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Speaker 1: Everyone. I'm Matt Ford, and welcome to the Good Trouble Show.

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I said I wouldn't do any more live shows, but

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here we are once again, so hopefully the train won't

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go too far off the tracks. Last week, the Congressional

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House Oversight Committee held a hearing on UAP. Retired Navy

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Rear Admiral Tim Galladett, former government official lou Elisondo, journalist

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Michael Schellenberger, and former NASA administrator Michael Gold testified in

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front of Congress with one clear message. UAPs are real

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and we can no longer ignore this problem despite the

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best efforts of the Pentagon and the IC to explain

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this away. Is stuff like balloon seagulls, airborne trash. Whatever.

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Congress of course smells bs from the Pedagon. Their excuse

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is stink and the source of this stench comes from

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the Pentagon's in house bullshit factory, otherwise known as ARROW

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or the All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office. ARROW, led by

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its former director, doctor Sean Kirkpatrick, perfected the art of

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shoveling cow dung to lawmakers and showing members of Congress

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what a UAP historical report written by a fifth grader

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looks like last December, doctor Kirkpatrick pulled the ripcord, resigning

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from Arrow sporting a nice golden parachute, landing himself a cushy,

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well paid job at oak Ridge National Laboratories, while continuing

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to shovel conspiracy theories about UAP, likely at the direction

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of the gatekeepers of the Deep Legacy UAP crash Retrieval

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and reverse engineering program. Speaking of gatekeepers, on the day

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of last week's congressional hearing, I issued a statement to

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members of Congress revealing that one of the UAP Legacy

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program gatekeepers was on doctor Kirkpatrick's double secret advisory board.

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Multiple confidential sources informed me that the former head of

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the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology was on Sean's

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secret panel. So is the very I mean think about

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it this way, the very Pentagon UAP office, which is

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supposed to function as the authorized recipient of classified whistleblower testimony,

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and I remind you the identities of the whistleblowers are

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supposed that are supposed to remain secret, is being advised.

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Think about this is being advised by one of the

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primary UAP gatekeepers for the Deep Legacy program. Its name's

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Glenn Gaffie, I mean you, Gaffney. You cannot make this

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stuff up. Today, a new director of ARROW, doctor John Koslowski,

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will be testifying at the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and

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Capabilities hearing shared by Senator Kirsten Jillbrandt. Will Arrow turn

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a new page under this new leadership. I don't know,

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I'm trying to be optimistic, but today we will air

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this hearing live and we'll be joined by two special guests,

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Seankhill and Vinnie Adams to unpack the goods. But first,

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please hit the subscribe ban thumbs up buttons on YouTube,

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leave a comment and let us know what you think

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about this episode. You can also find us on x

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at Good Trouble Show and everywhere else on the Internet

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at The Good Trouble Show. You can also find us

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wherever you enjoy your podcasts. Search for The Good Trouble

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Show with Matt Ford. And as always, if you would

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like to chip in to help keep the lights on,

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you can become a Patreon member of the Good Trouble

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Show by going to www dot patreon dot com, forward

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slash the Good Trouble Show, sign up and you can

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support our work. And yeah, we always need help with that.

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Our guests today are no strangers to the world of UAP.

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They've both been on The Good Trouble Show. Please welcome

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on your left retired US Navy Chief Master at Arms

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and witness to the famous tic TAC event Sean Kahill,

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and on your right the host of Disclosure Team and

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who was actually the very first guest on The Good

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Trouble Show, Vinnie Adams. Guys, thanks for joining us.

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Speaker 2: How are you good to be here?

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Speaker 3: Thank you, Matt? What was the pleasure?

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Speaker 1: Excellent? Excellent, glad glad to have you here. It looks

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like we're off to a to a rip roaring start.

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As I said, welcome back to the show. I want

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to before we dumped into this to this hearing here,

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and I'll bring it up. We still have the splash screen.

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Before we had nothing but nothing but static, so at

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least we have the splash screen, so that gives us

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some hope. But anyway, I want to talk about last

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week's hearing. Sean, what was your takeaway overall of the

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whole of the whole hearing? Do you think it moved

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the ball forward in terms of disclosure and overall public

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awareness of the UAP issue I did.

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Speaker 2: I think that what was said at the hearing is

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incredibly important. What we witnessed, as I'm fond of saying,

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was competent authority giving acknowledgment of probable non human intelligence

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specifically at least a crash retrieval program that ended up

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with biological retrieval as well. And I think having those

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things said in the public forum is very important. As

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always were very interested in what the closed door sessions

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afterward might yield.

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Speaker 1: Yeah. Absolutely, Vinnie, what was your take on the whole thing?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, you know, these are some witnesses that we would

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have liked to have seen some time ago. Is really

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good to see lou Alizondo under oath testifying, you know,

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with some really straight to the point facts and things

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that he stated. I think, like Sean said, it's important

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that things are happening behind closed doors.

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Speaker 3: You know.

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Speaker 4: I don't think there was a closed session at the

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time on the day, but I was led to believe

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that there were some individual meetings with some people, so

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hopefully the relevant information is now in the right hands

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to progress this forward.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and I thought too, like the overall like grouping

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of the witnesses, I mean, Admiral Tim Galladatt. I think

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his testimony was soon super important in that he brought

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up something that we were aware of before that he

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actually he went into Arrow for a meeting and and

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he felt like the whole thing was just a giant

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psychological operation, that was that he was being subjected to

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where they were trying to convince him that that the

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tic TAC was a balloon or blue technology or or whatnot.

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Now this was before John Koslowski, Doctor John Koslowski, This

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was the interim director of Arrow. Doctor I think doctor

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Tim Tim Phillips. But I thought I thought that Admiral

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Galadep's testimony was great. Of course lose Lose was great.

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That for me was was the highlight. And I have

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a question for both of you, what was the thing

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that you were most surprised about to hear coming out

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of the mouth of lou Elizondo. Sean, We'll start with you.

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Speaker 2: Well, I wouldn't say I was so much surprised as

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I was and vigored by his his his very direct

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answers to very direct questions. Mistrell Zano's put enough effort

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and enough investigation into this subject to understand that it's

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it's broader than the so called cover up that gentlemen

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like mister Kirkpatrick are fond of moving forward. There's more

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to it behind this, and mister Alesando gave him some

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very serious answers.

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Speaker 1: He did, and I think for me, like one of

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my big takeaways was the fact that he supported essentially

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what David Grush had claimed in terms of a crash

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retrieval program and all of that stuff. Any what were your.

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Speaker 4: Thoughts, Yeah, exactly that you know, lou has asked about

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the crush retrieval reverse engineering, and you know, he stated

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that he had signed some documentation or something in the

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past to not talk about it. Therefore, if there's nothing

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to see and how is there something to sign to

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not talk about it?

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Speaker 1: Do both of you feel? What's your take in terms

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of did this the ball down the field? Was it

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as far as you thought it would move? Of course?

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I think a lot of us we hope that these

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hearings will be like some kind of big bombshell, And

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I think in a way, like the way I kind

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of look at it is the hearings are the input

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and the legislative action is the output. So people come in,

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they testify to Congress, and hopefully at the end of

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the day there's some legislative action on that. What do

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you think, Sean, as far as like, did it move

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as far as you would have liked? Did it meet

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your expectations? What are your feelings on last week's hearing

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in that regard, I felt really.

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Speaker 2: Good about everything up until the point where lawmakers started

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asking how do we move forward with this? Who do

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we go to? Who do we talk to? For example,

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the chair of today's hearing, Senator Gillibrand, knows exactly how

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to get in touch with Lockheed Martin as she is

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landed one point three billion dollar deals within her district

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for them. So getting the CEO of Lockheed Martin under

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oath and subpoena and in front of excuse me, not

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in that order, of course, subpoena, under oath and in

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front of Congress should be a simple, normal daily task

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for these folks. I'm not sure why they don't know

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where to look when they're being told. If I may add,

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the Foreign Technology Division at right Patterson Air Force Base,

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the Secretary General, the Secretary of the Air Force, those

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people can and should be able to answer the questions

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at least that Congress has, especially behind closed doors.

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Speaker 1: Vinnie, how about you.

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Speaker 4: Well, I know one point of Representative Berlison, I think

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it was said, you know, we're holding these hearings to

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get answers from you to point us in the right direction.

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So hopefully they've got some more answers they can start

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honing in on the gatekeepers, knocking on the right doors,

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asking the right questions. That way, this ball will continue

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to move down the field. Otherwise we're going to just

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be stuttering and staggering every kind of twelve to sixteen

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months between the next hearings. So fingers crossed, we have

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some constant motion happening with people really going that's it.

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Speaker 1: Agreed, Okay, So today's testimony, and we'll cut to it

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as soon as it goes live. But this is the

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hearing of activities of the All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office,

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which is supposed to start in a few minutes. We

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understand that it may may be running late because the

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closed session occurred before this. But for the folks at

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home that have no idea what Arrow is or who

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doctor Sean Kirkpatrick was. Despite my very flowery description of

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doctor Sean Kirkpatrick, let's talk about arrow Sean if you would,

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and kind of like how it's previous director, doctor Sean

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Kirkpatrick seemingly was intent on getting to the truth of

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this whole UAP thing.

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Speaker 2: Well, I have to check my notes here because I

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always mess it up. But the All Domain Anomaly Resolution

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Office was set up in twenty twenty two. Mister Kirkpatrick

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was placed at the head of it, and they were

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tasked with, first of all their title, which was all

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Domains meaning air, sea, land, space, et cetera, of scrubbing

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the records and the historical records and finding a good

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picture of what was going on with UAP. That's the

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simplest way I can put it. And doctor Kirkpatrick seemed

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to have taken the job very lightly. At first, he

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seemed like he was going to put his due diligence

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in as a public servant. But then as time more by,

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he seemed to engage with a different aspect of it.

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Seemed to want to call out ufology and the people

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that were working on this as being crackpots, et cetera.

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And the air of a for lack of a better word,

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of dismissal seemed to come over the way that he

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was treating this very flippantly and not seriously whatsoever. And

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I think that's one of the reasons he's no longer

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the director.

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Speaker 1: I would certainly hope. So. I mean, Vina like when

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I started hearing like and it all started with his

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LinkedIn post where he just seemingly like went off the rails.

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I believe it was July of last year, June July

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somewhere last year. It seemed that he just he literally

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flipped on a dime, because I remember and one of

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his reports or commentary he was speaking about like you know,

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flying metal lorbs, things of that nature, stuff that obviously

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deserved some investigation, and then it was like he just

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flipped on a dime. Andy thoughts as to why do

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you think someone got to him? Do you think he

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just changed his mind or I don't know. I can't

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figure it out for the life of me.

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Speaker 4: No, it is very difficult. I mean, if you just

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look back to I think it was the nineteenth of

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April twenty twenty three, with the first sit down he

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had in the Senate Committee with Senator Gillibrand. He was

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airing some frustrations there with the lack of authorities that

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he had going after some of the data which he

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felt he needed for his investigations with Arrow. Maybe I

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think he might have even been he just didn't have

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any title fifty authorities at that time, so he seemed

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frustrated and needed to get them put into place to

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be able to gather all the information to really dig

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into the investigations. So maybe his frustrations just continued and

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grew from there. But you know, it was quite a

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short tenure.

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Speaker 3: Really.

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Speaker 4: A lot of it seemed rushed, a lot of it

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seemed frustrated. And I think we are better seeing the

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back of him now.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's I think so as well. And I think

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the thing that really sort of surprised me the most

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with all of this was this kind of like continual

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sort of disparaging of you know, members of Congress, people

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like David Grush and others by doctor Sean Kirkpatrick. It

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was even though he had exited the d D and

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worked for the was working for the Department of Energy,

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it was like he continued to be on this mission

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of really spreading conspiracy theories about about you know, the

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whole UAP thing, saying it's all circular reporting and whatnot.

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I mean Sean did any of that? Just seem odd

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that he was continue to message while he wasn't working

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for the Pentagon. You would think that they would have

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shut that down.

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Speaker 2: It seemed very odd to me, and not not to

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to be very careful with this. It sure seems like

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somebody that got put on the proverbial payroll to just

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start putting the bs out there, because that's not what

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an investigator does. And unless they called in someone that

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they knew was a yes man that when he went

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to investigate these things, was going to take the status

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quo answer of nothing to see here. If that's not

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the case, I have to ask is he is he

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negligent or is he wilfully ignorant?

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Speaker 3: I can't.

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Speaker 2: I can't tell with doctor Kirkpatrick, but the way he

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has acted since leaving the position is starting to make

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me think that it's more negligence and more wilful ignorance

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combined that there is something. There's an inside play of

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some kind here, gotcha?

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Speaker 1: Okay, So let's let's uh. I printed out doctor John

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Koslowski's bio and that, of course, as I understand that

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he is going to be the sole witness at this hearing,

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so doctor John T. Koslowski serves as the director of

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the All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office otherwise known as ZERO.

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Prior to that, doctor Koslowski held technical and leadership positions

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within the Research Directorate of the United Sorry of the

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National Security Agency. In that capacity, he led advanced mission

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oriented research in the fields of networking and computing and

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served as a subject matter expert in the area of

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free space optics. And I think probably sounds like somewhat

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like doctor Sean Kirkpatrick. With all of his laser work.

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He was advising various DoD agencies. In addition to his

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optics research and crypto mathematics, Doctor Koslowski invented an advanced

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language agnostic search engine and served at the DoD Special

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Communications Enterprise Office. Goes on to say here he received

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a bachelor's degree in mat addicts and physics from cal

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State University. Oh, here we go. It looks like we

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are going to the hearing. And if for some reason

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the feed drops out, everyone just tune tune into it

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at home.

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Speaker 5: ULL DO Million Anomaly Resolution Officer ARROW and Office Congress

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established in the fiscal year twenty twenty two and DAA

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to investigate this very serious problem of Unidentified anomalist phenomenon

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or UAP. Doctor Kozlowski comes to Arrow from the Research

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Directorate of the National Security Agency, where he worked in

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areas of optics research and cryptomthematics. He previously served at

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the DoD Special Communications Enterprise Office.

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Speaker 6: We look forward to regular engagements between you and the Committee.

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Speaker 5: When unidentified anomalist phenomenon enter our airspace, we need to

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know about it.

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Speaker 6: We need to identify it.

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Speaker 5: But in order to do that, we need to reduce

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the stigma and credibility challenges associated with these events. Our

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service members, scientists, foreign partners, and the general public need

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to know that their reporting, research and analysis will be

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taken seriously and acted on in good faith. In the

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spirit of transparency. ER recently released a consolidated annual report,

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just a few months after releasing the first volume of

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a historical record.

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Speaker 6: Report in March of this year.

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Speaker 5: These public documents help highlight the challenges still facing this office,

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including the lack of timely and actionable censor data, the

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need to resit the need to revisit places cases placed

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in the active archive, and the importance of improving reporting

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sources both in the interagency and internationally. In this hearing,

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I want to probe a series of specific issues. First,

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as incidents at Langley and elsewhere have demonstrated unmanned aerial

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systems or uas continued to pose significant threats to our

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national security. In addition to safety of flight issues, these

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uas create for our own pilots and aircrew. The uas

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present clear and undeniable counterintelligence concerns around some of the

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most sensitive airspace. While standard uas are not part of

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arrow's mission, your work on sensors at military installations across

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the country will be critical to making sure that we

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have the domain awareness necessary to accurately identify and track

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these objects. I expect your office to also play close

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attention to any anomaloust characteristics that these systems could present

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in the future. Second, I look forward to your presentation

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of three case studies demonstrating cases that ARO has resolved,

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including the Go Fast which is one of the most

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prominent UAP cases. However, I believe it is important to

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acknowledge ongoing public interest in the Nimitz incident, the Gimbal video,

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and other prominent UAP cases, and for ARROW to share

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what it can about those cases as well. It's also

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important that EROS speak to unresolved cases and what types

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of anomalist activity have merited further analysis. And while I

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know ARROW has gone through a period of transition over

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the past year, it is important to share these disclosures,

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both resolved and unresolved cases, with the public, even when

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a Senate hearing is not scheduled. Lastly, while some have

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been hesitant to come forward to ARROW in the past,

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I hope that potential individuals with firsthand knowledge of unreported

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programs view your arrival in this position as an opportunity

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for a new start. ARROW was created by Congress to

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do this work. Congress waived non disclosure agreements for those

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who disclose information to ARROW and gave ARROW the authority

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to go and turn over every rock. I hope those

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with information to share use this opportunity so that we,

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as your senators who represent you, can do our jobs.

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Speaker 6: I look forward to hearing more.

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Speaker 5: On these issues from doctor Kozlowski and for members to

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start a dialogue on this important topic.

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Speaker 6: With that, I'd like to turn to Senator Earns for

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her opening statement.

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Speaker 7: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you doctor Kozlowski. Our

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hearing today is about identifying UAPs and understanding their potential implications,

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which could range from technological advancements to potential threats to

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our national security. Are these phenomena tied to foreign adversaries

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such as China or Russia, leveraging advanced technologies beyond our

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current capabilities, or do they represent unknown scientific phenomena that

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challenge our current understanding. We must answer these critical questions

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to ensure that our national security is not compromised. It

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is vital that all agencies work in tandem to aggregate data,

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identify patterns, and develop robust analytical frameworks. Our ability to detect, track,

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and respond to UAPs requires the latest technology and full

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cooperation from all government branches. Thanks very much for your

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attention to this matter, and I look forward to the

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valuable insights that you and ERO can provide to our committee,

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and I yield back.

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Speaker 5: Thank you, Doctor Kuzosi, please make your opening statement.

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Speaker 8: Thank you Chairwoman jillibrand, Ranking Member Ernest, and distinguished members

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of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here

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on behalf of the Department of Defense. As the new

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Director of the All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office. I appreciate

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the opportunity to provide a status update on Arrow's work

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and respond to your questions about Unidentified Anomalist phenomenon or

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UAP on behalf of the Department and the entire AERO team,

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I want to say how grateful we are to Congress

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for its continued support. Unidentified objects in any domain posed

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potential threats to US safety and security.

