WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.200 --> 00:00:05.480 Chapter twelve of Considerations on Representative Government. This LibriVox recording 2 00:00:05.799 --> 00:00:10.320 is in the public domain. Considerations on Representative Government by 3 00:00:10.400 --> 00:00:16.320 John Stuart Mill, Chapter twelve ought pledges to be required 4 00:00:16.320 --> 00:00:20.559 from members of Parliament. Should a member of the legislature 5 00:00:20.640 --> 00:00:25.239 be bound by the instructions of his constituents. Should he 6 00:00:25.280 --> 00:00:28.000 be the organ of their sentiments or of his own, 7 00:00:29.239 --> 00:00:33.159 their ambassador to a Congress, or their professional agent, empowered 8 00:00:33.159 --> 00:00:35.320 not only to act for them, but to judge for 9 00:00:35.439 --> 00:00:38.039 them what ought to be done. These two theories of 10 00:00:38.079 --> 00:00:41.520 the duty of a legislator in a representative government have 11 00:00:41.640 --> 00:00:45.159 each its supporters, and each is the recognized doctrine of 12 00:00:45.200 --> 00:00:49.679 some representative governments. In the Dutch United Provinces, the members 13 00:00:49.759 --> 00:00:53.600 of the States General were mere delegates, and to such 14 00:00:53.640 --> 00:00:56.359 a length was the doctrine carried that when any important 15 00:00:56.399 --> 00:01:00.200 question arose which had not been provided for in their instruction, 16 00:01:00.679 --> 00:01:04.079 they had to refer back to their constituents, exactly as 17 00:01:04.120 --> 00:01:07.159 an ambassador does to the government from which he is accredited. 18 00:01:08.680 --> 00:01:12.760 In this and most other countries which possess representative constitutions, 19 00:01:13.640 --> 00:01:16.439 law and custom warrant a member of parliament in voting 20 00:01:16.439 --> 00:01:20.280 according to his opinion of right, however, different from that 21 00:01:20.439 --> 00:01:23.959 of his constituents. But there is a floating notion of 22 00:01:24.000 --> 00:01:29.560 the opposite kind, which has considerable practical operation on many minds, 23 00:01:30.079 --> 00:01:33.719 even of members of Parliament, and often makes them, independently 24 00:01:33.760 --> 00:01:36.680 of desire for popularity or concern for their re election, 25 00:01:37.480 --> 00:01:40.840 feel bound in conscience to let their conduct on questions 26 00:01:40.879 --> 00:01:44.760 on which their constituents have a decided opinion be the 27 00:01:44.959 --> 00:01:50.480 expression of that opinion, rather than of their own. Abstractedly 28 00:01:50.560 --> 00:01:54.079 from positive law and from the historical traditions of any 29 00:01:54.079 --> 00:01:57.640 particular people, which of these notions of the duty of 30 00:01:57.680 --> 00:02:02.000 a representative is the true one? Unlike the questions which 31 00:02:02.000 --> 00:02:05.000 we have hitherto treated. This is not a question of 32 00:02:05.079 --> 00:02:08.919 constitutional legislation, but of what may more properly be called 33 00:02:08.960 --> 00:02:15.319 constitutional morality, the ethics of representative government. It does not 34 00:02:15.360 --> 00:02:18.400 so much concern institutions as the temper of mind which 35 00:02:18.479 --> 00:02:22.000 the electors ought to bring to the discharge of their functions, 36 00:02:23.080 --> 00:02:25.840 the ideas which should prevail as to the moral duties 37 00:02:25.879 --> 00:02:29.800 of an elector. For let the system of representation be 38 00:02:29.919 --> 00:02:32.599 what it may, it will be converted into one of 39 00:02:32.719 --> 00:02:37.479 mere delegation. If the electors so choose. As long as 40 00:02:37.479 --> 00:02:39.759 they are free not to vote, and free to vote 41 00:02:39.759 --> 00:02:42.800 as they like, they cannot be prevented from making their 42 00:02:42.879 --> 00:02:46.680 vote depend on any condition they think fit to annex 43 00:02:46.800 --> 00:02:50.439 to it, by refusing to elect any one who will 44 00:02:50.479 --> 00:02:53.800 not pledge himself to all their opinions, and even if 45 00:02:53.840 --> 00:02:56.479 they please to consult with them before voting on any 46 00:02:56.520 --> 00:03:01.159 important subject, not foreseen, they can reduce their representative to 47 00:03:01.240 --> 00:03:05.759 their mere mouthpiece, or to compel him in honor, when 48 00:03:05.800 --> 00:03:08.840 no longer willing to act in that capacity, to resign 49 00:03:08.879 --> 00:03:11.919 his seat. And since they have the power of doing this, 50 00:03:12.280 --> 00:03:15.319 the theory of