45:08.800 What they mean is blue teaming was always defense. Red 943 00:45:08.880 --> 00:45:12.679 teaming was always aggression assessing, and they start realizing you 944 00:45:12.719 --> 00:45:16.519 can use your red team offense to improve your blue 945 00:45:16.559 --> 00:45:20.119 team defense, and vice versa. You can use your offense 946 00:45:20.639 --> 00:45:23.440 to deliver effects so you never have to defend. So 947 00:45:23.559 --> 00:45:26.840 this world all of a sudden is completely learning. The 948 00:45:26.880 --> 00:45:29.239 whole thing is changing, and it's kind of like what 949 00:45:29.280 --> 00:45:31.960 we're seeing right now in Ukraine, where warfare is completely 950 00:45:32.039 --> 00:45:34.639 changed to drones autonomous systems. 951 00:45:35.000 --> 00:45:38.000 This same effect was going down. 952 00:45:37.719 --> 00:45:38.960 Just out of curiosity. 953 00:45:39.000 --> 00:45:42.679 If you can answer in a roundabout way, even how 954 00:45:42.679 --> 00:45:45.039 many different tools do you think you used on a 955 00:45:45.079 --> 00:45:46.800 daily basis when you went into work. 956 00:45:49.760 --> 00:45:53.000 I don't want to be cliche, but it was definitely 957 00:45:54.599 --> 00:45:57.360 maybe sometime in a day, it might be a half 958 00:45:57.440 --> 00:45:59.760 dozen to a dozen, but in a month it could 959 00:45:59.760 --> 00:46:04.079 be a It was really the old school, you know, 960 00:46:04.119 --> 00:46:06.559 folks that were lucky enough like me to grow up 961 00:46:06.599 --> 00:46:10.280 and learn remember those early computer programming languages like Assembly, 962 00:46:11.000 --> 00:46:16.119 and then blend them with modern programming languages like you know, Python, 963 00:46:16.360 --> 00:46:18.719 and then stuff in between like C and C plus plus. 964 00:46:18.760 --> 00:46:20.960 There wasn't many of us who could do this, so 965 00:46:21.079 --> 00:46:24.239 you could imagine this was a time where they were 966 00:46:24.280 --> 00:46:26.480 really trying to do everything they could, whether it was 967 00:46:26.519 --> 00:46:30.599 retaining people on the active duty side or National guard side, 968 00:46:30.760 --> 00:46:33.119 because once you lose this to the tech world, getting 969 00:46:33.119 --> 00:46:36.039 them back into these spaces was pretty hard. So I'm 970 00:46:36.039 --> 00:46:38.400 not going to sugarcoat it. It was a cluster for 971 00:46:38.440 --> 00:46:41.960 a really long time, and it's definitely maturing now. It's 972 00:46:42.000 --> 00:46:44.559 maturing to the level that some of these teams not 973 00:46:44.639 --> 00:46:47.719 only understand what manpower needs to look like, they can 974 00:46:47.800 --> 00:46:51.159 forecast it, they can grow it, and they know. But again, 975 00:46:51.280 --> 00:46:55.960 this is still mid twenty fifteen, twenty thirteen, and this 976 00:46:55.960 --> 00:46:57.639 stuff isn't figured out yet. 977 00:46:57.880 --> 00:46:59.960 Can you can you tell us a little bit? 978 00:47:00.079 --> 00:47:02.880 And I don't want to get into anything too sensitive, 979 00:47:02.960 --> 00:47:05.920 so I'll say, like, if we think of you know, 980 00:47:05.960 --> 00:47:09.199 you mentioned espionage and attack, and if we think of 981 00:47:09.360 --> 00:47:15.719 espionage as intelligence collection, right, that we're collecting information and 982 00:47:15.920 --> 00:47:18.760 you know a lot of times there's probably I imagine 983 00:47:19.639 --> 00:47:24.400 the attack and espionage often show similar entry points. 984 00:47:24.760 --> 00:47:25.000 Right. 985 00:47:25.159 --> 00:47:28.639 Yeah, so there's a fancy word, unclassified word, but it's 986 00:47:28.719 --> 00:47:30.920 talking about the preparation of an environment. 987 00:47:31.039 --> 00:47:31.199 Right. 988 00:47:31.280 --> 00:47:34.639 Think about the difference between when you deliver an effect. 989 00:47:34.960 --> 00:47:36.679 Let's make up one in this room. Maybe the light 990 00:47:36.719 --> 00:47:39.159 that's above my hair, right, give me this fancy hair light. 991 00:47:40.000 --> 00:47:41.880 The difference of me being able to turn that on 992 00:47:41.960 --> 00:47:43.920 and off is often like flipping a switch. 993 00:47:44.199 --> 00:47:44.360 Right. 994 00:47:44.519 --> 00:47:47.039 However, this is the time that all of a sudden 995 00:47:47.079 --> 00:47:51.480 we start realizing our legal frameworks. It's all about following laws, period. 996 00:47:51.599 --> 00:47:53.559 I know there's a lot of disinformation, there's a lot 997 00:47:53.559 --> 00:47:57.760 of bs, especially postnodin, but the most law abiding organizations 998 00:47:57.760 --> 00:48:01.440 I've ever worked at, military NSA plenty of examples of 999 00:48:01.440 --> 00:48:02.320 where it didn't happen. 1000 00:48:02.400 --> 00:48:03.440 But it's kind of crazy. 1001 00:48:03.480 --> 00:48:06.760 And where I'm going with this is you started learning 1002 00:48:06.840 --> 00:48:09.519 our laws might not have let us prepare to get 1003 00:48:09.519 --> 00:48:12.239 in just in case you have to flip that switch. 1004 00:48:12.320 --> 00:48:14.719 So I'm telling you, when you start getting into this 1005 00:48:14.840 --> 00:48:19.639 time period twenty fifteen twenty seventeen, we're realizing things have 1006 00:48:19.679 --> 00:48:23.519 to change quick because our adversaries are not hung up 1007 00:48:23.679 --> 00:48:28.079 on riwas And if you think about people that aren't 1008 00:48:28.159 --> 00:48:30.880 nation state, let's start talking about the emergence of cybercrime. 1009 00:48:31.320 --> 00:48:34.840 They give no shits what the laws are. They are 1010 00:48:34.960 --> 00:48:38.239 just moving faster than anybody to innovate. So we actually 1011 00:48:38.320 --> 00:48:40.519 got caught up in a world in the US for 1012 00:48:40.559 --> 00:48:43.440 a little while that the real heroes were actually the 1013 00:48:43.480 --> 00:48:47.639 policy wonks, the lawyers, the legal folks actually realizing that 1014 00:48:48.000 --> 00:48:49.519 if we're going to obey the laws, we need to 1015 00:48:49.519 --> 00:48:52.239 make sure the laws not only protect US citizens' rights, 1016 00:48:52.800 --> 00:48:55.519 we have to be able to handle all the murky situations. 1017 00:48:55.920 --> 00:48:59.480 What if a US citizen goes abroad and you accidentally 1018 00:48:59.519 --> 00:49:01.760 do something and collect how do you like all this stuff? 1019 00:49:01.800 --> 00:49:02.559 Because no offense. 1020 00:49:02.920 --> 00:49:06.000 Like my mom is my best, you know, supporter, She's 1021 00:49:06.039 --> 00:49:08.159 also the first tinfoil hatter who's like, are. 1022 00:49:08.000 --> 00:49:09.119 You listening to my calls? 1023 00:49:09.119 --> 00:49:11.760 And I'm like, Mom, I give no cares what I'm 1024 00:49:11.800 --> 00:49:14.159 talking about in your calls. But that crap can happen 1025 00:49:14.159 --> 00:49:17.159 by accidents. So you can imagine lawyers had to allow 1026 00:49:17.239 --> 00:49:20.159 us to get in place gather intelligence, so you don't 1027 00:49:20.159 --> 00:49:21.920 have this nine to eleven event where you had the 1028 00:49:21.920 --> 00:49:26.320 info but couldn't action it. And so this time period again, 1029 00:49:26.400 --> 00:49:29.719 we as the US are still trying to make sure 1030 00:49:29.800 --> 00:49:33.440 we follow laws, but we can't get cut flat footed. 1031 00:49:33.519 --> 00:49:33.679 Right. 1032 00:49:33.760 --> 00:49:36.760 We are a nation state power that stays in power 1033 00:49:36.800 --> 00:49:40.159 by projecting power, right, and if we hamstring ourselves by 1034 00:49:40.199 --> 00:49:44.000 being perfect, you can sometimes let perfect be the enemy 1035 00:49:44.000 --> 00:49:46.960 of good, and good enough sometimes gets you know, get 1036 00:49:46.960 --> 00:49:47.760 shitped done. 1037 00:49:47.880 --> 00:49:50.159 There was that example just a couple of years ago. 1038 00:49:50.519 --> 00:49:54.280 If you remember Tucker Carlson making a big stink about 1039 00:49:54.360 --> 00:49:57.679 how somebody illegally leaked to him that he had been 1040 00:49:57.719 --> 00:50:00.719 caught up in an intercept. It turns out yes, he 1041 00:50:00.880 --> 00:50:03.400 was contacting the Russian government and talking to them. So 1042 00:50:03.639 --> 00:50:06.440 if you do that, no shit you're gonna get your 1043 00:50:06.440 --> 00:50:08.000 accounts are going to get intercepted. 1044 00:50:08.400 --> 00:50:09.199 And what's wild. 1045 00:50:09.320 --> 00:50:10.960 And this is some of the stuff that I think 1046 00:50:11.400 --> 00:50:14.679 many government agencies realized that we were caught flat footed 1047 00:50:14.800 --> 00:50:16.880 during the snowed and era because there was a lot 1048 00:50:16.920 --> 00:50:19.840 of things that people just zip their lips, right, No 1049 00:50:20.000 --> 00:50:22.639 such agency type world where we weren't going to talk 1050 00:50:22.679 --> 00:50:25.320 about this stuff right. And what it did is when 1051 00:50:25.360 --> 00:50:29.119 you have the absence of a narrative, people will be 1052 00:50:29.159 --> 00:50:31.519 more than happy to fill it in for you. And 1053 00:50:31.599 --> 00:50:33.400 so this is the stuff that, to be honest, the 1054 00:50:33.480 --> 00:50:37.760 Armed Services, I would generally say, gets it done right. 1055 00:50:37.800 --> 00:50:41.239 We don't overclassify. We have a mission. And that's because 1056 00:50:41.239 --> 00:50:43.800 I think we realize and we cherish loss of life. 1057 00:50:44.400 --> 00:50:46.400 But when you work in this world where it's all 1058 00:50:46.440 --> 00:50:48.760 secrets and it takes it away from loss of life, 1059 00:50:49.320 --> 00:50:52.119 you sometimes let some of this perfection get in the way. 1060 00:50:52.119 --> 00:50:55.599 And I'll tell you, like nobody wants to collect, but 1061 00:50:55.679 --> 00:50:58.119 I'll be darne. You'll find cases of people abusing. Just 1062 00:50:58.199 --> 00:51:00.679 like think about any employee. You probably hired somebody that 1063 00:51:00.679 --> 00:51:02.480 seemed legit when you hired them. They turn out to 1064 00:51:02.519 --> 00:51:04.679 be a turd d. This stuff happens. 1065 00:51:06.000 --> 00:51:08.079 Hey, guys, it's your pal Jack. I just want to 1066 00:51:08.079 --> 00:51:09.760 take a moment to tell you about the sponsor for 1067 00:51:09.840 --> 00:51:10.880 this show, which. 1068 00:51:10.639 --> 00:51:11.440 Is Stop Box. 1069 00:51:12.599 --> 00:51:18.199 Stop Box makes this very cool box to secure your 1070 00:51:18.239 --> 00:51:24.280 items in where your valuables or weapons could be a firearm, knife, 1071 00:51:24.320 --> 00:51:28.639 things that you want to keep away from kids. 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That's ten percent off and a free 1091 00:52:29.559 --> 00:52:33.519 Stopbox Pro when you use the code House at STOPBOXUSA 1092 00:52:33.719 --> 00:52:37.360 dot com. Discover a better way to balance security and 1093 00:52:37.440 --> 00:52:41.400 readiness with Stopbox. I think you've touched on something that's 1094 00:52:41.440 --> 00:52:44.679 like really interesting. I think especially around like the Snowden period, 1095 00:52:46.679 --> 00:52:51.239 because there really was not a public interface between an, 1096 00:52:51.400 --> 00:52:54.400 say and the public. I'm sure they had a public 1097 00:52:54.440 --> 00:52:56.280 affairs office, no offense. 1098 00:52:56.039 --> 00:52:58.280 But it was the House of Glass, right, I mean, yeah, 1099 00:52:58.320 --> 00:52:59.840 you know, you know evil. 1100 00:53:00.239 --> 00:53:05.039 So when that scandal broke, it was a little bit different, 1101 00:53:05.079 --> 00:53:08.480 I think than the military, because people can see their soldiers, 1102 00:53:08.519 --> 00:53:10.480 they can hear their soldiers, they can get to know 1103 00:53:10.559 --> 00:53:12.639 them a little bit, and it kind of takes away 1104 00:53:12.880 --> 00:53:16.440 the mystery of it, whereas with the NSA, we can 1105 00:53:16.599 --> 00:53:19.159 if it's a black box, we can project all sorts 1106 00:53:19.199 --> 00:53:22.480 of maorious things upon what you're actually doing. 1107 00:53:22.920 --> 00:53:26.199 Yeah, no offense when somebody doesn't tell me how something works. 1108 00:53:27.039 --> 00:53:29.039 I have survived by being. 1109 00:53:29.000 --> 00:53:33.000 Very pessimistic, right, right, as humans evolved, right, bad stuff 1110 00:53:33.000 --> 00:53:35.599 outside of the cave. And if you make something seem 1111 00:53:35.639 --> 00:53:38.280 shady in the dark, I'm not going to assume positivity 1112 00:53:38.320 --> 00:53:41.360 happens in the dark. Right, That's literally how we evolved 1113 00:53:41.360 --> 00:53:42.079 as a species. 1114 00:53:42.159 --> 00:53:44.400 So I can't wait. 1115 00:53:44.440 --> 00:53:46.159 If you do the math right, you've got some of 1116 00:53:46.199 --> 00:53:49.400 the snowed in era type stuff twenty ten to twenty fifteen. 1117 00:53:50.159 --> 00:53:53.079 Usually US has a lot of like declassification things that 1118 00:53:53.119 --> 00:53:55.840 happen in twenty five years. For some of this I 1119 00:53:55.880 --> 00:53:59.280 cannot wait to fast forward to you know, our equivalent 1120 00:53:59.320 --> 00:54:02.199 of twenty four, when some of these stories start to 1121 00:54:02.280 --> 00:54:06.320 become declassified. Maybe governments and officials declassify these things early 1122 00:54:06.840 --> 00:54:08.320 and tell the real story of how some of this 1123 00:54:08.360 --> 00:54:11.960 stuff happened. Because I will say, remember that word stemorage 1124 00:54:12.119 --> 00:54:13.880 I used if we thought it was bad in this 1125 00:54:14.039 --> 00:54:17.679 kind of twenty ten. When you don't give somebody a voice, 1126 00:54:17.880 --> 00:54:20.400 and you don't defend somebody who's working hard every day, 1127 00:54:21.000 --> 00:54:23.960 I'll just go take Google's five hundred thousand dollars a year, thanks, 1128 00:54:24.000 --> 00:54:26.960 because my civilian pay at ninety six thousand dollars a 1129 00:54:27.079 --> 00:54:28.639 year ain't cutting it. 1130 00:54:28.639 --> 00:54:29.079 Right, right. 1131 00:54:30.239 --> 00:54:33.920 Yeah, And you know, both the CIA and the NSAY 1132 00:54:33.920 --> 00:54:38.079 have this problem of not you know, they don't they'll 1133 00:54:38.119 --> 00:54:41.000 never talk about their victories. They'll never talk about the victories, 1134 00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:44.519 will never you know, air out like things that they've accomplished. 1135 00:54:44.840 --> 00:54:47.880 But when they when somebody does go rogue or somebody 1136 00:54:47.920 --> 00:54:50.920 does something bad or fails, you hear about that. 1137 00:54:51.119 --> 00:54:54.880 So it's easy to see these shady. 1138 00:54:54.559 --> 00:54:59.559 Evil organizations that are secretly, you know, pulling strings all 1139 00:54:59.599 --> 00:55:00.000 over the world. 1140 00:55:00.079 --> 00:55:00.760 World. 1141 00:55:01.039 --> 00:55:02.880 Yeah, and I'll tell you it's what's weird. Is you 1142 00:55:02.920 --> 00:55:05.440 work at a spy agency for about thirteen years, and 1143 00:55:05.480 --> 00:55:09.719 now I appreciate my privacy and transparency more than I've 1144 00:55:09.760 --> 00:55:14.079 ever appreciated. Yeah, but there's also this like again this 1145 00:55:14.199 --> 00:55:18.519 level of like the black and white is always easy. 1146 00:55:18.559 --> 00:55:21.400 It's the gray where things get dicey, right, It's that 1147 00:55:21.920 --> 00:55:25.360 I think about like AI and autonomous cars these days. 1148 00:55:25.400 --> 00:55:27.920 Do I go and you know, make the decision? 1149 00:55:28.039 --> 00:55:28.239 Right? 1150 00:55:28.599 --> 00:55:30.639 Do I take a right and run over three or 1151 00:55:30.639 --> 00:55:32.320 four people? Or do I take a left and run 1152 00:55:32.360 --> 00:55:34.440 over one person? How do you make that decision in 1153 00:55:34.559 --> 00:55:37.320 value life? And it could be you know, one child 1154 00:55:37.400 --> 00:55:39.960 or three ninety year old people. All this logic and 1155 00:55:40.000 --> 00:55:44.199 the reason I'm given this example is national security is 1156 00:55:44.360 --> 00:55:47.960 not one in the black and white. It's one on 1157 00:55:48.039 --> 00:55:51.440 interpreting the gray and trying your best during a crappy 1158 00:55:51.480 --> 00:55:54.480 situation to make the best decision and not regret it 1159 00:55:54.519 --> 00:55:55.920 for the rest of your short life, you know. 1160 00:55:56.320 --> 00:55:59.679 So back to the notion of like lifting the veil 1161 00:55:59.760 --> 00:56:02.079 or wearing the fog a little bit. I'd love to 1162 00:56:02.119 --> 00:56:04.159 ask you, since you were there for a hot minute. 1163 00:56:05.199 --> 00:56:07.719 I think a lot of people, including myself, don't really understand, 1164 00:56:08.000 --> 00:56:09.840 like what is the culture of the NSA. 1165 00:56:09.960 --> 00:56:11.599 What is it like to actually work there? 1166 00:56:11.639 --> 00:56:14.000 Who are your colleagues, the type of people that you're 1167 00:56:14.039 --> 00:56:14.679 working around. 1168 00:56:15.400 --> 00:56:17.519 So, I mean, this is the fun stuff about these 1169 00:56:17.519 --> 00:56:20.079 big agencies, right, And we haven't even talked people forget 1170 00:56:20.119 --> 00:56:21.760 that the US has like I don't know, what is it, 1171 00:56:21.880 --> 00:56:23.360 sixteen eighteen different. 1172 00:56:23.079 --> 00:56:25.440 Intelligence agencies, right, yeah, even. 1173 00:56:25.239 --> 00:56:27.760 Treasury has like some type you know, a work. But 1174 00:56:27.840 --> 00:56:29.280 the part that I'm getting at is that the big 1175 00:56:29.280 --> 00:56:31.559 ones you get the whole spectrum. 1176 00:56:31.639 --> 00:56:31.840 Right. 1177 00:56:31.880 --> 00:56:34.480 You get some people that are top level operators, and 1178 00:56:34.559 --> 00:56:36.760 you get some people at NSA who are janitors. 1179 00:56:36.840 --> 00:56:37.079 Right. 1180 00:56:37.159 --> 00:56:38.039 They they'll go. 1181 00:56:38.039 --> 00:56:40.800 Out and tout and you know, stolen valor and everything 1182 00:56:40.800 --> 00:56:42.920 else about how cool they were at NSA. But it's 1183 00:56:42.960 --> 00:56:45.440 like you weren't in the thick of it, and so 1184 00:56:45.719 --> 00:56:48.679 you can imagine you get all shapes, just like in life, 1185 00:56:48.719 --> 00:56:51.559 just at like any type of you know, career. But 1186 00:56:51.719 --> 00:56:54.239 the one thing that seemed to drive everybody together was 1187 00:56:54.360 --> 00:56:57.639 understanding that like, if you mess up the things that 1188 00:56:57.679 --> 00:57:01.960 we appreciate, right, true, freedom, true, just being good to people, 1189 00:57:02.000 --> 00:57:04.920 Screw politics and how you lean, Like I don't care 1190 00:57:04.960 --> 00:57:06.880 which way you lean. People love the smell of a 1191 00:57:06.880 --> 00:57:08.519 neighbor's good smelling barbecue. 1192 00:57:08.679 --> 00:57:08.800 Right. 1193 00:57:08.880 --> 00:57:11.079 We also hate paying taxes. I hate getting a red 1194 00:57:11.159 --> 00:57:13.639 light ticket. We all share way more that like unites 1195 00:57:13.679 --> 00:57:16.199 us than divides us. And I would actually describe that 1196 00:57:16.400 --> 00:57:18.360 was the era that I got to grow up in 1197 00:57:18.360 --> 00:57:22.400 the intelligence community. Didn't matter whether it's political, it was just, 1198 00:57:22.639 --> 00:57:27.119 oh my gosh, democracy is fragile. People forget the US. 1199 00:57:27.199 --> 00:57:29.840 It's only a couple hundred years old, like we are 1200 00:57:29.880 --> 00:57:32.280 a footnote. Like I remember the first place that I 1201 00:57:32.360 --> 00:57:35.280 lived in England in my duty station. The house that 1202 00:57:35.320 --> 00:57:38.000 I lived in was one hundred years older than the US. 1203 00:57:38.360 --> 00:57:41.400 That's a perplexing thing. And I think people forget like 1204 00:57:42.360 --> 00:57:44.719 if you don't just unite behind the like you know, 1205 00:57:44.760 --> 00:57:46.960 I'm not talking with DEI stuff, but like belonging, just 1206 00:57:47.039 --> 00:57:49.280 carrying around a mission that this thing that we love, 1207 00:57:49.320 --> 00:57:52.679 which is freedom, could go away, like it'll disappear. 