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Speaker 3: Reports of UAP activity, particularly.

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Speaker 8: Near national security sites, must be treated seriously and investigated

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with scientific rigor by the US government. By way of introduction,

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I'm John Kozlowski. I'm a researcher at my core with

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an academic background in mathematics, physics, and engineering. I've spent

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most of my career at the National Security Agency, leading

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advanced research in the areas of optics, computing, and cryptomathematics.

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By nature, I am drawn to tough scientific problems, which

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is what brought me to ARROW and the UAP mission.

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Since I arrived at ARROW in August, I've been impressed

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by the breadth and depth of my team's experience and

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the framework they've established to rigorously analyze UAP reports. Arrow

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has taken meaningful steps to improve data collection and retention,

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bolster sensor development effectively, triage UAP reports and reduced the

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stigma of reporting UAP events. Last year, ERROW worked with

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the DoD's Joint Staff to issue guidance to defense personnel

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worldwide on how to report UAP observations and is working

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with the military services regarding implementation. Arrow has also launched

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a public website that features UAP imagery, case resolutions, material analysis,

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archival records, and more. These are only a few examples

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of arrow's recent progress, and we're just getting sty. To date,

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ARROW has over sixteen hundred UAP reports in its holdings

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from across the US government. I'll share a slide in

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just a few minutes with updated UAP analytic trends. You'll

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see that many reports resolve the commonplace objects like birds, balloons,

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and unmanned systems, while others lack sufficient data for comprehensive analysis.

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Although only a small percentage of reports received by ARROW

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are potentially anomalous, these are the cases that require significant

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time resources and a focused scientific inquiry by ARROW and

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its network of partners. It is important to underscore that

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to date, ARROW has not discovered any verifiable evidence of

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extraterrestrial beings, activity, or technology. To accomplish erro's National Security Mission.

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I have set three priorities for the office, building strong partnerships,

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promoting transparency, and scaling up the work of the Office.

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ARROW cannot do its work alone. Building partnerships across government, academia,

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and industry, and with the public is essential to the

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success of the office. Strong cooperation with the military services

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is particularly important. We rely on their support to implement

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our reporting guidance and to amplify the message that there

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should be zero stigma associated with UAP reporting. We also

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rely on partnerships with the national labs, the Office of

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the Director of National Intelligence FBI, Department of Homeland Security NASA,

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all of which play a role in the whole of

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government effort to address UAP. Recognizing the talent and expertise

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that reside outside of the government, ERROW will continue to

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explore new ways to partner with the academic and scientific

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communities to investigate its most complex UAP cases. A related

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priority for ERRO is transparency. Our ability to collaborate with

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key partners, including the scientific community and the public, relies

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on information sharing to include downgrading and declassifying UAP related information.

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In some cases, it may be unclear to the public.

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Why the deals classified a piece of information in the

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first place. Why are photos of seemingly benign objects such

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as balloons classified. It's often the case that an object

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or phenomenon isn't itself a security concern, but the location, source,

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or method used to capture it is still sensitive. Many

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cases are difficult to quickly release to the public, but

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are reported to the appropriate committees in Congress that are

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authorized by law or House and Senate leadership to receive

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the information. It is important to note that AERO does

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not unilaterally declassify information. Instead, we work with the originator

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of a classified record to ensure that declassifying that record

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does not inadvertently harm national security. This can take time. Nonetheless,

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the Department is committed to declassifying and publicly sharing more

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information on UAP while protecting sensitive sources and methods. I'll

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be sharing some newly declassified imagery in just a few minutes.

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ERO is also working closely with the National Archives and

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Records Administration to make UAP related documents publicly available in

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a digitized collection. Meanwhile, ARROW continues to review the US

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historical record relating to UAP. We welcome any former or

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current government civilian, contractor or military service member with relevant

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information to reach out to us at www dot Arrow

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dot MILL. My final priority is scaling up Arrow's work

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to match its mission. Arrow needs to bolster the quantity, quality,

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and diversity of data that it acquires and examines. This

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means tapping into existing data sources within the interagency, while

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deploying Arrow's own organic sensor capabilities to the extent that

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UAP results from the domain awareness gaps. More and better

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data will help us fill those gaps and help us

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understand what is being encountered. In closing, ERROW is committed

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to the highest standards of scientific integrity. We will not

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foreclose on any explanation for UAPP prematurely. We will continue

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to follow the science and data wherever they lead. We

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will continue to have an open and frank dialogue with

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Congress in settings like these and in classified briefings. We

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will continue to keep you fully and currently informed of

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all UAP information, active or historical. And finally, we will

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share as much information as possible at the unclassified level

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to inform the public of errow's activities and its findings.

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For now, I'd like to turn to a brief presentation

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of UAP trends and cases, and then I'd be happy

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to take questions.

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Speaker 3: Okay.

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Speaker 8: This chart represents the UAP reporting since nineteen ninety six,

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and as has previously been discussed by AERO, that sense

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replacement seems to have caused a bias in our data,

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both geographic and at altitude, and we're working to resolve

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that bias in twenty twenty five or reduce that bias

477
00:28:02,880 --> 00:28:05,359
through broader engagements with the DoD as well as the

478
00:28:05,680 --> 00:28:08,759
IC and the rest of the government, also by incorporating

479
00:28:08,799 --> 00:28:12,160
broader sensors into our data, and through a public reporting

480
00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:15,079
mechanism that we hope to have live in mid twenty

481
00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:19,720
twenty five. On the left side shows the altitudes and

482
00:28:19,759 --> 00:28:22,960
we'll see a bit cut off. We'll see that most

483
00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:25,640
of the reporting occurs between fifteen thousand and twenty five

484
00:28:25,640 --> 00:28:28,160
thousand feet. That happens to be where most of our

485
00:28:28,200 --> 00:28:33,279
sensors are, and the reporting above and below that is

486
00:28:33,319 --> 00:28:37,480
also often coming from those same platforms. In the center,

487
00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:41,400
we'll see that the resolve cases have the vast majority

488
00:28:41,400 --> 00:28:46,240
being balloons and uas. We're seeing a great increase in

489
00:28:46,440 --> 00:28:50,720
satellites recently, particularly with the launch of Mega satellite constellations

490
00:28:50,759 --> 00:28:54,240
such as Starlink, where the satellites are catching what is

491
00:28:54,319 --> 00:28:58,920
called satellite flares or glint off the sun just after

492
00:28:59,039 --> 00:29:02,960
sunset or just before or sunrise. And on the rightmost

493
00:29:03,160 --> 00:29:06,240
we'll see the morphology or the shapes that have been reported.

494
00:29:06,559 --> 00:29:11,319
The majority have been lights or orbs. We think that

495
00:29:11,359 --> 00:29:14,119
there's going to be a increase in the lights with

496
00:29:14,200 --> 00:29:17,359
the mega constellations. But our most interesting cases, some of

497
00:29:17,400 --> 00:29:21,480
which I'll discuss later, are actually the shapes such as

498
00:29:21,519 --> 00:29:25,000
the triangles or the cylinders. And at the bottom we'll

499
00:29:25,000 --> 00:29:28,319
see the geographic bias that I mentioned before, where most

500
00:29:28,319 --> 00:29:31,799
of the reports historically had been near the government sites.

501
00:29:32,680 --> 00:29:35,839
This bias has been reduced recently by reporting from the FAA.

502
00:29:36,359 --> 00:29:39,960
We now get weekly reports from them, and great thank

503
00:29:40,000 --> 00:29:42,599
you to our aviators for making those reports. It helps

504
00:29:42,599 --> 00:29:43,559
our analysis quite a bit.

505
00:29:46,559 --> 00:29:46,680
Speaker 3: OK.

506
00:29:46,960 --> 00:29:49,799
Speaker 8: A case that we thought would be a trans medium

507
00:29:49,880 --> 00:29:52,039
case as it was reported, is well known on the outside,

508
00:29:52,079 --> 00:29:55,640
known as the Puerto Rico case, was data collected in

509
00:29:55,720 --> 00:29:59,400
twenty thirteen when a Customs and Border Patrol aircraft observed

510
00:29:59,400 --> 00:30:04,079
an object flying near an airport in Puerto Rico. The

511
00:30:04,519 --> 00:30:07,680
green line in this diagram is the track that the

512
00:30:07,680 --> 00:30:10,839
airplane was taking, and those many crossed lines are the

513
00:30:10,920 --> 00:30:14,400
directions that the camera was facing at the time that

514
00:30:14,440 --> 00:30:17,400
the airplane was flying around the airport, and we'll watch

515
00:30:17,440 --> 00:30:20,759
the video in just a moment. The orange arrow in

516
00:30:20,759 --> 00:30:23,680
the center is where we assess that the UAP was

517
00:30:23,759 --> 00:30:27,000
actually flying, and trans medium means that it goes from

518
00:30:27,079 --> 00:30:29,279
one domain into another. In this case, it looks like

519
00:30:29,359 --> 00:30:31,400
it goes from the air into the water and then

520
00:30:31,440 --> 00:30:33,839
back into the air. We assessed that it was actually

521
00:30:33,839 --> 00:30:41,119
flying over the airport the entire time, and this video

522
00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:45,319
was taken with infrared, and what appears to be the

523
00:30:45,480 --> 00:30:48,480
trans medium part where it goes into the water, is

524
00:30:50,079 --> 00:30:53,400
actually where the temperature of the water is equal to

525
00:30:53,440 --> 00:30:55,720
the temperature of the object, and the camera can no

526
00:30:55,759 --> 00:30:58,440
longer distinguish between the two. It's not that the object

527
00:30:58,519 --> 00:31:02,119
actually goes into the water, and so we assess that

528
00:31:02,200 --> 00:31:06,920
the object, likely a pair of balloons or sky lanterns,

529
00:31:07,000 --> 00:31:09,440
was floating at about seven knots over the airport and

530
00:31:09,440 --> 00:31:14,079
descending to about two hundred meters. And this video will

531
00:31:14,119 --> 00:31:17,839
be released and our report will be released later this year.

532
00:31:18,279 --> 00:31:22,599
The go fast was captured the public attention and congressional

533
00:31:22,640 --> 00:31:25,960
attention when it was made public in twenty seventeen, looks

534
00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:29,519
like an object flying very fast over the water, very

535
00:31:29,559 --> 00:31:34,240
close to the water. Through a very careful geospatial intelligence

536
00:31:34,279 --> 00:31:37,839
analysis using trigonometry, we assess with high confidence that the

537
00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:40,799
app object is not actually close to the water, but

538
00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:45,119
is rather closer to thirteen thousand feet. Diagram here shows

539
00:31:45,920 --> 00:31:50,480
as the platform is flying and capturing the object. If

540
00:31:50,519 --> 00:31:53,200
it is closer to the platform at a higher altitude,

541
00:31:53,799 --> 00:31:56,480
a trick of the eye called parallax makes it look

542
00:31:56,519 --> 00:31:59,240
like the object is moving much faster, and so we've

543
00:31:59,279 --> 00:32:02,200
written a detail tailed paper on parallax released that on

544
00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:04,440
our website so that the public can literally check our

545
00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:09,599
math on this analysis. An interesting case which I don't

546
00:32:09,599 --> 00:32:14,400
believe the public is familiar with, is captured in twenty

547
00:32:14,440 --> 00:32:18,720
eighteen from a UAV flying the Mediterranean watching Mount Etna

548
00:32:18,799 --> 00:32:21,759
as it was erupting, and it appears that that object

549
00:32:21,839 --> 00:32:26,000
is flying through the plume of superheated gas and ash.

550
00:32:26,559 --> 00:32:29,119
This was a rather difficult case to resolve. We had

551
00:32:29,200 --> 00:32:32,039
to pull in support from a number of IC and

552
00:32:32,160 --> 00:32:33,799
S and T partners and even reach out to a

553
00:32:33,880 --> 00:32:39,279
volcanologist and through very detailed three D modeling and pixel

554
00:32:39,319 --> 00:32:42,319
by pixel analysis of the object as it's traversing across

555
00:32:42,319 --> 00:32:45,559
the clouds. They assessed that the object was actually one

556
00:32:45,640 --> 00:32:47,880
hundred and seventy meters away from the plume and not

557
00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:53,079
flying through it. And to be clear, AERO does not

558
00:32:53,160 --> 00:32:55,960
believe every object is a bird, a balloon, or a UAV.

559
00:32:56,039 --> 00:32:58,119
We do have some very anomalous objects. It's just the

560
00:32:58,240 --> 00:33:00,920
nature of resolution. We can only resolve things that we understand.

561
00:33:01,279 --> 00:33:03,839
So we're now working on additional products where we can

562
00:33:03,960 --> 00:33:07,720
inform the public, Congress and others of the objects as

563
00:33:07,720 --> 00:33:14,440
we're studying them, rather than once we've resolved them. With that,

564
00:33:14,519 --> 00:33:15,400
I'll take your questions.

565
00:33:15,519 --> 00:33:16,720
Speaker 6: Thank you, doctor Kaslowski.

566
00:33:16,759 --> 00:33:23,599
Speaker 5: I appreciate your testimony. It's been widely reported that individuals

567
00:33:23,599 --> 00:33:26,920
claiming first tail and knowledge of unreported UAP programs have

568
00:33:27,000 --> 00:33:30,400
been reluctant to engage with ARROW. What message do you

569
00:33:30,400 --> 00:33:32,640
have for those individuals and how we work to gain

570
00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:33,160
their trust.

571
00:33:36,480 --> 00:33:39,519
Speaker 8: I would let them know that Congress has gone out

572
00:33:39,519 --> 00:33:42,920
of its way to create the organization AERO specifically to

573
00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:46,359
conduct these sorts of investigations and has uniquely empowered them

574
00:33:46,799 --> 00:33:49,839
to have access to all UAP related information, whether that's

575
00:33:49,960 --> 00:33:54,400
historic or current, and we take that responsibility and those

576
00:33:54,440 --> 00:33:58,519
authorities very seriously, and so we have been reaching out

577
00:33:58,680 --> 00:34:01,640
to a broader community cocouraging folks who had talked to

578
00:34:01,920 --> 00:34:04,920
Aero personnel in the past and maybe felt uncomfortable to

579
00:34:05,000 --> 00:34:08,679
come back to us. We've met with several of their

580
00:34:08,719 --> 00:34:11,920
interlocktors and a couple of firsthand witnesses, and we are

581
00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:14,519
making great progress in those first hand witnesses that we

582
00:34:14,599 --> 00:34:17,440
have talked to do feel comfortable coming back to us,

583
00:34:17,840 --> 00:34:20,159
and so we hope that more folks that do have

584
00:34:20,239 --> 00:34:25,599
information would go to www dot Aero dot mill, fill

585
00:34:25,639 --> 00:34:27,880
out the form, send it to us so we can

586
00:34:27,920 --> 00:34:30,519
bring them in for interviews and add their information to

587
00:34:30,519 --> 00:34:31,440
our investigations.

588
00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:32,159
Speaker 1: Thank you.

589
00:34:32,599 --> 00:34:36,079
Speaker 5: I recently just read your report from March, your historic Report,

590
00:34:36,480 --> 00:34:39,000
and I would encourage anyone who's interested in this topic

591
00:34:39,039 --> 00:34:42,079
to read the report, because when I was asked by

592
00:34:42,079 --> 00:34:44,280
a reporter about it, they said, well, it doesn't show

593
00:34:44,320 --> 00:34:47,679
any evidence of secret programs that have aliens.

594
00:34:48,800 --> 00:34:50,239
Speaker 6: That's not how I read the report.

595
00:34:50,280 --> 00:34:52,480
Speaker 5: What I read the report is the US government took

596
00:34:52,519 --> 00:34:56,320
citings extremely seriously over the last seventy five years, put

597
00:34:56,360 --> 00:34:59,320
some of the greatest minds ever to analyze these cases,

598
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:03,719
because they have assess them as some deeply unknown phenomena

599
00:35:04,159 --> 00:35:06,199
that may or may not cause threats, that may or

600
00:35:06,239 --> 00:35:08,719
may not be related to adversaries, but are certainly something

601
00:35:08,760 --> 00:35:11,519
that the US government need to know about. And what

602
00:35:11,599 --> 00:35:14,719
I read from this report is that we resolved numbers

603
00:35:14,760 --> 00:35:17,000
of cases, but in almost every instance, whether it was

604
00:35:17,039 --> 00:35:19,840
in the forties, the fifties, the sixties, the seventies, the eighties,

605
00:35:19,880 --> 00:35:21,360
the nineties, the knots.

606
00:35:21,599 --> 00:35:23,239
Speaker 6: Half the cases were unresolved.

607
00:35:23,360 --> 00:35:25,760
Speaker 5: So I don't think this is an example of the

608
00:35:25,760 --> 00:35:28,239
government not taking these cases seriously. I think this is

609
00:35:28,280 --> 00:35:31,519
an example of our government spending seventy five years taking

610
00:35:31,519 --> 00:35:35,159
these cases very seriously. And interestingly, for the group that

611
00:35:35,159 --> 00:35:37,400
put together this report, they didn't have access to any

612
00:35:37,440 --> 00:35:42,679
first hand reporting, and so from my perspective, for whistleblowers

613
00:35:42,719 --> 00:35:45,119
and people who want to commit police comm in because

614
00:35:45,599 --> 00:35:48,079
the purpose of ARROW is so that the Senators can

615
00:35:48,119 --> 00:35:52,440
do our job to provide oversight, accountability, and transparency, we

616
00:35:52,519 --> 00:35:56,599
find it very concerning that our pilots, that our Navy officers,

617
00:35:56,679 --> 00:36:00,519
that people who have sightings of UAPs are dead integrated,

618
00:36:00,960 --> 00:36:06,880
are somehow dismissed or disregarded. They need to be protected.