the constitution ought to suppose that they 51 00:03:15.360 --> 00:03:17.800 will wish to do it, since the very principle of 52 00:03:17.840 --> 00:03:22.120 constitutional government requires it to be assumed that political power 53 00:03:22.199 --> 00:03:25.840 will be abused to promote the particular purposes of the holder, 54 00:03:26.719 --> 00:03:29.639 not because it always is so, but because such is 55 00:03:29.680 --> 00:03:32.960 the natural tendency of things to guard against, which is 56 00:03:33.039 --> 00:03:37.520 the especial use of free institutions. However wrong therefore, or 57 00:03:37.639 --> 00:03:40.560 however foolish, we may think it in the electors to 58 00:03:40.599 --> 00:03:44.159 convert their representative into a delegate, that stretch of the 59 00:03:44.199 --> 00:03:47.800 electoral privilege being a natural and not an improbable one, 60 00:03:48.560 --> 00:03:51.199 the same precautions ought to be taken as if it 61 00:03:51.199 --> 00:03:53.800 were certain. We may hope that the electors will not 62 00:03:53.879 --> 00:03:56.240 act on this notion of the use of the suffrage. 63 00:03:56.879 --> 00:03:59.719 But a representative government needs to be so framed that 64 00:03:59.719 --> 00:04:01.800 even if they do, they shall not be able to 65 00:04:01.840 --> 00:04:04.080 effect what ought not to be in the power of 66 00:04:04.159 --> 00:04:08.520 any body of persons class legislation for their own benefit. 67 00:04:09.840 --> 00:04:11.960 When it is said that the question is only one 68 00:04:12.000 --> 00:04:17.800 of political morality, this does not extenuate its importance. Questions 69 00:04:17.839 --> 00:04:21.879 of constitutional morality are of no less practical moment than 70 00:04:21.920 --> 00:04:26.439 those relating to the Constitution itself. The very existence of 71 00:04:26.480 --> 00:04:30.160 some governments and all that renders others endurable, rests on 72 00:04:30.199 --> 00:04:35.800 the practical observance of doctrines of constitutional morality, traditional notions 73 00:04:35.800 --> 00:04:39.519 in the minds of the several constituted authorities, which modify 74 00:04:39.560 --> 00:04:42.000 the use that might otherwise be made of their powers. 75 00:04:43.600 --> 00:04:49.680 In unbalanced governments pure monarchy, pure aristocracy, pure democracy, such 76 00:04:49.759 --> 00:04:52.920 maxims are the only barrier which restrains the government from 77 00:04:52.959 --> 00:04:56.959 the utmost excesses in the direction of its characteristic tendency. 78 00:04:57.439 --> 00:05:01.000 In imperfectly balanced governments, where tempt is made to set 79 00:05:01.079 --> 00:05:05.600 constitutional limits to the impulses of the strongest power, but 80 00:05:05.639 --> 00:05:08.240 where that power is strong enough to overstep them with 81 00:05:08.319 --> 00:05:12.240 at least temporary impunity. It is only by doctrines of 82 00:05:12.279 --> 00:05:17.879 constitutional morality recognized and sustained by opinion, that any regard 83 00:05:17.959 --> 00:05:21.399 at all is preserved for the checks and limitations of 84 00:05:21.439 --> 00:05:26.519 the Constitution. In well balanced governments in which the supreme 85 00:05:26.560 --> 00:05:30.160 power is divided, and each sharer is protected against the 86 00:05:30.279 --> 00:05:34.360 usurpations of the others in the only manner possible, namely 87 00:05:34.439 --> 00:05:37.560 by being armed for defense with weapons as strong as 88 00:05:37.600 --> 00:05:41.199 the others can wield for attack, the government can only 89 00:05:41.240 --> 00:05:44.319 be carried on by forbearance on all sides to exercise 90 00:05:44.399 --> 00:05:49.319 those extreme powers, unless provoked by conduct equally extreme on 91 00:05:49.399 --> 00:05:52.839 the part of some other sharer of power. And in 92 00:05:52.879 --> 00:05:55.480 this case we may truly say that only by the 93 00:05:55.560 --> 00:06:00.000 regard paid to maxims of constitutional morality is the constant 94 00:06:00.000 --> 00:06:04.120 institution kept in existence. The question of pledges is not 95 00:06:04.160 --> 00:06:08.439 one of those which vitally concern the existence of representative governments, 96 00:06:09.079 --> 00:06:14.279 but it is very material to their beneficial operation. The 97 00:06:14.360 --> 00:06:17.480 laws cannot prescribe to the electors the principles by which 98 00:06:17.519 --> 00:06:20.199 they shall direct their choice, but it makes a great 99 00:06:20.199 --> 00:06:23.439 practical difference by what principles they think they ought to 100 00:06:23.519 --> 