1208 00:57:52.840 --> 00:57:54.000 And so I liked it. 1209 00:57:54.079 --> 00:57:57.280 I really was felt good. And all the different things 1210 00:57:57.360 --> 00:57:59.599 that outside of work divided people at work, it was 1211 00:57:59.639 --> 00:58:03.639 just like mission, mission, mission, get shit done. 1212 00:58:04.239 --> 00:58:07.119 I've heard well, first off, I've heard stories about D 1213 00:58:07.199 --> 00:58:08.960 and D games down in the cafeteria. 1214 00:58:09.960 --> 00:58:12.800 Ooh, so you you've done some digging here, and then 1215 00:58:13.000 --> 00:58:15.199 the question is what cafeteria. 1216 00:58:14.719 --> 00:58:16.239 Right, I don't know that. 1217 00:58:16.679 --> 00:58:17.159 I don't know. 1218 00:58:17.960 --> 00:58:20.519 OPS two has a different cafeteria than R and E. 1219 00:58:20.800 --> 00:58:22.760 So this is for anybody who's been in the buildings, 1220 00:58:22.840 --> 00:58:25.239 knows that there's a different level of geek. 1221 00:58:25.320 --> 00:58:27.039 Right, are you the neck beard geek? 1222 00:58:27.320 --> 00:58:29.880 Right it does math or are you more of like 1223 00:58:29.920 --> 00:58:32.639 the modern cyber like there's different levels of you know, 1224 00:58:32.679 --> 00:58:35.519 geek versus nerds. So, but you are right, it's a 1225 00:58:35.559 --> 00:58:39.559 pretty broad spectrum from your type A personalities. I used 1226 00:58:39.599 --> 00:58:41.239 to be a lot quieter. It turns out you can't 1227 00:58:41.280 --> 00:58:43.679 be a very good CEO if you can't storytell. I 1228 00:58:43.719 --> 00:58:47.440 had to learn that skill. And so what I'm talking 1229 00:58:47.440 --> 00:58:51.679 about is all walks of life, all race, all nationality, spicy, 1230 00:58:51.880 --> 00:58:54.400 too very timid. And it turns out some of the 1231 00:58:54.400 --> 00:58:57.639 people that you expect, like some of the biggest badasses 1232 00:58:57.679 --> 00:58:59.440 I ever worked with I can think of. I only 1233 00:58:59.440 --> 00:59:02.119 had probably two or three women coworkers, but I think 1234 00:59:02.159 --> 00:59:04.559 they had like something to prove, like they really had 1235 00:59:04.559 --> 00:59:05.599 their whole career to prove. 1236 00:59:05.880 --> 00:59:07.519 So some of the most competent people. 1237 00:59:07.320 --> 00:59:10.760 I work with were actually like hardcore math and computer 1238 00:59:10.840 --> 00:59:14.880 science women and that was sometimes intimidating. You don't have 1239 00:59:14.960 --> 00:59:18.360 that in the physical like you know, if you think 1240 00:59:18.360 --> 00:59:21.159 of like operator life, you guys are going to be 1241 00:59:21.199 --> 00:59:24.039 able to drag somebody heavier most of the time, ninety 1242 00:59:24.079 --> 00:59:26.199 percent of the time just because of like physicality. 1243 00:59:26.719 --> 00:59:29.679 It's a little intimidating when you have someone. 1244 00:59:29.480 --> 00:59:33.480 Five 't two crush your soul, right because they're just 1245 00:59:33.559 --> 00:59:35.920 that much better, because this is about mental mind power 1246 00:59:35.920 --> 00:59:38.920 and not the physicality that like testosterone and stuff separates. 1247 00:59:38.960 --> 00:59:41.800 So I'll tell you it was a cool place to 1248 00:59:41.840 --> 00:59:45.559 even be humbled real freaking quick, because I have a 1249 00:59:45.559 --> 00:59:48.599 cool resume. I will tell you I still only for 1250 00:59:48.800 --> 00:59:51.079 you know, fit in probably the top eighty percent, there's 1251 00:59:51.119 --> 00:59:54.000 about another twenty percent who could wreck me. They probably 1252 00:59:54.000 --> 00:59:56.400 can't communicate the same way I can, right, but from 1253 00:59:56.480 --> 00:59:59.519 skill to skill they'll wreck me, right, And you. 1254 00:59:59.480 --> 01:00:01.320 Know, and that's I think that is one of the 1255 01:00:01.360 --> 01:00:04.639 interesting things about you know, like in Range of Battalion, 1256 01:00:04.639 --> 01:00:06.800 they should say there are smart rangers and there are 1257 01:00:06.840 --> 01:00:11.039 strong rangers, right, So you know this idea, and it's 1258 01:00:11.079 --> 01:00:14.480 interesting that in in this cyber world and this you 1259 01:00:14.519 --> 01:00:17.760 know that like you say, there's there's this percent that 1260 01:00:19.000 --> 01:00:22.400 they they're their ability to interact with other humans, Like 1261 01:00:23.360 --> 01:00:26.639 it's like it's best if they have like a translator 1262 01:00:26.800 --> 01:00:29.880 a lot of times probably right, somebody who gets what 1263 01:00:29.920 --> 01:00:32.599 they're saying and you know gets this. 1264 01:00:33.039 --> 01:00:34.119 Being a true nerd. 1265 01:00:34.159 --> 01:00:36.320 We used to call it a middleware, that a middle 1266 01:00:36.400 --> 01:00:38.920 layer that like, okay, people that need to understand what 1267 01:00:38.960 --> 01:00:43.199 they're talking in a translation layer between you know, geek dashk, right, 1268 01:00:43.440 --> 01:00:44.559 do you sometimes need that? 1269 01:00:45.119 --> 01:00:49.239 But you know, the idea that there is this place 1270 01:00:49.480 --> 01:00:54.199 in our government security structure for these very brilliant people 1271 01:00:54.199 --> 01:00:58.320 who again may not you know, be great at dealing 1272 01:00:58.360 --> 01:01:01.199 with people, but they're really good at their job. 1273 01:01:01.920 --> 01:01:04.679 And they care, which is funny, Like it's so weird 1274 01:01:04.719 --> 01:01:07.079 when you hear about like I'm not a big polarizing 1275 01:01:07.119 --> 01:01:09.559 fan of anything, and the reason for it is there's 1276 01:01:09.559 --> 01:01:12.840 always something bigger, there's a bigger mission, right. I think 1277 01:01:12.840 --> 01:01:15.400 that's a dope place though, when you're like, whoa this 1278 01:01:15.480 --> 01:01:18.159 person that I probably on the outside would never go 1279 01:01:18.280 --> 01:01:21.280 like drink beers with or whatever, is literally in the 1280 01:01:21.320 --> 01:01:23.920 same trenches with me, fighting the same war. It's a 1281 01:01:23.920 --> 01:01:28.840 again coming from military that had deployment skills, coming into 1282 01:01:28.960 --> 01:01:31.920 the intelligence community where it comes in all shapes and forms. 1283 01:01:32.440 --> 01:01:35.559 It was like both I said earlier, humbling, but also 1284 01:01:35.639 --> 01:01:38.159 kind of like it definitely helped me be a better 1285 01:01:38.239 --> 01:01:40.280 dad to understand like kids come in all shapes and 1286 01:01:40.320 --> 01:01:42.880 forms as well, and it made me maybe a little 1287 01:01:42.920 --> 01:01:46.840 bit more appreciative of like, you better watch out because somebody, 1288 01:01:46.880 --> 01:01:49.199 for instance, that might not you know, be able to 1289 01:01:49.199 --> 01:01:51.360 take me in a game of beer pong or be 1290 01:01:51.440 --> 01:01:54.960 able to run sprints with me, might just run me 1291 01:01:55.039 --> 01:01:57.440 under the ground because their brain is like a ten 1292 01:01:57.480 --> 01:01:58.039 pound brain. 1293 01:01:58.159 --> 01:01:59.320 Yeah, yeah, they'll. 1294 01:01:59.159 --> 01:02:00.280 Turn your lights off night. 1295 01:02:00.679 --> 01:02:03.519 I've met a few of those, those five hundred pound brains. 1296 01:02:03.519 --> 01:02:06.239 And yeah, it's interesting you put it like that, because 1297 01:02:07.000 --> 01:02:09.159 I thank god that there are these people out there 1298 01:02:09.159 --> 01:02:11.760 who are so much smarter than I am, but they're 1299 01:02:11.800 --> 01:02:14.719 also super patriotic, like they're on our side. 1300 01:02:14.599 --> 01:02:15.840 Yeah, thank god for that. 1301 01:02:16.199 --> 01:02:20.320 Yeah, what what is you know? Could you mentioned this 1302 01:02:20.320 --> 01:02:27.199 this idea of this this evolution into the this attack mentality, 1303 01:02:27.880 --> 01:02:30.639 And I'm sure that there are people who were like, well, 1304 01:02:30.639 --> 01:02:32.840 if we have the espionage, if we have the placement, 1305 01:02:32.920 --> 01:02:34.639 why are we gonna why are we going to attack 1306 01:02:34.679 --> 01:02:36.199 and let them know we have the placement? 1307 01:02:36.760 --> 01:02:39.320 But but then there are other people probably like hey. 1308 01:02:39.480 --> 01:02:42.559 Like yeah, an espionage, there's that whole thing of like 1309 01:02:43.199 --> 01:02:45.199 then they'll know that we know that, they know that 1310 01:02:45.199 --> 01:02:45.719 we knowed. 1311 01:02:45.679 --> 01:02:51.079 Right lately, what are the pros and cons of attack? 1312 01:02:52.039 --> 01:02:54.480 Yeah, David, one of the best cases I remember, and 1313 01:02:54.519 --> 01:02:57.480 this was again humbling, and it was more human actually 1314 01:02:57.519 --> 01:03:00.800 than cyber. But it's the same mentality. I remember us 1315 01:03:00.840 --> 01:03:05.760 having intel that was ID related, you know, roadside bomb 1316 01:03:05.840 --> 01:03:11.599 type scenario and exposing the road side bomb that could 1317 01:03:11.679 --> 01:03:15.000 save not necessarily us, but maybe like it could be 1318 01:03:15.199 --> 01:03:19.360 second third party ally definitely civilians and if you gave 1319 01:03:19.440 --> 01:03:22.320 that up, could prevent us from you know, at the time, 1320 01:03:22.360 --> 01:03:26.760 it has always been lod and related. That math is 1321 01:03:26.880 --> 01:03:30.320 like it's like I don't know, Like today I don't 1322 01:03:30.360 --> 01:03:31.079 have I've. 1323 01:03:30.920 --> 01:03:33.119 Been really lucky not have any form of PTSD. 1324 01:03:33.599 --> 01:03:35.920 But the closest thing that I had was that type 1325 01:03:35.960 --> 01:03:38.679 of scenario where you're literally measuring trade offs. 1326 01:03:38.440 --> 01:03:41.559 In whose life is more valuable. 1327 01:03:41.599 --> 01:03:43.960 And I'll tell you it also like when you create 1328 01:03:44.000 --> 01:03:46.400 attack tools that you were talking about this new world. 1329 01:03:47.000 --> 01:03:50.000 I remember the first person the first time somebody said, Okay, 1330 01:03:50.000 --> 01:03:52.480 I appreciate you doing your work with the espionage. 1331 01:03:52.760 --> 01:03:54.480 You don't have to create an uninstaller. 1332 01:03:55.760 --> 01:03:58.320 And I thought, I have to uninstall my malware, right, 1333 01:03:58.360 --> 01:03:59.599 and they said, no, don't worry, it's going to be 1334 01:03:59.639 --> 01:04:04.320 kinetic uninstalled. That's a moment that humbled the shit out 1335 01:04:04.320 --> 01:04:07.960 of me because you're starting to realize that, oh, because 1336 01:04:08.000 --> 01:04:11.679 of me doing my job, just like anywhere else, bombs on, 1337 01:04:11.760 --> 01:04:13.880 bad guys get dropped. It's kind of similar to like, 1338 01:04:13.960 --> 01:04:15.760 you know the folks in Las Vegas that are flying 1339 01:04:15.840 --> 01:04:20.119 drones right that still get PTSD even though they're thousands 1340 01:04:20.119 --> 01:04:22.760 of miles away from any sort of battlefield in combat. 1341 01:04:22.960 --> 01:04:25.480 And I didn't have anything like that, but I remember 1342 01:04:25.519 --> 01:04:29.199 those moments that I thought, oh, I didn't gather the 1343 01:04:29.280 --> 01:04:31.480 intelligence and people blew up that day. 1344 01:04:31.559 --> 01:04:33.719 Like that's also like a really, that's. 1345 01:04:33.599 --> 01:04:37.719 That's the analyst PTSD that those folks get, right. 1346 01:04:37.760 --> 01:04:38.880 Why didn't I see that? 1347 01:04:38.920 --> 01:04:39.079 Well? 1348 01:04:39.079 --> 01:04:40.960 And it's like it's like when you have you know, 1349 01:04:41.039 --> 01:04:43.880 when you have a low level uh you know, you 1350 01:04:43.880 --> 01:04:47.079 you have this, You've identified this low level AQ guy 1351 01:04:47.559 --> 01:04:49.840 and you're like, all right, if we roll him up, 1352 01:04:50.119 --> 01:04:52.760 we lose access to anything he has. But if we 1353 01:04:52.840 --> 01:04:55.000 leave him out there, he might kill innocent people. 1354 01:04:55.280 --> 01:04:58.079 And it's that dilemma is that. 1355 01:04:58.280 --> 01:05:00.519 And I don't think I mean, I really don't think 1356 01:05:00.679 --> 01:05:03.039 enough actually gets talked about that because I think in 1357 01:05:03.079 --> 01:05:06.719 the movies, right, you watch any born identity type, you 1358 01:05:06.840 --> 01:05:09.039 just think that it's go, go go, But like people 1359 01:05:09.079 --> 01:05:12.039 don't realize there's a lot of like calculator risk, and 1360 01:05:12.119 --> 01:05:14.320 even worse than the calculator risks. Sometimes you just have 1361 01:05:14.360 --> 01:05:16.800 to make a decision very quick and hope that when 1362 01:05:16.800 --> 01:05:18.519 you're not in the black or in the white, those 1363 01:05:18.519 --> 01:05:21.519 are easy decisions. You'll later have to hope you got 1364 01:05:21.519 --> 01:05:24.320 it right in this like semi dark shade of gray. 1365 01:05:25.039 --> 01:05:28.039 I just I again, I think that some of the 1366 01:05:28.079 --> 01:05:30.639 better side of stories that will come out, Like you know, 1367 01:05:31.039 --> 01:05:33.199 growing up, I idolize the black Hawk. 1368 01:05:33.039 --> 01:05:35.239 Down stories and the things that were very physical. 1369 01:05:35.559 --> 01:05:37.920 I was a big fan of like Platoon, right, the 1370 01:05:38.079 --> 01:05:40.679 you know, the military stories that were all, you know, 1371 01:05:41.920 --> 01:05:45.719 all testosterone. And I think the stories that probably need 1372 01:05:45.760 --> 01:05:48.360 to come out, especially as we're starting to realize like 1373 01:05:48.440 --> 01:05:53.159 mental health directly has a relation to like people's peak performance. Right, 1374 01:05:53.360 --> 01:05:55.559 I don't think people normalize these things well enough. I 1375 01:05:55.559 --> 01:05:57.840 don't think that we normalize like how much goes down 1376 01:05:57.920 --> 01:06:01.400 like you called it the analyst trauma, right, But even 1377 01:06:01.480 --> 01:06:05.199 just things in business, right, people forget there's like real 1378 01:06:05.320 --> 01:06:08.559 good humans behind these things that then go home and 1379 01:06:08.639 --> 01:06:10.639 have to like smile to their family because it's no 1380 01:06:10.719 --> 01:06:12.480 such agency and like how is work? 1381 01:06:12.519 --> 01:06:13.039 I was good? 1382 01:06:13.440 --> 01:06:17.159 Yeah, yeah, yeah, speaking of that, you know, I know 1383 01:06:17.280 --> 01:06:19.559 you had mentioned to us before the show. I think 1384 01:06:19.559 --> 01:06:22.320 that you put some things through public review and so 1385 01:06:22.360 --> 01:06:23.400 on to make sure they're. 1386 01:06:23.280 --> 01:06:23.960 Yeah, good to go. 1387 01:06:24.639 --> 01:06:27.519 Are there any like war stories from NSA that you're 1388 01:06:27.519 --> 01:06:28.159 allowed to tell? 1389 01:06:29.000 --> 01:06:31.559 I will tell you some of the best NSA stories 1390 01:06:31.599 --> 01:06:34.760 that you know. The thing about NSA, right is there's 1391 01:06:34.800 --> 01:06:37.199 a lot that can make it through pre publication. It's 1392 01:06:37.360 --> 01:06:39.400 usually how was it collected? 1393 01:06:39.559 --> 01:06:43.079 Who is it collected by? What the overall measurable effect? 1394 01:06:43.599 --> 01:06:45.800 And it turns out some of the moments, like I'll 1395 01:06:45.800 --> 01:06:49.039 tell you, like NSA stories, we were so compartmented. People 1396 01:06:49.079 --> 01:06:55.119 don't realize how compartmented truly tailored operations are. I would 1397 01:06:55.159 --> 01:06:57.639 like my co founders, all three of us worked NSA together. 1398 01:06:57.960 --> 01:07:01.039 I remember we were all on different access pro none 1399 01:07:01.039 --> 01:07:02.800 of us knew what we did, and I remember a 1400 01:07:02.800 --> 01:07:07.159 moment I still to this day don't know if it's classified, unclassified, 1401 01:07:07.440 --> 01:07:10.519 just completely happenstance. But all three of my co founders 1402 01:07:10.519 --> 01:07:13.000 and I are sitting at a bar or busing and 1403 01:07:13.039 --> 01:07:15.480 we look and it has like a country that has 1404 01:07:15.519 --> 01:07:19.239 a nationwide internet outage, and all three of us look 1405 01:07:19.280 --> 01:07:21.719 at each other trying to see if anybody will give 1406 01:07:21.719 --> 01:07:25.159 a drive that no wordy breaks anything. And to this 1407 01:07:25.320 --> 01:07:27.719 day I still don't know, did like some cable come 1408 01:07:27.760 --> 01:07:30.320 and plugged, did they have a power outage or was 1409 01:07:30.360 --> 01:07:33.679 this an accidental like intelligence gathering operation that took down 1410 01:07:33.800 --> 01:07:34.599 like a core router. 1411 01:07:34.760 --> 01:07:36.159 I still don't know to these days. 1412 01:07:36.280 --> 01:07:38.599 Yeah, So I think those are the best stories of 1413 01:07:38.719 --> 01:07:42.400 like not what you did. But people don't realize to 1414 01:07:42.480 --> 01:07:45.920 truly protect secrets, you need to keep small amounts of 1415 01:07:45.960 --> 01:07:49.199 people knowing them. And the downfall of that is I 1416 01:07:49.639 --> 01:07:52.360 my best friends in life, I still don't know to 1417 01:07:52.400 --> 01:07:55.679 this day they could have been directly responsible or just 1418 01:07:55.719 --> 01:07:57.920 as clueless as I, And I think those are probably 1419 01:07:57.920 --> 01:08:01.199 the best stories that maybe when forty fifty years gets 1420 01:08:01.519 --> 01:08:04.039 done and people start declassifying, we'll go back and read 1421 01:08:04.079 --> 01:08:04.559 these things. 1422 01:08:05.000 --> 01:08:06.400 But I think that's actually. 1423 01:08:06.159 --> 01:08:09.199 The camaraderie that I love, is the sometimes. 1424 01:08:08.679 --> 01:08:12.239 Not knowing what are these are like SAPs that like 1425 01:08:12.320 --> 01:08:14.920 thirty people in the entire world are revolt. 1426 01:08:14.760 --> 01:08:16.760 All specials, you know, all the work that we did. 1427 01:08:16.760 --> 01:08:19.359 We're special access programs, so not just only you're in 1428 01:08:19.399 --> 01:08:21.199 a skiff, not just your top secret. 1429 01:08:21.359 --> 01:08:22.960 But they are so limited. 1430 01:08:23.239 --> 01:08:25.840 I mean we sometimes like if anybody's done the research 1431 01:08:25.880 --> 01:08:28.199 on what an ODA is or an a team in 1432 01:08:28.239 --> 01:08:31.199 the special forces world, you're talking twelve sometimes you know, 1433 01:08:31.239 --> 01:08:34.520 twelve person teams that subdivide into six person teams. I 1434 01:08:34.560 --> 01:08:37.279 was on programs where sometimes it was six people. 1435 01:08:39.359 --> 01:08:41.199 That's intense when you. 1436 01:08:41.239 --> 01:08:43.640 Like, you know, I even think to this day of 1437 01:08:43.800 --> 01:08:46.479 like how do these stories will they ever get told? 1438 01:08:46.520 --> 01:08:48.000 Like what if people pass? Right? 1439 01:08:48.119 --> 01:08:50.520 Yeah, all stories need to be told, But I think 1440 01:08:50.560 --> 01:08:54.479 nowadays there's a lot of maybe even overclassification that I 1441 01:08:54.640 --> 01:08:56.600 learned a lot from what we used to do with 1442 01:08:56.840 --> 01:09:00.880 like espionage in Vietnam and even during like a desert storm, 1443 01:09:00.920 --> 01:09:04.279 desert shield, And I don't know if those stories will 1444 01:09:04.279 --> 01:09:07.680 be told fast forward in twenty five years, because sometimes 1445 01:09:07.680 --> 01:09:11.239 they're so limited and so targeted that people just might 1446 01:09:11.279 --> 01:09:11.600 not be. 1447 01:09:11.560 --> 01:09:12.479 Around to tell them. 1448 01:09:12.720 --> 01:09:15.560 Do you think that leads to another type of stress? 1449 01:09:15.640 --> 01:09:18.520 We talked about it a little bit. But I've kind 1450 01:09:18.520 --> 01:09:21.600 of noticed on the military side of things, when you 1451 01:09:21.640 --> 01:09:24.359 have these SAPs, like you mentioned, only six people on 1452 01:09:24.399 --> 01:09:27.479 the program, there's only six people in the entire world 1453 01:09:27.520 --> 01:09:30.319 that can do that very important job. One of them 1454 01:09:30.359 --> 01:09:32.640 gets sick, one of them goes to you know, his 1455 01:09:32.720 --> 01:09:33.800 wife is having a baby. 1456 01:09:34.279 --> 01:09:36.079 Then you're even more shorthanded. 