Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the program. In
Speaker 1: this episode, we're going to dive right back into those
Speaker 1: core documents up at Moscow and we're going to take
Speaker 1: a look at the state's objection to defendant's motion to
Speaker 1: suppress and memorandum in support of the Apple Account Federal
Speaker 1: grand Jury Subpoena and sirch Warrant dated August first, twenty
Speaker 1: twenty three, State of Idaho, Plaintiff versus Brian C. Colberger,
Speaker 1: the defendant case number CR zero one DASH twenty four
Speaker 1: DASH three one sixty sixty five comes now the State
Speaker 1: of Idaho, buying through the Leata County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Speaker 1: respectfully response to Defendant's motion to suppress and memorandum in
Speaker 1: support Apple Account Federal grand Jury Subpoena and Search Warrant
Speaker 1: dated August first, twenty twenty three, filed on November thirteenth,
Speaker 1: twenty twenty four. Facts regarding the defendants represented facts the
Speaker 1: State respectfully refers to the Court to the defendants exhibits
Speaker 1: a through D filed in support of his instant motion
Speaker 1: as opposed to relying on the Defendant's objective summary and
Speaker 1: interpretation that begins at page three. The state's exhibits are
Speaker 1: attached as follows affidavid for search warrant for Apple with
Speaker 1: appended exhibits Apple search Warrants, States Exhibit order for return,
Speaker 1: State's Exhibit S three, and Apple records obtained from the U. S.
Speaker 1: Attorney's Office, which show the limited scope of information arguments one.
Speaker 1: Apple account information falls within the third party doctrine. The
Speaker 1: defendant first argues mister Coberger has a privacy interest in
Speaker 1: his Apple account information protected by the Fourth Amendment of
Speaker 1: the United States Constitution and Article I, Section seventeen of
Speaker 1: the Idaho Constitution requiring a warrant. As detailed in the
Speaker 1: state's response are Amazon Account, Federal Grand Jerry subpoena and
Speaker 1: search warrants dated April twenty six, twenty twenty three, and
Speaker 1: May a, twenty twenty three. The informationation the defendant seeks
Speaker 1: to suppress that was obtained by federal grand jury subpoena
Speaker 1: falls squarely within the third party doctrine, as recognized in
Speaker 1: Smith and Miller, and as the Supreme Court has continue
Speaker 1: to endorse in Carpenter c. Smith versus Maryland four forty
Speaker 1: two US seven forty three, seven forty four nineteen seventy nine,
Speaker 1: holding that persons have no reasonable expectational privacy in phone
Speaker 1: numbers they dial because they necessarily share those numbers with
Speaker 1: phone companies to make calls. United States versus Miller, four
Speaker 1: twenty five US four thirty five, nineteen seventy six, holding
Speaker 1: that persons have no reasonable expectational privacy and banking business
Speaker 1: records because they voluntarily share that information with banks. But
Speaker 1: see Carboner versus. United States, five eighty five US two
Speaker 1: ninety six, three oh six, three oh nine, twenty eighteen. First,
Speaker 1: the defendant voluntarily disclosed the subpoenaed information to Apple. Second,
Speaker 1: as the defendant nos from review of the discovery the informa.
Speaker 1: Theimation obtained from Apple was in no way a detailed
Speaker 1: and comprehensive record of the defendants movements see Carpenter, five
Speaker 1: eighty five US three O nine. The information provided was
Speaker 1: solely account subscriber information i e. Emails addresses, phone numbers,
Speaker 1: and the data account was created. The information provided by
Speaker 1: Apple was devoid of any location information. The state was
Speaker 1: justified and relying on the information provided from the U. S.
