Speaker 1: Chapter twenty. The intellect, the class of mental states or
processes grouped together under the name of intellectual processes, formed
a second great division of the mental states, the two
others being feeling and will, respectively. Intellect has been defined
as follows, the part or faculty of the human mind
by which it knows, as distinguished from the power to
feel and to will, The thinking faculty the understanding also
as that faculty of the human mind by which it
receives or comprehends the ideas communicated to it by the
senses or the perception or other means, as distinguished from
the power to feel and to will, The power or
faculty to perceive objects in their relations, the power to
judge and comprehend also the capacity for higher forms of knowledge,
as distinguished from the power to perceive and imagine. In
the preceding chapters, we have seen that the individual is
able to experience sensations in consciousness, and that he is
able to perceive them mentally, the latter being the first
step in intellectual activity. We have also seen that he
is able to reproduce the perception by means of memory
and imagination, and that by means of the latter he
is able to recombine and rearrange the objects of perception.
We have also seen that he has what are known
as feelings, which depend upon his previous experience and that
of his progenitors. So far, the mind has been considered
merely as receiving and reproducing instrument, with the added attachment
of the recombining power of the imagination. Up to this point,
the mind may be compared to the phonographic cylinder with
an attachment capable of recombining its recorded impressions. The impressions
received and perceived are stored away, are reproduced, and by
the use the imagination, are recombined. Up to this point,
the mind is seen to be more or less of
an automatic instinctive faculty. It may be traced through a
purely reflex activity of the lowest forms of life up
through the lower animals, step by step, until a very
high degree of mental power is perceived in animals like
the horse, dog, or elephant. But there is something lacking.
There is missing that peculiar power of thinking in symbols
and abstract conceptions which distinguishes the human race, and which
is closely bound up with the faculty of language or
expressing thoughts. In words, the comparatively high mental process of
the lower animals is dwarfed by the human faculty of thinking,
and thinking is a manifestation of the intellect. What is
it to think? Strange to say? Very few persons can
answer this question directly. At first they find themselves inclined
to answer the inquiry in the words of the child.
Why to think is to think? Let us see if
we can make it plain. The dictionary definition is a
little too technical to be of much use to the beginner.
But here it is to employ any of the intellectual powers,
except that of simple perception through the senses. But what
are the intellectual powers so employed, and how are they employed?
Let us see? Stating the matter plainly in common terms,
we may say that thinking is the mental process of
one comparing our perceptions of things with each other, noting
the points of likeness and of difference, two, classifying them
according to the ascertained likeness or difference, and thus tying
them up in mental bundles, with each set of things
of a kind in its own bundle. Three, forming the
abstract symbolic mental idea concept of each class of things
so grouped that we may afterwards use, as we use
figures in mathematical calculations. Four, using these concepts in order
to form inferences, that is, to reason from the known
to the unknown, and to form judgments regarding things, five,
comparing these judgments and adducing higher judgments from them, and
so on. Without thinking, man would be dependent upon each
particular experience for his knowledge, except so far as memory
and imagination could instinctively aid him. By thought processes, he
is enable to infer that, if certain things be true
of one of a certain kind of things, the same
thing may be expected from others of the same class.
As he is able to note points of likeness or difference,
he is able to form clearer and truer inferences. In addition,
he is able to apply his constructive imagination to the
rearrangement and recombination of things whose nature he has discovered,
and thus progress along the line of material achievement as
well as of knowledge. It must be remembered, however, that
the intellect depends entirely for its material upon the perception,
which in turn receives its raw material from the senses.
The intellect merely groups together the material of perception, makes inferences,
draws conclusions from and forms conclusions regarding them, and, in
the case of constructive imagination, recombines them in effective forms
and arrangement. The intellect is the last in order of
the course of mental evolution. It appears at last in
order in the mind of the child, but it often
persists in old age, after the feelings have grown dim
and the memory weak. Concepts what is known as the concept,
is the first fruit of the elemental processes of thought.
The various images of outside objects are sensed, then perceived,
and then grouped according to their likenesses and differences, and
the result is a production of concepts. It is difficult
to define a concept so as to convey any meaning
to the beginner. For instance, the dictionaries give the definition
as an abstract general conception, idea, or nation formed in
the mind. Not very clear this is it. Perhaps we
can understand it better if we say that the terms dog, cat, man, horse, house,
et cetera. Each expresses a concept. Every term expresses a concept.
Every general name of a thing or quality is a
term applied to the concept. We shall see this a
little clearer as we proceed. We form a concept in
this way. One we perceive an of things. Two, Then
we notice certain qualities possessed by things, certain properties, attributes,
or characteristics which make the thing what it is. Three.
