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Speaker 2: Thank you.
Speaker 1: Want to welcome everyone back to the peking Yonas Show.
Got a couple gentlemen hanging out with me today. Darryl Cooper,
how are you doing there?
Speaker 3: Doing all right?
Speaker 2: Brother?
Speaker 3: Always great to be with you.
Speaker 1: Doctor field House, how are you what's up? By doing good?
Doing good? So This came about because Thomas and one
of Thomas's siri he mentioned at the end of an
episode Thomas Cune and doctor field House contacts me and goes, oh,
you should see the notes I have on Cune and Jarrel. Uh,
Jarrel's up on Cune, so why don't we do an
episode about him? And that was about six months ago,
and as as things happen, we're finally doing it.
Speaker 3: So we've got a break in the news. You know,
this is a good time to kind of.
Speaker 1: Like, what's funny is I just recorded with Jay Burden
we did a review of Michael Samino's nineteen eighty five
movie The Year of the Dragon with uh yeah. So
it's like we don't want to talk. We don't want
to talk about current events.
Speaker 3: So this is why I want like a Caesar to
show up or some kind of like dictator, just so
that we can get back, like I want to interview
Steve Bannon and just talk about like black magic and
ancient occultism and stuff. I don't want to talk about
this crap anymore, Like.
Speaker 1: Come on, yeah, well, I want to do my hockey
podcast so bad.
Speaker 3: But could you see the new Natural Predator's logo.
Speaker 2: Y yeah, yeah, please, yes, are yeah?
Speaker 1: All right, doctor Field, how's lead us off here?
Speaker 2: Okay?
Speaker 4: And like we said, this has absolutely nothing to do
with Iran, so real quick, uh, Thomas Kohon. For anybody
who's just checking in, what's it about, It's about his
work the structures of scientific revolutions and how it influenced
how both scientists and non scientists and layman think about
the concept of paradigm. He's the guy who gave us
the term paradigm shift. So yeah, if you've done any
kind of grad school dealing with theoretical science or theoretical
social science, or theoretical version of any discipline that wants
to attended to science, even though it absolutely is not,
there's a good chance that he was the first book
that they made you read in that grad school program,
and famously, at least in my program and a lot
of other ones. They don't really give you, like the
Cliff Snows introduction as to why this guy matters and
why his works matters. They just sort of give you
this book, which is again very opaque because he's or
at least fairly opay because he's writing for other academics
and sort of like the professor sort of acts like Yoda,
where we're going to go and do these things and
maybe somehow we figure out how it matters, or like
mister Miyagi, somehow if you trust him, cleaning his cars
for him will eventually turn you into a bare knuckle fighter.
So yeah, so real quick. Thomas Kuhn nineteen twenty two
to nineteen ninety six. Again, he was in He was
an academic who's primarily known as a historian of science.
A historian of science. He went to trying to remember
where he went to one of the Ivy leagues, and
he studied physics. He graduated nineteen forty three. From his
undergrad he went and got his masters and his PhD
after that. Then he was in the scholars program. I
have to look again at what school that was. Excuse me,
Harvard Fellow program, which basically allows a newly minted PhD
to go in for the two years or whatever do
whatever research they want on whatever field they want. But
you got to show up and teach x number of
undergrad classes, which is a good deal, especially since you know,
being in school just got him out of World War two,
which is an interesting thing. I'd almost want to ask himself,
and you know, kept him out of the post war draft,
so more than anything, I think that was probably why
he chose that. But he was given the task of
doing a history of science class for non science majors.
Some of them were undergrad historians, a lot of them
were just guys with general liberal arts, but generally these
were people who were not interested in going to you know,
a regular academic Bachelor of science physics or hard science programs.
And one of the things he found teaching these students
that he he was the feedback he got that was
very interesting is most people, most laymen especially, had this
idea of just continuous linear progress in the history of science,
though a lot of us acknowledges there are times where
things step back, when we tend to think of those
as dark ages, And much like Spangler, even though I
don't think he directly cites Spangler at all, kne provides
a conceptual model where he understands that, you know, it's
not just continuous progress. We go through a series of
changes in worldview what he calls paradigms, in which we
cycle back and forth between a new framework, a new
conception for understanding how the world works, followed by a
series of that I'll go into a deale with of
what he calls normal science, where we do regular incrementalist
investigation experimentation, followed by periods in which we get more
and more data that doesn't align with that previous model
conceptual model. Followed by a crisis in which, you know,
we're trying to figure out, hey, why don't these models work?
What are the competing models? Followed by a new paradigm
as it were, excuse me, So, yeah, those are the
biggest things. His book Structures of Scientific Revolutions, published in
nineteen sixty two, there's three or four different further editions,
all the editions published in his lifetime. He famously included
brand new forwards introductions to each of the book on
top of the previous introductions are there, partly because he
was very unhappy the way people interpreted his work. The
example is his work is seen as sort of foundational
to postmodernism, to the idea that there isn't actually a truth,
there's just competing frameworks, different conceptual models. And he made
it very clear that he wasn't a Kuonian, you know.
Famously he said, look, I'm not a Kuonian, even though
you know that that perspective, that position was named after
him because he said, look, yes, there are different conceptual models,
but he understood that there is some capital T truth
out there and that hopefully science, if we're doing it properly,
gets closer and closer to that capital T truth, even
though yes, we will have conceptual models there. So that's
probably the quick and dirty summary of his work and
why it matters.
Speaker 3: Yeah anything, Daryl, Oh, yeah, I was. You know, I've
always you mentioned Spangler, and when we first started talking
about Coon a long time ago, you know, I mentioned
that Spangler was somebody who, you know, not exactly somebody
that you could say Kuhn's elaborating on or dialing in on,
but that they run very well in parallel with each other.
And if you think about Kuhn's idea of mental models,
you know, which is how does he put it? I
think he says the mental model is if you're putting like,
if you're putting together a puzzle, it's the it's the
picture on the box, right. This is the analogy that
he uses. And as you're starting to put together this puzzle,
as you pull the pieces out one by one, you know,
Spengler sort of had he had this this concept of
the er idea, which is it's this you know, you
can you can give it linguistic definition, but really it's
much more of a symbolic, conceptual, nonverbal principle that exists
within the soul of a civilization and all of the
people in a civilization. That is it all the manifestations
of their various creative powers, right, and and everything that
they that they do create. It sort of drives them
in the direction of of bringing this uh, this or
idea into the world, you know, toward its apotheosis basically.
