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<v Speaker 1>Welcome back to the deep Dive. Today. We're kracking open

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<v Speaker 1>a really fascinating stack of sources. It's excerpts from a

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<v Speaker 1>book called The Art of Network Penetration Testing. And this

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<v Speaker 1>isn't a theory, right, it's like a practical guide on

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<v Speaker 1>how the pros simulate cyber attacks on company networks.

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<v Speaker 2>That's exactly it. Our deep dive today is basically pulling

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<v Speaker 2>back the curtain on how ethical hackers operate. We're trying

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<v Speaker 2>to understand, you know, what does a network penetration test?

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<v Speaker 2>Why do companies even need them? And maybe the most

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<v Speaker 2>interesting part the actual steps, the phases and techniques they use.

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<v Speaker 2>It's all straight from this how to guide.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like we're getting the attackers playbook, but you know,

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<v Speaker 1>used for.

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<v Speaker 2>Defense precisely the core idea and the source really emphasizes

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<v Speaker 2>this is simulating how a real adversary thinks and acts,

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<v Speaker 2>trying to find those security weaknesses before the bad guys do.

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<v Speaker 1>The book uses that analogy, doesn't it hiring a professional adversary?

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<v Speaker 2>It does, and it's kind of surprising how much the

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<v Speaker 2>whole process can feel like like planning movie heist.

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<v Speaker 1>Huh okay, I like that you.

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<v Speaker 2>Know, mapping the place out, finding entry points, moving around,

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<v Speaker 2>just replace laser grids with firewalls. Maybe we'll walk through

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<v Speaker 2>all that, the planning, getting in, moving deeper, and then

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<v Speaker 2>the reporting. Lots of interesting stuff here.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's definitely unpack this. So first things first, what

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<v Speaker 1>exactly is a penetration test a pentist?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, think of it as an authorized simulated attack. The

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<v Speaker 2>goal isn't just scanning passively, it's actively trying to exploit weaknesses,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, just like a real attacker.

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<v Speaker 1>Would, so actively trying to break in, essentially exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And the book points out sometimes these tests are done

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<v Speaker 2>almost secretly, like the client's security team might not even

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<v Speaker 2>know what's happening until they get the final report.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, okay, trying to sneak past the guards, that's the idea.

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<v Speaker 2>You're adopting that malicious mindset. But here's a really important

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<v Speaker 2>point the book makes early on. A pentist isn't very

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<v Speaker 2>useful if the company's basic security, their hygiene is just

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<v Speaker 2>bad house. So well, if you've got what they call

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<v Speaker 2>low hanging fruit everywhere, default passwords not changed, people sharing logins,

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<v Speaker 2>everyone having admin rights, critical patches missing, ye appentis is

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<v Speaker 2>just going to find all those really obvious things first.

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<v Speaker 1>So like, if you haven't even locked the front door,

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<v Speaker 1>don't pay someone fancy to tell you the front door's unlocked.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a perfect way to put it. Fix the absolute

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<v Speaker 2>basics first. Default passwords, for instance, The source says they're

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<v Speaker 2>shockingly common and attackers actively look for them because they're

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<v Speaker 2>such easy wins.

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<v Speaker 1>It makes total sense. Fix the big holes before you

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<v Speaker 1>check for tiny cracks now. The book also mentions for

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<v Speaker 1>anyone wanting to learn this stuff, setting up a lab.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh definitely, learning by doing is crucial. The source suggests

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<v Speaker 2>using something like the Capsule Core Pentest project. It gives

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<v Speaker 2>you a pre built credit environment to practice on. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>and for your own machine, the attacker machine, they strongly

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<v Speaker 2>recommend starting with Linux Opuntu for example. So many of

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<v Speaker 2>the standard pen testing tools are built for Linux. They

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<v Speaker 2>just run better there.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, Getting the tools and the environment set up kind

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<v Speaker 1>of step zero.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, you need that stable tool rich setup Linux is

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<v Speaker 2>really fundamental for this kind of work.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So let's get into the actual process. The book

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<v Speaker 1>lays out a pretty standard four phase approach for specifically

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<v Speaker 1>internal network penetration tests or ionpts.

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<v Speaker 2>That's right, And interestingly, they mentioned a typical IMPT can

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<v Speaker 2>often wrap up within a normal forty hour work week.

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<v Speaker 1>Really okay, Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>These four phases are basically the attackers playbook once they're

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<v Speaker 2>inside the network perimeter. Yeah, even if that initial inside

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<v Speaker 2>access is just simulated for the test itself.