1457 01:09:36.119 --> 01:09:37.760 I mean, does that lead to a different type of 1458 01:09:37.800 --> 01:09:39.640 like stress, like and burnout? 1459 01:09:39.680 --> 01:09:40.800 Really is what I'm getting at. 1460 01:09:41.560 --> 01:09:44.640 Yeah, I think these type of things, like you're just 1461 01:09:44.680 --> 01:09:47.960 asking people to do unnatural things. Right, if you you know, 1462 01:09:48.079 --> 01:09:50.159 think about a sports team, right, any we just have 1463 01:09:50.279 --> 01:09:52.159 the Super Bowl in the US, not long ago, right 1464 01:09:52.279 --> 01:09:57.359 for NFL football, American football, there's always two or three 1465 01:09:57.399 --> 01:10:00.600 strings of you know, quarterbacks, reivers. 1466 01:10:01.199 --> 01:10:03.119 When you don't have that, not only do you. 1467 01:10:03.119 --> 01:10:05.560 Have to have like that depth to be able to 1468 01:10:05.600 --> 01:10:06.760 still get the mission done. 1469 01:10:07.520 --> 01:10:08.800 It's just asking a lot. 1470 01:10:08.880 --> 01:10:11.399 I actually think some of my most unhealthy work life 1471 01:10:11.399 --> 01:10:15.199 balance was during these times where I just now look 1472 01:10:15.239 --> 01:10:17.640 at it. You know, my company's now five hundred people. 1473 01:10:17.800 --> 01:10:21.039 I pride not having tiny you know, people who can't 1474 01:10:21.079 --> 01:10:21.319 do it. 1475 01:10:21.680 --> 01:10:22.880 I call it the bus factor. 1476 01:10:22.960 --> 01:10:24.800 Right, how many people at my company can get hit 1477 01:10:24.840 --> 01:10:26.279 and the mission still gets going, you know. 1478 01:10:26.239 --> 01:10:27.720 Run over by the bus. Yeah. 1479 01:10:27.720 --> 01:10:29.680 And I actually think in some of these places that 1480 01:10:29.720 --> 01:10:32.079 we were so small we didn't even know we were 1481 01:10:32.079 --> 01:10:34.560 creating stress because we're having to do the jobs of 1482 01:10:34.600 --> 01:10:37.720 not just one, but like, oh, if this falls, I 1483 01:10:37.840 --> 01:10:40.000 better be able to do at least sixty eighty percent 1484 01:10:40.039 --> 01:10:42.640 of that, so the mission still gets done. So I 1485 01:10:42.680 --> 01:10:45.359 don't think I've ever heard anybody publicly talk about that, 1486 01:10:45.840 --> 01:10:48.319 but I bet that happens. I know I felt it 1487 01:10:48.399 --> 01:10:49.880 over extended, is what I felt. 1488 01:10:50.039 --> 01:10:52.479 You know, the other thing in addition to that, because 1489 01:10:52.479 --> 01:10:54.319 you've talked about post amount of stress, and you've talked 1490 01:10:54.319 --> 01:10:58.520 about the camaraderie, but in addition to that is that 1491 01:10:59.640 --> 01:11:05.239 you know our friends, the cammaderie that we build, those 1492 01:11:05.319 --> 01:11:08.439 ties that bind us. When you walk out of that sat, 1493 01:11:08.479 --> 01:11:13.239 when you get read off, you lose something with those friends, 1494 01:11:13.239 --> 01:11:15.279 Like you can still hang out, you can still barbecue, 1495 01:11:15.680 --> 01:11:17.439 but you know you're not going to. 1496 01:11:19.000 --> 01:11:22.279 There are limits. Now, there's a barrier. 1497 01:11:22.920 --> 01:11:26.960 And when you leave, especially when you leave a service, 1498 01:11:26.960 --> 01:11:29.680 whether it's the military, the intelligence screen or whatever, and 1499 01:11:29.720 --> 01:11:32.119 you're out in this world where there's not that purpose 1500 01:11:33.079 --> 01:11:35.640 and the post traumatic stress or the operator syndrome and 1501 01:11:35.720 --> 01:11:38.680 all this stuff, and now you're also isolated and you 1502 01:11:38.720 --> 01:11:41.439 can't even really be that close to people who are 1503 01:11:41.479 --> 01:11:44.479 your best friends. I used to be close to them, 1504 01:11:44.479 --> 01:11:47.119 but there's but those walls go up. Once you leave, 1505 01:11:47.159 --> 01:11:47.720 you're gone. 1506 01:11:48.199 --> 01:11:50.560 So my co founder Chris right, he was navy, don't 1507 01:11:50.600 --> 01:11:54.199 judge him. We now have these moments that we talk 1508 01:11:54.239 --> 01:11:56.479 about this. We're like, why did we end up creating Huntress? 1509 01:11:56.560 --> 01:11:58.520 And now that we're ten years in, you know, hindsight's 1510 01:11:58.560 --> 01:12:02.039 always twenty twenty the amount of places that we were like, look, 1511 01:12:02.119 --> 01:12:04.640 we created a place that gave us the same mission 1512 01:12:04.840 --> 01:12:07.560 and the same fulfillment that we had, And so people 1513 01:12:07.800 --> 01:12:10.000 now ask, like the finance people are like, oh, you 1514 01:12:10.079 --> 01:12:11.880 got a big company, You've done these things, but they 1515 01:12:11.880 --> 01:12:14.720 don't realize the most of the motivations. There was some 1516 01:12:14.880 --> 01:12:18.840 very altruistic reasons, but there were some also very selfish 1517 01:12:18.920 --> 01:12:20.920 reasons that I just had to get back into the mission. 1518 01:12:21.199 --> 01:12:22.439 Right. It's almost like. 1519 01:12:23.279 --> 01:12:25.600 I bet there's some sort of like dopamine hit that 1520 01:12:25.680 --> 01:12:28.880 comes that you're addicted to. And I remember even going 1521 01:12:28.920 --> 01:12:31.159 like there's a couple of these like local like bars 1522 01:12:31.199 --> 01:12:34.359 and watering holes not far from NSA that you go 1523 01:12:34.479 --> 01:12:36.079 and you catch up with your friends and you're all 1524 01:12:36.159 --> 01:12:38.279 read out now and there's a little bit of a look. 1525 01:12:38.319 --> 01:12:40.560 You know, nobody's going to disclose classified, but you're kind 1526 01:12:40.560 --> 01:12:42.119 of you look at each other and you're like, okay, 1527 01:12:42.479 --> 01:12:44.159 I can vibe you because we can. You know, we're 1528 01:12:44.199 --> 01:12:48.039 speaking at a level that's you know, nonverbal, right, non physical, 1529 01:12:48.279 --> 01:12:50.479 but you know you kind of just you know, you 1530 01:12:50.560 --> 01:12:53.520 got that gut feeling you're like, okay, I can stay connected. Yeah, 1531 01:12:53.560 --> 01:12:57.000 when I jumped into the civilian world, I felt probably 1532 01:12:57.079 --> 01:13:00.640 as isolated and purposeless as I did. And so and 1533 01:13:00.680 --> 01:13:03.399 what's I'm lucky, Like I've always had some sort of 1534 01:13:03.439 --> 01:13:08.199 sexy flare. I got early cyber special Forces. I don't 1535 01:13:08.199 --> 01:13:10.199 know how the people, like a lot of the operators 1536 01:13:10.199 --> 01:13:12.760 will call, you know, the regular army folks legs, right. 1537 01:13:13.399 --> 01:13:16.039 But those folks there are the folks that didn't get 1538 01:13:16.039 --> 01:13:16.840 that sex appeal. 1539 01:13:16.920 --> 01:13:18.880 They didn't get the intel, they didn't get it. 1540 01:13:19.760 --> 01:13:22.159 I actually think about them a lot of what happens 1541 01:13:22.159 --> 01:13:24.439 when you didn't have that extra high that made all 1542 01:13:24.439 --> 01:13:27.359 this worth it, and you just were serving a mission 1543 01:13:27.399 --> 01:13:28.680 as best as you could. 1544 01:13:28.960 --> 01:13:31.119 And now you definitely don't have it because you don't. 1545 01:13:31.199 --> 01:13:33.239 Like for me, when I have my high highs and 1546 01:13:33.279 --> 01:13:36.079 then low lows, I can always go back and think, ah, 1547 01:13:36.119 --> 01:13:38.600 that roller coaster ride was great, right, right, But what 1548 01:13:38.640 --> 01:13:41.159 if everything was just mediocre and then you leave the 1549 01:13:41.239 --> 01:13:44.119 service and now you're low you don't have these moments 1550 01:13:44.199 --> 01:13:44.840 to reflect on. 1551 01:13:45.039 --> 01:13:46.239 So I don't know. 1552 01:13:46.319 --> 01:13:48.439 I think we're at a really interesting place where both 1553 01:13:48.560 --> 01:13:52.840 armed services, whether it's cyber, whether it's signals intelligence, whether 1554 01:13:52.880 --> 01:13:55.720 it's human intelligence, and just go to fashion kicking doors 1555 01:13:55.760 --> 01:13:58.920 in I bet there's a lot on the psychological side 1556 01:13:58.960 --> 01:14:01.000 we're going to learn now that we're becoming very aware 1557 01:14:01.039 --> 01:14:02.800 that these things have real effects. 1558 01:14:02.800 --> 01:14:03.920 Twenty thirty years later. 1559 01:14:04.039 --> 01:14:05.119 Yeah, I think you're right. 1560 01:14:05.159 --> 01:14:07.640 I mean we're already learning just on like the SOFTE, 1561 01:14:07.800 --> 01:14:10.760 Like we're learning so much about like blast injuries, you know, 1562 01:14:11.239 --> 01:14:14.359 all the door breaches and you know, and you know 1563 01:14:14.399 --> 01:14:17.199 post traumatic stress, like you know, I mean, I'm fifty five, 1564 01:14:17.319 --> 01:14:21.520 so like I remember made for TV movies in the 1565 01:14:21.640 --> 01:14:25.560 seventies about a Vietnam veteran having post traumatic stress and 1566 01:14:25.680 --> 01:14:28.640 losing his mind, like having flashbacks in the office and 1567 01:14:28.720 --> 01:14:31.600 people there are still someings out there who think that's 1568 01:14:31.640 --> 01:14:34.560 what it is, and that you know, they don't understand. 1569 01:14:34.600 --> 01:14:37.239 It comes in all shapes and sizes, from all different 1570 01:14:37.279 --> 01:14:38.159 types of things. 1571 01:14:39.239 --> 01:14:40.840 One of the things the reason why I was asking 1572 01:14:40.840 --> 01:14:43.960 you about how many tools you accessed on a daily basis, 1573 01:14:44.039 --> 01:14:49.560 I have a acquaintance working on a PhD dissertation about 1574 01:14:49.720 --> 01:14:53.359 what that does to a person psychologically. He was really 1575 01:14:53.479 --> 01:14:56.359 he was pointing out that if you're a soldier, let's 1576 01:14:56.359 --> 01:14:59.720 say you're an infantryman, you learn how to shoot an 1577 01:14:59.800 --> 01:15:03.520 m F four M two forty Bravo machine gun, M 1578 01:15:03.520 --> 01:15:07.119 two four nine saw three weapon systems. Maybe if you're 1579 01:15:07.119 --> 01:15:09.439 a sniper, you have a few more weapon systems, maybe 1580 01:15:09.439 --> 01:15:13.640 you have to earn six something like that. But people 1581 01:15:13.720 --> 01:15:16.239 are in the cyber warfare field. You're having to learn 1582 01:15:16.680 --> 01:15:20.640 hundreds of different tools and move between those systems, those 1583 01:15:20.640 --> 01:15:23.199 weapon systems, if you will, on a day to day basis, 1584 01:15:23.199 --> 01:15:26.399 And what does that do to, particularly a young person, 1585 01:15:26.560 --> 01:15:27.199 to their mind. 1586 01:15:27.479 --> 01:15:32.119 And I you know, obviously, you know, it's not ever 1587 01:15:32.159 --> 01:15:34.560 worth joking about any folks that are on any sort 1588 01:15:34.600 --> 01:15:36.840 of a spectrum because like that stuff's real. Some of 1589 01:15:36.880 --> 01:15:38.439 us get hit, you know, in the chest, some of 1590 01:15:38.479 --> 01:15:40.760 us get nicked with the tism, you know, yeah, I 1591 01:15:40.800 --> 01:15:43.319 think about Like I think part of the reason we 1592 01:15:43.399 --> 01:15:47.079 bonded so well from Cyber to some of the operators 1593 01:15:47.399 --> 01:15:52.079 is very specifically. We all had to learn different weapon systems. 1594 01:15:52.079 --> 01:15:54.399 Like I remember first deployment in Afghanistan. None of us 1595 01:15:54.399 --> 01:15:58.479 are shaving everything else. Everybody's using macarovs, AK forty seven's 1596 01:15:58.479 --> 01:16:02.560 and pkams. You don't learn that in basic training, right, 1597 01:16:02.640 --> 01:16:04.800 you don't learn any of that type of stuff. And 1598 01:16:04.880 --> 01:16:08.359 so like that flexibility, and I think they called it 1599 01:16:08.479 --> 01:16:10.399 fluidity at the time, like being able to go fluid 1600 01:16:10.439 --> 01:16:13.239 between different weapons systems on different arms. Learning the basics 1601 01:16:14.279 --> 01:16:16.760 only gets ratcheted up to a level like I remember 1602 01:16:16.760 --> 01:16:18.479 the guys looking and they're like, how do you keep 1603 01:16:18.520 --> 01:16:19.279 track of what to do? 1604 01:16:19.319 --> 01:16:20.479 And I'm like, I don't even know. 1605 01:16:21.000 --> 01:16:23.960 Yeah, I bet there is some real like ramifications, like 1606 01:16:23.960 --> 01:16:27.720 if somebody asked me, quantify the number of pools you've used, Like, 1607 01:16:27.880 --> 01:16:29.960 so I joined in two thousand and three, So what 1608 01:16:29.960 --> 01:16:31.279 would I be at I'd be I guess I would 1609 01:16:31.319 --> 01:16:32.920 be at twenty two years of like some of this 1610 01:16:33.000 --> 01:16:34.359 professional experience. 1611 01:16:34.520 --> 01:16:36.479 Yeah, I don't even know. 1612 01:16:36.600 --> 01:16:37.680 It would be thousands. 1613 01:16:37.800 --> 01:16:40.680 It doesn't even make sense, But I bet there's somewhere that, like, 1614 01:16:41.760 --> 01:16:43.760 if you're not on some sort of like okay with 1615 01:16:43.840 --> 01:16:46.399 the spectrum, and I guess we're all becoming, like with scrolling, 1616 01:16:46.439 --> 01:16:48.720 a little short minded and used to consuming a little 1617 01:16:48.720 --> 01:16:51.319 bit more. But somewhere in there it wears on you. 1618 01:16:51.399 --> 01:16:54.199 So I would be stoked if you actually have those resources. 1619 01:16:54.239 --> 01:16:56.199 I would love to see someone writing the dissertation. 1620 01:16:56.279 --> 01:16:57.239 Also, yeah, I can. 1621 01:16:57.319 --> 01:17:00.720 I can introduce you to that dude and maybe he 1622 01:17:00.760 --> 01:17:03.760 can get it to you when he finishes it. Well, 1623 01:17:04.319 --> 01:17:08.039 you mentioned jumping into the private sector before we jump 1624 01:17:08.199 --> 01:17:11.520 into that. Any final thoughts on NSA that you want 1625 01:17:11.560 --> 01:17:15.439 to talk about before we discuss your transition into the 1626 01:17:15.479 --> 01:17:16.199 private sector. 1627 01:17:17.079 --> 01:17:19.560 I am, you know, if I was to end it 1628 01:17:19.600 --> 01:17:22.760 on there, obviously I'm long removed. I don't carry a 1629 01:17:22.760 --> 01:17:25.760 badge there anymore. But if I was to you know, 1630 01:17:25.880 --> 01:17:28.520 end it with you know, standing on a soapbox, it's 1631 01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:31.640 we owe a lot to folks, just like in the arms, 1632 01:17:31.640 --> 01:17:35.760 services that are okay with be in silent professionals don't forget, 1633 01:17:36.399 --> 01:17:39.479 you know, the typical hero doesn't always look like Jason Bourne. 1634 01:17:39.479 --> 01:17:41.199 It doesn't look like some folks like the three of 1635 01:17:41.279 --> 01:17:42.319 us that can articulate. 1636 01:17:42.800 --> 01:17:44.920 It's kind of really interesting. 1637 01:17:44.479 --> 01:17:48.600 Of like at the future of true peak performance. 1638 01:17:49.600 --> 01:17:51.399 Brain power these days. 1639 01:17:51.079 --> 01:17:53.920 Can actually be the equivalent of top level athlete who 1640 01:17:53.920 --> 01:17:55.000 can bench the most weight. 1641 01:17:55.439 --> 01:17:57.520 So I just would challenge folks to consider that. 1642 01:17:57.600 --> 01:17:59.960 And even though I don't fit that personality for ends, 1643 01:18:01.039 --> 01:18:03.039 I think, I, you know, next time you sit back 1644 01:18:03.079 --> 01:18:05.039 and think about where you want to go, maybe you 1645 01:18:05.039 --> 01:18:08.279 don't fit in the military, don't forget the opportunities you 1646 01:18:08.319 --> 01:18:11.720 have to support you know, national security in different ways, 1647 01:18:11.760 --> 01:18:12.279 even if you. 1648 01:18:12.199 --> 01:18:13.039 Don't fit the mold. 1649 01:18:13.359 --> 01:18:17.119 At least for me, I really enjoyed every bit of it, 1650 01:18:17.199 --> 01:18:20.079 working for all the different types because I'm not a bodybuilder. 1651 01:18:20.439 --> 01:18:23.399 I'm also not you know, quiet, and it was cool 1652 01:18:23.439 --> 01:18:24.560 working with both sides of it. 1653 01:18:24.920 --> 01:18:25.520 That's awesome. 1654 01:18:26.680 --> 01:18:29.840 So what made you decide to transition from you know, 1655 01:18:30.000 --> 01:18:33.079 your leave behind your National Guard and your NSA careers 1656 01:18:33.159 --> 01:18:35.760 essentially into the private sector. I think you said, what 1657 01:18:35.800 --> 01:18:37.720 you had sixteen years in uniform. 1658 01:18:38.439 --> 01:18:40.479 Yeah, so they start thinking about that, I'm only four 1659 01:18:40.560 --> 01:18:42.239 years away. I think I might have had one bad 1660 01:18:42.319 --> 01:18:44.119 year in the Guard because I was a scrub, But 1661 01:18:44.199 --> 01:18:47.119 either way, four or five years very close to like 1662 01:18:47.279 --> 01:18:49.359 a twenty year retirement of some sorts. 1663 01:18:51.680 --> 01:18:53.560 Gosh, you're asking me the spicy question, brother. 1664 01:18:55.439 --> 01:18:59.640 I was pretty pretty upset by not having representation in 1665 01:18:59.640 --> 01:19:02.199 that STU world. I was definitely part of those that 1666 01:19:02.319 --> 01:19:05.920 felt like I had given it all. I had my kids, 1667 01:19:05.960 --> 01:19:08.840 the amount of birthdays I had missed, the amount of things. 1668 01:19:08.600 --> 01:19:09.199 I had given. 1669 01:19:09.760 --> 01:19:13.239 I finally had a moment where I said, Okay, I've 1670 01:19:13.279 --> 01:19:15.520 given all that I can. I need to use my 1671 01:19:15.640 --> 01:19:19.199 skills to give back to a new mission. And I 1672 01:19:19.199 --> 01:19:21.279 think I would have stayed longer if I would have 1673 01:19:21.319 --> 01:19:24.000 had better support, because at that time I had the money. 1674 01:19:24.000 --> 01:19:25.239 Contractor pays, no joke. 1675 01:19:25.319 --> 01:19:29.319 You can make some pretty decent money as a contractor sometimes, 1676 01:19:29.359 --> 01:19:32.600 you know, two two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, stuff 1677 01:19:32.640 --> 01:19:34.920 that you usually can only get on combat pay. That's 1678 01:19:34.960 --> 01:19:37.279 good pay, is a geek, right, Maybe not quite the 1679 01:19:37.319 --> 01:19:39.800 same pay as like a big you know, fortune one 1680 01:19:39.880 --> 01:19:43.800 hundred bay, but that's pretty great government services you know 1681 01:19:43.960 --> 01:19:45.399 pay or government service is. 1682 01:19:46.199 --> 01:19:46.800 But I didn't. 1683 01:19:46.880 --> 01:19:49.199 I didn't have that support. I didn't feel like the 1684 01:19:49.239 --> 01:19:52.640 mission resonated. And to be very frank, I was looking 1685 01:19:52.680 --> 01:19:55.680 at these operations that I was supporting and people forget 1686 01:19:55.760 --> 01:19:58.600 when you're in the military and you're doing intelligence gathering, 1687 01:19:59.159 --> 01:20:01.399 you might be on the same computer with not only 1688 01:20:01.640 --> 01:20:05.600 other nation states, you might be on the same computer 1689 01:20:05.640 --> 01:20:08.359 as a cyber criminal. And so as I pour me 1690 01:20:08.399 --> 01:20:10.479 a little bit of drink here in preparation, I guess 1691 01:20:10.560 --> 01:20:16.640 of this segment as I I knew that there was 1692 01:20:16.760 --> 01:20:19.800 kind of a wave, a tsunami about to come where 1693 01:20:20.000 --> 01:20:24.720 these people were going to go from just spy verspy. 1694 01:20:24.800 --> 01:20:27.399 It dawned on me that we were about to see 1695 01:20:27.399 --> 01:20:32.000 the first billion dollars cybercrime groups. And in twenty fifteen, 1696 01:20:32.039 --> 01:20:34.279 I realized, if I don't help get ahead of this, 1697 01:20:34.920 --> 01:20:37.439 we're going to see some of our most critical infrastructure. 