Speaker 1: Attorney's Office, which simply confirmed that defendant had Apple iCloud
Speaker 1: accounts and the email addresses usernames associated. This is allowed
Speaker 1: as to the subsequent search warrant. The State established probable
Speaker 1: cause for the remainder of the items sought, as shown
Speaker 1: by the lengthy and detailed affid David for a search
Speaker 1: warrant Two. Defendant is not demonstrated the search warrant afid
Speaker 1: David's contain intentionally or recklessly false statements or omissions in
Speaker 1: response to the Defendant's arguments under the affid David submitted
Speaker 1: in support of the application for the issued search warrant,
Speaker 1: recklessly or intentionally omitted material information, relies on information gained,
Speaker 1: and violation of the Constitution, and fails to provide probable
Speaker 1: cause for the requested search. The State refers the court
Speaker 1: two and hereby incorporate State's objection to Defendant's motion and
Speaker 1: memorandum in support for a. Frank's hearing, and State's objection
Speaker 1: to Defendant's motion to suppress genetic information. Three. The apple
Speaker 1: warrants incorporated the affid David for probable cause and exhibit
Speaker 1: by reference. The defendant next asserts that the search warrants
Speaker 1: fail to command law enforcement to search the accounts or
Speaker 1: contents of the iCloud. The Fourth Amendment to the United
Speaker 1: States Constitution requires that warrants must particularly describe the place
Speaker 1: to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. However,
Speaker 1: decisions must reflect the recognition that the Fourth Amendment commands,
Speaker 1: like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not obstrud United
Speaker 1: States Verus Ventresca three eighty US one O two one
Speaker 1: O eight eighty five seven forty one thirteen nineteen sixty five.
Speaker 1: The Ninth Circuit held that courts consider the afid David
Speaker 1: to be part of a warrant, which would cure any
Speaker 1: deficiencies in the naked warrant when one the warrant expressly
Speaker 1: incorporates the AFID David by reference, and two the AFID
Speaker 1: David is either attached physically or accompanies the warrant while
Speaker 1: agents execute the warrant. US versus SDI Future Health Incorporated.
Speaker 1: Five sixty eight f Dot three D. Circuit two thousand
Speaker 1: and nine, citing United States versus Cow fifty eight Ft
Speaker 1: three d. Ninth Circuit nineteen ninety five, applying requirements with
Speaker 1: respect to overbreadth of a warrant. See also US Versus
Speaker 1: Visakuru three fourteen ft. Three d one sixteen eleven twenty
Speaker 1: ninth Circuit two thousand and two, Applying requirements with respect
Speaker 1: to the lack of particularity of a warrant, the Court held,
Speaker 1: when the officer who requests authorization for the search, the
Speaker 1: magistrate who grants such authorization, and the officers who execute
Speaker 1: the search expressly rely upon a given set of papers
Speaker 1: containing a given series of words, they identify that set
Speaker 1: of papers and that series of words as the proof
Speaker 1: that proper precautions were taken to prevent an unreasonably invasive search.
Speaker 1: Fairness and common sense alike demand that we test the
Speaker 1: sufficiency of the precautions taken by examining that evidence. The
Speaker 1: SDI Future Health Court held will warrant expressly incorporates and
Speaker 1: affidavid when it uses suitable words of reference. Courts have
Speaker 1: not defined precisely what verbiage is suitable for this purpose,
Speaker 1: as there are no required magic words of incorporation Vescura
Speaker 1: three fourteen three d at eleven twenty in Veskira the
Speaker 1: suitable words, where upon the sworn complaint made before me
Speaker 1: in SDI Future Health, the suitable words were the supporting
Speaker 1: affidai vis as to the second prong, the affidavit is
Speaker 1: neither attached physically or accompanies the warrant while agents execute
Speaker 1: the warrant. The SDI Future Health Court stated, by making
Speaker 1: the affidavit available to the search team, the search team