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<v Speaker 1>Gotcha. So phase one, if we're sticking with the heist analogy,

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<v Speaker 1>this sounds like the planning, the recon phase casing the

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<v Speaker 1>joint exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>That Phase one is all about information gathering. The main

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<v Speaker 2>goal is to map out the target's attack surface. You

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<v Speaker 2>need to figure out, Okay, what systems are actually alive

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<v Speaker 2>on this network, what services are they running, where the

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<v Speaker 2>potential entry point?

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<v Speaker 1>How you even start finding systems? Networks can be huge.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the host discovery part. You're looking for live machines

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<v Speaker 2>within whatever IP range you've been given, or you're trying

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<v Speaker 2>to discover the source. Talks about different scopes. Here, white

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<v Speaker 2>box where the client gives you a list of targets, sure,

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<v Speaker 2>black box where you basically start blind, and gray box,

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<v Speaker 2>which is somewhere in between. Maybe you get some IP ranges.

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<v Speaker 2>But here's a really interesting point from the book. Even

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<v Speaker 2>in a white box test where the client gives you

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<v Speaker 2>a list. Experienced PEN testers often still scan the whole

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<v Speaker 2>range anyway. Why is that because clients frequently miss systems

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<v Speaker 2>on their own network inventories.

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<v Speaker 1>No kidding, so their own map might be wrong. That's

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<v Speaker 1>a big deal, it really is.

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<v Speaker 2>It shows why this kind of independent testing is so

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<v Speaker 2>valuable for techniques. You've got simple stuff like ping, but

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<v Speaker 2>mostly you're using powerful tools like ENMP. The book mentions

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<v Speaker 2>specific n MAP options like at PN to assume hosts

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<v Speaker 2>or up or things like min rate to speed up

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<v Speaker 2>the scanning significantly to cover faster exactly. They also mentioned

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<v Speaker 2>maybe sniffing network traffic with wireshark, looking for hosts talking,

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<v Speaker 2>or even hunting for hidden subnets if the scope allows.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so you found the live machines. What's next in

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<v Speaker 1>this info gathering phase.

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<v Speaker 2>Necktub is service discovery. So now you know who's home,

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<v Speaker 2>you need to figure out what doors are open on

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<v Speaker 2>those houses and what's behind.

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<v Speaker 1>Them doors being ports right.

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<v Speaker 2>Finding which services are running on which ports across that

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<v Speaker 2>whole range zero to six, five, five, three five, and

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<v Speaker 2>figuring out what the service is. Is it a web server,

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<v Speaker 2>a database, something.

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<v Speaker 1>Else, like checking the signs on the shops and you're

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<v Speaker 1>building analogy earlier.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and many services advertise themselves with service banners. It's

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<v Speaker 2>like that sign telling you the software name and maybe

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<v Speaker 2>even the version number. Tools like Curl can grab this

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<v Speaker 2>from web servers, for example, and getting that version info.

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<v Speaker 2>That's gold for an attacker looking for known exploits.

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<v Speaker 1>And end map is key here too for finding the

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<v Speaker 1>open ports.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh. Absolutely, enmap is your main cool for port scanning.

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<v Speaker 2>You're looking for common ones twenty two for Ssh, eighty

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<v Speaker 2>and four forty three for web three three eighty nine

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<v Speaker 2>for Windows Remote desktop. The source gets practical tips on

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<v Speaker 2>how to parse end map's output, maybe using command line

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<v Speaker 2>tools like rep or cut to filter results my filter.

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<v Speaker 2>So you can create specific target lists for the next step,

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<v Speaker 2>like okay, here's a list of just the web servers

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<v Speaker 2>or just the systems. Running Microsoft Seql helps you focus

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<v Speaker 2>your efforts.

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<v Speaker 1>Which leads to vulnerability discovery. Now you know what services

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<v Speaker 1>are running. Time to check if the locks on those doors.

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<v Speaker 2>Are weak precisely, Now you analyze those identified services for

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<v Speaker 2>known weaknesses. Is there an authentication problem, a configuration mistake?

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<v Speaker 2>Is it missing critical security patches?

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<v Speaker 1>Oh?

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, And this is where pintesting really differs from just

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<v Speaker 2>running say an SS or Qualis scan. Those tools often

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<v Speaker 2>flag potential issues based on version numbers, known cvs.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, theoretical problems.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, ap Pennus focuses on finding things that are actually

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<v Speaker 2>exploitable in that specific environment. Can I really use this

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<v Speaker 2>weakness to get in?