00:06:26.600 direct it. And the whole of that great question is 101 00:06:26.639 --> 00:06:30.040 involved in the inquiry whether they should make it a 102 00:06:30.040 --> 00:06:34.040 condition that the representatives shall adhere to certain opinions laid 103 00:06:34.040 --> 00:06:38.079 down for him by his constituents. No reader of this 104 00:06:38.199 --> 00:06:42.639 treatise can doubt what conclusion as to this matter results 105 00:06:42.680 --> 00:06:45.759 from the general principles which it professes. We have, from 106 00:06:45.759 --> 00:06:50.120 the first affirmed and unvaryingly kept in view the coequal 107 00:06:50.199 --> 00:06:54.800 importance of two great requisites of government, responsibility to those 108 00:06:55.000 --> 00:06:58.600 for whose benefit political power ought to be and always 109 00:06:58.680 --> 00:07:02.920 professes to be, and lloyd and jointly, therewith to obtain, 110 00:07:03.000 --> 00:07:06.040 in the greatest measure possible for the function of government, 111 00:07:06.360 --> 00:07:10.639 the benefits of superior intellect, trained by long meditation and 112 00:07:10.759 --> 00:07:15.600 practical discipline, to that special task. If this second purpose 113 00:07:15.959 --> 00:07:20.759 is worth attaining, it is worth the necessary price. Superior 114 00:07:20.839 --> 00:07:23.639 powers of mind and profound study are of no use 115 00:07:23.839 --> 00:07:26.240 if they do not sometimes lead a person to different 116 00:07:26.279 --> 00:07:30.040 conclusions from those which are formed by ordinary powers of 117 00:07:30.120 --> 00:07:34.000 mind without study. And if it be an object to 118 00:07:34.040 --> 00:07:39.040 possess representatives in any intellectual respects superior to average electors. 119 00:07:39.519 --> 00:07:42.480 It must be counted upon that the representative will sometimes 120 00:07:42.519 --> 00:07:46.319 differ in opinion from the majority of his constituents, and 121 00:07:46.360 --> 00:07:48.920 that when he does, his opinion will be the oftenest 122 00:07:49.000 --> 00:07:52.920 right of the two. It follows that the electors will 123 00:07:53.199 --> 00:07:56.920 not do wisely if they insist on absolute conformity to 124 00:07:57.040 --> 00:08:00.759 their opinions as the condition of his retaining his head seat. 125 00:08:02.399 --> 00:08:05.360 The principle is thus far obvious, but there are real 126 00:08:05.439 --> 00:08:09.000 difficulties in its application, and we will begin by stating 127 00:08:09.040 --> 00:08:12.680 them in their greatest force. If it is important that 128 00:08:12.680 --> 00:08:16.920 the electors should choose a representative more highly instructed than themselves, 129 00:08:17.600 --> 00:08:20.560 it is no less necessary that this wiser man should 130 00:08:20.560 --> 00:08:24.480 be responsible to them. In other words, they are the 131 00:08:24.560 --> 00:08:27.759 judges of the manner in which he fulfills his trust. 132 00:08:28.839 --> 00:08:31.279 And how are they to judge except by the standard 133 00:08:31.319 --> 00:08:34.639 of their own opinions? How are they even to select 134 00:08:34.720 --> 00:08:37.600 him in the first instance. But by the same standard 135 00:08:38.720 --> 00:08:41.799 it will not do to choose by mere brilliancy, by 136 00:08:41.879 --> 00:08:46.440 superiority of showy talent. The tests by which an ordinary 137 00:08:46.480 --> 00:08:50.480 man can judge beforehand of mere ability are very imperfect. 138 00:08:51.159 --> 00:08:54.440 Such as they are, they have almost exclusive reference to 139 00:08:54.519 --> 00:08:57.440 the arts of expression, and little or none to the 140 00:08:57.440 --> 00:09:01.360 worth of what is expressed. Latter cannot be inferred from 141 00:09:01.399 --> 00:09:04.559 the former. And if the electors are to put their 142 00:09:04.600 --> 00:09:08.960 own opinions in abeyance, what criterion remains to them of 143 00:09:09.000 --> 00:09:12.960 the ability to govern well? Neither if they could ascertain, 144 00:09:13.200 --> 00:09:17.120 even infallibly, the ablest man ought they to allow him 145 00:09:17.159 --> 00:09:20.440 altogether to judge for them, without any reference to their 146 00:09:20.480 --> 00:09:25.919 own opinions. The ablest candidate may be a Tory and 147 00:09:26.000 --> 00:09:30.080 the electors liberals, or a Liberal, and they may be Tories. 148 00:09:31.039 --> 00:09:34.080 The political questions of the day may be church questions, 149 00:09:34.200 --> 00:09:37.639 and he may be a high churchman or a rationalist, 150 00:09:38.200 --> 00:09:42.679 while they may be dissenters or evangelicals, and vice versa. 