Speaker 1: Problem, reaction, solution, cheetah ori, cheta ori, open form, debate.
The topics are Remember to give it to the topics today, guys.
You don't have to debate. If you want to, you can't.
The topics are as listed last time, same topics. Bible,
Church history, Batristics, councils, Islam, Quran revelation, Protestanism, Calvinism, Evangelicalism,
Roman Catholicism, papacy, Arianism, cults, Hebrew Roots, Joe's Witnesses, et cetera,
et cetera, Black Huber, Israelites, Yakube. All of these topics
are open for discussion today. I see we have people
who would like to discuss porphyry, neoplatonism. All those topics
are also welcome. The call in is via Twitter spaces.
You'll see the link in the show description. It is
the Twitter space. So if you want to call in
and ask, you don't have to debate. You can ask
a question, but if you want a debate, raise your
hand and you'll go to the front of the line.
Remember today isn't FAQ questions for Orthodox catechumens. So if
you're a catechumen and you have those kinds of questions,
you can take those to your spiritual father. You can
take those two competent people online who can answer those questions. Really, today,
we're looking for people who disagree, people who have an argument.
They want to present a case that they'd like to make.
Remember the way argumentation works, it's not arguing. Arguments in
this strict sense. Are some thesis with supporting evidences, syllogisms,
et cetera to back up what you're what the case is.
If you come on and say a bunch of stuff
and talk about me, or if you want to talk
about drama, none of that is relevant. None of that
is an argument. We can go ahead and just assert
and agree from the outset. I'm the worst person ever.
I am the worst KGB drug lord also working for
the CIA. So now that we've got that out of
the way, let's get to the actual argumentation. So we're
gonna focus on that. If you're a drunk wine mom
and you call in, we're gonna make fun of you.
If you're a person who wants to come in and
spit their bars, you're gonna get made fun of. Two
If I interrupt you, it's because you're not sticking to
the topic or to the issue, and that's a fair game.
Now again, you don't have to debate, but if you
do want to debate, you can't. So let's make that
clear for everybody. Remember the topics are listed. You can
only put a certain number of characters in the topic
description on the Twitter, so I can't fit everything in
there that I'd like to, even though it says God, Islam, Catholicism, Protestanism.
I put Sneaker and Tate in there because that's in
the news. We just had the impromptu debate with Muslim
lantern what two nights ago, so I figured that might
be hot topics. Uh, if the people from that sphere
want to hop on a debate, I don't mean that
I don't expect. I don't expect Muslim lantern or Sneaker
to hop on. I'm saying the people from that sphere
if they want to hop on. But now, last time,
we ended up having way more Roman Catholics in this
last six hour livestream calling in than I expected. So
you never know what you're gonna get. You think you're
gonna get more Islamic debates and discussions, and it ends
up being Protestants or Calvinists or Catholics or whatever, So
it's open for we never know. It's a roulette wheel
of feral madness, and I embrace it. We have fun
with it. So now get your feelings hurt. If you
come to debate and I start debating and then you
play victim, what do you come to debate? Well, it
says debate, and you can specify from the outset whether
you want to debate or not. Again, the topics are
listed and the top of the show link. The call
in is in the description of the show, and of
course the mods on YouTube will continually be putting it
in there as well. Also to be clear, because there
are a lot of multims that are coming over this way.
I am not an expert in Islam, and I've never
pretended to be. It is a topic that I devote
time to studying on the side. So it is not
my main focus of whatever. It's not my main attention.
It's not the sort what am I trying to I
can talk today. It is not the locus of my attention.
We have had several debates though in the last six years,
and so it is on my radar. I've read several
books on Islam. I've read a good portion of the Kuran.
I've not read the whole thing. I'm familiar with the
basic ideas of the various schools akida excuse me creeds.
I know there's a difference between a creed and a
feak or jurisprudence. I'm aware of those things. So let's
not haggle over minutia. If you want to debate, let's
get to the main issues. Yeah, if you want to
do Trinity Tawheed, that's also a fair game as well.
We can talk about that. We can talk about anything
related to Trinity, Christology. Those are the areas I know
very well. Anything related to Torah, profits, etc. Those are
the things that are my focus church fathers. I know
that very well. Now doctor Khalil is here, he and I.
People are saying, when are you going to have a
debate with Khalil. We have had multiple discussions on doing
a stream where we perhaps first have open discussion and
then later at debate in a timed formal way, or
we might just have discussions. I'm definitely open to that.
Of course, he is Shia, so he comes from a
different perspective than most of who we debated so far.
I think everybody we've debated so far is Sunni. I
can't think of any I think one time a Sufi
guy called in. Now two Sufis have called in to
debate on the open forms we do here. But for
the most part, I think we've only debated from within
the Sunni tradition, and that includes both Salafi and non Salafi.
So let's see Paul williams Azer she shavera Lee, right,
we had debates, but then them, and then we had debates
with Daniel Jake It Jaws and Daniel again, and then
Muslim Lantern. So I don't know about seven debates now. Anyway,
you're free to set the topic if you want to
set the agenda, what topic you want to talk about,
Just let me know from the outset. If you want
to make an argument, for say, I want to make
an argument for three minutes straight, let me talk for
the Oh yeah, you can do that, fine, Just make
it clear what you want to do again, keep it
to the topics. If you don't, I'm immediately just gonna
boot you and move on. So we'll go ahead and
open it up. Let's see. First up was black Sufi
Maleik and we were discussing in replies on Twitter. So
what's up man, How you doing?
Speaker 2: Hey Jake?
Speaker 3: Can you hear me?
Speaker 1: Sir?
Speaker 3: Okay?
Speaker 4: So, first and foremost, I did see that thing that
you posted about a seventh century for sure to you
know that this song is true. On the traditional Islamic narrative,
it's quite clear that during the time of the Sahaba
or the companions themselves, there were true prophecies of the
prophet coming true, for example, in the Quran. On the
traditional narrative, the Quran openly predicts, or if the prophet
only openly predicts, that Rome would beat the.
Speaker 3: Persians, the Romans would beat the Persians in their war, that.
Speaker 4: Certain people would die or pass away on top of
the miraculous elements of Islam.
Speaker 1: But that's not what the dilemma challenges, though it's not
related to that.
Speaker 4: I am making the point though, that they would have
evidences to justify their belief in Islam.
Speaker 1: But how does that answer the challenge about the Quran
saying confirm the Qoran with prior revelation.
Speaker 4: I would say that the Koran doesn't confirm prior revelation,
so I would just totally reject that premise.
Speaker 1: So these verses are not saying that you can look
to the Torod and the prophets and all of that.
Speaker 3: You don't need to look to the tour in prophets.
Speaker 1: What I'm saying versus the verses say that, sure.
Speaker 4: Right, and the uncorrupted versions and things like this, we
would say that you can't. Right, there's possibly stuff within
the New Testament.
Speaker 1: Okay, so how do you know there's a where is
the uncorrupted version?
Speaker 3: I don't think there's a whole uncorrupted versions, but we.
Speaker 1: Would say that our snippets, where is that that the
seventh century christenrds you could look to?
Speaker 4: So, for example, there are tons of verses that somebody
would say that you can contextually argue, would talk about
get a message, sorry, would talk about the Muhammadan prophecy
within the Torah or within the New Testament, right that
many Muslims are pretty sure you've heard have argued this,
but they're usually not explicit verses either way.
Speaker 1: So in other words, there is there do you understand
we have? We have versions of the Torah and the
Gospels and the prophets that precede, that predate the seventh century?
Speaker 5: Right? I do know that?
Speaker 1: So that refutes this idea that there was this other
uncorrupted one at the time of the Quran that they
could have looked to.
Speaker 3: No, So the Quran, okay.
Speaker 4: So the prophet himself, if you read the hideth corpus,
have you read a lot of hidethur?
Speaker 1: No?
Speaker 5: Some not a lot, okay.
Speaker 4: So the prophet himself clearly tells people that the Torah.
He says, don't don't believe everything in the Torah, like
he very clearly says, I believe, don't believe or disbelieve it.
Speaker 3: Right when it comes to certain things that you read
in the Torah.
Speaker 4: And then you have Umar and Uthman and others that
clearly say that when it comes to the corruption of
the New Testament and the Old it's the text that
is corrupted itself.
Speaker 3: If you read.
Speaker 4: Let's see, I can't remember the number of the hadith
in particular, but it is.
Speaker 3: In Sahi Muslim and Abukari.
Speaker 4: So these are very authentic haidiz and they're widely transmitted
as well.
Speaker 1: Well. But what about the other hadith that say that
it's impossible for the uh Tora to be corrupted or
God's word to be corrupted. That's also in the Quran
as well.
Speaker 4: Right, Well, we come to the question of divine speech
and it's corruptibility, I would say, in relation to the
divine essence is incorruptible.
Speaker 1: So a minute. So that means then that the that
the Quran in time and space is also corruptible.
Speaker 4: Right, somebody could have you know, if we didn't have
an entire empire forging the book basically, you know, putting
the book together, I would say, it's quite a possibility
that certain things.
Speaker 3: Could be nonpropetic in there.
Speaker 4: The actual argument for the preservation of the Quran is
basically that itself, right, it's not the.