1698 01:20:37.560 --> 01:20:41.680 Like don't think about just water and hospitals and you know, electricity, 1699 01:20:42.560 --> 01:20:46.119 think of like the backbone of world economies. Your fortune 1700 01:20:46.119 --> 01:20:49.079 five hundred, Yeah, that's dope, right, the biggest five hundred 1701 01:20:49.079 --> 01:20:52.439 companies of the world. But the US has thirty three 1702 01:20:52.840 --> 01:20:56.720 million businesses and the vast majority of those are twenty 1703 01:20:56.720 --> 01:20:59.199 five hundred employee companies all the way to the smallest. 1704 01:21:00.000 --> 01:21:02.159 And I realized that nobody was going to be able 1705 01:21:02.159 --> 01:21:05.560 to protect them. When cybercrime said, let's not go whale hunting, right, 1706 01:21:05.640 --> 01:21:08.880 Let's go hunting for like squirrels, rabbits and mice right right. 1707 01:21:08.920 --> 01:21:09.800 And so you can. 1708 01:21:09.720 --> 01:21:12.880 Imagine I'm a little bit bothered by the NSA system. 1709 01:21:13.319 --> 01:21:16.159 I'm getting crusty, I'm missing my kids, right, I'm realizing 1710 01:21:16.199 --> 01:21:19.239 I'm missing life. And I decided, okay, I'm going to 1711 01:21:19.319 --> 01:21:23.199 punch Even at sixteen years, even being this close, I 1712 01:21:23.239 --> 01:21:25.000 had a bigger calling and it was going to be 1713 01:21:25.039 --> 01:21:28.279 protecting not just the one percent of businesses, but the 1714 01:21:28.359 --> 01:21:30.399 ninety nine percent that fall below the enterprise. 1715 01:21:30.439 --> 01:21:31.640 So you can imagine. 1716 01:21:31.960 --> 01:21:34.800 Before before we jump into that, I do want to 1717 01:21:34.840 --> 01:21:37.840 ask you to unpack a little bit the Snowden. 1718 01:21:37.479 --> 01:21:40.720 Issue, yeah, and share share the. 1719 01:21:42.319 --> 01:21:45.800 And you know your claim, your issue, it sounds like, 1720 01:21:45.920 --> 01:21:48.439 was that there was no pushback against it, and so 1721 01:21:48.600 --> 01:21:50.720 I would love to ask you, you know, to give 1722 01:21:50.960 --> 01:21:54.199 the insider point of view. You talked a little bit 1723 01:21:54.199 --> 01:21:57.119 about the importance of following laws and everything, but like, 1724 01:21:57.239 --> 01:22:01.680 what would be as a intelligent professional, what would your 1725 01:22:01.680 --> 01:22:06.079 pushback be against the snow narrative of mass ubiquitous surveillance 1726 01:22:06.119 --> 01:22:07.079 against the American and. 1727 01:22:07.840 --> 01:22:11.880 And the like the argument that he was just a whistleblower. 1728 01:22:12.199 --> 01:22:13.119 Right, yeah. 1729 01:22:13.319 --> 01:22:16.119 Yeah, So we'll break those in two different parts. 1730 01:22:16.199 --> 01:22:16.319 Right. 1731 01:22:16.399 --> 01:22:21.720 The first one is people fuck up. Let's call a 1732 01:22:21.720 --> 01:22:24.920 spade a spade. Anybody can do it. I am not 1733 01:22:25.000 --> 01:22:27.960 a fan of having my personal data leaked by any 1734 01:22:28.199 --> 01:22:31.039 or snooped on by anyone, just the same way at 1735 01:22:31.079 --> 01:22:33.840 Defcon when I would happily call spot the FED against. 1736 01:22:33.600 --> 01:22:35.279 An FBI agenty same guy. 1737 01:22:35.680 --> 01:22:36.439 Yeah. 1738 01:22:36.560 --> 01:22:40.279 So people don't realize sometimes these government agencies collab and 1739 01:22:40.319 --> 01:22:42.439 when you get it wrong. From everything that I've come 1740 01:22:42.479 --> 01:22:44.680 to read in the public news, it sounds like some 1741 01:22:44.760 --> 01:22:47.359 pretty jacked up stuff that should have been fixed. It wasn't, 1742 01:22:47.359 --> 01:22:49.439 by the way, NSA's first mistake. If you go back 1743 01:22:49.439 --> 01:22:52.319 to like the Pike Church Committee type stuff. This is 1744 01:22:52.359 --> 01:22:56.319 not the first time a government agency has done dumb stuff, right, 1745 01:22:57.279 --> 01:22:59.880 But accidents happen, right, and to be able to call like, 1746 01:23:00.399 --> 01:23:04.199 you know, anybody you know, paint with a broad brushstroke. 1747 01:23:05.039 --> 01:23:08.239 I was really surprised to hear some of the people 1748 01:23:08.279 --> 01:23:11.399 that they don't realize. The average Joe does not realize 1749 01:23:11.439 --> 01:23:15.680 how much terrorism, how much abuse of money, and how 1750 01:23:15.720 --> 01:23:19.199 much kind of like world projection, all of our agencies 1751 01:23:19.279 --> 01:23:22.600 do to like keep the daily freedoms we have and 1752 01:23:22.640 --> 01:23:26.399 then to get roasted in the news by and again 1753 01:23:26.520 --> 01:23:28.520 I'll toe the line on this really closely. 1754 01:23:30.479 --> 01:23:32.520 Edward Snowden was an IT administrator. 1755 01:23:33.359 --> 01:23:37.840 Edward Snowden did the good thing that any person, for instance, 1756 01:23:37.880 --> 01:23:39.880 could do, which is, if you find something that is 1757 01:23:39.920 --> 01:23:43.600 truly illegal, you should file an IG complaint and get 1758 01:23:43.640 --> 01:23:47.600 that shit to attention. And if somebody ignores you, you should 1759 01:23:47.640 --> 01:23:50.079 do the most safe version. 1760 01:23:50.520 --> 01:23:53.319 Of whistleblowing right, go to Congress. 1761 01:23:53.359 --> 01:23:56.199 When twenty forty drops, we will see a narrative that 1762 01:23:56.239 --> 01:23:58.159 is very different, and I'll leave it at that, and 1763 01:23:58.199 --> 01:24:00.920 it's one of those that it doesn't match any narrative 1764 01:24:01.119 --> 01:24:04.760 of a Roger Stone film or if I got that 1765 01:24:04.880 --> 01:24:06.000 wrong right, some. 1766 01:24:05.960 --> 01:24:07.119 Of the movies that were on this. 1767 01:24:09.239 --> 01:24:12.359 He's an administrator that if you you know, when the 1768 01:24:12.520 --> 01:24:16.439 actual cards spill and the proof comes out, you'll see 1769 01:24:16.520 --> 01:24:19.479 it's not a hero, a hero in the sense that 1770 01:24:19.560 --> 01:24:21.159 he challenged good things. 1771 01:24:21.279 --> 01:24:22.399 I'm not going to take that away. 1772 01:24:23.920 --> 01:24:26.920 But there's more to any story, and I can't wait 1773 01:24:26.960 --> 01:24:29.119 for that one to become public. And that's as somebody 1774 01:24:29.119 --> 01:24:32.600 who like, maybe from me to you, I left my 1775 01:24:32.720 --> 01:24:37.399 whole career behind because I was so bothered by the 1776 01:24:37.439 --> 01:24:40.479 bigger story not coming out. So I'm hoping, and remember, 1777 01:24:40.520 --> 01:24:43.640 any president can declassify this type of stuff. I hope 1778 01:24:43.680 --> 01:24:46.680 we see some of these come public, but I don't know, 1779 01:24:46.800 --> 01:24:49.359 like it doesn't. Some of these stories don't become public. 1780 01:24:49.399 --> 01:24:51.720 And so on my end, it was enough that it 1781 01:24:51.760 --> 01:24:54.920 bothered me that me and enough people to come up 1782 01:24:54.960 --> 01:24:57.039 with an acronym called stemmeradge left. 1783 01:24:57.359 --> 01:24:58.079 Yeah. 1784 01:24:58.479 --> 01:25:03.600 Yeah, and you know, I have no personal inside knowledge 1785 01:25:03.880 --> 01:25:07.520 of that, but my like the way I see it, 1786 01:25:08.239 --> 01:25:12.000 like we can say whistleblower, I you know. 1787 01:25:12.319 --> 01:25:13.479 The guy had. 1788 01:25:14.439 --> 01:25:15.880 I think the guy got like, I don't think he 1789 01:25:16.359 --> 01:25:19.399 knew what he had. He got lucky that there happened 1790 01:25:19.399 --> 01:25:21.960 to be something that was, you know, sort of like 1791 01:25:22.079 --> 01:25:26.560 implicating the US government, but he was really just you. 1792 01:25:26.560 --> 01:25:30.640 Don't you don't accidentally fly to China and then accidentally. 1793 01:25:30.079 --> 01:25:34.520 And right exactly exactly exactly. Yeah. 1794 01:25:34.600 --> 01:25:36.960 And I think the other thing to point out is 1795 01:25:37.000 --> 01:25:41.199 that he didn't just take documents or below the whistle 1796 01:25:41.359 --> 01:25:44.279 on documents about like prism that was the big the 1797 01:25:44.319 --> 01:25:47.840 metadata issue. He took everything from what I understand, he 1798 01:25:47.920 --> 01:25:48.560 took everything. 1799 01:25:48.720 --> 01:25:53.720 Yeah, yeah, yeah, anyway, so you're you're we're right there, 1800 01:25:53.760 --> 01:25:56.920 we're on that knee, respecting like my career and respecting 1801 01:25:56.920 --> 01:25:59.119 that on to end up in handcuffs. But you know, 1802 01:26:00.520 --> 01:26:04.159 when something's a problem, you raise the problem and cause 1803 01:26:04.239 --> 01:26:07.279 the minimal damage as possible. Yeah, if, for instance, you 1804 01:26:07.319 --> 01:26:10.199 are creating maximum damage as a plan to keep you 1805 01:26:10.239 --> 01:26:12.760 out of jail, if what you were doing was ethical 1806 01:26:12.760 --> 01:26:15.399 from the get go, Don't get me wrong, there are 1807 01:26:15.399 --> 01:26:18.359 plenty of cases where good whistleblowers. 1808 01:26:17.560 --> 01:26:20.680 Have been hung to dry. I know this is the gray. 1809 01:26:20.760 --> 01:26:23.600 This isn't black, this isn't white, it's the gray. But 1810 01:26:23.720 --> 01:26:26.560 when the details come out, I hope that these things 1811 01:26:26.560 --> 01:26:29.640 are settled that call a spade is spade, call it 1812 01:26:29.680 --> 01:26:31.720 for all the good, and what I believe will be 1813 01:26:31.760 --> 01:26:34.000 interpreted is all the bad will finally come to roost 1814 01:26:34.039 --> 01:26:38.800 and we'll see like, okay, there's you know, life is complex, 1815 01:26:38.960 --> 01:26:39.920 and I guess you know. 1816 01:26:39.960 --> 01:26:41.319 The biggest thing that I appreciate. 1817 01:26:41.840 --> 01:26:45.399 It seems like that moment actually caused a lot of 1818 01:26:45.439 --> 01:26:50.039 the intelligence communities to realize if they don't have a 1819 01:26:50.279 --> 01:26:53.560 say in the narrative, the narrative will be formed around them, 1820 01:26:53.680 --> 01:26:55.680 and that has consequences. 1821 01:26:55.159 --> 01:26:58.640 Right, right, and not everything's bad is what I'm saying. 1822 01:26:58.760 --> 01:26:59.680 And the problem with. 1823 01:26:59.680 --> 01:27:03.680 That is is is that one it hurts recruitment to it, 1824 01:27:03.880 --> 01:27:07.079 you know, the the public sentiment, which you know may 1825 01:27:07.159 --> 01:27:09.399 or may not matter, but the public sentiment you know 1826 01:27:09.640 --> 01:27:13.960 about you know, these nefarious organizations that are listening to 1827 01:27:14.039 --> 01:27:16.000 our every phone call, Like how many people have to 1828 01:27:16.039 --> 01:27:18.119 work at the NSA to listen to my every phone 1829 01:27:18.119 --> 01:27:18.560 call I make? 1830 01:27:18.680 --> 01:27:18.880 Right? 1831 01:27:20.319 --> 01:27:23.239 Or you know the CIA also, you know, they're they're 1832 01:27:23.319 --> 01:27:25.600 just all over the world, you know, creating coups and 1833 01:27:25.640 --> 01:27:29.600 stuff like that. And it's it when these agencies won't 1834 01:27:29.600 --> 01:27:33.079 stand up for themselves, it hurts them, you know, Yeah, 1835 01:27:33.239 --> 01:27:35.680 it hurts their recruiting, It hurts their their efforts. 1836 01:27:36.760 --> 01:27:37.079 Yeah. 1837 01:27:37.880 --> 01:27:40.720 Yeah, So again I'm I I'm one of those type 1838 01:27:40.720 --> 01:27:43.000 of people that, like, I don't believe you should sit 1839 01:27:43.039 --> 01:27:45.319 on a fence, you should have an opinion, but I 1840 01:27:45.359 --> 01:27:49.600 also acknowledge, like it's not always left or right or 1841 01:27:49.720 --> 01:27:52.439 you know that side or this side right. Some stuff 1842 01:27:52.479 --> 01:27:54.600 is the devil in the details and you can kind 1843 01:27:54.600 --> 01:27:56.880 of only help, you know, and hope that at the 1844 01:27:57.000 --> 01:28:00.119 end you chose the best things. So if you can 1845 01:28:00.119 --> 01:28:04.560 tell enough for me to upend forego retirement and say, 1846 01:28:04.680 --> 01:28:08.159 I appreciate my service, I need to use my skills 1847 01:28:08.159 --> 01:28:11.520 for some other reason, and thankfully like the Service Army 1848 01:28:11.600 --> 01:28:13.279 to be able to do some pretty cool stuff. So 1849 01:28:13.520 --> 01:28:16.720 I can't be completely salty about Edward Snowden, but I 1850 01:28:16.760 --> 01:28:17.880 am ready for the reckoning. 1851 01:28:18.319 --> 01:28:21.439 Yeah yeah, So talk to us about making the jump 1852 01:28:21.479 --> 01:28:23.640 to the private sector and how that worked out for you. 1853 01:28:24.720 --> 01:28:26.880 Can I tell the embarrassing embarrassing. 1854 01:28:26.439 --> 01:28:31.239 Side, absolutely, because all of us have that story about 1855 01:28:31.560 --> 01:28:35.039 leaving governmental service and going into the private sector and 1856 01:28:35.079 --> 01:28:38.279 slamming face first into the ground at least once. 1857 01:28:39.880 --> 01:28:44.239 So all the stuff that made me like successful, right, promotions, early, 1858 01:28:44.680 --> 01:28:49.359 you know, awards, things along those lines. When you decide 1859 01:28:49.359 --> 01:28:51.680 to create a business, you have to go into sales, 1860 01:28:52.479 --> 01:28:55.119 and it turns out I did not have to do 1861 01:28:55.319 --> 01:28:57.760 much sales in the military. You guys would be so 1862 01:28:58.000 --> 01:29:00.960 like disappointed if you, like I've it ever leaked like 1863 01:29:01.000 --> 01:29:03.359 some of my first cold calls and stuff like this, 1864 01:29:04.159 --> 01:29:06.600 I sounded like a dumbass military guy. 1865 01:29:06.680 --> 01:29:09.000 I was at least hat honest, like I think guys. 1866 01:29:09.000 --> 01:29:10.199 The pitch usually went. 1867 01:29:10.079 --> 01:29:14.560 Something like, Hi, my name's Kyle, and I'm a former 1868 01:29:14.600 --> 01:29:17.359 service member and I'm exploring creating a startup, Do you 1869 01:29:17.359 --> 01:29:18.840 have a couple of minutes to like help me, like 1870 01:29:18.880 --> 01:29:21.239 I need help? Like I was always really honest, and 1871 01:29:21.279 --> 01:29:23.359 I found that if I was more honest that people 1872 01:29:23.399 --> 01:29:24.279 wouldn't hang up on. 1873 01:29:24.279 --> 01:29:24.800 Me as much. 1874 01:29:25.840 --> 01:29:28.880 And usually I'd find somebody that was either prior service 1875 01:29:29.000 --> 01:29:30.840 or respect the service. It would give me a little 1876 01:29:30.880 --> 01:29:33.399 bit of time. But Guys, you wouldn't believe, Like when 1877 01:29:33.439 --> 01:29:35.439 I started, I started thinking like I was going to 1878 01:29:35.479 --> 01:29:38.760 be selling to like one or two person companies. Think 1879 01:29:38.760 --> 01:29:41.479 about how many one or two like these little tiny 1880 01:29:41.520 --> 01:29:43.119 micro businesses. 1881 01:29:42.600 --> 01:29:46.720 That are still important. But I didn't know how to 1882 01:29:46.760 --> 01:29:47.399 make money. 1883 01:29:47.479 --> 01:29:50.960 I knew, like how to personally make money and pay bills, 1884 01:29:51.359 --> 01:29:53.039 but I didn't know how to do this at scale. 1885 01:29:53.199 --> 01:29:56.199 And so I am so stink and lucky that like 1886 01:29:56.520 --> 01:29:58.760 the State of Virginia did this program. 1887 01:29:58.840 --> 01:30:02.119 They call it an accelerator. It's pretty much like an MBA. 1888 01:30:02.000 --> 01:30:04.600 In sixteen weeks that teaches you how to build a startup. 1889 01:30:05.119 --> 01:30:06.760 Guys, if I didn't have that. 1890 01:30:06.800 --> 01:30:09.600 Program, one, I wouldn't be celebrating at whatever it is 1891 01:30:09.640 --> 01:30:12.479 now two billion dollar business. But I sure as heck 1892 01:30:14.039 --> 01:30:15.800 I wouldn't have Like I would still be living in 1893 01:30:15.800 --> 01:30:19.079 Maryland in my three bedroom townhouse, thinking about how I 1894 01:30:19.079 --> 01:30:21.159 could use military my military skills. 1895 01:30:21.199 --> 01:30:21.880 It was that bad. 1896 01:30:22.159 --> 01:30:24.439 Yeah, I'm cool. Now I can do these things. 1897 01:30:24.479 --> 01:30:26.720 Now I can pitch confident and I can get over 1898 01:30:26.920 --> 01:30:32.720 like the apost syndrome. But twenty fourteen, twenty fifteen, twenty sixteen, 1899 01:30:33.239 --> 01:30:36.159 these were like my puberty years that I'm just glad 1900 01:30:36.159 --> 01:30:38.279 that there wasn't more camera phones at that time. 1901 01:30:38.319 --> 01:30:41.880 It was that embarrassing what you know, And I think 1902 01:30:41.880 --> 01:30:45.079 that's very common for you know, people who are good 1903 01:30:45.119 --> 01:30:49.119 at something and and all business is sales, right, so 1904 01:30:49.159 --> 01:30:52.640 it's like or like I can make these The acumen 1905 01:30:52.720 --> 01:30:54.640 is yeah I can, or I can make this table, 1906 01:30:54.720 --> 01:30:57.319 but be like the table doesn't sell itself, and I 1907 01:30:57.319 --> 01:30:58.520 don't know how to run the business. 1908 01:31:00.880 --> 01:31:01.640 In addition to. 1909 01:31:01.640 --> 01:31:05.199 Sort of that type of thing, though, how was it 1910 01:31:05.199 --> 01:31:10.199 difficult for you to articulate too a two person business 1911 01:31:10.520 --> 01:31:13.840 who what they know about the Internet is you know, 1912 01:31:13.920 --> 01:31:16.319 plug it, you know, having the cable guy come out, 1913 01:31:16.359 --> 01:31:18.720 plug it in, and you know, to try turning it 1914 01:31:18.760 --> 01:31:20.720 on and off, and you're trying to explain to them 1915 01:31:21.079 --> 01:31:28.039 how their business is potentially at risk of getting ransomware 1916 01:31:28.279 --> 01:31:30.159 or speaking hyper gee right. 1917 01:31:30.199 --> 01:31:32.279 I mean to be honest, I think all careers have this. 1918 01:31:32.439 --> 01:31:34.760 I bet if a firefighter, right, I'm trying to choose 1919 01:31:34.760 --> 01:31:38.479 something that's not that's technical but not too technical. Imagine 1920 01:31:38.479 --> 01:31:41.359 a firefighter having to talk about all the physics things 1921 01:31:41.399 --> 01:31:45.399 that you can smother a fire by spraying, for instance, 1922 01:31:45.439 --> 01:31:48.119 and causing different vacuum Like, no one is going to 1923 01:31:48.239 --> 01:31:51.640 understand that. Must They've seen a video that was me 1924 01:31:51.840 --> 01:31:54.039 in the cyber world talking to people that were just 1925 01:31:54.079 --> 01:31:57.840 like Kyle, I know you have the skills, but if 1926 01:31:57.880 --> 01:32:00.800 you can't learn to talk to me and storytell to 1927 01:32:00.880 --> 01:32:04.319 me on my level, I'm never gonna appreciate what you're doing. 1928 01:32:04.680 --> 01:32:06.760 And thankfully, like the one gift. 1929 01:32:06.520 --> 01:32:08.720 I got was I got a lot of radical candor, 1930 01:32:08.840 --> 01:32:12.199 meaning people who I also got like what some people 1931 01:32:12.239 --> 01:32:14.840 call ruinous empathy, meaning they cared so much about me, 1932 01:32:14.920 --> 01:32:17.319 but weren't willing to challenge me, right, they would just 1933 01:32:17.399 --> 01:32:21.159 not tell me that I suck. Thankfully, it was actually 1934 01:32:21.199 --> 01:32:24.640 a lot of either people that were fan of the 1935 01:32:24.680 --> 01:32:28.279 military or support of the military or prior service that 1936 01:32:28.359 --> 01:32:30.520 would just tell me a spade is a spade and 1937 01:32:30.560 --> 01:32:33.319 be like, Kyle, you suck. I don't know what you're saying, 1938 01:32:33.600 --> 01:32:35.520 can you talk to me, like like tell me, like 1939 01:32:35.560 --> 01:32:39.640 I'm five, what you're doing and enough stumbling by the way, 1940 01:32:39.720 --> 01:32:41.520 like I would rather not fail. 1941 01:32:41.600 --> 01:32:42.359 It's just faster. 1942 01:32:42.760 --> 01:32:44.439 But it turns out if you're going to fail, do 1943 01:32:44.520 --> 01:32:48.359 it really quick and people give you. And so again 1944 01:32:48.680 --> 01:32:51.840 I just was blessed with failure and I had the 1945 01:32:51.880 --> 01:32:54.039 time to, by the way, like this was real early, 1946 01:32:54.520 --> 01:32:56.560 so I got those out of the way. So when 1947 01:32:56.560 --> 01:32:58.640 it came time for me really needing to know this, 1948 01:32:59.359 --> 01:33:01.800 all that military skills of being used to like in 1949 01:33:01.840 --> 01:33:04.479 this fast failing environment, just like a hacker trying to 1950 01:33:04.520 --> 01:33:07.279 break in. Yeah, nine and ninety nine times I fail. 1951 01:33:07.399 --> 01:33:10.479 I don't care. It works on the thousand. That mentality 1952 01:33:10.520 --> 01:33:12.960 helped me. Actually, my hacking skills literally help me be 1953 01:33:13.000 --> 01:33:13.920 a better entrepreneur. 