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<v Speaker 1>How'd you like to listen to dot net rocks with

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<v Speaker 1>where all the shows have no ads. Twenty dollars a month,

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<v Speaker 1>patron mug. Sign up now at Patreon dot dot NetRocks

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<v Speaker 1>dot com. Hello and welcome back to dot net rocks.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Carl Franklin and I'm Richard Campbell, and we're here

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<v Speaker 1>again for your dot net and all things, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>geek pleasure. I think so, Uh, Richard, how's it going

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<v Speaker 1>over there in Vancouver?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, if we get our time shifting right and nothing

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<v Speaker 2>weird happens and the creek don't rise, I should have

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<v Speaker 2>published episode one thousand of run As Radio yesterday.

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<v Speaker 1>Congratulations, thanks man, big milestone a lot of shows. Yeah

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<v Speaker 1>it is. And do you want to talk about dev intersection?

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<v Speaker 1>Can we talk about that now? Yeah?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, we can talk about dev intersection and you know,

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<v Speaker 2>all all the things come together well, and we're calling

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<v Speaker 2>it the we're sort of bouncing between the names because

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<v Speaker 2>there's a lot of emphasis on cloud development, so sort

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<v Speaker 2>of Azure community development you know stuff as well as

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<v Speaker 2>there's two other adjacent shows attached to it. But if

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<v Speaker 2>you know dev inter Section, you know what to expect.

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<v Speaker 2>The usual troublemakers including you and me, but also the

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<v Speaker 2>next Gen AI show, so lots of co piloting and

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<v Speaker 2>lots of real jenitor of AI, you know, smart folks,

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<v Speaker 2>the science people so forth, building cool things. And our

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<v Speaker 2>friend Michelle Busta Monte has started up a cybersecurity conference

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<v Speaker 2>adjacent to the other two. So yeah, three shows in one.

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<v Speaker 2>I got news about that one. Yeah, I'm doing two

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<v Speaker 2>talks at Michelle's security conference. Oh wow.

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<v Speaker 1>One of them is secure your Blazer Server Applications nice important,

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<v Speaker 1>and the other one is a live security this week.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh cool, I'm gonna do it on stage Channel show. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>we don't actually have the time yet, but we think

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<v Speaker 1>it might be in the evening, you know sometime.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a logical time to do it, right. Well,

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<v Speaker 2>if you working your butt off that week is aren't

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<v Speaker 2>you doing a session with Maddie as well on Yes

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<v Speaker 2>Purifying Never Hanks.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm really going to town this week. Crazy, I'm not

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<v Speaker 1>only doing a Blazer workshop one day, but yeah, Maddie

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<v Speaker 1>Montaguella and I and Jeff Fritz will be there too,

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<v Speaker 1>are going to aspirify the dot NetRocks dot com website.

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<v Speaker 2>Cool live in front.

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<v Speaker 1>Of your face.

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<v Speaker 2>There's nothing better than a Brownfield action man like actually

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<v Speaker 2>taking existing code and applying new standards to it and

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<v Speaker 2>not having a catch fire.

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<v Speaker 1>And honest to god, like, I don't really know what

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<v Speaker 1>to expect because this isn't something that's in my wheelhouse,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, So.

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<v Speaker 2>It's going to be a no, you're on the ride.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I'm on the ride. It's going to be a

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<v Speaker 1>learning experience for me and hopefully, you know, the it

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<v Speaker 1>will show.

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<v Speaker 2>Learn experience for everybody who's there.

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<v Speaker 1>It will show in the results. And then a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of other talks to Yeah, I'm going to be working

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<v Speaker 1>working hard. All right, let's start off with better no framework,

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<v Speaker 1>roll the music, all right? What do you got? Do

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<v Speaker 1>you know what lotty animations are?

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<v Speaker 2>No?