And so an example of that, uh, he would say,
you know, if you think about the Greeks for example,
you know, the Greeks, he points out Spangler would point
out that, you know, you have the Greek focus on
sculpture as an art form and much less on painting.
Obviously they did paint, but uh, you know, they didn't
have deep perspectible painting. It was much more on the
solid sculpture with an emphasis on proportion. That fits very
well into the emphasis that they gave to music. You know,
that was so central not only to their sort of
their their taste and art and everything, but their basic
understanding of religion in the world because and specifically string music.
And that's because you know, proportion, the relation between proportion
and tone is like, you know, very obvious in string music.
Even their mathematics, uh, you know, until the era of
like major cultural exchange really picked up, they lacked as
zero in their mathematics. They understood fractions like really in
terms of parts of physical whole objects. They only as
far as exponents, they only had to the second in
the third power because those were things that related to
calculating area and calculating volume, and so everything was very
much uh, this idea of the solid body that is
in the foreground, you know. He talks Spangler talks about
how there, how their their religious temples were like these
quat kind of solid units with very little interior space
relative to the size of the structure itself in comparison
to say, like the cavernous mosques or cathedrals that you
know would be built in other civilizations. And so, you know,
Spangler makes a point that like all of these things
are manifestations of this same sort of like this vaguely
felt like core idea that exists in the Greek soul,
and everything that they're doing is sort of working that out,
and that's sort of you know, you could you could
think of that in similar terms to Kuhn's analogy, where
you know, they have this even if they can't quite
see it visually, like it's they still have this picture
on the cover of the puzzle box. That's sort of
it's in there, and everything they're doing is trying to
take a piece of a puzzle and like create this
picture out of it. And you know, that's one of
the great things about Kuon is obviously he's a physicist
and he's very focused on the history of science, but
I really think his ideas are very, very widely applicable
to other fields as well.
Speaker 4: Yeah, very much so. And that's one of the things
we talked about in the past is much like Spangler,
like he said, he's somebody like I said, he he
does not embrace the sort of knee jerk view of
linear progress that we just inherently have in the West,
at least until we identify it and we think about it.
And much like Spangler, one of the things that he
does very much is he's he provides a framework for
looking at your own models how we see the world,
why we see it that way, which is a necessary
prerequisite before you can evaluate or discard an obsolete model.
One of the things there's a saying about mental models
is look, every model is wrong. Some are useful. And
when they say every model is wrong, they're saying as
if just like a bully in logic search, where you
have you know A and B and C, but you
have all those condigent contingent requirements, which means if you
have any one of those brilliant contingent requirements, you know
suddenly that thing is not correct right, not in the
perfectly logical sense, but that think it might still work
as a heuristic for how we intuitively understand the world
or some phenomenon, and moving on from that. One of
the things that John Boyd, because a lot of why
I got into this is not just because I was
made to read Koon like everybody else, but John Boyd,
the strategist, the Air Force officer.
Speaker 3: He actually cites.
Speaker 4: Boyd is one of the sort of starting points when
he tried to create an integral or integral conception for
warfare and strategy, and one of the points that's brought
out of Boyd's work is, Yeah, every model is wrong
in the sense it's not perfectly accurate and all the
contingent things, but probably a more accurate way to say
is every model is incomplete, and once you understand something
as being incomplete, it gives you the permission to sort
of evaluate why we think that way without necess rarely
painting somebody into a conceptual corner where they're going to
reflexively fight back against any person who challenges them. If
that makes sense.
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's one of the reasons that that that ideology.
While it's very often incredibly helpful and often necessary to
map the world around us and understand what's going on,
it also has a tendency over time for people to
pull people into it and sort of calcify and solidify
their thinking so that you know, it's like when you
when you talk to a lot of people right left, center,
doesn't matter. They could be our guy. A lot of
our guys are like this doesn't matter. Like this is
unless you really really take steps to get around this.
The tendency tends to be you start listening to somebody
and you realize that they're not actually really thinking and
telling you what they think, right Now what they're doing
is they're describing their mental model to you, like they're
describing that, you know, whether it's ideological or just whatever
the the field might be. Is they're just sort of
reciting that to you and defending it against anything you
might say. And you know, it's it's much less of
a sort of of of a sort of iterative model
of like continuous improvement, right, which is what you need
for any any activity that doesn't have like a like
a like a total end state, you know, like a
total wind condition where the game's over, like you know,
something where the game really doesn't end and things are
changing all the time, and so your job is to
take in new information, fit that into your mental model,
adjust accordingly, and do that in ways that ideally, like
if you have a learning system, whether it's in an
individual or a learning organization, a military, or a society
as a whole. You know, the idea, the ideal situation
is new information comes in and you have a system
to uptake that, distribute it, make adjustments kind of on
the fly. In reality, though, what ends up happening is
there are vested interests in the model that the paradigm
that currently exists and again this is Kon talks about
it in the scientific fields, but it's true everywhere. And
so there's resistance to new information and there's resistance to
making those changes. And what ends up happening is, you know,
the the like the data that doesn't fit into your model, right,
the data that your model can't explain, starts to accumulate
and accumulate, accumulate, and it builds up pressure until finally
it spills out in a disorderly way because you just
you failed to learn over time, right, the like just
as I'm talking right now, maybe because of the history
podcast I've been I've just been putting out. I think
about like the armies in World War One. You know,
we went like a whole century where there was radical
technological change, you know, heavy artillery, machine guns, like barbed wire,
all these things that became so important on the battlefield
in World War One, but there hadn't been like a
lot of these sort of smaller brushfire wars and just
like enough like large scale open conflicts that people could
learn from and watch and observe. And so when it
finally came, there were all of these unlearned lessons that
had to be learned, you know, between August and December
nineteen fourteen to everybody's you know, extreme detriment, and so
you know, that's that's something again. It's one of the
reasons that kun is so interesting to me is that
it really is something that you can apply at almost
any level, at any scale, you know, from the individual
on up to a whole society and organizations you know,
in between those.
Speaker 1: That was something I was going to bring up, was
talking about the nineteenth century. You look at any war
that would have been fought in their early nineteenth century
of you know, a single shot rifle, people still using
black powder, and then one hundred years later you're watching
planes fly overhead and people are dropping you know, explosives.
Speaker 2: Out of it.
Speaker 1: You fast forward thirty years, you're incinerating entire towns in Japan.