1954 01:33:14.159 --> 01:33:14.960 That's phenomenal. 1955 01:33:15.119 --> 01:33:22.199 The you know Udulu you know, yeah, yep, yeah, it's 1956 01:33:22.199 --> 01:33:25.000 funny you uh so one of our sponsors, I'm going 1957 01:33:25.079 --> 01:33:26.399 to say it because I like the company. 1958 01:33:26.439 --> 01:33:27.199 I like their product. 1959 01:33:27.239 --> 01:33:31.199 What Manscape used to sponsor us, and it's a great company. 1960 01:33:31.239 --> 01:33:33.359 And even though I don't sponsor us anymore, I'd recommend 1961 01:33:33.520 --> 01:33:36.199 everybody get one, but they'd send us copy and we 1962 01:33:36.239 --> 01:33:41.119 see this a lot in copy right that the copy 1963 01:33:41.279 --> 01:33:45.199 like it mentioned like how many RPMs this motor runs 1964 01:33:45.199 --> 01:33:46.760 at the little mansket motor. 1965 01:33:46.880 --> 01:33:49.760 And I'm reing this just like nobody nobody cares about that. 1966 01:33:49.840 --> 01:33:52.479 Actually, that scares me when I if I'm even my junk, right, 1967 01:33:52.880 --> 01:33:55.319 I want to know how many RPMs. I know that 1968 01:33:55.319 --> 01:33:58.119 the guard isn't gonna right, That's what I want to. 1969 01:33:58.079 --> 01:33:59.560 Know, right, you know. 1970 01:33:59.760 --> 01:34:02.159 And and it's like, but it's that type of thing 1971 01:34:02.159 --> 01:34:05.760 that somebody, some engineer who is very proud of getting that, 1972 01:34:05.960 --> 01:34:08.600 you know, the RPM off like got to add this, 1973 01:34:09.479 --> 01:34:11.520 and nobody said, we don't need to add that. 1974 01:34:13.039 --> 01:34:15.520 I mean, that's that's unlocking my fear. I will tell 1975 01:34:15.560 --> 01:34:16.399 you I would. 1976 01:34:17.199 --> 01:34:19.920 There was this analogy my first sale, very first sales 1977 01:34:19.960 --> 01:34:21.960 guy told me. He called it painting Seagulls. 1978 01:34:22.039 --> 01:34:24.520 It was this idea like imagine you've got a beautiful 1979 01:34:24.560 --> 01:34:26.880 family on a beach and they asked you to do 1980 01:34:26.960 --> 01:34:29.479 a portrait. So David, you're you're you're just painting this 1981 01:34:29.560 --> 01:34:32.239 portrait and you're like, man, this sky is missing something. 1982 01:34:32.600 --> 01:34:35.520 I'm going to add some seagulls. That moment right there, 1983 01:34:36.279 --> 01:34:39.800 you are inserting risk. You don't know, maybe that wife 1984 01:34:39.840 --> 01:34:42.960 is terrified as seagulls attacked her when she was six. 1985 01:34:43.479 --> 01:34:47.039 The amount of like sales objections I would immediately add 1986 01:34:47.079 --> 01:34:49.880 by thinking I was being so transparent, right, and I 1987 01:34:49.920 --> 01:34:53.640 wanted to have integrity, I was terrible. I could never 1988 01:34:53.760 --> 01:34:55.720 even get, like in the OODA loop, to the point 1989 01:34:55.720 --> 01:34:58.159 that I was deciding and acting because when I was 1990 01:34:58.159 --> 01:35:00.840 trying to observe an orient and edge kate like, I 1991 01:35:00.880 --> 01:35:02.800 never even got to this point. And so I ended 1992 01:35:02.880 --> 01:35:06.079 up having to learn from my lessons really the hard 1993 01:35:06.079 --> 01:35:10.079 way of how many I just often would add so 1994 01:35:10.239 --> 01:35:13.479 much information that I had sold myself out of the 1995 01:35:13.520 --> 01:35:16.039 deal that if I would have just shut up right right, 1996 01:35:16.119 --> 01:35:18.680 don't tell me about the RPMs next to something that 1997 01:35:18.760 --> 01:35:21.399 I care about. I just want to get the job 1998 01:35:21.479 --> 01:35:22.199 done right. 1999 01:35:23.399 --> 01:35:26.439 So you know you're dealing with you're dealing. 2000 01:35:26.159 --> 01:35:28.920 With like the business side of this with with you know, 2001 01:35:29.399 --> 01:35:35.479 civilians who have a risk. Was there any side of 2002 01:35:35.479 --> 01:35:38.399 the NSA or the military that ever looked at you 2003 01:35:38.479 --> 01:35:39.840 and said, what. 2004 01:35:39.960 --> 01:35:42.039 Exactly are you doing with this business? 2005 01:35:42.079 --> 01:35:45.199 And can you assure us that it in no way 2006 01:35:45.279 --> 01:35:48.000 relates to anything that you were doing with us? 2007 01:35:48.640 --> 01:35:51.000 So I had a little bit during the National Guard 2008 01:35:51.119 --> 01:35:53.800 side where they look. We definitely had to deconflict to 2009 01:35:53.840 --> 01:35:56.640 make sure, Like there's always this problem of like what 2010 01:35:56.800 --> 01:36:01.439 if we as a company find us tradecraft right right right, 2011 01:36:01.479 --> 01:36:05.239 would you burn us tradecraft? I am an elitist, very 2012 01:36:05.319 --> 01:36:09.000 hyper competitive bastard. So my rule of thumb is, I 2013 01:36:09.039 --> 01:36:11.079 don't care who you are if you're weak enough for 2014 01:36:11.159 --> 01:36:11.479 me to. 2015 01:36:11.439 --> 01:36:14.680 Catch you right back harder. Yeah, and that gets around that. 2016 01:36:14.800 --> 01:36:16.840 But I will tell you for a little while, there 2017 01:36:16.920 --> 01:36:19.880 was actually some of that conflict. Like I left the 2018 01:36:19.960 --> 01:36:22.600 service I think in twenty eighteen, but I found a 2019 01:36:22.680 --> 01:36:25.039 Huntress in twenty fifteen, and I had to navigate that 2020 01:36:25.079 --> 01:36:26.640 for about three years. 2021 01:36:26.960 --> 01:36:30.159 Yeah, Ken, you know, you told us a story about, 2022 01:36:30.239 --> 01:36:32.359 you know, falling flat on your face and trying to 2023 01:36:32.399 --> 01:36:33.880 pitch these little businesses and. 2024 01:36:33.840 --> 01:36:35.159 And out working out so great. 2025 01:36:35.479 --> 01:36:38.000 But could you tell us about like the success story, 2026 01:36:38.000 --> 01:36:40.279 a little bit of the aha moment closing your first 2027 01:36:40.279 --> 01:36:43.239 big deal and you know how that came about lessons 2028 01:36:43.319 --> 01:36:43.800 learned from that. 2029 01:36:44.680 --> 01:36:46.800 Yeah, I'm going to give the pitch that I used 2030 01:36:46.840 --> 01:36:49.199 to raise one hundred and fifty million dollars and then 2031 01:36:49.239 --> 01:36:52.079 translate how that pitch happened, and I'll do it very succinct. 2032 01:36:53.199 --> 01:36:56.079 So what I learned from my time at NSA, we 2033 01:36:56.079 --> 01:36:59.319 were a team that believed in using very small compartmented 2034 01:36:59.399 --> 01:37:04.880 teams an insane amount of automation to deliver value. The 2035 01:37:05.000 --> 01:37:08.600 value at that time at NSA was largely finding intelligence 2036 01:37:08.640 --> 01:37:11.560 against our foreign adversaries or saving life in the counter 2037 01:37:11.680 --> 01:37:15.640 terrorism mission. At Huntress, I went and took that same 2038 01:37:15.840 --> 01:37:20.319 very small compartmented teams. I use so much automation to 2039 01:37:20.359 --> 01:37:22.680 be able to bring this product to people that don't 2040 01:37:22.680 --> 01:37:25.479 have the budgets. And the thing we obsess about at 2041 01:37:25.560 --> 01:37:29.840 Huntress is a very small but measurable, valuable thing that 2042 01:37:29.920 --> 01:37:33.359 prevents people from getting wrecked by hackers. That pitch took 2043 01:37:33.399 --> 01:37:36.000 me like nine years to get right. I'm ten years 2044 01:37:36.039 --> 01:37:38.960 into it. That's how new this pitch is. What it 2045 01:37:39.000 --> 01:37:41.439 turned out that I ended up learning is I had 2046 01:37:41.479 --> 01:37:43.680 to get so simple. 2047 01:37:44.319 --> 01:37:46.560 I had to be able to speak in analogies. 2048 01:37:47.039 --> 01:37:49.960 I had to learn that people like to hear the story, 2049 01:37:49.960 --> 01:37:52.760 but they don't sometimes need to hear the seagull in 2050 01:37:52.800 --> 01:37:58.279 the depths. And I iterated on that pitch so freakin' long. 2051 01:37:58.960 --> 01:38:01.560 I think it literally took me four years before I 2052 01:38:01.640 --> 01:38:05.239 had a version of our pitch that actually like resonated 2053 01:38:05.239 --> 01:38:06.520 to the point that people were. 2054 01:38:06.399 --> 01:38:10.319 Giving me cash. So you can imagine, just like. 2055 01:38:10.359 --> 01:38:13.439 The cybersecurity mission I mentioned earlier, it's not like the movies. 2056 01:38:13.520 --> 01:38:17.159 It's usually like months and weeks of like gruesome you know, 2057 01:38:17.319 --> 01:38:20.600 hard work to get two minutes of like success. 2058 01:38:20.199 --> 01:38:21.199 And then you're back at it. 2059 01:38:22.279 --> 01:38:25.479 That prepared me for all the failures that I'll tell you, 2060 01:38:25.520 --> 01:38:29.960 like grit matters. Also, what's that country music selling? Get 2061 01:38:30.039 --> 01:38:31.479 to know when to hold them no wheen to fold. 2062 01:38:31.359 --> 01:38:32.920 Them by Kenny Rogers. 2063 01:38:33.119 --> 01:38:33.720 There you go. 2064 01:38:34.000 --> 01:38:37.640 I was probably foolish enough that at times I probably 2065 01:38:37.640 --> 01:38:40.439 should have folded them, but that grit actually allowed me 2066 01:38:40.479 --> 01:38:42.279 to see it through. So I can't tell you there's 2067 01:38:42.359 --> 01:38:47.000 anyone path for anybody, but for me, I was so 2068 01:38:47.199 --> 01:38:49.079 obsessed by just delivering a. 2069 01:38:49.039 --> 01:38:51.199 Small little bit of value. And we used to do this. 2070 01:38:51.239 --> 01:38:53.359 By the way, in the intelligence world, you don't got 2071 01:38:53.359 --> 01:38:56.479 to get bin laden get this. You know small person 2072 01:38:56.520 --> 01:38:59.000 in AQ right, you know some sort of al qai 2073 01:38:59.079 --> 01:39:01.359 to type personnel that allows you to go to the 2074 01:39:01.399 --> 01:39:03.720 next level, that allows you to go to the next level, 2075 01:39:03.920 --> 01:39:06.000 that that allows you to find family that allows you 2076 01:39:06.039 --> 01:39:07.760 to be able to do the DNA swab, that allows 2077 01:39:07.760 --> 01:39:09.279 you to be able to get into the phone, that 2078 01:39:09.319 --> 01:39:11.479 allows you to find the court courier, that allows you 2079 01:39:11.520 --> 01:39:13.640 to be able to have a team that drops bombs 2080 01:39:13.640 --> 01:39:16.560 on bad guys or breakstores, kicks them down and eliminates terrorists. 2081 01:39:17.119 --> 01:39:20.720 Those were all very small iterative moments, but they all 2082 01:39:20.720 --> 01:39:23.960 built on each other. Right, I don't think people appreciate 2083 01:39:24.159 --> 01:39:28.439 how much you can do that involves small iterative successes. 2084 01:39:28.920 --> 01:39:30.680 Instead of it, we would have just went ten years 2085 01:39:30.760 --> 01:39:34.199 to hatch the master plan, Ben Laden would still be 2086 01:39:34.199 --> 01:39:37.720 alive today. Right, I don't think people are okay with 2087 01:39:37.760 --> 01:39:39.720 that idea. And the one thing I would share with 2088 01:39:39.760 --> 01:39:43.359 the audience that turns out like it's better to not fail. 2089 01:39:43.720 --> 01:39:45.560 But if you're going to fail, fail in a way 2090 01:39:45.600 --> 01:39:47.760 nobody else has done before, and do it quick. 2091 01:39:48.119 --> 01:39:53.000 Yeah, And here's kind of a question for you. 2092 01:39:53.119 --> 01:39:58.359 Like obviously in coding or like not coding, but like 2093 01:39:58.479 --> 01:40:01.159 in hacking or whatever, you probably know when you fail, 2094 01:40:01.319 --> 01:40:03.680 like when you don't get entry, but like in business, 2095 01:40:04.760 --> 01:40:08.520 with these ideas, how how do you know when you failed? 2096 01:40:09.359 --> 01:40:12.800 And how do you know when to keep on? Like pushing. 2097 01:40:14.239 --> 01:40:18.560 I'm giggling, because when you pitch somebody in real life, 2098 01:40:18.760 --> 01:40:21.800 especially like me who's used to this little like you know, 2099 01:40:22.039 --> 01:40:24.279 even Cyber was fairly hyper masculine. 2100 01:40:24.279 --> 01:40:26.920 People only code. It's a lot of dudes, military, a 2101 01:40:26.920 --> 01:40:29.279 lot of dudes. I remember the first time pitching a 2102 01:40:29.880 --> 01:40:34.239 woman CEO and she was like, I have no idea 2103 01:40:34.359 --> 01:40:36.159 what you're talking. I could see it across her face 2104 01:40:36.199 --> 01:40:38.760 before she was even kind enough to tell me, like, 2105 01:40:38.840 --> 01:40:41.199 if you don't have that social awareness and I'll say 2106 01:40:41.239 --> 01:40:43.880 other parts of it, when I started like if I 2107 01:40:43.960 --> 01:40:45.960 missed that social c to be honest, if I was 2108 01:40:46.039 --> 01:40:49.119 like some of my other NSA compatriots and I didn't 2109 01:40:49.159 --> 01:40:52.640 have that, Like it's not just about IQ. Sometimes the 2110 01:40:52.800 --> 01:40:57.359 intelligence right only goes so far and the emotional quotient. 2111 01:40:57.079 --> 01:40:58.399 EQ picks up right. 2112 01:40:59.319 --> 01:41:03.560 If you can't read a room, I dare you to 2113 01:41:03.600 --> 01:41:06.720 start a company and then look back in two years 2114 01:41:06.720 --> 01:41:09.159 and find success, it's just not gonna happen. But I 2115 01:41:09.239 --> 01:41:11.720 was kind of blessed enough with that like middle of 2116 01:41:11.840 --> 01:41:14.199 skills that even when I didn't have it, Like my 2117 01:41:14.239 --> 01:41:16.720 co founder John, he is the quietest guy in the 2118 01:41:16.760 --> 01:41:20.000 room and we'll wreck you. But he couldn't do what 2119 01:41:20.039 --> 01:41:22.479 I do and my co founder, Chris, there's three of us. 2120 01:41:22.960 --> 01:41:25.359 He is when some people talk about what one engineer 2121 01:41:25.399 --> 01:41:27.399 can do, Chris is like a whole He can do 2122 01:41:27.439 --> 01:41:30.359 what one hundred engineers can do. We offset our balances. 2123 01:41:30.359 --> 01:41:32.760 But you remember that whole conversation we brought up earlier 2124 01:41:32.760 --> 01:41:36.800 about like team dynamic and sometimes having the right team, 2125 01:41:37.039 --> 01:41:38.840 and we have to be able to cover each other's 2126 01:41:38.880 --> 01:41:43.600 gaps but also compliment each other's gas. These skills turn 2127 01:41:43.640 --> 01:41:46.880 out like you can change worlds. You can build billion 2128 01:41:46.960 --> 01:41:51.199 dollar companies on the same tactics that six person military 2129 01:41:51.279 --> 01:41:54.600 units or six person intelligence units can do. So I 2130 01:41:54.720 --> 01:41:58.279 just if you can't tell, like my military time was 2131 01:41:58.439 --> 01:42:01.319 pivotal to team me up to make a big difference. 2132 01:42:01.960 --> 01:42:06.039 You know, it's interesting too, because you have a team. 2133 01:42:06.079 --> 01:42:08.760 You built a business with a team, And I think 2134 01:42:08.800 --> 01:42:10.560 a lot of veterans go out there to build business 2135 01:42:10.560 --> 01:42:14.279 by themselves and are very dissatisfied even if they're successful, 2136 01:42:14.760 --> 01:42:17.319 because we're used to working in those team environments and 2137 01:42:17.359 --> 01:42:19.479 when we're out there on our own, it's like, I 2138 01:42:19.920 --> 01:42:22.640 I mean, I'd rather like, who's my team? You know, 2139 01:42:22.800 --> 01:42:26.680 my employees are they my team? Like I think that that. 2140 01:42:26.640 --> 01:42:30.720 Must have been in my mind. I think that that 2141 01:42:30.800 --> 01:42:32.600 must have been very gratifying for the three of you. 2142 01:42:34.000 --> 01:42:36.079 I mean, think about the use of the word team, 2143 01:42:36.600 --> 01:42:40.760 team room right, my team, my teammates. I actually think 2144 01:42:40.800 --> 01:42:43.199 a lot of the starts with good old fashioned psychology. 2145 01:42:43.239 --> 01:42:45.319 I don't think we realize, like I know there's all 2146 01:42:45.319 --> 01:42:48.159 these corny you know, there's no I in. 2147 01:42:48.279 --> 01:42:50.359 Team corny or not. 2148 01:42:50.520 --> 01:42:52.479 I actually think some of these things that if you 2149 01:42:52.520 --> 01:42:54.479 get them right from the beginning, they just get your 2150 01:42:54.479 --> 01:42:56.960 head right. Yeah, they help you think about that. Like 2151 01:42:58.039 --> 01:43:00.520 there's like that old African prov or. I think it 2152 01:43:00.560 --> 01:43:03.239 goes something like, if you want to go fast, go alone. 2153 01:43:03.279 --> 01:43:06.439 If you want to go far, go together. There's nothing 2154 01:43:06.479 --> 01:43:09.079 wrong with going alone. There's nothing wrong with starting a 2155 01:43:09.199 --> 01:43:12.239 very small business and a lifestyle business that can still 2156 01:43:12.279 --> 01:43:15.359 make big differences. But if you want to move mountains, 2157 01:43:15.399 --> 01:43:18.039 you want to go far, you are not going to 2158 01:43:18.079 --> 01:43:21.000 get there. You could be the greatest cyber warfare operator 2159 01:43:21.119 --> 01:43:24.920 or greatest grunt or greatest pilot or whatever you do, 2160 01:43:26.640 --> 01:43:27.600 you're going to be able to. 2161 01:43:27.520 --> 01:43:28.640 Move what one X does. 2162 01:43:28.680 --> 01:43:30.479 And I will tell you, like I now have the 2163 01:43:30.520 --> 01:43:36.640 point where I think I'm in US Canada UK, Australia, 2164 01:43:36.720 --> 01:43:40.159 New Zealand right some Ireland in there too. I've got 2165 01:43:40.199 --> 01:43:43.920 five hundred plus teammates and we move not just paddling 2166 01:43:44.000 --> 01:43:46.399 in the same direction, but we're in the same boat, 2167 01:43:46.520 --> 01:43:49.039 in the same direction at the same cadence, and that. 2168 01:43:49.199 --> 01:43:51.079 Allows us to go both fast and far. 2169 01:43:51.239 --> 01:43:54.800 So I think the word team and team room actually 2170 01:43:54.840 --> 01:43:58.359 has a lot more to do with success of just 2171 01:43:58.399 --> 01:43:59.960 getting that right in the beginning, and if you get 2172 01:43:59.960 --> 01:44:02.159 it wrong, I just would challenge, like, how far can 2173 01:44:02.199 --> 01:44:02.520 you go? 2174 01:44:02.760 --> 01:44:03.119 Solo? 2175 01:44:03.760 --> 01:44:07.119 So let's I want to ask you about Huntress, uh 2176 01:44:07.640 --> 01:44:12.960 real quick, because you know my vast time, the whole 2177 01:44:12.960 --> 01:44:15.840 eight months that I was in cyber like, Huntress is 2178 01:44:15.880 --> 01:44:18.720 a name like it is, it is a name that 2179 01:44:18.840 --> 01:44:23.159 is known in the community. You know, people outside of 2180 01:44:23.159 --> 01:44:26.039 the community may not have heard of it, you know, 2181 01:44:26.319 --> 01:44:30.239 may or may not, but it's like it's known. 2182 01:44:30.720 --> 01:44:33.279 What are you? What is Huntress? What? What was your 2183 01:44:33.279 --> 01:44:35.159 original mission? Has that morphed? 2184 01:44:37.399 --> 01:44:38.880 Yeah? Why we start with the embarrassing? 2185 01:44:38.960 --> 01:44:41.479 Why started with a badass? Is what I want to know. 2186 01:44:41.479 --> 01:44:43.079 Why are you guys so bad ass? Yeah? 2187 01:44:43.239 --> 01:44:45.119 Yeah, we started with a mission that we were like 2188 01:44:45.680 --> 01:44:48.039 all we want to do is fuck a packers. That's 2189 01:44:48.079 --> 01:44:50.000 not a good mission statement, by the way, don't start 2190 01:44:50.039 --> 01:44:51.960 a company on that mission statement. But it was a 2191 01:44:52.000 --> 01:44:54.800 good north star. It told us like what we were there. 2192 01:44:55.920 --> 01:44:59.520 It ended up becoming a mission statement that was we 2193 01:44:59.560 --> 01:45:01.920 had to figure out who we were doing it for 2194 01:45:02.479 --> 01:45:04.560 and how we were doing it right, that's the why. 2195 01:45:04.760 --> 01:45:07.560 Start with why, move to how and who, and then 2196 01:45:07.640 --> 01:45:11.279 finish with what. So at Huntress, our whole mission is 2197 01:45:11.319 --> 01:45:16.520 to elevate mid sized businesses, small businesses, and these folks. 