Speaker 1: ensued that it accompanied the warrant to satisfy the requirements
Speaker 1: of incorporation. Nothing more is necessary for the Avid David
Speaker 1: to ensure that the discretion of the officers executing the
Speaker 1: warrant is limited. Town nine ninety seven f. Dot two
Speaker 1: d At five forty eight. Internal quotation marks omitted. The
Speaker 1: SDI Future Health Court went on the hold that a
Speaker 1: copy of the Avid David does not need to be
Speaker 1: given to the defendant, stating SDi's argument that the Fourth
Speaker 1: Amendment required the search team to provide all defendants a
Speaker 1: copy of the Apid David fails. SDI Future Health, five
Speaker 1: sixty eight at seven oh one. In the case at hand,
Speaker 1: the search warrant expressly incorporates the Avid David for search
Speaker 1: warrant by reference. The language included on the face of
Speaker 1: the search warrant is Corporal Brett Pain having given me
Speaker 1: proof upon oath this day, showing probable cause, establishing ground
Speaker 1: for the issuing of a search warrant. The suitable words
Speaker 1: proof upon oath is akin to upon the sworn complaint
Speaker 1: before me and the unsupporting affid Davids. The affid David
Speaker 1: for a probable cause. The appended exhibit A was the
Speaker 1: only proof presented to the magistrate. To read any other
Speaker 1: way would render the word proof meaningless and would be
Speaker 1: an abstract application not supported by ventresca. As a result,
Speaker 1: the affid David for Search Warrant an appended Exhibit A
Speaker 1: was incorporated by reference into the search warrant. With respect
Speaker 1: to the second prong, the investigators necessarily had copies of
Speaker 1: the affid David in their possession when they executed the
Speaker 1: warrant by emailing it to apple. The effect of this
Speaker 1: that the affid David for Search Warrant an appended Exhibit
Speaker 1: A cure any supposed efficiencies in the naked warrant. Next,
Speaker 1: regarding the defense argument that the warrant fails to actually
Speaker 1: provide a command to say search but instead order seizure,
Speaker 1: and it has no time frame, the defendant's argument fails
Speaker 1: to recognize that law enforcement must necessarily search for the
Speaker 1: item's disease. Further, these items would have been inevitably discovered
Speaker 1: since the order signed by Judge Marshall on August fourteenth,
Speaker 1: twenty twenty three. The search warrant was signed on August first,
Speaker 1: twenty twenty three, directed law enforcement as follows. It's further
Speaker 1: ordered that said property or any part thereof, may be
Speaker 1: delivered to any person or laboratory or laboratories for the
Speaker 1: purpose of conducting or obtaining any tests, analysis, or identification
Speaker 1: of said property which is deemed necessary by the custodial
Speaker 1: law enforcement agency or jurisdictional prosecuting attorney without further order
Speaker 1: of this Court, states Exhibit S two. Again, constitutional requirements
Speaker 1: are practical and not abstract. Van Tresca, three eighty US
Speaker 1: at one oh eight eighty five, Supreme Court at. Seven four,
Speaker 1: Part four. The Apple search warrant was not a general warrant.
Speaker 1: The defendant next asserts that the search warrant fails to
Speaker 1: provide specific particularization of what the search here. The defendant
Speaker 1: attempts to challenge the Apple search warrant on the grounds
Speaker 1: that it's too broad or too general in time and
Speaker 1: descriptions of the items to be seized to meet the
Speaker 1: particularity requirement of the fourth amendment. The State notes the
Speaker 1: defendant fails to identify what pieces of evidence he seeks
Speaker 1: to suppress from the Apple search warrant. All right, we're
Speaker 1: going to wrap up right here, and in the next
Speaker 1: episode we're going to pick up with a analysis. All
Speaker 1: of the information that goes with this episode can be
Speaker 1: found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and welcome
Speaker 1: back to the program. In this episode, we're going to
Speaker 1: pick up poor we left off with the State's objection