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<v Speaker 1>Like finding a specific old software version with a known

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<v Speaker 1>working exploit.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly That and missing patches are a huge one. The

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<v Speaker 2>book uses MS seventeen zero ten the eternal Blue vulnerability

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<v Speaker 2>as a prime example. It's famous from twenty seventeen, but

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<v Speaker 2>the source says finding system still missing this patch is

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<v Speaker 2>often an easy quick win for attackers.

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<v Speaker 1>Still wow, yep.

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<v Speaker 2>You can even use tools within frameworks like metasploit to

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<v Speaker 2>specifically check for it. Finding Eternal Blue unpatched that's a

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<v Speaker 2>major red flag.

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<v Speaker 1>One of the things like weak passwords authentication issues.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, absolutely critical. The source talks a lot about guessing

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<v Speaker 2>or brute forcing passwords, trying default credentials, building clients. Specific

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<v Speaker 2>word lists may be based on the company name They

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<v Speaker 2>mentioned using metasploit modules again to hammer login prompts for

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<v Speaker 2>databases like MSCL or myceycle or even VNC remote access services,

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<v Speaker 2>which sometimes don't lock accounts after too many bad guesses. Yikes.

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<v Speaker 2>And here's another surprising bit. The book notes that successful

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<v Speaker 2>password guessing often leads logs, but companies frequently do monitor

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<v Speaker 2>those logs closely enough, or they ignore the alerts.

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<v Speaker 1>So the alarm is ringing but nobody's listening.

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<v Speaker 2>Per pick analogy. Then you've got configuration vulnerabilities. Services just

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<v Speaker 2>set up insecurely, maybe using default settings. The book suggests

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<v Speaker 2>a cool tool called web shot.

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<v Speaker 1>What does that do?

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<v Speaker 2>It takes screenshots of lots of web servers really quickly,

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<v Speaker 2>helps you visually scan and spot potentially interesting things, maybe

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<v Speaker 2>an old admin interface or specific platforms like Apache, Tomcat

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<v Speaker 2>or Jenkins which are known to have remote code execution

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<v Speaker 2>possibilities if you can guess their admin passwords.

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<v Speaker 1>So Phase one is really about building this incredibly detailed

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<v Speaker 1>map of the network's weak spots, understanding the landscape exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It's deep reconnaissance lets you make an informed decision about

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<v Speaker 2>the path of least resistance, which vulnerability looks most promising

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<v Speaker 2>to get you that initial access, rather than just you know,

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<v Speaker 2>randomly trying stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, map complete weak points identified. Phase two focus penetration.

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<v Speaker 1>Now the heist crew actually makes their move right getting

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<v Speaker 1>inside the building.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the goal, precisely gain that initial foothold. You're actively

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<v Speaker 2>exploiting one or more of those vulnerabilities found in phase

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<v Speaker 2>one to get remote control, usually called getting a shell.

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<v Speaker 1>How does that work attacking a web server for.

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<v Speaker 2>Example, Well, say you found weak admin credentials on that

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<v Speaker 2>Tomcat or Jenkin server. You might be able to achieve

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<v Speaker 2>remote code execution RCE, basically tricking the server into running

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<v Speaker 2>your commands. Okay, for Tomcap, maybe you upload a malicious

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<v Speaker 2>web application file a war file through the admin panel.

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<v Speaker 2>That file then runs and gives you a command prompt

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<v Speaker 2>on the.

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<v Speaker 1>Server, a shell.

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<v Speaker 2>A shell. Yeah. Now, the source distinguishes between interactive shells

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<v Speaker 2>like a normal command prompt and non interactive ones, which

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<v Speaker 2>can be more limited. They even list some safe commands

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<v Speaker 2>you can usually run in those limited shells, like ipconfig

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<v Speaker 2>to check network settings, task lists to see processes, or

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<v Speaker 2>during kat to look at files.

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<v Speaker 1>So you might not get full easy control right away.

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<v Speaker 2>It depends on the exploit and the shell you get back.

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<v Speaker 2>Sometimes even limited access is enough. Here's a really clever

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<v Speaker 2>Windows trick. The book details the sticky keys back door.

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<v Speaker 1>Sticky keys like the accessibility feature.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, you replace the program that runs when you hit

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<v Speaker 2>shift five times sets dot ex with the command prompt

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<v Speaker 2>cmd dot ex. If you have remote desktop access RDB

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<v Speaker 2>and the right permissions to swap the files. Uh huh,

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<v Speaker 2>you can hit shift five times at the Windows login

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<v Speaker 2>screen and instead of sticky keys options, you get a

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<v Speaker 2>system level command prompt.