Then we compare these qualities of the thing with the
qualities of other things, and see that there is a
likeness in some cases in various degrees and a difference
in other cases in various degrees. Four. Then we generalize
or classify the perceived things according to their ascertained likenesses
and differences. Five. Then we form a general idea or
concept embodying each class of thing. And finally we give
to the concept a term or name, which is its symbol.
The concept is a general idea of a class of things.
The term is the expression of that general idea. The
concept is the idea of a class of things. The
term is the label affixed to the thing. To illustrate
this last distinction, let us take the concept and term
of bird, for instance. By perception, comparison, and classification of
the qualities of living things, we have arrived at the
conclusion that there exists a great general class, the qualities
of which may be stated thus warm blooded, feathered, winged
of viparous vertebrate. To this general class of quality possessing animals.
We apply the English term bird. The name is merely
a symbol. In German the term is fogel in Latin ABIs.
But in each in every case, the general idea or
concept above stated that is warm blooded, feathered, winged, oviparous
vertebrate is meant. If anything is found having all those
particular qualities, then we know it must be what we
call a bird, and everything we call a bird must
have those qualities. The term bird is the symbol for
that particular combination of qualities existing in a thing. There
is a difference between a mental image of the imagination
and a concept. The mental image must always be of
a particular thing, while a concept is always an idea
of a general class of things which cannot be clearly
pictured in the mind. For instance, the imagination may form
a mental picture of any known bird, or even of
an imaginary bird, but that bird always will be a distinct,
particular bird. Try to form a mental image of a
general class of birds. How would you do it? Do
you realize the difficulty? First, such an image would have
to include the characteristics of the large birds such as
the eagle, ostrich and condor, and of the small birds
such as the wren and humming bird. It must be
a composite of the shape of all birds, from the
ostrich swan, eagle crane down to the sparrow, swallow, and
humming bird. It must picture the particular qualities of birds
of prey, water birds, and domestic fowls, as well as
the grain eaters. It must exhibit all the colors found
in bird life, from the brightest reds and greens down
to the sober grays and browns. A little thought will
show that a clear mental image of such a concept
is impossible. What the most of us do when we
think of bird is the picture a vague flying shape
of dull color. For when we shop to think that
the term must also include the waddling duck and the
scratching barnyard chicken, we see that our mental image is faulty.
The trouble is that the term bird really means all bird,
and we cannot picture an all bird from the very
nature of the case. Our terms, therefore are like mathematical
figures or algebraic symbols, which we use for ease, speed
and clearness of thinking. The trouble does not end here.
Concepts not only include the general idea of things, but
also the general idea of the qualities of things. Thus sweetness, hardness, courage,
and energy are concepts, for we cannot form a mental
image of them by themselves. We may picture a sweet thing,
but not sweetness itself. So you see that a concept
is a purely abstract mental idea. A symbol akin to
the figures one, two, three, et cetera, and used in
the same way they stand for general classes of things.
A term is the verbal and written expression of the
general idea or concept. The student is requested to fix
these distinctions in his mind so as to render future
understanding of them easy. End of Chapter twenty Chapter twenty one.
Concept the idea of conception has been well defined by
Gaudy as that active mind by which it forms an
idea of a class, or that act of the mind
which enables us to use general names intelligently. He adds,
it is of course understood that I am using the
word class to denote an indefinite number of individuals that
resemble each other in certain particulars. Perception. The first step
in conception, as we have seen, is that of perception.
It is readily perceived that the character of our intellectual
processes depends materially upon the variety, clearness and accuracy of
our perceptions. Therefore, again we would refer our students to
the chapter in which we have stated the importance of
clear perception memory. The future steps of conception depend materially
upon the clearness of the memory, as we can classify
objects only by remembering their qualities beyond the immediate moment
of actual original perception. Therefore, the memory should be strengthened
for this as well as other objects. Abstraction. The second
step in conception is that of the mental abstraction of
qualities from the observed thing. That is, we must perceive
and then mentally set aside the observed qualities of the thing.