2198 01:45:16.239 --> 01:45:17.319 That don't have a budget. 2199 01:45:18.159 --> 01:45:23.439 We do that by leading with education and community, and 2200 01:45:23.479 --> 01:45:26.560 we end up delivering this one hacker at a time. 2201 01:45:26.640 --> 01:45:29.479 That's a double entendre talking about taking down one hacker 2202 01:45:29.520 --> 01:45:32.399 at a time, but we also do that growing one 2203 01:45:32.439 --> 01:45:34.880 ethical hacker at a time. Notice nothing in there talks 2204 01:45:34.880 --> 01:45:38.840 about making money. Nothing in there talks about making cybersecurity tools. 2205 01:45:39.600 --> 01:45:42.560 We just happen to build cybersecurity products. Our whole mission 2206 01:45:42.600 --> 01:45:46.119 is to elevate people that are underrepresented in business. Because 2207 01:45:46.119 --> 01:45:50.079 cyber criminals love direct small businesses that are underrepresented. They 2208 01:45:50.119 --> 01:45:53.920 extorre them for twenty fifty hundred thousand dollars and that's 2209 01:45:54.039 --> 01:45:57.279 usually enough that you can't run payroll for six weeks. Right, 2210 01:45:58.079 --> 01:46:00.520 How many Americans can go six weeks without pay? Not 2211 01:46:00.640 --> 01:46:04.000 very many. It's really really low, unfortunately. And the part 2212 01:46:04.000 --> 01:46:06.159 that I'm talking about is when you get your mission 2213 01:46:06.279 --> 01:46:10.399 right and you start with the real why, everything else 2214 01:46:10.439 --> 01:46:13.119 falls in place, that one hacker at a time, it 2215 01:46:13.159 --> 01:46:15.760 turns out we realize that if we lead with education, 2216 01:46:15.960 --> 01:46:18.520 growing other hackers to be able to join our mission, 2217 01:46:19.000 --> 01:46:21.600 and doing it with a community, not by ourselves, we 2218 01:46:21.680 --> 01:46:22.359 could go far. 2219 01:46:22.600 --> 01:46:25.640 And so like what I do is I sell security products. 2220 01:46:25.840 --> 01:46:28.640 Products that allows my shady team of hackers that if 2221 01:46:28.680 --> 01:46:31.199 anybody tries to get in, whether it's your computer, your 2222 01:46:31.199 --> 01:46:35.479 digital identity like your Google or Microsoft account, maybe it's 2223 01:46:35.520 --> 01:46:38.000 trying to get into your data, we're not only going 2224 01:46:38.039 --> 01:46:39.680 to prevent them from getting in, but when they do 2225 01:46:39.720 --> 01:46:42.439 get in, we wreck them. Right, that's the whole idea. 2226 01:46:42.479 --> 01:46:45.239 And it's not perfect, just like health, you can get sick. 2227 01:46:45.479 --> 01:46:47.640 But notice what I'm talking about is it started with 2228 01:46:47.680 --> 01:46:50.960 a mission. Everything else the stuff that we do afterwards, 2229 01:46:50.960 --> 01:46:53.800 building it, how we do it, that's the minutia. And 2230 01:46:53.840 --> 01:46:56.000 I think that's what I like most about hanging with 2231 01:46:56.039 --> 01:46:59.560 you guys, is you guys expose stories for the mission first, 2232 01:47:00.039 --> 01:47:02.760 and it turns out everything else can fall in place 2233 01:47:03.159 --> 01:47:05.239 and you can learn it. You know, after ten years, 2234 01:47:05.279 --> 01:47:09.439 I can sound crisp because I iterated with small successes 2235 01:47:10.239 --> 01:47:12.600 and I can eventually take down much bigger targets. So 2236 01:47:12.720 --> 01:47:15.159 if you can't tell, I owe a lot to what 2237 01:47:15.239 --> 01:47:17.039 I learned during my time in the service. 2238 01:47:17.279 --> 01:47:20.000 Yeah, it's it's amazing, you know. 2239 01:47:21.239 --> 01:47:26.880 So the cyber community is it's very interesting because you 2240 01:47:26.920 --> 01:47:27.720 have the government. 2241 01:47:27.960 --> 01:47:30.199 You have the government that is working on you know. 2242 01:47:30.199 --> 01:47:35.560 These uh you know national nation uh actress you know 2243 01:47:35.760 --> 01:47:36.840 uh threats. 2244 01:47:36.640 --> 01:47:40.119 Yeah, nation state adversaries, stuff like that, advance threats. 2245 01:47:40.319 --> 01:47:44.279 Yeah, yeah, and then you know, you then you have 2246 01:47:44.319 --> 01:47:46.680 a bunch of security companies and then you have like 2247 01:47:46.720 --> 01:47:51.319 you say, these these companies that can't they're not going 2248 01:47:51.399 --> 01:47:54.800 to have a couple of you know, uh cybersecurity guys. 2249 01:47:54.800 --> 01:47:56.560 They're not going to have you know, they're not they 2250 01:47:56.560 --> 01:47:59.760 don't have these things and and a lot of the 2251 01:47:59.800 --> 01:48:01.880 tool out there or out of reach for them. But 2252 01:48:01.920 --> 01:48:06.000 they are also the ones who get hit often and 2253 01:48:06.960 --> 01:48:09.920 you know, and so they get ransomwared. Then they have 2254 01:48:10.000 --> 01:48:13.199 to hire a DFI our team, and the DFI our team, well, 2255 01:48:13.279 --> 01:48:15.560 they hire lawyers, and the lawyers get to deal out 2256 01:48:15.960 --> 01:48:19.279 because the lawyers are basically like, this is this is 2257 01:48:19.279 --> 01:48:22.640 your exposure, Like, this is the risk that these people 2258 01:48:22.720 --> 01:48:23.439 might sue. 2259 01:48:23.239 --> 01:48:25.520 You, you know, the people, your clients or whoever. 2260 01:48:25.680 --> 01:48:27.840 Yeah, you're in business to make money, right, you got 2261 01:48:27.840 --> 01:48:28.920 to limit your liability. 2262 01:48:29.119 --> 01:48:31.279 Yeah, yeah, and you know. 2263 01:48:31.439 --> 01:48:35.439 And then with the forensics teams, these are civilian. 2264 01:48:34.960 --> 01:48:38.239 Companies that are being paid by these you know. 2265 01:48:38.720 --> 01:48:41.680 To find what to find really one thing, and that 2266 01:48:41.920 --> 01:48:46.239 is what is the company's exposure, right, and maybe do 2267 01:48:46.319 --> 01:48:51.399 some ransomware negotiations. But they're not paid the hourly to 2268 01:48:51.520 --> 01:48:56.520 go in and find out the code or the who 2269 01:48:56.560 --> 01:49:00.479 the actor was. And and so a lot of these 2270 01:49:00.520 --> 01:49:03.199 DFIR teams are actually on the cutting edge of like 2271 01:49:03.279 --> 01:49:05.279 seeing a lot of these thread actors for the very 2272 01:49:05.279 --> 01:49:07.680 first time, but they're not setting that off anywhere because 2273 01:49:07.720 --> 01:49:11.640 they're not getting paid the hourly to do it. So 2274 01:49:11.680 --> 01:49:18.399 you have this really like disconnected community in a way 2275 01:49:18.439 --> 01:49:22.199 of where because the national security it all plays like 2276 01:49:22.319 --> 01:49:25.239 a lot of these thread actors are part or at 2277 01:49:25.319 --> 01:49:32.600 least not necessarily sponsored by but maybe like giving permission 2278 01:49:32.680 --> 01:49:34.279 by nation state. 2279 01:49:34.039 --> 01:49:39.319 Actors loosely supported, loosely connected when it's favorable. You know, Hey, 2280 01:49:39.319 --> 01:49:41.359 I don't want to do something as a nation, why 2281 01:49:41.359 --> 01:49:44.880 don't I allow this slightly shady proxy that I get 2282 01:49:44.920 --> 01:49:47.239 permission to do it on my behalf because my hands 2283 01:49:47.239 --> 01:49:47.600 are clean. 2284 01:49:47.680 --> 01:49:48.359 You're nailing it. 2285 01:49:48.520 --> 01:49:50.520 But if one of these DFI R companies like comes 2286 01:49:50.600 --> 01:49:54.199 across or is in chat with a brand new thread 2287 01:49:54.199 --> 01:49:56.880 actor that nobody has seen before, they're not reporting that 2288 01:49:56.920 --> 01:50:00.279 to anybody because that you know, they're they're being build 2289 01:50:00.399 --> 01:50:04.760 hourly or they build hourly, and they're just going to 2290 01:50:04.840 --> 01:50:07.640 give these attorneys in these companies what they ask for. 2291 01:50:08.279 --> 01:50:10.920 And so it's sort of like, how does the government 2292 01:50:11.840 --> 01:50:17.199 incentivize these smaller companies to to you. 2293 01:50:17.159 --> 01:50:18.720 Know, to pump this information up? 2294 01:50:19.439 --> 01:50:25.000 And then should the government or state governments pay companies 2295 01:50:25.039 --> 01:50:32.119 like yours uh to cover everybody in order to you know, 2296 01:50:32.319 --> 01:50:35.800 basically as part of the infrastructure of our country. 2297 01:50:37.199 --> 01:50:39.399 We all have bias, and I'm going to show my 2298 01:50:39.520 --> 01:50:42.560 cards first. I'm a big fan, for instance, of there 2299 01:50:42.600 --> 01:50:45.800 is great places where the federal government should intervene. Sometimes 2300 01:50:45.840 --> 01:50:48.439 local government that's closest to you should be able to help. 2301 01:50:49.079 --> 01:50:52.239 I will also share that I'm a firm believer we 2302 01:50:52.279 --> 01:50:54.199 all have an obligation to take care of each other. 2303 01:50:54.279 --> 01:50:57.239 It's just kind of what's got us to be humans 2304 01:50:57.239 --> 01:51:01.119 in twenty twenty five. I'm giving that upfront because I 2305 01:51:01.159 --> 01:51:04.720 want to like caveat that. There is some places, for instance, 2306 01:51:04.760 --> 01:51:09.079 the government's job is to facilitate and allow companies to 2307 01:51:09.199 --> 01:51:12.960 be able to go toe to toe with cybercrime, to 2308 01:51:13.039 --> 01:51:16.840 go toe to toe with terrorism. But we don't need companies, 2309 01:51:16.880 --> 01:51:20.000 for instance, being vigilantis. Imagine if we just allowed like 2310 01:51:20.439 --> 01:51:23.640 the local person to provide security at the I don't 2311 01:51:23.720 --> 01:51:24.399 know bank. 2312 01:51:24.720 --> 01:51:25.359 You don't want that. 2313 01:51:25.439 --> 01:51:29.079 You need some level of professionalism, some level. Heck, the 2314 01:51:29.119 --> 01:51:31.520 person who cuts my hair has to go through a certificate. 2315 01:51:31.920 --> 01:51:33.920 I want the person guarding the bank to go through 2316 01:51:33.960 --> 01:51:36.159 some bar I don't want a vigilane right. 2317 01:51:36.279 --> 01:51:38.279 But where I'm going with this is their job is 2318 01:51:38.319 --> 01:51:39.760 to be able to enable this. 2319 01:51:40.479 --> 01:51:42.520 Just like the story I told earlier that when the 2320 01:51:42.600 --> 01:51:44.880 early days of cyber kind of as it started to 2321 01:51:44.960 --> 01:51:48.000 mature into twenty ten to twenty fifteen, the real heroes 2322 01:51:48.039 --> 01:51:50.159 were the lawyers who allowed us to do more of 2323 01:51:50.199 --> 01:51:53.159 this preparation of the environment right to be able to 2324 01:51:53.199 --> 01:51:56.920 do the effects that could actually stop terrorism or stop 2325 01:51:57.399 --> 01:52:00.720 nation states I actually think the role that we have 2326 01:52:00.920 --> 01:52:03.359 right now in twenty twenty five in the government, and 2327 01:52:03.399 --> 01:52:04.000 this is global. 2328 01:52:04.000 --> 01:52:05.359 I'm not making it about the US. 2329 01:52:06.279 --> 01:52:09.720 Some of it is about facilitating companies that are of 2330 01:52:09.760 --> 01:52:13.560 the right qualification and the right standard. Why are we 2331 01:52:13.680 --> 01:52:17.760 not doing more to take defense and not lead by 2332 01:52:17.800 --> 01:52:20.000 defending waiting for them to break down our door? 2333 01:52:20.319 --> 01:52:20.560 Right? 2334 01:52:20.560 --> 01:52:23.359 But if they're qualified people, and I'm not saying spin 2335 01:52:23.439 --> 01:52:25.960 up vigilantis, there's going to be people who interpret this wrong. 2336 01:52:26.159 --> 01:52:30.880 But private qualified maybe qualified letters of mark, cyber letters 2337 01:52:30.880 --> 01:52:31.279 of mark. 2338 01:52:32.520 --> 01:52:35.920 I mean, I'll tell you Huntress itself, two billion dollar company, 2339 01:52:36.000 --> 01:52:39.239 at the risk of, you know, liability when we find, 2340 01:52:39.279 --> 01:52:42.840 for instance, a threat actor who is just for instance, 2341 01:52:42.880 --> 01:52:44.920 a lot of times people come to us after they're 2342 01:52:44.960 --> 01:52:48.079 already hacked, not before we try to prevent it. When 2343 01:52:48.079 --> 01:52:50.680 somebody comes to me that they're hacked and I find 2344 01:52:50.720 --> 01:52:54.560 that this cyber criminal has stolen their data, These I'll 2345 01:52:54.560 --> 01:52:59.119 call them what they are, bastards accidentally leave their credentials exposed, 2346 01:52:59.239 --> 01:53:01.680 just like how we get credential I would be a 2347 01:53:01.760 --> 01:53:05.279 liar to say it is not. You know, I could 2348 01:53:05.279 --> 01:53:08.039 count on more than one hand the times that, for instance, 2349 01:53:08.079 --> 01:53:12.720 we said oh, they left their credentials exposed. We took 2350 01:53:12.720 --> 01:53:14.680 a look at the risk. We realized it was some 2351 01:53:14.720 --> 01:53:17.880 shady hosted server and insert shady country here, that you 2352 01:53:17.960 --> 01:53:21.840 have quite a good idea that it's malicious. We have 2353 01:53:22.039 --> 01:53:25.039 been more than happy to rendition that data back for somebody. 2354 01:53:25.560 --> 01:53:28.159 We have been more than happy to dump their logs, 2355 01:53:28.520 --> 01:53:30.800 and more than happy that when we find a mistake 2356 01:53:30.880 --> 01:53:35.399 that they make they use software vulnerabilities to get into 2357 01:53:35.399 --> 01:53:39.039 people's systems. We have actually found vulnerabilities in the same 2358 01:53:39.159 --> 01:53:42.079 systems that they used to steal and encrypt and hold 2359 01:53:42.159 --> 01:53:45.159 data for ransom, that we exploit their system and make 2360 01:53:45.199 --> 01:53:48.680 their software no longer work. That is not always in 2361 01:53:48.720 --> 01:53:51.119 an area that's clearly defined. I'm not talking about hacking 2362 01:53:51.199 --> 01:53:54.800 them back. I'm talking about using our offensive skills sometimes 2363 01:53:55.119 --> 01:53:57.359 to be able to make their software not work. And 2364 01:53:57.399 --> 01:53:59.239 the thing that I would go back to without ever 2365 01:53:59.279 --> 01:54:03.600 getting political, sometimes you can make a big difference by 2366 01:54:03.720 --> 01:54:06.560 just carrying a big stick, right, And if you have 2367 01:54:06.720 --> 01:54:10.920 a defensive company that's led with a very offensive mindset 2368 01:54:11.239 --> 01:54:14.560 that also believes in following rule of law, who is 2369 01:54:14.640 --> 01:54:17.239 happy to explore not just the black and the white, 2370 01:54:17.319 --> 01:54:21.159 but the gray. I think it's government's job to facilitate that, 2371 01:54:21.840 --> 01:54:25.520 and when lines are crossed, let's hold people accountable. We 2372 01:54:25.520 --> 01:54:28.039 can't do illegal things. We all have to be accountable 2373 01:54:28.079 --> 01:54:31.119 for our actions. But I do think that version is 2374 01:54:31.159 --> 01:54:33.920 a lot easier version that we can let capitalism do 2375 01:54:33.960 --> 01:54:37.920 its thing. Let's let businesses protect against hackers, but let's 2376 01:54:37.960 --> 01:54:41.199 not think about healthcare. If my only job was I 2377 01:54:41.279 --> 01:54:45.279 wait till you get stage four cancer, tell you like, 2378 01:54:45.520 --> 01:54:46.880 let you know you're gonna die. 2379 01:54:46.840 --> 01:54:47.560 That's too late. 2380 01:54:48.039 --> 01:54:49.960 Well, I got to be doing everything I can to 2381 01:54:50.000 --> 01:54:52.760 find it as early as possible, and if I can, 2382 01:54:52.920 --> 01:54:56.760 if I can possibly stop cancer from happening, no one 2383 01:54:56.800 --> 01:54:58.680 would say, don't do that. So why are we not 2384 01:54:58.800 --> 01:55:02.159 making similar analogy about stopping thread actors and treating them 2385 01:55:02.199 --> 01:55:05.800 like what they are. They're criminals and they should be stopped, 2386 01:55:05.800 --> 01:55:09.279 and that sometimes should be law enforcement closely partnered with 2387 01:55:09.520 --> 01:55:10.439 commercial businesses. 2388 01:55:10.800 --> 01:55:12.560 Well, I was gonna say, like, we've all deployed to 2389 01:55:12.640 --> 01:55:14.439 the you know, the g WAT in some way, and 2390 01:55:14.479 --> 01:55:19.359 it's sort of like the US's cyber policy seems to 2391 01:55:19.399 --> 01:55:23.279 me to be like we're getting attacked, so let's keep 2392 01:55:23.279 --> 01:55:24.640 building our base defenses. 2393 01:55:25.520 --> 01:55:26.640 Yeah, let's just keep on. 2394 01:55:26.920 --> 01:55:31.199 Let's add more sandbags, let's add more hescoes, Let's uh, 2395 01:55:31.319 --> 01:55:32.359 let's get to. 2396 01:55:32.039 --> 01:55:33.840 Say, Jack, are we taking you off yet with all 2397 01:55:33.880 --> 01:55:36.600 this nerd stuff here and hackers kind of going unrecked 2398 01:55:36.760 --> 01:55:37.520 only mildly. 2399 01:55:37.760 --> 01:55:41.640 But we're gonna jump to some user questions because I 2400 01:55:41.680 --> 01:55:44.640 know some of our viewers had had some stuff for 2401 01:55:44.760 --> 01:55:46.119 you as well that we want to make sure we 2402 01:55:46.159 --> 01:55:46.439 get to. 2403 01:55:47.079 --> 01:55:47.840 Let's do it. 2404 01:55:49.239 --> 01:55:54.560 Alrighty from the count of Kohiba, did you see any 2405 01:55:54.600 --> 01:55:57.720 differences in people who had shady backgrounds growing up for 2406 01:55:57.840 --> 01:55:58.760 straight laced kids. 2407 01:56:00.319 --> 01:56:01.119 A yeah. 2408 01:56:01.119 --> 01:56:04.319 I actually would say my general rule of thumb is 2409 01:56:04.439 --> 01:56:08.560 bad decision makers stay bad decision makers. However, if you 2410 01:56:08.720 --> 01:56:13.880 can't understand the nuance between what is a think about fruit, 2411 01:56:14.399 --> 01:56:17.880 I'll choose strawberries because why not I like them. Sometimes 2412 01:56:17.920 --> 01:56:22.800 fruit molds because it's next to bad fruit. Sometimes fruit 2413 01:56:22.840 --> 01:56:25.840 molds because it is truly the one that starts the molding. 2414 01:56:26.279 --> 01:56:29.840 I would say, generally speaking, I've seen rare cases where 2415 01:56:29.840 --> 01:56:33.640 people who make extremely bad decisions change making bad decisions. 2416 01:56:33.680 --> 01:56:37.760 It's not saying people can't change, However, I think sometimes 2417 01:56:37.840 --> 01:56:41.720 separating what's molding because they're surrounded by essentially a bad 2418 01:56:41.800 --> 01:56:45.079 environment is very different than, for instance, a bad egg. 2419 01:56:45.439 --> 01:56:47.720 So what I'm saying is I've seen plenty of people. 2420 01:56:47.920 --> 01:56:49.640 I mean, look at my I started this whole thing 2421 01:56:49.720 --> 01:56:51.720 admitting I've been some things that when I. 2422 01:56:51.640 --> 01:56:53.640 Was poor that are pretty crappy. I kind of wish 2423 01:56:53.640 --> 01:56:54.479 I could undo them. 2424 01:56:54.800 --> 01:56:57.439 They were circumstantial, and I've given back a lot more 2425 01:56:57.479 --> 01:57:00.359 than I've ever taken. And so I don't think this 2426 01:57:00.479 --> 01:57:02.720 is a case that you can just say if you've 2427 01:57:02.760 --> 01:57:05.640 messed up, there's no forgiveness that like that doesn't mimic life. 2428 01:57:05.720 --> 01:57:08.840 So I appreciate that question because no, I don't think 2429 01:57:08.960 --> 01:57:12.000 just because you've made a mistake you're wrong. But I 2430 01:57:12.000 --> 01:57:14.239 think there are degrees in it's the spectrum, and if 2431 01:57:14.239 --> 01:57:16.760 you cross a line, you're probably going to keep crossing 2432 01:57:16.800 --> 01:57:19.640 a line, not because it's wrong or right, but you 2433 01:57:19.840 --> 01:57:21.560 probably have something wrong with judgment. 2434 01:57:21.800 --> 01:57:25.119 Do you do you think that motivation is because I 2435 01:57:25.199 --> 01:57:29.039 feel like in you know, the cyber world, that there 2436 01:57:29.119 --> 01:57:31.239 is a lot of this, there's a lot of crossover 2437 01:57:31.279 --> 01:57:33.119 with the softman tell you right, like when we take 2438 01:57:33.119 --> 01:57:36.960 an an MP, I like like we have certain traits 2439 01:57:37.000 --> 01:57:42.359 that we share with criminals, and you know, but I think. 