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<v Speaker 1>Whoo, that's disius, there really is.

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<v Speaker 2>The book mentions you might need tools like cackles dot

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<v Speaker 2>ex first to mess with file permissions to allow the replacement.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, what about attacking databases like that ms sql example, if.

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<v Speaker 2>You found credentials in phase one, maybe that's SAFF password

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<v Speaker 2>one combo. The source uses as an example. You connect

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<v Speaker 2>to the database now if a specific stored procedure called

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<v Speaker 2>xpcmd shell is enabled, which shouldn't be usually. Why not

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<v Speaker 2>because it lets you run operating system commands directly from

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<v Speaker 2>the database. So you could type CQ commands that execute

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<v Speaker 2>WAMI or if config on the underlying server. You definitely

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<v Speaker 2>check what account the d B service itself is running,

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<v Speaker 2>asked to see how much power you just got?

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<v Speaker 1>Gotcha? And if you found that eternal blue vulnerability MS

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<v Speaker 1>seventeen M zero ten zero, that's.

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<v Speaker 2>Often a much more direct route. You'd use a pre

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<v Speaker 2>built exploit module like MS one CO ten p XC

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<v Speaker 2>and metasploit pointed at the vulnerable machine, run it and

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<v Speaker 2>often boom you get a show.

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<v Speaker 1>And you mentioned some shells are better than others.

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<v Speaker 2>Materpreter, Yeah, Interpreter is metasploits enhanced shell. It has a

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<v Speaker 2>lot more built in capabilities, specifically for the next phases

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<v Speaker 2>of the attack post exploitation. Simple commands like EPs in

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<v Speaker 2>Interpreter let you see running processes and crucially who's logged

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<v Speaker 2>in the source gives an example of spotting a domain

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<v Speaker 2>user capsule Cartian logged in via RDP this.

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<v Speaker 1>Way, so you can see other users on the system exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Interpreter also lets you easily run more advanced modules, and

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<v Speaker 2>you can even generate custom versions of the Materpreter payload

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<v Speaker 2>using tools like m venom to try and evade antivirus.

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<v Speaker 1>So summing up phase two, it's all about getting that

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<v Speaker 1>first access that beachhead and maybe compromising multiple systems quickly

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<v Speaker 1>if possible.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the core idea. Get inside established presence. The more

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<v Speaker 2>systems you initially compromise, the better your chances of finding

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<v Speaker 2>useful information like credentials or finding a path that leads

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<v Speaker 2>deeper into the network. For Phase three, okay.

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<v Speaker 1>We're in. We have shells on one or more machines.

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<v Speaker 1>Phase three post exploitation and privileged escalation. Back to the heist.

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<v Speaker 1>The crews inside now they're moving around looking for the vault,

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<v Speaker 1>getting keys to restricted areas.

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<v Speaker 2>Perfect analogy. That's exactly what this phase is about. The

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<v Speaker 2>key goals here, according to the source, are maintain reliable

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<v Speaker 2>re entry, harvest credentials, maybe install more permanent back doors,

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<v Speaker 2>and move laterally jump from system.

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<v Speaker 1>To system maintaining re entry. That sounds important. You don't

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<v Speaker 1>want your shell to just die if the user logs

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<v Speaker 1>off or rebooths.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely, you need persistence. For Windows. The book talks about

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<v Speaker 2>using a meterpretcript called persistence. It can set up a

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<v Speaker 2>simple backdoor, maybe a VBScript that runs automatically on startup

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<v Speaker 2>and connects back to your attack machine. Very and the

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<v Speaker 2>Sorts mays a critical ethical point here. You must keep

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<v Speaker 2>detailed notes of everything you installed or change so you

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<v Speaker 2>can clean it up perfectly. Later for Linux or Uni

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<v Speaker 2>X systems. They talk about using kron job scheduled tasks,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe to automatically set up reverse SSH tunnels, using pre

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<v Speaker 2>shared keys for passwordless access back.

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<v Speaker 1>In okay, persistence covered. What about credential harvesting finding usernames

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<v Speaker 1>and passwords?

