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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's unpack this. Have you ever picked up a

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<v Speaker 1>tool that seems straightforward at first glance, like a simple

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<v Speaker 1>multi tool, only to discover it can well build an

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<v Speaker 1>entire house or maybe even a city.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh huh.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, today we're taking a deep dive into end map,

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<v Speaker 1>a tool in cybersecurity that's far more powerful than most realize.

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<v Speaker 1>It's often misunderstood as just a basic port scanner, but

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<v Speaker 1>it's truly a precision instrument for gaining profound insight into

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<v Speaker 1>systems and networks.

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<v Speaker 2>It's remarkable, isn't it. And map has been around since

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<v Speaker 2>nineteen ninety seven. That's like even before Google was a

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<v Speaker 2>household name.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Yet its continuous evolution, driven by constant updates and community contributions,

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<v Speaker 2>keeps it incredibly relevant and capable.

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<v Speaker 1>So what's our goal today?

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<v Speaker 2>Our mission today is to cut through the noise and

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<v Speaker 2>give you a real shortcut to understanding end map's core functions.

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<v Speaker 2>It's absolutely crucial role in a cybersecurity career, and importantly,

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<v Speaker 2>how it's ethically and legally applied in real world scenarios.

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<v Speaker 1>And we've drawn some incredibly insights from a fantastic source

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<v Speaker 1>ultimate penetration testing with enmap, which is hot off the

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<v Speaker 1>presses from March twenty twenty four.

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<v Speaker 2>Very current.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so this deep dive is custom tailored for you,

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<v Speaker 1>whether you're just curious or maybe prepping for a critical

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<v Speaker 1>meeting in the world of offensive security. We'll explore surprising facts,

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<v Speaker 1>real world anecdotes, and give you those aha moments about

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<v Speaker 1>a tool that genuinely elevates cybersecurity assessments. Let's start right

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<v Speaker 1>where the magic happens. Many people hear enmap and immediately

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<v Speaker 1>think port scanner the default thought, and while that's its

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<v Speaker 1>fundamental core, saying endmap is just a port scanner is

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<v Speaker 1>kind of like saying a master chef only knows how.

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<v Speaker 2>To boil water, exactly, a huge oversimplification. Sure, you can

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<v Speaker 2>use it for a simple scan, but in the right hands,

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<v Speaker 2>it becomes this incredibly versatile instrument, and the foundation of

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<v Speaker 2>Enmap's depth, what allows it to be that precision instrument

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<v Speaker 2>you mentioned truly begins with a solid understanding of basic

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<v Speaker 2>network elements, things like ports and protocol.

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<v Speaker 1>The fundamentals.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, as you know any experience network pro knows, ports

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<v Speaker 2>are virtual anchor points that services us to process network traffic.

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<v Speaker 2>We're talking over sixty five thousand potential ports primarily using

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<v Speaker 2>either TCP Transmission Control Protocol or UDP User Data gram Protocol,

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<v Speaker 2>and the distinction, particularly PCP's essential three way handshake s

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<v Speaker 2>y n s y m ack ack is crucial.

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<v Speaker 1>Why is that?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, if that handshake gets interrupted, maybe by a firewall,

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<v Speaker 2>the connection just isn't established. Simple as that. Familiar TCP

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<v Speaker 2>ports like eighty for HTTP and four forty three for

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<v Speaker 2>HTTPS are classic examples everyone knows.

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<v Speaker 1>So how does this foundational knowledge translate when we actually

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<v Speaker 1>put endmap to work. Our source material uses the public

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<v Speaker 1>scan m dot nmap dot org target to illustrate this really.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, yeah, that's a great test bed.

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<v Speaker 1>A simple default scan just ENMP scan me dot nmap

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<v Speaker 1>dot org immediately reveals a wealth of information. You'll see

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<v Speaker 1>not just open ports like twenty two, nine nine, twenty

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<v Speaker 1>nine and uh three one three three classic hacker port right,

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<v Speaker 1>but also filtered ones like twenty five, eighty and five

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<v Speaker 1>four to thirty one at the top one thousand common boards.

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<v Speaker 2>End map scans by default, and the output it even

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<v Speaker 2>classifies six distinct port states open, closed, filtered, unfiltered, open

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<v Speaker 2>filtered and.

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<v Speaker 1>Closed filtered and filtered usually means.

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<v Speaker 2>Filtered often hints at a firewalls, presence blocking or dropping

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<v Speaker 2>the probes. Okay, now here's where nmp's true power begins

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<v Speaker 2>to reveal itself. By adding what are called flags or options,

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<v Speaker 2>you dramatically expand its capabilities flags.

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<v Speaker 1>Right like command line switches exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Consider the atch a flag. You can think of it

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<v Speaker 2>as a for all, it tells nmap to go dupe

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<v Speaker 2>on scan m dot nmap dot org. For instance, it

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<v Speaker 2>can uncover the operating system like Ubuntu Linux and precise

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<v Speaker 2>service versions such as open SSAH six point six point

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<v Speaker 2>one and a patchy two point four point seven. You

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<v Speaker 2>might even notice Port eighty shift from filtered to open

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<v Speaker 2>as nmap gathers more info.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah, so it gets smarter as it goes sort of yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Or for surgical precision, nash svvp T twenty two targets

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<v Speaker 2>just port twenty two for service versioning while providing verbose

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<v Speaker 2>output telling you exactly what it's doing.

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<v Speaker 1>Got it?

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<v Speaker 2>And for immediate vulnerability insights the script vulners dot NSS flag.

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<v Speaker 2>This one's amazing. It can pull a list of known

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<v Speaker 2>vulnerabilities for a specific version like OpenSSH six point six

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<v Speaker 2>point one P one directly from the vulners dot org database,

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<v Speaker 2>complete with CBS scores.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow. So it goes from scanner to vulnerability assessment tool

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<v Speaker 1>just like that.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely it transforms.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a lot of options, right, But the core insight

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<v Speaker 1>here isn't just knowing these flags individually, but understanding how

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<v Speaker 1>their strategic combination transforms en map exactly. It's about the synergy.

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<v Speaker 1>It moves from just a scanner into this sophisticated diagnostic tool,

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<v Speaker 1>letting you tailor your reconnaissance for almost any scenario. And

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<v Speaker 1>the good news is you don't have to memorize every

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<v Speaker 1>single flag. End map itself has built in help with

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<v Speaker 1>the aashlag always useful or the man map command in Linux,

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<v Speaker 1>and of course the full documentation is always online at

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<v Speaker 1>ndmap dot org.

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<v Speaker 2>Yep, the website's indispensable.

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<v Speaker 1>The power, as the book really highlights, comes from combining

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<v Speaker 1>these flags strategically, moving beyond individual features to truly amplified capabilities.

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<v Speaker 1>So if n map sounds this powerful, you might be wondering, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>how does it really fit into a cybersecurity career? The

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<v Speaker 1>field is, well, it's incredibly vast. Oh yeah, huge from

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<v Speaker 1>deep cryptography to proactive thread hunting. Many aspiring professionals try

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<v Speaker 1>to be open to anything you know, focusing on roles

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<v Speaker 1>like SoC analysts, GRC, and pen testing all at once.

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<v Speaker 1>The scattergun approach right, but that often leads to knowledge

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<v Speaker 1>that's as they say, a mile wide and an inch

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<v Speaker 1>deep very common. What's far more effective is gaining a

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<v Speaker 1>solid baseline than truly deep diving into a particular area specialize,

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<v Speaker 1>which leads.

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<v Speaker 2>To an important question, where exactly does end map fit

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<v Speaker 2>into that specialized deep dive. It's a foundational tool. It

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<v Speaker 2>shows up on baseline SERTs like CompTIA Security Plus and

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<v Speaker 2>more specialized ones like penthest plus and Certified Epic Hacker

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<v Speaker 2>CEH for hands on exams like EJPC or OSCP. You'll

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<v Speaker 2>absolutely rely on it for critical reconnaissance, so.

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<v Speaker 1>It's unavoidable for offensive security roles pretty much.

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<v Speaker 2>NMAP is most applicable to network penetration tests, purple teaming,

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<v Speaker 2>and red teaming. Instead of a generic answer like oh,

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<v Speaker 2>i'd scan ports and analyzed services, with NMAP, you'll learn

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<v Speaker 2>to confidently articulate a much more nuanced.

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<v Speaker 1>Approach like what give us an example.

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<v Speaker 2>Like saying i'd begin mapping the attack surface by enumerting

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<v Speaker 2>ports and services with a custom end map scan designed

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<v Speaker 2>to minimize network noise, maybe using packet fragmentation and reduce speed,

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<v Speaker 2>scanning only the local subnet first and definitely avoiding the

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<v Speaker 2>gateway initially. I'd then output that to an XML file

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<v Speaker 2>for import into Legion for a graphical view.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that sounds like someone who knows what they're doing exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>That immediately signals a much higher degree of knowledge to

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<v Speaker 2>anyone listening.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a powerful example of real world application. How do

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<v Speaker 1>you in a real engagement and balance that minimize network

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<v Speaker 1>noise approach with the client's desire for comprehensive coverage. Are

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<v Speaker 1>the trade offs you often have to explain?

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, definitely, it's all about communication. Really. You balance it

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<v Speaker 2>by setting clear expectations upfront in the rules of engagement,

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<v Speaker 2>the row y right the contract, and through regular check

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<v Speaker 2>ins during the test. You explain that a stealthier scan

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<v Speaker 2>might not find every single open port on day one,

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<v Speaker 2>but it greatly reduces the risk of detection by the

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<v Speaker 2>blue team and allows for a more prolonged, potentially more

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<v Speaker 2>effective engagement.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's a time versus stealth calculation.

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<v Speaker 2>Often, Yeah, it's a conversation you have with the client

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<v Speaker 2>based on their goals. So having covered the indispensable technical

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<v Speaker 2>aspects of end MAP and its role in a career,

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<v Speaker 2>a crucial layer we absolutely must add now is the

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<v Speaker 2>ethical and legal framework that governs its use.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a critical point. MAP performs active reconnaissance. It's establishing

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<v Speaker 1>direct connections with targets, right, It's knocking on the door,

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<v Speaker 1>which means you must have explicit permission from the system owner,

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<v Speaker 1>no exceptions none.

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<v Speaker 2>Compare this to passive reconnaissance like using shodand on io,

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<v Speaker 2>which queries archived publicly available information without any direct connection

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<v Speaker 2>to the target system itself.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah okay, so showed in is like looking at public records,

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<v Speaker 1>en MAP is like trying the doorknob.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a decent analogy. Yeah, this distinction is absolutely crucial

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<v Speaker 2>for legal and professional use. Ethically, on a broader scale,

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<v Speaker 2>this means you also carry a profound ethical responsibility as

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<v Speaker 2>a penetration tester. One of the cardinal rules is to

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<v Speaker 2>avoid impacting the CIA triad, confidentiality, integrity, and crucially here

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<v Speaker 2>availability ACA triad.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. Yeah, the core tenets.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, n MAP itself rarely causes major service disruption on

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<v Speaker 2>its own. Aggressive scanning using unsafe arguments or maybe untested scripts,

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<v Speaker 2>especially when aimed at fragile legacy systems, oh boy, can

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<v Speaker 2>very realistically impact the availability of systems. Taking down production

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<v Speaker 2>systems is not only a very bad day for you,

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<v Speaker 2>but it can have serious consequences.

