WEBVTT

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<v Speaker 1>How'd you like to listen to dot NetRocks with no ads? Easy?

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<v Speaker 1>you that and a special dot NetRocks patron mug. Sign

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<v Speaker 1>up now at Patreon dot dot NetRocks dot com. Hi,

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<v Speaker 1>this is Carl Franklin.

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<v Speaker 2>And this is Richard Campbell.

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<v Speaker 1>We've got two special shows coming up soon, episode nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>ninety nine and two thousand.

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<v Speaker 2>For episode nineteen ninety nine, we're collecting people's y two

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<v Speaker 2>k stories what did you do to help the Y

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<v Speaker 2>two k event not actually happen?

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<v Speaker 1>And for episode two thousand, we're going to be sharing

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<v Speaker 1>stories about how dot net shaped your career.

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<v Speaker 2>We have a special page at dot netroocks dot com

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<v Speaker 2>slash voxpop where you can record messages for us that

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<v Speaker 2>we can play on these special episodes. So tell us

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<v Speaker 2>what you did for Y two k and what dot

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<v Speaker 2>net means to you, and of course how long you've

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<v Speaker 2>been listening to dot net rocks. So go do dot

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<v Speaker 2>NetRocks dot com slash vox pop now and leave us

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<v Speaker 2>a message before the thought ev operates, like whiskey left

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<v Speaker 2>in a glass overnight, do it?

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<v Speaker 1>Hey, it's dot net Rocks, some Carl Franklin and I'm

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<v Speaker 1>Richard Campbell, And you know what where I am it's cold.

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<v Speaker 1>You know why there's so much fun snow. I'm supposed

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<v Speaker 1>to get a pellet delivery. They can't even back the

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<v Speaker 1>truck up to the basement to put the pellets in. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>I got to pay two hundred bucks to have the

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<v Speaker 1>guys trudge them through the house and down the stairs.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh my god, it's snowmageddon.

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<v Speaker 2>Is that cheaper than having someone plow all that out? Like?

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<v Speaker 1>But it's grass. I don't know what the answer. There's

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<v Speaker 1>no plowing, right, there's no plowing to be done otherwise

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<v Speaker 1>ripping and tearing.

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<v Speaker 2>I didn't even want to tell you how nice it

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<v Speaker 2>is on the west coast now, like we've learned to

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<v Speaker 2>shut up because the East coat's getting nails. Oh she

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<v Speaker 2>got nothing here. It's ridiculous. It's ridiculous.

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<v Speaker 1>We never had this much snow and also a cold

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<v Speaker 1>snap that's been below freezing for like three weeks.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, this is the polar vortex, right, the destabilization of

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<v Speaker 2>the Arctic high is pushing down into different parts of

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<v Speaker 2>the world. Yeah, and you are one of those parts.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, we're we're getting more snow than the rest of

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<v Speaker 1>the country.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, So let's talk about what happened in nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>eighty nine. Oh, my god, so much stuff happened. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>the fall of communism, well.

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<v Speaker 2>The beginning anyway. I mean, it'll take a couple of years,

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<v Speaker 2>but definitely the Eastern Block starts to unravel.

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<v Speaker 1>Yep, and so Union basically says we give up, We're done. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>we're not going to control all these countries anymore.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I mean, and then we've been to a bunch

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<v Speaker 2>of them and there they're museums and things like I'm

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<v Speaker 2>thinking about in Vilnius, the KGB Museum where they basically

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<v Speaker 2>left it as it was as the Soviets pulled out

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<v Speaker 2>in nineteen eighty nine. The duty uniform is still hanging

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<v Speaker 2>on the wall, all the documents they have been shredding

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<v Speaker 2>for months, like they knew things are coming.

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<v Speaker 1>And next year, as in the next episode, we'll talk

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<v Speaker 1>about nineteen ninety and that's where things really kind of well,

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<v Speaker 1>some really good things happened, and you know, a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of craziness happened.

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<v Speaker 2>To you know, we in the West look at nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>eighty nine and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc as

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<v Speaker 2>a dramatic progress in the world. But you understand that

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<v Speaker 2>for Russians and for the Chinese it was the ultimate disaster. Right, Like,

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<v Speaker 2>there's so much of the current conflict going on today

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<v Speaker 2>that start with the collapse in nineteen eighty nine, right,

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<v Speaker 2>because you know the other thing that happens in nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>eighty nine, that's tim and Square, Tiana and Square. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>and that was you know, there's this idea that as

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<v Speaker 2>they opened up and became more Western, they would adopt you,

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<v Speaker 2>the Western culture, and this is the closest the China did.

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<v Speaker 2>But after the crackdown of Tienum and Square, the establishment

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<v Speaker 2>of the technocracy at that point when today would just

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<v Speaker 2>plain old call it at an autocrat really turns at

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<v Speaker 2>that moment.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of that still happening. It's like, we

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<v Speaker 1>like democracy, but don't you dare protest?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, well they you know, don't like democracy. You will

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<v Speaker 2>there's one party. You follow the system, and you don't

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<v Speaker 2>follow the system, you will be re educated.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, yep. Excellon Valdez of course. Yeah, biggest oil spill

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<v Speaker 1>currently eleven million gallons.

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<v Speaker 2>Yep. We're you know, talking about putting a pipeline through

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<v Speaker 2>the west coast British Columbia, and Valdez comes up because

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<v Speaker 2>it's not that far away that when stuff like Bitaman

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<v Speaker 2>leaks into the ocean, it's a big deal.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's when the dishwasher detergent dawn got very popular.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, it saves a lot of birds. And we don't

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<v Speaker 2>let's not leave out the fall of the Berlin Wall

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<v Speaker 2>because that's December of nineteen eighty nine.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, all right, so what happened in technology and space

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<v Speaker 1>in nineteen eighty nine.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's do space first. So there are five Shuttle flights,

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<v Speaker 2>and again I'm not going to go into detail on

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<v Speaker 2>all of them, just every flies twice, just launching satellites.

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<v Speaker 2>Columbia does a single mission and it's a secret military

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<v Speaker 2>flight that they don't televise anything on. It's probably a satellite,

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<v Speaker 2>but we don't really know. But the two cool flights

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<v Speaker 2>are both on Atlantis, which are satellite launches, but their

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<v Speaker 2>interplanetary probes. They launched the Magellan probe to Venus and

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<v Speaker 2>the Galileo probe to Jupiter. This Galileo probe was one

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<v Speaker 2>of the great observatories, although it had a problem. Its

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<v Speaker 2>main high speed antenna never deploys properly, and it'll be

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<v Speaker 2>bandwidth limited its entire existence. Wow, But it'll still do

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<v Speaker 2>its job, just take longer to do it. I have

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<v Speaker 2>been remiss, my friend, since we got into the eighties

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<v Speaker 2>to talk about space dation mirror, because it's an incredibly

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<v Speaker 2>important piece of science, and it started in eighty six,

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<v Speaker 2>and I really haven't mentioned a lot, But in nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>eighty nine they actually launched a third module. So the

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<v Speaker 2>core module goes up in eighty six, which is basically

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<v Speaker 2>a modified Salute. Oh and by the way, at this moment,

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<v Speaker 2>the Soviet Union is operating two space stations in space

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<v Speaker 2>they have, Yeah, they had the Salute seven. This is

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<v Speaker 2>in nineteen eighty nine, which you'll continue operating till nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>ninety one. The last of the Salutes and Mirror, which

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<v Speaker 2>started in nineteen eighty six, which I'll keep grunning until

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<v Speaker 2>nineteen ninety six. So an eighty six they launch the

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<v Speaker 2>car module. In eighty seven they do Cavan one. And

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<v Speaker 2>this is the first time ever in civilization that a

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<v Speaker 2>multimodule space station was built. Mirror is the beginning of that.

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<v Speaker 2>And in nineteen eighty nine they launched Event two, and

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<v Speaker 2>so while Covent one was almost entirely astrophysics and sensors

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<v Speaker 2>and things, plus some infrastructure like gyroscopes, Event two has

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<v Speaker 2>the airlock EVA airlock on it for the Orlan space

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<v Speaker 2>suit and their maneuvering units, as well as more life support,

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<v Speaker 2>sensor and so forth. And there'll be a few more modules,

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<v Speaker 2>including the eventually the docking port for the Space Shuttle.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, the only thing I remember about Mer was

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<v Speaker 1>there was some sort of leak and they had to evacuate.

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<v Speaker 2>There was an accident with the Progress supply ship. They

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<v Speaker 2>lose control of it and it collides with the station.

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<v Speaker 2>It's an incredible story. Yeah, it's huge, and they lost

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<v Speaker 2>one of the newest modules, the Spectro module depressurized, although

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<v Speaker 2>they were able to still use it. They just have

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<v Speaker 2>to go to space suits to go into it. On

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<v Speaker 2>the interplanetary side, Voyager two makes it to Neptune, takes

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<v Speaker 2>our best pictures of Neptune ever, and last but not least,

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<v Speaker 2>the Phobos missions. So again into the Soviet Union. The

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<v Speaker 2>Soviet Union tried so many times ago to the Mars

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<v Speaker 2>and they and they failed consistently, and they were still

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<v Speaker 2>launching in the pairs like the Mariner missions the Americans

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<v Speaker 2>used to do. Phobos one and Phobos two, these were

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<v Speaker 2>two of the largest vehicles ever flown or attempted to

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<v Speaker 2>fly to Mars. They were sixty two hundred kilows each,

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<v Speaker 2>so that's like twelve thousand pounds. Like these were huge,

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<v Speaker 2>huge vehicles. Phobos one has a very agnomal experience where

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<v Speaker 2>it's launched in nineteen eighty eight but a mis entered

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<v Speaker 2>manual command disables its thrusters and they lose control of

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<v Speaker 2>it almost immediately.

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<v Speaker 1>Ben, that was you right, totally.

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<v Speaker 2>That wasn't It was a program and who was ultimately

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<v Speaker 2>punished for was kind of a big deal. But what

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<v Speaker 2>happened this is almost exactly what happened to Maritor one,

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<v Speaker 2>where they put in a command wrong and literally lost

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<v Speaker 2>the vehicles and process. There was test code in the

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<v Speaker 2>computer for Phobos one, and this is a very logical

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<v Speaker 2>test code. When you're on the ground, it's one of

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<v Speaker 2>the things you do after you finished a test sequence

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<v Speaker 2>is you disable the maneuvering thrusters because those things are

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<v Speaker 2>full of toxic chemicals and when it's on the ground,

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<v Speaker 2>you really don't want those going off, right, and so

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<v Speaker 2>when you complete the test sequence, it would immediately shut

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<v Speaker 2>those off. Now you don't need that test code in flight.

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<v Speaker 2>But because it's the nineteen eighties, they only have proms,

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<v Speaker 2>and so the only way way to remove that code

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<v Speaker 2>would be to dismantled computer and replace the prom So

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<v Speaker 2>they don't do it. They leave the code in with

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<v Speaker 2>a big sign saying don't run this code anyway. Guess

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<v Speaker 2>what They ran the code. So a misinjured command ended

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<v Speaker 2>up firing that code, which disables those controlers, and there's

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<v Speaker 2>no way to restart them. And so Phobos won it.

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<v Speaker 2>Never it never gets to Mars, never gets used. But

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<v Speaker 2>Phobos two they have more success with the original. They

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<v Speaker 2>supposed to fly in eighty six, it flies in eighty eight,

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<v Speaker 2>and it actually enters Mars orbit in nineteen eighty nine,

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<v Speaker 2>which is a huge success. However, and it was called

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<v Speaker 2>Phobos for a reason. They were there was a very

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<v Speaker 2>much it's gentle political maneuvering, right, this is parastroic and

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<v Speaker 2>so forth. So they don't want to step on the Americans.

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<v Speaker 2>So they're trying to do things that Mars and the

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<v Speaker 2>Americans haven't done. These were called Phobos because they were

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<v Speaker 2>specifically going to map and explore Phobos. They even want

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<v Speaker 2>to put a little rover down. All these kinds of things.

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<v Speaker 2>They didn't get to do most of them. And they

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<v Speaker 2>used this triple computer system, which is just the same

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<v Speaker 2>thing they Shuttle did, where you have three computers and

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<v Speaker 2>whichever two agree that's the correct command. Except one of

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<v Speaker 2>the computers completely fails on the way to Mars, so

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<v Speaker 2>now they're down to two, and then the second one,

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<v Speaker 2>a second one starts to fail and gets erratic, so

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<v Speaker 2>the one that's working correctly can't send commands because it's

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<v Speaker 2>only one.

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<v Speaker 1>See, this is further proof that everybody who goes to

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<v Speaker 1>space should always send a programmer with them.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, I don't know if that guy would like

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<v Speaker 2>that ride. It's not very comfortable, wow, and the bandwidth

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<v Speaker 2>is mediocre anyway. They if you manage to get thirty

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<v Speaker 2>seven photos of Phobos in map about eighty percent of it,

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<v Speaker 2>they're the most detailed pictures we've ever had of that.

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<v Speaker 2>Before they lose control of the vehicle because the computer

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<v Speaker 2>just kick So that's space in nineteen eighty nine.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, I know what's coming next, Richard. What the

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<v Speaker 1>birth of the World Wide Web nineteen eighty nine.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, no, it's a There's three important Internet things

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<v Speaker 2>that happened in nineteen eighty nine. The first is the

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<v Speaker 2>Internet passes one hundred thousand hosts, which is tiny when

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<v Speaker 2>you think about it, but at the time, and we

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<v Speaker 2>understand in nineteen eighty nine, the Internet's not a for

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<v Speaker 2>sure thing. It's sort of a sideline academic thing. It's

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<v Speaker 2>not that important. Yeah, the big initiative in industry is OSI.

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<v Speaker 2>This is IBM and Sun and even Microsoft. This is

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<v Speaker 2>what Bill was talking about at the time. He won't

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<v Speaker 2>change his mind for a couple of years yet, but yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>one hundred thousand hosts worldwide. It's also the first commercial

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<v Speaker 2>dial up connection. So a company called the World std

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<v Speaker 2>which is kind of a bad name. Did you ever

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<v Speaker 2>check that?

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<v Speaker 1>Should have picked a better name?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, World, I mean maybe they knew that virus is

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<v Speaker 3>we're going to be coming along.

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<v Speaker 2>Who knows.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh, there you go.