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<v Speaker 1>I didn't either until today, well until I found this, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>lottifiles dot com. These are free, lightweight animations, but I

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<v Speaker 1>guess they require a player, right, and so they look

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<v Speaker 1>like animated gifts to me, and I don't really understand

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<v Speaker 1>the difference yet. But However, I did find this Lotty

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<v Speaker 1>player which is in a part of the mud Blazer

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<v Speaker 1>extra package. So it's a Blazer Lotti player that makes

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<v Speaker 1>it easy to integrate high quality Lotty animations into your

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<v Speaker 1>Blazer applications. And it's a simple new get package and

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<v Speaker 1>it's you know, very easy to do. I just don't

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<v Speaker 1>know enough about Lottie to really care about it, but

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<v Speaker 1>somebody does, because this is, you know, this is kind

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<v Speaker 1>of an up and coming thing that's interesting. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Cool, another format.

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<v Speaker 1>Another format, Yeah, exactly. So that's what I got today.

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<v Speaker 1>Know it, learn it, love it. Who's talking to us?

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<v Speaker 2>Richard grabbed a commenta of a show nineteen fifty five

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<v Speaker 2>which you did at Build not that long ago, of course,

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<v Speaker 2>published in June, somewhat after the show, where we talked

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<v Speaker 2>to our friend Nicole Forrestkrenn, who hadn't seen in a while,

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<v Speaker 2>one of the you know, Devop's goddesses. She ran Dora

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<v Speaker 2>for the longest time and really was the person, I think,

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<v Speaker 2>more than anyone, who put the numbers to what it

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<v Speaker 2>meant to be a high performing team, like what the

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<v Speaker 2>difference was when you organized into rapid iterating ways, integrated

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<v Speaker 2>to and so Forth said, here's the performance different differences

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<v Speaker 2>that these teams get across the large numbers of organizations.

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<v Speaker 2>So she kind of took the you know, anecdotal side

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<v Speaker 2>of DevOps away and gave it a real science rigger.

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<v Speaker 2>And we've talked about this concept of frictionless development, about

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<v Speaker 2>what happens when you can code quickly and have this

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<v Speaker 2>infrastructure around you to know what's going on, and that

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<v Speaker 2>included using the contemporary AI technologies, although that was you know,

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<v Speaker 2>in May, and here we are in August September, where

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<v Speaker 2>of course things have.

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<v Speaker 1>Changed again light years away.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it keeps moving so fast. And so this comment

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<v Speaker 2>comes from Neil Tiberwalla who says, thanks for the great episode.

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<v Speaker 2>On one of the projects I'm working on, we are

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<v Speaker 2>also struggling to see how llms fit into DevOps. However,

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<v Speaker 2>are surprised to hear you all talking about multiple agents

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<v Speaker 2>merge conflicts. It seems like this is really a non

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<v Speaker 2>issue since the AI could just delete their work and

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<v Speaker 2>start over and redo the whole task. It's just some

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<v Speaker 2>computation not but otherwise not lost human programmer time. That

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<v Speaker 2>is the motivation for a merged process. Yeah, there's also

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<v Speaker 2>a cost in tokens. But I'm with you. Yeah, And

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<v Speaker 2>as you said on the show, a new paradigm requires

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<v Speaker 2>new ways of thinking. Definitely, software che all that is

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<v Speaker 2>changing again, and I'm not unhappy about it. It's interesting

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<v Speaker 2>to talk to folks and to experience all the different approaches.

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<v Speaker 2>So Neil, thank you so much for your comment. And

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<v Speaker 2>a copy of music Coby is on its way to you.

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<v Speaker 2>And if you'd like a copy of music Koba, I

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<v Speaker 2>write a comment on the website at don Arocks dot

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<v Speaker 2>com or on the facebooks. We publish every show there,

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<v Speaker 2>and if you comment there and I read it on

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<v Speaker 2>the show, I'll send you a copy of music Goba.

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<v Speaker 1>Music to code by I remember that, Yeah, that thing

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<v Speaker 1>I started a long time ago to help you focus

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<v Speaker 1>during development. Well now there's twenty two tracks, and if

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<v Speaker 1>you don't want to send in a comment and get

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<v Speaker 1>a free copy of it, you can go to music

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<v Speaker 1>too coode by dot net and you can download the

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<v Speaker 1>entire collection in MP three, flack or wave format.