619
00:36:07,079 --> 00:36:10,760
This is a huge issue for national security because number one,

620
00:36:10,840 --> 00:36:15,039
we don't have domain awareness, which is very problematic. Number Two,

621
00:36:16,039 --> 00:36:19,440
we don't have domain superiority if we don't understand how

622
00:36:19,440 --> 00:36:23,599
different UAPs are flying, what technology they're using, what their

623
00:36:23,639 --> 00:36:27,760
mission is, what their purpose is. And at the base level,

624
00:36:27,960 --> 00:36:31,159
we have so many UAPs around our bases, around our

625
00:36:31,159 --> 00:36:34,360
military sites, around our nuclear sites, that it's deeply disturbing

626
00:36:34,719 --> 00:36:38,119
that adversaries, at a minimum, could be using these opportunities

627
00:36:38,159 --> 00:36:42,079
to spy, to glean intelligence that will harm our long

628
00:36:42,159 --> 00:36:46,480
term national security. So I'm grateful that you're taking the

629
00:36:46,519 --> 00:36:49,800
whistleblowers very seriously. I'm grateful that AERO is trying its

630
00:36:49,840 --> 00:36:56,159
best to integrate the private sector the public into their work. Interestingly,

631
00:36:56,199 --> 00:36:59,079
in this hearing, we heard that the FAA is now

632
00:36:59,079 --> 00:37:01,760
working hand in glove, which is very helpful. We want

633
00:37:02,599 --> 00:37:07,719
this public facing accessibility to be put in place by

634
00:37:07,719 --> 00:37:10,639
twenty twenty five so that people can upload their videos,

635
00:37:10,679 --> 00:37:13,840
their data, their reports. I've met with people who have

636
00:37:13,880 --> 00:37:18,559
followed this issue for decades and they have thousands of examples,

637
00:37:18,719 --> 00:37:22,440
thousands of pieces of data that Ultimately, I want uploaded

638
00:37:22,480 --> 00:37:25,880
into ARROW so you can cross reference historic information with

639
00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:29,280
current information. Because this group at ARROW are the best

640
00:37:29,360 --> 00:37:32,920
scientists that we can find anywhere, and they will do

641
00:37:32,960 --> 00:37:34,280
the work that's needed to be done.

642
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:36,119
Speaker 6: So I just want to thank you for that. And

643
00:37:36,159 --> 00:37:37,920
then with my last forty two.

644
00:37:37,800 --> 00:37:41,239
Speaker 5: Seconds, can you tell us about any of the cases

645
00:37:41,280 --> 00:37:44,679
that merit further analysis by your ic in science and

646
00:37:44,719 --> 00:37:45,800
technology partners?

647
00:37:46,159 --> 00:37:48,360
Speaker 6: What is it that makes these cases anomalist?

648
00:37:48,840 --> 00:37:51,000
Speaker 5: And a large number of reports are placed in the

649
00:37:51,119 --> 00:37:54,440
active archive because AERO does not have enough information. What

650
00:37:54,519 --> 00:37:56,280
might prompt you to reopen a case like that?

651
00:37:56,440 --> 00:37:57,559
Speaker 6: And do you have any examples?

652
00:37:59,079 --> 00:38:01,599
Speaker 8: Sure, I'll start with the active archive case. So that

653
00:38:01,800 --> 00:38:03,760
is just the place where we put cases where we

654
00:38:03,760 --> 00:38:06,760
don't have enough scientific information to resolve them at that time.

655
00:38:06,800 --> 00:38:09,800
But we're always looking for opportunities to correlate them to

656
00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:12,280
new cases that come in as the new cases come in,

657
00:38:12,320 --> 00:38:15,480
as well as enriched those cases with additional data. We

658
00:38:15,519 --> 00:38:18,760
do have one example that I'm aware of where we

659
00:38:18,760 --> 00:38:21,800
were able to correlate a number of observations of interesting

660
00:38:21,880 --> 00:38:24,880
lights in the sky and eventually we concluded that it

661
00:38:24,920 --> 00:38:29,000
was multiple people observing starlink flares. Just as an example,

662
00:38:29,519 --> 00:38:32,880
three cases that merit analysis that we're working on right now.

663
00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:35,320
One we might be in the process of resolving, but

664
00:38:35,360 --> 00:38:38,400
nonetheless is still interesting. The first one was brought to

665
00:38:38,480 --> 00:38:40,920
us by a law enforcement officer out west where he

666
00:38:41,079 --> 00:38:44,800
observed a large orange ORB floating several hundred feet above

667
00:38:44,840 --> 00:38:47,920
the ground a couple miles away. He went to investigate

668
00:38:48,440 --> 00:38:51,440
what was going on with that orb, and as he

669
00:38:51,559 --> 00:38:53,480
was pulling up to the location where he thought would

670
00:38:53,480 --> 00:38:57,280
be below the orb, about forty to sixty meters away

671
00:38:57,280 --> 00:39:01,199
from some object that was the area was well lit,

672
00:39:01,280 --> 00:39:03,840
he saw a blacker than black object. He said it

673
00:39:03,880 --> 00:39:05,679
was about the size of a Prius, four to six

674
00:39:05,719 --> 00:39:09,719
feet wide, and as he got forty to sixty meters

675
00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:11,960
away from the object, it tilted up about forty five

676
00:39:12,000 --> 00:39:15,360
degrees and then it shot up vertically. He says, ten

677
00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:17,880
to one hundred times faster than any drone he's ever

678
00:39:17,920 --> 00:39:20,599
seen before. And it did that without making a sound

679
00:39:20,639 --> 00:39:22,559
as far as he could tell from inside of his vehicle,

680
00:39:22,960 --> 00:39:26,159
And just as it left his field of view through

681
00:39:26,280 --> 00:39:30,320
his windshield, then it emitted very bright red and blue

682
00:39:30,400 --> 00:39:33,199
lights that he limited he illuminated the inside of his

683
00:39:33,280 --> 00:39:37,400
vehicle as brightly as if someone had set off fireworks

684
00:39:37,440 --> 00:39:41,480
just outside his vehicle or street flares. So that's anomalous

685
00:39:41,519 --> 00:39:44,039
because of the size of the vehicle with the great acceleration.

686
00:39:44,280 --> 00:39:46,320
And when he came back to investigate that area, he

687
00:39:46,360 --> 00:39:49,800
found no disturbance of the ground beneath it. So that's

688
00:39:49,800 --> 00:39:53,480
one interesting one. Another one comes to us from southeast US.

689
00:39:54,079 --> 00:39:56,800
There was a US facility where two cars of government

690
00:39:56,880 --> 00:39:59,719
contractors were leaving the facility around nine o'clock in the morning.

691
00:40:00,679 --> 00:40:03,639
They looked up in the sky and saw a large

692
00:40:03,960 --> 00:40:08,159
metallic cylinder about the size of a commercial airplane, and

693
00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:11,360
it was stationary. They observed that there was a very

694
00:40:11,360 --> 00:40:15,039
bright white light behind or around the object. They saw

695
00:40:15,039 --> 00:40:19,679
it stationary for fifteen to twenty seconds, and then it disappeared. Obviously,

696
00:40:19,719 --> 00:40:23,280
an object that large stationary unless it's a blimp, is unusual.

697
00:40:23,320 --> 00:40:25,679
But then disappearing, we can't explain how that would happen.

698
00:40:26,440 --> 00:40:31,360
And then the last case was interesting. We had a

699
00:40:31,360 --> 00:40:34,679
aircraft that was flying parallel to another aircraft and it

700
00:40:34,719 --> 00:40:39,360
was capturing imagery of it, and a small looking object

701
00:40:39,360 --> 00:40:41,800
appeared to fly between the two of them, much faster

702
00:40:41,920 --> 00:40:45,440
than them through very careful analysis, we think that the

703
00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:48,920
object might have actually been further away than the object

704
00:40:48,920 --> 00:40:53,360
that it was videotaping, But it requires very careful analysis

705
00:40:53,400 --> 00:40:55,039
to come to those conclusions, and we don't have the

706
00:40:55,079 --> 00:40:57,559
metadata to support that yet.

707
00:40:59,199 --> 00:41:04,159
Speaker 7: Senator earned Yes, thank you, Madam Chair and doctor Kosloski.

708
00:41:04,280 --> 00:41:08,320
You mentioned that you do work with the intelligence community.

709
00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:15,599
You're working with the FAA. Has AERO involved academia. Have

710
00:41:15,719 --> 00:41:20,760
you gone to universities? Do you have outside organizations that

711
00:41:20,840 --> 00:41:24,039
you are working with, and if so, can you walk

712
00:41:24,159 --> 00:41:26,119
us through some of that collaboration.

713
00:41:27,840 --> 00:41:28,119
Speaker 5: Sure?

714
00:41:28,280 --> 00:41:31,400
Speaker 8: Right now, most of our collaborations that are peering towards

715
00:41:31,440 --> 00:41:36,000
academia are with your university affiliated research centers associated with

716
00:41:36,760 --> 00:41:41,079
universities or with ffrdcs. Our partnership with universities, I would say,

717
00:41:41,119 --> 00:41:44,480
is lacking right now. We have some one off associations

718
00:41:44,519 --> 00:41:49,800
with university professors. However, that's our fault, and it's largely

719
00:41:49,840 --> 00:41:52,440
because of the need to declassify data. We need to

720
00:41:52,440 --> 00:41:55,719
give the professors something to work on before we can

721
00:41:55,800 --> 00:41:59,760
really engage them. So we're working significantly on a declassification effort.

722
00:42:00,119 --> 00:42:03,960
Hired a number of declassification experts, and we're going to

723
00:42:04,000 --> 00:42:05,800
be trying to get cases like the ones that I

724
00:42:05,920 --> 00:42:09,360
just discussed here declassified so that we can engage with

725
00:42:09,440 --> 00:42:12,679
the universities on a regular basis and provide them the data.

726
00:42:13,079 --> 00:42:15,119
Talking to a scientist without data is going to be

727
00:42:15,199 --> 00:42:18,039
rather disappointing. So hopefully in twenty twenty five will be

728
00:42:18,159 --> 00:42:19,400
increasing those efforts.

729
00:42:19,159 --> 00:42:21,280
Speaker 7: Right, Well, I appreciate that. I think there's a huge

730
00:42:21,320 --> 00:42:24,840
pool of talent out there that you should tap into.

731
00:42:25,960 --> 00:42:30,239
Given the publics growing concern and interest in UAPs, how

732
00:42:30,280 --> 00:42:34,079
do you balance the need for the transparency that our

733
00:42:34,119 --> 00:42:38,960
public is demanding with the potential risks of revealing classified

734
00:42:39,039 --> 00:42:40,000
defense information.

735
00:42:41,719 --> 00:42:43,559
Speaker 8: Yeah, that's always a concern that's on the front of

736
00:42:43,559 --> 00:42:45,760
our minds. We want to make sure that we're deconflicting

737
00:42:46,519 --> 00:42:49,559
both on potential US programs and what the IC might

738
00:42:49,599 --> 00:42:54,280
be tracking for adversarial programs as we're aggregating that information

739
00:42:54,360 --> 00:42:57,920
and preparing to share it. However, oftentimes we can remove

740
00:42:58,280 --> 00:43:02,400
the discussion of the unidentify an anomaloust activity from the

741
00:43:02,440 --> 00:43:05,440
sensitive information that our partners are concerned with, and that's

742
00:43:05,480 --> 00:43:08,079
usually going to be the platforms that the information was

743
00:43:08,079 --> 00:43:11,039
collected with. If it is a truly anomalist and so

744
00:43:11,119 --> 00:43:14,679
we have our partners working alongside in the declassification of

745
00:43:14,719 --> 00:43:15,199
that data.

746
00:43:16,000 --> 00:43:16,440
Speaker 3: Very good.

747
00:43:16,559 --> 00:43:20,360
Speaker 7: And then without having to explain the UAP, what do

748
00:43:20,400 --> 00:43:25,639
we need to begin really doing about them? What precautions

749
00:43:25,639 --> 00:43:28,599
can we take, what should we be doing about them?

750
00:43:29,920 --> 00:43:34,159
Speaker 8: I think that removing the stigma. Reducing the stigma is

751
00:43:34,199 --> 00:43:35,679
the first step. We need to make sure that we're

752
00:43:35,679 --> 00:43:39,599
having honest and transparent conversations about them, because if we're

753
00:43:39,880 --> 00:43:43,239
hesitant to discuss them, then it opens the opportunity for

754
00:43:44,159 --> 00:43:48,400
an adversary, as you mentioned earlier, Senator Jillibrand, to come

755
00:43:48,440 --> 00:43:52,039
in and conduct some activity. So we need to do that,

756
00:43:52,159 --> 00:43:55,480
and we need to have more persistent monitoring and understand

757
00:43:55,559 --> 00:44:00,719
that whether it is a UAP or a counter UAS issue,

758
00:44:01,199 --> 00:44:04,840
that we need to have that complete domain awareness around

759
00:44:04,840 --> 00:44:06,440
our national security facilities.

760
00:44:06,519 --> 00:44:08,599
Speaker 7: Wonderful, Thank you, Thank you, Madam Chair.

761
00:44:10,159 --> 00:44:13,559
Speaker 5: Just a couple of follow up questions we didn't discuss

762
00:44:13,599 --> 00:44:21,159
in this setting. The most recent UAP or UAS encounter

763
00:44:22,039 --> 00:44:27,679
with bases like Langley. I know that the incursion by

764
00:44:28,079 --> 00:44:31,880
UASS that were publicly made available through the press that

765
00:44:32,000 --> 00:44:36,400
took over two weeks was fairly alarming to senators because

766
00:44:37,519 --> 00:44:39,800
there was a question about what technology they were using,

767
00:44:39,880 --> 00:44:41,559
There was a technic, there was a question about why

768
00:44:41,639 --> 00:44:44,679
it was so hard to detect. Can you speak to

769
00:44:45,519 --> 00:44:49,559
how ARROW will be integrated into the review of these

770
00:44:49,639 --> 00:44:52,719
kinds of cases and how you can be helpful to

771
00:44:52,800 --> 00:44:56,199
both the intelligence community and the Department of Defense in

772
00:44:56,360 --> 00:44:59,840
analyzing or being able to more quickly analyze what's no

773
00:45:00,239 --> 00:45:03,159
and what's not knowable so that because once you do

774
00:45:03,280 --> 00:45:06,199
identify it as a drone, for example, it then goes

775
00:45:06,320 --> 00:45:09,320
to the right department a DoD or the intelligence community

776
00:45:09,400 --> 00:45:12,199
to assess, deal with, or take down as the incident

777
00:45:12,280 --> 00:45:14,920
might be. But talk to us a little bit about

778
00:45:14,960 --> 00:45:17,519
what role you can play for the both the DoD

779
00:45:17,639 --> 00:45:22,840
and the IC community in these kinds of incursions that

780
00:45:22,920 --> 00:45:25,079
are happening when we don't know what tech is being

781
00:45:25,159 --> 00:45:27,559
used and we don't understand a flight pattern or we

782
00:45:27,599 --> 00:45:31,039
don't understand how they arrive and depart in the way

783
00:45:31,039 --> 00:45:31,360
they do.

784
00:45:33,519 --> 00:45:37,039
Speaker 8: Yeah, we are generally going to be supporting them through

785
00:45:37,079 --> 00:45:40,639
an advisory capacity as an organization that naturally needs to

786
00:45:40,679 --> 00:45:45,000
conduct baseline experiments of the environment to see what normal

787
00:45:45,079 --> 00:45:50,559
looks like, whether it's balloons, birds, anomalist activity, or drones

788
00:45:50,559 --> 00:45:53,400
flying through an environment. We're going to gather a lot

789
00:45:53,440 --> 00:45:56,559
of data that will allow us to characterize an environment

790
00:45:56,800 --> 00:46:00,480
very well and then detect and follow those tracks, hopefully

791
00:46:00,559 --> 00:46:03,239
rather efficiently. There's also a lot of overlap in the

792
00:46:03,280 --> 00:46:05,400
type of sensors that are going to be used for

793
00:46:05,480 --> 00:46:08,480
the counter UAS mission and the UAP mission, whether that's

794
00:46:09,320 --> 00:46:13,760
active detection like radars or passive like cameras, and so

795
00:46:13,800 --> 00:46:16,880
as ERO is trying to push the bounds on detectability

796
00:46:16,920 --> 00:46:20,480
for UAP, We're hopefully going to have best practices that

797
00:46:20,519 --> 00:46:24,440
we can also provide to the counter UAS, and potentially

798
00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:27,599
we might have additional technologies that we can offer them

799
00:46:27,599 --> 00:46:28,519
to support.

800
00:46:31,840 --> 00:46:33,920
Speaker 5: I'd like to just address a little bit of reporting

801
00:46:33,960 --> 00:46:38,039
and feedback. As you know, Ero is required to develop

802
00:46:38,079 --> 00:46:41,960
a mechanism for the public to report UAP information. Now

803
00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:44,880
that that mechanism for current and former military, civilian and

804
00:46:44,880 --> 00:46:48,480
contractor personnel has been established, can you speak to Arrow's

805
00:46:48,519 --> 00:46:51,320
plans for a public reporting mechanism and how did ARROW

806
00:46:51,360 --> 00:46:55,960
arrive at this approach and were other options considered? And second,

807
00:46:56,039 --> 00:46:58,840
for pilots and operators who have reported a UAP, what

808
00:46:58,960 --> 00:47:02,440
feedback if any Arrow provided to these individuals related to

809
00:47:02,440 --> 00:47:04,960
what ERO is doing with their report and how the

810
00:47:05,000 --> 00:47:07,920
report has been resolved. How does such feedback or lack

811
00:47:08,000 --> 00:47:10,360
thereof impact the frequency of UAP reporting.

812
00:47:12,320 --> 00:47:16,159
Speaker 8: Yeah, the public reporting mechanism that we've decided to go

813
00:47:16,199 --> 00:47:18,960
with is going to look similar to the reporting mechanism

814
00:47:18,960 --> 00:47:21,880
that we currently have for historical events, where we're going

815
00:47:21,960 --> 00:47:24,880
to ask folks to go to our website, download a

816
00:47:24,920 --> 00:47:27,920
PDF form, put in the narrative for their account, and

817
00:47:27,920 --> 00:47:32,360
then email that to us with accompanying media. Usually it'll

818
00:47:32,400 --> 00:47:35,880
probably be imagery. We went with that option because we

819
00:47:35,960 --> 00:47:38,440
thought one we could do it rather quickly, we could

820
00:47:38,440 --> 00:47:41,480
do it efficiently, make it very cost effective for the taxpayer.