So is it that if Kuhn wrote this in nineteen
sixty two, he's seeing it in the late fifties. It
did it just take Did it take that drastic a
scientific change, like seemingly overnight, but only in decades to
have someone come to this conclusion. I'm sure there were
proto coons in the past, but it seems like that
kind of scientific innovation would just give everyone pause, anyone
who was thinking about these things.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, part of what he talks about is
just the fact that we very often can't we don't
remember just how much scientific progress, both in terms of
applied science but in theoretical sciences, happened from you know,
the last couple decades of the eighteenth century up until
the first couple decades of the twentieth century, you know,
into the nineteen sixties. The field of electricity, just studying
electricity as a sub field of physics, you know, was
only beginning in the late eighteenth century, people like Benjamin
Franklin proving that, you know, lightning is a form of electricity,
which I'm still not sure how he did that without
shocking himself to death, but he One of the things
Koon sees is how we had competing fields of understanding
different aspects of physics, but electricity in particular, And he
talks about part of the issue is what's called incommensurability,
and one of the issues when you have competing paradigms
like we did for much of the nineteenth century, we
had different conceptual worldviews that conflicted with each other in
terms of describing physics. Very often these different frameworks they
can't really talk to each other. Like Daryl said, people
become resistant. Is part of the problem is the core
terms that we use can mean radically different things in
one framework versus another. So like one of the examples
Kon gives is the old Aristotelian model of the universe
or solar system, where you know, everything rotates around the
Earth versus the Taumaic idea where you know, the Earth
rotates around the Sun. One of the points he brings
up is just the term of what the word earth
meant in the old Aristotelian terms, by definition could not
rotate around the Sun because it was immovable.
Speaker 3: Right.
Speaker 4: It's just like when you see people actually do the
models of you know, the biblical conception of the solar system,
and it's like they don't see the Earth as a ball,
you know, usually it's a flat, you know, thing sitting
in the ether, you know, in which you know, everything
not just rotates around it, but just the dimensions of
the physical you know, perspective of Earth is basically either
unknowable or it's meant to be beyond our ability to
understand it. So big, So yeah, intercommensurability. Terms may not
mean each other mean the same thing from one group
to another, which means a lot of times, certain paradigms,
certain world views can't be reconciled directly with each other.
And one of the points I brought up just in
discussions in the last week I know with you, Pete,
was the term politics. Right, that word means slightly different
things in the English speaking framework versus what it means
in the German you know, the German language German language framework.
So some of the concepts like when clause it says,
you know, war's the extension of politics by other means,
and in English speaking American would say automatically, that's bullshit,
because war is a primal force. So one of the
things that needs to be understood is again politics means
something radically different in German social science theory, where it
means something more like the act of governance itself. And
I'm rambling here, but those are some of the issues
that feel a huge part of Kuhn's book is the
increments ability meaning people have two different conflicting worldview. It's
not just that they can't talk through their issues, but
the words mean radically different things, So essentially they're talking
past each other every step along the way.
Speaker 3: Does any talk about I can't remember if this was
from Kun himself or if it's just something that I
thought of while reading it or read when I was
reading about him specifically. With like the Ttolemaic versus Copernican
astronomical mental models or paradigms rather as data starts to accumulate,
that kind of lets people know there's something wrong with
the Telemaic model, like there's some problem here because we
can't account for all of these things that were beginning
to be able to measure and that we're that we're
seeing there's going to be like a quite a period
of time where first you just because you have that
accumulation of data that doesn't fit, you don't have a
better model to replace the old one with. And then
even once you do, like when like there was a
period of time after the Copernican model was sort of
it was out there for everybody that the Toolemaic model
was still able to actually help people navigate more accurately
for quite some time than the Copernican model, like a
lot of different things that it's still explained better because
the Copernican model wasn't fleshed out yet, and so that's
like a big part of the resistance to change as well,
Like you really do have to you see this, you know,
to come back to the military aspect. I mean, you know,
there's there's the saying that you know you always was
that you're always fighting the last war, right or you
learn and you learn the wrong lessons from the last warrant.
It's because you know, you have this theory about how
things have changed and everything's different now, and you know
you're going to see that air power, drones or whatever
it is has just changed everything. But the people you
have to sell that idea to are the ones who
fought and won the last war, and they have this
this you know, this this very powerful experience and a
vast amount of data that they feel bolsters their perspective
and makes it very difficult for you to climb that hill.
You know. One of the things that happens is, uh
is to sort of expand a little bit on my
previous point about about learning and the centrality of that.
You know, in order to avoid like a catastrophic disorderly
update of your operating system, you know, went sort of
due to a an external force that that that that
pushes you into it. One of the things that can
that can derail that is, uh, I guess what we
would call hubris, or just being sufficiently ahead or sufficiently
insulated from the consequences of your actions and decisions that learning.
You know, like those consequences. Another way of thinking about
that is, you know, that's feedback that should be going
into your system and updating your system. But if you're
sufficiently insulated from that feedback, you know, it can lead
to a kind of arrogance that totally derails that. And
the perfect example of that is what we're looking at
in Iran right now. Right we've had four years of
watching what was going on in Ukraine with very very
intelligent and dedicated people at the Pentagon. I promise you,
like for every more on ex General you see on
Fox News, there are one hundred oh fives at the
Pentagon who are shit hot, you know, and are very
squared away and they're studying this stuff, thinking about it
very deeply. And yet those guys have to have a
way to get what they're finding and the lessons that
they're learning up to the political level. When you think
about the obstacles that that you know, that they face
in this particular instance where they're watching what's happening in Ukraine,
they see how things have changed, and you need to
inform the political decision makers, the people at the top
that this this sort of way of preparing for in
waging war that we've built our entire military around. You know,
these gigantic, expensive systems that can do all of these
different diverse you know, just weapons system and platforms that
you know, can can perform any mission, all these things
from that F thirty five to the aircraft carrier, and
you know, these these hyper expensive, high maintenance, super high
skill requirements not only on the on the performance side,
but on the development and the maintenance side. You know,
all of these like complex inputs that have to go
into keep this big machine running. You can go and say, hey,
you know, we're watching in Russia right now, Like guys
aren't even using tanks anymore, Like all of these like
super fancy like Gen five fighters and all these things. Yeah,
they're really not They're really not that important over there.
We're watching, you know, and trying to get that up
past the obstacle of the entrenched interests in the current system,
you know that are benefiting from the current model is
extremely difficult, and it's really really difficult when we've been
in a situation where you know, we could fight and
lose two wars at the same time in Afghanistan in Iraq,
and you know, if you didn't have an internet connection
or a television, you could very plausibly not even know
we're at war. You know, there's very very very little
direct consequence that sort of stimulates that learning process.