Speaker 1: Uh well, I mean you understand preservation itself doesn't prove anything.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I would agree with that, right, But I'm trying
to tell you why we believe the Kuran in particular
is preserved. Right, That's why I'm trying to give you
that justification for why.
Speaker 3: We do have that belief in whole to it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but that's not what I asked you was on
what basis? Then, if if all us speech and time
and space in the written books can be correct, then
wouldn't that undercut your view on the Kuran.
Speaker 6: No, it wouldn't because as I just said, Well, you
just said, but you just said that the prior words
of a lah can be corrupted in terms of their
historical instantiations in the Torah, right, yes, okay, but not
the Quran.
Speaker 4: I'd say, the Quran when it comes to a double standard, Okay,
it's a totally different justification.
Speaker 1: No, it's not, No, it's not. You literally just admitted
that Allah's words can be corrupted in terms of their
physical instantiation, but not in the Quran. That's a double standard.
Speaker 3: Not really.
Speaker 4: I would say that the reason why we hold that
the Koran is preserved is because of totally different reasons.
Speaker 1: From that, it doesn't matter that you have totally different
reasons if you've already admitted that that Allah's words can
be corrupted. Anyway, let's get to the neoplatonism issues. I
thought that's what you want to talk about.
Speaker 3: That's also true, okay.
Speaker 4: So I would say that when it comes to you're
a pistemology and your problems with a pistemology, neoplatonic keenology
can just as easily justify the reliability to faculties.
Speaker 1: As neoplatonic What did you.
Speaker 3: Say, penology? Starting with the monad.
Speaker 1: What but how does that? What does that have to
do with Islam?
Speaker 4: Within the Sufi and Neoplatonic traditions themselves, they clearly hold
to neoplatonic theology.
Speaker 1: Okay, why why should I accept neoplatonic metaphysics as an
epistemic starting point?
Speaker 4: Well, I would say that's necessary for intelligibility.
Speaker 1: Why is that necessary for intelligibility.
Speaker 4: The same reason you hold the news to be necessary
for intelligbility.
Speaker 1: When you feel, well, that's a that's a faculty. That
doesn't mean that it provides justification because I believe in
an element of the worldview existing. So what I'm asking
is an epistemic justification question.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I know, And you usually use the logos and
news as a justification for faculty.
Speaker 1: Those aren't justifications. The news is not a justification. It
happened a faculty be a justification.
Speaker 4: So you don't think that because God exists, that's why
our factories are reliable, that's all what you believe.
Speaker 1: I do believe that, but I have a basis. But
I have a basis. I have a basis in terms
of revelational epistemology, which is not what you're arguing.
Speaker 4: So you don't argue that God himself, in his very
own essence in nature would entail that your faculties are reliable.
Speaker 1: No, Now, God's essence is unknowable, so we don't believe
that at all. But I would argue that physics is justification.
Revelation is the basis for metaphysics.
Speaker 4: Okay, So you hold that because the book says so,
therefore my faculties are reliable, or the tradition says so
as well.
Speaker 1: Now I hold that the transcendental argument gives me a
basis to believe in the reliability not just of my faculties,
but of the worldview as a whole.
Speaker 3: Let me make this point.
Speaker 4: So you would appeal to the transcendental argument to justify
from scripture instead, right, not from necessarily your metaphysics.
Speaker 1: Well, the transcendental argument is an argument for an entire worldview,
so it includes the whole. It includes the pieces of
the worldview too, such as divine revelations, such as universals,
such as categories. All of those things are part of
the world view. So one of the unique things about
TAG is that it's a worldview specific and holistic argumentation.
Thank you.
Speaker 2: Okay, So.
Speaker 4: Why couldn't write a Sufi or somebody like that use
the same justification for the reliability to faculties.
Speaker 1: Because it's not just an argument for the reliability of faculties.
It's an argument for objectivity, universality, laws of logic, all
those things which require a deity that is more than
just a bear unity or a bare monad.
Speaker 3: Why would you say that because this is now going to.
Speaker 1: Metaphysics, because I mean, yeah, we can go into a
pis and this argument can go in any direction. But
if you want to take it in the metaphysics direction,
that's that's fine with me. Because a unit bear unitarian
deity uh is not. It cannot be of justification for
why there's multiplicity in the world, how there's temporality in
the world. If you're a consistent neoplatonist, you have to
say the world's an emanation and not a temporal creation.
But everybody who believes the Bible, and I would assume
the Qur'an too, unless you're some sort of neoplatonists, which
you may be if you're a Sufi, the world comes
to be in time and it's not an eternal emanation.
Speaker 4: Well, I think that if you talk to Khalil, for example,
I think you spoken to him. He thinks that the
temporal world is actually created. And so almost every other
play in this that the world, like you know, the
universe that we're talking about here, is temporally created.
Speaker 1: Well okay, but well some neoplatonists that necessarily do not
know many neo We go to the history of neoplatonism
right here, and we can talk about how the world
that we inhabit isn't created, it's an emanation. Sure, they
do not believe create. Let me so to make this
very clear. Creation in our view presupposes an intentional personal god,
the God of Monad and neoplatonism is not intentional, and
he does not have a will by which he creates.
And we can go to the neoplatonic text right here.
I have the expert on neoplatonism, Martie Wallace. In his
book he specifically has a chapter on the neoplatonic deity,
whether it's poor, free, or whether it's any of them,
does not create. He does not possess a personal will.
The movement of the emanations is an overflowing of the one.
It is not a personal, intentional creation.
Speaker 4: Okay, So when we speak about the one. I do
agree that we only speak respect to intellection. Right, So
when any ads, for example, kindness says that the One
willing itself is how we get these types of like
let's say the first intellect.
Speaker 1: Right, Yeah, but it's not a personal God willing himself.
Speaker 3: Now I have to ask that question, what do you
mean by.
Speaker 5: Right?
Speaker 1: So this is one again, right. This is why I
was making that points to you in the comments, is
that we're not neoplatonists. The God of the Bible is
the God who reveals himself in time and space. By
the way, neoplatonic being cannot be in time and space.
But the God of the Bible, in the Hebrew texts
of the Torah, steps into time and space. They're Theophanes.
They're not created angels. They're called Yahweh, they're called God,
they're worship they're called divine. So again, that's why I
was arguing to you that Neoplatonism has nothing to do
with our trinitarian theology whatsoever. It's literally derived from the
Hebrew texts.
Speaker 4: I actually did agree with you that you guys are
even though you do adopt certain platonic views and opinion, like,
let's say, views on inherent hierarchy.
Speaker 1: Okay, you're right, that was you and the other guy.
That was a replied to the other guy.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I do think that you guys do adopt, sir,
in platonic views.
Speaker 4: You adopt what you guys saw is like the good
parts of Platonism, but then left what you guys thought
contradict Christianity right to a degree.
Speaker 1: But what like I was saying, like every one of
that ecumenical councils ends up refuting some heresi arc who
utilizes neoplatonic dialectics to try to prove their position right.
So another element of this I'm not trying to shift,
but you could say, you know, in a lot of
this is not just Neoplatonism and much of the Greek
philosophical tradition, the One, the absolute God, whatever we call it,
it's opposite the world. Okay, we rejected dialectics, so we
have no dialectical philosophy. That's why we believe in a
trinity that has ultimacy of unity and multiplicity. It's not
all a bare unity, and God's actions or attributes are
actually infinite, so there's a balance of the one and
the many. In our position, I think that also resolves
other metaphysical problems that other world view have. But it's
a uniquely trinitarian position where the persons of the triad
have a mutual exchange of love and other attributes and
energies such as divine glory. And that's why Jesus says
in John seventeen one to five that before the foundation
of the world, he shared with the Father the eternal
glory amongst the triad. So that means for us, there's
certain attributes that are natural or necessary, such as glory,
such as love, such as any attribute that's not contingent
upon the created order. But for God to actually exercise
providence or to exercise the power of creating, that's what
Ariosola referred to a second actuality, that's actualizing the powers
that he has. So we don't believe that God has
always exercised necessarily every power that he has. He can
exercise at will because he's a personal and intentional being.
That's why when Jesus becomes incarnate person that God had
steps into time and space, he willingly chooses not to
actualize all of his powers, to step into a mode
of being in time and space. That's all absolutely impossible
in a neoplatonic scheme. And to turn that question to you,
I would say, if you did have a neoplatonic scheme,
now I've read some Sufi text, and maybe you would
agree with this. Do you believe that everything is a
kind of manifestation of Allah or do you believe that
Allah is so transcendent that he really can't be revealed
or manifested in time and space.
Speaker 4: I would say that when it comes to apatheticism, first
of all, everything in a sense does reflect the divine
attributes quote unquote right. But I would not say that
everything in the world is gone. I'm not a pantheist
or panentheist.
Speaker 3: Right, I reject that type of view. That's what if
you read almost any Sufi.
Speaker 4: Metaphysician, like let's say Shake f Mettijenny Iven RB.
Speaker 3: They'll all reject pantheon right, very explicitly.
