1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:01,760 Speaker 1: Okay, so just stop for a second and try to 2 00:00:01,800 --> 00:00:04,160 picture the most I don't know if the most absurd 3 00:00:04,200 --> 00:00:06,799 disaster you can possibly think of. I'm not talking about 4 00:00:06,799 --> 00:00:11,359 a volcano or an earthquake. I'm talking about a giant, deadly, 5 00:00:11,480 --> 00:00:14,240 tidle wave. But and this is the key part, the 6 00:00:14,279 --> 00:00:15,400 wave isn't made of water. 7 00:00:15,480 --> 00:00:18,399 Speaker 2: It's made of molasses, right, something you put on your pancakes. 8 00:00:18,399 --> 00:00:20,679 It sounds like a joke, like a really dark cartoon premise, 9 00:00:21,039 --> 00:00:27,039 but this was terrifyingly real. January nineteen nineteen, Boston, A 10 00:00:27,199 --> 00:00:31,719 giant steel tank holding over two million gallons of molasses 11 00:00:32,079 --> 00:00:35,159 just it completely falls apart and it unleashes this thirty 12 00:00:35,159 --> 00:00:37,960 five foot high wall of syrup, moving at thirty five 13 00:00:38,039 --> 00:00:40,320 miles an hour, right into one of the busiest parts 14 00:00:40,320 --> 00:00:40,799 of the city. 15 00:00:40,880 --> 00:00:43,039 Speaker 1: And that absurdity is what grabs you. It really does. 16 00:00:43,359 --> 00:00:45,960 But the story underneath the tragedy and what came after, 17 00:00:46,320 --> 00:00:47,520 that's what changed everything. 18 00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:51,200 Speaker 2: Welcome to Thrilling Threads. Today we are diving deep into 19 00:00:51,200 --> 00:00:54,479 the Great Boston Molasses Flood of nineteen nineteen. We're going 20 00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:57,399 to explore how this almost comical catastrophe was really born 21 00:00:57,439 --> 00:01:01,439 from corporate greed and just shocked neglect and how it 22 00:01:01,439 --> 00:01:03,880 didn't just kill twenty one people, it ended up rewriting 23 00:01:03,880 --> 00:01:05,959 the entire rule book for how we build things safely 24 00:01:06,040 --> 00:01:09,079 in the modern world exactly. And that's what's so incredible 25 00:01:09,120 --> 00:01:12,079 about this story. Every time you walk into a building today, 26 00:01:12,239 --> 00:01:15,280 every single time you see an engineer's stamp on a blueprint, 27 00:01:15,599 --> 00:01:18,920 you are, in a very real way, benefiting from the 28 00:01:19,000 --> 00:01:22,560 legal fallout of people drowning in molasses a century ago. 29 00:01:22,920 --> 00:01:24,840 This was not a freak accident. We're going to show you. 30 00:01:25,079 --> 00:01:27,280 This was a disaster that was just waiting to happen, 31 00:01:27,439 --> 00:01:30,319 a perfect storm of bad engineering, a frantic rush for 32 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:33,400 profit before prohibition kicked in, and a legal system that 33 00:01:33,519 --> 00:01:35,040 just wasn't ready for it. 34 00:01:35,400 --> 00:01:38,079 Speaker 1: This is a story about why that building inspector you 35 00:01:38,079 --> 00:01:40,599 see on a construction site is so important. So to 36 00:01:40,640 --> 00:01:42,879 really get this, you have to understand where this happened. 37 00:01:43,040 --> 00:01:46,159 This tank wasn't in some deserted industrial wasteland. It was 38 00:01:46,239 --> 00:01:49,239 literally looming over people's homes. Let's start there, Part. 39 00:01:49,040 --> 00:01:51,120 Speaker 2: One, Boston's crowded Crucible. 40 00:01:51,359 --> 00:01:55,280 Speaker 1: Absolutely, the setting is everything, So picture Boston's North End 41 00:01:55,480 --> 00:01:58,319 nineteen nineteen. It's a tiny little patch of land barely 42 00:01:58,319 --> 00:02:01,439 a square mile, but right up against the waterfront on 43 00:02:01,480 --> 00:02:04,840 Commercial Street, and it is just buzzing with activity. This 44 00:02:04,920 --> 00:02:07,359 isn't just a place where stuff is stored. People live here, 45 00:02:07,400 --> 00:02:09,560 they work here. And if you go to the North 46 00:02:09,639 --> 00:02:12,240 End today you can still feel that. You know, the 47 00:02:12,319 --> 00:02:16,280 narrow streets, the brick buildings all pressed up against each other. 48 00:02:16,319 --> 00:02:19,080 It's got that energy. But back then it was even 49 00:02:19,280 --> 00:02:22,479 more intense, and it had changed a lot. Right, This 50 00:02:22,560 --> 00:02:23,719 used to be a wealthy area. 51 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:26,960 Speaker 2: Oh, absolutely, in the eighteenth century it was prime real estate. 52 00:02:27,280 --> 00:02:30,360 Paul Revere lived there. His house is still standing. It 53 00:02:30,400 --> 00:02:34,280 was all mansions. But then the Port Boston Harbor it 54 00:02:34,439 --> 00:02:39,000 just exploded into this huge industrial engine, and the wealthy families, well, 55 00:02:39,080 --> 00:02:40,560 they moved out. They didn't want to live with the 56 00:02:40,599 --> 00:02:42,000 noise and the smells. 57 00:02:41,599 --> 00:02:45,520 Speaker 1: Of the docks, and so a new wave of people moved. 58 00:02:45,240 --> 00:02:47,439 Speaker 2: In a tidal wave. Really, it became the first stop 59 00:02:47,479 --> 00:02:50,800 for European immigrants, first the Irish than Jewish families, and 60 00:02:50,840 --> 00:02:53,719 by the early nineteen hundreds it was overwhelmingly. 