Speaker 4: I was going to say before I know Pete's about
to say something is I said Aristotelian and Talemaic, and
you're right, it's Talemaic and Copernican. But yeah, I mean,
we could say this is an example of incremensibility where
people are talking past each other. But I think the
bigger issue is, like you said, it's an intentional cutting
off of feedback. I know, one of the things you
and I have talked about, and other people like Bill
Bueper have talked about, is a lot of people who
have a background in things like strategy and you know,
anti aircraft system in the stuff, have not talked a
whole lot about Ukraine, just because there was so little
reliable information coming out at any point that it wasn't
really clear what was going on. So much of what
we knew was intentionally if not propaganda, was just bullshit,
to the point that it's like, the only time I
see any documentaries with Americans talking anything about combat and Ukraine,
it's when they developed this new supposed really impenetrable line
of defense that nobody'll ever get through. And I always
get blocked because I said, you know what, they said
the same thing about the Magino line. And that's a
lot of it is we have a conceptual framework, at
least of what dominates the institutional military, especially the acquisition side,
which is concerned not just about fighting the last war,
but they really want to fight World War Two all
over again with you know beautiful you know sci fi systems.
Never mind that a lot of these systems didn't do
particularly well in Vietnam, they don't do particularly well against
the drones and all these systems. As I've talked about,
just the issues within doing invasion of a major country,
you know, take a long time to get someplace, because
we now build tanks that are so big that they
can't be transported down normal roads without shutting off some
lanes of traffic. So yeah, it's all those things. It's
it's real easy to isolate yourself from external feedback if
you're not going to allow it to come in. You
have the position of authority that's protected and people are
going to let you get away with it. And you
know the point that you know, like Pete said that
you know, information builds up because of disasters. It's one
of the concepts I always like is in zen Buddhism
and Japanese zen Buddhism is called satori, and the way
it's sometimes translated by people who do Japanese martial arts
is it's the kind of invitment that can only be
attained by being punched in the face. And that's usually
what happens. That's when militaries reform, is you get disaster,
a bunch of people die, and the state is destroyed,
and suddenly suddenly consequences matter. And part of why a
lot of my work in terms of just talking about
things like strategy and conceptions of how human beings are
led is ultimately I think we have a senior leadership class,
both in uniform and out in the United States that
wants to isolate itself from feedback, and sooner or later
the bill comes due. Sooner or lay or reality becomes real,
and I don't want people like me and you and
my neighbors to be hurt when that happens.
Speaker 3: Yeah, you see a good example of that all the time.
This is like a known phenomenon in MMA where you'll
have these guys who are shredding everybody in like the
smaller promotions. Maybe they get into the UFC in their
first few fights as they're working their way ups there,
just smashing people, and you think this guy is the
next champion. This guy's just nobody's ever going to beat
this guy. And then he runs into somebody who sort
of doesn't fold under the initial onslaught, and what you
sort of figure out is, oh, this guy is not
only the best dude in his gym, he is by
far the best guy in his gym. He bullies everybody
in his gym all the time, and as soon as
they get confronted with somebody, they not only don't have answers,
they very often just fold mentally because they're just they
haven't gone through that process of getting punched in the face.
You know, that confrontation with reality that forces you to
sort of reckon with you know, real limitations and have
to actually like find those other places that you're going
to need to go.
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's just like I tell people, if you're the
smartest person in the room, more often than not, you're
not hanging out with the right people.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah, this is something that I've said a lot over
the years. Is is a lot of the problems that
we have in society right now, as most people having
taken a punch to the face, and a punch to
the face does change your paradigm, it changes you. And
people have grown up in a people have been raised
in an environment where they've been protected where they didn't
you know. I mean I ran the streets and when
I was a kid, and there were many situations where
I don't know how I'm alive because you know, I
put myself into a situation where it's like, well I
get hit by a train, I get hit by a bus,
right now, things like that. But when you when you
live in a managerial framework, when everything is you know
Burnham's description of managerialism, it is to the least amount
of risk to destroy to change the environment you're in,
the structure you're in and that kind of you.
Speaker 2: Know, the you know what we saw with COVID.
Speaker 1: COVID was another one that I think opened a lot
of people's eyes to the fact that.
Speaker 2: The people who are.
Speaker 1: Quote unquote professional scientists are nothing but managers.
Speaker 2: It was the guys who you.
Speaker 1: Know, had clinics in California, little clinics that were doing videos,
that had figured out exactly what was going on, how
to take care, the best way to to fight what
was going on because they weren't stuck, and they weren't
they didn't have that position where they had a fear
of loss, that managerial position. And until you have something
that causes a paradigm shift, you're not going to have change.
And I don't think we I think the only change
we had even coming out of something like COVID, obviously
we haven't had a paradigm shift hard enough to bring
us out of We're always fighting the Cold War when
it comes to the military.
Speaker 2: But I don't think. I think the only thing that
came out of COVID.
Speaker 1: Is is that people is that normal people realize that
it's basically the medical system, everything is BS. But it
didn't it hasn't changed the medical system and how they operate,
the presuppositions that they operate upon, and they're they're basically cya.
Everything is about cya when it comes to these people.
So yeah, I mean it's sometimes it literally takes a
punch in the face and a punch and mouth to
change things.
Speaker 3: One of the things that go ahead.
Speaker 4: There was sometimes several times one of the This.
Speaker 3: Plays into something Spangler does as well, where you know,
he talks about as a society matures and it works,
you know, it's working through like uh, it's work. You know,
it's passed the really explosive period of creativity where there's
this newer idea and they're just you know, you see
all these these you know, he like he talks about
like Mozart and Beethoven for example, right and says, you know,
Beethoven wrote stuff as good as Mozart, but man, Mozart
threw that stuff off like it was nothing. And Beethoven
had to torture his soul to get one of those
things out. Because you know, after a while, as you're
trying to you know, as the tree is branching out
the smaller and smaller twigs, it's a lot harder to
find those those the room for improvement and and original
creative expression you know that hasn't already been done before.