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<v Speaker 2>This isn't okay, Yeah, funny you should mention that. I'll

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<v Speaker 2>be talking about that a little later there, Ben. So, yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>that was the first time you could actually buy a connection,

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<v Speaker 2>a dialut connection of the Internet in North America was

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<v Speaker 2>you know, this company called world STD and of course,

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<v Speaker 2>our buddy tv L Tim berners Lee submits a proposal

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<v Speaker 2>to CERN for a distributed document management system which will

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<v Speaker 2>laterally know as the World Wide Web.

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<v Speaker 1>I have a quick story. I was working at Crescent

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<v Speaker 1>Software in the nineties, the early nineties, between ninety and

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<v Speaker 1>ninety four and eighty nine to ninety four, I can't remember,

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<v Speaker 1>and we came out with a control for visual Basic

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<v Speaker 1>called the hypertext control. And all it was was you

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<v Speaker 1>were able to you know, show text with a code

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<v Speaker 1>that it wasn't HTML, but it was a code that

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<v Speaker 1>had a hyperlink and then it fired an event with

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<v Speaker 1>the hyperlinks that you could do whatever. And we thought

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<v Speaker 1>this was like totally amazing. But it was around this

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<v Speaker 1>time that that and it wasn't even one of our

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<v Speaker 1>programs that came up with it. It was somebody who we

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<v Speaker 1>had worked with a consultant, and that control went in

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<v Speaker 1>our collection. Isn't that cool?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's cool, and you know it speaks to that

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<v Speaker 2>whole embedded WebView and so forth. Like you guys were

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<v Speaker 2>ahead of this time with doing that. All right, a

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<v Speaker 2>few other computery things Microsoft releases. The first version of

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<v Speaker 2>Office of the Map correl draw comes out. Oh yes,

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<v Speaker 2>I remember SimCity woo. Yeah, the zip file format, Philip

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<v Speaker 2>Katz's encryption algorithm. Yes, the first version of sql server

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<v Speaker 2>one point zero. It's a sixteen bit version of server

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<v Speaker 2>for OS two a year. It's a yeah. It's a

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<v Speaker 2>port of sybase sql Server a collaboration to Microsoft side

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<v Speaker 2>Base and Ashton Tate remember for dBase those guys dBase

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<v Speaker 2>there you go. And sound Blaster. Yes, so creative technology

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<v Speaker 2>out of Singapore. It's actually their third sound card. They

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<v Speaker 2>code name on this one was Killer Card. Of course,

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<v Speaker 2>nine voice fms and the size are using the Yamaha

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<v Speaker 2>YM thirty eight twelve and it was not, oddly enough

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<v Speaker 2>compatible with the ad lib card, which was really the

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<v Speaker 2>first of the PC sound cards to storm in the

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<v Speaker 2>mar They crushed the ad lib card and they will

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<v Speaker 2>crush them all. Yeah. By far be the dominant product space.

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<v Speaker 1>I had dinner with mister sim who was the engineer

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<v Speaker 1>behind the sound Blaster when I worked for Voyetra.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, in the fact they called the Killer Card. I

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<v Speaker 2>think they knew we're going after this market and we're

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<v Speaker 2>going to take it.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and they did.

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<v Speaker 2>Intel releases the forty six DX, so our thirty two

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<v Speaker 2>bit processes, they're getting bigger and faster, and it will

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<v Speaker 2>of course, you will also be able to get the

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<v Speaker 2>four eighty seven math co processor for it. And Phillips

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<v Speaker 2>and Sony, in a rare collaboration, produced the first recordable CD.

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<v Speaker 2>They called it the CdWO for Compact disc Right once,

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<v Speaker 2>which of course is the standard for all CD back.

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<v Speaker 2>That's right you. Once you write on it, you can't

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<v Speaker 2>write on again. And reference to Ben's comment about viruses,

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<v Speaker 2>The very first recorded case of ransomware, the Aid's trojan

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<v Speaker 2>encrypted and hid files and then you could pay one

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<v Speaker 2>hundred and eighty nine dollars to get the encryption decryption key,

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<v Speaker 2>although later security analysts decompiled the code and found the

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<v Speaker 2>ransomware key in the code, so you didn't need just

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<v Speaker 2>showing that the bad guys are usually not that smart.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, if you're gonna ask for money, ask for

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<v Speaker 1>more than one hundred and eighty nine dollars.

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<v Speaker 3>I was going to say, I think we've had a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of inflation since then.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, Well, yeah, this is some pure criminal career advice.

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<v Speaker 2>It's nineteen eighty nine, so one hundred and eighty nine

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<v Speaker 2>kind of makes sense. I think. I don't know. Yeah, Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>that's what I got.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, I guess it's time for better no a framework.

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<v Speaker 2>Awesome? Alright, man?

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<v Speaker 1>What you got? Well, it's kind of a meatball softball.

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<v Speaker 1>I just want to bring some more attention to my

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<v Speaker 1>security podcast since we're talking about that with Ben today

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<v Speaker 1>AI Security Security this week. So what's different about this podcast?

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<v Speaker 1>First of all, what it is we talk about I

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<v Speaker 1>don't know, six or seven stories from the week where

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<v Speaker 1>there have been breaches, where there have been attacks, or

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<v Speaker 1>somebody got caught, or somebody did something great, or there's

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<v Speaker 1>some nasty zero day bug that we need to pay

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<v Speaker 1>attention to. But a lot of it has been centering

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<v Speaker 1>on AI stories lately, and it just is abundantly clear

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<v Speaker 1>that once the AIS get a hold of, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>creating zero days, and they already do zero day exploits

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<v Speaker 1>and exploiting them like at an insane clip that you know,

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<v Speaker 1>we're all kind of screwed and unless we're taking some

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<v Speaker 1>real precautions and guardrails. But anyway, it's a security This

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<v Speaker 1>Week podcast. And the other thing about it is we

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<v Speaker 1>laugh to keep from crying, you know, because some of

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<v Speaker 1>this stuff is just so horrible it's frightening. But we

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<v Speaker 1>certainly do or laugh our way through it. So that's it.

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<v Speaker 2>Awesome time.

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<v Speaker 1>Who's talking to us today, Richard?

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<v Speaker 2>I got a comment from a listener, actually a direct

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<v Speaker 2>message in LinkedIn, and this is from Timo toy venone

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<v Speaker 2>and I hope I pronounced your name correctly. I bet

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<v Speaker 2>I didn't. And he said, I'm a longtime friend from

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<v Speaker 2>Europe and I'm reaching out via LinkedIn because I couldn't

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<v Speaker 2>find the listener email. I hope that's okay. It's Richard

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<v Speaker 2>at PWOP dot com too, But yeah, okay. Your show

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<v Speaker 2>has been instrumental in landing my dot net engineer and

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<v Speaker 2>architect role back in twenty five to twenty thirteen, and

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<v Speaker 2>thanks for all the great content over the years. Just

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<v Speaker 2>a reminder we've been doing the show entirely too long.

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<v Speaker 2>After a decade away in agile coaching, I'm transitioning back

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<v Speaker 2>to dot net as roles now Blend's scrum master and

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<v Speaker 2>product owner with technical dot net advisor and architect responsibilities.

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<v Speaker 2>So my challenge how to efficiently relearn the stack after

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<v Speaker 2>ten years away, what's fundamentally changed versus what stayed the same?

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<v Speaker 2>Where would you focus?

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<v Speaker 1>And this is a relatively new comment.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, no, he just got it. So he left in

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<v Speaker 2>twenty thirteen, and now it's twenty twenty six and he's

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<v Speaker 2>got a new job and he's started looking at you

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<v Speaker 2>and just trying to think, like twenty thirteen cloud is

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<v Speaker 2>brand new and still very questionable.

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<v Speaker 1>Yep, right, you're not automatically moved there there there's no

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<v Speaker 1>open source do net nope.

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<v Speaker 2>Or before the open source versions of dot net and

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<v Speaker 2>open a sourcing of the dot net framework, before all

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<v Speaker 2>the Roslin stuff, like it's before any of that. He

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<v Speaker 2>left arguably at the height actually the beginning of the

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<v Speaker 2>there really is the dark times, Like what would argue

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<v Speaker 2>the height of dot net is twenty ten, right, studio

356
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<v Speaker 2>twenty ten f sharp, the support for open sources just

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<v Speaker 2>beginning in the in there, right, we've got early web

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<v Speaker 2>tools I you know, I E nine still not out yet,

359
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<v Speaker 2>like just sort of hit that, you know. Toy Studio

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<v Speaker 2>twenty third, twenty twelve was the one that was all

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<v Speaker 2>about Windows eight and they put the upper case menus

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<v Speaker 2>items and all menus or uppercase in visual studios. So

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<v Speaker 2>there was twenty thirteen edihoal we took that back out.

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<v Speaker 2>So that's a great thing about a bad feature. You

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<v Speaker 2>get two versions out of it and then he's gone.

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<v Speaker 2>He goes off to live in a happy agile land.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so wow, a few things have changed.

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<v Speaker 2>What all's changed? Yeah, I mean, oddly enough, you're going

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<v Speaker 2>to have to think about AI tooling certainly coming in now.

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<v Speaker 2>The nice thing is you've you've left, you can skip

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<v Speaker 2>over a ton of stuff like you're you really need

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<v Speaker 2>to restudy c sharp and the modern expressions of the

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<v Speaker 2>language and the is it it looks very different today.

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<v Speaker 1>The real thing here is that you know, dot net

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<v Speaker 1>went from being a Windows technology to being a multi

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<v Speaker 1>platform open source technology.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>See sharp it cell his open source, A lot of

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<v Speaker 1>the tools are open source. Visual Studio code is open source,

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<v Speaker 1>and so you know you're not getting charged for you know,

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<v Speaker 1>big enterprise I guess enterprise editions of visual Studio they

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<v Speaker 1>still charge for but.

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<v Speaker 2>Still out there.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, still cost the same, but you don't need that.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a free version, the community version of visual Studio

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<v Speaker 1>if you want to stay there. That's sure. It's just free.

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<v Speaker 2>But you know, thinking about Timo in his architect's role

388
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<v Speaker 2>means he's also going to be dealing with web devs

389
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<v Speaker 2>that have never touched studio in their life. They maybe

390
00:19:32.960 --> 00:19:34.759
<v Speaker 2>use studio code, and they still going to be a

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<v Speaker 2>part of the project, so that they're going to need

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<v Speaker 2>the dot net kit for that. Yeah, as well as

393
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<v Speaker 2>some traditional droppers like I hope they were cross to

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<v Speaker 2>the modern version of dot net because life is better

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<v Speaker 2>over there, without a doubt. Oh yeah, that depends on

396
00:19:46.359 --> 00:19:49.559
<v Speaker 2>the kind of clients they're ultimately going to build. He's

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<v Speaker 2>missed all of containerization for the most part.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's right. Unless he kept up with it.

399
00:19:54.880 --> 00:19:56.359
<v Speaker 2>He lay out our software a wee bit different.

400
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<v Speaker 1>Now he might have caught up with it. Kept up

401
00:19:58.480 --> 00:19:59.799
<v Speaker 1>with it on the other side, though.

402
00:20:00.279 --> 00:20:02.720
<v Speaker 2>I know it's a big bite, but you know, if

403
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<v Speaker 2>we were learning containers from scratch right now, I just

404
00:20:04.519 --> 00:20:07.319
<v Speaker 2>go directly to aspire because you don't use canators for fun.

405
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<v Speaker 2>You're doing it because you're going after cloud architecture, and

406
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<v Speaker 2>whatever bit of scaffolding you can do is to get

407
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<v Speaker 2>you to cloud style architectures will make your life easier.

408
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<v Speaker 2>So yep, that's certainly an easier bite.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I agree.

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<v Speaker 2>Anyway, I thought it was a fun comment. Yeah, Tiam,

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<v Speaker 2>I hope this guy gave you some ideas. Certainly this

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<v Speaker 2>show we're talking you know more about some of the

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<v Speaker 2>contemporary TOOLI and the problems they're in. So and there's

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<v Speaker 2>plenty more shows. So you dig through the catalog a bit,

415
00:20:31.240 --> 00:20:33.599
<v Speaker 2>I'm sure you'll find it. Fuse it'll help you. So, Timo,

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<v Speaker 2>thank you so much for a comment. And a copy

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<v Speaker 2>of music co buy is on its way to you.

418
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<v Speaker 2>And if you'd like a copy of music, go buy.

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<v Speaker 2>I write a comment on the website at dot NetRocks

420
00:20:39.559 --> 00:20:42.519
<v Speaker 2>dot com or on the facebooks or the LinkedIn's if

421
00:20:42.559 --> 00:20:44.640
<v Speaker 2>you like, and if we read it on the show,

422
00:20:44.680 --> 00:20:45.680
<v Speaker 2>we'll send you copy music.

423
00:20:45.680 --> 00:20:48.000
<v Speaker 1>Go buy music to code buy dot net if you

424
00:20:48.079 --> 00:20:51.400
<v Speaker 1>want to get it yourself MP three wave in flat format.

425
00:20:51.720 --> 00:20:55.440
<v Speaker 1>All right, so let's introduce Ben Decree for the first

426
00:20:55.440 --> 00:20:58.079
<v Speaker 1>time here on dot net rocks. Ben has been a

427
00:20:58.079 --> 00:21:01.880
<v Speaker 1>software engineer for over twenty five years. He's a Microsoft MVP,

428
00:21:02.200 --> 00:21:05.359
<v Speaker 1>and he's been knee deep in security and developer relations

429
00:21:05.359 --> 00:21:08.400
<v Speaker 1>for most of his career. He's spoken at conferences like

430
00:21:08.480 --> 00:21:13.880
<v Speaker 1>defcn NDC, dev Intersection, et cetera, et cetera. These days,

431
00:21:13.880 --> 00:21:17.079
<v Speaker 1>he's co founder of ven Labs, a startup studio based

432
00:21:17.079 --> 00:21:20.519
<v Speaker 1>in Kansas City, and he's just about to launch braid Flow.

433
00:21:21.160 --> 00:21:25.279
<v Speaker 1>And that's br aid Flow, an AI platform that tackles

434
00:21:25.319 --> 00:21:30.880
<v Speaker 1>the context drift problem keeping AI conversations focused when things

435
00:21:30.920 --> 00:21:34.640
<v Speaker 1>get complex. Welcome Ben, Thanks, thanks for having me. Wow,

436
00:21:34.640 --> 00:21:37.359
<v Speaker 1>where do we start? I mean, AI security is such

437
00:21:37.400 --> 00:21:41.240
<v Speaker 1>a big problem, and I just want to preface this

438
00:21:41.319 --> 00:21:44.279
<v Speaker 1>by saying, a couple of weeks ago, I got a

439
00:21:44.359 --> 00:21:49.960
<v Speaker 1>brand new six thousand dollars multi machine here in ninety

440
00:21:50.000 --> 00:21:53.039
<v Speaker 1>six gigs of RAM thirty two gig a fifty nine

441
00:21:53.119 --> 00:21:58.359
<v Speaker 1>hundred series card for the purpose of turning it into

442
00:21:58.519 --> 00:22:02.720
<v Speaker 1>my personal you know LM with Alama that I can

443
00:22:02.880 --> 00:22:06.640
<v Speaker 1>use like a getthub co pilot. And it is not

444
00:22:06.759 --> 00:22:07.400
<v Speaker 1>going well.