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<v Speaker 1>For your client career, limiting potentially potentially.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, So, understanding precisely what your scans are doing and

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<v Speaker 2>how they're doing it is ter amount. You need to

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<v Speaker 2>know your tool to truly.

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<v Speaker 1>Unlock end maps capabilities. In security assessments, it's crucial we

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<v Speaker 1>clarify the distinct roles of say, automated vulnerability scans versus

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<v Speaker 1>a nuanced penetration test. These terms get mixed up all

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<v Speaker 1>the time, constantly. Yeah. The vulnerability scanner, like NESSUS or

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<v Speaker 1>OpenVAS is primarily a tool for enumerting systems, identifying CPE

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<v Speaker 1>Common Platform.

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<v Speaker 2>Enumeration standardized names for software and hardware right.

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<v Speaker 1>And then automating the search for cvees, common vulnerabilities and exposures.

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<v Speaker 1>They're fantastic for recurring checks, but they are inherently prone

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<v Speaker 1>to false positives and false negatives.

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<v Speaker 2>What makes this particularly compelling is that many commercial and

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<v Speaker 2>even open source vulnerability scanners actually leverage end map under

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<v Speaker 2>the hood to gather that initial CPE information.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh interesting, So endmap is often part of the engine.

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<v Speaker 2>Often yeah for our purposes though. Penetration test is a

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<v Speaker 2>highly involved, intricate process, using both automated and manual techniques,

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<v Speaker 2>often from a black box.

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<v Speaker 1>Perspective, meaning you start with zero knowledge.

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<v Speaker 2>Pretty much no prior knowledge of the client's organization beyond

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<v Speaker 2>the scope defined in the Rules of Engagement the ROWE.

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<v Speaker 2>The ultimate goal is to simulate a sophisticated malicious actor

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<v Speaker 2>actively trying to avoid detection and achieve specific objectives.

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<v Speaker 1>To achieve this kind of deep simulation, pent testers follow

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<v Speaker 1>industry recognized frameworks, don't they.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, absolutely, We'll be mapping end map techniques to both

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<v Speaker 2>the IMEI r RK framework, specifically the reconnaissance tactic and

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<v Speaker 2>active scanning techniques like IP blocks, vulnerability scanning, and wordless stanning,

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<v Speaker 2>and also the Lockheed Martin cyber kill chain, which illustrates

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<v Speaker 2>the logical progression of an advanced persistent threat and apt

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<v Speaker 2>from reconnaissance all the way to actions on objectives.

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<v Speaker 1>Got IT frameworks provide structure.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and this naturally leads us to the more advanced

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<v Speaker 2>forms of security assessments red teaming and purple teaming.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, break those down.

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<v Speaker 2>Red teaming is essentially an advanced pentist where restrictions are

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<v Speaker 2>significantly reduced and the Blue team the defenders, are actively

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<v Speaker 2>trying to detect, block, and contain the Red team the attackers,

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<v Speaker 2>so it's a live fire exercise pretty much. The goal

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<v Speaker 2>here isn't just finding vulnerabilities, but assessing the holistic maturity

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<v Speaker 2>of the client's security program, from user awareness training right

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<v Speaker 2>through to incident response.

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<v Speaker 1>Capabilities and purple teaming.

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<v Speaker 2>Purple teaming, in contrast, involves close collaboration between red and

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<v Speaker 2>blue teams, often in real time. The goal is to

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<v Speaker 2>identify precisely what the blue team can.

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<v Speaker 1>Detect h working together to improve detection exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>N MAP is immensely helpful here because its versatility allows

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<v Speaker 2>for crafting numerous scenarios and generating indicators of compromise IOCs

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<v Speaker 2>to test detection thresholds. For example, you could start with

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<v Speaker 2>an obvious noisy scan right and progressively add obfuscation techniques

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<v Speaker 2>until detection is bypassed. This allows the blue team to

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<v Speaker 2>adjust their IDs, their eder or firewall settings. Accordingly, it's

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<v Speaker 2>a calibration exercise.

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<v Speaker 1>Given that NMAP is an active scanner and fundamentally requires permission,

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<v Speaker 1>Where do you safely practice these powerful techniques? You can't

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<v Speaker 1>just scan.

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<v Speaker 2>Google definitely not the answer, as the book clearly highlights,

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<v Speaker 2>is a lab environment. It's absolutely essential for true hands

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<v Speaker 2>on experience and learning. You need a safe.

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<v Speaker 1>Sandbox, makes sense, how do you set one up well?

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<v Speaker 2>A robust lab environment can be set up for surprisingly

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<v Speaker 2>little to no cost. We highly recommend nd MAP installed

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<v Speaker 2>on both Windows and Collie.

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<v Speaker 1>Linux Collie the Pen Testing District YEP.

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<v Speaker 2>Using virtual box or VMware to host your virtual machines.

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<v Speaker 2>You'll also want additional tools like zenmap, the graphical front

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<v Speaker 2>end for endmap, and Legion, which often come pre installed

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<v Speaker 2>on modern Collie versions.

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<v Speaker 1>And what do you scan in the lab?

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<v Speaker 2>For targets? You can use intentionally vulnerable virtual machine images.

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<v Speaker 2>Vulne hub is a great resource for this, things like

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<v Speaker 2>the planets Earth and Mercury. Or you could even set

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<v Speaker 2>up a Windows Server twenty twenty two VM and install

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<v Speaker 2>applications like Jenkins and open source Automation Server commonly seen

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<v Speaker 2>in enterprise pentists.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so download enmap virtual box, Collie some vulnerable vms exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>You can figure Collie in virtual box, give it enough

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<v Speaker 2>memory at least four GB recommended, and create a GNAT

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<v Speaker 2>network maybe call it NMAP lab, so your vms can

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<v Speaker 2>talk to each other but are isolated from.

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<v Speaker 1>Your main network, right, isolation is key.

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<v Speaker 2>Then you can use a simple end map scan like

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<v Speaker 2>nmap natat five ten point zero point two point zero

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<v Speaker 2>two four to discover the IP addresses of your vulnerable

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<v Speaker 2>vms on that lab subnet.

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<v Speaker 1>And you can take it further. Oh yeah, to.

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<v Speaker 2>Truly take your lab to the next level. You can

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<v Speaker 2>even install open source security products like Wazoo. It's a

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<v Speaker 2>free SIME and XDR solutions.

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<v Speaker 1>SIME and XDR security monitoring tools.

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<v Speaker 2>Right security, incident and event management, and extended detection and response.

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<v Speaker 2>This lets you visualize engage the level of obfuscation during

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<v Speaker 2>your advanced scanning tech seeks. You're effectively learning Blue team

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<v Speaker 2>and Purple team skills at the same time.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, so you can see your own scans from the

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<v Speaker 1>defender's perspective precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>The source truly emphasizes that while seeing demonstrations is helpful,

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<v Speaker 2>the most valuable learning comes from doing, making mistakes, troubleshooting,

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<v Speaker 2>forcing yourself to dig deeper in your own lab environment.

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<v Speaker 1>That trial and error.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, that hands on practice, as the author experienced firsthand,

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<v Speaker 2>solidifies your understanding far more efficiently than just reading about it.

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<v Speaker 1>Understanding an organization's attack surface is absolutely core to security.

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<v Speaker 1>This defines it as the set of points on the

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<v Speaker 1>boundary of a system where an attacker can try to enter,

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<v Speaker 1>cause an effect on, or extract data basically all the

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<v Speaker 1>ways in Yeah, think of your own home, not just

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<v Speaker 1>doors and windows, but maybe a remote garage door opener

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<v Speaker 1>in your car, or that baby monitor you just bought

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<v Speaker 1>that might have a hidden security flaw.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh oh personal story.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it was a real aha moment for me when

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<v Speaker 1>I realized my own new baby uditor had an ancient

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<v Speaker 1>telnet port wide open, an unauthenticated, unencrypted protocol from the seventies.

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<v Speaker 2>Wow on a new device.

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<v Speaker 1>On new device. It just goes to show how easily

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<v Speaker 1>these overlooked points can become a critical attack surface even

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<v Speaker 1>in our own homes.

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<v Speaker 2>And organizations face this on a much much grander scale,

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<v Speaker 2>especially complex or rapidly growing ones. For a pen tester,

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<v Speaker 2>truly grasping the attack surface is critical before you decide

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<v Speaker 2>how to attack. For defenders, it's essential to know every

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<v Speaker 2>possible attack point to properly deploy security.

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<v Speaker 1>Controls external versus internal.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. In external testing you're mapping from outside the network websites, VPNs,

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<v Speaker 2>things exposed to the Internet. In internal testing, you're looking

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<v Speaker 2>for what's reachable once you've already gained some initial access

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<v Speaker 2>inside the network.

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<v Speaker 1>And how does that process usually start?

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<v Speaker 2>It often starts with passive reconnaissance using tools like OASAMASS

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<v Speaker 2>or checking certificate transparency logs via CRT dot SHA. For

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<v Speaker 2>subdomain enumeration, you gather potential targets, consolidate them, and then

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<v Speaker 2>you move to en map for the active mapping part.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, now let's get into the n MAP flags that

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<v Speaker 1>specifically help you map an attack surface. We've touched on some,

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<v Speaker 1>but let's list the key ones for basic analysis, the

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<v Speaker 1>ones you'll use like day in and day out sound good. First,

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<v Speaker 1>sv service Version Detection.

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<v Speaker 2>CRUCIAL tells you what is running and which version. Not

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<v Speaker 2>just that poor eighty is open, but is it a

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<v Speaker 2>patchy two point four point seven or Genix one point

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<v Speaker 2>one eight?

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<v Speaker 1>That version number is key next A the all in

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<v Speaker 1>one scan.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah OS detection service version ing. It's slower, but very

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<v Speaker 2>comprehensive for that initial reconnaissance phase.

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<v Speaker 1>Nice T for timing right T.

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<v Speaker 2>Zero is paranoid slowest T five's insane. Fastest default is

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<v Speaker 2>T three. You absolutely need to adjust this for balancing

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<v Speaker 2>speed and stealth. AERE adds more detail to the output,

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<v Speaker 2>essential for troubleshooting and just understanding what end map is

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<v Speaker 2>actually doing under the hood. ASOX for XML output non negotiable,

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<v Speaker 2>really essential for importing into other analysis tools like zenmap

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<v Speaker 2>or Legion. Always always save your scan results.

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<v Speaker 1>Nice to specify ports yeah, nice.

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<v Speaker 2>P eighty or arrange nice P eighty to OFF four

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<v Speaker 2>to forty three or a list nas P eighty thy

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<v Speaker 2>four hundred and forty three. NAS is useful for a

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<v Speaker 2>quick scan of the top one hundred ports or all

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<v Speaker 2>norts if you really need to check everything all sixty five,

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<v Speaker 2>five hundred and thirty five and have a lot of time.

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<v Speaker 1>ACU for UDP scanning.