61 00:02:53,080 --> 00:02:56,400 Speaker 1: Italian and that led to just unbelievable density. I read 62 00:02:56,400 --> 00:02:58,879 that by nineteen fifteen you had forty thousand people living 63 00:02:58,879 --> 00:03:01,000 in that one square mile forty tho. 64 00:03:01,319 --> 00:03:03,680 Speaker 2: It was one of the most densely populated neighborhoods in 65 00:03:03,719 --> 00:03:06,319 the entire United States. It was an absolute powder keg, 66 00:03:06,680 --> 00:03:09,159 just in terms of human vulnerability. All these people packed 67 00:03:09,159 --> 00:03:12,199 into tenements with very little infrastructure to support them. 68 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:14,800 Speaker 1: And the tank itself was right there on Commercial Street 69 00:03:14,800 --> 00:03:15,800 in the thick of it all. 70 00:03:16,879 --> 00:03:19,639 Speaker 2: It wasn't just homes. You had the city's public works 71 00:03:19,680 --> 00:03:23,680 building right there, the Base State Railway terminal, little shops, 72 00:03:23,840 --> 00:03:27,479 food stalls, horse drawn carts everywhere. At lunchtime on a 73 00:03:27,520 --> 00:03:30,919 regular weekday, which this was, the streets were just choked 74 00:03:31,039 --> 00:03:34,599 with people, kids playing, workers on their lunch break, people 75 00:03:34,680 --> 00:03:36,319 rushing to catch the train, just. 76 00:03:36,400 --> 00:03:41,560 Speaker 1: Life happening right under the shadow of this monster. The 77 00:03:41,599 --> 00:03:45,360 colossus on Commercial Street, fifty feet tall. It's designed to 78 00:03:45,400 --> 00:03:48,400 hold two and a half million gallons of molasses. I mean, 79 00:03:48,479 --> 00:03:50,159 can you even picture that. It's like three and a 80 00:03:50,199 --> 00:03:52,879 half Olympic swimming pools stacked on top of each. 81 00:03:52,759 --> 00:03:55,120 Speaker 2: Other, and it would have just dominated the skyline of 82 00:03:55,120 --> 00:03:59,840 that neighborhood, a huge, dark steel cylinder towering over these 83 00:04:00,280 --> 00:04:02,240 three and four story brick tenements, and you. 84 00:04:02,199 --> 00:04:04,240 Speaker 1: Just have to wonder, how on earth did anyone think 85 00:04:04,280 --> 00:04:06,360 it was a good idea to put that right there? 86 00:04:06,479 --> 00:04:09,439 Speaker 2: Well, that question, that's the key, and it takes us 87 00:04:09,479 --> 00:04:12,479 right into part two, the sweet rush and the ignored warnings, 88 00:04:13,120 --> 00:04:15,759 because the answer is a really toxic mix of corporate 89 00:04:15,800 --> 00:04:18,879 desperation and just complete social indifference. 90 00:04:19,040 --> 00:04:19,920 Speaker 1: So who owned it? 91 00:04:20,480 --> 00:04:23,519 Speaker 2: The tank was operated by a company called Purity Distilling, 92 00:04:23,920 --> 00:04:27,000 which is owned by a bigger company, United States Industrial 93 00:04:27,040 --> 00:04:30,879 Alcohol or USIA, and USIA was in a bit of 94 00:04:30,879 --> 00:04:34,480 a panic because of two huge historical events that were 95 00:04:34,480 --> 00:04:35,439 happening at the same time. 96 00:04:35,519 --> 00:04:36,319 Speaker 1: Okay, what were they? 97 00:04:36,920 --> 00:04:40,439 Speaker 2: The first was World War One. During the war, molasses 98 00:04:40,560 --> 00:04:43,360 was actually a really important strategic material for. 99 00:04:43,360 --> 00:04:45,079 Speaker 1: What I mean. I know, you can make rum, but for. 100 00:04:45,040 --> 00:04:49,120 Speaker 2: A war industrial alcohol, they would distill the molasses to 101 00:04:49,160 --> 00:04:52,519 make ethanol, and that ethanol was a key component in 102 00:04:52,560 --> 00:04:54,839 making munitions explosives. 103 00:04:55,079 --> 00:04:57,879 Speaker 1: Wow, so the sweet stuff was being turned into bombs 104 00:04:57,959 --> 00:04:58,439 pretty much. 105 00:04:58,480 --> 00:05:01,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a sort of higher tech version of a 106 00:05:01,279 --> 00:05:04,759 Molotov cocktail. As one source put it, molasses was fuel 107 00:05:04,800 --> 00:05:05,560 for the war machine. 108 00:05:05,600 --> 00:05:07,879 Speaker 1: But the war ended in November nineteen eighteen, so I'm 109 00:05:07,879 --> 00:05:11,279 guessing the demand for bomb making materials just evaporated. 110 00:05:11,399 --> 00:05:13,560 Speaker 2: It fell off a cliff, and suddenly USIA has this 111 00:05:13,680 --> 00:05:17,920 massive infrastructure, including this brand new, enormous tank in Boston 112 00:05:18,360 --> 00:05:21,040 and a supply chain for molasses, but no one's buying 113 00:05:21,079 --> 00:05:21,720 their main product. 114 00:05:21,800 --> 00:05:23,199 Speaker 1: So they needed to pivot instantly. 115 00:05:23,800 --> 00:05:27,199 Speaker 2: And the pivot was obvious. If you can make industrial alcohol, 116 00:05:27,240 --> 00:05:29,399 you can make rump. So they decided to go from 117 00:05:29,399 --> 00:05:30,879 bombs to booze. 118 00:05:30,680 --> 00:05:33,079 Speaker 1: Which seems like a smart business move except for one 119 00:05:34,480 --> 00:05:36,319 very big problem looming on the horizon. 120 00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:38,240 Speaker 2: The massive problem the prohibition clock. 