Like there was a period of time time where we
weren't just inventing, you know, writing great music. We were
inventing orchestral music, you know what I mean. Like this
is just like the formative period of explosive growth. And
as you get more and more mature, and a lot
of these modes of creat creative expression, science, politics start
to become more institutionalized and mature as well. Then, just
like Burnham says, I think Sorell even talks about this
a bit, like you reach this point where you know
the skill that's being selected for is how good are
you at operating within the system, and how do you
know the rules of the system well enough to like
manipulate them to your benefits so that you rise and
that once you get into that place, then you really
do run into that wall where and this is the
Spanglarian point of it, you run into that wall where
people look around and say, man, like I could work
my whole life and you know, maybe not come up
with anything like really new and original like in this
field of expression that I'm that I'm into. And that's
when they start to turn around and look and you
start to see and this is not something that's just
a modern Western phenomenon. You see it in other historical cultures,
as Sanga describes as well. That's when you start getting
into this deconstruction period because you still can turn back
on the forms that have already been expressed and created
in your own society and start to critique and tear
those apart and pull them, you know, pull up the
various threads and you know, and see what holds together
and just tear things down. In other words, like that
becomes just it becomes the the path of least resistance
to like being able to put out something at least
that you know that that is a creative expression. The
consequence being, of course, that what you end up doing
is sawing off the branch that you're sitting on.
Speaker 4: Yeah, there's a couple of things I could say about that.
And even like the example of art form, I would
take this too. Most you know that we're most exposed
to is the novel slash film, right, because Spangler said
the novel was the only art form in Western civilization
that still had real vital creative energy when he wrote
Decline of the West and he said that he really
saw film as like an extension of the novel into
a visual medium. And even then we could take all
the you know, sort of ancillary things like short stories
is like a version of that, and the same way,
you know, television was sort of the same concept applied
to film. So yeah, it's like, again, all three of
us are like late gen X. We remember even just
the eighties, right, just how much energy there was in
creativity and film and books. You know, half of why,
guys my age, you'll get people who just won't shut
up about comic books as there was a time with
this cheap, you know, crappy little entertainment thing actually had
some real entertainment value, real creative value. And you know,
our our special effects have gotten infinitely better, but nobody
has a fucking story to tell. To the point that,
you know, it's like every movie that's brand new is
like the same thing, except you know, it's about focused egalitarianism.
And the stuff that's really good is like when we
had the Dune film is like, well, let's go take
this older story and bring it back and applied to
the military sphere, that's also very true, right, especially peacetime
standing army, Right, it tends to reward people who color
within the lines the best, you know, and that's great,
but again that's sort of like the whole monitor version
of leadership, which does not win wars and it doesn't
solve problems when there's actually problems, you know, that come
up in real time on the battlefield. Because again, one
of the things I was told, when the things I
tell everybody'son I ever been Tasta mentor is if you're
a troop leader, you're an officer, you exist to solve
problems that don't have solutions, because if it had a
written solution, your sergeant would have fixed it before you,
and you would have found it out, you know, at
roll call the next day. And again that's part of
why you see so many disgruntled people from our generation
who left the military after being deployed multiple times to
Iraq and Afghanistan. More than anything, it's they couldn't go
back to dealing in an environment in which coloring in
the lines was more important than actually, you know, training
troops and preparing for success. And that rambling answer is
we see that, you know, in front of us so much,
and again everything is turned into deconstruction.
Speaker 3: I like that advice to officers. I've heard you say
that before, and you know it's it's it's really excellent.
I actually related to it reminds me of something that
Roger Scrutin said in the intro to one of his books,
where he's talking about the difference between conservative and progressive
or conservative and liberal political flawsophy being based on the
idea that you know, the progressive or the liberal I
can't remember which one he used, you know, has this
idea of politics, like there's this thing we're trying to achieve,
this place we're trying to get, and politics is the
means by which we move to that place, and the
basic conservative outlook on that. And again we don't really
even have these anymore for the most part. But like, so,
don't think I'm talking about Sean Hannity or whatever is that. Uh,
you know, there's no there's no end to this thing,
Like there's no big finale at the end of the
story where we all win the game of society or
something like that. No, the whole goal or the whole
purpose of politics is much more like the purpose of
a friendship. It's like the whole goal of it is
to make sure we're still friends tomorrow. Like that's the
goal of a friendship. There's no purpose to the friendship.
I'm not your friend because we're trying to do X,
Y and Z. Like we might try and do X,
Y and Z because we're friends and we want something
to do together. But the purpose is to keep the
thing going, you know, for another day. And when we
start thinking in terms of end states, when we're talking
about systems and processes that really don't work that way,
I mean that's also how you end up in really
really dark and talk about like politics. I mean, that's
when you can end up in some very very dark places,
like you think about like the Bolsheviks, right, their whole
idea is like there is an end state, and we're
going to get to that place period.
Speaker 4: Human nature be damned, yeah.
Speaker 3: Exactly, and that because once we get there, then you know,
all sins are forgiven, because you know, the only people
who are left will understand why we did it. And
I mean you kind of have this honestly to a degree.
I think this mentality has taken over the Zionis in
Israel as well. You know, they are not playing the
game as if they're going to have to still live
next to these people tomorrow. You know, they're acting as
if like there's some there's something that they can accomplish
and it's just going to be the thousand year right,
and they don't have to worry about, you know, whether
about these people ever again. And you can get very apocalyptic,
you know, in your outcomes when you start thinking that way.
Speaker 4: Yeah, ignoring human nature becomes very destructive, no matter what
your political philosophy.
Speaker 1: Well, you know, one thing that I do like to
point out to people is how in the past war
has been fought and that there has to be honor
and you have to have respect for your enemies. That
doesn't that doesn't count for the Bolsheviks. I mean these people,
there was no this wasn't a state, it wasn't two
states facing off. These are people who like would live
in your building, and their goal was to kill you.
They wanted to kill you. They didn't care how many
people needed to be killed. Talking about like a very
recent event is if your first act in an act
of war is to take out the leadership, well you're
going to have to negotiate at some point and If
your first thing to do is take out the negotiators,
then to me, you're no better than the Bolsheviks because
you're not looking for an end, you're looking to destroy.
Your whole goal at this point is to create chaos,
as they did. As an I know, by the time
this comes out, Darryl's episode maybe public the second episode
of Enemy, but it just goes that episode describes the
situation in Germany and how they weren't the Bolsheviks weren't
seeking to take over Germany to restore order. They were
seeking to They were seeking chaos and murder and destruction.
And that's all. If your first act is to say, Okay,
we're going to decapitate the leadership, that just tells me
that you are looking at another you want another Libya,
and you want it to be complete chaos for the
people on the ground. And like I said, reiterate, that's
you're really no better than the Bolsheviks at that point.
Speaker 3: Yeah, and it plays into this, you know what we
were saying about deconstruction, about that just will to destroy.