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<v Speaker 2>This is huge. It's like finding spare keys lying around

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<v Speaker 2>the building. On Windows, the go to tool is mimicats,

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<v Speaker 2>often run through metasploids KB extension. It's famous for being

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<v Speaker 2>able to dump clear text passwords directly from the computer's

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<v Speaker 2>memory if they're stored there. Commands like tspkg or w

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<v Speaker 2>digest do this.

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<v Speaker 1>Clear text passwords and memory often Yes.

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<v Speaker 2>You can also try to grab cash domain credentials hashes

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<v Speaker 2>of passwords for users who've logged into that box before,

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<v Speaker 2>using formats like mscash two. On Linux unn the X,

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<v Speaker 2>you might check the user's commandhistoryfile dot bash history. People

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<v Speaker 2>sometimes type passwords on a command.

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<v Speaker 1>Line Oh wow, seriously it happens.

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<v Speaker 2>Or you grab the password hashes from the ETCA shadow file,

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<v Speaker 2>which stores them in a hashed format.

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<v Speaker 1>So you're grabbing credentials from memory history.

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<v Speaker 2>What else searching the filesystem itself, looking for configuration files

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<v Speaker 2>where developers might have hard coded passwords. The source list's

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<v Speaker 2>common examples web dot ca fig for asp, dot net apps,

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<v Speaker 2>tomcatusers dot xml for tomcat, can figure out ink dot php.

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<v Speaker 2>For some PHP apps, you'd use system search commands like

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<v Speaker 2>find star on Windows or grap on Linux to hunt

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<v Speaker 2>for keywords like password or PWD within files.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so now you've potentially got a collection of usernames,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe some clear text passwords, and a bunch of password hashes.

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<v Speaker 1>What do you do with the hashes?

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<v Speaker 2>You try to crack them using tools like John the Ripper.

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<v Speaker 2>The book explains the difference between brute force cracking trying

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<v Speaker 2>every single combination, which is super slow for strong passwords,

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<v Speaker 2>and dictionary attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>Using lists of common passwords.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly like the famous Rocky dot txt list. Dictionary attacks

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<v Speaker 2>are surprisingly effective against weaker common passwords. The source mentions

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<v Speaker 2>cracking the hash for that user t in and finding

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<v Speaker 2>the password was password eighty two to two, pretty common format.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so cracked passwords or harvested clear text ones, Now

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<v Speaker 1>you can move laterly.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, that's lateral movement. You take those credentials or even

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<v Speaker 2>just to hashes and use them to log in to

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<v Speaker 2>other computers on the network that you couldn't access before.

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<v Speaker 2>For Windows, the source highlights a really powerful technique called

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<v Speaker 2>pass the hash pa'ss the hash Yeah. Tools like crack map,

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<v Speaker 2>exec CME or Metasploit's smug in module let you authenticate

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<v Speaker 2>to other Windows machines using just the user's password hash.

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<v Speaker 2>You don't even need to crack it to the plain

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<v Speaker 2>text password first.

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<v Speaker 1>That's incredible. You just need the hash fingerprint, not the

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<v Speaker 1>actual key.

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<v Speaker 2>Essentially, yes, it works because of how Windows authentication protocols

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<v Speaker 2>can operate, so as you're moving laterally, you're also constantly

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<v Speaker 2>looking for privileged escalation.

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<v Speaker 1>Opportunities getting more power on the machines you land on.

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<v Speaker 2>Right going from a regular user to administrator on Windows

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<v Speaker 2>or to the root user on Linux. On Linux unax,

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<v Speaker 2>the source mentions looking for misconfigured SUID binaries. These are

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<v Speaker 2>special programs that run with the permissions of the file's owner,

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<v Speaker 2>not the user running it. The password command is a

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<v Speaker 2>classic example. It needs root privileges to change the password

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<v Speaker 2>file even when run by a normal user. If you

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<v Speaker 2>find a custom program mistakenly set with SUID and owned

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<v Speaker 2>by rout, you might be able to exploit it to

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<v Speaker 2>become route. The book even gives an example of potentially

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<v Speaker 2>backdooring the ETSETA password file itself this way to add

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<v Speaker 2>a new root level user.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so you're moving sideways, grabbing more power. What's the

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<v Speaker 1>ultimate goal?

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<v Speaker 2>Usually in most corporate environments using Windows Active directory, the

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<v Speaker 2>ultimate prize is domain administrator privileges. That's basically the keys

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<v Speaker 2>to the entire kingdom full control.

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<v Speaker 1>How do you get there?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, first you need to identify who the domain admins are,

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<v Speaker 2>like net group domain admins. Domain can list them. Then

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<v Speaker 2>you need to figure out where they might be logged

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<v Speaker 2>in currently, maybe using commands like hinsta on servers you

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<v Speaker 2>already have access to.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, find the admins, fine, where they are? Then what?