Speaker 1: So, yeah, I didn't think you were a pantheist, but
my question, I guess would be so for us. In
orthodox metaphysics, number one, the distinction between the attributes that
are related only to the created order versus the attributes
that are true from all eternity without whether or without
a creative order such as love or glory. Those things
are not contingent upon a world. But the exercise of
say divine providence doesn't make sense in our view if
he's not exercising that, if there's no world over which
he's provident. So this would be the modal collapse point.
This would be the point to where if God is
eternally exercising, say providence, then there's an eternal world over
which he's exercised that providence. And so if there's an
eternal world, then now we have a second God or
second deity next to God, a diad, whereby the created
order is also eternal, just like God's eternal. So I
would say that might be a problem depending upon how
you conceive of the distinction between God's essence and his actions,
if you believe there's a real distinction or not, and
if there's no real distinctions, then I would say the
position would fall into motal collapse. And that's why we
don't believe in a bear unitarian deity. We believe in
a real personal triad.
Speaker 4: I would say that it's consistent because it's quite obvious
that if you read Sufi metaphysics, we are necessitarians. Right,
if you hold to ads, it does entail necessitarianism.
Speaker 5: You'd agree with that, right, I think?
Speaker 2: So?
Speaker 5: Yeah, okay, So we would.
Speaker 4: Say that, let's say the first intellect is a turnal,
but we wouldn't say that the tip paroal world is eternal, right,
so you know, like the entire hierarchy of platinism, right, yeah,
and so we would negate that in relation to the
temporal world, but in relation to like let's say the
first intellect or Hakika Muhammadia, we would affirm that eternality.
Speaker 5: So well, I don't really see.
Speaker 1: Is the first intellect a deman in an ontological diminished status?
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's dependent, right, and so have multiple deities? I
would say that that's an impossibility.
Speaker 1: Right For one, you just said it's dependent.
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's dependent right upon the emanation of the One
or the monad or God. But I would say, at
the same time anything that this is like very classical
plan is that anything that comes from the one is
subbortinate to the ones.
Speaker 3: So and so they don't have the same essence.
Speaker 1: You can't call them God, right and side question, heret
do you think that the Quran teaches this? I mean
does the Koran teach ancient Platonic metaphysics? Is that? Does
that what's really revealed in the Kuran? Are you there?
You're muted?
Speaker 3: Oh, okay.
Speaker 4: So I wouldn't say explicitly because you can't have disagreements
on how to interpret the Quran. But I would say
that the death corpus and things like this do give
credence to the view of the suit in particular.
Speaker 1: You know, I'm saying where so all of this is
obviously Greek metaphysics, right, And you're you don't think this
is cribbed.
Speaker 3: I don't think it's necessarily.
Speaker 1: Wrong that we know to crib I didn't say right
or wrong cribbed.
Speaker 3: No, not really.
Speaker 1: Okay, So you literally said her appealing to Plato and
these texts, and you're saying that when the Qoran is written, right, Muhammad,
who is illiterate, is not this is not coming from that.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Speaker 4: I would not say that these ideas are coming from
strict plainism. I just said revelation and revelation just corresponds
to reality.
Speaker 1: So so the so the revelation that comes centuries after
Plato and these people is not getting it from Plato,
even though it's you're literally sitting here appealing to Plato.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I would say that.
Speaker 1: Okay, okay, yeah, all right, anything else? So okay, so
what what what if there's what I know you're saying
that what Plato says, you can't call it god or whatever.
But you just said that. I mean, there's an eternal
second principle of intellect? How is that not two different things?
How are you? How are you?
Speaker 4: Because I think I justified I said why earlier?
Speaker 3: Why in playing?
Speaker 1: No, I'm asking your position.
Speaker 3: Yeah, this is this is the same position.
Speaker 1: Basically, but it's not from Plato. I would not say
that's what are you appeeling to play?
Speaker 3: I'm not actually appealing. I don't think that you just.
Speaker 1: You just said okay, uh so, how do you believe
in one God if there's these multiple principles of diminished
ontological status.
Speaker 3: Because the news is subortinate to the one.
Speaker 5: It's not.
Speaker 1: You just restated your position.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I just stated the position because.
Speaker 1: How is that consistent with How is that consistent with
the claim that you only worship one God when there's
multiple principles of dem nos ontological status that you're calling.
Speaker 4: God because they don't have the same essence, like I'm
only referring to the one, and how is it not
because these are two distinct entities, like this is.
Speaker 1: Polly is exactly Polly? That means many, Yeah, greetings from
among something. Yeah, so it's all neo platonic argumentation. It's
all directly from preda Plato. But it's not from Plato.
It's not neo platonic. And there's multiple entities that are
not poly multiple entities. Greetings. What's up?
Speaker 5: Hey? Could you can you hear?
Speaker 1: Uh huh?
Speaker 5: Yeah.
Speaker 7: So my question is about the phot schism. That's like
my first one, and it's not really an argue. There's
just a few concerns I've got with decent Orthodox position.
Speaker 1: So, yeah, have you read the Varnick's book? No, I
hope it actually so. The Varnick is the one of
the most famous Uni eight scholars who basically goes back
to excuse me, various Orthodox schisms and sort of regurgitates
and revises, not regurgitates, revises the position of Rome. And
that's why now Rome accepts these Eastern fathers as potentially saints.
Speaker 5: Right, okay, yeah, right, well I'll suppose all you for.
Speaker 1: You thought then, yeah, I mean he I would just
defer to your own your own guys for that.
Speaker 5: Yeah right, yeah, okay, that's enough.
Speaker 1: There's also another book too that Congar wrote after nine
hundred years, the touches on that from the Roman Catholic perspective,
basically admitting that uh we we can. I mean, this
is why Rome has changed their position. I mean, jomp
All the second says you can revere these people as
saints when they were heretics for centuries.
Speaker 7: Yeah, yeah, no, that's that's good. I mean, I'll go
look at that. It's that kind of answers my first question.
Speaker 1: Already before you you can ask the hold on, you
can ask the second question to the guy in the
chat was talking a bunch of smack. If you aren't
gonna come to debate, we're gonna beat you. So Romancaalic,
dude Jay in the chat, come to bate where you're gone,
Go ahead, Yeah, all.
Speaker 5: Right, thank you.
Speaker 7: So I've spent a lot of time looking at TAG
over the last few months, and I think for a
lot of people it's kind of like a revelation. You know,
it's almost a Eureka moment because it's a new side
of things that they haven't considered before, right, I mean,
I think a lot of people use like natural theology
straight away and they never even consider this side of things.
So it's been like interesting to go through this, and
if I my understanding of it, it's like a REDUCTI
your argument. So if all the other possibilities of false,
then the conclusion of the argument must be true because
only the other arguments or arguments against.
Speaker 5: It can possibly be you know, it couldn't possibly.
Speaker 8: Exist will possibly be true.
Speaker 7: So my question really is like, how can you insert
gold into this? Because all the other world views are circular? Right,
So if we use like an empiricis worldview, the impirsis
worldview doesn't make sense because in order to validate.
Speaker 1: The argument is not that all the other world views
are circular in ours is not. The argument is that
every worldview is circular. So it becomes a question of
who can give a coherent account of the worldview. So,
in other words, any worldview that posits self evidence or
foundationalist principles, as any Roman Catholic natural theology based worldview
would do, we're saying that that's not going to work.
You're in You're gonna end up in some circularity even
on your principles of self evidence. So the first point
we make there is to say that your worldview is
not actually self evident and not actually foundationalist. You're actually
violating the principles that you claim to hold to. And
so if they have two options, there, say a Roman
Catholic natural theology proponent, And this came up in the
Trent debate, right Trent said, no, I still believe in
self evidence. I'll use Descartes cogito. And then what I
argued in the debate was, well, you don't actually believe
it's self evident because you made appeals to other things
to prove it. That means it's not self evident. So, uh,
if you're in if you don't believe in self evidence,
then you're in our the And then you're into the
boat that I want you to to step into. You're
in the position that I've been arguing, which is that
at root, all positions will bottom out at ultimately appealing
to some ultimate authority, and in that sense, at a
paradigm level, be circular. That's the point. So we're not
saying that we escape that dilemma, is saying that at
a paradigm level, every position has some bottoming out final
authority to appeal to. So that's what TAG is saying.
And TAG does involve in part or reductio internal critique,
but it's not just that. You also have to present
the positive case for our worldview, which is well, our
worldview is grounded in divine revelation, it's grounded in Christian metaphysics,
it is grounded in the theology and the view of history,
and the grounding of the universals of logic and so
forth in the divine mind. All of those things for
us would function as the structure of how our web
of belief works. And then we would say, if you
compare that to the web of beliefs of any other worldview,
the other worldviews can't give an account for their systems,
or they bottom out at something contradictory or absurd, etc.
Speaker 7: Okay, so like every single worldview, including your worldview, is
a circular one.