Speaker 1: to Colberger's motion to suppress and memorandum in support of
Speaker 1: the Apple account Federal grand Jury Subpoena and Search Warrant
Speaker 1: dated August first of twenty twenty three. Analysis. The Fourth
Speaker 1: Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article one, section
Speaker 1: seventeen of the Idaho Constitution prohibit the issuance of a
Speaker 1: warrant unless it particularly describes the place to be searched
Speaker 1: and the person or thing to be seized. US Constitutional
Speaker 1: Amendment four, Idaho Constitution, Article one, Section seventeen. The purpose
Speaker 1: of this guarantee is to safeguard the privacy of citizens
Speaker 1: by insuring against the search of premises where probable causes
Speaker 1: lacking State Verse tel one forty five Idaho. Nine eighty five,
Speaker 1: nine eighty nine, one eighty eight p Dot three d
Speaker 1: nine twenty seven, nine thirty one. Court of Appeals, two
Speaker 1: thousand and eight. Search is pursuant to a warrant are
Speaker 1: typically reasonable. However, the specific evil is a general warrant
Speaker 1: abhorred by colonists, and the problem is not that of
Speaker 1: the intrusion per se, but of general exploratory rummaging in
Speaker 1: a person's belongings Coolidge versus New Hampshire, four three US
Speaker 1: four forty three, four sixty seven, ninety one. Supreme Court,
Speaker 1: twenty twenty two, twenty thirty eight, nineteen seventy one. To
Speaker 1: prevent general exploratory rummaging, the Fourth Amendment requires a particular
Speaker 1: description of the things to be seized. Whether a warrant
Speaker 1: is over broad or lacks sufficient particularity is a legal question.
Speaker 1: Teel one, forty five, Idaho nine ninety one, eighty eight
Speaker 1: p Dot three, d at nine thirty two. The Fourth
Speaker 1: Amendment requires particularity to prevent the seizure of one thing
Speaker 1: under a warrant describing another thing, and to prevent the
Speaker 1: discretion of officers executing the warrant id At nine ninety
Speaker 1: one one eighty eight, p Dot three d at nine
Speaker 1: thirty three. The particularity requirement objective is that search is
Speaker 1: deemed necessary by a magistrate should be as limited as possible.
Speaker 1: Id C State versus Caldero, one oh nine, Idaho eighty
Speaker 1: eighty four, seven oh five, p Dot two, D eighty five,
Speaker 1: eighty nine of Appeals, nineteen eighty five. The Idaho Court
Speaker 1: of Appeal is held a search warrant must be particular
Speaker 1: enough so that as to what is to be taken,
Speaker 1: nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
Speaker 1: the warrant, quoting Marin versus United States two seven eight
Speaker 1: five US one ninety two one ninety six, nineteen twenty seven. However,
Speaker 1: the Court cautioned that this statement is not to be
Speaker 1: read literally. Id State vers. Wimer one thirty three, Idaho
Speaker 1: four forty two, four forty nine nine eighty eight p
Speaker 1: Dot two D two sixteen two twenty three, nineteen ninety nine.
Speaker 1: Wayne R. Lefay Search and Seizure Section four dot six
Speaker 1: a at six oh five, Fourth Edition, two thousand and four. Instead,
Speaker 1: the warrant must allow the searcher to reasonably ascertain and
Speaker 1: identify the things which are authorized to be seized. Id
Speaker 1: United States Verse Cook six fifty seven f Dot two,
Speaker 1: D seven thirty seven thirty three, Fifth Circuit, nineteen eighty one.
Speaker 1: United States Verse betten Courts seven thirty four f Dot
Speaker 1: two D seven fifty seven fifty four eleven Circuit nineteen
Speaker 1: eighty four. Courts look to the following to determine if
Speaker 1: a description is sufficiently particular. One whether probable cause exists
Speaker 1: to seize all items of a particular type described in
Speaker 1: the warrant. Two, whether the warrant sets out objective standards
Speaker 1: by which executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure
Speaker 1: from those that are not. And three whether the government
Speaker 1: was able to describe the items more particularly considering the
Speaker 1: information available to it at the time the warrant is issued.