151 00:09:42.960 --> 00:09:46.000 His abilities in these cases might only enable him to 152 00:09:46.039 --> 00:09:49.399 go greater lengths and act with greater effect in what 153 00:09:49.480 --> 00:09:53.440 they may conscientiously believe to be a wrong course. And 154 00:09:53.480 --> 00:09:56.200 they may be bound by their sincere convictions to think 155 00:09:56.240 --> 00:09:59.720 it more important that their representative should be kept on 156 00:09:59.759 --> 00:10:02.960 the use points to what they deem the dictate of duty, 157 00:10:03.759 --> 00:10:06.519 than that they should be represented by a person of 158 00:10:06.600 --> 00:10:10.879 more than average abilities. They may also have to consider, 159 00:10:11.279 --> 00:10:14.519 not solely how they can be most ably represented, but 160 00:10:14.639 --> 00:10:17.679 how their particular moral position and mental point of view 161 00:10:17.720 --> 00:10:21.159 shall be represented at all. The influence of every mode 162 00:10:21.200 --> 00:10:23.480 of thinking which is shared by numbers ought to be 163 00:10:23.519 --> 00:10:27.399 felt in the legislature, and the Constitution being supposed to 164 00:10:27.399 --> 00:10:30.120 have made due provision that other and conflicting modes of 165 00:10:30.159 --> 00:10:34.960 thinking shall be represented likewise, To secure the proper representation 166 00:10:35.120 --> 00:10:37.600 for their own mode may be the most important matter 167 00:10:38.120 --> 00:10:41.639 which the electors, on the particular occasion have to attend to. 168 00:10:42.879 --> 00:10:45.840 In some cases, too, it may be necessary that the 169 00:10:45.919 --> 00:10:49.440 representatives should have his hands tied to keep him true 170 00:10:49.440 --> 00:10:52.679 to their interest, or rather to the public interest, as 171 00:10:52.720 --> 00:10:56.879 they conceive it. This would not be needful under a 172 00:10:56.919 --> 00:10:59.919 political system which assured them an indefinite choice of other 173 00:11:00.080 --> 00:11:05.159 honest and unprejudiced candidates, but under the existing system, in 174 00:11:05.200 --> 00:11:08.879 which the electors are almost always obliged by the expenses 175 00:11:08.919 --> 00:11:13.120 of election and the general circumstances of society, to select 176 00:11:13.120 --> 00:11:17.200 their representative from persons of a station in life widely 177 00:11:17.240 --> 00:11:21.320 different from theirs and having a different class interest, who 178 00:11:21.320 --> 00:11:24.919 will affirm that they ought to abandon themselves to his discretion. 179 00:11:25.840 --> 00:11:29.000 Can we blame an elector of the poorer classes, who 180 00:11:29.000 --> 00:11:31.399 has only the choice among two or three rich men 181 00:11:32.000 --> 00:11:35.799 for requiring from the one he votes for a pledge 182 00:11:35.840 --> 00:11:38.759 to those measures which he considers as a test of 183 00:11:38.799 --> 00:11:42.879 emancipation from the class interests of the rich. It will, 184 00:11:42.919 --> 00:11:46.360 moreover always happen to some members of the electoral body 185 00:11:46.399 --> 00:11:49.679 to be obliged to accept the representatives selected by a 186 00:11:49.720 --> 00:11:52.559 majority of their own side. But though a candidate of 187 00:11:52.559 --> 00:11:56.120 their own choosing would have no chance, their votes may 188 00:11:56.159 --> 00:11:59.240 be necessary to the success of the one chosen for them, 189 00:11:59.360 --> 00:12:01.919 and their only means of exerting their share of influence 190 00:12:01.960 --> 00:12:05.360 on his subsequent conduct may be to make their support 191 00:12:05.360 --> 00:12:08.919 of him dependent on his pledging himself to certain conditions. 192 00:12:10.120 --> 00:12:14.799 These considerations and counter considerations are so intimately interwoven with 193 00:12:14.879 --> 00:12:18.559 one another. It is so important that the electors should 194 00:12:18.679 --> 00:12:23.000 choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves, and should 195 00:12:23.039 --> 00:12:26.840 consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom. While 196 00:12:26.879 --> 00:12:30.320 it is impossible that conformity to their own opinions, when 197 00:12:30.360 --> 00:12:33.879 they have opinions, should not enter largely into their judgment 198 00:12:33.919 --> 00:12:36.840 as to who possesses the wisdom and how far its 199 00:12:36.879 --> 00:12:41.399 presumed possessor has verified the presumption by his conduct, that 200 00:12:41.480 --> 00:12:44.679 