Speaker 1: At base level, Yes, every worldview will bottom out at
something that is self referencing. For everybody who's a natural
theology self evidence proponent, their bottomed out ultimate principles are
whatever they think is self evident. They're axioms, they're dosastically
basic beliefs, and we're simply saying, well, that's arbitrary, and
it's also inconsistent. It doesn't work with Chisholm's criterion problem,
it doesn't work with the I mean, there's multiple critiques. So,
for example, the Chisolm if you're not familiar, the criterion
problem says you can't have any knowledge claim without a
theory of knowledge. But if you have a theory of knowledge,
by necessity, you also have a knowledge claim because you
claim to know the theory of knowledge. This is a
dilemma for any self evidence foundational proponent that they can't
get out. There's literally no way out of that. You've
got nerds that think they can solve that or whatever,
but they're missing the point that you can't have self
evidence about without some level of arbitrary in us. And
the other critique you can make, which is I think
equally is devastating, is if I ask you, okay, well,
so some things are self evident and some things are not. Yes, Well,
that presupposes that you have some prior criteria or standard
by which you list the self evident things versus the
non self evident things. And if that's the case, then
there's a more fundamental criteria that undergirds the self evidence criteria.
Speaker 5: Right, yeah, no, that that's a good answer, Thank you
for that. My question then would.
Speaker 1: Be, by the way, do you have the book before
you go on.
Speaker 5: The book? Which books are The.
Speaker 1: Epistemology by W. J. Wood. It's a really good readable
text on this and I recommend that one because the
chapter on foundationalism is really good, like all the stuff
that you heard me critiquing Rent in the debate, like
it's in any standard epistemology text, right.
Speaker 5: I will look at that was up to B. J. Wood.
Speaker 1: Yes, yeah, his book's really good.
Speaker 5: Yeah, thank you.
Speaker 1: That's very.
Speaker 5: Yeah. I mean that's kind of the problem.
Speaker 7: You don't really want to go into the deep end
and start reading things you don't fully understand, because you can,
you know, it just kind of you know, it feels district.
Speaker 1: Well, so the Green Bonjeour book on Epistemology is like
a grad school textbook. So a lot of people who
buy that find it very difficult. But I would say
if you read the Wood book first, then you'll do
better with the Boneour book.
Speaker 5: Right, Yeah, that's that was useful. Yeah.
Speaker 7: So my question then would be Why does your argument
get kind of like a concession. Why does your circularity
receive a concession? Is it because yours begins with something
that grounds the transcendental categories?
Speaker 1: Well, it's not a concession. Whereas we don't have to
answer this problem. We're saying all worldviews are subject to
fundamental circularity. So then the question is, well, then how
would we prove any worldview. That's when it gets into coherence,
that the worldview as a whole is coherent, has reasons
for that worldview versus other worldviews. So we're not excluding ourselves.
We're saying, no, we're also part of the same thing.
We're all in the same boat. Your self evidence is
not true, if I foundationals is not true, then we're
all in the same boat. Well, if we're all in
the same boat, how are we gonna judge between worldviews?
The only way to judge between world views would be
to compare the systems as a whole and see which
ones are coherent, which ones work, and which ones don't.
Speaker 7: Right, And there must be some worldview because knowledge has
to exist because.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well everybody necessarily will have some basic beliefs in
the three elements of a worldview, right, everybody will have
some basic belief on metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology.
Speaker 7: Yeah, okay, I guess my final point would what would
you say to someone who would deny the existence of
truanscendental categories altogether.
Speaker 1: Well, I mean you could go that route, but you
would be in an even more difficult situation because transcenal
categories are the things that undergird the possibility of predication
at all. So if you deny those things, you're in
an even deeper boat of trying to figure out You're
into deeper waters trying to figure out how predication is
possible at all. I mean, in other words, they're not
things that we're making up. We're saying that transnial categories
are the preconditions for the possibility of predication or knowledge
at all. So if you want to deny those things,
it'd be like saying that you know, in order to
have a cake, I necessarily need these ingredients, and then
I say, well, what if I deny the ingredients, Well,
you're not gonna have a cake.
Speaker 5: Yeah No, that's that's great. Yeah, thank you for answer.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I would say too, I'll try to remember to
send you a couple of FDA's papers, because he also
touches on these subjects very well. Let's see now, the
dude talking smack in the chat? Are you here? I
don't see who you are. Maybe you're this guy, young Catholic?
What's up? Hello, so revel. If you're not gonna come chat,
just get booted. What's up? Man? What's up?
Speaker 8: I just had a question, not like a debate or anything.
Speaker 5: You just wanted to ask.
Speaker 9: I'm Catholic, by the way, but what's the Eastern Orthodox
position on baptizing non Eastern Orthodox or rebaptizing in a sense?
Speaker 8: Is that allowed?
Speaker 9: Sound of the Catholic position? Is that only certain denominations
have valid baptisms? What's the what's the Eastern Orthodox position?
Speaker 1: It's a case by case basis on the decision of economya.
That's up to the local bishops.
Speaker 8: Okay, I mean, like would that be I mean, wouldn't
that be like a contradiction that certain bishops?
Speaker 2: Is it?
Speaker 5: Under?
Speaker 8: Is it the Eastern Orthodox disposition.
Speaker 9: That the bishops have the authority to make the decision?
Speaker 1: Yeah? The ultimate interpreters of the cannons and their application
are the local episcopate.
Speaker 8: Okay, I mean, I only had one question, So.
Speaker 1: Okay, that's one. Appreciate it. Let's see, I don't know
where so how can you join the The link is
in the show description and it has literally been linked
in the chat a million times. So where's the romancality?
People are talking smack like they're the ones that I
want them to come? Where are they at? So you'll
have to tell me who you are because there's like
twenty people, fourteen people requesting to speak, So I don't
know who you are. Peter, what's up? Peter?
Speaker 3: Can you hear me?
Speaker 10: Man?
Speaker 11: Hey, I have a question about John six forty. Okay, basically,
I had a moment where I was looking at a
picture of Jesus, and while I was looking at the picture,
my spiritual eyes were open and I came to the
realization that he was God, and I believe that he
was God in that moment while looking at him. Is
that in accordance with John six forty?
Speaker 1: Well, I think John six forty is a text that
obviously shows the deity of Christ. So but I mean
an orthodox view, we don't typically rely on mystical experiences
because we can fall into prelass so we always guard
people against trusting in those kinds of things, not to
say that they can't happen. But I wouldn't rest my
dogmas or my beliefs on a personal experience like that.
I would rather say that The text itself says that
rather than trying to, you know, fall fall back on
some sort of of a mystical experience.
Speaker 11: I see you're saying, then, what would you what would
your be a idea of what John six forty means.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it means that Christ, in our nature, even though
he's already by nature equal to the Father and has
all the same powers as the Father. As he says
in John five, he's saying that also in his status
as human being, that he also is granted power in
our nature. So essentially, the son of God, who is
also the son of Man, now has in our nature
the ability to raise everyone up and give them eternal life.
So shows the deedy of Christ. It shows that Christ
is the one that will, by his divine power, raise
everyone from the dead at the resurrection, and that he
will judge the living and the dead, which he could
only do if he were divine.
Speaker 11: It says that everyone who looks to or looks on
the sun.
Speaker 2: What does that mean to you?
Speaker 1: I mean's look in faith. I don't think it's necessarily
literally saying that the physical movement of the eyes. It's
saying look in the sense of look in faith. Ali Malik,
you gotta unmute man, Ali Ali?
Speaker 5: What's up?
Speaker 1: Dude?
Speaker 9: Kay?
Speaker 1: Did you turn your mic on? We can't hear you. Uh,
turn your mic on and come back and I'll let
you back in. Uh fazlan Ahmad? What's up?
Speaker 9: Yah h.
Speaker 2: H Hello, I'm lord of it.
Speaker 5: Be there.
Speaker 1: So I can't hear you, man, what's up?
Speaker 2: Yeah? Yeah? So I am fine. So so I have
a doubt. So recently you.
Speaker 10: Had a dibate to the Muslim So yeah, I have
a doubt in Christianity, a doubt so yeah, doubt mean
so so when you say the attribute of good, attribute
of Elohim, So, what do you say about that one?
Are they eternal like you talk about ISLAMO when it
comes to Allah.
Speaker 2: You took about that attribute of Almah.
Speaker 10: So what do you say the attribute of Elohim the
good of old New Testament?
Speaker 1: I mean we say it's always been the Trinity. Alohim
is a reference to the Trinity.
Speaker 10: Okay, But what about the attribute of Aloheim like his speech,
his system, his power, his love.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's what I was explaining in the beginning was
that there's different actions in different attributes. So some of
them are actualized or done from all eternity, like love
or glory. Other attributes are attributes or actions particular and
relevant only to the created orders, such as divine providence.
God does not actualized divine providence from all eternity because
that would require an eternal world. However, he has always
had the power of divine providence or of creating, even
though he didn't eternally.
Speaker 10: Create, Okay, but simply put together, like, are they created
or are they uncreated?
Speaker 2: His attribute?
Speaker 1: Now, God has no created parts or attributes okay.
Speaker 2: The uncreated. So like in Islam he said the empty
the uncreated?
Speaker 1: Correct, Okay, So.
Speaker 10: That they are part of him or they are separate
from him.
Speaker 1: We don't believe that distinctions entail parts, composition, or division.
Speaker 2: No, I'm asking they are within himself or a.
Speaker 5: Well.
Speaker 1: We believe in what's called the essence sentergy distinction. So
they're distinct, but they're really him. It's a both and
not an either or.