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<v Speaker 2>Often overlooked, but critical services like DNSS and m P

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<v Speaker 2>and VPN protocols run on UDP. You'll miss things if

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<v Speaker 2>you only scan TCP. Very handy filter shows only open ports,

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<v Speaker 2>cuts through the noise of closed or filtered ports, lets

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<v Speaker 2>you focus on potential.

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<v Speaker 1>Entry point, and finally, reason this one's great for troubleshooting.

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<v Speaker 2>Reveals why NMAP reported a port status in g sinec

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<v Speaker 2>reset super helpful for understanding filtered ports and firewall behavior.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so those are the building blocks.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and combining these flags is truly where the power

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<v Speaker 2>comes alive. An initial scan might look something like and

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<v Speaker 2>mapbattgc to open B twenty one million, twenty two million,

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<v Speaker 2>twenty five million, eighty billion, one one hundred and ten billion,

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<v Speaker 2>one hundred and seventy nine billion, one hundred seventy nine million,

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<v Speaker 2>four hundred forty three million, eight hundred and forty three

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<v Speaker 2>at GBA eight hundred and four hundred and forty three

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<v Speaker 2>deshil targets dot t xtox results one dot xml break

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<v Speaker 2>that down. Okay, so al targets dot tixt to read

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<v Speaker 2>target ips from a file and desh ox results one

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<v Speaker 2>dot xml to save the output.

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<v Speaker 1>Makes sense and when you find vulnerabilities right.

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<v Speaker 2>When identifying vulnerabilities, remember context is key. A high severity

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<v Speaker 2>CVE with no known public exploit and no SISEKEV observations.

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<v Speaker 3>keV known exploited vulnerabilities Exactly that CVE might be less

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<v Speaker 3>valuable in a timebound PENTICS than a moderate severity one

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<v Speaker 3>with readily available proof of concept exploits.

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<v Speaker 1>That you can actually use, so focus on demonstrable impact precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>The critical insight here is that the true value for

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<v Speaker 2>a pentester lies in assessing the real world exploitable impact

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<v Speaker 2>of a vulnerability within that specific client context, not just

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<v Speaker 2>its theoretical CVSS score. The book has a case study

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<v Speaker 2>on this, right yeah compelling one about a small financial

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<v Speaker 2>services business. They used simple, regularly scheduled endmap scans to

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<v Speaker 2>continuously monitor their attack surface. They gained crucial insight without

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<v Speaker 2>a huge budget, proving end maps immense value even for

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<v Speaker 2>smaller organizations.

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<v Speaker 1>Once you've mapped that attack surface, turning raw information into

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<v Speaker 1>actionable intelligence, the next step is identifying legitimate vulnerabilities that

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<v Speaker 1>can actually be exploited.

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<v Speaker 2>Right the refinement stage.

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<v Speaker 1>Think of it like a military intelligence cycle, planning, collection, processing, analysis,

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<v Speaker 1>and dissemination a good analogy.

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<v Speaker 2>This refinement often starts with common Platform Enumeration or CPE,

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<v Speaker 2>that standardized way of encoding it product names maintained by NIST.

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<v Speaker 1>How does endmap find CPEs.

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<v Speaker 2>Endmap tries to identify them by analyzing things like ICMP

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<v Speaker 2>time to live values, TCP initial sequence number sampling, service banners,

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<v Speaker 2>and headers. Then it queries its internal databases.

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<v Speaker 1>But you mentioned it a caveat.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, a crucial one. MP is isn't always one hundred

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<v Speaker 2>percent accurate on specific versions or patch levels. Always try

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<v Speaker 2>to verify with another tool or a manual check if possible.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay. Once CPE is established, you look for cvees, correct.

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<v Speaker 2>Common vulnerabilities and exposures those common identifiers for specific security weaknesses.

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<v Speaker 2>And while the Common Vulnerability scoring system CVSS scores vulnerabilities

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<v Speaker 2>from zero to ten, it lacks that crucial context we.

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<v Speaker 1>Talked about, right, the impact context.

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<v Speaker 2>A Cisco IOSXE remote code execution and an IP based

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<v Speaker 2>camera password disclosure could both have a nine point eight

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<v Speaker 2>CVSS score, but their real world impact for a specific

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<v Speaker 2>organization can differ drastically. Practical exploitability often trumps.

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<v Speaker 1>The raw score, and this is precisely where the n

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<v Speaker 1>MAP Scripting Engine or NSE truly shines.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, the NC is arguably nmec's most powerful feature

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<v Speaker 2>written in Lua. Right yep, written in LUA. It enables

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<v Speaker 2>customs scripts for deeper enumeration, vulnerability identification, and sometimes even exploitation.

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<v Speaker 2>You use it with the straightforward script flag.

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<v Speaker 1>Like the vulnerm example.

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<v Speaker 2>Earlier exactly Vulners dot nts queries, the vulners dot com

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<v Speaker 2>API for associated vulnerabilities and CVSS scores. It classifies itself

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<v Speaker 2>as vulne safe and external. NSC scripts fall into fourteen

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<v Speaker 2>distinct categories, which really help you organize and select them.

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<v Speaker 1>Fourteen categories.

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<v Speaker 2>Likely well, you've got things like author for authentication checks,

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<v Speaker 2>broadcasts for network discovery, brute for brute forcing, use that

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<v Speaker 2>one very carefully, huh, exploit for active exploitation attempts, and

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<v Speaker 2>critically safe, which is your absolute go to for professional

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<v Speaker 2>engagements because they're designed not to disrupt systems. Safe safe

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<v Speaker 2>is very good. They also have types like pre rule,

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<v Speaker 2>host service and postural, indicating exactly when they run during

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<v Speaker 2>a scan sequence.

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<v Speaker 1>Beyond the basics, those intermediate inmat flags give you even

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<v Speaker 1>more nuanced control.

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<v Speaker 2>Right definitely, script and script help are obviously essential for

428
00:21:54.319 --> 00:21:55.720
<v Speaker 2>using the NSESE effectively.

429
00:21:55.799 --> 00:21:56.279
<v Speaker 1>Makes sense.

430
00:21:56.480 --> 00:21:59.119
<v Speaker 2>Then you have SNS, which conducts a quickping sweep just

431
00:21:59.200 --> 00:22:02.720
<v Speaker 2>for host discovery is the host up, while dash ENAPN

432
00:22:02.839 --> 00:22:06.920
<v Speaker 2>disables host discovery. Why disabling crucial in environments that block

433
00:22:07.200 --> 00:22:11.160
<v Speaker 2>ICMP pings or actively detect them as reconnaissance. If you

434
00:22:11.240 --> 00:22:13.559
<v Speaker 2>know the hosts are likely up or ping is blocked,

435
00:22:13.960 --> 00:22:16.559
<v Speaker 2>dash MPN tells n map to just assume their up

436
00:22:16.559 --> 00:22:18.000
<v Speaker 2>and try scanning ports anyway.

437
00:22:18.359 --> 00:22:20.680
<v Speaker 1>Got it? What about port selection s.

438
00:22:20.799 --> 00:22:23.920
<v Speaker 2>FF scans the top one hundred ports quickly. Top ports

439
00:22:23.960 --> 00:22:27.119
<v Speaker 2>hashtag lets you specify any number like topports twenty five

440
00:22:27.200 --> 00:22:28.920
<v Speaker 2>hundred for a decent balance of speed and.

441
00:22:28.880 --> 00:22:31.480
<v Speaker 1>Coverage and version detection intensity right.

442
00:22:31.440 --> 00:22:34.599
<v Speaker 2>Version intensity hashtag goes from zero to nine. Default is seven.

443
00:22:34.839 --> 00:22:38.000
<v Speaker 2>Higher numbers mean more probes, more aggressive fingerprinting. There are

444
00:22:38.000 --> 00:22:40.720
<v Speaker 2>aliases like version light which is two, or version all

445
00:22:40.799 --> 00:22:41.559
<v Speaker 2>which is nine.

446
00:22:41.720 --> 00:22:44.119
<v Speaker 1>And where do you often find the most useful vulnerabilities?

447
00:22:44.200 --> 00:22:45.359
<v Speaker 1>Is it always cvees?

448
00:22:46.079 --> 00:22:46.400
<v Speaker 2>Often?

449
00:22:46.480 --> 00:22:46.519
<v Speaker 1>No?

450
00:22:46.839 --> 00:22:50.119
<v Speaker 2>We find tons of issues from simple misconfigurations like default

451
00:22:50.119 --> 00:22:53.680
<v Speaker 2>credentials left unchanged or SMB signing not being enabled on

452
00:22:53.680 --> 00:22:54.319
<v Speaker 2>Windows shares.

453
00:22:54.359 --> 00:22:56.799
<v Speaker 1>Easy fixes, big impact, huge impact.

454
00:22:57.160 --> 00:23:00.559
<v Speaker 2>Also inherently flawed protocols like telnet or ip IV two

455
00:23:00.680 --> 00:23:03.279
<v Speaker 2>running on UDP port six twenty three, m qtt on

456
00:23:03.319 --> 00:23:06.240
<v Speaker 2>eighteen eighty three. These are often wide open and of

457
00:23:06.279 --> 00:23:09.319
<v Speaker 2>course technical debt outdated systems like old Windows Server twenty

458
00:23:09.359 --> 00:23:12.119
<v Speaker 2>twelve R two, or maybe an old Jenkins instance on

459
00:23:12.200 --> 00:23:14.200
<v Speaker 2>port eighty eighty, which you can sometimes find with the

460
00:23:14.200 --> 00:23:17.400
<v Speaker 2>broadcast Jenkins Discover dot NEDSA script.

461
00:23:17.599 --> 00:23:21.799
<v Speaker 1>So while enmap isn't a direct replacement for commercial vulnerability scanners.

462
00:23:21.359 --> 00:23:24.160
<v Speaker 2>Like NESSUS, No, it's not designed for that scale or

463
00:23:24.160 --> 00:23:25.079
<v Speaker 2>reporting depth.

464
00:23:24.880 --> 00:23:27.359
<v Speaker 1>It's absolutely excellent for stealth or when other tools simply

465
00:23:27.400 --> 00:23:29.640
<v Speaker 1>aren't an option, maybe in a very restricted.

466
00:23:29.240 --> 00:23:32.720
<v Speaker 2>Environment exactly, you can combine flags cleverly like NMP, dash

467
00:23:32.759 --> 00:23:35.640
<v Speaker 2>PN topports five hundred, DASH two dash sv version all

468
00:23:35.640 --> 00:23:39.319
<v Speaker 2>script vulner dot NSA, dashile targets, dot t XT, doshox results,

469
00:23:39.319 --> 00:23:39.960
<v Speaker 2>dot XML.

470
00:23:40.119 --> 00:23:43.480
<v Speaker 1>Let's see no peng scan top five hundred ports, slow speed,

471
00:23:43.759 --> 00:23:47.240
<v Speaker 1>aggressive version scanning, run vulner script, use a target list

472
00:23:47.359 --> 00:23:48.119
<v Speaker 1>saved XML.

473
00:23:48.359 --> 00:23:52.119
<v Speaker 2>Yep, that's a pretty thorough yet moderately paced vulnerability focused scan.