445
00:22:08.200 --> 00:22:10.240
<v Speaker 3>No, we were trying something similar here the other day,

446
00:22:10.319 --> 00:22:13.640
<v Speaker 3>my wife and I and we took a pretty good

447
00:22:13.680 --> 00:22:18.400
<v Speaker 3>gaming rig and installed Lama CPP and it runs dog

448
00:22:18.440 --> 00:22:19.480
<v Speaker 3>slow well.

449
00:22:19.519 --> 00:22:23.640
<v Speaker 1>Lama runs great on it locally, and even if I

450
00:22:23.759 --> 00:22:27.240
<v Speaker 1>do you know, if I'm running it just talking to Alama.

451
00:22:27.279 --> 00:22:30.240
<v Speaker 1>But what I really want is an agent, you know,

452
00:22:30.319 --> 00:22:34.440
<v Speaker 1>I'll a get ub copilot CLI that does everything and

453
00:22:34.480 --> 00:22:36.880
<v Speaker 1>these things like I can't get them to get beyond

454
00:22:37.440 --> 00:22:39.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, the the Jason that they're going to send

455
00:22:40.000 --> 00:22:42.160
<v Speaker 1>and then they never send it. Like I've tried three

456
00:22:42.200 --> 00:22:43.960
<v Speaker 1>or four of them and they all get stuck there.

457
00:22:44.000 --> 00:22:44.640
<v Speaker 2>So I don't know.

458
00:22:45.279 --> 00:22:47.359
<v Speaker 1>But that's not here nor there. I just want to

459
00:22:47.920 --> 00:22:49.279
<v Speaker 1>I just want to preface that story.

460
00:22:49.440 --> 00:22:51.160
<v Speaker 3>Sure, I mean we can dig into that as well

461
00:22:51.160 --> 00:22:55.519
<v Speaker 3>if you want. It's somewhat related to the security thing.

462
00:22:56.279 --> 00:22:58.880
<v Speaker 3>Like one of the big issues that a lot of

463
00:22:58.960 --> 00:23:01.119
<v Speaker 3>organizations have at the moment when they're thinking about do

464
00:23:01.160 --> 00:23:05.519
<v Speaker 3>we let our developers use these AI development tools is

465
00:23:05.519 --> 00:23:08.480
<v Speaker 3>what happens to that code? Where does it go? Whose stories?

466
00:23:08.720 --> 00:23:11.480
<v Speaker 3>And you have data sovereignty issues with countries as well,

467
00:23:12.000 --> 00:23:14.759
<v Speaker 3>or even austrating client to the moment who is like.

468
00:23:14.920 --> 00:23:17.319
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's exactly why I want to run alarm locally

469
00:23:17.359 --> 00:23:20.119
<v Speaker 1>because my customers don't want me using.

470
00:23:19.880 --> 00:23:23.680
<v Speaker 3>The the tools. So it's hugely I see a future

471
00:23:23.680 --> 00:23:27.799
<v Speaker 3>where probably a lot of people, mostly people who use

472
00:23:27.839 --> 00:23:31.079
<v Speaker 3>technology heavily already, will have their own influence machine at home.

473
00:23:31.720 --> 00:23:34.480
<v Speaker 3>I think that's just going to be commoditized.

474
00:23:35.240 --> 00:23:37.480
<v Speaker 2>Well, and it just gets rid of the token issue too,

475
00:23:38.200 --> 00:23:40.279
<v Speaker 2>questioning the massformans. Of course you're going to get from

476
00:23:40.279 --> 00:23:43.039
<v Speaker 2>it rather than sure, you know, although sooner or later,

477
00:23:43.119 --> 00:23:45.480
<v Speaker 2>these all you can eat accounts are going to go away.

478
00:23:45.680 --> 00:23:48.039
<v Speaker 3>Oh yeah, I mean they're heavily subsidized in the moment.

479
00:23:48.359 --> 00:23:52.079
<v Speaker 3>They can't continue to do that. Even if if electricity

480
00:23:52.119 --> 00:23:56.200
<v Speaker 3>prices and all the associated costs come down, it's still

481
00:23:56.240 --> 00:23:57.079
<v Speaker 3>heavily subsidized.

482
00:23:57.440 --> 00:23:57.640
<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

483
00:23:58.400 --> 00:24:01.039
<v Speaker 3>But the other thing is, like I would be happy

484
00:24:01.160 --> 00:24:03.960
<v Speaker 3>at the moment with an influence machine that was perhaps

485
00:24:04.039 --> 00:24:07.200
<v Speaker 3>a little slower, but didn't have that. So I use

486
00:24:07.519 --> 00:24:11.519
<v Speaker 3>cloud code and they have the five hour window, and

487
00:24:11.960 --> 00:24:14.039
<v Speaker 3>if I could get it to do something for ten

488
00:24:14.079 --> 00:24:18.079
<v Speaker 3>hours while I'm sleeping and not just stop halfway through, Yeah,

489
00:24:18.119 --> 00:24:19.720
<v Speaker 3>it doesn't really matter to me if it's a bit slower,

490
00:24:19.720 --> 00:24:21.359
<v Speaker 3>because it still gets more done overall.

491
00:24:21.640 --> 00:24:25.039
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Yeah, I've definitely got friends running multiple or you

492
00:24:25.039 --> 00:24:27.839
<v Speaker 2>can eat accounts because they literally run them against each

493
00:24:27.839 --> 00:24:32.440
<v Speaker 2>other overnight routinely. Like that's just the way you do work, right,

494
00:24:32.480 --> 00:24:34.039
<v Speaker 2>You get up in the morning to see what your

495
00:24:34.039 --> 00:24:36.480
<v Speaker 2>half a dozen bots have cooked off for yourself. I'm

496
00:24:36.480 --> 00:24:38.880
<v Speaker 2>sure you're spending a couple of grand a month, but.

497
00:24:40.680 --> 00:24:44.240
<v Speaker 3>Work just between me and my wife, we're spending easily

498
00:24:44.279 --> 00:24:48.839
<v Speaker 3>five k a year if we're looking at two mexicounts each,

499
00:24:49.599 --> 00:24:51.839
<v Speaker 3>sure five six k a year. And then we've got

500
00:24:51.880 --> 00:24:53.759
<v Speaker 3>all the other TOOLI on top. How much does it

501
00:24:53.799 --> 00:24:56.240
<v Speaker 3>cost to build a pretty good rig for home? How

502
00:24:56.319 --> 00:24:58.440
<v Speaker 3>quickly could you pay that often? In terms of written

503
00:24:58.480 --> 00:25:00.480
<v Speaker 3>on investment, I don't think take that long.

504
00:25:00.519 --> 00:25:03.200
<v Speaker 1>Well, and like I said, this one costs six thousand, right,

505
00:25:03.720 --> 00:25:06.880
<v Speaker 1>and it's all in one box. Right, it works great?

506
00:25:07.000 --> 00:25:08.799
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, yeah, well I'll catch up with you afterwards. I'll

507
00:25:08.799 --> 00:25:09.839
<v Speaker 3>find out what specs you're running.

508
00:25:09.920 --> 00:25:13.319
<v Speaker 2>It's in true reality. And I was just reading Anthropic

509
00:25:13.519 --> 00:25:18.920
<v Speaker 2>is now offering you for a fee faster service from them. Yeah,

510
00:25:19.119 --> 00:25:20.839
<v Speaker 2>two and a half time, so you can sort of

511
00:25:20.839 --> 00:25:24.000
<v Speaker 2>go fast laying with them. So I feel like those guys,

512
00:25:24.279 --> 00:25:26.279
<v Speaker 2>the cloud guys, have got to figured out of all

513
00:25:26.319 --> 00:25:28.759
<v Speaker 2>of the company, the new AI companies, rather than the

514
00:25:28.799 --> 00:25:31.440
<v Speaker 2>tech shiants, the one that seemed to be making things

515
00:25:31.440 --> 00:25:33.839
<v Speaker 2>that people want and will spend money on seems to

516
00:25:33.839 --> 00:25:36.400
<v Speaker 2>be Anthropy and today anyway, the other.

517
00:25:36.200 --> 00:25:39.279
<v Speaker 3>Thing I really like about Anthropic is their stems on security. Yeah,

518
00:25:39.319 --> 00:25:42.400
<v Speaker 3>they've got huge research teams making sure that they're being

519
00:25:42.400 --> 00:25:45.440
<v Speaker 3>as ethical as possible. They understand the repercussions, that they're

520
00:25:45.480 --> 00:25:47.559
<v Speaker 3>fixing guardrails, all of those kind of things, Like if

521
00:25:47.559 --> 00:25:49.920
<v Speaker 3>I had to put my money on which one's going

522
00:25:49.960 --> 00:25:52.920
<v Speaker 3>to survive because they quote do the right thing or

523
00:25:53.640 --> 00:25:56.519
<v Speaker 3>pay attention to the needs, and they do heavily focus

524
00:25:56.559 --> 00:25:58.359
<v Speaker 3>on the coding side of things. It's where they've made

525
00:25:58.359 --> 00:26:02.200
<v Speaker 3>their names so far. Yeah, I would say if there's

526
00:26:02.200 --> 00:26:06.440
<v Speaker 3>going to be one frontier model or provider that comes

527
00:26:06.440 --> 00:26:13.079
<v Speaker 3>out of this as the go to for software development center.

528
00:26:12.839 --> 00:26:15.400
<v Speaker 2>Topic, it sure seems that way. And it's funny how

529
00:26:15.519 --> 00:26:18.319
<v Speaker 2>little the sense of trust towards the tech giants is,

530
00:26:18.839 --> 00:26:20.720
<v Speaker 2>Like you would have thought back in the day, it

531
00:26:20.759 --> 00:26:22.880
<v Speaker 2>was like nobody ever went wrong for using IBM. It's

532
00:26:22.920 --> 00:26:24.880
<v Speaker 2>like you would have thought Microsoft had sewn up. They

533
00:26:24.920 --> 00:26:28.640
<v Speaker 2>offer the protection of will handle any lawsuits you're exposed to,

534
00:26:28.680 --> 00:26:32.319
<v Speaker 2>and so forth, and still the reputation is shockingly bad.

535
00:26:32.839 --> 00:26:36.000
<v Speaker 2>And here's this little company with minimal of anything. But

536
00:26:36.160 --> 00:26:37.599
<v Speaker 2>we're willing to give them the chance.

537
00:26:37.759 --> 00:26:39.079
<v Speaker 3>And I'm sure I probably don't want to get too

538
00:26:39.119 --> 00:26:41.079
<v Speaker 3>much into politics, but if you look at what Opening

539
00:26:41.119 --> 00:26:42.960
<v Speaker 3>Eye has been doing in terms of we're going to

540
00:26:42.960 --> 00:26:45.519
<v Speaker 3>be open source. Now we're not open source, and people

541
00:26:45.599 --> 00:26:48.000
<v Speaker 3>getting fired, and there's all sorts of stuff going inside.

542
00:26:48.039 --> 00:26:51.759
<v Speaker 3>There's question mark surrounding that company. It's hard to work

543
00:26:51.759 --> 00:26:53.599
<v Speaker 3>out what direction they're trying to go in.

544
00:26:53.640 --> 00:26:56.599
<v Speaker 1>They're under a lot of monetary pressure, you know, and

545
00:26:57.000 --> 00:27:01.200
<v Speaker 1>they've spent, they've taken lots of money. What are they

546
00:27:01.119 --> 00:27:05.480
<v Speaker 1>they're giving they're giving back, but you know they have competitors,

547
00:27:05.720 --> 00:27:07.039
<v Speaker 1>right sure, yeah.

548
00:27:06.839 --> 00:27:09.759
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, And I don't see that same sense of this

549
00:27:09.839 --> 00:27:11.640
<v Speaker 2>is a product you must use coming out of open

550
00:27:11.680 --> 00:27:14.200
<v Speaker 2>AI the way I'm seeing over and over again, and

551
00:27:14.240 --> 00:27:17.839
<v Speaker 2>not just one thing, like these new plugins for PowerPoint

552
00:27:17.880 --> 00:27:20.920
<v Speaker 2>and Excel out of Anthropic are stunning, Like what has

553
00:27:21.000 --> 00:27:24.400
<v Speaker 2>the M three sixty five team been doing that? Out

554
00:27:24.480 --> 00:27:27.400
<v Speaker 2>of nowhere? Anthropy goes, hey, how about this? He's being Oh,

555
00:27:27.440 --> 00:27:29.400
<v Speaker 2>you mean the thing I always wanted from Excel?

556
00:27:29.640 --> 00:27:32.960
<v Speaker 3>Right, okay, So the chlaud cowork feature that came out

557
00:27:33.000 --> 00:27:37.240
<v Speaker 3>recently was ideated. I'm not sure iver I like that word,

558
00:27:37.240 --> 00:27:39.960
<v Speaker 3>but I'll go with it. It was ideated ten days before

559
00:27:40.079 --> 00:27:42.519
<v Speaker 3>was released. Like the speed at which they bringing stuff

560
00:27:42.519 --> 00:27:44.039
<v Speaker 3>out of there. And I read an article the other

561
00:27:44.079 --> 00:27:47.759
<v Speaker 3>day that anthropic engineers are you take away the word

562
00:27:47.839 --> 00:27:50.799
<v Speaker 3>software aren't actually coding anymore. They do sison Claud to

563
00:27:50.799 --> 00:27:53.400
<v Speaker 3>make Claud better, right, Yeah, it's all our specifications. It's

564
00:27:53.440 --> 00:27:55.880
<v Speaker 3>all about knowing what you want to build and getting

565
00:27:56.200 --> 00:27:58.480
<v Speaker 3>the AI tooling to understand that to a sufficient enough

566
00:27:58.519 --> 00:28:03.119
<v Speaker 3>level to build a good product. And they're eating their

567
00:28:03.119 --> 00:28:05.880
<v Speaker 3>own on food literally in the best sense of that example.

568
00:28:06.160 --> 00:28:07.160
<v Speaker 3>And they're doing redeveloped.