it seems quite impracticable to lay down for the elector 201 00:12:45.080 --> 00:12:48.799 any positive rule of duty, and the result will depend 202 00:12:48.919 --> 00:12:53.840 less on any exact prescription or authoritative doctrine of political 203 00:12:53.879 --> 00:12:57.000 morality than on the general tone of mind of the 204 00:12:57.039 --> 00:13:00.799 electoral body. In respect of the important requisite of deference 205 00:13:00.840 --> 00:13:05.360 to mental superiority, individuals and peoples who are acutely sensible 206 00:13:05.399 --> 00:13:08.320 of the value of superior wisdom are likely to recognize 207 00:13:08.320 --> 00:13:12.360 it where it exists by other signs than thinking exactly 208 00:13:12.440 --> 00:13:15.879 as they do, and even in spite of considerable differences 209 00:13:15.879 --> 00:13:18.600 of opinion. And when they have recognized it, they will 210 00:13:18.639 --> 00:13:22.440 be far too desirous to secure it at any admissible cost, 211 00:13:23.039 --> 00:13:25.559 to be prone to impose their own opinion as a 212 00:13:25.639 --> 00:13:28.480 law upon persons whom they look up to as wiser 213 00:13:28.519 --> 00:13:32.519 than themselves. On the other hand, there is a character 214 00:13:32.559 --> 00:13:34.679 of mind which does not look up to any one, 215 00:13:35.519 --> 00:13:38.600 which thinks no other person's opinion much better than its own, 216 00:13:40.000 --> 00:13:42.000 or nearly so good as that of a hundred or 217 00:13:42.000 --> 00:13:45.840 a thousand persons like itself. Where this is the turn 218 00:13:45.879 --> 00:13:48.600 of mind of the electors, they will elect no one 219 00:13:48.639 --> 00:13:51.440 who is not or at least who does not profess 220 00:13:51.519 --> 00:13:54.919 to be the image of their own sentiments, and will 221 00:13:54.919 --> 00:13:58.679 continue him no longer than while he reflects those sentiments 222 00:13:58.720 --> 00:14:03.639 in his conduct, And all aspirants to political honors will endeavor, 223 00:14:03.720 --> 00:14:07.679 as Plato says in The Gorgeous, to fashion themselves after 224 00:14:07.720 --> 00:14:11.279 the model of the demos, and make themselves as like 225 00:14:11.360 --> 00:14:14.639 to it as possible. It cannot be denied that a 226 00:14:14.639 --> 00:14:19.200 complete democracy has a strong tendency to cast the sentiments 227 00:14:19.200 --> 00:14:23.200 of the electors in this mold. Democracy is not favorable 228 00:14:23.240 --> 00:14:26.879 to the reverential spirit that it destroys. Reverence for a 229 00:14:26.919 --> 00:14:30.440 mere social position must be counted among the good, not 230 00:14:30.559 --> 00:14:33.399 the bad, part of its influences, though by doing this 231 00:14:33.559 --> 00:14:37.200 it closes the principal school of reverence as to merely 232 00:14:37.279 --> 00:14:42.559 human relations which exists in society. But also democracy, in 233 00:14:42.600 --> 00:14:46.879 its very essence, insists so much more, forcibly, on the 234 00:14:46.960 --> 00:14:49.879 things in which all are entitled to be considered equally 235 00:14:50.159 --> 00:14:52.919 than on those in which one person is entitled to 236 00:14:53.039 --> 00:14:57.679 more consideration than another, that respect for even personal superiority 237 00:14:58.120 --> 00:15:01.399 is likely to be below the mark. It is for this, 238 00:15:01.679 --> 00:15:05.120 among other reasons, I hold it of so much importance 239 00:15:05.600 --> 00:15:08.480 that the institutions of the country should stamp the opinions 240 00:15:08.480 --> 00:15:12.360 of persons of a more educated class as entitled to 241 00:15:12.399 --> 00:15:15.799 greater weight than those of the less educated, And I 242 00:15:15.840 --> 00:15:20.279 should still contend for assigning plurality of votes to authenticated 243 00:15:20.320 --> 00:15:23.720 superiority of education, were it only to give the tone 244 00:15:23.759 --> 00:15:30.080 to public feeling, irrespective of any direct political consequences. When 245 00:15:30.159 --> 00:15:33.000 there does exist in the electoral body an adequate sense 246 00:15:33.039 --> 00:15:36.440 of the extraordinary difference in value between one person and another, 247 00:15:38.120 --> 00:15:40.720 they will not lack signs by which to distinguish the 248 00:15:40.799 --> 00:15:45.600 persons whose worth, for their purposes is the greatest. Actual 249 00:15:45.639 --> 00:15:49.840 public services will be naturally the foremost indication. To have 250 00:15:49.919 --> 00:15:53.480 filled posts of magnitude and done important things in them 251 00:15:53.799 --> 00:15:56.480 of which the wisdom has been justified by the results. 