121 00:05:38,439 --> 00:05:40,199 Speaker 1: Ah right, Yeah. 122 00:05:40,279 --> 00:05:42,720 Speaker 2: By this point, the Eighteenth Amendment had already been pushed through. 123 00:05:42,759 --> 00:05:46,079 Everyone knew that national prohibition was coming. The official date 124 00:05:46,160 --> 00:05:49,759 was set for January nineteen twenty, exactly one year away. 125 00:05:50,439 --> 00:05:54,000 After that, selling liquor legally in the United States would 126 00:05:54,000 --> 00:05:54,319 be over. 127 00:05:54,519 --> 00:05:57,319 Speaker 1: So they had a one year window, a twelve month 128 00:05:57,519 --> 00:06:00,279 all out sprint to make and sell as much rum 129 00:06:00,279 --> 00:06:03,040 as they possibly could before the taps were turned off 130 00:06:03,040 --> 00:06:03,439 for good. 131 00:06:03,680 --> 00:06:06,959 Speaker 2: It was a manic profit at all costs race against time. 132 00:06:07,199 --> 00:06:10,720 You can just imagine the meetings, maximize production, cut every corner, 133 00:06:10,879 --> 00:06:13,439 ignore any small problems, just fill that tank and get 134 00:06:13,480 --> 00:06:14,360 the rum out the door. 135 00:06:14,519 --> 00:06:16,439 Speaker 1: So the pressure on that tank wasn't just you know, 136 00:06:16,480 --> 00:06:21,000 physical from the molasses. It was financial, immense financial pressure, and. 137 00:06:20,920 --> 00:06:25,199 Speaker 2: That pressure, that desperation. It explains what happened. Just two 138 00:06:25,279 --> 00:06:29,600 days before the disaster. On January thirteenth, nineteen nineteen, they 139 00:06:29,680 --> 00:06:32,240 got a new shipment of molasses and they filled that 140 00:06:32,360 --> 00:06:34,759 tank right to the very top to the brim two 141 00:06:34,839 --> 00:06:37,839 point three million gallons. And you have to remember molasses 142 00:06:37,959 --> 00:06:41,240 is way heavier than water, raise about twelve pounds per gallon. 143 00:06:41,600 --> 00:06:44,040 So the stress on the steel walls of that tank, 144 00:06:44,240 --> 00:06:48,720 what engineers call hoops stress, was just astronomical. It was 145 00:06:48,759 --> 00:06:50,199 at its absolute maximum. 146 00:06:50,240 --> 00:06:52,240 Speaker 1: Okay, but if the tank was so dodgy, and we're 147 00:06:52,240 --> 00:06:54,639 about to get into just how dodgy it was, how 148 00:06:54,639 --> 00:06:57,759 did they get away with it? Weren't there inspectors building codes. 149 00:06:58,000 --> 00:07:00,959 Speaker 2: That's the crazy part. This was before for any of that. 150 00:07:01,040 --> 00:07:04,720 Really structural safety was basically a gentleman's agreement. There was 151 00:07:04,759 --> 00:07:06,920 no law that said an engineer had to sign off 152 00:07:06,920 --> 00:07:09,920 on the stress calculations. There was no city inspector who 153 00:07:09,959 --> 00:07:12,240 was required to check the thickness of the steel. If 154 00:07:12,240 --> 00:07:15,879 the company paid for a permit and said it's fine, 155 00:07:15,959 --> 00:07:17,680 the city basically had to take their word for. 156 00:07:17,600 --> 00:07:19,920 Speaker 1: It unless it was like actively falling over. 157 00:07:20,079 --> 00:07:23,199 Speaker 2: Exactly, and USIA just kept saying it's fine, it's fine, 158 00:07:23,319 --> 00:07:26,040 even though all the evidence, all the warning signs were 159 00:07:26,079 --> 00:07:27,680 screaming that it was not fine. 160 00:07:27,800 --> 00:07:30,759 Speaker 1: So what were those signs. This wasn't something that failed silently, 161 00:07:30,920 --> 00:07:31,439 was it not? 162 00:07:31,560 --> 00:07:33,839 Speaker 2: At all? It was a disaster in slow motion from 163 00:07:33,879 --> 00:07:36,800 the very beginning. The tank itself was a rush job. 164 00:07:37,120 --> 00:07:40,240 It was built too fast by workers who weren't skilled 165 00:07:40,240 --> 00:07:43,240 in that kind of construction, and the steel plates they 166 00:07:43,360 --> 00:07:46,199 used were way too thin for a tank of that 167 00:07:46,399 --> 00:07:48,360 size holding a liquid that dense. 168 00:07:48,759 --> 00:07:50,319 Speaker 1: So it started leaking. 169 00:07:50,079 --> 00:07:51,959 Speaker 2: Almost from day one. I mean, this is one of 170 00:07:51,959 --> 00:07:55,959 the most incredible details. It leaked so much that neighborhood kids, 171 00:07:56,160 --> 00:08:00,000 mostly the Italian immigrant children, would bring buckets and pale 172 00:08:00,160 --> 00:08:02,079 to the base of the tank to collect the runoff. 173 00:08:02,199 --> 00:08:04,199 They'd take it home for their families to use. 174 00:08:04,480 --> 00:08:07,560 Speaker 1: Wait, really, it was leaking that much, not just a drip, 175 00:08:07,600 --> 00:08:09,199 but enough to fill buckets. 176 00:08:09,279 --> 00:08:13,319 Speaker 2: We're talking long, fifty foot brown streaks of molasses constantly 177 00:08:13,360 --> 00:08:15,879 running down the side of this black steel tank. It 178 00:08:15,959 --> 00:08:18,120 was an open secret. People just got used to it. 179 00:08:18,519 --> 00:08:21,199 The company even tried to paint the tank brown to 180 00:08:21,319 --> 00:08:22,040 hide the leaks. 181 00:08:22,399 --> 00:08:27,120 Speaker 1: That's that is just stunning negligence. They literally tried to 182 00:08:27,160 --> 00:08:28,079 paint over the problem. 