569
00:28:07.440 --> 00:28:10.680
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, they're doing what everybody said they would do. These

570
00:28:10.680 --> 00:28:12.720
<v Speaker 2>guys seem to actually be doing it. Are now sort

571
00:28:12.720 --> 00:28:18.519
<v Speaker 2>of running away with what's possible here. Okay, but I

572
00:28:18.559 --> 00:28:21.079
<v Speaker 2>think about the security on the dev side where I

573
00:28:21.160 --> 00:28:23.759
<v Speaker 2>have teams now where when they use remote developers, the

574
00:28:23.920 --> 00:28:27.839
<v Speaker 2>remote developers have to RDP into an instance with the

575
00:28:27.839 --> 00:28:31.039
<v Speaker 2>dev tools on it because they won't allow anything to

576
00:28:31.160 --> 00:28:34.720
<v Speaker 2>go onto even that remote desktop. You know, if you're

577
00:28:34.720 --> 00:28:36.519
<v Speaker 2>going to steal from that code basis, because you're going

578
00:28:36.559 --> 00:28:39.559
<v Speaker 2>to take pictures of the code like that's how tight they.

579
00:28:39.440 --> 00:28:42.759
<v Speaker 3>Are, which you could probably automate with Claud cowork.

580
00:28:43.279 --> 00:28:48.000
<v Speaker 4>Oh yeah, so much for protections, right, Although if you're

581
00:28:48.000 --> 00:28:50.160
<v Speaker 4>willing to throw the vms up in the clouds, you're

582
00:28:50.160 --> 00:28:52.759
<v Speaker 4>probably willing to use the AI in the cloud as well,

583
00:28:52.839 --> 00:28:54.920
<v Speaker 4>Like I just I don't know that we can contain

584
00:28:55.039 --> 00:28:56.920
<v Speaker 4>data all that Well, if you're going to be on

585
00:28:56.960 --> 00:28:58.160
<v Speaker 4>the internet, you're on the Internet.

586
00:28:58.200 --> 00:29:02.880
<v Speaker 3>I think the risk profile there is very interesting. If

587
00:29:03.559 --> 00:29:07.559
<v Speaker 3>I was a Department of Defense type organization in a country,

588
00:29:07.559 --> 00:29:10.599
<v Speaker 3>they didn't want my code to leave sovereign borders totally

589
00:29:10.640 --> 00:29:14.720
<v Speaker 3>unset there, So my source control, my hosting, all of

590
00:29:14.720 --> 00:29:17.640
<v Speaker 3>that needs to be within borders because when I'm pushing

591
00:29:17.680 --> 00:29:20.440
<v Speaker 3>my code around, that code is literally being pushed around.

592
00:29:20.440 --> 00:29:22.640
<v Speaker 3>When database dumps are being sent around, when people are

593
00:29:22.640 --> 00:29:27.480
<v Speaker 3>signing up for accounts, that data is HGPSTLS, straw. But

594
00:29:27.759 --> 00:29:29.960
<v Speaker 3>the essentially we've got a whole lot of plaintext data

595
00:29:30.000 --> 00:29:33.559
<v Speaker 3>at some point that's been passed around. When you're pushing

596
00:29:33.559 --> 00:29:37.720
<v Speaker 3>context to an infant server, there's plaintext in there, but

597
00:29:37.759 --> 00:29:40.279
<v Speaker 3>then it gets tokenized, and then it gets stored in

598
00:29:40.400 --> 00:29:43.279
<v Speaker 3>some kind of vector representation, and it's pulled out in

599
00:29:43.279 --> 00:29:45.880
<v Speaker 3>interesting ways, and then you've got the key valuecation and

600
00:29:46.359 --> 00:29:49.680
<v Speaker 3>there's a lot of obfuscation under the hood. So what

601
00:29:49.880 --> 00:29:52.880
<v Speaker 3>is it that actually gets stored long term? A lot

602
00:29:52.880 --> 00:29:57.200
<v Speaker 3>of the providers will say that we don't remember your prompts,

603
00:29:57.200 --> 00:29:59.440
<v Speaker 3>and we don't remember the responses, but we remember some

604
00:29:59.440 --> 00:30:02.920
<v Speaker 3>of the stuff that happens in between. So the risk

605
00:30:02.960 --> 00:30:06.200
<v Speaker 3>profile there is interesting because it's no longer as clean

606
00:30:06.240 --> 00:30:09.759
<v Speaker 3>cut as our data is at rest in another country,

607
00:30:09.759 --> 00:30:11.960
<v Speaker 3>because it kind of is, but it also kind of isn't.

608
00:30:12.759 --> 00:30:14.920
<v Speaker 3>So I think when we think about whether or not

609
00:30:15.000 --> 00:30:18.359
<v Speaker 3>we can use these tools, we need to not so

610
00:30:18.480 --> 00:30:20.000
<v Speaker 3>much to think about where is the data going, but what

611
00:30:20.079 --> 00:30:25.720
<v Speaker 3>is the likelihood of that data representing a leaking kind of.

612
00:30:25.720 --> 00:30:30.039
<v Speaker 2>Risk actually actually risky information of any kind that could

613
00:30:30.039 --> 00:30:31.039
<v Speaker 2>be harmful to a company.

614
00:30:31.319 --> 00:30:33.160
<v Speaker 3>So we've seen the examples where somebody would go to

615
00:30:33.400 --> 00:30:36.839
<v Speaker 3>cloud code or chatchypt and they would say count from

616
00:30:36.839 --> 00:30:41.240
<v Speaker 3>one to two thousand, or repeat the word organization one

617
00:30:41.279 --> 00:30:44.039
<v Speaker 3>hundred times was a good example, and then after like

618
00:30:44.079 --> 00:30:46.680
<v Speaker 3>the sixty fourth time, it would start leaking information that

619
00:30:46.720 --> 00:30:50.960
<v Speaker 3>it was trained on. There was the report of the

620
00:30:51.440 --> 00:30:55.079
<v Speaker 3>email signature of a legal firm being leaked that way,

621
00:30:56.160 --> 00:30:58.519
<v Speaker 3>Because essentially all is doing is predicting an X word,

622
00:30:59.240 --> 00:31:03.960
<v Speaker 3>and as the context kind of doubles, it's saying, okay, organizational, organization, organization,

623
00:31:04.119 --> 00:31:06.480
<v Speaker 3>and it forgets what it's doing, says organizational the next

624
00:31:06.559 --> 00:31:10.640
<v Speaker 3>likely word is is not liable for anything? Blah blah blah.

625
00:31:10.640 --> 00:31:13.279
<v Speaker 3>So it starts it's doing what it's supposed to do.

626
00:31:13.440 --> 00:31:15.440
<v Speaker 3>What's the most likely word to come next, and it

627
00:31:15.480 --> 00:31:16.440
<v Speaker 3>protects the context.

628
00:31:16.480 --> 00:31:21.039
<v Speaker 1>It feels like my brain first thing in the morning, Right, So.

629
00:31:21.200 --> 00:31:23.799
<v Speaker 3>I was going to say we need need more coffee?

630
00:31:24.279 --> 00:31:27.119
<v Speaker 2>I slept well, right, You.

631
00:31:29.599 --> 00:31:34.880
<v Speaker 3>Copies of this context can get pulled out, right, But

632
00:31:35.000 --> 00:31:38.599
<v Speaker 3>is there enough there for it to be a concern?

633
00:31:39.039 --> 00:31:41.160
<v Speaker 2>Is it harmful in the right way?

634
00:31:41.759 --> 00:31:42.559
<v Speaker 3>And how do you measure that?

635
00:31:42.799 --> 00:31:42.880
<v Speaker 4>Like?

636
00:31:42.920 --> 00:31:44.519
<v Speaker 3>That's the other thing is there's there's no way for

637
00:31:44.599 --> 00:31:48.480
<v Speaker 3>us to actually know what's gone out to somebody else

638
00:31:49.119 --> 00:31:49.799
<v Speaker 3>and what was that?

639
00:31:49.839 --> 00:31:52.400
<v Speaker 2>And this is the challenge of a security person is

640
00:31:52.680 --> 00:31:55.400
<v Speaker 2>there are no absolutes. Nothing's ever one hundred percent anything.

641
00:31:55.480 --> 00:31:58.680
<v Speaker 2>Its scope of risk, right, And so you're looking at

642
00:31:58.720 --> 00:32:02.079
<v Speaker 2>a situation going, well, this is seen to be much scoper. Yes,

643
00:32:02.119 --> 00:32:04.200
<v Speaker 2>it's not absolute, but it's also not a high scope

644
00:32:04.240 --> 00:32:07.119
<v Speaker 2>of risk. Here, totally interesting problem. All right, we should

645
00:32:07.119 --> 00:32:09.279
<v Speaker 2>take a little break and maybe dig into some security

646
00:32:09.279 --> 00:32:11.680
<v Speaker 2>fundamentals that folks can take a come away with. That's good,

647
00:32:11.960 --> 00:32:18.480
<v Speaker 2>right after these important messages and we're back. It's don

648
00:32:18.480 --> 00:32:21.400
<v Speaker 2>at Rock's amateur Campbell that's called Franklin Yo. Talking to

649
00:32:21.440 --> 00:32:25.680
<v Speaker 2>our friend Ben Ben Deshry about well, you've been a

650
00:32:25.720 --> 00:32:29.039
<v Speaker 2>security guy before AI was dominant on these things, right,

651
00:32:29.079 --> 00:32:31.160
<v Speaker 2>you were the o off guy, Like you've done all

652
00:32:31.160 --> 00:32:34.000
<v Speaker 2>of that sort of stuff, Like, how much has that changed.

653
00:32:34.240 --> 00:32:36.240
<v Speaker 2>You've had the battle of trying to get developer security

654
00:32:36.400 --> 00:32:38.160
<v Speaker 2>software all along.

655
00:32:38.559 --> 00:32:41.920
<v Speaker 3>Developers love security insofar as they want to do a

656
00:32:41.920 --> 00:32:42.400
<v Speaker 3>good job.

657
00:32:42.559 --> 00:32:43.480
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, sure, but.

658
00:32:43.680 --> 00:32:46.000
<v Speaker 1>They're not like implementing it or being restricted by it.

659
00:32:46.039 --> 00:32:48.960
<v Speaker 3>Though I think we want to implement it. Maybe I'm

660
00:32:48.960 --> 00:32:50.799
<v Speaker 3>just weird like that because I like security. But I

661
00:32:50.839 --> 00:32:54.119
<v Speaker 3>think oftentimes the biggest story that I've seen the narrative

662
00:32:54.160 --> 00:32:57.079
<v Speaker 3>of software development in the last twenty five thirty years

663
00:32:57.319 --> 00:33:00.039
<v Speaker 3>is developers want to do it, but we need to

664
00:33:00.079 --> 00:33:03.359
<v Speaker 3>watch back in the early days, like the early two thousands,

665
00:33:03.400 --> 00:33:06.119
<v Speaker 3>it used to be that security was a future. You'd

666
00:33:06.119 --> 00:33:08.559
<v Speaker 3>have like something in the backlog, we need to implement

667
00:33:08.559 --> 00:33:10.559
<v Speaker 3>this feature, and then there's another ticket saying make sure

668
00:33:10.559 --> 00:33:11.039
<v Speaker 3>it's secure.

669
00:33:11.240 --> 00:33:15.880
<v Speaker 1>I would argue that back then the threats weren't as persistent, pernicious, or.

670
00:33:16.200 --> 00:33:20.079
<v Speaker 3>There was different numerous but you still don't want credit

671
00:33:20.079 --> 00:33:23.039
<v Speaker 3>card data leaked across the internet, like the fact that

672
00:33:23.039 --> 00:33:24.720
<v Speaker 3>it was put in as a separate ticket that could

673
00:33:24.720 --> 00:33:28.880
<v Speaker 3>get pushed to the next sprint was an issue. And

674
00:33:28.960 --> 00:33:31.799
<v Speaker 3>then we started treating security. We realized that was probably

675
00:33:31.799 --> 00:33:35.000
<v Speaker 3>a bad idea because we were separating implementation from the

676
00:33:35.000 --> 00:33:38.960
<v Speaker 3>feature implementation from the security implementation. So we decided to

677
00:33:38.960 --> 00:33:41.759
<v Speaker 3>put it all into one. And the problem with that

678
00:33:41.880 --> 00:33:45.160
<v Speaker 3>is then, whereas before the team had visibility of we're

679
00:33:45.160 --> 00:33:47.240
<v Speaker 3>not doing the security stuff that we should be doing,

680
00:33:47.680 --> 00:33:49.519
<v Speaker 3>now because it was wrapped up into a single ticket,

681
00:33:49.640 --> 00:33:53.559
<v Speaker 3>it became the developers problem because the project manager would

682
00:33:53.559 --> 00:33:55.400
<v Speaker 3>come along on the Thursday morning and say, we need

683
00:33:55.400 --> 00:33:57.160
<v Speaker 3>to get this out by the end of tomorrow, and

684
00:33:57.200 --> 00:33:59.960
<v Speaker 3>you're like, well, I don't have enough time to do

685
00:34:00.079 --> 00:34:02.559
<v Speaker 3>the full ticket. I can do the implementation and leave

686
00:34:02.599 --> 00:34:04.440
<v Speaker 3>the security till later, but now we're not tracking that.

687
00:34:04.759 --> 00:34:07.400
<v Speaker 3>So became invisible that we weren't doing it. So we've

688
00:34:07.400 --> 00:34:08.239
<v Speaker 3>always had a problem.

689
00:34:08.320 --> 00:34:10.360
<v Speaker 2>Right, I can build, I can build a building, but

690
00:34:10.400 --> 00:34:11.719
<v Speaker 2>I can't put a door with a lock on.

691
00:34:12.039 --> 00:34:15.039
<v Speaker 3>Right, I'll get round to it. We'll do that next week.

692
00:34:15.079 --> 00:34:16.960
<v Speaker 3>And then next week they're like, nope, this week is

693
00:34:17.000 --> 00:34:19.760
<v Speaker 3>Windows week. Yeah, yeah, still no locks on the Windows.

694
00:34:20.400 --> 00:34:23.000
<v Speaker 1>So part yeah, part of this is meanwhile, somebody came

695
00:34:23.039 --> 00:34:24.480
<v Speaker 1>in install your hammer.

696
00:34:24.360 --> 00:34:26.840
<v Speaker 2>Right, and it's just so there's also a problem with

697
00:34:26.920 --> 00:34:30.360
<v Speaker 2>the PMS or not prioritizing security there until obviously becomes

698
00:34:30.400 --> 00:34:30.920
<v Speaker 2>a crisis.