252 00:15:56.679 --> 00:15:58.879 To have been the author of measures which appear from 253 00:15:58.879 --> 00:16:01.799 their effects, to have been wisely planned, to have made 254 00:16:01.840 --> 00:16:05.600 predictions which have been often verified by the event, seldom 255 00:16:05.679 --> 00:16:09.320 or never falsified by it. To have given advice which, 256 00:16:09.360 --> 00:16:13.519 when taken, has been followed by good consequences when neglected 257 00:16:13.639 --> 00:16:18.080 by bad. There is doubtless a large portion of uncertainty 258 00:16:18.120 --> 00:16:20.720 in these signs of wisdom, But we are seeking for 259 00:16:20.799 --> 00:16:23.960 such as can be applied by persons of ordinary discernment. 260 00:16:24.919 --> 00:16:27.279 They will do well not to rely much on any 261 00:16:27.320 --> 00:16:31.600 one indication unless corroborated by the arrest, and in their 262 00:16:31.720 --> 00:16:35.279 estimation of the success or merit of any practical effort, 263 00:16:35.600 --> 00:16:39.080 to lay great stress on the general opinion of disinterested 264 00:16:39.120 --> 00:16:43.759 persons conversant with the subject matter. The tests which I 265 00:16:43.799 --> 00:16:47.960 have spoken of are only applicable to trained men, among 266 00:16:48.039 --> 00:16:52.000 whom must be reckoned those who, though untried practically, have 267 00:16:52.120 --> 00:16:56.559 been tried speculatively, who in public speech or in print, 268 00:16:56.600 --> 00:17:00.159 have discussed public affairs in a manner which proves that 269 00:17:00.200 --> 00:17:04.240 they have given serious study to them. Such persons may, 270 00:17:04.599 --> 00:17:07.640 in the mere character of political thinkers, have exhibited a 271 00:17:07.680 --> 00:17:11.160 considerable amount of the same titles to confidence as those 272 00:17:11.160 --> 00:17:13.960 who have been proved in the position of practical statesmen. 273 00:17:16.200 --> 00:17:19.440 When it is necessary to choose persons wholly untried, the 274 00:17:19.480 --> 00:17:23.839 best criteria are reputation for ability among those who personally 275 00:17:23.920 --> 00:17:27.559 know them, and the confidence placed and recommendations given by 276 00:17:27.559 --> 00:17:32.680 persons already looked up to by tests like these, Constituencies 277 00:17:32.720 --> 00:17:36.839 who sufficiently value mental ability and eagerly seek for it, 278 00:17:37.240 --> 00:17:41.920 will generally succeed in obtaining men beyond mediocrity, and often 279 00:17:41.960 --> 00:17:44.480 men whom they can trust to carry on public affairs 280 00:17:44.920 --> 00:17:48.519 according to their unfettered judgment, to whom it would be 281 00:17:48.599 --> 00:17:50.960 an affront to require that they should give up that 282 00:17:51.079 --> 00:17:56.200 judgment at the behest of their inferiors in knowledge. If 283 00:17:56.240 --> 00:17:59.599 such persons, honestly sought are not to be found, then 284 00:17:59.640 --> 00:18:04.119 indeed the electors are justified in taking other precautions, or 285 00:18:04.200 --> 00:18:08.519 they cannot be expected to postpone their particular opinions, unless 286 00:18:08.559 --> 00:18:10.640 in order that they may be served by a person 287 00:18:10.680 --> 00:18:14.599 of superior knowledge to their own. They would do well, indeed, 288 00:18:14.759 --> 00:18:18.880 even then, to remember that, when once chosen, the representative, 289 00:18:18.920 --> 00:18:22.599 if he devotes himself to his duty, has greater opportunities 290 00:18:22.640 --> 00:18:26.079 of correcting an original false judgment than fall to the 291 00:18:26.119 --> 00:18:30.319 lot of most of his constituents, a consideration which generally 292 00:18:30.359 --> 00:18:33.519 ought to prevent them, unless compelled by necessity to choose 293 00:18:33.880 --> 00:18:38.440 someone whose impartiality they do not fully trust, from exacting 294 00:18:38.440 --> 00:18:41.920 a pledge not to change his opinion, or if he does, 295 00:18:42.079 --> 00:18:46.039 to resign his seat. But one an unknown person not 296 00:18:46.160 --> 00:18:50.440 certified in unmistakable terms by some high authority is elected 297 00:18:50.480 --> 00:18:53.640 for the first time, the elector cannot be expected to 298 00:18:53.720 --> 00:18:57.920 make conformity to his own sentiments the primary requisite. It 299 00:18:57.960 --> 00:19:00.799 is enough if he does not regard a subsequent change 300 00:19:01.039 --> 00:19:06.559 of those sentiments honestly avowed with