When there's no easily available, like obvious paths to create,
people default to tearing down. And that's really sort of
the political manifestation of that. You know, for all of
the Marxist clap trap that the Bolsheviks would would spew
when you actually watched them in practice, you know, the
entire thing was driven by a hatred for everything that
already existed and what came after it. I mean, this
is one of the reasons that you know, people will
say to this day that real communism hasn't been tried,
even though there's been fifty different versions of it. And
you know the reason is because the system is not
that important, you know, like, yeah, okay, sees the means
of production. We've all read Marx, we all went to
the sor bone or whatever. But like, you know, the
actual like Vietnamese communism doesn't have to look like Russian
communism doesn't have to look like it doesn't matter, like
the end state really doesn't matter. What matters is it's
this motive energy that's going to allow you to tear
down all of the things around you that you hate.
And the reason that you hate them is because you know,
they were created during that period of time where there
were truly great men, you know who were just they
were they were able to create things that are if
not impossible, are almost impossible within the constraints of like
the society as it exists in the in the more mature,
sort of institutionalized phases stages. And so you look around
and you see all these things that seem to have
been built by giants, and you know, you can really
have one of two responses to that. That's like a
reverence for tradition, you know, and a and a sort
of gratitude for your inheritance or you know, the I
guess you'd say, like the ego driven side of it,
or very individualistic side is to be to feel it
as an indictment, you know, and an accusation against yourself
and your own inadequacies and wanting to tear that down. Yeah.
Speaker 4: I was going to say first that the same people
who say the communism have never been tried, think that
every single right winger to the right of Hillary Clinton
is or fascism. Yeah, yeah, so all those things. I mean,
the biggest thing I would say that is frequently lost
is I think leftist, rightist, whatever. Most people understand the
eco ecosystem, you know, a complex system in nature is
a complex thing with you know, many different parts that
we don't necessarily completely understand, and that damaging it could
have you know, long run effects that we can't necessarily predict. Therefore,
we want to have a minimalist approach, a small c
conservative approach. The leftists who believe that also seem to
think that human nature is infinitely malleable and that there
is no structure in the society outside of the organizational
chart of government as it exists today.
Speaker 3: And well, and what you end up with when you
have a situation like that, where, you know, especially when
they have institutional power as they have in our society
since the Second World War, is that the the resistance
they're able to mount to any new systems of thought
or new ideas that are trying to account for the
ground reality that the current paradigm is not accounting for,
they have like real means of power to suppress that
and drive it underground. And when that, you know, when
that starts to happen, you kind of actually, you know,
I got a good quote from from one of my
favorite books, Chantelle del Soul's book Icarus Fallen. She says,
any refusal to acknowledge reality merely forces it underground. Suppressing
conflict does not make it go away, but rather allows
it to come back in less visible and more perverse forms.
As soon as a clandestine form of thought or existence
opposite to its official or legal counterpart appears and develops
with any degree of tenacity, we can be sure that
something essential is involved. There's every reason to suspect that
our dominant thinking and institutions must therefore be based on
a misguided, if not downright false anthropology. As soon as
an underground world becomes organized on a large scale beneath
the official world, as soon as a vast unspoken world
develops behind the dominant discourse, one can be sure that
a profound disequilibrium looms. And again, I remember when I
read that, even when I first read Del Soul's book,
it reminded me of Kuh And I think maybe that
was because you and I had recently talked about Coon
or something, But it fits in there very well. There's
that period of disruption that he talks about, you know,
where the amount of the pressure that's building up from
all of the unaccountable data is. It puts everybody into
the place where I think we are right now and
have been for some time, where almost everybody looks around
and they're like, yeah, this isn't this is not going
to work very much longer. You know, this can't possibly
go one doesn't matter. You're right left center, you know what,
you have, institutional power, you don't or any everybody's just
kind of looking around like, yeah, this thing's not working anymore.
And yet you know, that's a period of like profound opportunity,
but profound danger as well, and certainly profound anxiety, you know,
for individuals and societies as a whole.
Speaker 4: Yeah, that gets back to the issue very much so
comparing to Kun with the idea of you know, I
can go through the cycle again if you want, if
you consider it to consider it relevant. But the big
thing is we have that option period because you know,
facts don't exist in the earlier paradigm. At some point
we have competing at paradigms and that that is sort
of the conflict period before you know, a new paradigm
is adopted, and that's absolutely where we are.
Speaker 2: It's like.
Speaker 4: The current socio political zeitgeist. You know that many people
say dare not speak its name. We know it's based
upon egalitarianism, despite the fact that you know, in every
single way people aren't equal because they're not the same, right,
I'm not six foot tall, I don't have a one
fifty IQ. My dad's got both of those things, but
I don't, So, you know, I, in that sense, I'm
definitely not as good as him. And that's just the
way the world is, because we're different. But anything that's
anti egalitarian as is something that's going to be vehemently,
militantly opposed, just reflexively, in so many different levels. And
because our system, you know, claims to be a galitarian
though the same system, you know, basically the Chuds, people
like us are inherently less equal. So everybody's equal except
for us. You know, everybody's as good as a man
except for a man, and everybody is you know, as
normal as straight people, except for straight people. Meanwhile, we
have a society where nobody wants to protect anybody, nobody
wants to produce anything, and nobody makes children anymore. And
we pretend like this is going to continue on forever
and that this isn't coming towards a chaotic collapse. But yeah,
that idea of just a false anthropology, a an or
excuse me, a blatantly wrong idea about human nature. And
I'm one of those people who thinks that you know,
very much the human nature is real. It may not
be something that we can, you know, directly model. We
may not completely understand it, but it's sort of like
the weather. You know. We can have models that are
better and worse, and we can try to understand it,
but very much are Our main model for human action
has to include the understanding that people want what they
want and it may be different from us. And a
lot of times all we can understand about another group
of people the person, is how what they want is
different than yours. And you know, there's more things in
heaven and Earth than are dripped up in any one
of our philosophies. And that's more than anything. The establishment
pretends to have all the answers to everything, and you
know that's hubris, it's myopia. It's just that wilful disconnection
from external facts is so much at the heart of
just the rot in authority establishment today.
Speaker 3: Yeah, the you know, it's interesting how the way you
just describe egalitarianism, especially as it exists under our like
mature institutionalized civil rights regime, is that, you know, in
a weird way, like the institutionalized version of it is
an admission of its inverse, you know, by pointing out
or by by making the case that there's only one
group of people and it's a definable group and you know,
by various characteristics that are not in need of institutional health,
you know, to make their way through the world. Like
it's almost it's an emission of the superiority of that group,
even though it's not intended that way.