821
00:47:41,559 --> 00:47:44,280
But also we think we can gather all the data

822
00:47:44,280 --> 00:47:46,760
that we're going to need to conduct our analysis, and

823
00:47:46,800 --> 00:47:49,280
then we're going to have that feed into an automated

824
00:47:49,280 --> 00:47:52,360
processing system that will cross correlate that against all the

825
00:47:52,360 --> 00:47:55,320
other public reporter cases as well as the US government cases.

826
00:47:55,800 --> 00:47:59,480
We did consider a number of other reporting mechanisms as

827
00:48:00,079 --> 00:48:04,400
to include automated online forms as well as cell phone apps,

828
00:48:04,599 --> 00:48:10,000
and we ultimately decided that this would be the safest, cheapest,

829
00:48:10,480 --> 00:48:13,679
and easiest to maintain in the future while protecting the

830
00:48:13,960 --> 00:48:17,880
private information of the individuals who are reporting. For the

831
00:48:17,960 --> 00:48:23,840
regarding the feedback from the result reports. Right now, we

832
00:48:23,880 --> 00:48:28,199
don't have a good feedback mechanism. It's fairly informal. We're

833
00:48:28,199 --> 00:48:32,119
working on building a case management system that ERROW will

834
00:48:32,199 --> 00:48:35,639
use at all classification levels, and hopefully in that we'll

835
00:48:35,679 --> 00:48:38,920
be able to provide feedback as the case is going

836
00:48:38,960 --> 00:48:43,360
through the resolution process that we have multiple phases. Then

837
00:48:43,760 --> 00:48:47,079
the folks who report that, whether it's a pilot at

838
00:48:47,079 --> 00:48:51,559
the classified level or someone potentially reporting through another mechanism,

839
00:48:51,639 --> 00:48:57,440
they'll get that automated feedback. And then it is not

840
00:48:58,280 --> 00:49:00,840
determined at this point yet how much information we'll be

841
00:49:00,880 --> 00:49:04,280
able to include in that feedback where it is in

842
00:49:04,320 --> 00:49:06,920
the process. It'll depend on the classification of the resolution

843
00:49:07,000 --> 00:49:07,440
of the case.

844
00:49:09,719 --> 00:49:12,280
Speaker 5: My final question is is there anything that you need

845
00:49:12,360 --> 00:49:14,800
to tell the Senate that you need from us, Whether

846
00:49:14,800 --> 00:49:19,119
it's funding, whether it's support, whether it's legislation. Is there

847
00:49:19,159 --> 00:49:21,559
any request that ARROW has of us, or anything else

848
00:49:21,559 --> 00:49:23,440
you need to brief us on for us to be

849
00:49:23,440 --> 00:49:27,079
able to do our jobs to protect our service members

850
00:49:27,159 --> 00:49:33,000
as well as integrate public interest and public data and

851
00:49:33,000 --> 00:49:34,960
information into the future.

852
00:49:35,239 --> 00:49:36,960
Speaker 6: Analysis efforts of ARROW.

853
00:49:38,559 --> 00:49:40,239
Speaker 8: So, first of all, I want to say thank you again.

854
00:49:40,679 --> 00:49:43,320
I think that the authorities that we have are remarkable,

855
00:49:43,559 --> 00:49:45,880
and I think that we are well resourced as an office.

856
00:49:45,920 --> 00:49:47,719
The only ask that I would have is that you

857
00:49:47,719 --> 00:49:51,599
continue to champion us, particularly with witnesses, encourage them to

858
00:49:51,679 --> 00:49:54,079
come forward and report to us so that we can

859
00:49:54,199 --> 00:49:59,400
have a more fulsome investigation of the potential historic or

860
00:49:59,440 --> 00:50:01,760
ongoing legacy programs.

861
00:50:03,480 --> 00:50:12,360
Speaker 6: Thank you so much. Hearing adjourned, Wow.

862
00:50:12,039 --> 00:50:19,199
Speaker 1: Okay, that was mute. This So that was doctor John

863
00:50:19,440 --> 00:50:25,320
cosquad Copter. He went to the doctor Sean K. Kirkpatrick University.

864
00:50:25,440 --> 00:50:30,440
His he is clearly, in my view, carrying the same

865
00:50:30,519 --> 00:50:35,840
water as before. Sean your your your initial thoughts.

866
00:50:36,679 --> 00:50:40,360
Speaker 2: You know, everybody said the right thing, and nobody said anything.

867
00:50:41,639 --> 00:50:46,440
Senator Gillibrand identified cases that could easily be discussed, like

868
00:50:47,079 --> 00:50:51,000
tik tak, for example, which I was present for, but

869
00:50:51,039 --> 00:50:56,079
they're not brought up. The methods and sources and locations

870
00:50:56,119 --> 00:50:58,840
on that are all well known except for a few

871
00:50:58,840 --> 00:51:00,960
of the systems. And the fact is, as it keeps

872
00:51:00,960 --> 00:51:04,239
getting pushed down the road, I saw someone who is

873
00:51:04,280 --> 00:51:07,639
a better speaker than doctor Sean Kirkpatrick. And as I said,

874
00:51:07,639 --> 00:51:09,920
he said all the right things, but his first his

875
00:51:09,960 --> 00:51:12,000
next chance up to bat will prove whether he has

876
00:51:12,039 --> 00:51:13,159
anything to offer or not.

877
00:51:14,559 --> 00:51:17,079
Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure, Vinnie, what do you think?

878
00:51:18,639 --> 00:51:20,920
Speaker 4: It seemed like he was trying to correct and right

879
00:51:20,960 --> 00:51:23,400
a lot of wrongs that Sean Kirkpatrick had brought in,

880
00:51:23,440 --> 00:51:27,039
almost begging witnesses that had already spoken with Arrow previously

881
00:51:27,119 --> 00:51:29,840
to come back, give us another chance. We'll treat you

882
00:51:29,880 --> 00:51:33,000
better this time. Maybe it's too little too late. It's

883
00:51:33,119 --> 00:51:35,400
very clear that there are some a lot of hoops

884
00:51:35,440 --> 00:51:39,000
for Arrow to jump through for any semblance of credibility

885
00:51:39,119 --> 00:51:41,679
or seriousness. I don't know if it's just been lost.

886
00:51:41,719 --> 00:51:44,880
It's too little too late, with the implementation of some

887
00:51:44,920 --> 00:51:49,480
of their new systems not till mid twenty twenty five,

888
00:51:49,519 --> 00:51:52,159
it's a long road ahead, and just looking at the

889
00:51:52,159 --> 00:51:54,880
comments there and nobody's happy with them at all.

890
00:51:54,960 --> 00:51:56,280
Speaker 3: So maybe it's a lost cause.

891
00:51:56,960 --> 00:52:02,559
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's yeah, kind of speechless about the whole thing.

892
00:52:03,559 --> 00:52:07,679
One of the things that caught my eye or ear

893
00:52:08,400 --> 00:52:13,480
was there was absolutely no talk about last week's hearing.

894
00:52:13,960 --> 00:52:17,800
I mean, it is like that hearing never even took place.

895
00:52:18,199 --> 00:52:24,559
So I just don't understand how this doctor Koslowski couldn't

896
00:52:24,559 --> 00:52:27,800
even have couldn't even bother mentioning it. And I do

897
00:52:27,880 --> 00:52:30,519
wish and I am a big fan of Senator Kirsten

898
00:52:30,599 --> 00:52:32,679
jill Brand. I do believe that we would not even

899
00:52:33,000 --> 00:52:36,159
be having this kind of hearing if it were not

900
00:52:36,239 --> 00:52:39,519
for her. But there was no mention of it any

901
00:52:40,239 --> 00:52:41,480
Sean your thoughts as to why.

902
00:52:42,880 --> 00:52:46,239
Speaker 2: I saw a lot of a lot of pre prep

903
00:52:46,559 --> 00:52:52,079
and a lot of deflection. I saw nothing of substance.

904
00:52:52,119 --> 00:52:54,320
It's really hard for me when a senator asked someone

905
00:52:54,320 --> 00:52:57,400
in charge of an office like ERO to discuss anomalies

906
00:52:57,800 --> 00:53:02,519
and they discussed pro se case, they presented no anomalous

907
00:53:02,519 --> 00:53:07,320
information whatsoever. I'm not sure what we're doing. I understand

908
00:53:07,320 --> 00:53:10,599
that Senator Gillibrand she has champion this to a great deal,

909
00:53:10,639 --> 00:53:13,800
but we need to see more aggressive questioning. We need

910
00:53:13,800 --> 00:53:15,920
to see people like we saw last week placed on

911
00:53:15,960 --> 00:53:18,079
the spot to answer some yes or no questions. We

912
00:53:18,159 --> 00:53:22,119
have no idea what Arrow has really been up to.

913
00:53:22,239 --> 00:53:24,239
Have they discovered anything or is this just one big

914
00:53:24,280 --> 00:53:24,920
boon doggle?

915
00:53:25,760 --> 00:53:27,800
Speaker 1: Yeah, I would I would say it's one one big,

916
00:53:28,039 --> 00:53:33,800
one big boon boon doggle. And Reniic Patel, someone that

917
00:53:33,960 --> 00:53:36,880
was actually out in Washington, d C. Helping us at

918
00:53:37,000 --> 00:53:41,159
a UAP disclosure fund. We were really grateful for his help.

919
00:53:41,519 --> 00:53:45,280
Someone he found this on Twitter, so or excuse me

920
00:53:45,480 --> 00:53:49,199
x So if anyone wants to know how close doctor

921
00:53:49,599 --> 00:53:55,599
Koslowski's handler is, look no further than just a few

922
00:53:55,599 --> 00:53:59,280
feet away. So on your left there is Pentagon Public

923
00:53:59,280 --> 00:54:02,320
Affairs off us, sir, who who has a I think

924
00:54:02,360 --> 00:54:06,480
a master is in psychological warfare if if I remember right,

925
00:54:06,519 --> 00:54:09,440
That's what Loue Elizondo pointed out. So there on the left, uh,

926
00:54:10,079 --> 00:54:14,679
sue sue go Pentagon public affairs officer, where literally any

927
00:54:14,920 --> 00:54:20,960
public media inquiry regarding the UAP issue goes through her,

928
00:54:21,400 --> 00:54:26,639
goes through a psychological warfare officer. I mean, you know,

929
00:54:26,320 --> 00:54:30,559
you just can't make this ship up. It's it's it's insane.

930
00:54:30,960 --> 00:54:34,320
Speaker 2: Well, she literally wrote a portion of the book on

931
00:54:34,440 --> 00:54:38,960
psychological warfare and has also written papers on shaping operations

932
00:54:39,000 --> 00:54:44,039
in a domestic sense utilizing media and other outlets. It's

933
00:54:44,079 --> 00:54:47,119
pretty clear that that at least one person is holding

934
00:54:47,199 --> 00:54:51,039
some puppet strings. The question is who's holding Susan's Yeah.

935
00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:54,599
Speaker 1: Well that that is that is a good, good question, Vinny.

936
00:54:54,880 --> 00:54:58,840
One of the things that he said or appeared to

937
00:54:59,719 --> 00:55:03,960
try debunk was the Awkwadia thing, and I didn't catch

938
00:55:04,000 --> 00:55:06,039
all of it. I was doing a couple of technical things,

939
00:55:06,079 --> 00:55:10,360
but I noticed someone in the chat said that doctor

940
00:55:10,440 --> 00:55:14,920
Koslawski explained it away as a Chinese balloon. Is that correct?

941
00:55:16,599 --> 00:55:16,880
I get.

942
00:55:16,960 --> 00:55:20,280
Speaker 4: I was kind of paying mixed attention to different things,

943
00:55:20,360 --> 00:55:22,079
making some notes, But what it seemed it was a

944
00:55:22,119 --> 00:55:23,679
very rushed, quick presentation.

945
00:55:24,239 --> 00:55:26,920
Speaker 3: He didn't point to it being completely debunked.

946
00:55:26,960 --> 00:55:30,000
Speaker 4: I think it was just a very whimsical attempt at

947
00:55:30,000 --> 00:55:32,760
saying that they've done something with it, you know, And

948
00:55:32,800 --> 00:55:34,800
these are the things that he was focusing on, whereas

949
00:55:34,920 --> 00:55:37,039
the focus for me should have gone on what we

950
00:55:37,280 --> 00:55:39,800
had in the recent Arrow report. They've got nine hundred

951
00:55:39,800 --> 00:55:43,480
outlier cases in their active archive. Three point five percent

952
00:55:43,559 --> 00:55:48,239
of them could represent breakthrough technologies or something genuinely anomalous.

953
00:55:48,519 --> 00:55:50,159
I think that's where the focus should have been a

954
00:55:50,159 --> 00:55:52,960
little bit more, to persuade in Congress that these are

955
00:55:52,960 --> 00:55:56,440
what they're really looking to deal with, rather than just

956
00:55:57,599 --> 00:55:58,280
everything else.

957
00:55:58,719 --> 00:56:00,239
Speaker 3: It seems like smoke and mirror.

958
00:56:01,639 --> 00:56:04,440
Speaker 1: Smoking mirrors. Indeed, and if I remember correctly it was

959
00:56:04,480 --> 00:56:07,280
either I don't think it was Senator jillbrand I think

960
00:56:07,280 --> 00:56:10,840
it was doctor Koslowski that that said, and correct me

961
00:56:10,880 --> 00:56:13,400
if I'm wrong. I may may have misheard it that

962
00:56:13,800 --> 00:56:18,440
ARROW had all of the authority it needed to investigate

963
00:56:18,559 --> 00:56:22,719
these claims. Did I imagine that? Or is that exactly

964
00:56:22,760 --> 00:56:23,440
what was said?

965
00:56:23,840 --> 00:56:25,679
Speaker 3: You heard that right? That was towards the end there.

966
00:56:25,719 --> 00:56:29,039
Speaker 4: This is where Sean Kirkpatrick last time, he clearly didn't

967
00:56:29,079 --> 00:56:32,039
have the authorities because Losky was very adamant that he

968
00:56:32,119 --> 00:56:35,079
had everything he needed in that respect, and so no

969
00:56:35,199 --> 00:56:36,760
excuses going forward.

970
00:56:36,960 --> 00:56:38,320
Speaker 1: No go ahead, Shan.

971
00:56:38,400 --> 00:56:42,320
Speaker 2: Please, How does one call up to the CIA and

972
00:56:42,400 --> 00:56:44,880
say give me all of your stuff on UAP and

973
00:56:44,920 --> 00:56:48,039
they go we got nothing, And you say, okay? Is

974
00:56:48,079 --> 00:56:50,480
that all the authority that you need is to make

975
00:56:50,519 --> 00:56:53,079
a phone call and to accept what another department head

976
00:56:53,119 --> 00:56:55,440
or another civil servant tells you about a one hundred year,

977
00:56:55,519 --> 00:57:00,320
eighty year cover up. This is blatantly ridiculous that they

978
00:57:00,360 --> 00:57:02,039
can't find anything to work.

979
00:57:01,880 --> 00:57:06,480
Speaker 1: On blatantly ridiculous as well. And there's something we mentioned

980
00:57:06,480 --> 00:57:08,760
this on the show a while back. There is something

981
00:57:08,800 --> 00:57:14,360
that's called special Agent authority or eighteen eleven authority eighteen

982
00:57:14,360 --> 00:57:17,639
eleven authority. If you're a special agent, you can carry

983
00:57:17,639 --> 00:57:21,920
a gun, you have subpoena power, you have the power

984
00:57:22,000 --> 00:57:26,840
to arrest, you're essentially acting. You have the authority to

985
00:57:27,079 --> 00:57:32,440
act as a law officer to conduct a proper investigation.

986
00:57:33,320 --> 00:57:39,199
Arrow has no eighteen eleven authority period. They have no

987
00:57:39,320 --> 00:57:43,880
subpoena authority. They have no authority to break down doors.

988
00:57:43,920 --> 00:57:47,280
They cannot go to Lockheed Martin or any other place

989
00:57:47,559 --> 00:57:50,840
and demand to be let in to see what is there.

990
00:57:51,159 --> 00:57:56,960
They do not have the proper investigative authority period. The end,

991
00:57:57,639 --> 00:58:02,039
Arrow telling you that is a bunch of bullshit. John Koslowski,

992
00:58:02,280 --> 00:58:05,400
he should know better. This is something that Kirkpatrick went

993
00:58:05,440 --> 00:58:08,800
on about. And the fact is legally they do not

994
00:58:09,039 --> 00:58:16,440
have the authority they need to be digging this stuff up. Vinny,

995
00:58:16,519 --> 00:58:19,920
do you think that this guy is Kirkpatrick two point zero?

996
00:58:20,360 --> 00:58:24,599
Is he just more polished or or is he just

997
00:58:24,800 --> 00:58:26,719
doing what people up the chain are telling him to do?

998
00:58:26,760 --> 00:58:27,599
Any thoughts.

999
00:58:28,119 --> 00:58:29,639
Speaker 4: I think it's a mixture there. There's a little bit

1000
00:58:29,639 --> 00:58:31,480
of everything that you just just said there. I think

1001
00:58:31,480 --> 00:58:33,960
he was clearly nervous. I think, you know, we can

1002
00:58:33,960 --> 00:58:36,079
give him that, but at the same time, he seemed

1003
00:58:36,079 --> 00:58:38,320
to still be going for the low hanging fruit when

1004
00:58:38,360 --> 00:58:40,079
it came to some of the things he discussed, And

1005
00:58:40,119 --> 00:58:41,840
I think he should have been a bit more prepared

1006
00:58:41,880 --> 00:58:43,679
to kind of put it out there a bit more

1007
00:58:43,840 --> 00:58:46,639
give us some confidence back to the to the general

1008
00:58:46,679 --> 00:58:49,840
public and to the Senate. I mean, Gillibran was holding

1009
00:58:49,840 --> 00:58:52,320
no punches back there. She was straight in there, knew

1010
00:58:52,320 --> 00:58:54,840
what she wanted to say. It was really quite good

1011
00:58:54,840 --> 00:58:56,519
to see because we hadn't heard a lot from her

1012
00:58:56,519 --> 00:58:59,119
in the past few months. It almost felt like maybe

1013
00:58:59,119 --> 00:59:01,360
she'd kind of given up a little bit. But she

1014
00:59:01,480 --> 00:59:03,400
came back full force today and I think, you know

1015
00:59:03,440 --> 00:59:04,960
that put him on the spot a little bit, but

1016
00:59:05,559 --> 00:59:07,039
still too little, not enough.