474
00:23:52.240 --> 00:23:54.960
<v Speaker 2>And the book details a real world internal and external

475
00:23:54.960 --> 00:23:59.119
<v Speaker 2>pentist where NMAP was used as staggering nineteen times nineteen times. Yeah,

476
00:23:59.200 --> 00:24:03.440
<v Speaker 2>it was critical mapping the external attack surface, pinpointing WordPress,

477
00:24:03.440 --> 00:24:07.960
<v Speaker 2>plug and vulnerabilities. Finding those outdated Windows servers. Internally, it

478
00:24:08.039 --> 00:24:12.559
<v Speaker 2>helped uncover default credentials and vulnerable Cisco smart install services.

479
00:24:12.640 --> 00:24:13.839
<v Speaker 1>Ooh smart install.

480
00:24:14.039 --> 00:24:17.759
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that provided access to configuration files containing hashed admin

481
00:24:17.799 --> 00:24:21.559
<v Speaker 2>passwords that were later cracked offline. It truly highlights NMAP

482
00:24:21.640 --> 00:24:25.559
<v Speaker 2>as a critical foundation for even the most complex exploitation chains.

483
00:24:25.680 --> 00:24:28.640
<v Speaker 1>Okay, here's where the real challenge often begins. Yeah, imagine

484
00:24:28.680 --> 00:24:34.160
<v Speaker 1>pen testing a very large enterprise network, say eight subnets

485
00:24:34.279 --> 00:24:38.079
<v Speaker 1>sixteen million plus ips. Yeah, spending even a second on

486
00:24:38.160 --> 00:24:40.599
<v Speaker 1>each would take you what a year and a half roughly?

487
00:24:40.839 --> 00:24:44.720
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's infeasible. This is a classic challenge often unmet

488
00:24:44.720 --> 00:24:47.960
<v Speaker 2>in basic training, but it's absolutely crucial in real world,

489
00:24:48.119 --> 00:24:49.319
<v Speaker 2>large scale engagements.

490
00:24:49.400 --> 00:24:50.759
<v Speaker 1>How do you tackle that scale well?

491
00:24:50.799 --> 00:24:54.720
<v Speaker 2>On a broader scale? Mastering large networks fundamentally requires understanding

492
00:24:54.759 --> 00:24:58.319
<v Speaker 2>subnetting and CIDR notation twenty four to sixteen eight. You

493
00:24:58.359 --> 00:25:00.960
<v Speaker 2>simply can't stand everything at once. You start with black

494
00:25:00.960 --> 00:25:04.079
<v Speaker 2>box subnit discovery. Instead of trying to scan all sixty

495
00:25:04.119 --> 00:25:07.759
<v Speaker 2>five thousand ips in a sixteen, you strategically ping sweep

496
00:25:07.799 --> 00:25:11.440
<v Speaker 2>only the likely gateways, typically the point one or point

497
00:25:11.400 --> 00:25:14.000
<v Speaker 2>twenty five to four address of each potential twenty four

498
00:25:14.079 --> 00:25:15.480
<v Speaker 2>subnet within that larger.

499
00:25:15.319 --> 00:25:17.359
<v Speaker 1>Range AH target thro routers.

500
00:25:17.079 --> 00:25:20.000
<v Speaker 2>First exactly like en map, nashi sen ten type one,

501
00:25:20.000 --> 00:25:21.920
<v Speaker 2>put back two five five point one ten, pint Mezzera

502
00:25:21.960 --> 00:25:23.880
<v Speaker 2>two five five point two five four. You can even

503
00:25:23.920 --> 00:25:26.680
<v Speaker 2>pipe this through standard Linux commands like AWK or g

504
00:25:26.720 --> 00:25:28.880
<v Speaker 2>rep to get a clean list of only the live

505
00:25:28.920 --> 00:25:30.200
<v Speaker 2>gateway ips.

506
00:25:29.839 --> 00:25:32.640
<v Speaker 1>So you drastically reduce the initial target space dramatically.

507
00:25:32.720 --> 00:25:35.599
<v Speaker 2>You reduce your targets from a sprawling sixteen to the

508
00:25:35.599 --> 00:25:39.079
<v Speaker 2>equivalent of just scanning two twenty fours worth of potential gateways,

509
00:25:39.480 --> 00:25:40.440
<v Speaker 2>much more manageable.

510
00:25:40.559 --> 00:25:42.519
<v Speaker 1>That's a brilliant way to narrow down the playing field.

511
00:25:42.559 --> 00:25:45.000
<v Speaker 1>So once you have that refined list of live gateways,

512
00:25:45.039 --> 00:25:47.759
<v Speaker 1>what's your next move for identifying those quick wins, the

513
00:25:47.759 --> 00:25:49.160
<v Speaker 1>easily exploitable systems.

514
00:25:49.200 --> 00:25:51.920
<v Speaker 2>Precisely, once you have that refined list, you pivot to

515
00:25:51.960 --> 00:25:54.759
<v Speaker 2>scanning those specific live hosts for the low hanging fruit,

516
00:25:55.119 --> 00:25:57.559
<v Speaker 2>things like Cisco smart install on TCP port four to

517
00:25:57.559 --> 00:26:00.200
<v Speaker 2>seven eighty six, Java RMI on Penning ninety nine, or

518
00:26:00.200 --> 00:26:02.559
<v Speaker 2>maybe ipmiv two on UDP six twenty three.

519
00:26:02.720 --> 00:26:03.680
<v Speaker 1>High impact targets.

520
00:26:03.720 --> 00:26:07.519
<v Speaker 2>Often, yeah would use commands like nmap, dmpt fourshil live

521
00:26:07.559 --> 00:26:10.880
<v Speaker 2>hoost dot txtp for seven eight six opendsh ox smart

522
00:26:10.920 --> 00:26:12.720
<v Speaker 2>install scan dot XML.

523
00:26:12.519 --> 00:26:15.440
<v Speaker 1>Okay, dage PN because we know they're alive. Nag at

524
00:26:15.599 --> 00:26:16.759
<v Speaker 1>four for speed.

525
00:26:16.880 --> 00:26:19.640
<v Speaker 2>Right, optimizing for time when every minute counts on a

526
00:26:19.680 --> 00:26:23.680
<v Speaker 2>large engagement target port four seven eight six, show only open,

527
00:26:23.839 --> 00:26:24.680
<v Speaker 2>save the results.

528
00:26:25.200 --> 00:26:28.359
<v Speaker 1>Optimizing scans for speed in massive environments sounds like a

529
00:26:28.400 --> 00:26:32.680
<v Speaker 1>real skill, extending far beyond just the NAGET flags. What

530
00:26:32.720 --> 00:26:35.279
<v Speaker 1>other parameters do you reach for when you really need

531
00:26:35.319 --> 00:26:37.640
<v Speaker 1>to push endmps limits on speed and what are the

532
00:26:37.640 --> 00:26:38.200
<v Speaker 1>trade offs?

533
00:26:38.240 --> 00:26:40.400
<v Speaker 2>It's definitely an art. Yeah, you have to go beyond

534
00:26:40.440 --> 00:26:43.319
<v Speaker 2>just nag T. Consider min host group to tell nmap

535
00:26:43.359 --> 00:26:47.319
<v Speaker 2>to scan numerous hosts simultaneously in parallel. Maybe two hundred

536
00:26:47.319 --> 00:26:49.920
<v Speaker 2>and fifty six for scanning twenty four groups, or you

537
00:26:49.920 --> 00:26:52.079
<v Speaker 2>can push it up to twenty forty eight for larger

538
00:26:52.160 --> 00:26:53.559
<v Speaker 2>chunks if the network can handle it.

539
00:26:53.720 --> 00:26:54.839
<v Speaker 1>Okay, parallel scanning.

540
00:26:54.880 --> 00:26:58.079
<v Speaker 2>What else then, initial DART timeout and max sert timeout

541
00:26:58.119 --> 00:27:01.720
<v Speaker 2>specified in milliseconds. Please control how long end map waits

542
00:27:01.759 --> 00:27:04.640
<v Speaker 2>for a probe response. Tuning these down can crucially speed

543
00:27:04.720 --> 00:27:08.240
<v Speaker 2>up scans on slow or high latency networks. Fewer retries

544
00:27:08.279 --> 00:27:11.599
<v Speaker 2>too exactly max retries. The default is ten. You can

545
00:27:11.640 --> 00:27:14.200
<v Speaker 2>reduce that maybe to three or five for faster scans,

546
00:27:14.279 --> 00:27:16.839
<v Speaker 2>especially if you're willing to trede a little potential accuracy

547
00:27:16.839 --> 00:27:17.279
<v Speaker 2>for speed.

548
00:27:17.359 --> 00:27:19.880
<v Speaker 1>You might miss a packet okay in timeouts.

549
00:27:19.519 --> 00:27:23.440
<v Speaker 2>Host timeout specified in minutes. Usually this ensures end map

550
00:27:23.480 --> 00:27:26.960
<v Speaker 2>doesn't get stuck indefinitely on a single unresponsive host, which

551
00:27:26.960 --> 00:27:29.960
<v Speaker 2>can happen, and things like defeat ARTHT rate limit or

552
00:27:29.960 --> 00:27:33.559
<v Speaker 2>defeated comp rate limit can try to overcome host rate limiting.

553
00:27:33.400 --> 00:27:35.559
<v Speaker 1>Ah when hosts try to slow you down.

554
00:27:35.480 --> 00:27:38.799
<v Speaker 2>Right, but using those often comes at the cost of accuracy,

555
00:27:39.359 --> 00:27:42.799
<v Speaker 2>and the difference between AMICT four aggressive and m Q

556
00:27:43.039 --> 00:27:48.680
<v Speaker 2>five insane is particularly significant. M five is extremely aggressive.

557
00:27:48.720 --> 00:27:50.880
<v Speaker 2>It sets things like max retries two and a short

558
00:27:50.880 --> 00:27:54.839
<v Speaker 2>host timeout fifteen meter. It often sacrifices accuracy for raw

559
00:27:54.920 --> 00:27:55.640
<v Speaker 2>speed and.

560
00:27:55.599 --> 00:27:57.519
<v Speaker 1>The biggest risk of being too aggressive you.

561
00:27:57.559 --> 00:28:01.079
<v Speaker 2>Might miss critical open services because packets got dropped, or worse,

562
00:28:01.200 --> 00:28:04.279
<v Speaker 2>you could cause an unintended denial of service by overwhelming

563
00:28:04.279 --> 00:28:07.839
<v Speaker 2>a host or network device. That's a very bad outcome.

564
00:28:07.480 --> 00:28:09.359
<v Speaker 1>And that's exactly what the book highlights with a real

565
00:28:09.400 --> 00:28:10.480
<v Speaker 1>world scenario, isn't it.

566
00:28:10.480 --> 00:28:13.759
<v Speaker 2>It does a pentester found their initial super aggressive scan,

567
00:28:13.920 --> 00:28:17.079
<v Speaker 2>even with custom high speed parameters, was simply too much

568
00:28:17.160 --> 00:28:20.480
<v Speaker 2>for a client's large, perhaps fragile network. It resulted in

569
00:28:20.599 --> 00:28:23.599
<v Speaker 2>inaccurate data and a lot of wasted time and frustration.

570
00:28:23.799 --> 00:28:24.559
<v Speaker 1>So what do they learn?