699
00:34:31.159 --> 00:34:32.480
<v Speaker 3>So this has been one of the things that I've

700
00:34:32.480 --> 00:34:34.480
<v Speaker 3>tried to do as much as possible with helping developers

701
00:34:34.519 --> 00:34:37.679
<v Speaker 3>understand how to write secure software and the processes to follow.

702
00:34:38.000 --> 00:34:41.559
<v Speaker 3>Is it not just your processes or the engineering team's processes.

703
00:34:41.920 --> 00:34:49.039
<v Speaker 3>It's an institutional understanding, systemic understanding within your organization that

704
00:34:49.159 --> 00:34:51.440
<v Speaker 3>this is important. Get buying from people outside of the

705
00:34:51.440 --> 00:34:55.000
<v Speaker 3>engineering department, not just the outside the engineering team. Because

706
00:34:55.039 --> 00:34:57.559
<v Speaker 3>if if your marketing team and your sales team and

707
00:34:57.599 --> 00:35:00.159
<v Speaker 3>your HR team all no, if we don't do this,

708
00:35:00.159 --> 00:35:02.239
<v Speaker 3>this could be really bad for our pr This could

709
00:35:02.239 --> 00:35:06.280
<v Speaker 3>be something that doesn't allow us to succeed beyond our

710
00:35:06.280 --> 00:35:08.480
<v Speaker 3>competitives over the next few years. But give it to

711
00:35:08.480 --> 00:35:10.920
<v Speaker 3>them in rational terms and say's a lot of that

712
00:35:11.000 --> 00:35:13.039
<v Speaker 3>kind of stuff that we seltare engineers need to do.

713
00:35:13.079 --> 00:35:14.679
<v Speaker 3>We kind of need to push the message up into

714
00:35:14.719 --> 00:35:19.320
<v Speaker 3>the organization because if you don't get buy in, then

715
00:35:19.360 --> 00:35:22.280
<v Speaker 3>there's no understanding of why right, you're spending time on.

716
00:35:22.239 --> 00:35:26.599
<v Speaker 2>That, yeah, and it's yeah, just you can't ship without

717
00:35:26.599 --> 00:35:29.360
<v Speaker 2>this anymore. That you can't. It's like, I guess if

718
00:35:29.360 --> 00:35:30.880
<v Speaker 2>it was if I was in is shoes. It's like,

719
00:35:31.079 --> 00:35:33.480
<v Speaker 2>so you don't actually need me to store the data either, right,

720
00:35:33.599 --> 00:35:38.960
<v Speaker 2>Like that's not important totally. This is These are not features,

721
00:35:39.000 --> 00:35:41.960
<v Speaker 2>This is infrastructure. These are basic things we need to

722
00:35:41.960 --> 00:35:43.920
<v Speaker 2>do before we can do anything else. Well, I guess

723
00:35:44.239 --> 00:35:46.480
<v Speaker 2>you know I've heard you say this line that the

724
00:35:46.480 --> 00:35:49.280
<v Speaker 2>shift left of security is like part of the basic

725
00:35:49.360 --> 00:35:52.840
<v Speaker 2>plumbing of the initial startup of this app includes it's

726
00:35:52.840 --> 00:35:54.599
<v Speaker 2>security totally.

727
00:35:54.719 --> 00:35:56.599
<v Speaker 3>So bringing AI into the picture, it doesn't change that

728
00:35:57.039 --> 00:36:00.320
<v Speaker 3>at all. The way I like to think of AI

729
00:36:00.480 --> 00:36:06.480
<v Speaker 3>as an engineering assistant is I used to describe it

730
00:36:06.519 --> 00:36:08.639
<v Speaker 3>as the junior engineer that you're pair programming with.

731
00:36:08.880 --> 00:36:13.239
<v Speaker 5>That's changing now because we're getting more into like the

732
00:36:13.719 --> 00:36:16.840
<v Speaker 5>ralph loops and the orchestration and all of these kind

733
00:36:16.840 --> 00:36:21.239
<v Speaker 5>of things that allow the LMS in the background to

734
00:36:21.360 --> 00:36:24.400
<v Speaker 5>chug away for hours. We're gaining to the point now

735
00:36:24.400 --> 00:36:30.719
<v Speaker 5>where we're having to make a decision between speed and oversight.

736
00:36:31.599 --> 00:36:33.639
<v Speaker 5>I'm not sufficiently convinced that either way of the moment,

737
00:36:33.679 --> 00:36:37.280
<v Speaker 5>I'm currently personally going for speed because I think they're

738
00:36:37.280 --> 00:36:39.440
<v Speaker 5>bringing guardrails and test suites and all of those, all

739
00:36:39.480 --> 00:36:41.440
<v Speaker 5>of those things that we used to do under the

740
00:36:41.440 --> 00:36:44.920
<v Speaker 5>traditional software development life cycle that the waterflow life cycle,

741
00:36:45.360 --> 00:36:48.840
<v Speaker 5>that kind of got diluted. I don't know if there's

742
00:36:48.840 --> 00:36:50.920
<v Speaker 5>a pan in there somewhere with waterfall, but it got

743
00:36:50.960 --> 00:36:53.920
<v Speaker 5>diluted when we went to more agile, the run fast

744
00:36:53.920 --> 00:36:56.159
<v Speaker 5>and break stuff kind of methodology of the twenty tens,

745
00:36:56.519 --> 00:36:59.280
<v Speaker 5>where we'd write software and it was relatively easy to

746
00:36:59.280 --> 00:37:01.280
<v Speaker 5>go back and change if a client came back with

747
00:37:01.280 --> 00:37:02.199
<v Speaker 5>with a change request.

748
00:37:02.480 --> 00:37:04.000
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, but she also had a tight tight to the

749
00:37:04.039 --> 00:37:06.159
<v Speaker 2>client the whole time. Right, It wasn't just don't have

750
00:37:06.199 --> 00:37:08.599
<v Speaker 2>a plan, It's that the person you're planning with is

751
00:37:08.639 --> 00:37:12.000
<v Speaker 2>sitting beside you, so you have a lot of imput.

752
00:37:11.719 --> 00:37:14.079
<v Speaker 3>Sure, But the problem with this point is all of

753
00:37:14.119 --> 00:37:16.119
<v Speaker 3>the information is now in the heads of two people,

754
00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:19.599
<v Speaker 3>as opposed to documented and understandable. So if we think

755
00:37:19.639 --> 00:37:24.440
<v Speaker 3>of developing with AI the same as it doesn't necessarily

756
00:37:24.519 --> 00:37:26.880
<v Speaker 3>to be enterprise skill software development. But let's say you've

757
00:37:26.880 --> 00:37:28.960
<v Speaker 3>got a team of four people working on a project. Sure,

758
00:37:29.119 --> 00:37:30.880
<v Speaker 3>and one of those team members could be stopped out

759
00:37:30.880 --> 00:37:33.719
<v Speaker 3>for another team member at the drop of hat. And

760
00:37:33.800 --> 00:37:35.840
<v Speaker 3>that's kind of the equivalent of the context window. Right

761
00:37:36.239 --> 00:37:39.079
<v Speaker 3>as soon as the LLLM wipes context window and starts again,

762
00:37:39.119 --> 00:37:41.360
<v Speaker 3>it's like a new developer joining the team. How quickly

763
00:37:41.400 --> 00:37:44.039
<v Speaker 3>can you onboard that developer? And before we had it

764
00:37:44.039 --> 00:37:47.400
<v Speaker 3>in our heads and we were being handheld or handholding

765
00:37:47.559 --> 00:37:52.079
<v Speaker 3>probably bidirectional handholding with a client trying to develop the software.

766
00:37:52.599 --> 00:37:54.880
<v Speaker 3>It was fast because we were able to iterate quickly

767
00:37:54.960 --> 00:37:58.719
<v Speaker 3>because the feedback loop was small, but the documentation and

768
00:37:58.719 --> 00:38:04.360
<v Speaker 3>the persistence of that information was not there. So if

769
00:38:04.360 --> 00:38:07.159
<v Speaker 3>we think about the way we used to write software,

770
00:38:07.159 --> 00:38:10.920
<v Speaker 3>where specifications and understanding the problem was core before you

771
00:38:10.920 --> 00:38:15.079
<v Speaker 3>even started coding, I see a change back to that direction. Yeah,

772
00:38:15.079 --> 00:38:18.719
<v Speaker 3>we're getting specification driven development again, where you write some

773
00:38:18.760 --> 00:38:21.639
<v Speaker 3>really good specs and then you can even use an

774
00:38:21.639 --> 00:38:25.079
<v Speaker 3>element to convert that into an implementation plan and then

775
00:38:25.119 --> 00:38:26.719
<v Speaker 3>you give that implementation plan.

776
00:38:27.400 --> 00:38:29.280
<v Speaker 2>When we have tools like this, right, I get have

777
00:38:29.400 --> 00:38:32.000
<v Speaker 2>spec Kit is literally that, right.

778
00:38:32.320 --> 00:38:35.000
<v Speaker 3>Yeap spec it's great open spec I've been playing with

779
00:38:35.079 --> 00:38:39.840
<v Speaker 3>as well. I actually find nowadays just chatting with Claude

780
00:38:40.719 --> 00:38:42.440
<v Speaker 3>and talking as long as you give it a framework

781
00:38:42.480 --> 00:38:44.079
<v Speaker 3>like this is what I want a specification a file

782
00:38:44.119 --> 00:38:47.119
<v Speaker 3>to look like, and I want specification specification files to

783
00:38:47.119 --> 00:38:50.079
<v Speaker 3>be around the topic of concern as opposed to functional specifications.

784
00:38:51.199 --> 00:38:54.960
<v Speaker 3>You can just chat with an LM directly. A lot

785
00:38:54.960 --> 00:39:00.679
<v Speaker 3>of these frameworks for developing specs are great, but if

786
00:39:00.679 --> 00:39:03.360
<v Speaker 3>somebody wants to get into it and just chat with

787
00:39:03.400 --> 00:39:06.320
<v Speaker 3>Claude for half an hour and then say, now build something,

788
00:39:06.760 --> 00:39:09.480
<v Speaker 3>as long as you're able to define the outcome. And

789
00:39:09.519 --> 00:39:11.960
<v Speaker 3>this is the biggest thing. I'm seeing memes come up

790
00:39:11.960 --> 00:39:14.519
<v Speaker 3>all the time on Facebook and LinkedIn now of like

791
00:39:14.599 --> 00:39:17.960
<v Speaker 3>the four panel cartoon where on the one side you've

792
00:39:17.960 --> 00:39:21.039
<v Speaker 3>got a Vibe code and they're like, build me a game.

793
00:39:21.239 --> 00:39:23.800
<v Speaker 3>That's awesome, and then the next frame is the computer

794
00:39:23.800 --> 00:39:26.440
<v Speaker 3>catches fire. And then on the other side you've got

795
00:39:26.920 --> 00:39:29.920
<v Speaker 3>what this particular cartoon called a Vibe engineer, which is

796
00:39:29.960 --> 00:39:32.079
<v Speaker 3>build me a game that uses this technology on this

797
00:39:32.119 --> 00:39:34.159
<v Speaker 3>platform and web sockets and this and then the other,

798
00:39:34.559 --> 00:39:36.360
<v Speaker 3>and then in the next frame is a functioning app.

799
00:39:36.719 --> 00:39:38.840
<v Speaker 3>The only difference there is the amount of specification and

800
00:39:38.880 --> 00:39:41.400
<v Speaker 3>time taken to put the detail into that specification at

801
00:39:41.400 --> 00:39:42.199
<v Speaker 3>the beginning.

802
00:39:41.880 --> 00:39:44.880
<v Speaker 2>Sure well, and the nice thing is you keep iterating

803
00:39:44.880 --> 00:39:47.119
<v Speaker 2>on this too. You know, I've seen these specs sort

804
00:39:47.119 --> 00:39:49.679
<v Speaker 2>of evolve and make better and better code as we've

805
00:39:49.760 --> 00:39:52.360
<v Speaker 2>learned the limitations of the tools. Although you get to

806
00:39:52.360 --> 00:39:53.800
<v Speaker 2>a certain size of a spec where now you have

807
00:39:53.840 --> 00:39:56.039
<v Speaker 2>to decompose it, like you can only feed so much

808
00:39:56.079 --> 00:39:59.840
<v Speaker 2>data in any given agent. The other piece I've seen is,

809
00:40:00.280 --> 00:40:03.280
<v Speaker 2>and we got this right away, it writes better prs,

810
00:40:03.559 --> 00:40:06.920
<v Speaker 2>it writes better issues like you actually, naturally when you're

811
00:40:06.960 --> 00:40:09.679
<v Speaker 2>using these tools, get better documentation to get someone back

812
00:40:09.760 --> 00:40:12.599
<v Speaker 2>up to speed because so many details are automatically generated.

813
00:40:12.639 --> 00:40:14.639
<v Speaker 2>But just got to get people to actually read that

814
00:40:14.760 --> 00:40:16.960
<v Speaker 2>or have the tool read it too. Like I think

815
00:40:16.960 --> 00:40:18.519
<v Speaker 2>there's probably a lot of insight.

816
00:40:18.239 --> 00:40:21.000
<v Speaker 1>There, but the tool can usually read the source code

817
00:40:21.039 --> 00:40:22.280
<v Speaker 1>and figure things out quickly.

818
00:40:22.440 --> 00:40:25.719
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, but I wonder what you'd learn by reading through

819
00:40:25.719 --> 00:40:29.880
<v Speaker 2>the issues, pull requests and iterations on that that is

820
00:40:29.920 --> 00:40:32.480
<v Speaker 2>deeper than just what the ending code was, Like, what

821
00:40:33.239 --> 00:40:34.920
<v Speaker 2>does the tool struggle with? What do we have to

822
00:40:34.920 --> 00:40:36.840
<v Speaker 2>iterate the most on to be successful?

823
00:40:37.119 --> 00:40:37.840
<v Speaker 3>That would be interesting.