Speaker 1: State Verse TL one forty five Idaho nine eighty five,
Speaker 1: nine eighty nine, one eighty eight p Dot three D
Speaker 1: nine twenty seven, nine thirty one. Court of Appeals two
Speaker 1: thousand and eight. The Ninth Circuit has held the specificity
Speaker 1: required in a warrant varies depending on the circumstances of
Speaker 1: the case and the type of items involved. United States
Speaker 1: Versus Pilatro eight hundred f dot two D nine fIF
Speaker 1: fifty nine nine sixty three, Ninth Circuit, nineteen eighty six. Further,
Speaker 1: warrants which describe generic categories of items are not necessarily
Speaker 1: invalid if a more precise description of the items subject
Speaker 1: to seizure is not possible id United States first card
Speaker 1: Well six eighty F dot two D seventy five seventy eight,
Speaker 1: Ninth Circuit, nineteen eighty two. As stated above, Idaho courts
Speaker 1: allow a search warrant AFFID DAVID to support the particularity
Speaker 1: requirement atomic Verse State one sixty three, Idaho one fourteen
Speaker 1: one twenty four and twenty five four oh eight P
Speaker 1: Dot three D four seventy four, four eighty four and
Speaker 1: eighty five twenty seventeen. While the particularity requirement is not
Speaker 1: usually difficult to apply to a physical world, courts have
Speaker 1: recognized that it is challenging to apply to the digital world.
Speaker 1: For example, the United States Supreme Court is observed cell
Speaker 1: phones differ in both quantitative and qualitative sense from other
Speaker 1: objects that might be kept on a person. Ryley versus California,
Speaker 1: five Sis seventy three, US three seventy three three ninety
Speaker 1: three one thirty four Supreme Court two four seven, three,
Speaker 1: two four eight nine, twenty fourteen. To be compliant with
Speaker 1: the Fourth Amendment, the search warrant must specify the particular
Speaker 1: items of evidence to be searched for and seized from
Speaker 1: the phone, and be strictly limited to the time period
Speaker 1: and information or other data for which probable cause has
Speaker 1: been properly established through the facts and circumstances set forth
Speaker 1: under oath in the warrant supporting Affi. David. Vigilance in
Speaker 1: enforcing the probable cause and particularity requirements is thus essential
Speaker 1: to the protection of the vital privacy interests inherent in
Speaker 1: virtually every modern cell phone and to the achievement of
Speaker 1: the meaningful constraints contemplated in Riley. Adam Gershwitz articulated the
Speaker 1: complication of the particularity requirement regarding digital information in his
Speaker 1: Vanderbilt Law Review article the post Riley Search Warrant, Search
Speaker 1: Protocols and Particularity in cell phone searches. Girshowitz correctly observe
Speaker 1: that because electronic data can be hidden anywhere on a
Speaker 1: computer or cell phone, it's very hard for officers to
Speaker 1: narrow down and advance the area that should be searched.
Speaker 1: Gershowitz review found that there are two fairly narrow categories
Speaker 1: of cases in which courts tend to find particularity violations,
Speaker 1: one when the search warrant does not state on its
Speaker 1: face what crime the search is being conducted to find
Speaker 1: evidence of, and two where the search warrant contains over
Speaker 1: broad catch all language. Defendant's argument focuses on the second category,
Speaker 1: stating data compilation requested in the Apple warrant is too
Speaker 1: broad in that it makes no attempt at narrowing and
Speaker 1: results instead in a blanket request for everything available into
Speaker 1: Apple accounts and the iCloud. Defendant's motion to suppress Page fourteen.
Speaker 1: Defendant relies on Wheeler Verse State, a Delaware Supreme Court
Speaker 1: case that is not binding on this court. However, Neever,
Speaker 1: the Wheeler Court held that warrants must be tested by
Speaker 1: courts in a common sense and realistic fashion, and reviewing
Speaker 1: courts should avoid a hypertechnical approach. The Wheeler Court did
Speaker 1: not require a time frame to meet their particularity requirement,
Speaker 1: instead explaining that while investigators should generally include specific information
Speaker 1: known to them within the body of a search warrant,
Speaker 1: we hesitate to prescribe rigid rules and instead reiterate the
Speaker 1: warrants must designate the things to be searched and seized
Speaker 1: as particular as possible. Wheeler made it clearer that the
Speaker 1: cases must be reviewed on a case by case basis.