183 00:08:28,199 --> 00:08:30,720 Speaker 2: And it wasn't just the visible leaks. There were audible 184 00:08:30,759 --> 00:08:34,320 warnings too. City workers who had offices nearby told the 185 00:08:34,320 --> 00:08:37,200 company that the tank would and this is a quote, 186 00:08:37,399 --> 00:08:39,600 grown and shutter and shape every time there was a 187 00:08:39,639 --> 00:08:40,679 delivery of molasses. 188 00:08:40,759 --> 00:08:42,080 Speaker 1: You could hear it straining. 189 00:08:42,519 --> 00:08:45,399 Speaker 2: Yes, you could hear the metal under stress. And for 190 00:08:45,480 --> 00:08:47,519 two days after they filled it to the top on 191 00:08:47,600 --> 00:08:50,600 January thirteenth, it groaned constantly. 192 00:08:50,720 --> 00:08:52,759 Speaker 1: So you have engineers who must have known it was 193 00:08:52,840 --> 00:08:55,840 under design, You have neighbors who can see it leaking constantly, 194 00:08:55,879 --> 00:08:58,240 you have city workers who can hear it about to fail, 195 00:08:58,759 --> 00:09:01,840 and nothing happen, happens. Why didn't the city step in? 196 00:09:01,960 --> 00:09:05,559 Why was there, as you said, almost no official outrage. 197 00:09:05,720 --> 00:09:07,879 Speaker 2: And that's where the social part of this story becomes 198 00:09:07,919 --> 00:09:11,159 so important and so tragic. The North End was, as 199 00:09:11,200 --> 00:09:15,320 we said, ninety eight percent Italian immigrants. Most didn't speak English, 200 00:09:15,759 --> 00:09:19,639 many were not yet citizens. They were politically speaking, completely invisible. 201 00:09:19,679 --> 00:09:22,480 Speaker 1: They had no political voice, They couldn't vote, they didn't 202 00:09:22,519 --> 00:09:25,519 have powerful lobbyists at City Hall arguing on their. 203 00:09:25,399 --> 00:09:28,519 Speaker 2: Behalf exactly, And I think you could be pretty sure 204 00:09:28,559 --> 00:09:32,440 that if USIA had tried to build that same leaky, groaning, 205 00:09:32,639 --> 00:09:36,240 dangerous tank in a wealthy neighborhood like Beacon Hill, it 206 00:09:36,279 --> 00:09:38,360 would have been shut down by lawsuits before the first 207 00:09:38,360 --> 00:09:39,399 seal plate was in place. 208 00:09:39,600 --> 00:09:41,519 Speaker 1: But because it was in the North End, they knew 209 00:09:41,519 --> 00:09:42,399 they could get away with it. 210 00:09:42,840 --> 00:09:45,519 Speaker 2: The sources are pretty clear that the location was chosen 211 00:09:46,120 --> 00:09:50,360 because there would be really no opposition. USIA basically had 212 00:09:50,399 --> 00:09:53,240 contempt for the safety of that community because that community 213 00:09:53,279 --> 00:09:54,360 had no power to fight back. 214 00:09:54,679 --> 00:09:57,320 Speaker 1: It's just this bitter irony, isn't it. The very people 215 00:09:57,320 --> 00:10:00,639 who were ignored, the ones with no political power. Their 216 00:10:00,679 --> 00:10:04,279 tragedy is what ends up creating safety standards that protect everyone, 217 00:10:04,360 --> 00:10:05,039 powerful or not. 218 00:10:05,360 --> 00:10:08,440 Speaker 2: It's the central tragedy and the ultimate legacy of the 219 00:10:08,440 --> 00:10:12,759 whole event. The political vacuum created the physical vulnerability chilling. 220 00:10:12,600 --> 00:10:15,559 Speaker 1: And that vulnerability, combined with that frantic rush for profit, 221 00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:19,240 meant that on January fifteenth, at lunchtime, that tank was 222 00:10:19,279 --> 00:10:22,039 a bomb waiting to go off. Let's get into it 223 00:10:22,159 --> 00:10:26,000 Part three, The twenty five minute Catastrophe. 224 00:10:25,159 --> 00:10:27,480 Speaker 2: The time is just after twelve thirty in the afternoon. 225 00:10:28,120 --> 00:10:31,759 It's an unseasonably warm day for Boston in January, about 226 00:10:31,759 --> 00:10:35,000 forty degrees fahrenheit, and that little bit of warmth might 227 00:10:35,039 --> 00:10:37,480 have been the final straw. It could have caused the 228 00:10:37,559 --> 00:10:41,720 molasses inside the tank to ferment slightly, creating CO two gas, 229 00:10:42,039 --> 00:10:45,320 which would have increased the internal pressure just that tiny 230 00:10:45,320 --> 00:10:48,159 bit more a point, a tipping point, and the eyewitness 231 00:10:48,159 --> 00:10:52,080 accounts of what happened next are just their visceral. There 232 00:10:52,120 --> 00:10:55,159 was a patrolman, Frank McManus, who was on his beat nearby. 233 00:10:55,519 --> 00:10:57,200 He heard two distinct sounds. 234 00:10:57,639 --> 00:10:58,200 Speaker 1: What were they? 235 00:10:58,360 --> 00:11:01,879 Speaker 2: The first was what he called a tremendous rumbling, grinding sound. 236 00:11:02,320 --> 00:11:04,919 That was the sound of the steel plates beginning to tear. 237 00:11:05,080 --> 00:11:07,320 Speaker 1: And the second sound, this is the one that gets me. 238 00:11:07,519 --> 00:11:09,679 He heard rat a tat, tat. He thought it was 239 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:10,919 a machine gun, right. 240 00:11:11,080 --> 00:11:13,840 Speaker 2: But it wasn't. That was the sound of thousands of 241 00:11:13,840 --> 00:11:16,919 steel rivets, the bolts holding the tank together, popping off 242 00:11:16,960 --> 00:11:18,679 one by one under the immense pressure. 