824
00:40:38.079 --> 00:40:40.519
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I just I just feel like we're not that

825
00:40:40.679 --> 00:40:47.239
<v Speaker 2>far away from having an agent that is your penetration tester,

826
00:40:47.639 --> 00:40:50.159
<v Speaker 2>that is your is this app secure? And it gives

827
00:40:50.199 --> 00:40:52.679
<v Speaker 2>you a rating that it actually hammers on the app

828
00:40:52.760 --> 00:40:55.920
<v Speaker 2>and talks about the holes that are in it. Because

829
00:40:55.960 --> 00:40:58.920
<v Speaker 2>this is the sort of meticulousness is what these tools

830
00:40:58.920 --> 00:41:01.920
<v Speaker 2>are actually good at. A friend of mine who's deeply

831
00:41:02.000 --> 00:41:04.360
<v Speaker 2>versus says, it didn't matter how many interns I had,

832
00:41:04.400 --> 00:41:06.599
<v Speaker 2>I could never get a hundred percent code coverage till

833
00:41:06.639 --> 00:41:10.039
<v Speaker 2>I got these tools. Then how to present code coverage

834
00:41:10.079 --> 00:41:12.280
<v Speaker 2>john testing, which is not that difficult to happen, It

835
00:41:12.400 --> 00:41:13.159
<v Speaker 2>just took time.

836
00:41:13.400 --> 00:41:17.440
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, in the beginning, I talked about lllms or in

837
00:41:17.760 --> 00:41:23.199
<v Speaker 1>different AI tools that are finding zero days and writing

838
00:41:23.280 --> 00:41:27.480
<v Speaker 1>exploits for them at an amazing, alarming clip. And you

839
00:41:27.480 --> 00:41:31.840
<v Speaker 1>know it's scary, yes, but you also can think about, well,

840
00:41:31.920 --> 00:41:34.360
<v Speaker 1>let's deploy it on the other side, let's use AI

841
00:41:34.519 --> 00:41:39.280
<v Speaker 1>to to test our constantly test our systems and find

842
00:41:39.280 --> 00:41:41.760
<v Speaker 1>the holes in our systems so that they don't become

843
00:41:41.880 --> 00:41:45.360
<v Speaker 1>zero days. And you know, as a defensive measure.

844
00:41:45.079 --> 00:41:47.639
<v Speaker 2>Find them and fix them. Yeah, find them and fix them,

845
00:41:47.719 --> 00:41:50.320
<v Speaker 2>because consistently the good guys have more resources than the

846
00:41:50.320 --> 00:41:50.880
<v Speaker 2>bad guys.

847
00:41:50.920 --> 00:41:52.880
<v Speaker 1>Anyway, well hopefully so, who knows.

848
00:41:53.199 --> 00:41:57.599
<v Speaker 3>My brain's gone off on a slight tension to this point. Yes,

849
00:41:57.760 --> 00:42:01.159
<v Speaker 3>to let's get the AIS to penetration test and do

850
00:42:01.199 --> 00:42:03.760
<v Speaker 3>all the unit tests and functional tests and all of

851
00:42:03.760 --> 00:42:06.840
<v Speaker 3>those kind of things would be a natural extension anyway.

852
00:42:07.599 --> 00:42:10.159
<v Speaker 3>But as you were saying, let's find the zero days

853
00:42:10.199 --> 00:42:13.960
<v Speaker 3>before the bad actors. Let's call them that find that

854
00:42:15.480 --> 00:42:21.840
<v Speaker 3>open claw and multipook. Can you imagine if you have

855
00:42:21.920 --> 00:42:24.519
<v Speaker 3>open clare running on your machine or a machine that

856
00:42:24.559 --> 00:42:27.920
<v Speaker 3>has access to your code and the backlog and the

857
00:42:27.960 --> 00:42:30.639
<v Speaker 3>decision tree and all of those kind of things, and

858
00:42:30.719 --> 00:42:35.199
<v Speaker 3>one of your penetration agents finds a zero day that

859
00:42:35.239 --> 00:42:38.679
<v Speaker 3>it then fixes in your code, and then open claw

860
00:42:38.800 --> 00:42:42.360
<v Speaker 3>notices this and puts it on multbook saying, hey, one

861
00:42:42.400 --> 00:42:45.000
<v Speaker 3>of our developer agents just found this thing. Isn't that interesting?

862
00:42:45.000 --> 00:42:47.360
<v Speaker 3>And then suddenly all of these agents and there's a

863
00:42:47.440 --> 00:42:50.199
<v Speaker 3>question as to where multipook is actually really what it

864
00:42:50.239 --> 00:42:52.880
<v Speaker 3>purports to be. There's some news articles coming out saying

865
00:42:52.880 --> 00:42:56.199
<v Speaker 3>that it's it's staged. But let's assume that it is

866
00:42:56.239 --> 00:43:00.599
<v Speaker 3>what it purports to be. Now we've got this communication

867
00:43:00.679 --> 00:43:04.840
<v Speaker 3>distitution distribution mechanism for all these agents to learn about

868
00:43:04.960 --> 00:43:05.960
<v Speaker 3>zero days in real.

869
00:43:05.800 --> 00:43:09.079
<v Speaker 2>Time, right like you could be parallelizing the fixes in

870
00:43:09.159 --> 00:43:13.000
<v Speaker 2>a tremendous rate, right, or the attacks like that's the

871
00:43:13.039 --> 00:43:14.880
<v Speaker 2>problem is, like what happens from here?

872
00:43:15.039 --> 00:43:18.239
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it would definitely be both. Can I can I

873
00:43:18.280 --> 00:43:20.480
<v Speaker 3>abuse this before all of the fixes are in?

874
00:43:21.079 --> 00:43:24.400
<v Speaker 2>Probably? Yeah? Yeah, you know, we've always looked for places.

875
00:43:24.960 --> 00:43:28.679
<v Speaker 2>Science fiction has always talked about the superintelligence effect that

876
00:43:28.760 --> 00:43:31.079
<v Speaker 2>at some point these tools get to a place where

877
00:43:31.079 --> 00:43:34.559
<v Speaker 2>they're learning far faster and far more than humans can

878
00:43:34.599 --> 00:43:37.079
<v Speaker 2>and become a super intelligence. It's science fiction, to be clear,

879
00:43:37.599 --> 00:43:40.199
<v Speaker 2>and you know, the reality as we with these lms

880
00:43:40.280 --> 00:43:43.000
<v Speaker 2>is we've largely seen it's all derivative work, even though

881
00:43:43.000 --> 00:43:46.440
<v Speaker 2>it's potentially valuable, Like very few people make it through

882
00:43:46.480 --> 00:43:48.760
<v Speaker 2>the whole checklist of actually securing an app and a

883
00:43:48.840 --> 00:43:51.519
<v Speaker 2>tool would be far more persistent on it than a

884
00:43:51.559 --> 00:43:55.400
<v Speaker 2>person would. All of that is good, but this abil

885
00:43:55.559 --> 00:43:59.760
<v Speaker 2>this drag race of U code being generated, finding vulnerabilities

886
00:43:59.760 --> 00:44:02.400
<v Speaker 2>in it, rippling those fixes out while the attackers are

887
00:44:02.400 --> 00:44:04.920
<v Speaker 2>also running at it like that's a fast iteration cycle.

888
00:44:04.960 --> 00:44:08.519
<v Speaker 2>That means if you're outside of that loop, the software

889
00:44:08.519 --> 00:44:10.119
<v Speaker 2>that's going to come out the other side of being

890
00:44:10.199 --> 00:44:14.280
<v Speaker 2>in that battleground is vastly more secure than the software

891
00:44:14.320 --> 00:44:16.960
<v Speaker 2>that's not it, and it will happen fast. That to

892
00:44:17.000 --> 00:44:19.039
<v Speaker 2>me is the first time I've really felt like that

893
00:44:19.559 --> 00:44:23.280
<v Speaker 2>rush of speed from these tools would actually impact something real.

894
00:44:24.920 --> 00:44:27.239
<v Speaker 2>I never expect these tools to create new knowledge, that's

895
00:44:27.280 --> 00:44:30.960
<v Speaker 2>not what they are, but to press against all the

896
00:44:30.960 --> 00:44:33.960
<v Speaker 2>weaknesses and systems and find them and potentially fix them.

897
00:44:34.320 --> 00:44:35.400
<v Speaker 2>That makes total sense to me.

898
00:44:35.599 --> 00:44:37.800
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it's part of my build loop at the moment.

899
00:44:37.920 --> 00:44:40.559
<v Speaker 3>Is as well as getting it to generate code. I'm

900
00:44:40.599 --> 00:44:44.360
<v Speaker 3>saying right, tests, There's an interesting bit of research that

901
00:44:44.400 --> 00:44:47.400
<v Speaker 3>I'm trying to dig deeper into at the moment. There's

902
00:44:47.599 --> 00:44:52.719
<v Speaker 3>no one hundred percent certainty either way whether LM's writing

903
00:44:52.760 --> 00:44:57.440
<v Speaker 3>tests that test LM generator code is a good thing.

904
00:44:58.360 --> 00:45:04.400
<v Speaker 3>My original hypothesis was that at the the probability of

905
00:45:04.440 --> 00:45:09.639
<v Speaker 3>an LM writing a test that passes against code that

906
00:45:09.679 --> 00:45:12.920
<v Speaker 3>does the wrong thing, Yeah, is quite low. It turns

907
00:45:12.920 --> 00:45:15.519
<v Speaker 3>out it isn't actually that low. Yeah, It's around about

908
00:45:15.519 --> 00:45:16.960
<v Speaker 3>forty percent from some of the stuff that I was

909
00:45:16.960 --> 00:45:18.440
<v Speaker 3>looking into. So we still need to be careful about

910
00:45:18.440 --> 00:45:20.840
<v Speaker 3>who's writing the tests and how do we validate those.

911
00:45:20.679 --> 00:45:23.280
<v Speaker 2>Sure, the same way we feel about any code it generates,

912
00:45:23.320 --> 00:45:25.280
<v Speaker 2>Like the number of times that I get code generated,

913
00:45:25.320 --> 00:45:27.440
<v Speaker 2>that's right, the first time is very low. But how

914
00:45:27.440 --> 00:45:30.800
<v Speaker 2>many times do you generate test code and never go

915
00:45:30.840 --> 00:45:32.000
<v Speaker 2>past the initial iteration?

916
00:45:32.480 --> 00:45:34.360
<v Speaker 3>Well, ideally, why would you expect it to be any

917
00:45:34.519 --> 00:45:36.360
<v Speaker 3>iterating on your code. If you're using an AI to

918
00:45:36.480 --> 00:45:38.519
<v Speaker 3>iterate your code, you would have them iterate your tests

919
00:45:38.559 --> 00:45:41.840
<v Speaker 3>as well. Yeah, And I think the reason why I

920
00:45:41.880 --> 00:45:44.320
<v Speaker 3>was hoping that it would be a lower chance of

921
00:45:44.320 --> 00:45:47.239
<v Speaker 3>that going wrong than it might actually be is because

922
00:45:47.280 --> 00:45:50.280
<v Speaker 3>it's not just like the LM is not going to

923
00:45:50.280 --> 00:45:52.639
<v Speaker 3>write a test that tests the wrong thing and then

924
00:45:52.679 --> 00:45:54.880
<v Speaker 3>write code to satisfy the test, because it has a

925
00:45:54.920 --> 00:45:57.639
<v Speaker 3>whole lot of extra context in there part of the

926
00:45:57.679 --> 00:46:01.960
<v Speaker 3>test or the testing quotes. Also, does it meet the

927
00:46:01.960 --> 00:46:06.679
<v Speaker 3>requirement of the specs, does it meet my programming objectives

928
00:46:06.679 --> 00:46:09.400
<v Speaker 3>like the overall system prompt of being a helpful coding

929
00:46:09.400 --> 00:46:11.960
<v Speaker 3>a system that writes secure code, Like, there's all sorts

930
00:46:11.960 --> 00:46:13.679
<v Speaker 3>of other stuff that goes into it other than just

931
00:46:13.760 --> 00:46:15.880
<v Speaker 3>does it pass the test that I think that it's

932
00:46:15.920 --> 00:46:19.679
<v Speaker 3>going to sway it more towards not necessarily good quality code,

933
00:46:19.840 --> 00:46:24.280
<v Speaker 3>but does what it's supposed to do in the closest

934
00:46:24.280 --> 00:46:27.119
<v Speaker 3>possible to the best way with as few issues as possible.

935
00:46:27.199 --> 00:46:29.079
<v Speaker 2>Well, part of what you're writing out in that prompt

936
00:46:29.119 --> 00:46:31.679
<v Speaker 2>is what quality code means to you, right, and part

937
00:46:31.679 --> 00:46:33.199
<v Speaker 2>of that is secure code.

938
00:46:33.280 --> 00:46:35.639
<v Speaker 3>Right, and they'll be bad. There's a whole lot of

939
00:46:35.679 --> 00:46:38.880
<v Speaker 3>prompts that get sent to whichever coding agent of choice

940
00:46:38.920 --> 00:46:40.719
<v Speaker 3>you're using that you don't even see. So if you're

941
00:46:40.760 --> 00:46:44.119
<v Speaker 3>using code or open code or code X or any

942
00:46:44.159 --> 00:46:46.039
<v Speaker 3>of these, they will have their own prompts built in

943
00:46:46.679 --> 00:46:50.079
<v Speaker 3>that kind of set up the infrom server to understand

944
00:46:50.119 --> 00:46:53.599
<v Speaker 3>the perspective of the following request. And then that request

945
00:46:53.599 --> 00:46:58.559
<v Speaker 3>will be your code base, your specifications files, anything that

946
00:46:58.599 --> 00:47:02.880
<v Speaker 3>you write into, like your actual message. All these kind

947
00:47:02.920 --> 00:47:05.280
<v Speaker 3>of things get added into the context. But there is

948
00:47:06.119 --> 00:47:10.159
<v Speaker 3>a large chunk of context, I say large. Claud code

949
00:47:10.199 --> 00:47:15.679
<v Speaker 3>by default sins about seventeen k of context before anything

950
00:47:15.719 --> 00:47:16.960
<v Speaker 3>in your code base or anything.

951
00:47:17.039 --> 00:47:20.320
<v Speaker 1>Wow, that's a lot, right, But it has to be.

952
00:47:21.000 --> 00:47:22.920
<v Speaker 3>It has to be because it's setting the scene.

953
00:47:23.039 --> 00:47:23.199
<v Speaker 2>Right.

954
00:47:23.280 --> 00:47:26.239
<v Speaker 3>Here's here's what Claude wants you to do, or what

955
00:47:26.400 --> 00:47:29.639
<v Speaker 3>Anthropic want Claude to do, and then here's the context

956
00:47:29.639 --> 00:47:32.079
<v Speaker 3>of the ACRO application. So there's extra stuff in there

957
00:47:32.079 --> 00:47:34.599
<v Speaker 3>that is extra guardrails and extra safety.