its grounds. Undisguisedly stated 301 00:19:07.039 --> 00:19:12.400 as a peremptory reason for withdrawing his confidence, even supposing 302 00:19:12.440 --> 00:19:15.839 the most tried ability and acknowledged eminence of character and 303 00:19:15.880 --> 00:19:19.599 the representative. The private opinions of the electors are not 304 00:19:19.640 --> 00:19:24.240 to be placed entirely in abeyance. Deference to mental superiority 305 00:19:24.319 --> 00:19:28.279 is not to go the length of self annihilation abnegation 306 00:19:28.480 --> 00:19:31.880 of any personal opinion. But when the difference does not 307 00:19:31.960 --> 00:19:35.720 relate to the fundamentals of politics, however decided the elector 308 00:19:35.759 --> 00:19:38.920 may be in his own sentiments, he ought to consider 309 00:19:38.960 --> 00:19:42.079 that when an able man differs from him, there is 310 00:19:42.119 --> 00:19:45.319 at least a considerable chance of his being in the wrong, 311 00:19:45.920 --> 00:19:48.440 and that, even if otherwise, it is worthwhile to give 312 00:19:48.519 --> 00:19:52.480 up his opinion in things not absolutely essential, for the 313 00:19:52.519 --> 00:19:56.279 sake of the inestimable advantage of having an able man 314 00:19:56.559 --> 00:19:59.160 to act for him in the many matters in which 315 00:19:59.160 --> 00:20:03.160 he himself is now qualified to form a judgment. In 316 00:20:03.240 --> 00:20:07.240 such cases, he often endeavors to reconcile both wishes by 317 00:20:07.279 --> 00:20:10.559 inducing the able man to sacrifice his own opinion on 318 00:20:10.640 --> 00:20:13.759 the points of difference. But for the able man to 319 00:20:13.880 --> 00:20:18.480 lend himself to this compromise his treason against his especial office, 320 00:20:18.720 --> 00:20:22.559 abdication of the peculiar duties of mental supremacy, of which 321 00:20:22.599 --> 00:20:25.400 it is one of the most sacred, not to desert 322 00:20:25.440 --> 00:20:28.480 the cause which has the clamor against it, nor to 323 00:20:28.559 --> 00:20:31.920 deprive of his services those of his opinions which need 324 00:20:31.960 --> 00:20:36.160 them the most. A man of conscience and known ability 325 00:20:36.480 --> 00:20:39.559 should insist on full freedom to act as he, in 326 00:20:39.640 --> 00:20:43.400 his own judgment, deems best, and should not consent to 327 00:20:43.440 --> 00:20:47.519 serve on any other terms. But the electors are entitled 328 00:20:47.599 --> 00:20:50.680 to know how he means to act, What opinions on 329 00:20:50.720 --> 00:20:54.240 all things which concern his public duty he intends should 330 00:20:54.279 --> 00:20:58.440 guide his conduct. If some of these are unacceptable to them, 331 00:20:58.880 --> 00:21:01.880 it is for him to satisfy them that he nevertheless 332 00:21:01.920 --> 00:21:05.279 deserves to be their representative. And if they are wise, 333 00:21:05.640 --> 00:21:09.279 they will overlook in favor of his general value, many 334 00:21:09.400 --> 00:21:13.680 and great differences between his opinions and their own. There 335 00:21:13.680 --> 00:21:17.640 are some differences, however, which they cannot be expected to overlook. 336 00:21:18.359 --> 00:21:20.920 Whoever feels the amount of interest in the government of 337 00:21:20.960 --> 00:21:24.440 his country which befits. A free man has some convictions 338 00:21:24.480 --> 00:21:28.119 on national affairs which are like his life blood, which 339 00:21:28.160 --> 00:21:31.039 the strength of his belief in their truth, together with 340 00:21:31.079 --> 00:21:34.160 the importance he attaches to them, forbid him to make 341 00:21:34.200 --> 00:21:37.519 a subject of compromise or postpone to the judgment of 342 00:21:37.559 --> 00:21:42.599 any person, however greatly his superior. Such convictions, when they 343 00:21:42.640 --> 00:21:46.079 exist in a people, or in any appreciable portion of one, 344 00:21:46.440 --> 00:21:50.680 are entitled to influence in virtue of their mere existence, 345 00:21:51.279 --> 00:21:54.079 and not solely in that of the probability of their 346 00:21:54.119 --> 00:21:58.640 being grounded in truth. A people cannot be well governed 347 00:21:58.680 --> 00:22:02.279 in opposition to their prime of right, even though these 348 00:22:02.319 --> 00:22:06.319 may be in some points erroneous. A correct estimate of 349 00:22:06.359 --> 00:22:10.799 the relation which should subsist between governors and governed does 350 00:22:10.839 --> 00:22:13.759 not require the electors to consent to be represented by 351 00:22:13.799 --> 00:22:16.599 