243 00:11:18,759 --> 00:11:21,120 Speaker 1: So the tank was literally unzipping itself. It wasn't just 244 00:11:21,159 --> 00:11:22,840 a leak, It just blew apart. 245 00:11:22,919 --> 00:11:26,639 Speaker 2: It completely disintegrated, in one violent explosive burst. 246 00:11:26,399 --> 00:11:29,200 Speaker 1: And McManus he had the presence of mind to get 247 00:11:29,200 --> 00:11:29,919 to a call box. 248 00:11:30,320 --> 00:11:32,799 Speaker 2: He did, and he made what has to be one 249 00:11:32,840 --> 00:11:36,799 of the strangest emergency calls in history. He told the 250 00:11:36,799 --> 00:11:41,360 dispatcher sent all available rescue personnel immediately, there's a wave 251 00:11:41,399 --> 00:11:43,320 of molasses coming down Commercial Street. 252 00:11:43,799 --> 00:11:46,559 Speaker 1: I can't imagine what that dispatcher must have been thinking. 253 00:11:46,559 --> 00:11:49,279 Speaker 2: Probably that he was dealing with a prank call, but 254 00:11:49,360 --> 00:11:52,919 it was real. When the tank failed, all two point 255 00:11:52,960 --> 00:11:57,120 three million gallons of that molasses shot outwards, accelerating almost 256 00:11:57,159 --> 00:12:00,320 instantly to about thirty five miles per hour up a 257 00:12:00,360 --> 00:12:03,799 car exactly. The initial wave was about thirty five feet high, 258 00:12:04,080 --> 00:12:05,919 and then it sort of leveled off into this churning, 259 00:12:05,960 --> 00:12:08,679 twenty foot high, one hundred and sixty foot wide wall 260 00:12:09,080 --> 00:12:10,200 of brown sludge. 261 00:12:10,320 --> 00:12:12,960 Speaker 1: And because it's molasses, it's not like a water wave 262 00:12:12,960 --> 00:12:15,480 that would just splash. It had weight, It had mass. 263 00:12:15,320 --> 00:12:18,279 Speaker 2: Immense mass. It was a liquid battering ramp. It didn't 264 00:12:18,320 --> 00:12:21,360 just flow around things, it obliterated them. The sources say 265 00:12:21,399 --> 00:12:24,080 it literally scoured the waterfront. It just picked up everything 266 00:12:24,080 --> 00:12:24,440 in its. 267 00:12:24,320 --> 00:12:26,840 Speaker 1: Past, people, horses, carts. 268 00:12:26,759 --> 00:12:29,480 Speaker 2: Even parts of the elevated railway. It knocked the train 269 00:12:29,600 --> 00:12:33,200 car clean off the tracks. But the firehouse example is 270 00:12:33,240 --> 00:12:35,440 maybe the most shocking illustration of its power. 271 00:12:35,799 --> 00:12:36,879 Speaker 1: Yeah, tell us about that. 272 00:12:37,399 --> 00:12:39,799 Speaker 2: So, fire Station thirty one was about eighty feet away 273 00:12:39,799 --> 00:12:42,600 from the tank. The wave hit. It was such force 274 00:12:43,000 --> 00:12:45,440 that it lifted the entire building off its foundation and 275 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:49,840 shoved its sideways. The second floor collapsed and just pancaked 276 00:12:49,840 --> 00:12:51,159 down onto the first floor. 277 00:12:50,919 --> 00:12:52,519 Speaker 1: And there were firefighters inside. 278 00:12:52,799 --> 00:12:55,679 Speaker 2: Yes, several of them were trapped in this tiny eighteen 279 00:12:55,679 --> 00:12:59,240 inch crawl space between the collapse floors, and the molasses 280 00:12:59,320 --> 00:13:02,320 was pouring in rising around them. They were struggling just 281 00:13:02,360 --> 00:13:04,840 to keep their heads above the goo. It's a miracle 282 00:13:04,840 --> 00:13:05,879 any of them survived. 283 00:13:06,080 --> 00:13:08,559 Speaker 1: That's a level of horror that's hard to even comprehend. 284 00:13:09,000 --> 00:13:10,480 Instantaneous destruction. 285 00:13:10,720 --> 00:13:14,200 Speaker 2: It was for many people. The initial impact was instantly fatal, 286 00:13:14,799 --> 00:13:17,840 but the disaster had two phases, and the second one 287 00:13:17,879 --> 00:13:19,519 was in some ways even more cruel. 288 00:13:19,799 --> 00:13:21,159 Speaker 1: The sticking exactly. 289 00:13:21,679 --> 00:13:24,279 Speaker 2: The initial blast was over in minutes, but once the 290 00:13:24,279 --> 00:13:27,120 waves stopped moving, the cold January air started to cool 291 00:13:27,159 --> 00:13:30,799 the molasses down, it congealed, It got thicker and stickier 292 00:13:30,840 --> 00:13:35,240 and heavier. It became this giant, inescapable trap. People were 293 00:13:35,279 --> 00:13:37,000 literally glued in place. 294 00:13:36,879 --> 00:13:38,519 Speaker 1: So rescuers couldn't even get to them. 295 00:13:38,720 --> 00:13:41,120 Speaker 2: They couldn't. They were trying to wade through this stuff, 296 00:13:41,200 --> 00:13:43,240 and it was like trying to walk through quicksand or 297 00:13:43,240 --> 00:13:46,159 wet tar. Many of the twenty one people who died 298 00:13:46,360 --> 00:13:50,039 didn't die from the impact. They drowned or suffocated hours later, 299 00:13:50,399 --> 00:13:54,159 stuck fast in the cold, thick molasses while rescuers tried 300 00:13:54,159 --> 00:13:55,320 desperately to reach them. 301 00:13:55,399 --> 00:13:58,279 Speaker 1: I just I can't imagine the logistics of that rescue. 