958
00:47:34.320 --> 00:47:38.920
<v Speaker 2>Right, and then most sophisticated AI tool user I see

959
00:47:38.920 --> 00:47:41.880
<v Speaker 2>now have a prefix set ahead of their particular project

960
00:47:42.159 --> 00:47:45.320
<v Speaker 2>specs as well that are more guidelines, so guidelines on

961
00:47:45.400 --> 00:47:48.000
<v Speaker 2>top of guidelines or toper guidelines before we even start

962
00:47:48.000 --> 00:47:50.559
<v Speaker 2>talking about and this is what you're making in this iteration.

963
00:47:51.440 --> 00:47:53.480
<v Speaker 3>And we're surprised that when we come to the end

964
00:47:53.480 --> 00:47:54.960
<v Speaker 3>of all of that and all we've written is one

965
00:47:55.039 --> 00:48:00.320
<v Speaker 3>line saying fix this bug, and it's forgotten everything else

966
00:48:00.360 --> 00:48:02.760
<v Speaker 3>before because the context windows kind of strolled way past,

967
00:48:02.800 --> 00:48:05.360
<v Speaker 3>and it's right, it's in a rearview mirror some way.

968
00:48:05.639 --> 00:48:07.760
<v Speaker 2>I banged into this with home my home Assistant instance

969
00:48:07.800 --> 00:48:11.159
<v Speaker 2>the other day, where I was still using three or

970
00:48:11.400 --> 00:48:13.840
<v Speaker 2>you know, three plus, and the context win was like

971
00:48:13.880 --> 00:48:18.000
<v Speaker 2>sixteen K and the specification of my homes system instance

972
00:48:18.000 --> 00:48:21.000
<v Speaker 2>now is nineteen K, so literally I could do nothing.

973
00:48:21.039 --> 00:48:22.719
<v Speaker 2>I had to move up to four to get a

974
00:48:22.800 --> 00:48:25.159
<v Speaker 2>sixty four K context window just to have anything work.

975
00:48:25.360 --> 00:48:26.880
<v Speaker 2>And at the same time I was sitting back and going,

976
00:48:27.119 --> 00:48:31.079
<v Speaker 2>why is this so big? Like this is not efficient,

977
00:48:31.519 --> 00:48:34.880
<v Speaker 2>Like all of this fields a remarkably inefficient. Shouldn't we

978
00:48:35.000 --> 00:48:39.519
<v Speaker 2>be narrowing the scope of these llms architecturally, not just

979
00:48:39.599 --> 00:48:42.000
<v Speaker 2>by prompts every single time we call them. Like, no,

980
00:48:42.079 --> 00:48:43.239
<v Speaker 2>wonder we're wasting so much.

981
00:48:43.280 --> 00:48:47.559
<v Speaker 1>Another reason we should be running local inference engines. Yeah,

982
00:48:47.599 --> 00:48:50.320
<v Speaker 1>and that's totally that's where we're going. Yeah, I think so,

983
00:48:50.480 --> 00:48:51.679
<v Speaker 1>and it won't be an issue.

984
00:48:51.760 --> 00:48:54.440
<v Speaker 2>I just feel like we're still mailing two broader models.

985
00:48:54.920 --> 00:48:57.639
<v Speaker 2>I know. I lived through the OLAP revolution, and every

986
00:48:57.639 --> 00:49:00.440
<v Speaker 2>time we did a data analytics cube or you come

987
00:49:00.559 --> 00:49:02.960
<v Speaker 2>the first time you started with the mother of all cubes,

988
00:49:03.559 --> 00:49:06.760
<v Speaker 2>and it was never useful other than instructional for what

989
00:49:06.840 --> 00:49:10.079
<v Speaker 2>to make next that it was far more important to

990
00:49:10.320 --> 00:49:12.719
<v Speaker 2>de scope that make a smaller one once you get

991
00:49:12.719 --> 00:49:16.039
<v Speaker 2>that initial explore and everything I look at so far

992
00:49:16.119 --> 00:49:17.960
<v Speaker 2>in this is like we're still building mother all cubes

993
00:49:18.000 --> 00:49:20.639
<v Speaker 2>every time and then and then fighting to scope it

994
00:49:20.679 --> 00:49:23.000
<v Speaker 2>down to the work we actually need to do, rather

995
00:49:23.039 --> 00:49:25.679
<v Speaker 2>than start with something that's tuned to the work. Totally.

996
00:49:26.440 --> 00:49:31.360
<v Speaker 3>I'm wondering whether we're going to get roughly stack shaped

997
00:49:31.760 --> 00:49:34.559
<v Speaker 3>small language models. Yeah, because the LM we use for

998
00:49:34.599 --> 00:49:38.119
<v Speaker 3>coding knows everything about cobol and Java and c shop

999
00:49:38.199 --> 00:49:41.480
<v Speaker 3>and PHP and javascripting. I don't need all of those, No,

1000
00:49:41.639 --> 00:49:43.480
<v Speaker 3>Can I get one that just does what I need to.

1001
00:49:43.960 --> 00:49:46.239
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, the three languages you're doing in this app at

1002
00:49:46.239 --> 00:49:48.599
<v Speaker 2>this time, and the architecture that you care about, like,

1003
00:49:48.800 --> 00:49:52.119
<v Speaker 2>just scope it down. I got a feeling a few

1004
00:49:52.159 --> 00:49:53.960
<v Speaker 2>years now we're going to be talking about an LM

1005
00:49:54.039 --> 00:49:56.320
<v Speaker 2>specific to an app. Yeah, that the more mature and

1006
00:49:56.400 --> 00:49:59.800
<v Speaker 2>application is, the better this tool is at making modifications

1007
00:49:59.840 --> 00:50:02.199
<v Speaker 2>to right, because it Yeah, ultimately the tool is going

1008
00:50:02.239 --> 00:50:03.800
<v Speaker 2>to know more about how the software was built than

1009
00:50:03.840 --> 00:50:06.280
<v Speaker 2>any person. Right, Those people are all gone, right, like,

1010
00:50:06.320 --> 00:50:08.159
<v Speaker 2>look at any mature piece of software that we have

1011
00:50:08.239 --> 00:50:08.760
<v Speaker 2>that problem.

1012
00:50:09.079 --> 00:50:12.280
<v Speaker 1>But these tools, well, that's if the tool was that's

1013
00:50:12.320 --> 00:50:14.519
<v Speaker 1>if the tool was stayful though, but it's not. It's

1014
00:50:14.599 --> 00:50:17.079
<v Speaker 1>like Groundhog Day. Every time you talk to it. You

1015
00:50:17.119 --> 00:50:19.239
<v Speaker 1>have to give it the context, as you were saying.

1016
00:50:19.039 --> 00:50:23.280
<v Speaker 3>But that's that's just the context, the underlying model that

1017
00:50:23.320 --> 00:50:25.119
<v Speaker 3>the context we do is then pass through in order

1018
00:50:25.159 --> 00:50:27.639
<v Speaker 3>to create the apport response can still be made a

1019
00:50:27.679 --> 00:50:28.559
<v Speaker 3>lot smaller.

1020
00:50:28.320 --> 00:50:29.960
<v Speaker 1>Right, but it's not going to know anything about your

1021
00:50:30.000 --> 00:50:32.440
<v Speaker 1>app unless that's built into the model or you use

1022
00:50:32.519 --> 00:50:36.440
<v Speaker 1>RAG or something like that, right, or it can just

1023
00:50:36.519 --> 00:50:38.639
<v Speaker 1>see what it sees every time.

1024
00:50:38.719 --> 00:50:40.880
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean my assumption was that Richard was saying

1025
00:50:40.880 --> 00:50:42.559
<v Speaker 3>that you would take that code base and then train

1026
00:50:42.599 --> 00:50:42.920
<v Speaker 3>them all.

1027
00:50:43.480 --> 00:50:46.519
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, okay, train into it. Yeah, and that because again

1028
00:50:46.599 --> 00:50:49.039
<v Speaker 2>it's like I'm just trying to narrow the scope. Like

1029
00:50:49.519 --> 00:50:51.199
<v Speaker 2>if you know, one of the things you learn about

1030
00:50:51.199 --> 00:50:53.119
<v Speaker 2>third version of an app is we're not introducing in

1031
00:50:53.159 --> 00:50:56.679
<v Speaker 2>that language. Thanks, right, Like that, the bar for new

1032
00:50:56.760 --> 00:50:59.159
<v Speaker 2>architecture or any of that, it gets really really high.

1033
00:50:59.280 --> 00:51:01.039
<v Speaker 2>We have a known set are patterns that work for

1034
00:51:01.079 --> 00:51:03.440
<v Speaker 2>this app, and the making changes in those patterns are easy,

1035
00:51:03.639 --> 00:51:06.199
<v Speaker 2>and anything outside of that pattern is a heavy left.

1036
00:51:07.000 --> 00:51:09.639
<v Speaker 3>So here's another thing I've been wondering, why do we

1037
00:51:09.679 --> 00:51:10.920
<v Speaker 3>care about which language we use?

1038
00:51:11.159 --> 00:51:11.440
<v Speaker 2>Ah?

1039
00:51:11.480 --> 00:51:13.320
<v Speaker 3>Well, that's and this has been something people have been

1040
00:51:13.320 --> 00:51:16.159
<v Speaker 3>talking about already. Isn't something new, But why not just

1041
00:51:16.199 --> 00:51:17.639
<v Speaker 3>have a same carriage model that only?

1042
00:51:17.960 --> 00:51:18.480
<v Speaker 2>But why?

1043
00:51:18.760 --> 00:51:20.880
<v Speaker 1>I think, Well, because I need to be able to

1044
00:51:20.920 --> 00:51:24.360
<v Speaker 1>read and verify the code that gets published today, the

1045
00:51:24.440 --> 00:51:25.639
<v Speaker 1>last chain in the link.

1046
00:51:25.639 --> 00:51:28.559
<v Speaker 3>Today, in the chain, I would not be surprised. I

1047
00:51:28.559 --> 00:51:31.519
<v Speaker 3>still remember when like twenty twenty three AI has just

1048
00:51:31.519 --> 00:51:33.320
<v Speaker 3>come out, Everyone's like this is going to take away

1049
00:51:33.360 --> 00:51:35.519
<v Speaker 3>all the developers' jobs, and people are like, you know what,

1050
00:51:36.000 --> 00:51:38.079
<v Speaker 3>in five years time, this is going to be writing

1051
00:51:38.079 --> 00:51:41.519
<v Speaker 3>software for us, and I'm like, give it one or

1052
00:51:41.519 --> 00:51:44.079
<v Speaker 3>two well or two years later. It's writing all the

1053
00:51:44.079 --> 00:51:45.960
<v Speaker 3>code for us. So if when I'm thinking, you know what,

1054
00:51:46.000 --> 00:51:47.960
<v Speaker 3>in five years time, maybe it'll be good, you know,

1055
00:51:48.039 --> 00:51:51.119
<v Speaker 3>for taking human written specs by somebody who doesn't under

1056
00:51:51.199 --> 00:51:53.400
<v Speaker 3>understand architecture and write software that works.

1057
00:51:53.800 --> 00:51:54.639
<v Speaker 1>It's already happening.

1058
00:51:54.719 --> 00:51:58.480
<v Speaker 3>I reckon it'll be two or three years, maybe even

1059
00:51:58.559 --> 00:51:59.519
<v Speaker 3>by the end of twenty six.

1060
00:51:59.719 --> 00:52:01.280
<v Speaker 1>But it's already happening.

1061
00:52:01.320 --> 00:52:02.480
<v Speaker 2>Isn't that You.

1062
00:52:02.480 --> 00:52:05.559
<v Speaker 3>Still need to know enough about the code that I'm writing.

1063
00:52:05.719 --> 00:52:08.880
<v Speaker 3>I still need to handhold it after the loop. So

1064
00:52:08.920 --> 00:52:10.960
<v Speaker 3>I will build some really good specs. I'll get it

1065
00:52:11.000 --> 00:52:13.239
<v Speaker 3>to run for three, five, seven hours whatever, well not

1066
00:52:13.400 --> 00:52:18.239
<v Speaker 3>seven because token Windows, and I'll get back to it

1067
00:52:18.280 --> 00:52:20.960
<v Speaker 3>and it's ninety nine percent there. I'm happy with the code.

1068
00:52:21.000 --> 00:52:23.280
<v Speaker 3>It doesn't quite do what I wanted. Maybe it misunderstood

1069
00:52:23.280 --> 00:52:28.400
<v Speaker 3>a requirement. Maybe it didn't write a test that would

1070
00:52:28.440 --> 00:52:32.199
<v Speaker 3>make sure that the doc container was restarted. There's something missing.

1071
00:52:32.280 --> 00:52:35.280
<v Speaker 3>It hasn't done a perfect job. It's not hard for

1072
00:52:35.320 --> 00:52:37.760
<v Speaker 3>me to fix because I have a software engineering mind,

1073
00:52:38.360 --> 00:52:40.679
<v Speaker 3>but my mom wouldn't be able to fix that. I

1074
00:52:40.719 --> 00:52:41.800
<v Speaker 3>think in a year or two.

1075
00:52:41.840 --> 00:52:43.320
<v Speaker 1>Now would you want your mom to fix that?

1076
00:52:43.760 --> 00:52:46.599
<v Speaker 3>Why wouldn't you? Why would you not want any human

1077
00:52:46.599 --> 00:52:47.960
<v Speaker 3>in the world to build? Say I want a piece

1078
00:52:48.000 --> 00:52:49.800
<v Speaker 3>of software that's going to do this for me, and

1079
00:52:49.840 --> 00:52:52.320
<v Speaker 3>the software goes, okay, here I am. I think that's

1080
00:52:52.320 --> 00:52:52.920
<v Speaker 3>where we're heading.

1081
00:52:53.079 --> 00:52:55.679
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, of course, yeah, that's where that's we're not.

1082
00:52:55.760 --> 00:52:58.079
<v Speaker 2>That's where the club at really spoke to us, as

1083
00:52:58.119 --> 00:53:00.000
<v Speaker 2>everybody wants their own software around them.

1084
00:53:00.280 --> 00:53:02.000
<v Speaker 3>And at that point we don't care about the language.

1085
00:53:02.079 --> 00:53:05.280
<v Speaker 3>So now we can have a small language model that

1086
00:53:05.760 --> 00:53:10.760
<v Speaker 3>understands three or four core languages. Maybe we've got typescript, GO,

1087
00:53:11.840 --> 00:53:13.840
<v Speaker 3>a couple of others that kind of round out the

1088
00:53:13.840 --> 00:53:16.519
<v Speaker 3>whole ecosystem of what you might need, and then you

1089
00:53:16.559 --> 00:53:19.920
<v Speaker 3>don't need to get just compress it down and nobody

1090
00:53:19.960 --> 00:53:25.079
<v Speaker 3>will ever write Java, Cobal or PHP or again except

1091
00:53:25.079 --> 00:53:25.800
<v Speaker 3>for the hobbyists.