Speaker 4: You know, inevitably it becomes a declaration of that group
as the enemy. So instead of acknowledging them as better
or worse, they define them as just the outside, that
thing that is permissible to be destroyed. And it's like
the original Germanic language word for outlaw literally meant somebody
who was outside the law, somebody wasn't protected by the law.
And very quickly that's what the dominant American culture is becoming.
Speaker 1: It's not a coincidence that as Marxism grows and as
Marxism spreads, that the Enon regime has to be.
Speaker 2: Done away with, and then that we have to fight wars.
Speaker 1: To to destroy monarchy, because monarchy, even bad monarchy, points
towards stability, points towards an eternal something. I think, as
you said in the last episode that you know, some
of these some of these European names were like the
Pacific and like the and like the Atlantic. They they
stood a top time at that point, and with their
destruction now we well, I don't even know if you
can call it a paradigm shift. To Echo Kun, you you.
Speaker 2: Have to You don't have a shift.
Speaker 1: You have a destruction which eventually will will lead to
some something will lead to order eventually. I do believe that,
So I believe Yaki believed that, and I do believe
that too.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I'd almost say it's like the paradigm shift was
a century ago. I mean essentially the institutional left, which
to include Marxism. But I mean, as as Paul Godfried
Sai and Thomas has said, the problem with critical theory
and you know, social mark cultural Marxism is it's not
really Marxism, even though it's derivative and you know, it's
sort of descended from those things. So it's it's something
more than that. It's something worse than that that sometimes
we can't really name, but that I think that paradigm
really became dominant post World War One because again with
the ending of the Habsburg monarchy. The ending of the
hole Inzalens in German Germany, you basically had the elimination
of any monarchy with one or two exceptions in which
the actual executive authority was, you know, in the person
of the monarch. And yeah, there are lots of countries
that have kings, but in a parliamentary state for the
most part, a few exceptions, you know, the king has
as much authority as the president of Israel. Nobody gives
a shit, right, It's where you put a politician that
is neutral enough across the spectrum that you want to
keep from ever holding a real authority in the future.
And that's in many ways that's kind of what you know,
functional monarchies, functional and air quotes are today. It's the
one thing that the British monarchy is most concerned with
is they're not engaged in politics. And as as I
point out, you know, the German the continental understanding of
politics is a little bit broader, a little bit slightly
different than the Anglo American one, where you know, a
German theorist would historically say, no, there's no such thing
as an a political monarchy, because to be the ruler
is to exercise politics to exercise decision making authority. And yeah,
that paradigm really changed i think post World War One,
with a few exceptions, and you know, it's sort of
like we're living in the the crisis that was sown
hundred and fifty years ago.
Speaker 3: One of the things, you know, one of the problems
with conservatives in general, and something that it always runs
into is you know, you see this today, you saw
it after the First World War. You know, it's interesting
how you go back there and you look around and
you're like, there's basically like like everybody's a socialist, like
literally everybody, even the right wing fascists right call themselves
national socialist. Mussolini was a socialist, you know in name
before he was a fascist and all these things. You say,
well why is that? And it's because when the old
regime falls or starts to come apart, or the contradiction
start to pile up to the point where you know,
people are starting to flee the sinking ship and look
for other options. You know, the conservatives they're always busy
trying to plug the holes in the hole. Like they're
invested in the status quo and the institutions as they exist,
and once those things are gone. There's this period of
time where everybody except for the people who were tearing
the ship down and poking holes in the hole, everybody
else is kind of looking around like what do we
do now, you know, And it takes some time to
sort of formulate that and figure it out. And there's
this period of time where the destroyers have basically free reign,
you know, And I think that, I mean, I really
think that we're heading toward, you know again to take
conservatism is something different nowadays. But like, uh, you know,
once Trump Trump is removed from the scene, you know,
we have this this quote unquote movement that is that
is you know, so invested in just the personality of
this one man that you know, even if he goes
in rallies for somebody in an off year election, like
nobody's shown up unless he's on the ball, like they
just don't care. And once he's sort of taken off
the scene, like he built his entire model on delegitimizing
the entire you know, quote unquote right wing in America
before that, and once he's gone, you're gonna have this
period of time, I think where we better get our
act together pretty damn quick, because the other side is
going to have free reign for a period of time
until we do, and we need to start formulating now.
And I know, like Pete, you know you're you're very
engaged in this, which I really appreciate, is like this is,
this is these are questions we need to start asking now.
You know, this isn't something where and it's and that's why,
you know, uh, the National Socialist understood this, the the
fascists in Italy, just all across Europe understood this, except
maybe in Spain, and even a lot of them there
did as well, which is that your your job is
not to bring back or preserve the old order. If
that's the case, you're going to be the dude just
bailing buckets of water out while the dude is setting
fire to the sales. And you know, you better be
building another boat. And that's got to be the goal,
like at a time like this, because it's going to
be a lot harder to do, you know, once once
we're underwater.
Speaker 4: Yeah, a Giomphi's book, I mean, on the subject, he
said he's not he's not a reactionary. He's an archaeo futurist.
What are the actual core principles and bring them into
the indefinite future. The quote I was going to say
was from the Big Lebowski, which is, say what you
will about the tenets and national socialism, but it is
an ethos and I'm sure we'll get interesting comments on that.
But obviously I'm not a Nazi. But the point is
effective right wing movements, when they did exist, had a
definite thing they were for. The I'm not knocking conservatism.
I really see myself as a paleo conservative, but so
much of what is the right in American culture in
politics is largely defined by being antithetical to the left.
That's actually establishment. And it's okay, But if all you
know is what you're against and not what you're for,
you know, you're not really in the driver's seat. You're
just reacting to somebody else.
Speaker 2: Yeah, there is.
Speaker 1: You can't just build an arc, ok I mean, you
have to build an arc at this point, but you
have to know that you know at the end of
that forty days when you land what comes next. And
I think that's what a lot of people are. They're
waiting around for somebody else to figure out. And I
think it's that's what it's going to take. Something I
said about six months ago. I actually emailed it to
myself and forgot about it, and then I was texting
with a friend the other day and I said, basically,
we need a visionary we have there's nobody who is
standing up and going, Okay, this is the vision of
the future. This is the way we we think that
it can that we can go forward and that we
can thrive. Now, who's who's behind it? Who's going to
get behind it? And you need a visionary, you need
a founder. You need you know, in tech they call
it a founder. For our guys, I don't know that
anybody has stepped up to figure that out yet, to
be the dreamer, to be the person who is, uh,
you know, who's like, okay, this, this is exactly what
it's going to look like.