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<v Speaker 2>Then? You try to compromise that session or machine. Maybe

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<v Speaker 2>you can impersonate their logged in session using tools like

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<v Speaker 2>Metasplois incognito. Or maybe you get lucky and use mimicats

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<v Speaker 2>on the machine where a domain admin is logged in

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<v Speaker 2>and steal their password or hash right out of memory.

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<v Speaker 1>So target the admins directly? Is there another way?

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<v Speaker 2>Yes? The real holy grail, as the source calls it,

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<v Speaker 2>is getting your hands on the NTDs dotd it file

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<v Speaker 2>from a domain controller.

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<v Speaker 1>The domain controller that's the main server for the Windows domain.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and that NTBs dotd it file it contains the

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<v Speaker 2>password hashes for every single user and computer in the

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<v Speaker 2>entire domain. It could be thousands.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, but isn't that file locked super tight by the OS.

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<v Speaker 2>It is while the domain controller is running. You can't

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<v Speaker 2>just copy it. So the book describes the standard TECHNIQE

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<v Speaker 2>using volume shadow copies VSC.

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<v Speaker 1>Shadow copies like the system backups.

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<v Speaker 2>Kind of yeah. You can use a built in Windows

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<v Speaker 2>command VS and flyming and create shadow to create a

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<v Speaker 2>point in time snapshot of the domain controller's hard drive.

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<v Speaker 2>This snapshot acts like a separate mounted volume, like plugging in.

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<v Speaker 1>A USB drive that has a copy of the system

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<v Speaker 1>files from a moment ago.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly like that. And crucially, the files on this shadow

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<v Speaker 2>copy aren't locked by the live operating system, so you

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<v Speaker 2>can just copy the NTDs dot dt file from the

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<v Speaker 2>shadow copy. You also need one other file from the

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<v Speaker 2>shadow copy, the System registry hive.

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<v Speaker 1>Why that one?

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<v Speaker 2>You need the system hive because it contains the key

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<v Speaker 2>required to decrypt the hashes stored in NTDs dot d.

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<v Speaker 2>Once you have both files NTDs dot D and system.

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<v Speaker 2>You take them offline to your attack machine. Then you

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<v Speaker 2>use tools like secret stump dot PUI from a toolkit

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<v Speaker 2>called impack it. You feed it those two files and

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<v Speaker 2>it extracts all the domain passwerd hashes.

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<v Speaker 1>All of them thousands, potentially game over basically pretty much.

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<v Speaker 2>With all those hashes, you can use past the hash

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<v Speaker 2>to access almost anything or start cracking the important ones.

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<v Speaker 2>So yeah, Phase three is really about leveraging that initial access,

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<v Speaker 2>moving strategically, escalating privileges, and aiming for that total control

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<v Speaker 2>to show maximum potential impact.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, incredible, We've planned the heist, reached the building, moved

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<v Speaker 1>through it, grab the crown jewels. Phase four documentation. This

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<v Speaker 1>isn't the part where the heist crew vanishes, is it.

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<v Speaker 2>No? Quite the opposite. This phase is absolutely critical. The

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<v Speaker 2>goal here is to deliver real value back to the client,

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<v Speaker 2>and you need to clearly report exactly how you got in,

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<v Speaker 2>what you found, what the risks are, and most importantly,

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<v Speaker 2>how they can fix it. The book really stresses this.

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<v Speaker 2>You need meticulous notes during the test. You can't write

401
00:19:42.480 --> 00:19:44.319
<v Speaker 2>a good report weeks later from memory.

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00:19:44.480 --> 00:19:47.039
<v Speaker 1>Makes sense. What goes into this report. What are the

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00:19:47.079 --> 00:19:47.799
<v Speaker 1>key sections?

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00:19:47.880 --> 00:19:51.119
<v Speaker 2>The source lays out the standard components. First, the executive summary,

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<v Speaker 2>high level, non technical for managers, for leadership. It answers

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00:19:55.640 --> 00:19:58.880
<v Speaker 2>the basic questions, who did the test, what was the scope,

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<v Speaker 2>what were the major find When did it happen? And

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<v Speaker 2>why does it matter? The how comes later?

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00:20:03.799 --> 00:20:05.599
<v Speaker 1>Got it? Big picture first exactly?