Speaker 2: Okay.
Speaker 10: But like as an example, when it come to Jesus,
his attribute of court.
Speaker 2: Jesus is the word of Court, so that is an attribute.
So in the sense that Jesus should be.
Speaker 1: We do not believe that it's an attribute. We believe
that he's a distinct person or hypostasis. So he's the
second person of the trinity, not an attribute.
Speaker 10: But his speech is attribute. Right to the word of
God is attribute of guoth. The wisdom of God is
attribute of good.
Speaker 1: Right, it is both an attribute and in this case
a person as well, because in our view, the attributes
have a manifestation that happens in each person in a
unique way, in a unique mode. So the speech of
God is not just an attribute. In this case, it
is also a person.
Speaker 10: Okay, then how about the wisdom of Gurt.
Speaker 2: It is an attribute to right.
Speaker 1: The scriptures identify Christ as the wisdom of God as
well as both an attribute and a manifest and a person.
Speaker 10: But there are so many attribuments, like the counsel of Gurth,
the glory of.
Speaker 1: Gurth right, and so my basis is what divine revelation
tells us, not can I make every attribute a person?
We don't believe every attribute is a person. What I'm
saying is there are two different things going on here.
One is the Trinity and then the movement of those
attributes or energies in the way that they manifest or
the way that they move. So, uh, you could say,
for example, the Holy Spirit is the law of the
manifestation of the Love of God. I am not identifying
the Holy Spirit as the Love of God because love
is an attribute common to Father's Son and Holy Spirit,
but he's uniquely manifested by the person of the Spirit.
Speaker 2: Okay, So what is your criteria? And so what is
the criteria to attribute to become a person? Yeah? What
what is the criteria?
Speaker 1: Divine revelation is the criteria?
Speaker 2: Yeah, the religion.
Speaker 10: But as an example of you all, if I go
to the word of court, so use a word of
courde is a person also a no?
Speaker 1: No? So the divine revelation, I mean, what's in it?
For example, the Torah and the prophets. That's where we
get the Doctor and the Trinity from. It doesn't come
from Greek philosopher, It's not invented by Constantin or Paul.
It's in the Torah.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I got to that point.
Speaker 10: But as an example of the same Bible talk about
the wisdom of the glory of Court. So when it
come to glory of quote, how you say that is
not a person. How you get to that conclusion. The
glory of God is not a person, but the right.
Speaker 1: So if you read it, I understand what your question is.
If you read Ezekiel one to ten, glory is a
attribute but is also manifested as the person of the Son.
So our starting point is not ninety nine names or
all of God's attributes. We start with the person of
the Father, the generation of the Son, and the procession
of the Spirit. Those three persons uniquely manifest every attribute
in a unique way. That's what I'm saying. So there
could never be new persons. We can't come up with
a fourth There's not ninety nine persons or whatever. Each
attribute moves in a certain way from the Father through
the Son and in the Spirit. That movement is eternal.
That's our trinitarian doctrine.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I got that point, But what is your criteria like?
Have an example?
Speaker 1: I to the criteria is that divine revelation states and
gives me the grounding first and foremost to begin the
theology with the theology of the persons of the Trinity.
So if there's let me let me explain that. So
in the Old Testament, for example, we have Yahweh. We
have his Angel messenger who comes in time and space,
who manifests as his messenger, as his angel, as his face,
as his glory, as his wisdom, as his word. We
think that's the son, that's Jesus in the Old Testament,
and his spirit is present all throughout. So these three
persons or hypostases are manifested all throughout the Torah and
the prophets. That's our criteria and starting point for where
we would then look to. Well, then what are these
attributes and how are they manifested?
Speaker 10: Okay, but when it comes to the Spirit of Gurt
Bible just moment, the seven.
Speaker 2: Separate spirit trift.
Speaker 10: So if the seven spirit of Court, then how can
you end up in Trinity?
Speaker 1: Now, the seventh spirits are said to be attributes or
operations w are common to all three. That's not the
same thing as the Holy Spirit. Two different things. Because
when you look at the seven spirits, they're listed in Isaiah.
So Isaiah says the spirit of Wisdom, the spirit of knowledge,
the spirit of fear of the Lord. All those are
on the person of Christ because that passage in Isaiah
eleven is about the incarnation. Those are common attributes that
are called the seven spirits of God. It doesn't mean
that God literally has seven holy spirits. That's distinct from
the person of the Holy Spirit.
Speaker 10: But in the seven is spirit is spirit of Cody
is mentioned the same spirit in Genesis, right, So you
identify that as a separate person.
Speaker 1: Right, But that's not right. So it's from Isaiah eleven
and it says that the spirit of the Lord will
rest upon him. That's the Holy Spirit, because the Holy
Spirit in the Baptism of Christ rests upon him. I
know you don't believe this, but I'm saying that it's
not inconsistent within our texts. So what Isaiah eleven is
predicting is a Messianic prediction. Right, there shall come forth
a rod from the stem of Jesse. That's David. Jesse's
David's dad. So this is talking about the Thevidic lineage
of the Messiah. We think that this branch is Christ.
The spirit of the Lord will rest upon him, that's
the Holy Spirit. That's what happens in Christ baptism, the
spirit of wisdom, understanding, counsel, might, knowledge, and fear of
the Lord. Right, So these the seven here is just
a symbolic number of both the Holy Spirit and the
attributes that are common to all all three persons of
the Trinity.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, I got that.
Speaker 10: But what I'm telling you, so the it's mentioned seven spirit,
but the second spirit is the Holy Spirit, the spirit
of court.
Speaker 1: Right, It's just it's just a symbolic right, there's not
seven attributes. It's just a symbolic number of perfection. There's
there's other attributes that are common.
Speaker 2: Like uh, okay, okay, okay.
Speaker 10: So, but when it comes to the endle of courte,
like I think in the Full of dismentioned angel Gabriel
is the endle of code.
Speaker 1: Angel. Angel is a word that just means messenger.
Speaker 5: Right.
Speaker 1: So in the Old Testament, when it's used, sometimes it's Gabriel,
like in Daniel, and it specifies that Daniel came to
Gabriel came to Daniel. Other times it's specified that it's
Michael at the end of Daniel, for example, Michael the
arch angel defends the nation of Israel. But in other
places the Angel messenger and again it just means messenger
that can be a created or an uncreated messenger. And
that's why we say in so many places that the
angel is called God, called Yahweh, and worshiped in the
Old Testament.
Speaker 10: Okay, but just on explicit evidence side the angle of
courde is Jesus.
Speaker 1: I can say that again. I can hear you say
that again.
Speaker 10: Yeah, do we have an explicit evidence the New Testament say,
Jesus is the angle of court?
Speaker 1: Yeah, absolutely, Jesus and John five through nine identifies himself
as an angel. In those chapters. He says that he's
the one that appeared on Mount Sinai and the Burning
Bush and Extodu three where the angel says I am
that I am. Exos twenty three, he says that the
name of Yahweh is in that angel messenger, so he's
called Yahweh. And remember God doesn't give his glory to another.
And yet here he is saying that this angel messenger
is is Yahweh. So Jesus also says that Abraham looked
forward to believe in him.
Speaker 10: Johnny, they're explicit, right, No.
Speaker 1: It's explicit. He explicitly says that he's the one that
talked face to face with Moses. He says, no one
sees the Father in any time. This is John five
through nine. Right, John five, he says no one sees
the Father at any time, and yet Moses talked face
to face with God. Who was Moses talking to If
no one sees the Father, Jesus is saying that he
is the one talking face to face with Moses. And
that's why he tells the Pharisees that you have to
honor and worship the Son as you honor and worship
the Father. And that's why the Pharisees then went to
stone Jesus in John five.
Speaker 10: But when it comes like Moses to quote that the
it is he did not talk with the glory quote.
Speaker 1: Well, it says right. It says in Exodus both that
Moses talked face to face with God. It says that
no one can see God face to face. So the
resolution to this dilemma is that Jesus is the face
of God that talked to Moses face to face. And
that's the argument used to making in John five.
Speaker 2: You can't have the opinion, but.
Speaker 1: I'm gonna move on. I'm not trying to be rude.
It is really hard to hear what you're saying. So
we're gonna move on to the next but thank you
for those questions. With the next one, Uh, Welsh papist,
what's up faith alone? Protestants call in If you the
chat is not for you to spam to British ca enter,
you're booted.
Speaker 8: Amy Jay, Yes.
Speaker 12: Sir, I just kind of just a few questions in
regards to Orthodox biology.
Speaker 13: I'm a Catholic.
Speaker 14: I'm just curious about a couple of things.
Speaker 12: Obviously, you would reject sort of the Augustinian view of
original sin. The Eastern tradition always did, and I'm just
curious as to why that is, because you know, like
say passages like.
Speaker 14: Psalm fifty where David.
Speaker 12: Talks about you know, my mother, you know, bought me
in sin, or say Roman spy for example. I'm just
curious what is the Eastern perspective on passages.
Speaker 2: Such as that.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Right, the Augustinian view has bound up with his doctrine,
which he's very explicit on. I give you all the
references where he says that all men were in Adam
as in an archetype. He says this in the City
of God explicitly that means for him that not only
are we in Adam in potentia, but we're also guiltilty
of adam sin because we are in him as an archetype.