Speaker 4: Yeah. I think part of isolating anybody with an anti
establishment perspective in the last decade or so has a
lot to do with that. They may not come out
of institutional academia, but a lot of times there are
definitely people who are educating those establishments. They may not
be the institutional command element of the military, but they
usually come out of the military or the civil service
or something like that. And part of connecting or disconnecting,
like Daryl said, all the people who are in any
way opposed to that establishment paradigm is it makes it
really hard for those people to be in the situation
which they could create, you know, a vision and actually
disseminate it and actually get any kind of buy in,
not to mention the external feedback required to sort of
revise that vision into a workable model, because America does
a good job producing really crazy people who know how
to fix the world, and most of them are on
the street corner, and that's kind of of the model.
I agree with you completely, and I don't necessarily have
the solution of it, than I know, a future leadership
cadre for whatever comes next is going to invest a
lot of time and energy into producing a vanguard. What
kind of vanguard that's up for debate, But that's where
we're at. And the only place I've seen any kind
of interesting work on this whatsoever, has been in you know, fiction,
really science fiction and fantasy. Yeah.
Speaker 3: I mean, I think the thing that the right is
going to have to figure out, and it's something that
I don't see any evidence of, so far for the
at least for the most part, is got to learn
how to follow, you know, I mean, you've just the
right is great at producing would be generals and not
a lot of people who are willing to follow anybody else,
especially if the you know, if the person that they're
following deviates from you know, something like even the slicer.
There's just a lot of ego involved that makes it
very difficult. And this is something that all the great
movements of the past that really did create you know,
long term lasting like wide scale change, whether you want
to talk about from you know, the spread of Islam
to Communism under Lenin, I mean Stalin under you know,
the reason that he won out over Trotsky or one
of the reasons is he just understood maybe as a
former seminarian and as somebody who grew up Christian, he
had a he had a better understanding of the need
for people, the need for the sacred in a in
a in a movement like that, you know, when he
took Lenin's body and embalmed it, you know, and basically
turned into this religious relic. I mean, it was something
that you know, at exhibits even though he might have
been you know, a professed atheist that he understood something
at least very fundamental about human nature and human needs.
And you know, short of a of a real religious
figure like that, like somebody that sweeps people off their
feet with enthusiasm and emotion and everything, you know, people
are going to have I mean, this is somebody that
John you and I like know just from being in
the military that like, you know, you have to accept
that the ship sinks unless we say sir, yes, sir
to an officer that we think is a moron. Sometimes
it's just how the whole thing has to work, or
the whole system falls apart, you don't get anywhere accomplish anything.
And I think that, uh, you know, the right is
still like very very childlike in that way. You know
a lot of people who who are unwilling to follow
is a lot of ego, and we're gonna have to
We're gonna have to move past that.
Speaker 4: I think, Yeah, one advice I give to any person
who's going to be in a position of authority, and
I realize this is like the tenth time I've used
that phrase is if you're not you can't command yourself,
You're never going to command somebody else. And a lot
of times I tell people who are you know who
talk about seriously and I appreciate this, you know, especially
very religious people who want, you know, turn their sons,
maybe their daughters as well, but their sons into future
leaders in that hypothetical world where we're going to is
what to do, you know, to turn them into that
kind of leadership leader? I said, you know, first off,
historically that's what the boy Scouts were for, and it's
been taken over. But there are times of several you know,
good competing alternative scouting organizations on the old model. They're
actually very good. But the other thing I tell people
is your son needs a dog, because if a son
can't lead and take care of and actually get a
dog to follow him, he's never going to get soldiers
to follow him when they're being shot at. And I'm
not necessarily categorically critical of every person on our side,
but as Daryl said, there's some very meticulous work that
is not always fun, that goes into producing effective organizations
following as well as leading, and there's not any cheat
code to get around that, right, You've got to do
it well.
Speaker 1: I mean, those people can be a part of it,
be a part of building it, or they can just
be following it later. Yeah, I mean way they're going
to benefit from it. But you know, I'd rather be
a part of knowing, even if I'm not part of
the leadership cadre, that I'm helping to build it and
bring those people together who can make those decisions.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, that goes to ego.
Speaker 1: You know, it's like, I don't, look, I'm I'm too
fucking old to have an ego at this point. It's like,
I want to I want to live out a peaceful
life and you know, in three years, I don't want
to be the first podcast or arrested and thrown in
a fucking hole with an ID life soldier as an
IDF soldier as my fucking jailer exactly.
Speaker 4: And the two things about that, and part of the
problem is guys who can't cooperate, as Daryl said, they're
not even going to be a part of it, right
because they're why some things fail when nobody can cooperate
to an end. And the second thing is leadership in
some ways is fractal. Look, not everybody's going to be
a general. Not everybody's going to be an emperor, but
start off being the person who's actually a leader in
your household but in your community. So many functions that
broken down local society, like just people taking local political offices,
Virginia being the ultimate example. You know, the Democrats swept
more than anything because the Republican Party Virginia fails to
put quality candidates up there because they don't give a
shit about winning. They care about getting contracts from the
National Republican Party. But yeah, you may not be an emperor,
but you may have to be somebody in a position
of authority in your local community and at whatever level.
You know, a proper education the way it was traditionally
understood in classical Republicanism, like the people who created the
United States of America, is you need to be prepared
for whatever office and tasks and war and peace that's
required of your community. And I'm not going to pretend
that I'm like a great example of that, but I've
come through certain pipelines that were interested in developing that,
and we need to concert an effort on that because
I think ultimately that vanguard strategy producing leaderships for the
future is integral into whatever is done to build the
future tomorrow.
Speaker 3: On that note, fellas to quote the great Thomas seven
seven seven, I got to raise up.
Speaker 1: All right, well, I'll sign us out here, Darryl. Tell
people where they can find your work and your awesome
new episode.
Speaker 3: Yeah, sliok up the Marty made podcast wherever you get podcasts.
If you want to support the show because you just
like it so much, then go to the substack, which
is subscribed dot substack dot com. The new series is
called Enemy the Germans War. I just put out the
third episode just earlier this week.
Speaker 1: All right, and doctor field House, we appreciate you joining
us to share your share, your vision and your the
information that you've written about Thomas Kune.
Speaker 2: Thank you.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I appreciate it. Like I said, more than anything
is you don't really need to read all of Kuno
Cliff's notes is good enough. And if I didn't do
it that here I can always add to the future.
I've got a substack that at some point I'll start
posting to, but definitely read. Listen, subscribe to Pete, subscribe
to Darryl and Dark Enlightenment. Those are the best guys
I know, so thank
Speaker 2: You, appreciate you both