1092
00:53:26.320 --> 00:53:30.039
<v Speaker 2>Even those contemporary languages are really about the modern architectures

1093
00:53:30.239 --> 00:53:32.599
<v Speaker 2>and having you sort of fall into the pit of success.

1094
00:53:32.679 --> 00:53:34.559
<v Speaker 2>None of that means anything. Maybe all this stuff's going

1095
00:53:34.559 --> 00:53:36.480
<v Speaker 2>to be written and see when it's generated. Sure, just

1096
00:53:36.639 --> 00:53:38.440
<v Speaker 2>as fast as bare metal as you wanted to do

1097
00:53:38.719 --> 00:53:42.800
<v Speaker 2>directly an assembly right into assembly core processor specifically, what

1098
00:53:42.840 --> 00:53:45.440
<v Speaker 2>do you care get as much performance out of it

1099
00:53:45.480 --> 00:53:48.880
<v Speaker 2>as you can. You know, the ultimate tester is the user.

1100
00:53:49.039 --> 00:53:50.960
<v Speaker 2>User accept the testing is ultimately what it matters. And

1101
00:53:51.000 --> 00:53:52.519
<v Speaker 2>one thing the user doesn't look at is any of

1102
00:53:52.519 --> 00:53:55.199
<v Speaker 2>the code. So if the app does what it's supposed

1103
00:53:55.239 --> 00:53:57.079
<v Speaker 2>to do, does any of that matter?

1104
00:53:57.239 --> 00:53:59.440
<v Speaker 3>And even to that extent before the user is using it.

1105
00:53:59.639 --> 00:54:03.280
<v Speaker 3>My my process of the moment is it installs Playwright,

1106
00:54:03.719 --> 00:54:06.880
<v Speaker 3>it has a headless browser like it's testing the user

1107
00:54:06.920 --> 00:54:08.519
<v Speaker 3>experience before I look at it.

1108
00:54:08.519 --> 00:54:10.280
<v Speaker 2>It's operating it as if it was the user.

1109
00:54:10.360 --> 00:54:13.519
<v Speaker 1>Personally. That future scares the shit out of me. It does,

1110
00:54:13.800 --> 00:54:15.920
<v Speaker 1>just because of the loss of control and the loss

1111
00:54:15.960 --> 00:54:19.239
<v Speaker 1>of checks and balances in the absolute faith that you

1112
00:54:19.320 --> 00:54:21.880
<v Speaker 1>have and the AI to do the right thing, all

1113
00:54:21.920 --> 00:54:24.360
<v Speaker 1>of those reasons, the security.

1114
00:54:23.920 --> 00:54:25.920
<v Speaker 3>To be honest, I'm with you. I'm with you on that.

1115
00:54:26.000 --> 00:54:28.159
<v Speaker 3>It is scary. I don't know whether or not I

1116
00:54:28.360 --> 00:54:30.960
<v Speaker 3>like it. But if I take a step back and

1117
00:54:31.000 --> 00:54:33.679
<v Speaker 3>pragmatically look at where this is going as an industry

1118
00:54:33.679 --> 00:54:37.199
<v Speaker 3>and society is going with AI, I think it's somewhat inevitable.

1119
00:54:37.400 --> 00:54:38.840
<v Speaker 1>If she had a heart attack, he went to the

1120
00:54:38.840 --> 00:54:40.920
<v Speaker 1>hospital and the doctor says, we're going to install this

1121
00:54:40.960 --> 00:54:43.519
<v Speaker 1>new AI created pacemaker.

1122
00:54:43.639 --> 00:54:45.199
<v Speaker 3>Has it gone through the same testing, but a human

1123
00:54:45.239 --> 00:54:47.599
<v Speaker 3>created pacemaker has to go through Yeah? If so, And

1124
00:54:47.639 --> 00:54:48.239
<v Speaker 3>it's how I fail.

1125
00:54:48.320 --> 00:54:49.800
<v Speaker 1>Well, you know they're going to tell you. They're going

1126
00:54:49.840 --> 00:54:51.840
<v Speaker 1>to tell you everything is just wonderful and it's so

1127
00:54:51.920 --> 00:54:53.119
<v Speaker 1>much better than everything else.

1128
00:54:53.239 --> 00:54:55.400
<v Speaker 2>Well, they do they do? Anyway? Why would you know

1129
00:54:55.480 --> 00:54:57.599
<v Speaker 2>one way or the other? Sure? In fact, why are

1130
00:54:57.599 --> 00:54:59.239
<v Speaker 2>they even telling you anything other We're going to fix

1131
00:54:59.280 --> 00:54:59.880
<v Speaker 2>your heart today.

1132
00:55:00.039 --> 00:55:02.800
<v Speaker 1>What I'm saying is Okay, maybe that's a bad idea,

1133
00:55:02.920 --> 00:55:06.000
<v Speaker 1>but how about you know, you go to buy a car,

1134
00:55:06.199 --> 00:55:09.280
<v Speaker 1>or you go to do just something that's critical right?

1135
00:55:09.960 --> 00:55:12.400
<v Speaker 1>And oh no, humans were involved in the in the

1136
00:55:12.480 --> 00:55:15.320
<v Speaker 1>creation and making of this. This was completely done by

1137
00:55:15.400 --> 00:55:16.800
<v Speaker 1>AI and robots or whatever.

1138
00:55:17.199 --> 00:55:18.920
<v Speaker 3>It's why I give it a one to two year

1139
00:55:18.960 --> 00:55:22.440
<v Speaker 3>back because this isn't going to happen until we have

1140
00:55:22.800 --> 00:55:29.519
<v Speaker 3>enough evidence, whether that's testable or just through somewhat anecdotal,

1141
00:55:29.599 --> 00:55:32.960
<v Speaker 3>like self driving cars for example. Yeah, once we know

1142
00:55:33.199 --> 00:55:35.719
<v Speaker 3>that they're less likely to kill somebody than a human,

1143
00:55:35.760 --> 00:55:38.119
<v Speaker 3>which I think we're already at that point, then there

1144
00:55:38.159 --> 00:55:44.119
<v Speaker 3>will become mainstream adoptable an AI driven or AI created pacemaker.

1145
00:55:44.239 --> 00:55:47.039
<v Speaker 3>Maybe not right now, but once they've been around enough

1146
00:55:47.039 --> 00:55:50.559
<v Speaker 3>and tested in the right kind of control group environs

1147
00:55:50.960 --> 00:55:53.719
<v Speaker 3>to be shown to be as effective, if not safer,

1148
00:55:53.760 --> 00:55:57.599
<v Speaker 3>than human created ones, then it'll have to be. Society

1149
00:55:57.639 --> 00:56:03.000
<v Speaker 3>will adopt it eventually. But if it happened tomorrow, then

1150
00:56:03.039 --> 00:56:05.320
<v Speaker 3>maybe not. But that's because I don't think it's that yet.

1151
00:56:05.440 --> 00:56:09.000
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there's great Harvard Studies says, the more you understand

1152
00:56:09.000 --> 00:56:12.559
<v Speaker 2>about these technologies, less you trust them, so the most

1153
00:56:12.800 --> 00:56:15.840
<v Speaker 2>are also the most ignorant. Right, yes, right, we're all

1154
00:56:15.880 --> 00:56:22.000
<v Speaker 2>in this far enough that we're concerned for very clear reasons, right, yeah, right.

1155
00:56:23.480 --> 00:56:25.199
<v Speaker 1>And by the way, if you don't know open Claude

1156
00:56:25.239 --> 00:56:27.039
<v Speaker 1>is you haven't been paying attention to the news. It's

1157
00:56:27.480 --> 00:56:31.320
<v Speaker 1>open c l A W D D. And then it

1158
00:56:31.360 --> 00:56:34.119
<v Speaker 1>became molt. What's that it was?

1159
00:56:34.159 --> 00:56:38.199
<v Speaker 3>It was Claude bought with a W before it was

1160
00:56:38.199 --> 00:56:40.480
<v Speaker 3>open claw. Yeah, so its clawed with a D.

1161
00:56:40.800 --> 00:56:40.960
<v Speaker 2>Right.

1162
00:56:41.000 --> 00:56:44.159
<v Speaker 3>Then it became multipot multipot and then then open claw

1163
00:56:44.280 --> 00:56:45.239
<v Speaker 3>without the D at the end.

1164
00:56:45.400 --> 00:56:46.880
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, okay, but it's uh.

1165
00:56:47.239 --> 00:56:49.679
<v Speaker 2>I've included the show links. If folks haven't seen it,

1166
00:56:49.760 --> 00:56:50.519
<v Speaker 2>go to take a look.

1167
00:56:50.679 --> 00:56:54.159
<v Speaker 1>It's basically a tool that connects to multiple APIs and

1168
00:56:54.239 --> 00:56:57.800
<v Speaker 1>things and integrates with your multiple agents. And you know, if.

1169
00:56:57.760 --> 00:57:00.480
<v Speaker 2>You're ready to give away your keys to piece of

1170
00:57:00.519 --> 00:57:03.079
<v Speaker 2>software like this is supposed to be a security show,

1171
00:57:03.119 --> 00:57:05.559
<v Speaker 2>so let's talk about the least possible secure that you

1172
00:57:05.599 --> 00:57:06.000
<v Speaker 2>could do.

1173
00:57:06.119 --> 00:57:09.239
<v Speaker 1>Well, that's that's the cautionary tale right there.

1174
00:57:09.239 --> 00:57:13.119
<v Speaker 2>Right, But for the average mortal, for the productivity benefit

1175
00:57:13.159 --> 00:57:16.559
<v Speaker 2>that these tools provide, Like, what they're really showing you

1176
00:57:16.880 --> 00:57:18.719
<v Speaker 2>is what the potential is stuff is.

1177
00:57:19.079 --> 00:57:21.800
<v Speaker 3>This is the AI we were promised. Yeah, this is jovis.

1178
00:57:21.840 --> 00:57:25.280
<v Speaker 2>That's the that's their pitch. The only problem is it's

1179
00:57:25.400 --> 00:57:27.920
<v Speaker 2>really scary to trust it, and most people aren't qualified

1180
00:57:27.960 --> 00:57:29.960
<v Speaker 2>to assess that trust in the first place. So right,

1181
00:57:30.079 --> 00:57:32.320
<v Speaker 2>we're going to have some bad fallouts from this yet.

1182
00:57:32.440 --> 00:57:34.440
<v Speaker 2>But the rest of us, I think again, we're I

1183
00:57:34.440 --> 00:57:36.400
<v Speaker 2>think we're experienced. Now we're all looking at going he

1184
00:57:36.519 --> 00:57:40.079
<v Speaker 2>know this is cool? You go first? Yeah, I see.

1185
00:57:42.079 --> 00:57:44.800
<v Speaker 3>Pretty much talking. Which I do have a laptop that

1186
00:57:44.840 --> 00:57:48.000
<v Speaker 3>I've wiped recently that will be getting open Chloor installed

1187
00:57:48.039 --> 00:57:51.639
<v Speaker 3>on it. It'll be put onto my isolated IoT network

1188
00:57:51.719 --> 00:57:53.440
<v Speaker 3>and it will not have access to my credit cards

1189
00:57:53.519 --> 00:57:55.239
<v Speaker 3>or one password yeah.

1190
00:57:55.239 --> 00:57:57.880
<v Speaker 1>Plan good. Let us know how that goes for you.

1191
00:57:58.119 --> 00:57:59.079
<v Speaker 2>I will nice all.

1192
00:57:59.000 --> 00:58:00.760
<v Speaker 3>Right, yeah, if you never hear from me again, it

1193
00:58:00.840 --> 00:58:01.599
<v Speaker 3>went very badly.

1194
00:58:05.159 --> 00:58:08.760
<v Speaker 1>Get a phone call. I don't know where I am.

1195
00:58:08.880 --> 00:58:10.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm in a phone booth somewhere.

1196
00:58:10.599 --> 00:58:13.159
<v Speaker 3>Very lawnmore man, I thought I were gonna say open

1197
00:58:13.199 --> 00:58:17.000
<v Speaker 3>CLO was going to call you. I am Ben.

1198
00:58:17.679 --> 00:58:24.679
<v Speaker 1>There you go nine wait a call back. Oh Ben.

1199
00:58:24.719 --> 00:58:26.440
<v Speaker 1>It's been such pleasure talking to you. I wish we

1200
00:58:26.480 --> 00:58:28.840
<v Speaker 1>could talk more, and I'm sure we're going to in

1201
00:58:28.880 --> 00:58:29.599
<v Speaker 1>the future.

1202
00:58:29.320 --> 00:58:29.960
<v Speaker 2>When you come back.

1203
00:58:30.719 --> 00:58:31.360
<v Speaker 3>Thanks for having me.

1204
00:58:31.400 --> 00:58:34.199
<v Speaker 1>Thank you, and we'll talk to you, dear listener next

1205
00:58:34.199 --> 00:58:57.559
<v Speaker 1>time on dot net rocks. Dot net Rocks is brought

1206
00:58:57.599 --> 00:59:01.000
<v Speaker 1>to you by Franklin's Net and produced by Pop Studios,

1207
00:59:01.400 --> 00:59:05.440
<v Speaker 1>a full service audio, video and post production facility located

1208
00:59:05.440 --> 00:59:08.360
<v Speaker 1>physically in New London, Connecticut, and of course in the

1209
00:59:08.440 --> 00:59:13.519
<v Speaker 1>cloud online at pwop dot com. Visit our website at

1210
00:59:13.559 --> 00:59:15.400
<v Speaker 1>d O T N E, t R O c k

1211
00:59:15.679 --> 00:59:20.480
<v Speaker 1>S dot com for RSS feeds, downloads, mobile apps, comments,

1212
00:59:20.800 --> 00:59:23.320
<v Speaker 1>and access to the full archives going back to show

1213
00:59:23.400 --> 00:59:27.119
<v Speaker 1>number one, recorded in September two thousand and two, and

1214
00:59:27.239 --> 00:59:29.639
<v Speaker 1>make sure you check out our sponsors. They keep us

1215
00:59:29.639 --> 00:59:33.119
<v Speaker 1>in business. Now, go write some code. See you next time.

1216
00:59:34.039 --> 00:59:37.960
<v Speaker 2>You got Jack, Middle Vans and