This leads Augustine to his massive damn Nata doctrine that
all men are damned as a damned mass, a damn
ball of damnation in Adam, and thus he thinks that
there's inherited guilt for infants. Roman Catholic theology in the
Late Middle Ages softens this with the limbo of infants
and so forth, but I think they still retain some
of these principles. This is what leads Roman Catholicism to
things like the immaculate conception doctrine. They think that for
Mary to be pure, she would also have to have
been conceived immaculately. We don't believe any of that. We
do think she's a spotless virgencyt in committee the actual sins.
But many, all of these fron church fathers are almost
unanimous in saying that infants do not bear personal guilt.
So how do it Does that mean they're Pallagian? No, They,
just as you said, simply didn't accept or didn't believe
in the Augustinian doctrine. Of inherited guilt, and it's also
bound up with Augustine's collapsing of person into nature, both
in the trinity and in humanity. In Orthodox theology, for
Saint Maximus, for example, guilt is only something that can
be had as by an individual person. So the mode
of willing that you do as an individual hypostasis, is
the only way that you could ever be guilty of something.
This is why Ezekiel, for example, says that the son
shall not bear the sins of the father. Well, how
do we explain this? Well in Romans five the text
that you mention if you read Mayandorf's critique of Augustine,
and this is also in Pameazanski's book too, by the way,
as a whole section about the Augustinian doctrin of original sin.
This is the standard rokor dogmatic theology book. He says
that the mistake that Augustine made was assuming that all
men sin in Adam, when the text in the Greek
reads all men sin because of Adam sin. So it
doesn't mean that we're guilty of adam sin. It means
the effects of Adam's sin pass on to us, and
so in that sense, yes, we have the contagion, we
have the deprivation of grace. We agree with all those things,
which is why we baptize infants, but we do not
believe that infants are guilty of personal actual sin.
Speaker 12: Thanks for that answers. So the next one would be
when you by the way, by.
Speaker 1: The way, before you, before you go to that. I
just remembered I do have a three hour talk on
this topic, going through the text of Augustine and others.
If you're interested in in a longer version of this.
Speaker 14: I was sure looking to terms sort of new to
your stuff. So anyway, what was.
Speaker 13: I ready to say?
Speaker 10: Oh?
Speaker 12: Yes, you had a discussion with the slimilantin yesday and
you made a case for monarcical trinitarianism, which I've come
across in say Saint Basil and the two Saint Gregor Cappadocian.
Speaker 5: Yeah.
Speaker 12: Yeah, I'm just curious before them because just from my
own personal reading of the Church Harvest so far, you
just say, if you were to go before them, who
else would you say?
Speaker 14: Hell to the monarcicle?
Speaker 1: Well, I think I think Ireon As teaches it. I
think you can see an ignacious where he talks about
the threefold structure in the church, mirroring father and Son.
I think it's it's pretty consistent.
Speaker 7: Uh.
Speaker 1: The only the only time I can think of this
really becoming confused is in the argument. So after Origin,
if you look in First Principles, he starts arguing that
what divine simplicity means is what Neoplatonists mean, and so
after Origin you get a tendency. Even Augustine when he
argues for philly Oquah, for example, he's basically cribs, you know,
on the Trinity, certain passages from the Aeneids. So this
idea of simplicity that passes into Plotinus and others really
gets regurgitated in Origin in Augustine and becomes more and
more popular in the West. To start your trend turn
theology with the simplicity of the essence based on quite
literally a plutonium definition from Origin's First Principles, Chapter one.
I think it's around fourteen, but it's book one of
First Principles, and then it becomes pretty standard for people
to utilize that as the working definition of what simplicity
has to be. And if you read Bradshaw's book Arizola
East and West as well as Rodigalwitz's book on Divine
Simplicity in the Cappadoceans Day points out that the Cappadocians
don't first and foremost utilize this Plutonian definition of simplicity.
For them, simplicity first and foremost is whether God is,
whether God acts or is acted upon. So that's a
reference to simplicity, that's a reference to what characterizes the
divine nature. It's impassibility, it's it's not changeable. But when
we speak of God acting in the world, that's the
essence centergy distinction, which characterizes the Cappadocians as well. And
so they begin with distinctions in the trinity, not with
the essence and the Trinity.
Speaker 14: Thank you.
Speaker 12: I just got two more questions. Whether the next one
would be in regards to the ic and creed i e.
Speaker 14: The video quay. Obviously, the videokre was rejected in.
Speaker 12: The East because of the manner and how it was
placed into the creed. So obviously the one reason was
part of the ecclesiology, obviously, but what was more the
theological reasons for the rejection of the video qui as well.
Speaker 1: Well. The classic text on this is the Mysticgology of
Saint Photius. And then another I highly recommend even more
than that one is the reprinting of Saint gregor At
Palomas's book Apidictic Treatise on the Holy Spirit, because what
Palamas does is really build on the argumentation in Photius's
Critique of the Philioquay and take it to the next level,
so he gets way more in depth with Apidictic logic
and argumentation, and those two books I think are essential.
So I would recommend reading those two to see what
what they were arguing in Photius's day, in Palamas's day.
Speaker 8: Thank you.
Speaker 14: Last question would be punny it up about Palomas in a.
Speaker 12: Sense, Palamas is obviously the first won't be the right
way to put it, the first person to really put
forward the essence energy distinction.
Speaker 1: No, I don't think that's true at all.
Speaker 12: Well, I mean it is any right, I mean, is
in a full disclosure, in full writing, so speA.
Speaker 1: I mean that it's all throughout on the Orthodox faith.
I mean John Damascus is Christology is all premised on
the essen center distinction. Saint Maximus is a dispute with
Paris is all premised on the essencenary. That whole book
is based on the argument the s sentaristinction.
Speaker 14: Did you say, what's his name name? Saint John and Damascus.
Speaker 5: Yeah.
Speaker 1: The third book of On the Orthodox Faith, chapter fifteen
and on is all essencenrigy distinction applied to Christology. Say,
Maximus's entire book Disputation with Piris is all based on
essenceentarty distinction. So another what I'm arguing, what I'm pointing
out is that essenceentary astinction is way more clear and
perceptible in Christology even than it is in Trinitarian theology.
Speaker 12: Just as well as small caveat question for yourself from
ja bec as I'm aware that you were. You were
Roman Catholic once upon a time.
Speaker 14: Obviously what.
Speaker 12: Convinced you of the essence energy distinction over say, divine
simplicity is taught by the tomis like a quietness and such.
Speaker 1: Going through a lot of essays and articles debating it.
In Ergetic Procession had a about a forty page comment
debate many many years ago where they were debating this
back and forth. That was one of the first things
that got me questioning it. I read Philip Schard's book
Greek East, Latin West and the essay in there on
the energies was really another thing that was moving me
in that direction. I started reading the Cappadocians at length,
and I noticed that it's not just Letter two thirty four.
It's pretty consistent in all the Cappadocians to argue on
the basis of the essen centeris stinction, including basils on
the Holy Spirit, including basils against Eunomius. And then when
I moved into reading a lot of Saint Cyril, noticing
that Saint Cyril makes use of the essence centertys sinction
all the time. It's fundamental to his argumentation about how
the Eucharus is the real presence it. Then moving into
reading a lot of Saint Maximus and seeing that Maximus
clearly teaches the essenceinerti stinction all over the place John
Damascus teaches it. When I noticed the debate between when
Aquinas rejects John Damascus on the essenceinnies stinction explicitly. This
is in his work de Veritate Aquinas cites mymonities is
the reason why he rejects the essenceneries stinction of John
the Masaca. So that was very telling to me where
this idea was coming from. Classical theism, Mymonides, Plotinus, et cetera.
It really has nothing to do with what's argued in
terms of the Old Testament, and that's where the real
clincher was. I read Bradshaw's essay on essence energy what
kind of distinction? And then I read his book ariosol
aasim Last and then all of his other essays where
he talks about the manifestation of divine glory, and then
I think the main final clincher was the Theophanes. The
Theophanes are clear as day God in time and space.
It's literally rejected and not possible on a Tomistic, Roman,
Catholic ads schema, and that's why they all teach that
the Theophanes are created angelic beings, just like Muslims, just
like Jews.
Speaker 14: Thanks for your time, Jage, Absolutely.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well a remember this guy is when we had
the two Thomas the other day, Colin, and we had
this argument, what do we get Jewish Muslim ex to Jesus,
They're worshiping an angel. The glory of God is an angel,
a created being. There's no created God, there's no created glory.
You can't worship creatures, you can't worship angels, and by angels,
I mean created angelic beings. Can't worship Michael and Gabriel.
You can worship the Angel of the Covenant, who's Jesus,
because he's not a creature, He's the eternal son of God.
Aaron lifted up his hand towards the people, and he
blessed them. He came down from the sin offering and
the burnt offering and the peace offering. Moses and Aaron
wentner the tabernacle came out and blessed the people, and
the glory of Leahweh appeared to all. Fire came out
from before the Lord consume the burnt offering. What is
Paul sayd hebrews Our God is a consuming fire. This
is not a created fire. God has no created fire.