302 00:13:58,279 --> 00:14:00,360 How do you even free someone from that? 303 00:14:00,720 --> 00:14:03,879 Speaker 2: It was frantic. Sailors jumped off ships in the harbor 304 00:14:03,879 --> 00:14:07,039 to help. Firefighters laid ladders across the surface to try 305 00:14:07,039 --> 00:14:09,480 and distribute their weight so they wouldn't sink in. They 306 00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:12,799 were up to their waists, sometimes their chests in this stuff, 307 00:14:12,919 --> 00:14:15,679 fighting against time as it got colder and harder. It 308 00:14:15,720 --> 00:14:18,200 was a gruesome, sticky battlefield. 309 00:14:17,559 --> 00:14:20,440 Speaker 1: Which brings us right to the cleanup part four, the 310 00:14:20,480 --> 00:14:24,840 sticky aftermath, because once the rescue was over, the recovery 311 00:14:24,919 --> 00:14:29,639 had to begin, and the scene must have been just apocalyptic. 312 00:14:29,799 --> 00:14:32,639 Speaker 2: Commercial Street was just splinters. Buildings were gone, and the 313 00:14:32,759 --> 00:14:35,240 entire area was buried under this layer of what was 314 00:14:35,240 --> 00:14:36,759 described as basically tar. 315 00:14:36,879 --> 00:14:39,080 Speaker 1: Two point three million gallons of it. 316 00:14:39,080 --> 00:14:41,600 Speaker 2: It was a problem nobody'd ever fased before. If it's water, 317 00:14:41,720 --> 00:14:44,799 it drains. If it's mud, you can shovel it. But 318 00:14:44,879 --> 00:14:49,559 molasses just congeals. It's too sticky to shovel properly, but 319 00:14:49,559 --> 00:14:51,200 it's too thick to just wash away. 320 00:14:51,600 --> 00:14:52,879 Speaker 1: What did they even try to do? 321 00:14:53,080 --> 00:14:55,600 Speaker 2: Well? First, they tried blasting it with high pressure hoses 322 00:14:55,639 --> 00:14:58,440 from the fire hydrants. The idea was just to push 323 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:01,320 it all into the harbor, but that didn't no because 324 00:15:01,360 --> 00:15:03,960 the high sugar content made it resistant to fresh water. 325 00:15:04,279 --> 00:15:06,679 The water just sort of rolled over the top or 326 00:15:06,720 --> 00:15:09,480 mixed in a little bit, creating an even bigger volume 327 00:15:09,559 --> 00:15:10,519 of sticky mass. 328 00:15:10,559 --> 00:15:12,399 Speaker 1: So then what picks and shovels. 329 00:15:12,600 --> 00:15:15,080 Speaker 2: They tried that too, but the molasses would just sort 330 00:15:15,120 --> 00:15:18,360 of reform and stick to the tools. They even tried 331 00:15:18,399 --> 00:15:20,879 something really extreme. They tried to burn it off with 332 00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:23,159 gas torches burning molasses. 333 00:15:23,320 --> 00:15:25,080 Speaker 1: The smell must have been unbelievable. 334 00:15:25,080 --> 00:15:28,399 Speaker 2: Oh just imagine burnt sugar, smoke and whatever else was 335 00:15:28,440 --> 00:15:30,919 mixed in with the debris. And it didn't even work. 336 00:15:30,919 --> 00:15:34,000 It just created this hard carameized crust on top, which 337 00:15:34,080 --> 00:15:36,720 insulated the gow underneath and made it even harder to 338 00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:37,080 get at. 339 00:15:37,200 --> 00:15:39,559 Speaker 1: So they're just stuck. The whole neighborhood is just trapped 340 00:15:39,559 --> 00:15:40,080 in syrup. 341 00:15:40,519 --> 00:15:44,200 Speaker 2: It seemed that way for weeks until one firefighter had 342 00:15:44,200 --> 00:15:47,600 a brilliant IDEA. Okay, he realized it was a chemical problem. 343 00:15:48,519 --> 00:15:50,919 If fresh water didn't work, maybe a different kind of 344 00:15:50,960 --> 00:15:54,240 water would. He suggested pumping salt water in from Boston 345 00:15:54,279 --> 00:15:55,480 Harbor ah. 346 00:15:55,519 --> 00:15:56,080 Speaker 1: The salt. 347 00:15:56,279 --> 00:15:59,480 Speaker 2: The salt was the key. For whatever chemical reason, the 348 00:15:59,519 --> 00:16:02,879 salt in the ocean water was able to cut through 349 00:16:02,879 --> 00:16:07,200 the molasses. It broke down the viscosity just enough that 350 00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:09,039 they could finally start washing it away. 351 00:16:09,360 --> 00:16:12,679 Speaker 1: So they just started flooding the streets with ocean water. 352 00:16:12,679 --> 00:16:15,440 Speaker 2: Millions and millions of gallons of it, pumping it out 353 00:16:15,480 --> 00:16:17,879 of the harbor onto the streets, and then letting it 354 00:16:17,919 --> 00:16:20,519 all flow back into the harbor, carrying the molasses with it. 355 00:16:20,600 --> 00:16:22,720 Speaker 1: The scale of that is just mind boggling. 356 00:16:22,799 --> 00:16:25,559 Speaker 2: It took six months. Six months of this worked just 357 00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:28,080 for the North End to get back to something resembling normal, 358 00:16:28,200 --> 00:16:31,200 and every basement, every cellar in the area was filled 359 00:16:31,279 --> 00:16:32,279 solid with this stuff. 