571
00:28:24.880 --> 00:28:27.480
<v Speaker 2>They learned that T four was actually the optimal setting

572
00:28:27.519 --> 00:28:31.319
<v Speaker 2>for that specific environment, rather than blindly defaulting to T five.

573
00:28:31.839 --> 00:28:35.880
<v Speaker 2>It taught them a valuable lesson. The same optimized scans

574
00:28:36.000 --> 00:28:39.599
<v Speaker 2>cannot be used during every pentist. Each environment is different.

575
00:28:39.920 --> 00:28:43.599
<v Speaker 1>That really underscores that understanding how these tools work beyond

576
00:28:43.720 --> 00:28:44.559
<v Speaker 1>just a checklist.

577
00:28:44.680 --> 00:28:48.200
<v Speaker 2>Is paramount absolutely overly aggressive scan and can violate the

578
00:28:48.240 --> 00:28:51.720
<v Speaker 2>rules of engagement by impacting network availability, So finding that

579
00:28:51.759 --> 00:28:55.160
<v Speaker 2>precise balance for each unique situation is always key.

580
00:28:55.559 --> 00:28:59.079
<v Speaker 1>Well in Map's command line interface is incredibly powerful, Dealing

581
00:28:59.119 --> 00:29:01.680
<v Speaker 1>with the sheer data ill uge of data it can generate,

582
00:29:02.039 --> 00:29:06.079
<v Speaker 1>especially from large engagements, can quickly become overwhelming. Just staring

583
00:29:06.119 --> 00:29:08.680
<v Speaker 1>at text outputs, oh yeah, it can be a lot.

584
00:29:08.799 --> 00:29:12.839
<v Speaker 1>This is precisely where graphical user interfaces GUIs step in

585
00:29:12.880 --> 00:29:16.119
<v Speaker 1>to provide clarity and efficiency. We're talking about Zenmap primarily

586
00:29:16.160 --> 00:29:19.160
<v Speaker 1>for Windows in mac os and Legion, which comes pre

587
00:29:19.240 --> 00:29:20.680
<v Speaker 1>installed on Kelle Linux.

588
00:29:20.839 --> 00:29:26.119
<v Speaker 2>These GUIs provide crucial context and significantly ease the analytical burden. Zenmap,

589
00:29:26.160 --> 00:29:28.960
<v Speaker 2>for example, lets you launch custom end map scans using

590
00:29:28.960 --> 00:29:32.319
<v Speaker 2>pre configured profiles or by grafting your own bespoke ones

591
00:29:32.400 --> 00:29:33.759
<v Speaker 2>right in the interface.

592
00:29:33.640 --> 00:29:35.720
<v Speaker 1>And it helps with results massively.

593
00:29:36.039 --> 00:29:39.079
<v Speaker 2>You can import existing and map XML scan results and

594
00:29:39.240 --> 00:29:43.759
<v Speaker 2>organize them intuitively by host, port, or service. That's indispensable

595
00:29:43.759 --> 00:29:46.880
<v Speaker 2>for quickly parsing vast amounts of data. You can even

596
00:29:46.920 --> 00:29:50.279
<v Speaker 2>compare multiple stand files side by side to troubleshoot issues

597
00:29:50.400 --> 00:29:53.960
<v Speaker 2>or track changes over time. It's truly indispensable for speeding

598
00:29:54.039 --> 00:29:55.319
<v Speaker 2>up data analysis, and.

599
00:29:55.319 --> 00:29:58.240
<v Speaker 1>Legion takes that concept a powerful step further, doesn't it.

600
00:29:58.240 --> 00:30:01.000
<v Speaker 2>It does. While it also let's you launch an import

601
00:30:01.079 --> 00:30:05.640
<v Speaker 2>endmap scans, its real differentiator is its semi automated framework.

602
00:30:06.079 --> 00:30:09.440
<v Speaker 2>Imagine identifying a web server running on port eighty okay,

603
00:30:09.720 --> 00:30:13.079
<v Speaker 2>and then with just a click in Legion automatically taking

604
00:30:13.119 --> 00:30:16.200
<v Speaker 2>screenshots of the web page or launching other specialized tools

605
00:30:16.240 --> 00:30:19.279
<v Speaker 2>like Nikto for web vulnerability scanning against that host.

606
00:30:19.400 --> 00:30:20.799
<v Speaker 1>Wow. So it connects tools together.

607
00:30:21.000 --> 00:30:24.400
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, Legion integrates dozens of common open source pen testing

608
00:30:24.440 --> 00:30:27.480
<v Speaker 2>tools and hundreds of scripts. Making it a highly versable

609
00:30:27.519 --> 00:30:30.599
<v Speaker 2>asset in any pen tester's arsenal. It helps automate the

610
00:30:30.640 --> 00:30:31.519
<v Speaker 2>follow up actions.

611
00:30:31.720 --> 00:30:33.880
<v Speaker 1>That sounds powerful. How customizable is it?

612
00:30:34.039 --> 00:30:37.880
<v Speaker 2>What's particularly compelling about Legion is its high degree of customization.

613
00:30:37.960 --> 00:30:41.839
<v Speaker 2>Through its configuration file Legion dot com, you can modify

614
00:30:41.880 --> 00:30:45.279
<v Speaker 2>scheduler settings to define automatic actions when certain conditions are met.

615
00:30:45.319 --> 00:30:48.440
<v Speaker 2>For example, if it finds an open FTP port, automatically

616
00:30:48.440 --> 00:30:52.079
<v Speaker 2>attempt to fault logins, though you'd be very careful enabling

617
00:30:52.119 --> 00:30:54.559
<v Speaker 2>things like that in a stealth engagement right could be noisy,

618
00:30:54.799 --> 00:30:57.960
<v Speaker 2>very You can also define stage end map settings with

619
00:30:58.000 --> 00:31:00.920
<v Speaker 2>custom port scans, stages tailored for different scope sizes.

620
00:31:01.079 --> 00:31:03.440
<v Speaker 1>Age is like different levels of intensity exactly.

621
00:31:03.480 --> 00:31:07.240
<v Speaker 2>You could have small scope a super thorough option, eventually

622
00:31:07.279 --> 00:31:10.799
<v Speaker 2>standing all TCTEDP ports running vulners dot n SE at

623
00:31:10.839 --> 00:31:14.039
<v Speaker 2>the end. Very noisy and slow, but comprehensive for maybe

624
00:31:14.079 --> 00:31:17.960
<v Speaker 2>a single twenty four medium scope. This reduces ports to

625
00:31:18.000 --> 00:31:20.839
<v Speaker 2>maybe just over ten thousand common TCP and a few

626
00:31:20.920 --> 00:31:24.240
<v Speaker 2>key UDP ports, A reasonable choice for a few twenty

627
00:31:24.240 --> 00:31:26.720
<v Speaker 2>four subnets, especially if you can let it run overnight.

628
00:31:27.079 --> 00:31:31.079
<v Speaker 2>Large scope highly optimized with only specific, commonly interesting ports

629
00:31:31.079 --> 00:31:34.039
<v Speaker 2>for identifying those quick wins we talked about, perfectly suited

630
00:31:34.079 --> 00:31:37.559
<v Speaker 2>for massive sixteen or eight subnets where speed is absolutely paramount.

631
00:31:37.759 --> 00:31:41.039
<v Speaker 1>That level of customization lets you really tailor legion for

632
00:31:41.160 --> 00:31:43.680
<v Speaker 1>efficient strategic analysis totally.

633
00:31:44.680 --> 00:31:48.279
<v Speaker 2>The ability to chain conditions, tools and actions provides a

634
00:31:48.319 --> 00:31:51.799
<v Speaker 2>remarkably flexible semi autonomous pin testing framework.

635
00:31:52.400 --> 00:31:56.480
<v Speaker 1>Now, let's talk about being truly stealthy. Evading detection by

636
00:31:56.519 --> 00:32:01.440
<v Speaker 1>security products, IDs, IPS, EDRs.

637
00:32:00.599 --> 00:32:01.799
<v Speaker 2>The blue team's arsenal.

638
00:32:02.000 --> 00:32:04.359
<v Speaker 1>Right, when it comes to evading them, it's far more

639
00:32:04.400 --> 00:32:07.759
<v Speaker 1>an art form than a precise science, and n map's

640
00:32:07.799 --> 00:32:12.559
<v Speaker 1>default behaviors surprisingly can often be detrimental to staying under

641
00:32:12.559 --> 00:32:12.960
<v Speaker 1>the radar.

642
00:32:13.160 --> 00:32:16.119
<v Speaker 2>This raises an important question, what exactly are those n

643
00:32:16.200 --> 00:32:18.759
<v Speaker 2>MAP defaults that we need to be aware of. Many

644
00:32:18.880 --> 00:32:22.519
<v Speaker 2>pentesters still think SSS, the s yn scan or stealth

645
00:32:22.559 --> 00:32:25.160
<v Speaker 2>scan makes n MAP inherently stealthy.

646
00:32:24.799 --> 00:32:26.720
<v Speaker 1>Because it doesn't complete the TCP handchake.

647
00:32:26.880 --> 00:32:29.319
<v Speaker 2>Right, But it's been an end map's default behavior for

648
00:32:29.359 --> 00:32:32.039
<v Speaker 2>privileged users for a long long time, and security products

649
00:32:32.039 --> 00:32:35.160
<v Speaker 2>are now incredibly well trained to detect that specific pattern.

650
00:32:35.240 --> 00:32:37.720
<v Speaker 1>Ah, So stealth isn't so stealthy anymore.

651
00:32:37.400 --> 00:32:40.519
<v Speaker 2>Not by itself. No Furthermore, n MAP scans hosts in

652
00:32:40.559 --> 00:32:44.400
<v Speaker 2>predictable ascending numerical order by default ten moist vera zero

653
00:32:44.440 --> 00:32:46.759
<v Speaker 2>point one than ten onever en point two, et cetera.

654
00:32:47.119 --> 00:32:49.720
<v Speaker 2>It has fixed packet size is typically forty bytes for

655
00:32:49.759 --> 00:32:52.880
<v Speaker 2>a SYM packet, and static time to live values usually

656
00:32:52.920 --> 00:32:55.519
<v Speaker 2>sixty four, and that default T three speed is actually

657
00:32:55.559 --> 00:32:58.720
<v Speaker 2>quite fast. All of these predictable patterns contribute to easy

658
00:32:58.759 --> 00:33:01.720
<v Speaker 2>detection by modern secure systems looking for scanning behavior.

659
00:33:01.839 --> 00:33:04.920
<v Speaker 1>Thankfully, you have immense power to manipulate these. What are

660
00:33:04.960 --> 00:33:07.920
<v Speaker 1>some of those advanced flags that allow for significant obfuscation.

661
00:33:08.160 --> 00:33:11.720
<v Speaker 1>You've got quite a toolkit. Advanced flags for obfuscation include

662
00:33:11.759 --> 00:33:15.480
<v Speaker 1>out shaft. This fragments the packets into smaller pieces, making

663
00:33:15.480 --> 00:33:17.960
<v Speaker 1>them harder for some simple fear walls or IDs to

664
00:33:18.039 --> 00:33:21.640
<v Speaker 1>reassemble and inspect data. Length appends random data to the

665
00:33:21.759 --> 00:33:25.200
<v Speaker 1>end of packets, adding entropy and making signature based detection harder.