1017
00:59:07,719 --> 00:59:12,039
Speaker 1: It's indeed, Sean, any what do you think to Kirkpatrick

1018
00:59:12,119 --> 00:59:14,199
two point zero or is he just doing what the

1019
00:59:14,199 --> 00:59:15,840
folks up the chain are telling them to do.

1020
00:59:16,599 --> 00:59:18,039
Speaker 2: You know, I want to be nice. I want to

1021
00:59:18,039 --> 00:59:20,000
be nice to the new doctor and say that he

1022
00:59:20,079 --> 00:59:22,400
was on the spot today and that he deserves a chance.

1023
00:59:22,440 --> 00:59:24,800
But we did the same thing with doctor Kirkpatrick, and

1024
00:59:24,840 --> 00:59:28,840
today was an opportunity to shine. We've had drone incursions

1025
00:59:28,840 --> 00:59:32,039
over Langley. Recently, we've got things like the two thousand

1026
00:59:32,079 --> 00:59:36,519
and four tic Tech incident, which was over a nuclear

1027
00:59:36,840 --> 00:59:40,360
vessel and a fleet of warships. Why are you showing

1028
00:59:40,440 --> 00:59:43,079
us balloons off of Puerto Rico if that's what she got,

1029
00:59:43,559 --> 00:59:48,679
Why is the Unidentified Anomaly Office only showing us identified things?

1030
00:59:50,039 --> 00:59:56,400
Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly the whole drone thing. So, over the past

1031
00:59:57,800 --> 01:00:02,599
past several weeks, I've been speaking to a law enforcement

1032
01:00:02,719 --> 01:00:05,960
leader in the middle of the country who had drone

1033
01:00:06,000 --> 01:00:10,000
incursions over their town, over their county, over two hundred

1034
01:00:10,519 --> 01:00:15,039
drone incursions. And I'm using the the word drone with

1035
01:00:15,480 --> 01:00:19,159
quotes because it's my belief these are these are not drones.

1036
01:00:20,079 --> 01:00:23,840
This this particular police chief said that there were over

1037
01:00:24,639 --> 01:00:27,920
over around two hundred drones or two hundred of these

1038
01:00:28,000 --> 01:00:31,480
vehicles appearing over their town over a two week period

1039
01:00:32,519 --> 01:00:37,639
between one and fifty or so nine to one one calls.

1040
01:00:38,119 --> 01:00:43,000
These things were viewed by multiple law enforcement officers. None

1041
01:00:43,039 --> 01:00:45,639
of the drones, and this is something that you heard

1042
01:00:45,719 --> 01:00:49,480
also on the Langley thing, none of these drones made

1043
01:00:49,679 --> 01:00:52,639
any noise. That is the key. None of them made

1044
01:00:52,639 --> 01:00:57,679
any noise. So when I hear this guy basically saying,

1045
01:00:57,760 --> 01:01:00,400
and this is something that I sort of a frame

1046
01:01:00,559 --> 01:01:02,920
that I think that we're hearing all the time. Is

1047
01:01:03,719 --> 01:01:06,480
you know you're hearing it from You've heard it from NASA,

1048
01:01:06,800 --> 01:01:09,360
you're hearing it from Arrow. Is you know what, we

1049
01:01:09,440 --> 01:01:12,719
need to spend a bunch more money and put out

1050
01:01:12,760 --> 01:01:16,599
some sensors and let's figure out what this new thing is.

1051
01:01:16,639 --> 01:01:22,000
That's that's that's going on. He mentioned something regarding regarding

1052
01:01:22,199 --> 01:01:25,599
Arrow and Langley and that how AEROW will be integrating

1053
01:01:26,239 --> 01:01:30,920
a new sensors to take sort of baseline measurement. So,

1054
01:01:31,000 --> 01:01:33,519
in other words, use these sensors look at the sky

1055
01:01:34,079 --> 01:01:38,000
and figure out what's normal, and so that when we

1056
01:01:38,159 --> 01:01:41,880
have two hundred of these drones flying over the over

1057
01:01:41,920 --> 01:01:44,840
the Air Force base, we'll know what they are. Well,

1058
01:01:45,039 --> 01:01:46,400
the logic just seems ridiculous.

1059
01:01:46,599 --> 01:01:48,519
Speaker 2: Go ahead, Matt, can I can I interject for a

1060
01:01:48,519 --> 01:01:52,239
second thing. I spent my career as an anti terrorism specialist,

1061
01:01:52,559 --> 01:01:58,719
and every nuclear facility, every vessel, every United States military

1062
01:01:58,760 --> 01:02:04,119
installation as in place anti terrorism response procedures for low

1063
01:02:04,159 --> 01:02:06,519
slow flyers. That's what we call them. Okay, it might

1064
01:02:06,519 --> 01:02:09,239
differ between services, but the fact is we've been dealing

1065
01:02:09,280 --> 01:02:13,000
with autonomous and remotely controlled aircraft and ready for that

1066
01:02:13,039 --> 01:02:15,559
fight for a very long time, even before they became

1067
01:02:15,679 --> 01:02:18,960
as common as they are now. The fact is is

1068
01:02:19,000 --> 01:02:21,360
there in all of those places, there's a standard operating

1069
01:02:21,400 --> 01:02:24,599
procedure for the personnel to respond to that, for intelligence

1070
01:02:24,599 --> 01:02:28,840
gatherers to take photographs, for capture of data from all

1071
01:02:28,880 --> 01:02:31,400
of the systems that are in the area, to include surveillance,

1072
01:02:31,440 --> 01:02:34,800
personal phones, et cetera. The idea that we don't know

1073
01:02:34,840 --> 01:02:38,880
what's going on over Langley is insane. It's kind of

1074
01:02:38,920 --> 01:02:42,199
like when we shift the conversation over to something that, yes,

1075
01:02:42,280 --> 01:02:46,000
is very important, which is aircraft safety, but at the

1076
01:02:46,000 --> 01:02:50,760
same time that is kindergarten level stuff to what the

1077
01:02:51,480 --> 01:02:53,480
conclusions are from some of these things.

1078
01:02:54,679 --> 01:02:56,880
Speaker 4: Yeah, I could follow up on that as well, Matt. Sorry,

1079
01:02:57,079 --> 01:02:59,280
just to add in. They're talking about getting baselines for

1080
01:02:59,320 --> 01:03:01,719
these things. They might to have these baselines already. Some

1081
01:03:01,800 --> 01:03:03,559
of these drones have been reported to as big as

1082
01:03:03,559 --> 01:03:07,239
twenty meters in diameter. I believe we have some. Sorry,

1083
01:03:07,280 --> 01:03:09,519
the US has some of the most advanced anti drone

1084
01:03:09,559 --> 01:03:12,800
technology going. I think the drone buster has failed at

1085
01:03:12,840 --> 01:03:15,800
Langley on multiple occasions. They must have all this data,

1086
01:03:15,840 --> 01:03:17,800
Where are these things coming from? Where are they going?

1087
01:03:18,280 --> 01:03:20,400
This is this is this doesn't make sense.

1088
01:03:21,360 --> 01:03:24,000
Speaker 1: It makes no sense. And for instance, this police chief

1089
01:03:24,039 --> 01:03:28,679
that have had the pleasure of speaking with, he described

1090
01:03:28,719 --> 01:03:32,960
one particular hell. These folks refer to them as drones.

1091
01:03:33,039 --> 01:03:36,760
But when you read at least from these incidents, read

1092
01:03:36,800 --> 01:03:40,320
the nine to one one call reports and whatnot, they're

1093
01:03:40,400 --> 01:03:45,360
usually described as large balls of light. In one particular case,

1094
01:03:45,400 --> 01:03:48,599
when he was going out to a call, he said

1095
01:03:48,639 --> 01:03:51,440
that this thing was literally the size of his Ford

1096
01:03:51,559 --> 01:03:57,960
F one fifty pickup truck. And it just it just

1097
01:03:58,119 --> 01:04:01,920
blows me away that that they think that we're going

1098
01:04:02,000 --> 01:04:05,119
to buy all of this, you know, all of this

1099
01:04:05,280 --> 01:04:08,400
bs especially on this whole this whole drone thing. And

1100
01:04:08,400 --> 01:04:10,440
and Shawn, as you were pointing out in terms of

1101
01:04:10,519 --> 01:04:13,679
in terms of sensors, I went and just did some

1102
01:04:13,920 --> 01:04:19,840
basic research on the ground, uh, the unclassified ground radar

1103
01:04:19,960 --> 01:04:23,519
systems at Langley, and I don't remember the acronym, but

1104
01:04:23,880 --> 01:04:27,719
these were ground excuse me, ground based radars that are

1105
01:04:27,800 --> 01:04:31,280
for the purpose of controlling the airspace in terms of

1106
01:04:31,400 --> 01:04:33,440
aircraft going in and out. It's sort of like air

1107
01:04:33,480 --> 01:04:37,480
surveillance radar and just about I think there were four

1108
01:04:37,519 --> 01:04:40,960
systems that I saw. They all said that the aircraft

1109
01:04:41,400 --> 01:04:45,760
in order for targets to register, you didn't need a

1110
01:04:45,800 --> 01:04:49,480
transponder it. I think one system said it could measure

1111
01:04:50,159 --> 01:04:52,639
any airborne target as small as like, I think a

1112
01:04:52,760 --> 01:04:56,679
basketball or something like that. So, so as you were

1113
01:04:56,719 --> 01:05:00,400
pointing to Sean, It's like, I find it incredibly hard

1114
01:05:00,440 --> 01:05:04,639
to believe that they do not have data on these things.

1115
01:05:05,079 --> 01:05:07,639
So I guess my question to both of you, do

1116
01:05:07,679 --> 01:05:12,119
you do you think that this sort of ignorance is

1117
01:05:12,480 --> 01:05:17,199
an act. Is it a delaying tactic so that they

1118
01:05:17,239 --> 01:05:19,199
can say, oh, we need you know, we need another

1119
01:05:19,280 --> 01:05:22,079
year to collect data. What do you think the end

1120
01:05:22,119 --> 01:05:24,840
game or the motivation is or do you really think

1121
01:05:24,840 --> 01:05:26,760
that they just don't have it? Sean?

1122
01:05:26,840 --> 01:05:30,239
Speaker 2: You first, I think that for this too have being

1123
01:05:30,360 --> 01:05:33,159
kept secret for one hundred years, whatever is the ultimate

1124
01:05:33,199 --> 01:05:36,880
truth behind it, is going to make some people lose

1125
01:05:36,920 --> 01:05:39,039
their jobs. Let's put it that way. I don't think

1126
01:05:39,079 --> 01:05:41,239
anybody wants to be left holding the bag, and no

1127
01:05:41,239 --> 01:05:42,960
one wants to be to look like a fool if

1128
01:05:42,960 --> 01:05:45,119
they make some kind of pronouncement that they've been given

1129
01:05:45,519 --> 01:05:51,360
without the physical evidence that's required to stand behind those convictions.

1130
01:05:51,360 --> 01:05:53,440
This is a lousy place. This is a time when

1131
01:05:53,480 --> 01:05:56,800
the executive branch and the legislative branch need to come

1132
01:05:56,840 --> 01:05:59,320
together and they need to give us a clear history

1133
01:05:59,320 --> 01:06:03,599
of what's been going going on. We've received no definitive

1134
01:06:03,679 --> 01:06:06,239
answers on what's been going on for the last eighty years.

1135
01:06:06,320 --> 01:06:08,679
Is this just an arms race? Is it a cover

1136
01:06:08,840 --> 01:06:14,360
up between our advanced programs? Is this something truly unknown there?

1137
01:06:14,400 --> 01:06:19,079
Anybody who investigates this as a as a profession, so

1138
01:06:19,159 --> 01:06:22,960
to speak, will find that that it is very clearly

1139
01:06:23,559 --> 01:06:26,440
laid out that this is not a nothing burger, and

1140
01:06:26,559 --> 01:06:28,840
it's the idea we're going to keep kicking it down

1141
01:06:28,880 --> 01:06:30,400
the road. Is very disheartening.

1142
01:06:32,639 --> 01:06:35,920
Speaker 1: Any One thing that a phrase or refrain that we've

1143
01:06:35,920 --> 01:06:39,719
heard quite a bit, is this phrase of no evidence

1144
01:06:39,880 --> 01:06:48,079
of extraterrestrial, verifiable extraterrestrial activity. Why do they continue to

1145
01:06:48,280 --> 01:06:52,920
use the word extraterrestrial? To me, it seems by design.

1146
01:06:53,719 --> 01:06:56,800
Speaker 4: I thinks, by design and somewhat lazy at the same time.

1147
01:06:56,960 --> 01:07:00,360
I mean this In this recent transcript that I think

1148
01:07:00,440 --> 01:07:02,679
was released from a meeting with Kazlowski the other day,

1149
01:07:03,440 --> 01:07:06,119
there seem to be some contradictions in there almost saying

1150
01:07:06,159 --> 01:07:08,320
we've seen no sign of this, we've seen no sign

1151
01:07:08,360 --> 01:07:12,039
of advanced technology or breakthrough technologies. But then you know,

1152
01:07:12,159 --> 01:07:15,480
when pressed by the press further into the interview part

1153
01:07:15,519 --> 01:07:18,159
of that meeting, he said, well, you know, some of

1154
01:07:18,199 --> 01:07:20,599
it obviously could be because we.

1155
01:07:20,559 --> 01:07:21,320
Speaker 3: Don't know what they are.

1156
01:07:21,360 --> 01:07:23,400
Speaker 4: So he's almost always taking it back a little bit

1157
01:07:23,480 --> 01:07:25,559
and switching things up. So it's just a little bit

1158
01:07:25,840 --> 01:07:28,519
of the same old story, this continuation that we've seen

1159
01:07:28,519 --> 01:07:31,559
for so long that probably is just hiding the embarrassment

1160
01:07:31,599 --> 01:07:33,960
that they genuinely don't know what they're dealing with. They

1161
01:07:34,000 --> 01:07:38,000
cannot control their airspace and they cannot ultimately control the

1162
01:07:38,039 --> 01:07:39,400
safety of the general public.

1163
01:07:39,880 --> 01:07:44,480
Speaker 2: Yeah, and it's also, please it's very projective of their assumptions,

1164
01:07:44,480 --> 01:07:46,920
and it's very projective of what they intend to deliver

1165
01:07:47,000 --> 01:07:49,840
to us when there is no sense of urgency and

1166
01:07:49,920 --> 01:07:53,079
no sense of seriousness around the first letter in their title.

1167
01:07:55,360 --> 01:08:00,400
Speaker 1: Yeah, I couldn't, couldn't it, couldn't agree more. One of

1168
01:08:00,400 --> 01:08:06,079
the things that he also mentioned was he wants zero stigma,

1169
01:08:06,599 --> 01:08:10,159
and I think at one point he was talking about

1170
01:08:10,199 --> 01:08:14,760
that that they you know, that they are taking this seriously,

1171
01:08:15,360 --> 01:08:21,000
that they want whistle blowers to come in and provide secure,

1172
01:08:21,520 --> 01:08:27,319
secure testimony. But how when you had doctor Sean Kirkpatrick,

1173
01:08:27,359 --> 01:08:34,159
the former director of Arrow, basically making fun of anyone

1174
01:08:34,399 --> 01:08:37,880
in a way that is involved with this, saying that

1175
01:08:37,920 --> 01:08:41,840
it's that it's there's nothing to it and and it's

1176
01:08:41,880 --> 01:08:47,039
all circular reporting from a bunch of UFO zelots. If

1177
01:08:47,359 --> 01:08:50,760
if I were a whistleblower and I were hearing the

1178
01:08:51,560 --> 01:08:54,479
guy that's set up Arrow, the guy that was the

1179
01:08:54,560 --> 01:08:57,800
head of it, I don't know that I would certainly

1180
01:08:57,960 --> 01:09:01,800
trust Arrow because it would seem like it's a trap.

1181
01:09:01,840 --> 01:09:06,680
As whoever that guy in Star Wars said, Yeah, I

1182
01:09:06,840 --> 01:09:09,399
just it makes me insane. Vinnie, what do you think?

1183
01:09:10,760 --> 01:09:12,960
Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean that loses a lot of trust, absolutely,

1184
01:09:13,039 --> 01:09:15,279
But I think some trust had already been lost. We

1185
01:09:15,319 --> 01:09:18,359
know as podcasters we've spoken to certain witnesses who had

1186
01:09:18,399 --> 01:09:22,039
went to Arrow, Robert Salas, Mario Woods to name a few.

1187
01:09:22,359 --> 01:09:24,399
We know that their testimony was taken a lot of

1188
01:09:24,399 --> 01:09:27,760
the times over the phone, sometimes not recorded. Brief notes

1189
01:09:27,760 --> 01:09:30,439
were taken. It didn't seem like it was being taken seriously.

1190
01:09:30,840 --> 01:09:32,479
It doesn't show a lot of trust in what they

1191
01:09:32,479 --> 01:09:35,319
were talking about. Then you have doctor Kirkpatrick coming out

1192
01:09:35,359 --> 01:09:39,600
with such bold and embarrassing statements that he made, of

1193
01:09:39,600 --> 01:09:41,039
course is going to be no trust. This is why

1194
01:09:41,079 --> 01:09:44,640
we heard and saw whistleblowers going directly to common members

1195
01:09:44,680 --> 01:09:49,680
of Congress and just completely circumnavigating around Arrow. There's got

1196
01:09:49,720 --> 01:09:51,399
a lot of work to do to even bring the

1197
01:09:51,439 --> 01:09:53,920
trust back to allow that to happen going forward.