one who intends to govern them in opposition to their 352 00:22:16.640 --> 00:22:20.920 fundamental convictions. If they avail themselves of his capacities of 353 00:22:21.039 --> 00:22:24.119 useful service in other respects at a time when the 354 00:22:24.119 --> 00:22:26.400 points on which he is vitally at issue with them 355 00:22:26.519 --> 00:22:29.680 are not likely to be mooted, they are justified in 356 00:22:29.759 --> 00:22:33.079 dismissing him at the first moment when a question arises 357 00:22:33.240 --> 00:22:36.319 involving these and on which there is not so assured 358 00:22:36.440 --> 00:22:39.480 a majority for what they deem right as to make 359 00:22:39.559 --> 00:22:45.680 the dissenting voice of that particular individual unimportant. Thus I 360 00:22:45.759 --> 00:22:49.759 mention names to illustrate my meaning, not for any personal application. 361 00:22:50.799 --> 00:22:54.559 The opinions supposed to be entertained by mister Cobden and 362 00:22:54.640 --> 00:22:58.599 mister bright On resistance to foreign aggression might be overlooked 363 00:22:58.680 --> 00:23:02.759 during the Crimean War, when there was an overwhelming national 364 00:23:02.839 --> 00:23:06.240 feeling on the contrary side, and might yet very properly 365 00:23:06.319 --> 00:23:09.440 lead to their rejection by the electors at the time 366 00:23:09.599 --> 00:23:12.960 of the Chinese quarrel, though in itself a more doubtful question, 367 00:23:13.519 --> 00:23:16.000 because it was then for some time a moot point, 368 00:23:16.200 --> 00:23:20.160 whether their view of the case might not prevail as 369 00:23:20.200 --> 00:23:23.319 the general result of what precedes, we may affirm that 370 00:23:23.440 --> 00:23:27.799 actual pledges should not be required, unless from unfavorable social 371 00:23:27.839 --> 00:23:32.079 circumstances or family institutions. The electors are so narrowed in 372 00:23:32.119 --> 00:23:34.640 their choice as to be compelled to fix it on 373 00:23:34.759 --> 00:23:39.279 a person presumptively under the influence of partialities hostile to 374 00:23:39.359 --> 00:23:43.000 their interest, that they are entitled to a full knowledge 375 00:23:43.039 --> 00:23:46.440 of the political opinions and sentiments of the candidate, and 376 00:23:46.480 --> 00:23:49.839 not only entitled, but often bound to reject one who 377 00:23:49.880 --> 00:23:52.920 differs from themselves on the few articles which are the 378 00:23:52.960 --> 00:23:56.400 foundation of their political belief. That in proportion to the 379 00:23:56.440 --> 00:23:59.599 opinion they entertain of the mental superiority of a candidate, 380 00:24:00.319 --> 00:24:02.559 they ought to put up with his expressing and acting 381 00:24:02.599 --> 00:24:05.680 on opinions different from theirs on any number of things 382 00:24:05.680 --> 00:24:09.519 not included in their fundamental articles of belief. That they 383 00:24:09.519 --> 00:24:12.359 ought to be unremitting in their search for a representative 384 00:24:12.400 --> 00:24:15.720 of such caliber as to be entrusted with full power 385 00:24:15.839 --> 00:24:19.119 of obeying the dictates of his own judgment, that they 386 00:24:19.160 --> 00:24:21.880 should consider it a duty which they owe to their 387 00:24:21.880 --> 00:24:25.279 fellow countrymen to do their utmost toward placing men of 388 00:24:25.319 --> 00:24:29.319 this quality in the legislature, And that it is of 389 00:24:29.440 --> 00:24:33.400 much greater importance to themselves to be represented by such 390 00:24:33.440 --> 00:24:36.519 a man than by one who professes agreement in a 391 00:24:36.559 --> 00:24:39.359 greater number of their opinions, For the benefits of his 392 00:24:39.480 --> 00:24:43.000 ability are certain, while the hypothesis of his being wrong 393 00:24:43.319 --> 00:24:45.880 and their being right on the points of difference is 394 00:24:45.960 --> 00:24:50.000 a very doubtful one. I have discussed this question on 395 00:24:50.039 --> 00:24:52.880 the assumption that the electoral system in all that depends 396 00:24:52.920 --> 00:24:56.960 on positive institution, conforms to the principles laid down in 397 00:24:57.000 --> 00:25:01.680 the preceding chapters. Even on this hypothet phthesis, the delegation 398 00:25:01.799 --> 00:25:05.680 theory of representation seems to me false and its practical 399 00:25:05.720 --> 00:25:09.000 operation hurtful, though the mischief would in that case be 400 00:25:09.039 --> 00:25:13.160 confined within certain bounds. But if the securities by which 401 00:25:13.200 --> 00:25:16.880