666
00:33:25.759 --> 00:33:29.880
<v Speaker 1>Exclude ports and exclude host Simply avoid specific targets or

667
00:33:29.880 --> 00:33:33.359
<v Speaker 1>ports that you know are heavily monitored or sensitive. Discovery

668
00:33:33.400 --> 00:33:37.799
<v Speaker 1>ignores can sometimes help with firewalls that spoof RST responses

669
00:33:37.839 --> 00:33:41.960
<v Speaker 1>to make all ports appear closed. DASH RPN, again crucial

670
00:33:41.960 --> 00:33:45.000
<v Speaker 1>for disabling the initial ICMP ping when it's blocked or

671
00:33:45.119 --> 00:33:49.200
<v Speaker 1>likely to be detected. H D decoy scanning. This spoofs

672
00:33:49.279 --> 00:33:51.680
<v Speaker 1>your source IP address with other random or specified IP

673
00:33:51.880 --> 00:33:53.759
<v Speaker 1>to try and hide your true location in the noise.

674
00:33:54.160 --> 00:33:55.960
<v Speaker 1>Use this one with extreme caution, though it can be

675
00:33:56.079 --> 00:33:59.440
<v Speaker 1>very risky, might cause issues, and attribution becomes complex. Okay,

676
00:33:59.480 --> 00:34:02.319
<v Speaker 1>that DECOYL one sounds tricky, So how do you combine

677
00:34:02.359 --> 00:34:04.599
<v Speaker 1>the others for a truly stealthy approach? Give us an

678
00:34:04.599 --> 00:34:07.519
<v Speaker 1>example of a good obfuscated scan some best practices for

679
00:34:07.559 --> 00:34:09.119
<v Speaker 1>evading those Blue Team detections.

680
00:34:09.400 --> 00:34:13.000
<v Speaker 2>Combining these is absolutely key. A basic obfuscated scan might

681
00:34:13.039 --> 00:34:15.400
<v Speaker 2>look like n map dash data like five randomized house

682
00:34:15.440 --> 00:34:18.840
<v Speaker 2>ten point zero point zero two four, just fragmenting, adding

683
00:34:18.880 --> 00:34:20.639
<v Speaker 2>a little data and randomizing.

684
00:34:20.159 --> 00:34:22.599
<v Speaker 1>The target word other than the default Definitely.

685
00:34:22.639 --> 00:34:26.119
<v Speaker 2>For greater stealth, adds speed throttling, host discovery, disabling and

686
00:34:26.159 --> 00:34:29.880
<v Speaker 2>maybe port exclusions end map dash up dattling five randomized hosts,

687
00:34:29.960 --> 00:34:32.760
<v Speaker 2>dash of T two dash PN exclude ports twenty two million,

688
00:34:32.800 --> 00:34:35.079
<v Speaker 2>one hundred thirty nine thousand, four hundred and forty five

689
00:34:35.559 --> 00:34:38.320
<v Speaker 2>ten tons zero point two twenty five four okay, T.

690
00:34:38.119 --> 00:34:41.679
<v Speaker 1>Two speed no paying, avoiding SSH and SMB ports right,

691
00:34:41.719 --> 00:34:41.960
<v Speaker 1>and you.

692
00:34:42.000 --> 00:34:44.760
<v Speaker 2>Might add host timeout and retry limits for better accuracy

693
00:34:44.800 --> 00:34:47.360
<v Speaker 2>on slower or less reliable networks, and map bashit dattling

694
00:34:47.440 --> 00:34:49.599
<v Speaker 2>five randomized hosts such as T two jush PN, exclude

695
00:34:49.599 --> 00:34:51.800
<v Speaker 2>ports twenty million, one hundred thirty one thousand, four hundred

696
00:34:51.800 --> 00:34:54.400
<v Speaker 2>and forty five, host timeout five meters max retrice three.

697
00:34:54.559 --> 00:34:56.519
<v Speaker 1>So what are the core best practices to keep in

698
00:34:56.519 --> 00:34:59.159
<v Speaker 1>mind to consistently try and avoid blue team detection?

699
00:34:59.280 --> 00:35:03.320
<v Speaker 2>Here are some essential practices. Avoid scanning gateways often point

700
00:35:03.320 --> 00:35:05.440
<v Speaker 2>one or point two five y five early on, as

701
00:35:05.480 --> 00:35:09.480
<v Speaker 2>they are typically heavily monitored. Deprioritize highly sensitive ports like

702
00:35:09.559 --> 00:35:13.159
<v Speaker 2>SSH twenty two and SMBE nine four forty five initially

703
00:35:13.440 --> 00:35:16.000
<v Speaker 2>as alerts on these are common. Never scan the same

704
00:35:16.119 --> 00:35:19.679
<v Speaker 2>endpoint repeatedly within a short timeframe, mix it up. Avoid

705
00:35:19.800 --> 00:35:23.239
<v Speaker 2>NSC scripts that attempt default logins off some brute scripts,

706
00:35:23.360 --> 00:35:26.280
<v Speaker 2>as these are often highly detectable and generate immediate alerts.

707
00:35:26.679 --> 00:35:29.639
<v Speaker 2>Throttle your scan speeds significantly to stay below the noise

708
00:35:29.679 --> 00:35:32.039
<v Speaker 2>floor T two or even T one or T zero.

709
00:35:32.679 --> 00:35:36.760
<v Speaker 2>Ensure both your packets signature size data and scan heuristics

710
00:35:36.800 --> 00:35:40.480
<v Speaker 2>timing order, have sufficient entropy make them varied and less predictable,

711
00:35:40.559 --> 00:35:43.880
<v Speaker 2>And critically, always start reconnaissance on your local subnet first

712
00:35:43.960 --> 00:35:47.679
<v Speaker 2>if possible, to avoid triggering IDAs or firewalls on gateways

713
00:35:47.719 --> 00:35:50.159
<v Speaker 2>before you've even reached your intended target network segment.

714
00:35:50.400 --> 00:35:52.880
<v Speaker 1>That's incredibly practical advice, and the book has a purple

715
00:35:52.880 --> 00:35:55.840
<v Speaker 1>teening case study that perfectly illustrates this, showing how detection

716
00:35:55.880 --> 00:35:58.039
<v Speaker 1>can be bypassed up by step absolutely.

717
00:35:58.079 --> 00:36:00.320
<v Speaker 2>The case study starts with a default end map scan

718
00:36:00.440 --> 00:36:03.679
<v Speaker 2>on a local subnet, which immediately triggered detection from a

719
00:36:03.719 --> 00:36:05.840
<v Speaker 2>security product sensor identified using.

720
00:36:05.760 --> 00:36:07.360
<v Speaker 1>Net discovery cut red handed YEP.

721
00:36:08.000 --> 00:36:11.719
<v Speaker 2>Then by sequentially adding opuscation techniques first natas T two,

722
00:36:12.000 --> 00:36:16.760
<v Speaker 2>then randomized hosts NASHPN dash effor fragmentation data length five

723
00:36:17.039 --> 00:36:19.639
<v Speaker 2>and even a slightly modified anastool.

724
00:36:19.199 --> 00:36:21.440
<v Speaker 1>Fifty eight YTTL fifty eight just to.

725
00:36:21.400 --> 00:36:24.119
<v Speaker 2>Be different from the default sixty four makes the packets

726
00:36:24.119 --> 00:36:27.840
<v Speaker 2>look less standard, and eventually, by also excluding port twenty two,

727
00:36:28.159 --> 00:36:32.639
<v Speaker 2>SSH detection was successfully evaded. This iterative process allowed the

728
00:36:32.679 --> 00:36:35.480
<v Speaker 2>blue team to see exactly which techniques worked and fine

729
00:36:35.480 --> 00:36:37.199
<v Speaker 2>tune their sensor rules in real time.

730
00:36:37.320 --> 00:36:38.679
<v Speaker 1>That's prople teaming in action.

731
00:36:38.840 --> 00:36:41.440
<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and another powerful example from the book is a

732
00:36:41.480 --> 00:36:44.519
<v Speaker 2>red teaming engagement against a bank. Initial access was gained

733
00:36:44.559 --> 00:36:47.480
<v Speaker 2>through vishing social engineering over the phone impersonating an IT

734
00:36:47.719 --> 00:36:51.039
<v Speaker 2>provider classic that led to remote access and exfiltration of

735
00:36:51.119 --> 00:36:54.320
<v Speaker 2>VPN credentials. N MAP was then used with extreme stealth,

736
00:36:54.360 --> 00:36:56.519
<v Speaker 2>using a command very similar to the one we discussed

737
00:36:56.719 --> 00:36:59.679
<v Speaker 2>en map NAST two two randomized host stashed PN stropene

738
00:36:59.719 --> 00:37:02.840
<v Speaker 2>data length five national fifty eight pas P twenty one million,

739
00:37:02.880 --> 00:37:05.920
<v Speaker 2>twenty five twenty one million, twenty five million, twenty five million,

740
00:37:05.960 --> 00:37:09.039
<v Speaker 2>eighty million, four hundred forty three million, eight hundred eighty million,

741
00:37:09.039 --> 00:37:10.800
<v Speaker 2>eight hundred and forty three thousand, four hundred and seven

742
00:37:10.800 --> 00:37:13.159
<v Speaker 2>eighty six open ten end point two twenty five.

743
00:37:13.039 --> 00:37:16.840
<v Speaker 1>Four, targeting specific ports low and slow right to.

744
00:37:16.800 --> 00:37:19.840
<v Speaker 2>Find an outdated Cisco Catalyst switch with smart install still

745
00:37:19.880 --> 00:37:23.760
<v Speaker 2>open on port forty seven eighty six. This yielded hashed

746
00:37:23.760 --> 00:37:27.360
<v Speaker 2>admin credentials from the config file and critical network configurations.

747
00:37:27.960 --> 00:37:30.480
<v Speaker 2>Even though the red team was eventually detected later. N

748
00:37:30.559 --> 00:37:33.519
<v Speaker 2>MAP was absolutely critical in mapping the internal network for

749
00:37:33.559 --> 00:37:37.760
<v Speaker 2>this major compromise, demonstrating its foundational role even in highly

750
00:37:37.800 --> 00:37:39.559
<v Speaker 2>sensitive advanced operations.

751
00:37:39.960 --> 00:37:43.320
<v Speaker 1>The n MAP Scripting Engine NSESE can keep coming back

752
00:37:43.360 --> 00:37:47.519
<v Speaker 1>to it. It's truly en Map's most powerful and customizable feature,

753
00:37:47.599 --> 00:37:48.000
<v Speaker 1>isn't it?

754
00:37:48.000 --> 00:37:50.960
<v Speaker 2>It really is. It allows you to invoke incredibly creative

755
00:37:51.000 --> 00:37:55.639
<v Speaker 2>and powerful additional functionality, all written in that flexible Lewis scripting.

756
00:37:55.320 --> 00:37:58.880
<v Speaker 1>Language, and those fourteen distinct categories of NSC scripts offer

757
00:37:58.920 --> 00:38:02.360
<v Speaker 1>incredible versatility for almost any scenario. Can you recap some

758
00:38:02.440 --> 00:38:03.079
<v Speaker 1>key ones.