For instance, man first perceived the existence of certain qualities
in things. He found that a certain number of things
possessed some of these qualities in common, while others possessed
other qualities in the same way, and thus arose classification
from comparison. But both comparison and classification are possible only
by abstraction, or the perception of the quality as a thing. Thus,
the abstraction of the idea of the quality of sweetness
from the idea of sugar. Sweetness is equality. Rather than
a thing itself, it is something possessed by sugar, which
helps to make sugar what it is. Color, shape, size,
mental qualities, habits of action. These are some of the
qualities first observed in things and abstracted from them in thought. Redness, sweetness, hardness, softness, largeness, smallness, fragrance, swiftness, slowness, fierceness, gentleness, warmness, coldness,
et cetera. These are abstracted qualities of things. Of course,
these qualities are never really divorced from things, but the
mind divorces them in order to make thinking easier. An
authority says animals are incapable of making abstractions, and that
is the reason why they cannot develop formal thought. Abstract
thought is identical with rational thought, which is the characteristic
feature of the thought of speaking beings. This is the
reason why abstract thought is upon earth the exclusive property
of man, and why brutes are incapable of abstract thought.
The process of naming is the mechanism of abstraction, for
names establish the mental independence of the objects named. The
processes of abstraction depend upon attention. Concentrated attention attention directed
to the qualities of a thing tends to abstract the
qualities in thought from the thing itself. Mill says abstraction
is primarily the result of attention. Hamilton says attention and
abstraction are only the same process, viewed in different relations.
Cultivation of the power of abstraction means, principally cultivation of attention.
Any mental activity which tends towards analysis or separation of
a thing into its parts, qualities, or elements will serve
to cultivate and develop the power of abstraction. The habit
of converting qualities into concepts is acquired by transforming adjective
terms into their corresponding noun terms. For instance, a piece
of colored candy possesses the qualities of being round, hard, red, sweet,
et cetera. Transforming these adjective qualities into noun terms, we
have the concepts of roundness, hardness, redness, and sweetness, respectively. Comparison.
The third step in conception is that of comparison, in
which the qualities of several things are compared or examined
for likenesses and differences. We find many qualities in which
several things differ, and a few in which there is
a likeness. Classes are formed from resemblances or likenesses, while
individuals are separated from apparent classes by detection of differences. Finally,
it is found that separate things, while having many points
difference which indicate their individuality, nevertheless have a few points
of likeness which indicate that they belong to the same
general family or class. The detection of likenesses and differences
in the qualities of various things is an important mental process.
Many of the higher thought processes depend largely upon the
ability to compear things properly. The development of attention and
perception tends to develop the power of comparison, classification, or generalization.
The fourth step in conception is that of classification or generalization,
whereby we place individual things in a mental bundle or class,
and then this bundle, in company with other bundles, into
a higher class, and so on. Thus we grip all
the individual small birds having certain characteristics into a species,
then several related species into a larger family, and this
into a still larger and to as we finally grip
all the bird families into the great concept which we
call birds, and of which the simple term bird expresses
the general concept. Jevons says, we classify things together whenever
we observe that they are like each other in any respect,
and therefore think of them together. In classifying a collection
of objects, we do not merely put together into groups
those which resemble each other, but we also divide each
class into smaller ones in which the resemblance is more complete. Thus,
the class of white substances may be divided into those
which are solid and those which are fluid, so that
we get the two minor classes of solid white and
fluid white. It is desirable to have names by which
to show that one class is contained in another, and
accordingly we call the class which is divided into two
or more smaller species, the genus, and the smaller ones
into which it is divided the species. Every species is
a small family of the individuals composing it, and at
the same time is an individual species of the genus
just above it. The genus, in turn, is a family
of several species, and at the same time an individual
genus in a greater family or genus above it. The
student may familiarize himself with the idea of generalization by
considering himself as an individual. John Smith John represents that
unit of generalization. The next step is to combine John
with the other Smiths of his immediate family. Then this
family may be gripped with his near blood relations, and
so on, until finally all the related Smiths near and
remote are grouped together in a great Smith family. Or
in the same way, the family group may be enlarged
until it takes in all the white people in a county,
then all the white people in the state, then all
in the United States, then all the white races, then
all the white and other light skinned races, then all mankind. Then,
if one is inclined, the process may be continued until
it embraces every living creature, from Monaron to man. Reversing
the process, living creatures may be divided and subdivided until
all mankind is seen to stand as a class. Then
the race of man may be divided into sub races
according to colour. Then the white race may be subdivided
into Americans and non Americans, and the Americans may be
divided into the inhabitants of the several States, or into
Indianans or non Indianans, then into the inhabitants of the
several counties of Indiana, and thus the posey countians are reached.
Then the posey county people are divided into Smiths and nonsmiths,
then the Smith family into its constituent family groups, and
then into the smaller families, and so on, until the
classification reaches one particular John Smith, who at last is
found to be an individual in a class by himself.
This is the story of the ascending and descending processes
of generalization.