2440 01:57:42.159 --> 01:57:43.680 That that. 2441 01:57:45.159 --> 01:57:49.560 It's, you know, we have sort of the same adrenaline, 2442 01:57:49.560 --> 01:57:52.720 the sort of same compartmentalization, the same desire for. 2443 01:57:52.800 --> 01:57:55.159 Challenge, but we don't have we don't have. 2444 01:57:55.119 --> 01:57:58.520 The selfishness or the desire, you know, the desire to profit. 2445 01:57:59.039 --> 01:58:01.640 And so I think maybe a cyber there's a difference 2446 01:58:01.640 --> 01:58:05.800 between that hurteen, fourteen, seventy year old kid who wants 2447 01:58:05.840 --> 01:58:07.560 to hack into a system to see if he can 2448 01:58:07.560 --> 01:58:10.039 get into the system and the kid who wants to 2449 01:58:10.039 --> 01:58:11.720 hack in the system to see what he can take. 2450 01:58:12.840 --> 01:58:16.600 Yeah, you mentioned the selfishness, right, One of the core 2451 01:58:16.680 --> 01:58:19.560 values in the Air Force was serviced before self. 2452 01:58:21.000 --> 01:58:22.439 Why are you doing it? Are you doing it? 2453 01:58:22.439 --> 01:58:25.760 Because it's experimenting and I've had I've been selfish before. 2454 01:58:25.840 --> 01:58:27.159 Right, it's a you know, but. 2455 01:58:27.199 --> 01:58:30.039 When I look back in hindsight, a lot of it 2456 01:58:30.159 --> 01:58:32.119 was and ends to a means that was in a 2457 01:58:32.159 --> 01:58:35.520 way that was inconsequential. Did anybody get upset back in 2458 01:58:35.560 --> 01:58:40.319 the day that I was using their unlimited minutes AOL account? 2459 01:58:40.800 --> 01:58:43.319 They probably never even noticed yet they were giving me 2460 01:58:43.399 --> 01:58:46.800 a chance to learn. That is so gray, But that's 2461 01:58:46.960 --> 01:58:50.199 very different than I tried to get their credit card number. Right, 2462 01:58:50.239 --> 01:58:52.359 and they just used their credit card and racked up 2463 01:58:52.399 --> 01:58:54.560 all kinds of gift cards with it. Right, that's a 2464 01:58:54.680 --> 01:58:58.800 very different version. And so the gentleman or you know, 2465 01:58:58.840 --> 01:59:01.199 a lady or person that asked that question, like, that's 2466 01:59:01.239 --> 01:59:04.560 a really astute question because, to be very frank, it's 2467 01:59:04.600 --> 01:59:06.880 all a spectrum, and I think the answer is somewhere 2468 01:59:06.920 --> 01:59:09.399 there in probably the middle to dark gray. 2469 01:59:09.840 --> 01:59:11.000 I think that's still okay. 2470 01:59:11.279 --> 01:59:16.039 Yeah, we got another question v due to the place, 2471 01:59:16.159 --> 01:59:19.079 due to places like China having an internet, and as 2472 01:59:19.079 --> 01:59:21.800 opposed to an internet, could regular Americans actually do any 2473 01:59:21.840 --> 01:59:23.520 kind of hacking in places like China? 2474 01:59:25.079 --> 01:59:28.399 So the thing everybody forgets, right, think about a castle wall, 2475 01:59:28.880 --> 01:59:32.640 and even if you have the world's greatest you know, moat, 2476 01:59:33.159 --> 01:59:35.880 and you have all the walls in the world, some 2477 01:59:35.960 --> 01:59:38.359 people have to bring food in and out of that castle. 2478 01:59:39.119 --> 01:59:41.960 So China does with the Great Firewall. For those that 2479 01:59:42.039 --> 01:59:44.800 don't know, it's an actual logical layer that prevents certain 2480 01:59:44.840 --> 01:59:48.079 traffic that only operates in China and certain traffic that 2481 01:59:48.119 --> 01:59:51.000 for instance, allows outgoing. So it's not as easy as 2482 01:59:51.119 --> 01:59:54.640 just walking into a place with no castle wall. But 2483 01:59:54.800 --> 01:59:58.000 they're not on their own and as a result, sometimes 2484 01:59:58.039 --> 01:59:59.720 you have to be able to find just like the 2485 02:00:00.119 --> 02:00:03.399 about the old stories about the Trojan horse, right, sometimes 2486 02:00:03.439 --> 02:00:05.720 you got to be able to get things in. And 2487 02:00:06.199 --> 02:00:08.399 you know, if they were truly like a hermit kingdom 2488 02:00:08.399 --> 02:00:11.319 that nothing could come in or out, they wouldn't be 2489 02:00:11.359 --> 02:00:13.600 the nation state that they are. So where I'm sharing 2490 02:00:13.640 --> 02:00:17.000 with this is I think that there is some value 2491 02:00:17.159 --> 02:00:18.359 and having castle walls. 2492 02:00:19.079 --> 02:00:20.600 But let's not be s ourselves. 2493 02:00:20.760 --> 02:00:23.800 No castle wall is permanent because unless you're self sustaining 2494 02:00:23.840 --> 02:00:27.000 from the inside, stuff's coming from the outside end. And 2495 02:00:27.039 --> 02:00:29.199 as long as that's coming from the outside end, someone 2496 02:00:29.279 --> 02:00:30.520 like me is trying to exploit it. 2497 02:00:30.720 --> 02:00:33.520 Yeah, do you think that there's ever any future in 2498 02:00:33.560 --> 02:00:37.439 which like a standard defense is just basically to learn 2499 02:00:37.439 --> 02:00:40.720 how to put like create a poison pill for people's 2500 02:00:40.760 --> 02:00:42.960 like data that you know what I mean. 2501 02:00:44.119 --> 02:00:46.479 So I've gone back and forth between should we have 2502 02:00:46.600 --> 02:00:48.800 data that just you know, deletes itself or you know 2503 02:00:48.920 --> 02:00:51.239 kind of like mission impossible, this message will self. 2504 02:00:51.000 --> 02:00:51.720 Distract, right. 2505 02:00:52.439 --> 02:00:55.479 I've also balanced with the such opposite side of the 2506 02:00:55.479 --> 02:00:58.880 spectrum of do we care way too much about what 2507 02:00:59.000 --> 02:00:59.800 data gets leaked? 2508 02:01:00.000 --> 02:01:00.439 No offense? 2509 02:01:00.439 --> 02:01:02.359 At this time, I think I've had like ninety six 2510 02:01:02.399 --> 02:01:05.359 times my Social Security number. I probably have like nine 2511 02:01:05.520 --> 02:01:11.800 overlapping credit card policies right now. I get by every day. 2512 02:01:11.960 --> 02:01:14.399 I'm a super nerd. I've got Alexus in my house. 2513 02:01:14.520 --> 02:01:16.279 I could probably talk to my phone right now and 2514 02:01:16.319 --> 02:01:19.359 ask it to do its thing. There is some level 2515 02:01:19.479 --> 02:01:21.239 that I think we kind of got to dial it 2516 02:01:21.279 --> 02:01:23.479 back and say, like, look at do you remember that 2517 02:01:23.560 --> 02:01:25.479 movie Catch me if I can. That's that guy Frank 2518 02:01:25.479 --> 02:01:30.439 Abagnail that fished the checks. It's twenty twenty five. Check 2519 02:01:30.479 --> 02:01:33.560 fraud still happens. We never solved that problem. Why do 2520 02:01:33.640 --> 02:01:36.239 we think we're going to solve this cyber crime problem? 2521 02:01:36.279 --> 02:01:38.039 So I think some of it we just got to 2522 02:01:38.039 --> 02:01:40.840 tone it down and realize, you get hacked in twenty 2523 02:01:40.840 --> 02:01:43.920 twenty five. What's important is can you find it before 2524 02:01:44.000 --> 02:01:47.720 it becomes like deathly, right before they drain your account? 2525 02:01:47.800 --> 02:01:49.960 And when they drain your account, is there some sort 2526 02:01:50.000 --> 02:01:52.640 of way that we can, you know, ease the burden, 2527 02:01:52.760 --> 02:01:55.439 because that's pretty extreme to have like no money to 2528 02:01:55.479 --> 02:01:57.840 pay for bills, you know. So my point behind a 2529 02:01:57.840 --> 02:02:01.840 lot of that statement is I think that there is 2530 02:02:01.960 --> 02:02:04.720 a level of I wish sometimes data would self delete. 2531 02:02:04.760 --> 02:02:07.000 We'd be a little bit smarter, you know, minimize it. 2532 02:02:07.760 --> 02:02:10.319 But I think we should also not a butt but 2533 02:02:10.399 --> 02:02:13.119 an and we should also just chill out a little 2534 02:02:13.119 --> 02:02:14.479 bit and be okay with certain things. 2535 02:02:14.600 --> 02:02:16.039 Is gonna leak in twenty twenty five. 2536 02:02:16.279 --> 02:02:18.439 So when I say poison pill, I don't just mean 2537 02:02:18.479 --> 02:02:23.920 the data is self deleting, but basically installing malwell or 2538 02:02:23.960 --> 02:02:26.640 you know, basically destroying whatever that data goes to. 2539 02:02:27.239 --> 02:02:29.359 Ooh see, that's a good one. I don't you know 2540 02:02:29.399 --> 02:02:32.039 what's unfortunate. I don't think that we're quite at the 2541 02:02:32.119 --> 02:02:35.199 level that people are playing that four dimensional chess yet. 2542 02:02:35.399 --> 02:02:38.279 Should we have things like we're getting better, Like, even 2543 02:02:38.279 --> 02:02:40.640 though I'm not a huge crypto fan, we're getting. 2544 02:02:40.319 --> 02:02:42.600 Wallets that are like better resilient. 2545 02:02:42.920 --> 02:02:45.279 They try to prevent people's data from getting stolen, and 2546 02:02:45.279 --> 02:02:51.000 they have some of these built in protection mechanisms. I 2547 02:02:51.000 --> 02:02:53.600 I'm never a naysayer. I always think glass half full 2548 02:02:53.720 --> 02:02:58.399 unless it's suburban, right, But I actually think we're still 2549 02:02:58.439 --> 02:03:01.439 playing in many ways checker, not even chess, let alone 2550 02:03:01.479 --> 02:03:03.680 four dimensional chess. So I think what you're getting to, 2551 02:03:04.359 --> 02:03:07.079 we'll get there. Yeah, We're just not there yet, Like 2552 02:03:07.119 --> 02:03:10.239 we still can't keep people from stealing my darn s 2553 02:03:10.359 --> 02:03:11.279 F eighty six data. 2554 02:03:11.640 --> 02:03:13.680 Well I've we talked about that before. 2555 02:03:13.760 --> 02:03:15.079 Yeah, our our OPM file. 2556 02:03:15.159 --> 02:03:19.640 Yeah yeah, so yeah, I wish That's my long way 2557 02:03:19.680 --> 02:03:21.319 of saying, I hope we get there. 2558 02:03:21.520 --> 02:03:25.079 Yeah, all right, m corbyin how do you feel about 2559 02:03:25.119 --> 02:03:31.279 the fact that Chinese cybersecurity organizations are cyber organizations openly 2560 02:03:31.359 --> 02:03:33.279 acknowledge and publicize their partnerships. 2561 02:03:33.319 --> 02:03:35.880 Does it result in better collective action? 2562 02:03:37.479 --> 02:03:40.840 So? I think that some of the things that's needed. 2563 02:03:41.000 --> 02:03:43.199 And by the way, for the remember when I started 2564 02:03:43.199 --> 02:03:45.600 this story, I said all the people that were in 2565 02:03:45.720 --> 02:03:50.239 decision makers were former tank drivers, pilots, sub drivers, ship 2566 02:03:50.319 --> 02:03:53.840 you know, admirals. Turns out in twenty twenty five, some 2567 02:03:53.960 --> 02:03:56.560 of the people in office now are people who started 2568 02:03:56.560 --> 02:04:00.880 their careers in offensive cyber So what I'm saying this is, 2569 02:04:02.079 --> 02:04:04.520 if we go back to the root question, we've actually 2570 02:04:04.520 --> 02:04:07.479 got some really well informed people that are helping make 2571 02:04:07.560 --> 02:04:10.840 better decisions that allow us to kind of be more 2572 02:04:10.880 --> 02:04:15.319 public and with more public like I can tell you publicly, 2573 02:04:16.079 --> 02:04:20.359 Huntress collaborates with all kinds of law enforcement, less about government, 2574 02:04:20.720 --> 02:04:24.279 but all kinds of world law enforcement. Sometimes in countries 2575 02:04:24.319 --> 02:04:28.560 you wouldn't expect like, you know, people forget that. Sometimes 2576 02:04:28.640 --> 02:04:31.760 on what you read in the news, you read like, oh, 2577 02:04:31.800 --> 02:04:35.479 we're going to trade political prisoners behind the scenes. Sometimes 2578 02:04:35.520 --> 02:04:39.600 cyber criminals are traded. These nation state governments, for instance, 2579 02:04:39.640 --> 02:04:43.239 that protect some of these sometimes use these players as chips, 2580 02:04:43.520 --> 02:04:45.640 and believe it or not, law enforcement is some of 2581 02:04:45.680 --> 02:04:48.479 the people that we've actually had the best success of collaborating. 2582 02:04:48.800 --> 02:04:52.039 We've worked on raids that have brought back millions of 2583 02:04:52.079 --> 02:04:55.960 dollars of stolen money from cyber crime takedowns. So that's 2584 02:04:56.000 --> 02:04:58.920 my very long way of saying we could do better, 2585 02:04:59.079 --> 02:05:03.439 and I will wholeheartedly argue some countries are challenging us 2586 02:05:03.439 --> 02:05:08.319 of how well they do open collaboration, but don't underestimate 2587 02:05:08.479 --> 02:05:10.760 how much dope stuff goes down in the shadows, like 2588 02:05:10.800 --> 02:05:14.439 we're you know, we're not playing from a position of weakness. 2589 02:05:14.520 --> 02:05:17.239 We use this term in the intelligence community that we 2590 02:05:17.319 --> 02:05:21.520 call everybody else not peers. We call them near peers. 2591 02:05:22.199 --> 02:05:25.760 It's not by accident, it's not by hubris. We do 2592 02:05:25.840 --> 02:05:28.600 a lot of stuff really well. Don't underestimate what the 2593 02:05:28.680 --> 02:05:29.159 US can do. 2594 02:05:31.239 --> 02:05:34.800 I have a question, out of all the state actors, 2595 02:05:34.880 --> 02:05:37.359 who's the best at hacking. 2596 02:05:38.800 --> 02:05:41.279 That's such a good invest is such a loaded Do 2597 02:05:41.319 --> 02:05:44.640 you know who I like and who I'm not going 2598 02:05:44.720 --> 02:05:47.199 to use the word admire because like that'll be on 2599 02:05:47.359 --> 02:05:49.199 like I go, I file for IPO and that'll be 2600 02:05:49.279 --> 02:05:53.640 used against me. North Korea knows what they are, and 2601 02:05:53.680 --> 02:05:56.479 they know what they are and what they are generally 2602 02:05:56.640 --> 02:06:00.520 is very dependent on China for certain things. And they 2603 02:06:00.560 --> 02:06:04.199 are also pretty darn broke. And this is a country 2604 02:06:04.279 --> 02:06:11.079 that is more than happy to use their very very stringent, 2605 02:06:11.880 --> 02:06:14.640 you know, economic sanctions that are against them that they 2606 02:06:14.680 --> 02:06:18.520 have no problem going after your crypto wallet, going after Swift, 2607 02:06:18.600 --> 02:06:22.039 that's the you know payment systems behind credit cards, and 2608 02:06:22.079 --> 02:06:26.359 they have made millions maybe even there's some estimates that 2609 02:06:26.439 --> 02:06:29.760 go into the big B word that is not playing around. 2610 02:06:29.760 --> 02:06:31.880 Could you imagine like as a business and if you 2611 02:06:31.960 --> 02:06:34.880 think about what some of these nation states are, their 2612 02:06:34.920 --> 02:06:38.159 biggest businesses in their country are actually their hackers bringing 2613 02:06:38.199 --> 02:06:41.359 in revenue wild that's pretty crazy, and we don't do 2614 02:06:41.439 --> 02:06:44.359 that in the US. We don't do economic you know, 2615 02:06:44.520 --> 02:06:47.760 espionage this way, some people will split hairs. I'll tell 2616 02:06:47.760 --> 02:06:50.479 you ninety nine times out of one hundred unless there's 2617 02:06:50.479 --> 02:06:53.359 some weird accident. We don't do that the way we 2618 02:06:53.399 --> 02:06:56.640 play with economic espionages through like things like immigration. We'll 2619 02:06:56.640 --> 02:06:59.199 just steal your best and brightest and make them US citizens. Right, 2620 02:06:59.399 --> 02:07:01.159 not going to open that can, because that's a whole 2621 02:07:01.159 --> 02:07:03.680 different other thing. But we play at a different level 2622 02:07:03.680 --> 02:07:06.720 of four D chess, and I admire North Korea knowing 2623 02:07:06.760 --> 02:07:08.600 how bad they are at some things and being able 2624 02:07:08.640 --> 02:07:11.520 to make a whole lot of money with a handful 2625 02:07:11.600 --> 02:07:13.319 of people they're not us. 2626 02:07:13.439 --> 02:07:15.600 Well, you can't keep up with ghost but that's pretty dope. 2627 02:07:15.840 --> 02:07:18.680 Before uh well not before, but during I mean they 2628 02:07:18.720 --> 02:07:21.239 were also involved in the whole supernotes. 2629 02:07:20.640 --> 02:07:23.199 Thing and oh yeah, oh yeah. 2630 02:07:23.439 --> 02:07:26.720 I mean they were like like, uh, you know, counterfeiting 2631 02:07:27.199 --> 02:07:31.720 physical US dollars. So this is just a criminal regime. 2632 02:07:31.880 --> 02:07:33.880 Like like you said, they know who they are and 2633 02:07:33.920 --> 02:07:34.439 what they do. 2634 02:07:34.600 --> 02:07:37.720 Yeah, So I mean, is there not something to admire 2635 02:07:37.760 --> 02:07:40.680 where they're like, Yo, it's getting harder to repre you know, 2636 02:07:40.880 --> 02:07:43.840 to recreate and forage and create counterfeit dollars. 2637 02:07:43.840 --> 02:07:47.279 So let's just not counterfeit as hard, and let's. 2638 02:07:47.079 --> 02:07:50.079 Go after this new emerging digital Let's go after people 2639 02:07:50.079 --> 02:07:53.039 behind crypto. Let's go after some of these core systems, 2640 02:07:53.079 --> 02:07:55.399 like they know how to get paid, and I know 2641 02:07:55.479 --> 02:07:58.760 it's so easy to like throw a Kim jong unmema 2642 02:07:58.800 --> 02:08:03.239 out there, but like they're scrappy, they're hustling. They remind 2643 02:08:03.279 --> 02:08:05.840 me of a startup they got startup energy. 2644 02:08:06.039 --> 02:08:10.279 Well, you know what's wild is, you know the same 2645 02:08:10.439 --> 02:08:13.439 scams that worked in the eighteen hundreds, like this Snake 2646 02:08:13.479 --> 02:08:18.079 Oil says like the Nigerian prince like this with these 2647 02:08:18.119 --> 02:08:25.279 crypto drops, you know, like they're using the somebody in competence. Yes, exactly, 2648 02:08:25.359 --> 02:08:28.279 somebody wants something that's too good to be true and 2649 02:08:28.319 --> 02:08:30.800 they believe that they just might be the person to 2650 02:08:30.800 --> 02:08:34.119 get it, and they give people access to everything. 2651 02:08:34.199 --> 02:08:36.039 You know, it's it's wild. 2652 02:08:36.479 --> 02:08:39.359 And people forget when they're succeeding. They don't have to 2653 02:08:39.399 --> 02:08:41.920 succeed big. It doesn't have to be billions. When you 2654 02:08:41.960 --> 02:08:47.199 have such a disproportionate exchange rate, a fifty thousand dollars 2655 02:08:47.319 --> 02:08:52.119 ransom could be significantly bigger for folks in economic sanctioned worlds. 2656 02:08:52.239 --> 02:08:55.520 So I just sometimes think that we just like how 2657 02:08:55.560 --> 02:08:58.199 we're really bad as humans, like comper in and how 2658 02:08:58.239 --> 02:09:00.560 many like stars in the sky are great of sand 2659 02:09:00.600 --> 02:09:04.640 on Earth, there's a different law, right, a different set 2660 02:09:04.680 --> 02:09:07.439 of physics in North Korea or these other you know, 2661 02:09:07.560 --> 02:09:11.359 world regimes, even Iran, who's like much smaller that they 2662 02:09:11.399 --> 02:09:14.159 are winning and just at their scale. And I don't 2663 02:09:14.159 --> 02:09:18.159 think we necessarily like we talk trash against them, but 2664 02:09:19.039 --> 02:09:23.479 you got to watch out because startups sometimes disrupt big environments. 2665 02:09:23.520 --> 02:09:25.279 And I'm not saying North Korea is going to become 2666 02:09:25.359 --> 02:09:28.159 a nation state, but what you know, a nation state 2667 02:09:28.199 --> 02:09:29.840 for instance that we have to worry about, like a 2668 02:09:29.960 --> 02:09:33.479 China Russia type of scenario. But don't sleep on their 2669 02:09:33.520 --> 02:09:36.359 ability to dis you know, deliver bigger bang for the buck. 2670 02:09:36.439 --> 02:09:37.159 That's what I'm saying. 2671 02:09:37.359 --> 02:09:39.720 And the simple fact is a lot of these countries 2672 02:09:39.760 --> 02:09:40.640 will play by. 2673 02:09:40.600 --> 02:09:42.279 Rules that we won't even consider. 