1198
01:09:54,439 --> 01:09:56,920
Speaker 1: Sean, if you were a whistleblower, would you go into

1199
01:09:57,000 --> 01:09:59,560
Arrow today and spill the beans.

1200
01:10:00,880 --> 01:10:05,680
Speaker 2: I see? I don't see a comprehensive investigation coming out

1201
01:10:05,720 --> 01:10:07,159
of the information being given to Aero.

1202
01:10:07,960 --> 01:10:12,279
Speaker 1: Do you think that whistleblowers are jeopardizing their safety by

1203
01:10:12,279 --> 01:10:16,039
going to Arrow or jeopardizing their identity?

1204
01:10:17,199 --> 01:10:19,600
Speaker 2: Well, I've been privy to some of the disgusting tactics

1205
01:10:19,680 --> 01:10:22,880
used by Susan Go and by others within the Department

1206
01:10:22,880 --> 01:10:25,760
of Defense to try to silence certain people within the communities,

1207
01:10:26,640 --> 01:10:31,680
editing of Wikipedia pages, slandering, sending surrogates out to write

1208
01:10:31,680 --> 01:10:35,760
blog posts, and to defame people on forums like Reddit

1209
01:10:35,800 --> 01:10:40,439
and Twitter. I'm not sure what we're going to get

1210
01:10:40,439 --> 01:10:41,520
when that's the status quo.

1211
01:10:42,359 --> 01:10:45,880
Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't think. I certainly don't think that we're

1212
01:10:45,920 --> 01:10:48,399
going to get any sort of any sort of forward movement.

1213
01:10:48,680 --> 01:10:52,399
So in January, and this is some information most people

1214
01:10:52,880 --> 01:10:55,680
may or may not be aware of. In January, doctor

1215
01:10:55,760 --> 01:11:00,640
Sean Kirkpatrick in with the blanket on the name, but

1216
01:11:00,920 --> 01:11:05,199
he was the NASA scientist debunker of the of the

1217
01:11:05,319 --> 01:11:10,159
NASA UAP study. Sean Kirkpatrick and this guy are having

1218
01:11:10,359 --> 01:11:15,039
a network special on PBS. UH. It's not called Noble

1219
01:11:15,159 --> 01:11:18,239
actually it's nov or something like that, but they essentially

1220
01:11:18,600 --> 01:11:24,119
are debunking the Aquaedia case and the UH. And I

1221
01:11:24,840 --> 01:11:27,319
think the other video as well, So it's probably like

1222
01:11:27,399 --> 01:11:33,279
a carbon copy of what we saw today. Why do

1223
01:11:33,359 --> 01:11:35,560
you think, and I put this to both you any

1224
01:11:35,600 --> 01:11:39,680
any thoughts as to why Kirkpatrick continues to do this.

1225
01:11:40,640 --> 01:11:42,880
I would think like if I worked for the government,

1226
01:11:43,000 --> 01:11:45,159
I worked for do O D, I exited d O

1227
01:11:45,279 --> 01:11:49,000
D and went picked up a job at DOE. My

1228
01:11:49,119 --> 01:11:52,079
boss is a Doe would say, hey, man, you know

1229
01:11:52,119 --> 01:11:55,119
you're you're talking. You need to stay in your lane.

1230
01:11:56,039 --> 01:11:59,359
Is is is this They're just giving him free reign?

1231
01:11:59,560 --> 01:12:02,880
Is this by design? Sean? What are your thoughts on that?

1232
01:12:03,640 --> 01:12:06,920
Speaker 2: Well, it's obvious the way that mister Kirkpatrick is behaving

1233
01:12:07,039 --> 01:12:10,800
benefits someone, and those that seem to prop him up

1234
01:12:10,800 --> 01:12:14,159
are those that have a have some kind of motivation

1235
01:12:14,399 --> 01:12:17,319
to not discuss this topic, to not bring any of

1236
01:12:17,359 --> 01:12:20,640
the great conclusions that the American people in the world

1237
01:12:20,640 --> 01:12:27,800
in general are entitled to. So I just see a patsy.

1238
01:12:28,000 --> 01:12:30,000
I see someone who's going to cash in where he's

1239
01:12:30,079 --> 01:12:32,000
told he was allowed to go have fun. He's going

1240
01:12:32,079 --> 01:12:34,880
to go have fun. And as many seem to take

1241
01:12:35,039 --> 01:12:38,439
very serious, they take very serious things these days, and

1242
01:12:38,479 --> 01:12:41,680
they think that being a troll and being a disruptor

1243
01:12:41,720 --> 01:12:44,279
in them is somehow what people need, and it's not.

1244
01:12:44,439 --> 01:12:46,760
They need trust, they need faith, and they need answers.

1245
01:12:48,359 --> 01:12:52,159
Speaker 1: Do you think that Sean Kirkpatrick Vinnie out there parroting

1246
01:12:52,199 --> 01:12:54,840
all of this stuff. Is this helping or hurting the conversation?

1247
01:12:54,960 --> 01:12:57,520
And do you think it's intentional He's he was just

1248
01:12:57,520 --> 01:13:00,119
given a loose reins or do you think that there

1249
01:13:00,159 --> 01:13:01,319
could be something more behind that.

1250
01:13:03,039 --> 01:13:06,439
Speaker 4: It does almost certainly point to it being he's been

1251
01:13:06,560 --> 01:13:09,000
directed to do it. He's had every opportunity to wash

1252
01:13:09,039 --> 01:13:11,880
his hands of this subject. Look forward to his cushy

1253
01:13:11,880 --> 01:13:16,560
little job where Oakridge and be breathed a sigh of

1254
01:13:16,560 --> 01:13:18,439
relief that he no longer has to deal with the subject.

1255
01:13:18,520 --> 01:13:21,640
Yet here he is, he keeps coming back taking little digs.

1256
01:13:21,760 --> 01:13:24,359
So it almost seems that there's an ulterior motive out

1257
01:13:24,359 --> 01:13:26,079
there for the reason why he would even do that.

1258
01:13:26,840 --> 01:13:31,359
Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't get it. Finally, so what is your

1259
01:13:31,439 --> 01:13:33,680
sort of takeaway? Any other points that I'd missed that

1260
01:13:33,720 --> 01:13:36,840
you would like to bring up. I'll start with you, Sean.

1261
01:13:37,840 --> 01:13:41,560
Speaker 2: You know, I have an adversarial attitude to people who

1262
01:13:41,640 --> 01:13:43,720
get in front of the mic and say that what

1263
01:13:43,760 --> 01:13:46,279
we've all worked so hard on is nothing. But at

1264
01:13:46,279 --> 01:13:48,920
the same time, I am very emboldened by what we've seen.

1265
01:13:48,920 --> 01:13:51,319
If we'd spoken to any of us ten years prior

1266
01:13:51,359 --> 01:13:54,520
to now, we would be absolutely and just over the

1267
01:13:54,560 --> 01:13:56,680
moon with what we're seeing happen right now. We have

1268
01:13:56,720 --> 01:13:59,319
to remember that these things do move slowly. They are

1269
01:13:59,399 --> 01:14:02,600
moving fast behind closed doors. It's a question of getting

1270
01:14:02,600 --> 01:14:04,760
people with integrity in front to tell us the truth.

1271
01:14:05,880 --> 01:14:09,439
Speaker 4: Betty your thoughts, Yeah, I think obviously it's going to

1272
01:14:09,479 --> 01:14:12,000
take time. We heard some mid twenty twenty five dates

1273
01:14:12,000 --> 01:14:13,600
thrown forward there. I think what I'm going to be

1274
01:14:13,680 --> 01:14:16,000
really looking out for is when the general public are

1275
01:14:16,079 --> 01:14:17,560
able to submit.

1276
01:14:17,239 --> 01:14:17,920
Speaker 3: Reports to Arrow.

1277
01:14:18,000 --> 01:14:20,159
Speaker 4: Let's see how they deal with members of the public

1278
01:14:20,239 --> 01:14:22,600
if they give them the time, respect and decency.

1279
01:14:23,560 --> 01:14:27,199
Speaker 1: Indeed, So, Vinie, where can we find your show and

1280
01:14:27,800 --> 01:14:31,279
any new guests on Disclosure Team that you would like

1281
01:14:32,000 --> 01:14:33,600
to tell us around the corner?

1282
01:14:34,840 --> 01:14:37,000
Speaker 4: Yep, So you can find Disclosure Team on YouTube and

1283
01:14:37,319 --> 01:14:40,880
most podcast podcast platforms. I've got all sorts of guests

1284
01:14:40,960 --> 01:14:43,560
lined up. I've got Thiago and I'm going to butcher

1285
01:14:43,600 --> 01:14:46,159
his last name Lichetti or something. He featured recently in

1286
01:14:46,439 --> 01:14:51,319
George Knapp's investigation Alien covering the Kolaras incident. So really

1287
01:14:51,359 --> 01:14:54,000
looking forward to digging into that case. But yeah, lots

1288
01:14:54,039 --> 01:14:55,479
more guests lined up.

1289
01:14:55,640 --> 01:14:59,039
Speaker 1: Absolutely, Sean, you were recently on News Nation. Anything else

1290
01:14:59,039 --> 01:15:00,000
coming up for you.

1291
01:15:00,760 --> 01:15:03,159
Speaker 2: I'll be announcing soon a podcast I'll be doing with

1292
01:15:03,520 --> 01:15:06,279
our in conjunction with our nan new app called The Experience.

1293
01:15:06,319 --> 01:15:08,239
We'll be announcing our guest list and some of the

1294
01:15:08,279 --> 01:15:11,520
subjects will be going after and very soon we'll be

1295
01:15:11,560 --> 01:15:14,239
launching our app and it's open beta and we look

1296
01:15:14,279 --> 01:15:17,279
forward to putting those dates out and providing links to everybody.

1297
01:15:17,439 --> 01:15:19,479
Speaker 1: What can you tell us about this app? I'm very

1298
01:15:19,520 --> 01:15:20,560
excited about this.

1299
01:15:21,079 --> 01:15:24,199
Speaker 2: It's a social media app that looks to give people

1300
01:15:24,279 --> 01:15:27,000
who study the phenomenon, who have interacted with it, or

1301
01:15:27,039 --> 01:15:29,880
maybe just generally curious about it, a place where they

1302
01:15:29,920 --> 01:15:32,880
can go, where they can meet, where their data is protected,

1303
01:15:33,800 --> 01:15:36,159
and where they can have a discussion about this with

1304
01:15:36,359 --> 01:15:40,079
like minded people share their very much like what Aero

1305
01:15:40,359 --> 01:15:42,159
is trying to set up, but not a form with

1306
01:15:42,199 --> 01:15:44,640
a PDF that you fill out, something that's interactive and

1307
01:15:44,680 --> 01:15:47,680
something that has community management, where the stigma is not

1308
01:15:47,760 --> 01:15:50,439
applied and where everyone has a safe place to have

1309
01:15:50,479 --> 01:15:51,159
a conversation.

1310
01:15:51,800 --> 01:15:55,279
Speaker 1: Excellent, And actually we have a question from Shelley Montgomery

1311
01:15:55,359 --> 01:15:57,520
and folks at folks at home, if you're watching, if

1312
01:15:57,560 --> 01:16:00,199
you have any questions for Sean or Vinnie, now the

1313
01:16:00,239 --> 01:16:04,680
time to post those. Shelley Montgomery, mister Cahill, your thoughts

1314
01:16:04,720 --> 01:16:09,079
on a possibility our company or whatever they are also

1315
01:16:09,520 --> 01:16:13,720
watch just normal town power plants? Have any been spotted

1316
01:16:14,039 --> 01:16:16,479
in these in these areas.

1317
01:16:17,239 --> 01:16:22,439
Speaker 2: I've seen reports of UAP over power lines, over power transformers,

1318
01:16:23,680 --> 01:16:26,720
substations and things like that. It is a common experience

1319
01:16:26,800 --> 01:16:29,800
and I've even seen some of those reports that went

1320
01:16:29,880 --> 01:16:32,520
up to the u a PTF at the time. So yes,

1321
01:16:32,560 --> 01:16:34,439
that is that is pretty common. I hope we see

1322
01:16:34,439 --> 01:16:35,000
more about that.

1323
01:16:36,079 --> 01:16:40,000
Speaker 1: I think so too. I sometimes wonder if arrows what

1324
01:16:40,119 --> 01:16:43,560
seems to be reluctance to deal with the drone issue.

1325
01:16:44,119 --> 01:16:47,439
And I think both of you guys would would agree

1326
01:16:47,479 --> 01:16:51,279
with this. There is a long history in UAP literature

1327
01:16:51,600 --> 01:16:57,359
of UAPs using mimicry or or signature management to appear

1328
01:16:57,479 --> 01:17:02,640
as something prosaic or relatable to folks. There are any

1329
01:17:02,680 --> 01:17:05,760
any kind of comparisons or examples of that either of

1330
01:17:05,760 --> 01:17:06,560
you can give.

1331
01:17:07,479 --> 01:17:10,119
Speaker 3: I think just continuing, Oh sorry, Sean, no, no, you go,

1332
01:17:10,279 --> 01:17:10,680
you go ahead.

1333
01:17:11,359 --> 01:17:13,359
Speaker 4: I just wanted to just wanted to continue on the

1334
01:17:13,439 --> 01:17:16,359
drone incursions over kind of power plants and nuclear facilities.

1335
01:17:16,399 --> 01:17:19,199
We have to remember that these have been reported in

1336
01:17:19,239 --> 01:17:22,039
the last five to six years in other countries such.

1337
01:17:21,920 --> 01:17:23,560
Speaker 3: As Sweden, Germany.

1338
01:17:24,159 --> 01:17:27,479
Speaker 4: There's been quite a lot of media headlines overseas about that,

1339
01:17:27,800 --> 01:17:30,319
and nothing really ever came of them either. Now we

1340
01:17:30,399 --> 01:17:34,520
had Arrow in the report talking about alliances with a

1341
01:17:34,520 --> 01:17:37,199
lot of the kind of five eyes and that wasn't

1342
01:17:37,239 --> 01:17:40,199
mentioned today. Hopefully we start to see more of that

1343
01:17:40,239 --> 01:17:43,039
sort of conversation happening across the seas.

1344
01:17:43,279 --> 01:17:45,600
Speaker 1: Absolutely as Sean, you were going to add something.

1345
01:17:46,199 --> 01:17:47,119
Speaker 2: Oh Anny got it?

1346
01:17:47,560 --> 01:17:51,560
Speaker 1: Okay, Okay, great, well, awesome, Well, guys, thank you very

1347
01:17:51,640 --> 01:17:54,159
much for coming on. I hope that this is the

1348
01:17:54,199 --> 01:17:58,640
first of more hearings from Arrow, but I don't know.

1349
01:17:59,279 --> 01:18:01,520
I was a bit underwhelmed, to be honest.

1350
01:18:03,680 --> 01:18:04,399
Speaker 3: We have a lot to do.

1351
01:18:04,960 --> 01:18:08,279
Speaker 1: We have a lot to do, that that is for sure. Okay, guys,

1352
01:18:08,319 --> 01:18:10,680
thank you very much for joining us, and look forward

1353
01:18:10,720 --> 01:18:12,359
to having you back on the show. And thanks thanks

1354
01:18:12,359 --> 01:18:14,399
for taking taking your time both of you guys for

1355
01:18:14,600 --> 01:18:17,600
coming on. And Vinnie, I'll be on your show hopefully soon.

1356
01:18:17,720 --> 01:18:20,319
And Sean, I look forward to your podcast.

1357
01:18:20,920 --> 01:18:21,800
Speaker 2: Good to see you, gentlemen.

1358
01:18:22,039 --> 01:18:23,039
Speaker 3: We thanks, thank you.

1359
01:18:23,640 --> 01:18:28,159
Speaker 1: Okay, great, Yeah, I mean I don't know. I I

1360
01:18:28,800 --> 01:18:33,760
it just so here here, here's the deal. When we

1361
01:18:34,119 --> 01:18:39,600
want to talk about whether we can trust Errow, I'm

1362
01:18:39,600 --> 01:18:42,319
going to read a statement. I'm going to pull it

1363
01:18:42,399 --> 01:18:48,520
up here that I put to that I put hopefully

1364
01:18:48,640 --> 01:18:51,119
to be picked up by Congress. I don't have a

1365
01:18:51,159 --> 01:18:55,319
screenshot of it, but I'm going to pull it up

1366
01:18:55,359 --> 01:18:57,479
here in just a second. So I'm kind of doing

1367
01:18:57,520 --> 01:19:02,159
this doing this on on the on the fly. So

1368
01:19:02,640 --> 01:19:06,640
this was something that I wrote that I think very

1369
01:19:06,640 --> 01:19:11,239
well may end up being entered into the Congressional record.

1370
01:19:11,279 --> 01:19:14,119
I'll know more about that here in a bit a

1371
01:19:14,119 --> 01:19:17,920
written statement of Matthew Ford for the US Committee on

1372
01:19:18,039 --> 01:19:23,199
Oversight and Accountability Subcommittees on Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Government,

1373
01:19:23,920 --> 01:19:29,319
Government Innovation, National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs Unidentified

1374
01:19:29,720 --> 01:19:33,439
anomalist phenomena exposing the truth, which, of course was this.