Speaker 1: In Wheeler, the defendant being investigated for witness tampering and
Speaker 1: his digital devices were collected pursuant search warrants see generally id.
Speaker 1: Despite orders to search for text type documents a letter
Speaker 1: regarding witness intimidation, the forensic examiner captured image files and
Speaker 1: video files. Within these files, the investigators found CP As
Speaker 1: a result, the challenge search warrant failed to satisfy the
Speaker 1: particularity requirement for two reasons. One, the search warrant did
Speaker 1: not guide and control the forensic examiner's judgment as to
Speaker 1: what was to be seized on the computer, and two,
Speaker 1: the language of the search warrant clearly included items that
Speaker 1: were not subject to seizure i e. Activity regarding witness intimidation.
Speaker 1: The Seventh Circuit of Court of Appeals has noted that
Speaker 1: broad language may be permissible where the warrant constrains the
Speaker 1: search to evidence of a specific crime. The rationale is
Speaker 1: that criminals don't advertise where they keep evidence. Bishop nine
Speaker 1: ten three d at three thirty six. A warrant authorizing
Speaker 1: the search of a house for drugs permits the police
Speaker 1: to search everywhere in the house, because everywhere is where
Speaker 1: a contraband may be hidden. Idea at three thirty six
Speaker 1: and three thirty seven apply to electronic devices. Criminals can
Speaker 1: and often do hide, mislabel, or manipulate far files to
Speaker 1: conceal criminal activity, such that a broad, expansive search of
Speaker 1: the device may be required because law enforcement cannot know
Speaker 1: in advance how a suspect may label or code files.
Speaker 1: Other courts have held that by necessity, government efforts to
Speaker 1: locate particular files will require examining many other files to
Speaker 1: exclude the possibility that the sought after data are concealed there.
Speaker 1: This does not mean that law enforcement can search electronic
Speaker 1: files where evidence is unlikely to be i e. If
Speaker 1: there is probable cause evidence will be found in text
Speaker 1: messages but not photos, then access to all data violates
Speaker 1: the particularity requirement. What courts have made resoundingly clear is
Speaker 1: whether a search warrant satisfies the particularity requirement depends on
Speaker 1: the facts and circumstances of the crime for which the
Speaker 1: warrant is being sought. Determining the permissible parameters of a
Speaker 1: cell phone search is a fact intensive inquiry and must
Speaker 1: be resolved based on the parteint particular facts of each case.
Speaker 1: Similar to the nexus of analysis, the inquiry can be
Speaker 1: based on the type of crime, the nature of the
Speaker 1: evidence sought, and the normal inferences about how far back
Speaker 1: in time the evidence can be found. Citing Commonwealth versus
Speaker 1: White four seventy five twenty sixteen B, the Apple search warrant,
Speaker 1: when considered with the search warrant AFFIDAVID and Exhibit A,
Speaker 1: satisfies the particularity requirement as mentioned above. IDAHO allows a
Speaker 1: search warrant affidavid to support the particularity requirement when the
Speaker 1: warrant references the apidavid for probable cause. There are no
Speaker 1: magic words for reference. As stated above, the Apple search
Speaker 1: warrant specifically referenced the search warrant affidavid and incorporated the
Speaker 1: Exhibit A with the words proof upon oath this day
Speaker 1: showing probable cause. When the Apple search warrant is considered
Speaker 1: along with the APIDAVID for probable cause and the twenty
Speaker 1: five page Exhibit A, the warrants are sufficiently particular and valid.