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00:20:05.960 --> 00:20:09.799
<v Speaker 2>Then the engagement methodology. This explains your approach. Was it whitebox,

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00:20:09.839 --> 00:20:12.759
<v Speaker 2>gray box, black box? It outlines the four phases you followed.

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<v Speaker 2>After that comes the attack narrative, the story of the

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<v Speaker 2>heist exactly. It's the step by step story of your

414
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<v Speaker 2>specific compromise. How did you get that first shell? What

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00:20:21.759 --> 00:20:24.000
<v Speaker 2>credentials did you find? How did you move from machine

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<v Speaker 2>AID to machine B? How did you eventually get domain admin?

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<v Speaker 2>If you did it.

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<v Speaker 1>Reads like a narrative, okay, that makes it understandable.

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<v Speaker 2>Then you have the core technical details. The technical observations

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<v Speaker 2>are findings. Each finding needs structure. The source suggests severity

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<v Speaker 2>like high, medium, low. High usually means direct compromise or

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<v Speaker 2>a clear path to it, a clear title. The observation itself.

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<v Speaker 2>The example found default Tomcat admin password, The impact what

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00:20:50.799 --> 00:20:56.079
<v Speaker 2>an attacker could do gain make code execution on the server, evidence, screenshots,

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00:20:56.319 --> 00:21:00.000
<v Speaker 2>command output to prove it assets affected, which specific servers

426
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<v Speaker 2>ips and finally a recommendation and what's.

427
00:21:03.279 --> 00:21:06.039
<v Speaker 1>The philosophy behind what counts as a finding?

428
00:21:06.400 --> 00:21:09.359
<v Speaker 2>This is important. The book emphasizes finding should be based

429
00:21:09.400 --> 00:21:13.160
<v Speaker 2>on demonstrable compromise or a clear attack path you successfully

430
00:21:13.200 --> 00:21:16.480
<v Speaker 2>executed or validated. It's not usually about just listing minor

431
00:21:16.519 --> 00:21:19.680
<v Speaker 2>best practice deviations like maybe an old SSL cipher being enabled,

432
00:21:19.799 --> 00:21:22.680
<v Speaker 2>unless you could actually leverage that weakness somehow during your attack.

433
00:21:22.920 --> 00:21:25.799
<v Speaker 1>So focus on what an attacker could really do, not

434
00:21:26.000 --> 00:21:27.759
<v Speaker 1>just theoretical stuff exactly.

435
00:21:27.839 --> 00:21:31.640
<v Speaker 2>It's about proven risk and the recommendations need to be actionable.

436
00:21:32.039 --> 00:21:37.200
<v Speaker 2>Update this software and force stronger password complexity, disable xpcmd shell.

437
00:21:38.200 --> 00:21:40.319
<v Speaker 2>One key ethical point the source makes is not to

438
00:21:40.359 --> 00:21:44.000
<v Speaker 2>recommend specific vendor products unless that was part of the agreement.

439
00:21:44.319 --> 00:21:47.559
<v Speaker 2>You identify the type of control needed, not push a

440
00:21:47.599 --> 00:21:48.440
<v Speaker 2>particular brand.

441
00:21:48.640 --> 00:21:50.480
<v Speaker 1>And supporting infogos and appendices.

442
00:21:50.599 --> 00:21:53.359
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, things like how you define severity levels, the full

443
00:21:53.440 --> 00:21:56.079
<v Speaker 2>list of live hosts and open ports you found, maybe

444
00:21:56.160 --> 00:21:59.400
<v Speaker 2>a list of the tools used, references all the supporting data.

445
00:21:59.440 --> 00:22:03.039
<v Speaker 1>Okay, that's comprehensive. And one last really crucial step. The

446
00:22:03.039 --> 00:22:05.839
<v Speaker 1>book mentions cleanup absolutely critical.

447
00:22:06.240 --> 00:22:09.599
<v Speaker 2>Responsible pen testing means leaving the client's environment exactly as

448
00:22:09.599 --> 00:22:12.519
<v Speaker 2>you found it or arguably slightly more secure. By removing

449
00:22:12.519 --> 00:22:14.960
<v Speaker 2>any tools or changes you made, you cannot leave them

450
00:22:15.000 --> 00:22:15.640
<v Speaker 2>more vulnerable.

451
00:22:15.680 --> 00:22:16.680
<v Speaker 1>What does cleanup involve?