2674 02:09:42.720 --> 02:09:45.680 Like I mean, look like look at human espionage. There 2675 02:09:45.680 --> 02:09:49.159 are countries that will still honeypot and the United States 2676 02:09:49.199 --> 02:09:53.079 will not honeypot, you know, I mean, look. 2677 02:09:52.880 --> 02:09:56.159 At the koshogi you know situation, right though the reporter, 2678 02:09:57.000 --> 02:09:59.760 when's the last time the US was accused of hacking 2679 02:09:59.800 --> 02:10:02.079 some be apart in an embassy, Like, we play on 2680 02:10:02.199 --> 02:10:05.600 slightly different rules in the physical and digital world, right, 2681 02:10:06.720 --> 02:10:07.640 And I think that's. 2682 02:10:07.479 --> 02:10:14.000 My officers, We don't do those kinds of you know, uh. 2683 02:10:13.800 --> 02:10:16.880 And there is a level of like I will say, 2684 02:10:16.880 --> 02:10:19.279 there's a weird thing about espionage that it's a very 2685 02:10:19.359 --> 02:10:24.439 gentleman's general person's game. But we got to understand that 2686 02:10:24.640 --> 02:10:27.159 we have to play smarter and harder because some people 2687 02:10:27.359 --> 02:10:29.239 just won't play by our rules. And that's not an 2688 02:10:29.279 --> 02:10:32.039 excuse to play by the rules. Like you don't want 2689 02:10:32.079 --> 02:10:34.239 to fall into that, right, you don't. You've got to 2690 02:10:34.239 --> 02:10:37.960 protect some level of humanism, Like even adversaries they wake 2691 02:10:38.039 --> 02:10:39.960 up and they probably have back pain the same way 2692 02:10:40.000 --> 02:10:43.159 that my you know, aging you know ass is starting 2693 02:10:43.159 --> 02:10:45.920 to feel back pain, like something generally connects us. They're 2694 02:10:45.920 --> 02:10:48.720 still humans. So I think it's important that we can't 2695 02:10:48.760 --> 02:10:51.840 lose that right. At the same time, let's not let 2696 02:10:51.880 --> 02:10:53.720 them take our kindness for a weekend. 2697 02:10:53.760 --> 02:10:56.279 So let me ask you a quick question because I 2698 02:10:56.279 --> 02:10:59.359 I feel kind of strongly about cybercrime, and I I 2699 02:10:59.439 --> 02:11:01.119 feel as though our. 2700 02:11:00.920 --> 02:11:02.560 Government gets wrong. 2701 02:11:02.840 --> 02:11:07.840 That's it's not breaking into the bodega and stealing their cash, 2702 02:11:08.920 --> 02:11:15.920 it is that I'm all for presidential findings. I am 2703 02:11:15.960 --> 02:11:21.119 all for the cyber terrorism. If you shut down a hospital, 2704 02:11:21.159 --> 02:11:22.680 that now you become. 2705 02:11:22.960 --> 02:11:27.000 A title fifty Title ten target that you're not. 2706 02:11:27.359 --> 02:11:29.760 It's not a lot you know, an FBI case anymore, 2707 02:11:29.760 --> 02:11:34.359 it's not law enforcement. I would like to see consequences. 2708 02:11:34.359 --> 02:11:36.720 I would like to see these things elevated in our 2709 02:11:36.920 --> 02:11:40.680 in our sort of warfare, or in a new domain, 2710 02:11:40.720 --> 02:11:41.760 a new warfare domain. 2711 02:11:42.319 --> 02:11:44.800 Yeah, so, David, I think there's nuance in what you 2712 02:11:44.960 --> 02:11:45.399 just said. 2713 02:11:45.560 --> 02:11:47.399 But I will tell you so what we've been hanging 2714 02:11:47.439 --> 02:11:50.119 out bs in for what two hours or so, I 2715 02:11:50.159 --> 02:11:52.520 will tell you, like, we protect one hundred and fifty 2716 02:11:52.680 --> 02:11:56.880 thousand businesses worldwide, even with all of our skills, all 2717 02:11:56.920 --> 02:12:00.119 of our prevention, et cetera. I'm sure there's probably a 2718 02:12:00.439 --> 02:12:03.279 to a couple dozen that have been wrecked in the 2719 02:12:03.319 --> 02:12:06.279 last two hours, even the ones we protect. It's like 2720 02:12:06.319 --> 02:12:09.560 saying there's perfect prevention against cancer. It's not real. Sometimes 2721 02:12:09.560 --> 02:12:11.560 it's about just finding it early. And the point that 2722 02:12:11.560 --> 02:12:14.239 I'm getting across the whole idea is finding it before 2723 02:12:14.279 --> 02:12:17.199 it kills you. If you look at things that way, 2724 02:12:17.319 --> 02:12:20.239 at that scale, that even just during this two hours 2725 02:12:20.239 --> 02:12:23.520 that we're hanging you know, just there's companies that are 2726 02:12:23.560 --> 02:12:26.279 not going to be able to deliver food tomorrow. There's 2727 02:12:26.319 --> 02:12:28.640 going to be companies that can't run payroll. There's going 2728 02:12:28.720 --> 02:12:31.680 to be companies that can't schedule logistics meetings, and there's 2729 02:12:31.720 --> 02:12:34.319 going to be people that's causing stress on real people. 2730 02:12:34.800 --> 02:12:38.359 I don't think we equate cybercrime with real crime. And 2731 02:12:38.439 --> 02:12:40.760 I think in some ways we even victim shame. Oh 2732 02:12:40.840 --> 02:12:43.399 you got hacked, Right, you don't blame somebody for getting 2733 02:12:43.479 --> 02:12:46.319 robbed at knife point in New York City, Right, you 2734 02:12:46.399 --> 02:12:48.199 just flat out and say that's crap, Get out, go 2735 02:12:48.239 --> 02:12:50.840 after the criminal. And I think some ways that we 2736 02:12:50.920 --> 02:12:54.840 need more support to, like, let's treat hackers, and I 2737 02:12:54.880 --> 02:12:57.600 don't mean all hackers not ethical, right, the people who 2738 02:12:57.600 --> 02:13:02.279 are threat actors cyber criminals. Treat them like they are criminals, 2739 02:13:02.880 --> 02:13:06.720 and it should come with some real consequences. And let's 2740 02:13:06.760 --> 02:13:09.359 be willing to handle the gray areas. Maybe there's some 2741 02:13:09.399 --> 02:13:12.159 places that we have to interpret. Maybe there's some people 2742 02:13:12.159 --> 02:13:14.119 that aren't quite the same level. Right, just like how 2743 02:13:14.159 --> 02:13:17.800 we're having the conversations on like recreational drugs and stuff, 2744 02:13:18.000 --> 02:13:20.560 Let's be smart humans and understand there's gray. 2745 02:13:21.039 --> 02:13:22.239 Yeah, but I'm telling you. 2746 02:13:22.199 --> 02:13:25.279 When it's very clear that you're out to ruin people's lives, 2747 02:13:26.760 --> 02:13:29.000 why are we not considering. 2748 02:13:28.680 --> 02:13:30.520 More and I'm not going to all the way to 2749 02:13:30.560 --> 02:13:31.359 the extreme. 2750 02:13:31.039 --> 02:13:34.960 Of use of force. There is some level of disproportionate 2751 02:13:34.960 --> 02:13:38.359 force that I think. I imagine if, for instance, somebody 2752 02:13:38.479 --> 02:13:42.600 drone striked a group that was doing scam calls. That's 2753 02:13:42.640 --> 02:13:44.720 the most extreme example I can come up with here 2754 02:13:44.760 --> 02:13:47.760 at night. And what I'm going with is it probably 2755 02:13:47.840 --> 02:13:52.119 doesn't take too many of these things to have real repercussions. 2756 02:13:52.159 --> 02:13:54.479 And I would not advocate for like loss of life, 2757 02:13:54.640 --> 02:13:56.720 but maybe when it hits a certain level that you're 2758 02:13:56.760 --> 02:14:00.159 willing to attack a hospital, let's call it what it is. 2759 02:14:00.159 --> 02:14:02.680 It's no longer cyber crime. It's much closer to terrorism, 2760 02:14:03.079 --> 02:14:05.680 if not split out terrorism. And I just don't think, Yeah, 2761 02:14:05.720 --> 02:14:10.920 there's a whole lot of this willingness to have this 2762 02:14:11.039 --> 02:14:11.920 hard conversation. 2763 02:14:12.079 --> 02:14:16.000 Yet Yeah, for me, it's like even talking about scam calls. 2764 02:14:16.800 --> 02:14:19.840 I mean, do we measure how many Americans kill themselves 2765 02:14:19.880 --> 02:14:24.960 because they've lost everything through a scam call or through ransomware? Like, 2766 02:14:25.760 --> 02:14:28.520 so have they sort of taken that life? 2767 02:14:29.239 --> 02:14:31.800 I don't know. I feel like you, you know, you send. 2768 02:14:31.560 --> 02:14:34.640 A tomahawk to one or two thread actors and and 2769 02:14:34.920 --> 02:14:37.039 you'll separate the week from the chat, you'll see who's 2770 02:14:37.039 --> 02:14:38.640 serious about, you know, ransomware. 2771 02:14:38.760 --> 02:14:40.159 There will still be some that don't care. 2772 02:14:40.239 --> 02:14:43.439 You're not right, absolutely absolutely, But. 2773 02:14:43.439 --> 02:14:46.479 And there's versions of this right like jail time. I've 2774 02:14:46.520 --> 02:14:49.520 seen some of these that are like responsible for millions, 2775 02:14:49.600 --> 02:14:51.600 and they still end up with four to six years 2776 02:14:51.640 --> 02:14:54.920 when they finally get extradited. I again, I think there's 2777 02:14:55.000 --> 02:14:58.199 difference between people who rob banks and people who shoot 2778 02:14:58.199 --> 02:15:01.680 people while robbing banks. That's logical, that is a difference 2779 02:15:01.720 --> 02:15:05.239 between that. But I don't think, for instance, we do 2780 02:15:05.439 --> 02:15:08.039 enough to look at the blast radius. We don't look 2781 02:15:08.079 --> 02:15:10.439 at the collateral damage. And I do think we will 2782 02:15:10.439 --> 02:15:14.119 get there. I really think that now we're starting to realize. 2783 02:15:14.439 --> 02:15:16.560 But I will also say guys to not to like 2784 02:15:16.600 --> 02:15:19.000 maybe tone down some of the rhetoric. There's a lot 2785 02:15:19.000 --> 02:15:22.800 of incidents actually that businesses do get hacked and they 2786 02:15:22.800 --> 02:15:25.640 go back to business in six to eight weeks as well. 2787 02:15:25.920 --> 02:15:27.520 So I do think that we got to make sure 2788 02:15:27.560 --> 02:15:30.840 that like, when it's extreme, let's treat it more extreme, right, 2789 02:15:31.000 --> 02:15:33.640 and when it's chill, let's normalize that some people get 2790 02:15:33.680 --> 02:15:36.119 the car burglarized and let's just go back to work 2791 02:15:36.159 --> 02:15:38.039 the next day. You know, get the window fixed by 2792 02:15:38.279 --> 02:15:41.039 USA or whoever your car insurance. And so if you 2793 02:15:41.039 --> 02:15:43.520 can't tell, I'm like this weird version of where I'm 2794 02:15:43.560 --> 02:15:45.479 simultaneously saying reck. 2795 02:15:45.319 --> 02:15:49.279 Them right and also chill, And I think that's okay. 2796 02:15:49.039 --> 02:15:52.119 Right, we have any more question? One more question? 2797 02:15:52.600 --> 02:15:55.640 Do you have any thoughts on cyber having kinetic effects 2798 02:15:55.640 --> 02:16:00.720 in warfare like hacking medical devices and altering device functionality? 2799 02:16:02.479 --> 02:16:05.319 I think if laws support it, do it. And I 2800 02:16:05.319 --> 02:16:07.920 don't mean that laws can't take it down. But for instance, 2801 02:16:07.960 --> 02:16:11.399 if I could take your internet connected car and I 2802 02:16:11.479 --> 02:16:14.560 have everything against you that you are an arms dealer 2803 02:16:14.560 --> 02:16:18.680 that's taken life, if I have the same war power, 2804 02:16:18.720 --> 02:16:21.359 for instance, if I was there to actually take life, 2805 02:16:22.399 --> 02:16:24.399 why does it matter if it comes from a bullet 2806 02:16:24.560 --> 02:16:27.760 or your Mercedes swerving off the bridge. I know that's extreme, 2807 02:16:27.800 --> 02:16:29.880 and I'm trying to make a point with it, but 2808 02:16:30.000 --> 02:16:34.319 my point behind it is let's not go to extreme 2809 02:16:34.399 --> 02:16:37.040 on either side, but let's keep things proportional. 2810 02:16:37.360 --> 02:16:38.559 Does it really matter? 2811 02:16:38.680 --> 02:16:40.840 And so I come from a world that my job 2812 02:16:40.879 --> 02:16:44.920 has literally taken life because of this, and it wasn't 2813 02:16:44.959 --> 02:16:47.040 against people who just did a little bit of credit 2814 02:16:47.040 --> 02:16:50.040 card fraud. They were people who blew up ten, fifteen, 2815 02:16:50.159 --> 02:16:55.239 twenty innocent people, some of their own citizens, some foreign Again, 2816 02:16:55.399 --> 02:16:57.879 I think the nuance matters here, So I'm trying to 2817 02:16:57.920 --> 02:17:01.200 give these edgy points to like make sure people have 2818 02:17:01.360 --> 02:17:04.399 a sound bite and they can like jolt them to think. 2819 02:17:05.079 --> 02:17:06.760 But I'm also trying to bring it down to the 2820 02:17:06.840 --> 02:17:10.799 nuance matters. So for me, there is definitely situations that 2821 02:17:10.879 --> 02:17:13.479 exist that we should be able to use cyber to 2822 02:17:13.600 --> 02:17:17.120 deliver kinetic effects when the juice is worth the squeeze, 2823 02:17:17.239 --> 02:17:19.079 or when we would have done the same thing if 2824 02:17:19.079 --> 02:17:20.319 it was a physical situation. 2825 02:17:20.440 --> 02:17:26.000 Right, Yeah, Kyle, tell us about where can people find you? 2826 02:17:26.079 --> 02:17:29.159 Where can they find Huntress? What types of companies should 2827 02:17:29.159 --> 02:17:32.840 contact you? And you try to procure your services? I 2828 02:17:32.879 --> 02:17:34.280 mean who needs to find you? 2829 02:17:35.079 --> 02:17:37.840 Yeah, so I gave all the embarrassing stories earlier. When 2830 02:17:37.879 --> 02:17:41.280 I was small, we serviced businesses that were small businesses. 2831 02:17:41.360 --> 02:17:45.040 It turns out now we're cybersecurity for all businesses and 2832 02:17:45.079 --> 02:17:47.399 it's not just a tool where the full team that 2833 02:17:47.520 --> 02:17:50.799 actually does all the development and the same team building 2834 02:17:50.799 --> 02:17:54.440 the tool is the same team hunting these cyber criminals. 2835 02:17:54.959 --> 02:17:58.079 Huntress dot com is obviously the website but it turns 2836 02:17:58.120 --> 02:18:00.760 out some of our spiciest stuff you can find is 2837 02:18:00.799 --> 02:18:04.440 on stuff like LinkedIn, on x right, on Facebook. We 2838 02:18:04.479 --> 02:18:07.959 actually show on a daily basis what we're wrecking. And 2839 02:18:08.000 --> 02:18:10.280 that goes back to that mission statement I said earlier. 2840 02:18:10.559 --> 02:18:15.639 If you lead with not only transparency and integrity, but 2841 02:18:16.239 --> 02:18:18.040 educate these companies that don't. 2842 02:18:17.799 --> 02:18:19.360 Have resources, maybe like yours. 2843 02:18:19.799 --> 02:18:23.600 With community and with education, you can kind of make 2844 02:18:23.639 --> 02:18:24.799 a real big difference in the world. 2845 02:18:24.840 --> 02:18:26.520 So again, the website's cool. 2846 02:18:26.600 --> 02:18:28.559 You can learn about us on a website, but if 2847 02:18:28.600 --> 02:18:30.319 you want to see the real kind of like deal 2848 02:18:30.360 --> 02:18:32.920 that you've got to experience tonight, find us on LinkedIn, 2849 02:18:33.000 --> 02:18:34.799 Find us on one of those social networks that's where 2850 02:18:34.799 --> 02:18:36.639 we actually talk, just like we talked today. 2851 02:18:36.920 --> 02:18:37.399 Yeah. 2852 02:18:37.440 --> 02:18:37.879 Awesome. 2853 02:18:38.520 --> 02:18:40.760 Yeah, it's been fantastic, really really. 2854 02:18:40.520 --> 02:18:43.600 Thank you Kyle guys. Well again, I appreciate it. 2855 02:18:43.639 --> 02:18:43.840 Again. 2856 02:18:43.879 --> 02:18:45.479 We got to touch a lot of topics that some 2857 02:18:45.520 --> 02:18:47.440 people shy away from. We got to be able to 2858 02:18:47.440 --> 02:18:49.159 play both sides of the fence, and I just really 2859 02:18:49.200 --> 02:18:51.840 appreciate I know it took us a handful of years 2860 02:18:51.840 --> 02:18:54.360 for both of our schedules to work, but I don't know. 2861 02:18:54.639 --> 02:18:56.920 Two and a half drinks in and I'm feeling like 2862 02:18:57.120 --> 02:18:58.079 we succeeded. 2863 02:18:58.120 --> 02:18:59.479 So cheers, guys, outstanding. 2864 02:18:59.520 --> 02:19:02.079 We'll do it and some time, Kyle, and thank you 2865 02:19:02.120 --> 02:19:05.120 for your time spending some for your Friday evening with us. 2866 02:19:05.719 --> 02:19:07.200 Yeah, this was awesome, Thank you so much. 2867 02:19:07.239 --> 02:19:10.280 Guys. Hi, I got one more question? What the where? 2868 02:19:10.319 --> 02:19:12.239 What countries does Huntress service? 2869 02:19:13.559 --> 02:19:14.959 So we actually service all of them? 2870 02:19:15.040 --> 02:19:15.200 Right? 2871 02:19:15.319 --> 02:19:16.920 There is a you know when it comes down to 2872 02:19:17.120 --> 02:19:20.159 like we have some legal obligations like I can't service 2873 02:19:20.239 --> 02:19:23.360 Syria today if they're sanctioned away. But when I say 2874 02:19:23.360 --> 02:19:25.760 one hundred and fifty thousand businesses, I'm not talking about 2875 02:19:25.799 --> 02:19:29.399 like in the Atlanta or Baltimore a DC region. There 2876 02:19:29.399 --> 02:19:32.000 are one hundred and fifty thousand businesses that some you 2877 02:19:32.040 --> 02:19:34.760 would know and some that just provide all the power 2878 02:19:34.760 --> 02:19:37.399 and electricity that you don't know across the entire globe. 2879 02:19:37.440 --> 02:19:38.120 So no joke. 2880 02:19:38.520 --> 02:19:42.000 We are a proper global company, wrecking hackers no matter 2881 02:19:42.000 --> 02:19:42.760 where they try to go. 2882 02:19:42.719 --> 02:19:47.520 After what what would be your like five year dream 2883 02:19:47.680 --> 02:19:48.520 for hundreds? 2884 02:19:49.559 --> 02:19:49.840 Dude? 2885 02:19:50.120 --> 02:19:52.319 So I asked this question or I get asked this 2886 02:19:52.440 --> 02:19:54.680 question a lot too, meaning I asked my teammates, but 2887 02:19:54.760 --> 02:19:58.479 also get asked and what's nice about it is hackers 2888 02:19:59.000 --> 02:20:01.760 are so innovati if they have to be respected, just 2889 02:20:01.920 --> 02:20:05.639 like for instance, adversaries, they're smart humans. And the one 2890 02:20:05.680 --> 02:20:08.760 thing that I love is, think about launching a rocket 2891 02:20:08.799 --> 02:20:11.680 to the moon. Physics don't change, right. If you know 2892 02:20:11.719 --> 02:20:13.879 the physics, you know the Earth orbit, you can take 2893 02:20:13.920 --> 02:20:16.600 a rocket, go around the moon, slingshot back, land it 2894 02:20:16.639 --> 02:20:17.559 on a drone platform. 2895 02:20:17.600 --> 02:20:18.079 You're done. 2896 02:20:18.879 --> 02:20:23.959 But cybersecurity is brilliant shady humans against brilliant ethical humans. 2897 02:20:24.280 --> 02:20:26.799 And the part that I would share is I hope 2898 02:20:26.959 --> 02:20:29.719 more and more and more through like our conversation we 2899 02:20:29.799 --> 02:20:33.399 shared today that the ethical side can you know, not 2900 02:20:33.479 --> 02:20:36.760 just cat and mouse this, but disproportionately win. We're not 2901 02:20:36.799 --> 02:20:38.680 going to win at all, but I think we're on 2902 02:20:38.760 --> 02:20:42.600 the cusp of using our offensive skills to support defense 2903 02:20:43.200 --> 02:20:47.040 that could finally change. Like, so, cyber criminals are making 2904 02:20:47.159 --> 02:20:49.879 less money than the companies protecting them, and I know 2905 02:20:49.920 --> 02:20:54.159 that sounds like so capitalistic. You want that companies like 2906 02:20:54.200 --> 02:20:57.200 this are making money. You are just doing whatever you do, 2907 02:20:58.079 --> 02:21:03.879 dry cleaning, delivering pain right services, shipping things, whatever, widget software. 2908 02:21:04.200 --> 02:21:06.680 You want that to win. And for me, I would 2909 02:21:06.719 --> 02:21:07.319 like no matter. 2910 02:21:07.239 --> 02:21:09.479 Where threat actors go, I would love for Huntress to 2911 02:21:09.479 --> 02:21:11.639 be one step ahead like that would be a really 2912 02:21:11.639 --> 02:21:13.600 cool place that I could like pass away and feel 2913 02:21:13.639 --> 02:21:14.079 good about. 2914 02:21:14.479 --> 02:21:15.120 That's awesome. 2915 02:21:16.479 --> 02:21:19.120 Kyle, thank you again for taking the time to do 2916 02:21:19.200 --> 02:21:22.200 this interview, and maybe we'll come back to you again 2917 02:21:22.399 --> 02:21:25.079 at some juncture in the future when we need your 2918 02:21:25.559 --> 02:21:30.840 cyber expertise. And we will see all you guys next week. 2919 02:21:31.280 --> 02:21:34.280 There's some links down the description for you'll find Kyle, 2920 02:21:34.319 --> 02:21:35.319 you'll find Huntress. 2921 02:21:35.840 --> 02:21:38.280 You also find our Patreon. Thank you everyone who 2922 02:21:38.360 --> 02:21:41.440 Subscribes, and we have new merch also, so you can 2923 02:21:41.440 --> 02:21:44.959 find that down there, and thank you everyone, and we 2924 02:21:45.000 --> 02:21:46.000 will see you next week.