This is the uncreated light and fire of God. John one,
uncreated light, John one versus created light Genesis one, Matthew seventeen.
Uncreated light emanates from the resurrect or from the transfigured Christ.
That same uncreated light is the same uncreated light and
glory here. What do the Israelites do? Do they say
thank you Yahweh for a created image of angelic glory? No,
they say fall down their face and worship God. This
passage is so adamantly clear to refute the stupidity of
the Roman Catholic Thomas. And that's why I again shared
this paper the other day, Bodies of God. I'll just
get the quotes up for you because I have it
on my desktop. All right, hopefully you can see this
if you're looking on YouTube. Summary and conclusion a Quitnas
deals with anthromomorphic descriptions and images. More directly, whether God
is depicted in dimensions, hands, eyes, et cetera, standing or
in the case of Isaiah, it is not God himself
because God is absolutely simple and God is spirit. God
cannot manifest in time and space. And again they're so silly,
these Tomas. They don't even realize that this undercuts the incarnation.
And what is a Quitas's view, well, contrasted to Summers,
it is the opposite of Summers. Hence why we always
reference the Summer's book. So hopefully you can see that. Now,
let me find you the actual full paper here, had
it pulled up the other day. Let me see if
I can find it. Bodies of God.
Speaker 2: Let the bodies, the flu let the bodies.
Speaker 1: No, that's not it. Here it does Aquinas and Sohmer
on Bodies of God the paper by Richard Wilson here,
that's a necessary read for illustrating this principle, this point,
which is that the atomistic ads doctrine in terms of
denying the Theophanes, which is explicit. Remember that guy that
called him the other day that said, I don't think
Aquinas denies the Theophanes. Yeah, he does. So no idea
where you have no idea what you're talking about. This
paper is good in contrasting these two views. Now again,
Sohmer is not orthodox. Why are we recommending a Jewish guy?
Because Sohmer is arguing that Hebrew Revelation, contrary to his
own revenge traditions, is admitting that there's distinct type of
stacees in God. There is a real multiplicity that is
not just conceptual or distinction or virtual, but that whether
it's the Old Testament Theophanes, or whether it's the unique
doctrine of divine eminence and transcendence in the Jewish Hebrew revelation,
God is not a sole, unitary being. In fact, the
notion that distinction necessarily entails composition of division, and that
God must be a generic unity is more characteristic of
the Maimonides period of Judaism. So while I'm not saying
that there are no Jews prior to Mammonides who believed
in a unitary perspective, the point of all of these books,
and of the opening statement in the Daniel Hikikichu debate
my first debate with him, not the one with Sam
schmun The first debate was to simply demonstrate that modern
Jewish scholarship is admitting that at the time of Christ,
Judaism did not believe in a soul, generic, unitarian God.
The Hebrew Revelation believed based on all of these they
ofteny texts. This is what Sohmer goes through. For example,
Yahweh turned his face to Gideon in the Book of Judges.
If God can't be in time and space, how the
heck is he going to turn his face to Gideon?
How the heck is Jacob going to wrestle with Yahweh?
Jesus and John two identifies himself as the one wrestling
with Jacob. So the point is, I know that Muslims
don't accept any of these texts, but Muslims often make
the argument that Jews are Unitarians, and they don't believe
in Jesus, and if they, if Jesus was a Messiah,
they would have accepted it. Well, first of all, it's
fallacy because you can be hardhearted and not accept him. Secondly,
it's not true that the Jews all rejected him, because
the entire first foundation of the Church, in the first
ten books, ten chapters of Acts, is all thousands of Jews.
All the apostles are Jews, so that's also not true. Secondly,
second Temple Judaism was not monolithic in its Unitarian teaching.
And this is not just somewhere that admits this. It's
all these other Jewish texts as well that admit this. Okay,
you see how this is why this argument is so powerful.
Alan Siegel's two Powers in Heaven, Boyarin's borderlines Schaeffer's two Books,
or he's got another one, but two Gods in Heaven
the Jewish Gospels, this one deals largely with Daniel seven.
I think, yeah, Daniel seven, where the Messiah Son of
Man comes and presents himself before the Ancient of days.
That's clearly two distinct persons. Now, to be clear, because
then we have a lot of slow boys the word
god is not a proper noun. It can refer to
different things. So when it says two gods are two powers,
it's just noting that Jews at the time of Christ,
many of them acknowledge and recognized that the Old Testament
revelation is not a strict Unitarian deity. It does not
mean polytheism in the sense of many many gods. We
do not believe that. We believe that there's only one God,
the Father, and that he has shared that divine nature
with the Son and with the Spirit. So in terms
of the divine nature, in terms of the indwelling of
the persons, there are not many gods. There is only
one God. Hence the Nicene creet says we believe one God,
the Father Almighty. Now there's a lot of people in
the chat yippin and yappin. Are these people coming to debate? Guys,
if there's any mods, if the people keep yapping and
they won't come to bate, just to boot them. Next up,
let's see, we've got some people have been waiting for
a long time. So let's see he's been waiting for
a long time. Thorn thorn, or they get on mute man.
Speaker 14: Hi, can you hear me?
Speaker 2: Jay? Hi?
Speaker 5: Thank you for having me.
Speaker 15: I recently discovered you and I've been waiting for this.
I just have a question regarding predestination. I'm trying to
piece it all together in terms of predestination.
Speaker 5: God's knowledge, God's will.
Speaker 15: And how does it come into play in our free will?
Speaker 5: Right?
Speaker 1: So the Orthodox view Orthodox view I believe right. So
Orthodox Christianity does not believe in Calvinism, does not believe
in a hard determinism. We believe that God is sovereign,
He does know all things. But God has also created
a world where there are secondary causes. So you can
read book one of John Damascus on this where he
talks about foreign knowledge. He talks about God creating a
world where there are secondary causes. Many Muslims don't believe
that they believe in a form of occasionalism because they
think that their secondary causes this would detract from God's
power and causality. But we do believe that creatures do
have the ability to have real causal powers, real causation
in the world. Now, in contrast to Calvinism, we look
at text like Ephesians IE, and we note that that
was written to a visible community is not written to
the invisible elect. If it's written to a visible community,
then Paul is calling that whole group, quite literally, the predestined.
So this whole idea of Calvinism that ultimately these verses
are written only to the secret elect is just simply
not true. And also it violates a lot of Christology.
So if Christ has two wills to natures and two energies,
then the fullness of humanity requires that human nature have
its own will and energy. So the fall and depravity
cannot mean that man lost its natural will and natural energy.
So that's the Orthodoxy and Catholics, I'm excuse mean Calvinists
typically begin their theology from the divine determination, the Divine decree,
and then they do seteriology, and Trinity and thea and
Christology are all downstream from that. We think that's all
wrong headed. Trinity and Christology comes first, That then determines sateriology,
and that's why the predestined is seeing through largely a
chrystological lens armor.
Speaker 5: Mm hm.
Speaker 13: So I wanted to speak to you about what you
said to Black Sufie.
Speaker 16: If you remember him, he was on a couple of
minutes ago he was talking about his neoplatonic view emanation
from the one. So I heard you say that if
the first Intellect or the Muhammed and reality, if it's eternal,
that would make it a second God. But I just
wanted to say, for Islamic philosophers and for Sufi's, we
don't identify divinity with eternality or accidental necessity. For us,
divinity is only identified with essential necessity. And if that's
the case, then the first Intellect being eternal or necessary
in existence in terms of good logical necessity, that doesn't
make it divine.
Speaker 13: It still makes it a creature. So we don't have
multiple goods.
Speaker 1: So now, but what you're doing is you're taking things
that are elements of the created order, like multiplicity, temporality,
and you're giving it divine attributes.
Speaker 16: No, because, for example, necessity in the in the first
cause in God is essential, right, but in the first
Intellect is accidental, So that you know that shared necessariy.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's let's get more basic than this.
Speaker 5: How do you know that?
Speaker 1: How do you know that it's accidental and versus necessary?
Speaker 13: Well, we have knowledge of the essence existence distinction, right, So.
Speaker 1: But where did you derive this knowledge? Is it from play?
Speaker 15: Now?
Speaker 1: Remember he said Plato, Plato, Plato, But it's not from Plato.
Speaker 16: No, I don't believe it's from Plato. For me, I
get my views from Evansino.
Speaker 1: Where did he get them?
Speaker 16: Well, we believe the essence existence distinction is the self
evident truth because.
Speaker 1: You can Oh, how do you know that's self evident?
Speaker 2: Yeah?
Speaker 16: I know you're going to run the criterion problem, but
I don't accept that because.
Speaker 1: Oh, you don't accept it, so your answers you don't
accept it, Yeah.
Speaker 13: Because I just argue for epistemic finitism.
Speaker 1: Okay, how does that resolve the fact? How does that
resolve the criterion problem?
Speaker 16: Because the criterion problem assumes that there is a criterion
prior to the first principles of knowledge, but epistemic finitism.
Speaker 13: Shows that they cannot be a criterion player to the
first principle.
Speaker 1: Okay, how do you know that there can How do
you know that there cannot be that?