759
00:38:02.920 --> 00:38:06.360
<v Speaker 2>Sure you've got off? For authentication related tecks? Broadcasts for

760
00:38:06.440 --> 00:38:09.760
<v Speaker 2>discovering systems on the local network like broadcast Jenkins discover

761
00:38:10.280 --> 00:38:14.320
<v Speaker 2>brute force techniques again, handle with extreme care. Default are

762
00:38:14.360 --> 00:38:17.360
<v Speaker 2>the common generally safe scripts run with aven S C

763
00:38:17.639 --> 00:38:22.800
<v Speaker 2>ORVA flags. Discovery focuses on active reconnaissance and specific information

764
00:38:22.880 --> 00:38:27.000
<v Speaker 2>gathering like the SEMM share script. DOS are scripts that

765
00:38:27.039 --> 00:38:30.079
<v Speaker 2>can cause denial of service. Definitely avoid these in production.

766
00:38:30.360 --> 00:38:35.320
<v Speaker 2>Destinly exploit actively attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities like shell

767
00:38:35.360 --> 00:38:40.239
<v Speaker 2>shock or MS seventeen zero ten. External scripts query external

768
00:38:40.320 --> 00:38:44.320
<v Speaker 2>data sources like our friend vulners dot NSA fuzzer sends

769
00:38:44.400 --> 00:38:48.159
<v Speaker 2>unexpected or randomized packets. Though honestly, NMP isn't the best

770
00:38:48.159 --> 00:38:51.519
<v Speaker 2>tool for heavy fuzzing malware tries to detect systems infected

771
00:38:51.519 --> 00:38:55.960
<v Speaker 2>by malware. Vone checks for specific vulnerabilities without attempting exploitation.

772
00:38:56.119 --> 00:38:58.679
<v Speaker 1>Vones exploit important distinction Crucial.

773
00:38:58.599 --> 00:39:01.519
<v Speaker 2>Intrusive scripts have a high price probability of crashing systems

774
00:39:01.599 --> 00:39:05.320
<v Speaker 2>or disrupting services. Avoid those in production. Two sayer design

775
00:39:05.400 --> 00:39:08.000
<v Speaker 2>not to exploit or crash systems, making them your absolute

776
00:39:08.079 --> 00:39:11.599
<v Speaker 2>go to for professional engagements. And finally, version scripts are

777
00:39:11.639 --> 00:39:13.639
<v Speaker 2>related to enhancing service versioning and.

778
00:39:13.599 --> 00:39:15.159
<v Speaker 1>They run into different times yep.

779
00:39:15.239 --> 00:39:18.159
<v Speaker 2>They operate in distinct phases. Pre rule runs before any

780
00:39:18.199 --> 00:39:22.519
<v Speaker 2>scanning starts. Host runs once per target host service. The

781
00:39:22.559 --> 00:39:26.159
<v Speaker 2>most common type runs against specific services discovered on ports,

782
00:39:26.320 --> 00:39:29.239
<v Speaker 2>and postol runs after all targets have been scanned.

783
00:39:29.840 --> 00:39:33.000
<v Speaker 1>Using these scripts sounds pretty intuitive. The primary flag is

784
00:39:33.079 --> 00:39:34.239
<v Speaker 1>just script right it is.

785
00:39:34.599 --> 00:39:37.559
<v Speaker 2>You can specify scripts by their file name like script

786
00:39:37.679 --> 00:39:42.119
<v Speaker 2>smbsho S, dush discovery dot NSA, or by category like

787
00:39:42.199 --> 00:39:43.039
<v Speaker 2>script discovery.

788
00:39:43.119 --> 00:39:44.559
<v Speaker 1>Can you combine categories Yes.

789
00:39:44.679 --> 00:39:47.960
<v Speaker 2>For example, script as runs all scripts whose names start

790
00:39:48.000 --> 00:39:50.360
<v Speaker 2>with N, but cautions some of those can be aggressive.

791
00:39:50.800 --> 00:39:53.480
<v Speaker 2>Or for more refined control, you could do script safe

792
00:39:53.519 --> 00:39:55.679
<v Speaker 2>and not sim to run all scripts in the safe

793
00:39:55.719 --> 00:39:59.159
<v Speaker 2>category except the SMB. Once clever and forcing a script,

794
00:39:59.280 --> 00:40:02.159
<v Speaker 2>you can force a script to run even if NMP

795
00:40:02.159 --> 00:40:04.960
<v Speaker 2>thinks the target doesn't meet its usual conditions by prefixing

796
00:40:04.960 --> 00:40:07.000
<v Speaker 2>the script name with a plus up and for fine

797
00:40:07.039 --> 00:40:09.960
<v Speaker 2>tune control over script behavior. Script dogs lets you pass

798
00:40:10.079 --> 00:40:13.880
<v Speaker 2>arguments directly to scripts like script ars, user admin pass,

799
00:40:13.920 --> 00:40:17.840
<v Speaker 2>welcome one, two three. For attempting authenticated enumeration with certain scripts,

800
00:40:18.079 --> 00:40:21.079
<v Speaker 2>again use with extreme care and only when authorized.

801
00:40:21.320 --> 00:40:23.239
<v Speaker 1>Where do these scripts live? Can you add your own?

802
00:40:23.360 --> 00:40:25.920
<v Speaker 2>You can locate all the default scripts and Collie Linux

803
00:40:26.000 --> 00:40:29.039
<v Speaker 2>under usher and map scripts, and crucially yes, you can

804
00:40:29.079 --> 00:40:32.320
<v Speaker 2>easily add community created scripts often found on GitHub by

805
00:40:32.360 --> 00:40:35.559
<v Speaker 2>simply downloading them and copying the dot ss file into that.

806
00:40:35.559 --> 00:40:39.400
<v Speaker 1>Directory, so you can extend ENDMPS capabilities easily.

807
00:40:39.159 --> 00:40:42.039
<v Speaker 2>Very easily. For instance, the book mentions checking for a

808
00:40:42.079 --> 00:40:46.039
<v Speaker 2>specific implant related to CVE twenty twenty three, twenty one

809
00:40:46.159 --> 00:40:50.800
<v Speaker 2>ninety eight in Cisco IOSE, a simple custom lewiscript could

810
00:40:50.800 --> 00:40:53.920
<v Speaker 2>be written to define an action function. This function might

811
00:40:54.000 --> 00:40:56.639
<v Speaker 2>just construct a CURL command to target a specific URL

812
00:40:56.679 --> 00:41:00.440
<v Speaker 2>on the device like https, dot target, tip, webu loogout confirmed,

813
00:41:00.440 --> 00:41:03.159
<v Speaker 2>dot HTML, dot log and hash one and then print

814
00:41:03.159 --> 00:41:05.000
<v Speaker 2>the result to see if the implant responds.

815
00:41:05.159 --> 00:41:07.239
<v Speaker 1>That sounds surprisingly simple to implement.

816
00:41:07.440 --> 00:41:09.880
<v Speaker 2>It often is. The simplicity of Lua and the NSC

817
00:41:10.000 --> 00:41:12.320
<v Speaker 2>framework makes it a great way to automate niche checks

818
00:41:12.400 --> 00:41:15.719
<v Speaker 2>or look for specific indicators of compromise directly within your

819
00:41:15.800 --> 00:41:16.599
<v Speaker 2>end map scans.

820
00:41:17.000 --> 00:41:19.480
<v Speaker 1>As we start to wrap up this deep dive, it's

821
00:41:19.559 --> 00:41:22.280
<v Speaker 1>really vital to discuss the dos and don'ts of using

822
00:41:22.400 --> 00:41:26.079
<v Speaker 1>nmap professionally because the technical hacking part is only one

823
00:41:26.079 --> 00:41:27.639
<v Speaker 1>piece of the puzzle, right.

824
00:41:27.639 --> 00:41:32.239
<v Speaker 2>Oh, absolutely, communication ethics and truly understanding client objectives are

825
00:41:32.719 --> 00:41:35.119
<v Speaker 2>just as crucial, if not sometimes more so than the

826
00:41:35.159 --> 00:41:36.119
<v Speaker 2>technical skills.

827
00:41:36.280 --> 00:41:39.320
<v Speaker 1>So how do you tailor your endmap approach based on

828
00:41:39.360 --> 00:41:39.800
<v Speaker 1>the client?

829
00:41:40.519 --> 00:41:43.000
<v Speaker 2>Well, every client and engagement is distinct. You need to

830
00:41:43.079 --> 00:41:47.239
<v Speaker 2>identify the right scan at the right time. For example,

831
00:41:47.239 --> 00:41:50.320
<v Speaker 2>consider a compliance driven client who's had negative experiences with

832
00:41:50.400 --> 00:41:52.440
<v Speaker 2>pentists before. Let's call them.

833
00:41:52.320 --> 00:41:54.039
<v Speaker 1>Client A okay, nervous client.

834
00:41:54.239 --> 00:41:57.480
<v Speaker 2>Right your paramount focus, there is no negative impact. You'd

835
00:41:57.559 --> 00:42:01.880
<v Speaker 2>lean heavily on slow scan speeds T one zero, strictly

836
00:42:01.880 --> 00:42:07.039
<v Speaker 2>avoid any intrusive or potentially disruptive scripts, limit network noise aggressively,

837
00:42:07.559 --> 00:42:11.119
<v Speaker 2>and perhaps even customize the report to specifically emphasize your

838
00:42:11.159 --> 00:42:14.519
<v Speaker 2>meticulous care for preserving their CIA triad makes sense.

839
00:42:14.599 --> 00:42:16.079
<v Speaker 1>What about a different scenario.

840
00:42:15.800 --> 00:42:19.920
<v Speaker 2>Say Client B wants you to validate their network segmentation controls.

841
00:42:19.599 --> 00:42:21.760
<v Speaker 1>Okay, testing internal boundaries there, you.

842
00:42:21.760 --> 00:42:26.320
<v Speaker 2>Might more aggressively test bypassing those controls using stealthy n

843
00:42:26.400 --> 00:42:31.039
<v Speaker 2>MAP scans combined with evasion techniques, and you'd likely communicate

844
00:42:31.119 --> 00:42:34.119
<v Speaker 2>in near real time with the client if you successfully

845
00:42:34.159 --> 00:42:37.079
<v Speaker 2>access a sensitive network segment you shouldn't have reached.

846
00:42:37.199 --> 00:42:39.239
<v Speaker 1>And the mature client For Client.

847
00:42:39.079 --> 00:42:43.039
<v Speaker 2>C maybe a mature organization that conducts frequent pentists, You'll

848
00:42:43.119 --> 00:42:47.000
<v Speaker 2>likely need more complex, in depth scans using advanced NSEC

849
00:42:47.039 --> 00:42:50.440
<v Speaker 2>scripts or techniques to uncover novel or deeply hidden issues.

850
00:42:50.840 --> 00:42:53.440
<v Speaker 2>You'll need to balance that depth with optimized speed to

851
00:42:53.480 --> 00:42:56.880
<v Speaker 2>cover the scope and meticulously document your entire process because

852
00:42:56.880 --> 00:43:00.119
<v Speaker 2>they'll scrutinize it. It's all about tailoring your approach to

853
00:43:00.119 --> 00:43:01.239
<v Speaker 2>the client's maturity and.