452
00:22:16.839 --> 00:22:20.720
<v Speaker 2>It means killing all your active sessions and shells, Removing

453
00:22:20.720 --> 00:22:23.480
<v Speaker 2>any files you uploaded, any backdoors you installed, like that

454
00:22:23.559 --> 00:22:27.680
<v Speaker 2>persistent script or the sticky keys hack, Reversing any configuration

455
00:22:27.839 --> 00:22:30.880
<v Speaker 2>changes you made, like if you had to enable xpcmd

456
00:22:30.960 --> 00:22:33.839
<v Speaker 2>shell to prove a point you disabled it again, delete

457
00:22:33.880 --> 00:22:37.279
<v Speaker 2>any temporary shares you created. It's about meticulous housekeeping.

458
00:22:37.440 --> 00:22:40.960
<v Speaker 1>Got it, leave no trace except for the report exactly.

459
00:22:41.160 --> 00:22:45.440
<v Speaker 1>So wow, we've really walked through that entire simulated attack

460
00:22:45.559 --> 00:22:48.799
<v Speaker 1>life cycle based on this guide, from the initial planning

461
00:22:48.839 --> 00:22:51.799
<v Speaker 1>and discovery, finding those weak spots, getting that foothold, moving

462
00:22:51.880 --> 00:22:55.960
<v Speaker 1>laterally and escalating privileges, potentially gaining full control, and then

463
00:22:56.119 --> 00:22:59.920
<v Speaker 1>crucially documenting it all so the organization can actually improve.

464
00:23:00.200 --> 00:23:03.319
<v Speaker 2>It's a really powerful process when done right. And that

465
00:23:03.440 --> 00:23:06.160
<v Speaker 2>core takeaway which the source hits on again and again,

466
00:23:06.480 --> 00:23:09.119
<v Speaker 2>is that understanding how an attacker thinks and operates, which

467
00:23:09.119 --> 00:23:12.119
<v Speaker 2>is what a good pentis simulates is probably the best

468
00:23:12.119 --> 00:23:14.599
<v Speaker 2>way to figure out how to build effective defenses. And

469
00:23:14.640 --> 00:23:16.839
<v Speaker 2>that low hanging fruit we talked about at the start,

470
00:23:17.359 --> 00:23:21.640
<v Speaker 2>default passwords, missing patches, it's not just theory. The book

471
00:23:21.680 --> 00:23:24.279
<v Speaker 2>makes it clear that's often the actual way attackers get

472
00:23:24.279 --> 00:23:28.599
<v Speaker 2>their first foothold basic security hygiene, getting the fundamentals right.

473
00:23:28.880 --> 00:23:30.880
<v Speaker 2>It really does go an incredibly long way.

474
00:23:31.160 --> 00:23:34.240
<v Speaker 1>It is pretty striking, isn't it. How finding just one mistake,

475
00:23:34.440 --> 00:23:39.160
<v Speaker 1>one oversight, that default password, that unpatched vulnerability like eternal

476
00:23:39.160 --> 00:23:43.119
<v Speaker 1>Blue can potentially unravel the security of an entire network

477
00:23:43.240 --> 00:23:46.079
<v Speaker 1>Using the kinds of techniques laid out here. It really

478
00:23:46.200 --> 00:23:48.880
<v Speaker 1>underscores that old saying defenders have to be right every time,

479
00:23:48.920 --> 00:23:50.319
<v Speaker 1>attackers only need to be right once.

480
00:23:50.440 --> 00:23:53.440
<v Speaker 2>It's a sobering reality for anyone in defense. Yeah, but

481
00:23:53.720 --> 00:23:56.960
<v Speaker 2>understanding the attack paths makes defense much smarter.

482
00:23:57.000 --> 00:24:00.599
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely so for you listening to this, thinking about this

483
00:24:00.680 --> 00:24:04.720
<v Speaker 1>whole process, the reconnaissance, the exploitation, the lateral movement, the

484
00:24:04.759 --> 00:24:08.400
<v Speaker 1>sheer power of finding just one open door. What single

485
00:24:08.440 --> 00:24:11.440
<v Speaker 1>security practice maybe in your own work or even personal setup,

486
00:24:11.440 --> 00:24:13.880
<v Speaker 1>feels like it might be that potential weak point, that

487
00:24:14.000 --> 00:24:16.440
<v Speaker 1>one thing that maybe deserves a closer look after hearing

488
00:24:16.440 --> 00:24:19.079
<v Speaker 1>all this something to definitely think about after this deep

489
00:24:19.119 --> 00:24:22.759
<v Speaker 1>dive into the art and science of network penetration testing.