Speaker 13: Because epistemic finishism is true, so.
Speaker 1: It's self evident because this other thing which is self evident,
So you can just tack on all the things that
are self evident.
Speaker 13: Right, Well, eventually.
Speaker 2: Do you have a response to.
Speaker 1: So No, So, now what that exactly? I just critiqued it.
Speaker 13: No, do you have a response to it?
Speaker 2: No?
Speaker 1: No, now you're changing it. Yeah. The response is that
you just tacked on another self evident principle. You've missed.
You missed the whole point of the critique. Yeah, you did.
You just said no, because this other thing is self evident,
because that is what you said.
Speaker 5: Can I speak?
Speaker 1: That is what you said, can I speak? Is that
not what you said? This other thing is also self evident?
Speaker 14: No, ethostemic phanatism has arguments for it.
Speaker 1: And the argument was this other thing is self evident. No, No,
that is what you argued, memorable, that is what you said.
Speaker 16: The argument formic phanatism is that if we have knowledge
of something, that knowledge can either be dependent.
Speaker 1: And I said, how do you know that that's the case?
And you said, because of self evident.
Speaker 13: Well, we certainly do have knowledge of things, right.
Speaker 1: I said, how do you know that that second principle
is the case? And you said, it's self evident that principle.
The second the proposition you just say You said, we
know it because of this, And I said, how do
you know that second thing you just said. And you said,
because it's self evident.
Speaker 14: Yeah, we know what.
Speaker 1: Uh yeah, so the second thing is also the self
evident thing is true because this other self evident thing
is true. You did You're a selfist. You just said that.
Speaker 14: Can I speak if we have knowledge of anything? Any
given proposition?
Speaker 1: Say X, right, how do you know that that's true?
I know, I'm saying that proposition. How do you know
that proposition is true?
Speaker 14: Well, for example, tortological statements?
Speaker 8: Are those not true?
Speaker 1: Well, tautology doesn't tell me anything about reality and how
it works in the world. So you can say it's true,
but you can say it's true by definition. But I'm saying,
how do you know that something true by definition is applicable? Okay,
how do you know.
Speaker 13: Because of epistemic finitism.
Speaker 1: Because it's self evident. Yeah, so it's a circle. Good
circle circle.
Speaker 14: Epistemic phinitism is not circular.
Speaker 1: You're telling me that, And I said, how do you
know that? Then you gave this other principle, and I said,
how is that principle? How do you know that principle?
And you said it's self.
Speaker 13: Evident because I don't.
Speaker 1: My pestiology doesn't matter. I'm asking yours, forget my epistemology.
Speaker 13: Yours because you just pre suppose.
Speaker 7: No.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so here he goes. He deflects away from the
epistemic critigue to because you're a religion you think it's true. No,
you didn't. You didn't answer. You said this other thing,
which is self evident, falling into the very thing that
it doesn't the very thing you think it answers, it
doesn't answer, and then you deflect. Do you think your
a position and self evident? I don't think my position
is self evident. I don't believe in self evidence. So
get out of here with that selfistruy. You don't solve
the criterion problem by saying that, well, I have this
finitude position that relies on this thing. And then when
I ask you, well, then how do you know that
position is true from that thing? And then you say
it's that thing is self evident. That's a circle. So
it doesn't resolve. And there's a lot of these people
out there that think there was resolving the criterion problem
by saying this other thing, and they're missing the point
of the criterion problem. I mean, you might think that
resolves it, but the thing that you appealed to. You
just said again is self evident. And by the way,
beyond the criterion problem is the other problem I mentioned,
which is just as evitat devastating, which is that how
do you know the things that are self evident versus
the things that are not? That's a more prior principle. Okay,
we lost that other dude, Marcel, I'm you, Joe, you
can hear me.
Speaker 17: All right, So I just kind of question this is
a question that I just won't like, you know, I
just want to give the benefit of the delt. You
do know that the Sunnis do believe that the is uncreated, right, correct,
So I just want to know, like they believe that
Jibriel or Gabriel is a created being. So I just
want to know, like how the uncreated words is like
able to be comprehended by a creative bee and give
to the mohamments.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean I've asked that question many times, Like
how do you escape this question when you say, like
forty two and what is it? One to ten? Alla
has nothing like the created order? Okay? Well, if all
is nothing like it and Allah does not enter into
time and space as many of them believe, then how
does this message or these words of a law translate
into the created form of the crime.
Speaker 17: Yeah, so that's that's about argument, right, I can make
that argument.
Speaker 12: Right.
Speaker 5: I just just want to get the benefit of the telt,
That's what.
Speaker 17: I just want to get the benefit of the delt
because I just you know, I just have this you know,
this argument. But again they say, like, you know, like
you have this kind of ability to you know, you.
Speaker 13: Know calmber Head the words the full line givee to
my heart.
Speaker 1: Okay, Well, saying that he had the ability to do it,
it doesn't tell us how it's possible given their metaphysical scheme.
So that's an ad hoc rescue.
Speaker 5: They'll be all right.
Speaker 17: And there was almost one other thing that I won't
want to ask you that you know that the I
think he's also been even like something called like fatalism. Right,
everything is just like pre written by an angel.
Speaker 1: Yeah. They believe in a hard determinism correct.
Speaker 17: Yeah, So if that is the case, then why someone
has to be a Muslim because one day suddenly I
like him just like take over your mind, body and just.
Speaker 5: Like you know, make you do whatever you like.
Speaker 1: So I mean many of them are Yeah, many of
them are occasionalists, which is even more extreme position that
at every second Allah is destroying and recreating the world
because there cannot be secondary causes. There cannot be creaturely causes,
because for creatures to have causal power would detract from
all a sovereignty. That's how silly this position is. But
and it's also just goes back to like pagan fatalism.
Now keep in mind, like what we're talking about is
not hidden, it's not new. They've been critiquing each other
on these issues, where for example, here critique of the
Palmerian creed. This whole book is about how all the
Salafi argumentation about parts and attribute shes and all this
stuff hands that it's anthropomorphic heresy. They are making an
analogy between God and Allah in the created order, and
this whole book is about in what degree you can
and can't do that, and how it's shirk. So, in
other words, it been to me has a doctrine of concurrence.
Right where Allah has a hand. We don't know the
modality of a hand, but it's a real hand in
some way, but it's nothing like the created hand of
the world that the people have in the world. So
how is that? I mean, it's silly, right. All this
stuff is so silly, but it's given this air of, like,
you know, sophistication.
Speaker 13: Try again, So going just taking me off this time
because I disagree with you.
Speaker 1: No, I I removed you because you're not answering the question.
You're just talking to circles.
Speaker 13: Okay, but can I just say something at this time?
Speaker 14: Justification isn't necessary because I'm.
Speaker 13: Just giving an account.
Speaker 1: How do you know what you're saying all this?
Speaker 13: Okay, I'm giving an account. I don't need to justify it.
Speaker 1: So you don't have to justify your account. That's why
you're a sophist. So if you can you understand how
silly this is. If you can do that, I can
do that. This is so silly. I can give an account.
I don't have to justify it. You do have to
justify it because we're arguing in pistemology. Get out here
with all the sophistry. Get on my nerves. It's crazy
to do my back out. If you don't have to
justify your account, I don't have to justify an account.
You see how silly this is? Packy John? So you
understand that they missed the whole point of the criterion problem,
and they come back and say that, Well, the solution
to the criterion problem is I give an account. I
tell a story that I don't have to give a
justification for.
Speaker 5: Yeah, what's up, Jake, yep? Yeah.
Speaker 18: I wanted to ask you some questions, some problems that
I have with Christiana that I'm.
Speaker 8: Looking into it.
Speaker 18: So I wanted to ask you about like Christology, So
the human nature and the divine nature, how do you
even reconcile those? Like, for example, the divine nature is
eternal and then the human nature is created, So how
do you reconcile Jesus being eternal and then also created
at the same.
Speaker 1: Time because of two natures? So he's a divine person
who becomes incarnate. Is not a divine nature that becomes incarnated.
It's a divine person with a divine nature who steps
into time and space. How do we know that's possible
because he'd already been doing it for all of the
Old Testaments, stepping into time and space. So we believe
it not on the basis the first of all of metaphysics,
but on the basis of the divine revelation that it
tells us that the second person, Yahweh's son has stepped
into time and space many many times because he's not
bound by the logic and the principles of the created order.
God created the created order, He created logic. Logic is
a created thing in our view, it's not something that
binds God. God is the ground of logic, he is
not submitting to and the slave of logic. Logic is
a created principle based on principles in the divine mind,
and He transcends it. So there's nothing impossible or out
of hand for God to choose not to actualize every
one of his properties or powers and to step into
time and space, just like the Muslims or the Jews
believe that God was in time and space in various
ways and various capacities, unless they're the Muslims who reject
this and think that God is only transcendent, which if
He's only transcendent, then you have the problem with the
previous caller that how do we know what Allah's uncreated
Kuran is telling us? Because how could there be any
similarity between the uncreated Koran and the created Korans and
time and space so this problem, this bridge is, this gap,
is never bridged in that position if you stress and
only believe in transcendence. The Orthodox view following Hebrew Revelation