854
00:43:01.199 --> 00:43:04.519
<v Speaker 1>Objectives beyond just tailoring the scan type. What are the

855
00:43:04.679 --> 00:43:09.239
<v Speaker 1>absolute key considerations to avoid negatively impacting client systems during

856
00:43:09.280 --> 00:43:12.199
<v Speaker 1>any engagement? It sounds like there are some cardinal rules.

857
00:43:12.400 --> 00:43:16.320
<v Speaker 2>There are, and they're pretty much non negotiable for professionals. First,

858
00:43:16.400 --> 00:43:19.440
<v Speaker 2>once you fingerprint a system or service, understand how it

859
00:43:19.480 --> 00:43:22.119
<v Speaker 2>works fundamentally before you start poking at it or trying

860
00:43:22.159 --> 00:43:25.559
<v Speaker 2>to exploit it. For example, the book mentions old pure

861
00:43:25.639 --> 00:43:29.320
<v Speaker 2>FTPD versions having a maximum connection limit. If you just

862
00:43:29.400 --> 00:43:32.039
<v Speaker 2>keep hammering it with connections without closing them properly, you

863
00:43:32.079 --> 00:43:33.880
<v Speaker 2>could easily cause a denial of service.

864
00:43:34.000 --> 00:43:36.079
<v Speaker 1>Know the target before you shoot exactly.

865
00:43:36.719 --> 00:43:39.480
<v Speaker 2>Second, always try to understand the criticality of the systems

866
00:43:39.519 --> 00:43:42.360
<v Speaker 2>you're targeting. A Windows two thousand and three server might

867
00:43:42.400 --> 00:43:45.079
<v Speaker 2>be full of known exploits, but if it's running some

868
00:43:45.239 --> 00:43:47.039
<v Speaker 2>ancient business critical.

869
00:43:46.679 --> 00:43:49.039
<v Speaker 1>Process, don't touch it without explicit permission.

870
00:43:49.119 --> 00:43:51.960
<v Speaker 2>Precisely, it might be far too risky to scan aggressively,

871
00:43:52.039 --> 00:43:56.159
<v Speaker 2>let alone exploit without very explicit, careful permission and maybe

872
00:43:56.159 --> 00:43:59.519
<v Speaker 2>scheduling it for an off hours window. Third, if you're

873
00:43:59.519 --> 00:44:02.079
<v Speaker 2>ever in doubt about a system or a potential action,

874
00:44:02.599 --> 00:44:06.119
<v Speaker 2>ask for clarification from your client's point of contact. That

875
00:44:06.239 --> 00:44:12.639
<v Speaker 2>little bit of extra context can prevent major unforeseen disruptions communication. Again, always, fourth,

876
00:44:12.840 --> 00:44:16.360
<v Speaker 2>clarify upfront if any systems have specific day or time

877
00:44:16.440 --> 00:44:19.760
<v Speaker 2>restrictions for stanning, you don't want to be running heavy

878
00:44:19.800 --> 00:44:23.519
<v Speaker 2>scans during their peak business hours or critical processing windows.

879
00:44:23.760 --> 00:44:26.400
<v Speaker 1>Goodpoint and fifth, and this is a huge.

880
00:44:26.199 --> 00:44:30.360
<v Speaker 2>One we mentioned with labs. Never test something completely new,

881
00:44:30.480 --> 00:44:32.719
<v Speaker 2>like a brand new script or technique you just found

882
00:44:33.159 --> 00:44:36.440
<v Speaker 2>for the very first time, in a live client environment.

883
00:44:36.960 --> 00:44:40.039
<v Speaker 2>Always always test it in your lab first to understand

884
00:44:40.079 --> 00:44:41.719
<v Speaker 2>its behavior and potential.

885
00:44:41.400 --> 00:44:42.519
<v Speaker 1>Impact lab first.

886
00:44:42.559 --> 00:44:46.639
<v Speaker 2>Always always, finally, know when to move on to another target.

887
00:44:47.079 --> 00:44:50.559
<v Speaker 2>Pentists are time bound engagements. Don't get tunnel vision and

888
00:44:50.639 --> 00:44:53.960
<v Speaker 2>let frustration lead you to overly aggressive or unsafe scans

889
00:44:54.000 --> 00:44:57.519
<v Speaker 2>on a single difficult target that just won't crack. Move on,

890
00:44:58.000 --> 00:44:58.880
<v Speaker 2>cover more ground.

891
00:44:59.199 --> 00:45:03.239
<v Speaker 1>That's such p practical, clearly experienced driven advice, and it

892
00:45:03.320 --> 00:45:07.119
<v Speaker 1>ties right back to the importance of continuous communication throughout

893
00:45:07.159 --> 00:45:08.320
<v Speaker 1>an engagement, doesn't it.

894
00:45:08.320 --> 00:45:12.679
<v Speaker 2>It absolutely does. Surprises and cybersecurity consulting are rarely good surprises.

895
00:45:13.000 --> 00:45:16.440
<v Speaker 2>Effective communication with clients through regular status updates, maybe quick

896
00:45:16.480 --> 00:45:18.559
<v Speaker 2>daily emails a weekly call.

897
00:45:18.440 --> 00:45:19.840
<v Speaker 1>Is essential was that achieve.

898
00:45:20.159 --> 00:45:22.880
<v Speaker 2>It keeps them fully aware of your progress, reassures them

899
00:45:22.920 --> 00:45:25.760
<v Speaker 2>you're working, allows you to call out major findings in

900
00:45:25.840 --> 00:45:29.000
<v Speaker 2>near real time so they can start remediation planning, and

901
00:45:29.079 --> 00:45:32.960
<v Speaker 2>provides vital opportunities for you to ask those clarification questions.

902
00:45:32.679 --> 00:45:35.280
<v Speaker 1>We talked about makes sense. Are there standard touch points?

903
00:45:35.719 --> 00:45:39.079
<v Speaker 2>Setting milestones like notifying them at twenty five percent, fifty

904
00:45:39.119 --> 00:45:42.480
<v Speaker 2>percent and seventy five percent project completion is a good practice,

905
00:45:43.320 --> 00:45:47.159
<v Speaker 2>and definitely establish a protocol for immediate notification for any

906
00:45:47.199 --> 00:45:51.440
<v Speaker 2>critical or high severity findings. Ultimately, your goal should be

907
00:45:51.480 --> 00:45:55.119
<v Speaker 2>to help the client genuinely improve their security posture, not

908
00:45:55.360 --> 00:45:58.960
<v Speaker 2>just to win the engagement by finding flaws. It's collaborative.

909
00:45:59.360 --> 00:46:01.280
<v Speaker 1>So what is this that's all mean for you the listener?

910
00:46:01.519 --> 00:46:04.039
<v Speaker 1>We've just taken a really deep dive into endmap, haven't we,

911
00:46:04.360 --> 00:46:07.199
<v Speaker 1>from its fundamental port scanning functions all the way to

912
00:46:07.280 --> 00:46:12.400
<v Speaker 1>its advanced capabilities in vulnerability identification, evasion techniques and even

913
00:46:12.400 --> 00:46:13.719
<v Speaker 1>customs scripting with the NSE.

914
00:46:13.880 --> 00:46:15.119
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, we covered a lot of ground.

915
00:46:15.440 --> 00:46:18.960
<v Speaker 1>You've seen how this single, albeit complex tool is foundational

916
00:46:18.960 --> 00:46:23.320
<v Speaker 1>for critical roles in penetration testing, red teaming and purple teaming,

917
00:46:23.599 --> 00:46:27.760
<v Speaker 1>and why those ethical and legal considerations are absolutely paramount.

918
00:46:27.440 --> 00:46:30.599
<v Speaker 2>And on a broader scale, end maps versatility and power

919
00:46:30.679 --> 00:46:34.719
<v Speaker 2>are truly limited only by your creativity and crucially, your

920
00:46:34.760 --> 00:46:37.960
<v Speaker 2>deep understanding of how it actually works under the hood. Right,

921
00:46:38.239 --> 00:46:41.639
<v Speaker 2>It's not about mechanically following a checklist of commands, but

922
00:46:41.719 --> 00:46:46.000
<v Speaker 2>about grasping the why and the how behind your scanning actions.

923
00:46:46.559 --> 00:46:49.719
<v Speaker 2>The compelling anecdotes and real world examples from our source

924
00:46:49.760 --> 00:46:53.800
<v Speaker 2>material really bring this to life, highlighting the profound impact

925
00:46:53.880 --> 00:46:55.519
<v Speaker 2>of strategic informed use.

926
00:46:56.239 --> 00:47:00.000
<v Speaker 1>You now have hopefully a solid foundation to explore further.

927
00:47:00.519 --> 00:47:02.880
<v Speaker 1>I genuinely encourage you to set up your own lab

928
00:47:03.000 --> 00:47:06.360
<v Speaker 1>environment just like we discussed, and start experimenting safely with

929
00:47:06.400 --> 00:47:08.840
<v Speaker 1>these flags and scripts. Get your hands dirty.

930
00:47:09.800 --> 00:47:11.280
<v Speaker 2>That's where the real learning happens.

931
00:47:11.360 --> 00:47:14.199
<v Speaker 1>What stands out to you about end Map's potential Now

932
00:47:14.199 --> 00:47:16.000
<v Speaker 1>that we've pulled back some of the layers, how could

933
00:47:16.000 --> 00:47:18.719
<v Speaker 1>you apply these techniques, maybe just to better understand the

934
00:47:18.760 --> 00:47:22.199
<v Speaker 1>security posture of your own home network or perhaps your

935
00:47:22.239 --> 00:47:26.639
<v Speaker 1>workplace network, always remembering those crucial ethical and legal boundaries of.

936
00:47:26.639 --> 00:47:30.639
<v Speaker 2>Course, permission first. The joy of discovery, that Aha moment

937
00:47:31.079 --> 00:47:35.119
<v Speaker 2>is profoundly found in that hands on practice. Continue to learn,

938
00:47:35.639 --> 00:47:39.559
<v Speaker 2>always question assumptions, and make an effort to consider multiple perspectives,

939
00:47:39.559 --> 00:47:43.480
<v Speaker 2>the attackers the defenders. Critical thinking is truly essential in

940
00:47:43.480 --> 00:47:46.280
<v Speaker 2>this field, especially with the overload of information out there,

941
00:47:46.480 --> 00:47:48.800
<v Speaker 2>and end map is an incredible tool to sharken that

942
00:47:48.840 --> 00:47:49.559
<v Speaker 2>exact skill.

943
00:47:49.760 --> 00:47:52.280
<v Speaker 1>This has been another deep dive into the fascinating and

944
00:47:52.360 --> 00:47:56.000
<v Speaker 1>sometimes complex world of cybersecurity. We hope you feel more

945
00:47:56.039 --> 00:47:59.320
<v Speaker 1>informed and more importantly equipped to continue your own learning

946
00:47:59.400 --> 00:48:03.280
<v Speaker 1>journey until next time, Keep exploring, keep questioning, and keep

947
00:48:03.280 --> 00:48:04.599
<v Speaker 1>making those Aha moments.