360 00:16:32,559 --> 00:16:35,320 Speaker 1: I read about a banana salesman he'd hid in his 361 00:16:35,360 --> 00:16:38,720 life savings over four thousand dollars in cash in his 362 00:16:38,799 --> 00:16:40,639 shop's basement, and they. 363 00:16:40,519 --> 00:16:43,120 Speaker 2: Had to dig out a solid twelve feet of molasses 364 00:16:43,120 --> 00:16:46,200 and debris just to find his money. Think about that 365 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:49,519 shoveling through twelve feet of cold, hard tar. 366 00:16:49,639 --> 00:16:52,480 Speaker 1: And the legacy, the physical mark on the city. It 367 00:16:52,559 --> 00:16:53,840 lasted for so long. 368 00:16:54,120 --> 00:16:58,840 Speaker 2: The harbor was brown for months. But the smell, that's 369 00:16:58,840 --> 00:17:02,000 what people remembered. Local said that for years, even decades later, 370 00:17:02,039 --> 00:17:04,279 on a really hot summer day, you could still get 371 00:17:04,319 --> 00:17:07,799 a faint, sweet, sickly smell of molasses rising up from 372 00:17:07,839 --> 00:17:08,240 the ground. 373 00:17:08,319 --> 00:17:11,119 Speaker 1: It was a sensory ghost of the disaster exactly. So 374 00:17:11,160 --> 00:17:13,640 the physical cleanup took half a year, But the real 375 00:17:13,720 --> 00:17:16,519 lasting change that wasn't about cleaning the streets. It was 376 00:17:16,519 --> 00:17:20,160 about cleaning up the law. The company USIA was in 377 00:17:20,240 --> 00:17:22,599 a world of trouble. Then that takes us to our 378 00:17:22,640 --> 00:17:26,319 final part five. The unintended legacy right. 379 00:17:26,599 --> 00:17:30,039 Speaker 2: Usaa's negligence was just so obvious, the shoddy construction, the 380 00:17:30,119 --> 00:17:33,680 ignored leaks, the mad dash for profit. By nineteen twenty, 381 00:17:33,720 --> 00:17:36,880 they were facing over one hundred separate civil lawsuits, from 382 00:17:36,920 --> 00:17:39,039 the families of the dead, from the one hundred and 383 00:17:39,039 --> 00:17:41,839 fifty people who were seriously injured, from businesses like the 384 00:17:41,920 --> 00:17:43,599 railway whose property was destroyed. 385 00:17:43,640 --> 00:17:45,680 Speaker 1: So how did the carts even handle that one hundred 386 00:17:45,680 --> 00:17:46,440 different trials. 387 00:17:46,720 --> 00:17:49,160 Speaker 2: Well, they did something that was at the time revolutionary. 388 00:17:49,319 --> 00:17:53,039 They consolidated all those suits. One hundred and nineteen different 389 00:17:53,039 --> 00:17:57,240 plaintiffs all grouped together to sue USIA as a single entity, 390 00:17:57,759 --> 00:18:01,160 and in doing so, they essentially created the blueprint for 391 00:18:01,240 --> 00:18:02,920 the modern class action lawsuit. 392 00:18:03,359 --> 00:18:07,160 Speaker 1: Wow. Okay, So this sticky, bizarre disaster is the reason 393 00:18:07,160 --> 00:18:10,240 we have class action suits today for oil spills or 394 00:18:10,240 --> 00:18:11,119 faulty products. 395 00:18:11,160 --> 00:18:13,880 Speaker 2: It was the first really significant one against a major 396 00:18:14,000 --> 00:18:17,920 US corporation. It established a legal framework that lets hundreds 397 00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:20,799 or thousands of ordinary people banned together to take on 398 00:18:20,839 --> 00:18:23,920 a corporate giant. It completely leveled the playing field. 399 00:18:23,960 --> 00:18:26,880 Speaker 1: That's huge. That's a massive legacy on its own. 400 00:18:26,799 --> 00:18:30,200 Speaker 2: It is, But the trial itself said another maybe even 401 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:33,319 more important precedent. The case dragged on for five years, 402 00:18:33,440 --> 00:18:35,400 and USI's main defense was to claim it was an 403 00:18:35,440 --> 00:18:37,920 act of God. They tried to argue that the tank 404 00:18:37,920 --> 00:18:40,960 had been sabotaged or that it was just an unavoidable accident. 405 00:18:41,039 --> 00:18:43,440 Speaker 1: So how did the plaintiffs prove it was negligence? 406 00:18:43,880 --> 00:18:46,759 Speaker 2: The use science, And this is the other big legal first. 407 00:18:47,200 --> 00:18:49,359 This trial was one of the first in American history 408 00:18:49,440 --> 00:18:52,400 to rely heavily on expert testimony as evidence. 409 00:18:52,680 --> 00:18:54,000 Speaker 1: So they brought in scientists. 410 00:18:54,079 --> 00:18:58,279 Speaker 2: They brought in structural engineers and physicists, and they basically 411 00:18:58,359 --> 00:19:01,039 put the tank on trial. Didn't just have people say 412 00:19:01,079 --> 00:19:04,519 it leaked. They had experts coming with calculations. They calculated 413 00:19:04,519 --> 00:19:07,319 the exact hoop stress on the steel plates from two 414 00:19:07,400 --> 00:19:10,519 point three million gallons of dense molasses, and then they 415 00:19:10,599 --> 00:19:14,319 proved with math that the steel used was only half 416 00:19:14,319 --> 00:19:16,440 as thick as it needed to be to handle that 417 00:19:16,519 --> 00:19:17,319 pressure safely. 418 00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:20,000 Speaker 1: So it wasn't just that it failed. They proved it 419 00:19:20,039 --> 00:19:21,559 was designed to fail exactly. 420 00:19:21,599 --> 00:19:24,039 Speaker 2: They proved it was a result of deliberate cost cutting, 421 00:19:24,200 --> 00:19:27,880 not an accident, and the judge accepted this scientific evidence 422 00:19:27,960 --> 00:19:28,759 as legal. 423 00:19:28,519 --> 00:19:30,799 Speaker 1: Proof, which must have been a game changer, a. 424 00:19:30,720 --> 00:19:33,960 Speaker 2: Total game changer. In nineteen twenty five, the judge ruled 425 00:19:34,000 --> 00:19:37,119 that USIA was one hundred percent responsible due to negligence. 