1375
01:19:33,560 --> 01:19:38,680
Hearing this in the statement, here's what I say, Chairwoman Mace,

1376
01:19:38,960 --> 01:19:42,319
Chairman Grothman, ranking members Conley and Garcia, and members of

1377
01:19:42,359 --> 01:19:45,680
the Committee. I'm Matthew Ford, an American journalist and host

1378
01:19:45,760 --> 01:19:49,720
of the Good Trouble Show podcast. Today, I'm introducing damning

1379
01:19:49,800 --> 01:19:53,439
information regarding the former director of the All Domain Anomaly

1380
01:19:53,520 --> 01:19:58,279
Resolution Office or ARROW, doctor Sean Kirkpatrick. I'm a patriot

1381
01:19:58,279 --> 01:20:02,800
who cares deeply about our nations security, but above all,

1382
01:20:03,000 --> 01:20:06,600
I care about the truth. In November of last year,

1383
01:20:06,680 --> 01:20:11,600
journalists Christopher Sharp, Josh Josh Boswell and I published a

1384
01:20:11,680 --> 01:20:15,439
story in The Daily Mail exposing for the first time

1385
01:20:15,840 --> 01:20:20,119
the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology's Office of Global

1386
01:20:20,199 --> 01:20:25,920
Access and its classified UAP crash recovery program. Last weekend,

1387
01:20:26,000 --> 01:20:29,840
Christopher Sharp published a follow up article in The Liberation

1388
01:20:29,960 --> 01:20:33,720
Times providing further detail on how the CIA's Directorate of

1389
01:20:33,760 --> 01:20:39,960
Science and Technology operates its UAP, UAP related crash recovery

1390
01:20:40,039 --> 01:20:43,920
and reverse engineering programs through the Office of Global Access

1391
01:20:44,239 --> 01:20:51,760
and the CIA's Counter Proliferation Mission Center WCPMC. The Head

1392
01:20:51,760 --> 01:20:54,399
of the Directorate of Science and Technology serves as the

1393
01:20:54,560 --> 01:21:01,680
primary gatekeeper of the entire UAP Deep Legacy program. Again,

1394
01:21:02,119 --> 01:21:05,680
the Head of the Directorate of the CIA Directorate of

1395
01:21:05,720 --> 01:21:10,439
Science and Technology serves as the primary gatekeeper of the

1396
01:21:10,600 --> 01:21:16,359
entire up Deep Legacy program, overseeing operations such as detection

1397
01:21:16,439 --> 01:21:23,399
of UAPs through classified programs, recovery operations, disbursement of recovered

1398
01:21:23,439 --> 01:21:28,399
craft to government agencies and private defense contractors, and protection

1399
01:21:28,680 --> 01:21:33,840
of derived off world technologies. My sources have alleged that

1400
01:21:34,000 --> 01:21:39,239
Glenn Gaffney, the former head of the Directorate the CIA

1401
01:21:39,319 --> 01:21:44,119
Directorate of Science and Technology, is one of those gatekeepers.

1402
01:21:44,920 --> 01:21:48,680
Last year, I revealed that doctor Sean Kirkpatrick. I revealed

1403
01:21:48,680 --> 01:21:51,159
this on The Good Trouble Show for the very first time,

1404
01:21:51,880 --> 01:21:55,359
that doctor Sean Kirkpatrick, the former director of EROW, had

1405
01:21:55,399 --> 01:22:01,039
assembled a secret technical advisory group to Council Aero. Following

1406
01:22:01,079 --> 01:22:05,319
my story, doctor Kirkpatrick confirmed the existence of this committee

1407
01:22:05,399 --> 01:22:10,479
two members of Congress, but refused refused to disclose the

1408
01:22:10,600 --> 01:22:17,439
member's identities. So Congress was asking doctor Kirkpatrick, who is

1409
01:22:17,479 --> 01:22:21,720
on this secret board that you have assembled, and doctor Kirkpatrick,

1410
01:22:22,079 --> 01:22:28,600
in typical fashion, refused to divulge those names. Multiple sources

1411
01:22:28,640 --> 01:22:33,079
have confirmed that Glenn Gaffney, the former head of the

1412
01:22:33,119 --> 01:22:37,760
CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology and gatekeeper of the

1413
01:22:37,880 --> 01:22:42,920
UAP Deep Legacy Program, was handpicked by doctor Sean Kirkpatrick

1414
01:22:43,199 --> 01:22:49,199
to be on this advisory board. I emphasize this, I continue,

1415
01:22:49,239 --> 01:22:55,039
I emphasize this. The most consequential person involved with the

1416
01:22:55,159 --> 01:23:01,520
cover up of non human technology is advising, is advising

1417
01:23:01,840 --> 01:23:07,239
the office which Congress has given a legal mandate to

1418
01:23:07,399 --> 01:23:12,680
find it. This is an abomination. I continue. This is unconstitutional,

1419
01:23:13,039 --> 01:23:19,359
This is criminal. Furthermore, this revelation is significant because one

1420
01:23:19,399 --> 01:23:23,880
of arrow's primary missions is to provide a means for

1421
01:23:23,960 --> 01:23:30,439
government whistleblowers to make protected disclosure on classified UAP Special

1422
01:23:30,479 --> 01:23:35,600
Access programs and controlled Access programs or CAPS to ARROW

1423
01:23:35,920 --> 01:23:41,880
and its staff. The fact that doctor Sean Kirkpatrick chose

1424
01:23:41,960 --> 01:23:48,520
as one of his primary advisors, the very gatekeeper overseeing

1425
01:23:48,680 --> 01:23:55,039
CIA controlled UAP access programs, raises serious questions about doctor

1426
01:23:55,119 --> 01:24:01,079
Kirkpatrick's true motives as the director of ARROW. Reporting indicates

1427
01:24:01,079 --> 01:24:05,720
that ERAW may function as a fly paper operation, intercepting

1428
01:24:05,760 --> 01:24:11,560
whistleblowers testimony and feeding their identities back to the CIA.

1429
01:24:13,119 --> 01:24:16,600
You have heard that there are whistleblowers who don't trust ERA.

1430
01:24:17,239 --> 01:24:19,640
My sources have informed me that this is one of

1431
01:24:19,640 --> 01:24:24,520
the reasons why if the CIA intercepts their testimony before

1432
01:24:24,520 --> 01:24:30,680
it reaches Congress, whistleblowers are in grave danger. Therefore, I

1433
01:24:30,760 --> 01:24:35,239
employ you to wield your subpoena powers against hostile witnesses

1434
01:24:35,640 --> 01:24:39,279
such as Glenn Gaffney, former p D d and I,

1435
01:24:39,439 --> 01:24:43,560
Stephanie O. Sullivan, and the former head of the CIA's

1436
01:24:43,640 --> 01:24:49,399
Office of Global Access, Douglas Wolf. Dozens of whistleblowers are

1437
01:24:49,680 --> 01:24:52,720
depending on you. Thank you, Thank you for your leadership

1438
01:24:53,000 --> 01:24:57,319
and for your attention on this h on this urgent,

1439
01:24:57,680 --> 01:25:00,800
urgent matter. So you know. So here here we have

1440
01:25:01,359 --> 01:25:05,760
doctor Koslowski saying to whistleblowers, Hey, come on in. This

1441
01:25:05,840 --> 01:25:11,960
is a new ARROW, and I can tell you as

1442
01:25:11,960 --> 01:25:16,359
of two weeks ago. As of two weeks ago, this

1443
01:25:16,920 --> 01:25:23,880
secret Technical Advisory Group Advising Arrow put together by doctor

1444
01:25:23,920 --> 01:25:29,039
Sean Kirkpatrick, and one of one of one of the

1445
01:25:29,079 --> 01:25:34,279
primary folks on that technical Advisory group is the very

1446
01:25:34,760 --> 01:25:39,000
guy that is one of the primary gatekeepers of the

1447
01:25:39,119 --> 01:25:44,720
CIA portion of the of this entire thing. So I

1448
01:25:44,720 --> 01:25:49,720
say it again, the the Technical Advisory Group Advising Arrow,

1449
01:25:49,800 --> 01:25:54,239
the group that Sean Kirkpatrick refused to tell Congress who

1450
01:25:54,279 --> 01:25:57,840
was sitting on that on that panel is one of

1451
01:25:57,920 --> 01:26:03,640
the main gatekeepers. The head of of UH the or

1452
01:26:03,920 --> 01:26:06,800
was head. He's no longer there. But the head of

1453
01:26:06,840 --> 01:26:11,479
the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology now the head

1454
01:26:11,600 --> 01:26:15,319
of of C I a DS and T. Guess who

1455
01:26:15,399 --> 01:26:18,840
works Guess who is under his his or her jurisdiction

1456
01:26:19,239 --> 01:26:25,439
the CIA Office of Global Access. That position, this CIA,

1457
01:26:25,600 --> 01:26:29,680
the head of the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology

1458
01:26:31,520 --> 01:26:36,880
oversees the CIA Office of Global Access. And also, and also,

1459
01:26:36,960 --> 01:26:41,279
and this is critically important when I talk about jeopardizing

1460
01:26:41,319 --> 01:26:46,199
of whistleblowers physical safety, their lives, their lives, the head

1461
01:26:46,239 --> 01:26:50,760
of DS and T, who was Glenn Gaffney, would have

1462
01:26:50,880 --> 01:26:57,680
had visibility into retaliatory measures taken by the security contractors

1463
01:26:57,960 --> 01:27:02,359
working for the defense, the aerospace Defense companies that have

1464
01:27:02,560 --> 01:27:07,680
these goodies. I say it again, Glenn Gaffie, who was

1465
01:27:07,720 --> 01:27:11,039
the head of DS and T for the CIA, under

1466
01:27:11,039 --> 01:27:16,399
his responsibility, he would have had visibility and or involvement

1467
01:27:16,520 --> 01:27:24,880
possibly in retaliation against whistleblowers. Includes physical threats, This includes

1468
01:27:25,119 --> 01:27:30,359
kinetic retaliation. That position in the CIA would have had

1469
01:27:30,720 --> 01:27:36,720
visibility that would have been part of their portfolio. So

1470
01:27:36,800 --> 01:27:41,000
that's why I say in this letter to Congress, you

1471
01:27:41,279 --> 01:27:46,000
have to subpoena these folks. You have to drag Glenn Gaffney,

1472
01:27:48,279 --> 01:27:52,119
the former head of Office of Global Access, Douglas Wolf.

1473
01:27:52,600 --> 01:27:55,159
You've got to get all of these folks under oath,

1474
01:27:55,279 --> 01:28:00,479
in a skiff, under the threat of perjuring themselves and

1475
01:28:00,760 --> 01:28:06,560
ask them very direct questions. I can tell you multiple sources,

1476
01:28:07,039 --> 01:28:12,680
multiple sources of former and current government employees specifically stated

1477
01:28:12,960 --> 01:28:16,880
that former head of CIA Directorate of Science and Technology,

1478
01:28:17,159 --> 01:28:21,439
Glenn Gaffney has been involved in this UAP issue and

1479
01:28:21,560 --> 01:28:26,800
the legacy, the deep legacy crash retrieval and reverse engineering program.

1480
01:28:26,840 --> 01:28:30,560
Glenn Gaffney has been involved with this for a very

1481
01:28:31,039 --> 01:28:36,119
very long time. Those are the allegations. Now, do I

1482
01:28:36,159 --> 01:28:39,840
have direct firsthand knowledge of that, No, because I don't

1483
01:28:39,880 --> 01:28:42,439
work for the government. I do not hold a security clearance.

1484
01:28:43,159 --> 01:28:45,199
But the way you get to the bottom of that

1485
01:28:46,039 --> 01:28:49,960
improved if those allegations are indeed true. And again I'm

1486
01:28:50,000 --> 01:28:54,760
hearing this from multiple people, multiple people that were former

1487
01:28:54,840 --> 01:28:59,680
or current government employees that worked this topic as part

1488
01:28:59,720 --> 01:29:05,720
of their portfolio. All of them said Glenn Gaffney is highly, highly,

1489
01:29:06,079 --> 01:29:10,279
highly involved with all of this, and that particular position,

1490
01:29:10,600 --> 01:29:13,640
the head of the Directorate of Science and Technology for

1491
01:29:13,720 --> 01:29:19,319
the CIA, is one of the primary gatekeepers of the

1492
01:29:19,520 --> 01:29:26,079
deep legacy UAP controlled access program. Now, why isn't that

1493
01:29:26,479 --> 01:29:29,600
being asked at these hearings. That's what I want to know.

1494
01:29:30,119 --> 01:29:35,239
It's it is high time that this happened. I mean, look,

1495
01:29:35,479 --> 01:29:38,760
he I'm trying to give doctor Koselowski the benefit of

1496
01:29:38,800 --> 01:29:43,359
the doubt. He certainly seems much more amenable. He's nowhere

1497
01:29:43,720 --> 01:29:47,680
near as arrogant as doctor Sean Kirkpatrick. I certainly hope

1498
01:29:47,800 --> 01:29:51,079
he can write above the fifth grade fifth grade level.

1499
01:29:51,079 --> 01:29:54,800
We know doctor Sean Kirkpatrick literally, for whatever reason, cannot

1500
01:29:54,800 --> 01:29:57,359
write a report that would even pass a fifth grade

1501
01:29:57,960 --> 01:30:02,479
science class. So I I am confident that doctor Koslowski

1502
01:30:02,680 --> 01:30:07,159
is a good step forward. But here's the thing, everyone

1503
01:30:07,199 --> 01:30:09,119
at home, I want all of you to keep in mind.

1504
01:30:11,600 --> 01:30:15,840
Lifers in government they are still there because they are

1505
01:30:15,960 --> 01:30:21,079
not risk takers. The senior executive service folks, they want

1506
01:30:21,199 --> 01:30:25,199
they want their retirement, They want to sail off into

1507
01:30:25,319 --> 01:30:28,720
the sunset. Of course, they want to do the right thing,

1508
01:30:28,760 --> 01:30:33,600
and I think by and large they attempt to do so.

1509
01:30:34,439 --> 01:30:40,159
But as a career government bureaucrat, there is zero, there

1510
01:30:40,279 --> 01:30:44,680
is zero incentive for any of these folks to buck

1511
01:30:44,840 --> 01:30:50,399
chain of command. Zero. They don't want to jeopardize their retirement,

1512
01:30:50,720 --> 01:30:54,119
they don't want to jeopardize their security clearance, which will

1513
01:30:54,399 --> 01:30:59,359
ensure that they have that they have employment post government work.

1514
01:31:01,520 --> 01:31:06,720
There is literally no incentive for them to do the

1515
01:31:06,840 --> 01:31:12,479
right thing. So let's say that doctor Koslowski was fully

1516
01:31:12,560 --> 01:31:17,359
read in to the legacy UAP, the deep legacy UAP program,

1517
01:31:19,239 --> 01:31:22,840
but his bosses, the folks up the chain of command

1518
01:31:23,239 --> 01:31:26,039
from him, say, look, you can't go there. We don't

1519
01:31:26,079 --> 01:31:29,359
want you to open these doors. If someone tells you

1520
01:31:29,439 --> 01:31:32,640
to go open up a door A because Lockheed Martin

1521
01:31:32,680 --> 01:31:35,960
has something stuffed behind that door, do us a favor.

1522
01:31:36,159 --> 01:31:38,880
Just don't go open yet. Well, we'll just tell you

1523
01:31:38,920 --> 01:31:43,239
there's nothing behind that door. He's a doctor. Koslowski is

1524
01:31:43,279 --> 01:31:47,920
in a position where it's a no win situation for him.

1525
01:31:48,000 --> 01:31:50,840
He's people are going to go after him, as we

1526
01:31:51,119 --> 01:31:55,760
as we saw today with this performance. But he can't

1527
01:31:56,079 --> 01:32:01,319
do he can't he can't go row. The guy doesn't

1528
01:32:01,319 --> 01:32:03,680
want to end up in jail. He's obviously not going

1529
01:32:03,720 --> 01:32:08,800
to leak anything that is classified a classified, special access

1530
01:32:08,880 --> 01:32:12,279
or controlled access program. It is just not going to happen.

1531
01:32:13,520 --> 01:32:16,399
The only way that this is going to happen is

1532
01:32:16,640 --> 01:32:21,479
hopefully the Trump administration gives them a different directive and

1533
01:32:21,600 --> 01:32:25,479
says this has got to come out. And for anyone

1534
01:32:25,560 --> 01:32:28,720
in the Trump transition team, I hope you're listening to

1535
01:32:28,800 --> 01:32:33,159
this show. It is time to rip this band aid off.

1536
01:32:33,439 --> 01:32:35,960
This is and I used to make fun of Trump

1537
01:32:36,000 --> 01:32:38,479
all the time about this deep state stuff. I thought

1538
01:32:38,520 --> 01:32:40,640
he was full of it, but it turns out Trump

1539
01:32:40,760 --> 01:32:43,880
was right about a lot of it. And I'm being

1540
01:32:43,960 --> 01:32:49,520
nonpartisan here, but this is the ultimate deep state thing,

1541
01:32:49,560 --> 01:32:51,199
if you want to call it that, even though it's

1542
01:32:51,199 --> 01:32:54,000
a politically loaded term. But at the end of the day,

1543
01:32:54,319 --> 01:32:57,600
you have a group afty or fifty ish or so

1544
01:32:58,000 --> 01:33:05,199
senior executive Service employee that are managing the special access

1545
01:33:05,239 --> 01:33:09,920
programs and the controlled access programs and the programs in DOE,

1546
01:33:11,520 --> 01:33:16,000
and all of this, half of it sits classified under

1547
01:33:16,039 --> 01:33:20,399
the National Security Council, and the other half sits under

1548
01:33:20,439 --> 01:33:25,600
the Department of Energy as transclassified for nuclear information. These

1549
01:33:25,600 --> 01:33:31,119
fiftiest or so folks that we didn't vote in that

1550
01:33:31,199 --> 01:33:35,079
we never asked any of us what they think we

1551
01:33:35,119 --> 01:33:40,279
should be doing about this whole UAPSU. These folks is

1552
01:33:40,640 --> 01:33:44,279
folks of fiftieth or so senior executive service folks. They

1553
01:33:44,279 --> 01:33:47,680
are the ones managing this. They are the ones gatekeeping this.

1554
01:33:48,039 --> 01:33:51,239
They are the ones hiding this from American presidents. They

1555
01:33:51,239 --> 01:33:54,760
are the ones hiding this from some secretaries of Defense.