Speaker 1: While the Apple search warrant was broadly worded regarding each
Speaker 1: category of digital evidence listed the search warrant, Affidavid and
Speaker 1: Exhibit A provide the particularity necessary to satisfy the three
Speaker 1: factor tests set fourth in Teal. First, probable cause existed
Speaker 1: to seize all items of a particular type described in
Speaker 1: the warrant. The Apple Search warrants sought evidence of defendant's plans,
Speaker 1: thought process, research, locations, photos, or other pertinent information located
Speaker 1: on two Apple accounts shown to be associated with defendant.
Speaker 1: To determine the parameters of the court should look to
Speaker 1: the particular facts of the case. Based on the affidavid
Speaker 1: of probable cause, we know several facts. Defendant was a
Speaker 1: suspect in a burglary and homicide occurring at eleven twenty
Speaker 1: two King Rhode in Moscow, Idaho, Honor about November thirteenth,
Speaker 1: twenty twenty two. Defendant was the owner of two Apple
Speaker 1: iCloud accounts. Active pain set out with what information Apple
Speaker 1: captures in connection with an Apple ID. Two Apple iCloud
Speaker 1: accounts were accessed by the defendant leading up to the
Speaker 1: homicides and following the homicides, the defendant was seeking an
Speaker 1: advanced degree in criminology and had studied cloud based forensics
Speaker 1: prior to the crimes. Defendant had attempted to conceal his
Speaker 1: location during the time of the crimes. Together, the above
Speaker 1: established probable cause to search for evidence of defendant's plans,
Speaker 1: thought process, research, locations, photos, or other pertinent information located
Speaker 1: on two Apple accounts shown to be associated with defendant. Second,
Speaker 1: the warrant set out objective standards by which executing officers
Speaker 1: could differentiate items subject to seizure from those that were not.
Speaker 1: The seizure of items was limited to the crime for
Speaker 1: which the defendant was arrested. Investigation into burglary and our
Speaker 1: homicides at eleven twenty two King Roade in Moscow, Honor
Speaker 1: about November thirteenth, twenty twenty two. The temporal range of
Speaker 1: October seventh, twenty sixteen, dates accounts were created to December thirtieth,
Speaker 1: twenty twenty two. Date of Coberger's arrest was justified given
Speaker 1: the type of crime, nature of evidence sought, and normal
Speaker 1: inferences about how far back in time the evidence could
Speaker 1: be found. Third, the government was not able to describe
Speaker 1: the items more particularly, considering the information available to it
Speaker 1: at the time the warrant was issued, Detective Pain could
Speaker 1: not reasonably narrow the scope further. Since Detective Pain was
Speaker 1: seeking evidence that could be located in multiple formats in areas,
Speaker 1: and considering electronic data can be stored anywhere, it was
Speaker 1: impossible for Detective Pain to narrow down in advance the
Speaker 1: Apple areas that should be searched. As a result, if
Speaker 1: the court employs a common sense and realistic approach and
Speaker 1: not the hypertechnical approach the defense is suggesting, the court
Speaker 1: should find the Apple Search warrant passes the Teel test
Speaker 1: and sufficiently is particular. In summary, given the circumstances of
Speaker 1: this case, the Apple Search Warrant and its respective AFFI
Speaker 1: David and Exhibit A are so particular as can reasonably
Speaker 1: be expected, and therefore fall within the proper parameters set
Speaker 1: forth and Teal and consistently applied by other courts around
Speaker 1: the country. Unlike general exploratory warrants, the Apple Search warrant
Speaker 1: allow the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things
Speaker 1: which are authorized to be seized. Teal one forty five,
Speaker 1: Idaho nine ninety two one eight eight p Dot three
Speaker 1: d at nine twenty four. Thus suppression is not warranted
Speaker 1: conclusion based on the above, the State respectfully requests that
Speaker 1: the Court deny the defendant's motion to suppress the memorandum
Speaker 1: in support Apple account. Federal grand jury subpoena and search
Speaker 1: warrant dated August first, twenty twenty three. Respectfully submitted this
Speaker 1: sixth day of December twenty twenty four, and it was
Speaker 1: signed by Ashley Jennings. All of the information that those
Speaker 1: with this episode can be found in the description box.