426 00:19:37,559 --> 00:19:39,559 They had to pay out about six hundred thousand dollars, 427 00:19:39,640 --> 00:19:41,519 which is around nine million in today's money. 428 00:19:41,559 --> 00:19:43,519 Speaker 1: But like you said, the money wasn't the biggest thing. 429 00:19:43,640 --> 00:19:45,480 It was the aftermath of that verdict. 430 00:19:45,720 --> 00:19:49,039 Speaker 2: The verdict was the catalyst. It created this huge public 431 00:19:49,079 --> 00:19:53,319 outcry for reform. People were horrified that a company could 432 00:19:53,319 --> 00:19:55,759 be so reckless and that the government had no power 433 00:19:55,759 --> 00:19:56,400 to stop them. 434 00:19:56,440 --> 00:19:59,880 Speaker 1: And before this, construction was basically the wild West. 435 00:20:00,759 --> 00:20:03,480 Speaker 2: Architects didn't even have to sign their drawings. An engineer 436 00:20:03,480 --> 00:20:07,200 wasn't necessarily held legally responsible if their bridge collapsed. There 437 00:20:07,200 --> 00:20:09,680 were no mandated minimum standards for things like this. 438 00:20:09,839 --> 00:20:11,920 Speaker 1: And the molasses flood changed all of that. 439 00:20:12,160 --> 00:20:14,920 Speaker 2: It forced the government's hand. Yeah, the city of Boston 440 00:20:15,039 --> 00:20:19,000 acted first. They passed new regulations requiring that architects and 441 00:20:19,039 --> 00:20:22,599 engineers had to formally sign and seal their building plans. 442 00:20:22,920 --> 00:20:25,079 They had to put their professional license on the line, 443 00:20:25,440 --> 00:20:27,599 a testing that the design was safe. 444 00:20:27,240 --> 00:20:31,279 Speaker 1: Which completely shifts the accountability. It's not just some faceless 445 00:20:31,319 --> 00:20:35,160 corporation anymore. It's an individual professional who's on the hook. 446 00:20:35,519 --> 00:20:39,160 Speaker 2: And that idea spread like wildfire. A wave of building 447 00:20:39,200 --> 00:20:43,039 codes and regulations swept across the country. The very idea 448 00:20:43,279 --> 00:20:45,799 that a plumber needs to be certified, That an inspector 449 00:20:45,799 --> 00:20:48,359 has to sign off on wiring before you put up drywall. 450 00:20:48,640 --> 00:20:51,319 That an engineer's calculations for a skyscraper have to be 451 00:20:51,359 --> 00:20:54,480 reviewed and approved. All of that stems directly from the 452 00:20:54,519 --> 00:20:55,960 lessons learned from this disaster. 453 00:20:56,319 --> 00:20:58,720 Speaker 1: It's just incredible to think about. We live inside this 454 00:20:58,799 --> 00:21:02,079 invisible web of safety regulations every single day, and we 455 00:21:02,200 --> 00:21:05,079 just take it for granted. And it all started because 456 00:21:05,160 --> 00:21:07,720 a company was in a rush to make rum a 457 00:21:07,799 --> 00:21:11,119 poorly built tank, a tragic accident, and out of it 458 00:21:11,160 --> 00:21:14,079 comes the foundation for modern American safety standards. 459 00:21:14,119 --> 00:21:16,880 Speaker 2: And the ultimate irony, which we touched on, is still 460 00:21:16,920 --> 00:21:19,559 the most powerful part of the story. The residents of 461 00:21:19,599 --> 00:21:22,519 the North End were ignored, They were seen as powerless, 462 00:21:23,039 --> 00:21:26,839 and yet they're horrible suffering created this protective legal structure 463 00:21:27,039 --> 00:21:29,880 that now shields every single person in this country, whether 464 00:21:29,880 --> 00:21:31,920 they're rich or poor, a citizen or not. 465 00:21:32,319 --> 00:21:36,160 Speaker 1: It took this truly horrifying disaster, this freakish event caused 466 00:21:36,160 --> 00:21:38,720 by greed, to force the government to protect the public 467 00:21:38,759 --> 00:21:41,160 in a way that politics alone just couldn't achieve at 468 00:21:41,160 --> 00:21:41,640 the time. 469 00:21:42,200 --> 00:21:46,000 Speaker 2: Right, we rely on these hidden rules, but we forget 470 00:21:46,359 --> 00:21:49,519 the human price that was paid to create them, which 471 00:21:49,559 --> 00:21:51,200 I think leads us to the final question we want 472 00:21:51,200 --> 00:21:53,359 to leave you with. We have all these codes and 473 00:21:53,359 --> 00:21:57,599 regulations now, but you still hear stories about shortcuts, about 474 00:21:57,640 --> 00:22:00,960 warnings being ignored for the sake of profit. So do 475 00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:03,000 you think we've truly learned the lesson? Do we pay 476 00:22:03,119 --> 00:22:05,640 enough attention to the quiet groans and the small leagues 477 00:22:05,640 --> 00:22:08,640 today or does history just keep telling us that, unfortunately, 478 00:22:08,839 --> 00:22:12,079 tragedy is always the fastest path to meaningful safety reform. 479 00:22:12,160 --> 00:22:13,759 Speaker 1: We'd love to know what you think. Is it the 480 00:22:13,759 --> 00:22:16,599 sheer absurdity of the disaster that sticks with you or 481 00:22:16,640 --> 00:22:20,359 the incredible legal legacy left behind. Let us know we'll 482 00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:22,160 be back next time with another thrilling thread.