1556
01:33:55,760 --> 01:33:59,680
And that, my friends, is an abomination of the Constitution

1557
01:33:59,760 --> 01:34:03,439
of the u United States. You cannot have a functional

1558
01:34:03,479 --> 01:34:07,880
democracy when you've got the the head, the head of

1559
01:34:07,920 --> 01:34:14,359
the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology, calling the shots

1560
01:34:15,359 --> 01:34:23,840
deciding what possibly what retaliatory measures against whistleblowers are. Okay,

1561
01:34:24,760 --> 01:34:28,920
it was shared with me a while back what the

1562
01:34:28,920 --> 01:34:33,680
CIA was up to in terms of retaliation against whistleblowers,

1563
01:34:34,079 --> 01:34:36,479
and it made me want to go to the bathroom

1564
01:34:36,560 --> 01:34:40,720
and vomit. It made me so sick as an American

1565
01:34:41,159 --> 01:34:45,159
to know that this this sort of rogue element in

1566
01:34:45,279 --> 01:34:49,720
our in our government, thinks that doing those sorts of

1567
01:34:49,760 --> 01:34:58,279
things is okay. It's not okay. And and the fact

1568
01:34:58,319 --> 01:35:03,920
that you have a corre up Department of Defense Inspector

1569
01:35:04,039 --> 01:35:10,439
General Inspector General's Office operating where if you are a

1570
01:35:10,479 --> 01:35:14,119
whistleblower and you go and you file a PPD nineteen

1571
01:35:15,640 --> 01:35:19,800
Presidential Protected Disclosure nineteen form and you send that to

1572
01:35:19,960 --> 01:35:26,039
the DODIG to whistle blow on UAP special access programs

1573
01:35:26,039 --> 01:35:30,199
that you think are illegal. And oh, by the way,

1574
01:35:30,239 --> 01:35:32,000
when you do that, you know what's going to happen.

1575
01:35:32,920 --> 01:35:36,439
The Pentagon Department of Defense Inspector General is going to

1576
01:35:36,520 --> 01:35:45,279
leak those facts, the protected, the legally protected confidential disclosure

1577
01:35:45,359 --> 01:35:50,239
you made. The DODIG is going and leaking them. The

1578
01:35:50,359 --> 01:35:55,199
DoD IG leaked details about David Grush's testimony, The DoD

1579
01:35:55,359 --> 01:36:00,920
IG leaked testimony of about Loue Alizondo. So here you

1580
01:36:01,039 --> 01:36:04,439
have the d o d IG who's saying, come on in,

1581
01:36:04,840 --> 01:36:08,199
tell it, give us the goods. We'll keep your identity secret.

1582
01:36:08,479 --> 01:36:14,840
We'll we'll keep your your testimony classify or secret. But

1583
01:36:15,039 --> 01:36:17,720
guess what they're going to leak the non classed stuff.

1584
01:36:18,119 --> 01:36:21,079
Guess what they're going to leak your name? Why are

1585
01:36:21,079 --> 01:36:24,640
they doing that? So the d O d ig they

1586
01:36:24,840 --> 01:36:26,720
they want to they're speaking out of both sides of

1587
01:36:26,720 --> 01:36:30,159
their mouth. They're saying. They're saying, folks, come on in,

1588
01:36:30,399 --> 01:36:33,640
make a protected disclosure. We've got your back. None of

1589
01:36:33,680 --> 01:36:35,960
this stuff will leaked out. You can tell us everything

1590
01:36:36,000 --> 01:36:38,279
you want in the skiff. Nothing is going to get

1591
01:36:38,359 --> 01:36:42,840
leaked out. But their actions are different than their words.

1592
01:36:43,079 --> 01:36:47,279
They leak these things. They leak whistleblower identities, They leak

1593
01:36:47,640 --> 01:36:51,880
non class details regarding their testimony, and why are they

1594
01:36:51,920 --> 01:36:57,119
doing that. They are sending a message to whistleblowers that

1595
01:36:57,560 --> 01:37:01,479
while yes, we may say we want you to come

1596
01:37:01,520 --> 01:37:04,640
on in and tell us about all this governmental malfeasance,

1597
01:37:05,359 --> 01:37:09,319
but the subtext is they do not want you to

1598
01:37:09,359 --> 01:37:13,119
come in because if you do, you know what's going

1599
01:37:13,199 --> 01:37:18,119
to happen. Your identity is going to get leaked, Certain

1600
01:37:18,319 --> 01:37:21,600
details about your protected disclosure are going to be leaked.

1601
01:37:22,239 --> 01:37:25,520
And oh, by the way, chances are nine times out

1602
01:37:25,560 --> 01:37:29,800
of ten your security clearance is going to get flagged. Now,

1603
01:37:29,800 --> 01:37:33,199
why is that important. Folks that exit the government who

1604
01:37:33,279 --> 01:37:37,960
have any sort of security clearance TSSCI secret whatever, that

1605
01:37:38,199 --> 01:37:41,960
is their golden ticket when they exit government and they

1606
01:37:42,000 --> 01:37:46,640
want to work on a classified program for any sort

1607
01:37:46,680 --> 01:37:52,880
of government contractor that requires any kind of clearance TSTSSCI whatever.

1608
01:37:54,239 --> 01:37:57,720
If they don't have that clearance, if their clearance is flagged,

1609
01:37:58,720 --> 01:38:03,560
those former government and employees they cannot find a job

1610
01:38:04,359 --> 01:38:09,000
period the end. So think about it. You're a you're

1611
01:38:09,000 --> 01:38:12,119
an Air Force officer. You have as part of your

1612
01:38:12,199 --> 01:38:17,119
job a TSSCI clearance and a bunch of different tickets

1613
01:38:17,159 --> 01:38:19,680
for different SATs that you were read in and then

1614
01:38:19,720 --> 01:38:22,880
eventually read out of. And you want to go work

1615
01:38:22,920 --> 01:38:27,079
for a Lockheed Martin or a Northrop Grummitt. You go

1616
01:38:27,159 --> 01:38:29,800
in for that interview and you think everything is okay,

1617
01:38:30,520 --> 01:38:34,520
and during that interview, the security officer says, sorry, sir,

1618
01:38:34,640 --> 01:38:38,159
sorry ma'am, but there's a flag on your clearance. We

1619
01:38:39,159 --> 01:38:43,079
cannot hire you because as part of this job, you

1620
01:38:43,239 --> 01:38:47,079
need to be able to handle Special Access Program level information.

1621
01:38:47,680 --> 01:38:50,880
And since you don't have a clearance to view SAP materials,

1622
01:38:51,640 --> 01:38:56,479
you're out a lot. I can tell you that this

1623
01:38:56,760 --> 01:39:03,239
form of retaliation continues to this day. There are people

1624
01:39:04,000 --> 01:39:08,439
whose clearances have been flagged and they cannot find a

1625
01:39:08,680 --> 01:39:15,399
damn job. These folks that have served our country with distinction,

1626
01:39:17,039 --> 01:39:23,640
warned the uniform, men and women who have decided to

1627
01:39:23,840 --> 01:39:29,039
do the right thing and flag what are illegal things

1628
01:39:29,079 --> 01:39:32,199
taking place within our government by going to the dodig.

1629
01:39:33,640 --> 01:39:39,039
The Pentagon throws them under the bus. They threaten them,

1630
01:39:39,479 --> 01:39:44,479
they flag their security clearances, They ensure the Pentagon ensures

1631
01:39:45,119 --> 01:39:49,680
that if you are a whistleblower, good luck finding a job.

1632
01:39:51,319 --> 01:39:53,800
You might as well work for Home Depot because you

1633
01:39:53,840 --> 01:39:56,199
are not going to get a job that requires a

1634
01:39:56,239 --> 01:39:59,560
security clearance. Because the folks that are part of the

1635
01:39:59,600 --> 01:40:07,840
security infrastructure, the security officers that work the security, the

1636
01:40:07,880 --> 01:40:12,159
security aspect of special access programs and controlled access programs

1637
01:40:12,159 --> 01:40:14,760
for the IC, they're going to flag your clearance. They're

1638
01:40:14,760 --> 01:40:17,000
going to make damn sure you are not going to

1639
01:40:17,039 --> 01:40:23,079
get a job because they the Pentagon is hell bent.

1640
01:40:23,560 --> 01:40:27,359
They are hell bent on retaliating against our men and

1641
01:40:27,439 --> 01:40:33,319
women of uniform who are going against the grain. Men

1642
01:40:33,359 --> 01:40:37,600
and women who have warned the uniform or served our government,

1643
01:40:37,920 --> 01:40:42,319
served our country in some capacity. Folks that have decided,

1644
01:40:42,359 --> 01:40:44,960
you know, what this is not right. What is happening

1645
01:40:45,000 --> 01:40:50,279
behind the scenes is not right. And they had the

1646
01:40:51,039 --> 01:40:54,920
courage to do the right thing. They had the courage

1647
01:40:55,199 --> 01:40:59,840
to put duty above self, to put country above self.

1648
01:41:00,760 --> 01:41:03,279
And what thanks do they get? They get their security

1649
01:41:03,279 --> 01:41:07,039
clearance flagged? What thanks do they get? They have security

1650
01:41:07,039 --> 01:41:10,159
contractors that go and put tracking devices on their cars,

1651
01:41:10,640 --> 01:41:13,720
what thanks do they get? The CIA planning to do

1652
01:41:13,800 --> 01:41:16,560
certain things I can't talk about here. Those are the

1653
01:41:16,600 --> 01:41:20,880
things that Congress must subpoena these folks. They need to

1654
01:41:20,960 --> 01:41:25,000
subpoena the head of DS and T, whoever the head is,

1655
01:41:25,279 --> 01:41:28,359
the former head of DS and T, Glenn Gaffney, the

1656
01:41:28,399 --> 01:41:33,399
former head of the CIA Office of Global Access. You

1657
01:41:33,399 --> 01:41:36,479
need to throw them on the stand, make them swear

1658
01:41:36,640 --> 01:41:43,920
under oath, and ask them really hard questions. Ask them,

1659
01:41:43,960 --> 01:41:47,479
are they aware of or were they involved in any

1660
01:41:47,560 --> 01:41:54,079
decision making regarding retaliatory measures, either directly by the government

1661
01:41:54,960 --> 01:41:58,399
or through the use of cutouts, or through the use

1662
01:41:58,760 --> 01:42:05,000
of government defense contractors and their security their security contractors.

1663
01:42:05,359 --> 01:42:08,720
Were they aware and or involved in any of those

1664
01:42:08,800 --> 01:42:16,640
retaliatory measures against government whistleblowers or potential government whistleblowers. That's

1665
01:42:16,640 --> 01:42:20,760
what they should ask. They should ask, are they aware

1666
01:42:20,880 --> 01:42:25,920
of where the money for a Boeing charging eight thousand

1667
01:42:26,000 --> 01:42:31,359
dollars for a bottle of a soap dispenser for an airplane.

1668
01:42:31,720 --> 01:42:36,520
Let's say that soap dispenser giving a generous, generous offering.

1669
01:42:36,600 --> 01:42:40,680
Let's say that soap dispenser cost one thousand dollars. Where

1670
01:42:40,760 --> 01:42:45,600
did where did Boeing funnel that other seven thousand dollars?

1671
01:42:46,479 --> 01:42:49,680
Guarantee you they funneled it into areas that they don't

1672
01:42:49,720 --> 01:42:55,439
want us to know about. Congress must also subpoena the

1673
01:42:55,680 --> 01:43:00,640
c suite of all the major defense contractors. I'm talking

1674
01:43:00,720 --> 01:43:06,439
aerospace corporation. I'm talking Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin. They

1675
01:43:06,479 --> 01:43:11,479
need to bring the corporate leadership in before Congress put

1676
01:43:11,520 --> 01:43:15,840
them under oath and ask them exactly what they have

1677
01:43:15,920 --> 01:43:20,840
been up to regarding any program cap SAP, or any

1678
01:43:21,000 --> 01:43:26,760
of their private programs involving technologies of unknown origin or tuos.

1679
01:43:27,039 --> 01:43:30,720
They need to ask about UAPs. They need to ask

1680
01:43:31,840 --> 01:43:36,319
what other funding mechanisms that are below the radar will

1681
01:43:36,399 --> 01:43:41,199
say funding mechanisms that they have to fund these projects.

1682
01:43:42,079 --> 01:43:45,760
They need to ask what materials that should be in

1683
01:43:45,800 --> 01:43:50,359
the government's possession. They're not giving that those are the

1684
01:43:50,399 --> 01:43:56,359
things that need to be asked. So any whistleblowers, there

1685
01:43:56,359 --> 01:43:59,760
are potential whistle blowers that are asking or asking themselves

1686
01:43:59,840 --> 01:44:04,159
right now, if they should go trust Arrow and go testify,

1687
01:44:04,760 --> 01:44:10,119
Absolutely not. I would not recommend any government whistleblower, current

1688
01:44:10,239 --> 01:44:16,399
or former, go to Arrow. The mere fact that Arrow,

1689
01:44:16,760 --> 01:44:22,239
as of two weeks ago, has this secret technical advisory group,

1690
01:44:22,560 --> 01:44:26,039
of which at least at some point ago Glenn Gaffney,

1691
01:44:26,359 --> 01:44:29,159
former head of CIA Director to sign Technology, was part

1692
01:44:29,199 --> 01:44:32,239
of the other thing I can tell you as well,

1693
01:44:32,479 --> 01:44:35,720
any members of Congress that are watching this, there are

1694
01:44:35,920 --> 01:44:41,520
other members of the of Arrow's advisory board, their technical

1695
01:44:41,560 --> 01:44:44,279
advisory group, the group that they don't want to tell

1696
01:44:44,319 --> 01:44:48,720
you who is on that group. There are a host

1697
01:44:49,039 --> 01:44:53,960
of other members that you would probably flip your lid

1698
01:44:54,279 --> 01:44:58,560
if you found out who is on that group. So,

1699
01:44:58,680 --> 01:45:04,279
Senator jillibrand anyone else watching this, if you want to

1700
01:45:04,359 --> 01:45:10,760
know whether you can trust Arrow right now, you need

1701
01:45:10,960 --> 01:45:15,319
to demand the list of names of who is sitting

1702
01:45:15,640 --> 01:45:21,119
on the Arrow Technical Advisory Group. You're going to be

1703
01:45:21,159 --> 01:45:25,359
floored and you're going to be enraged, And I guarantee

1704
01:45:25,359 --> 01:45:28,039
you Once you find out who is on that list,

1705
01:45:28,720 --> 01:45:31,079
you're going to be asking a lot of questions and

1706
01:45:31,119 --> 01:45:33,600
throwing a lot of people under oath because what is

1707
01:45:33,680 --> 01:45:39,800
going on is illegal, it is wrong, and furthermore, sending

1708
01:45:39,800 --> 01:45:43,840
somebody to ARROW when you've got the head of DS

1709
01:45:43,840 --> 01:45:46,840
and T, one of the primary gatekeepers of the deep

1710
01:45:46,920 --> 01:45:50,560
legacy program, I can tell you he or she that

1711
01:45:50,680 --> 01:45:53,079
is in that position right now. There is a damn

1712
01:45:53,119 --> 01:45:56,600
good chance that any whistleblower that is going to ARROW,

1713
01:45:57,039 --> 01:46:01,399
that person sitting on that technical Advisory Group is likely

1714
01:46:01,680 --> 01:46:05,680
funneling all of that information back to the CIA and

1715
01:46:05,840 --> 01:46:10,199
back to the defense contractors. And it is the defense

1716
01:46:10,279 --> 01:46:16,640
contractors that are the primary group that is engaged in

1717
01:46:17,079 --> 01:46:25,039
retaliation against whistleblowers. So you know, I absolutely there is

1718
01:46:25,079 --> 01:46:29,199
no way that I would recommend anyone go to ARROW

1719
01:46:29,239 --> 01:46:35,319
that has any concern about their safety, because there is

1720
01:46:35,640 --> 01:46:40,479
just no guarantee that your identity and or what you're

1721
01:46:40,520 --> 01:46:44,640
disclosing is not going to get funneled back to CIA,

1722
01:46:44,800 --> 01:46:48,000
DS and T. It is probably going to get funneled

1723
01:46:48,039 --> 01:46:52,520
back to the defense contractors, who who are at the

1724
01:46:52,600 --> 01:46:55,760
end of the day, are just more concerned about power

1725
01:46:55,800 --> 01:46:59,880
and their bottom line. You don't want to do it.

1726
01:46:59,840 --> 01:47:03,600
It's not it's uh, it's it's just not worth it.

1727
01:47:04,359 --> 01:47:09,279
So anyway, I really appreciate everyone joining the show today.

1728
01:47:09,359 --> 01:47:12,760
Please tell your friends about us. We we only can

1729
01:47:12,800 --> 01:47:15,119
grow as fast as people will tell us. Tell us

1730
01:47:15,119 --> 01:47:17,800
about tell your friends about the show. Please hit the

1731
01:47:17,840 --> 01:47:22,840
subscribe and thumbs up button buttons. YouTube looks at those

1732
01:47:22,960 --> 01:47:27,039
metrics and decides whether those signals are gonna are gonna

1733
01:47:27,159 --> 01:47:30,279
encourage them to recommend our show to people that do

1734
01:47:30,359 --> 01:47:34,319
not track the UAP topic. At the end of the day,

1735
01:47:34,760 --> 01:47:41,279
as lou Elizondo so eloquently stated at the hearing, this

1736
01:47:41,359 --> 01:47:47,079
is about our democracy. This is about whether our constitutional

1737
01:47:47,319 --> 01:47:53,479
republic survives. You cannot have a functioning democracy when you

1738
01:47:53,760 --> 01:47:59,479
have a cancer, a malignant tumor that is eroding the

1739
01:47:59,720 --> 01:48:04,520
very foundation of truth and what it means to be

1740
01:48:04,840 --> 01:48:10,640
an American. You cannot have a democracy when the Pentagon

1741
01:48:11,319 --> 01:48:15,119
throws under the bus the men and women that have

1742
01:48:15,479 --> 01:48:21,119
worn the uniform in service to this country. It is unacceptable,

1743
01:48:21,960 --> 01:48:26,199
it is wrong, and has got to come to an end.