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<v Speaker 2>Nice.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, So this being showed nineteen one hundred and sixty,

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<v Speaker 1>let's talk about what happened in nineteen sixty six. There's

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<v Speaker 1>you know this is one of those years, right that

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<v Speaker 1>people remember space exploration, Soviet Lunar nine spacecraft, and I'm

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<v Speaker 1>sure we'll talk more about that. The nineteen sixty six

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<v Speaker 1>FIFA World Cup held in England. The host nation won

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<v Speaker 1>its first championship by defeating West Germany in the final.

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<v Speaker 1>The Cultural Revolution in China Mao Jeidong right, so significant

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<v Speaker 1>social and political upheaval. The Vietnam War. The US announced

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<v Speaker 1>a substantial increase in troops in Vietnam. Civil rights Sammy Young,

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<v Speaker 1>junior civil rights activist, was murdered in Alabama, highlighting the

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<v Speaker 1>ongoing struggle for civil rights. The New York City Transits Strike,

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<v Speaker 1>a wildcat strike by public transportation workers, began January second

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<v Speaker 1>and lasted until January thirteenth. But my favorite category, music

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<v Speaker 1>and culture. The Beach Boys Pet Sounds was released, which

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<v Speaker 1>totally reshaped pop music. John Lennon sparked outrage with his

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<v Speaker 1>comment that the band was more popular than Jesus.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah not smart.

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<v Speaker 1>I shouldn't have said it, and I'm sorry. And The

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<v Speaker 1>flint Stones aired its series finale on April first, And

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<v Speaker 1>there's of course a lot more of it. What do

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<v Speaker 1>you want to tell us about technology?

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<v Speaker 2>In space Richard, You know, ninety six six is not

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<v Speaker 2>a huge here on the space side, just because it's

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<v Speaker 2>the end of the Gemini program and just before the

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<v Speaker 2>Apollo program really ramps up. Although there's lots of Cold

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<v Speaker 2>War stuff going on, lots of reconnaissance satellites and so forth.

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<v Speaker 2>But I would point out that Surveyor won launches and

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<v Speaker 2>lands on the Moon successfully for the first time, one

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<v Speaker 2>of the very first soft landings on the Moon ever.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow.

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<v Speaker 2>And also they start doing mapping of the Moon with

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<v Speaker 2>the prospect for landing with an orbit called the lou

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<v Speaker 2>Or orbiter. And it's a time before CCDs and so forth,

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<v Speaker 2>so taking pictures and sending them back is not a

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<v Speaker 2>simple thing in nineteen sixty six, So yeah, it's not

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<v Speaker 2>the most exciting year sings. They'll get hairy from here

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<v Speaker 2>as the Apollo program really gets rocking along. But at

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<v Speaker 2>this but on that year they still did a few

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<v Speaker 2>important things and it wouldn't be You're not wrong that

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<v Speaker 2>the Soviets had the Luna twelve mission, which also took

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<v Speaker 2>photos of the Moon, although admittedly after the Americans got them.

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<v Speaker 2>But let's talk about important stuff, like nineteen sixty six

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<v Speaker 2>is the year the cool whip is invented, all right,

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<v Speaker 2>nothing like an edible oil product.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, edible oil. Cardiovascular dream come true.

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<v Speaker 2>Listen, palm oil is well, let's be clear, not your friend.

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<v Speaker 1>Not your friend.

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<v Speaker 2>On the computer side, Helid Packard's very first computer, the

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<v Speaker 2>HP twenty one sixteen A, which is a funny number

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<v Speaker 2>for your first one. It was actually an acquired computer.

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<v Speaker 2>They bought a comp called Data Systems who made a

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<v Speaker 2>thing called the DSi one thousand, although they had never shipped.

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<v Speaker 2>They bought the company back in sixty four finished it up.

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<v Speaker 2>It was all integrated circuits, which is very novel of

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<v Speaker 2>the time, and magnetic core memory because they're still a

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<v Speaker 2>couple of years away from digital ram being a thing.

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<v Speaker 2>This is a sixteen bit mini computer with a ten

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<v Speaker 2>megahertz clock. It comes with four K words sixteen bit words,

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<v Speaker 2>but you could externally expand it that's more coarse up

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<v Speaker 2>to eight k and if you wanted to go to

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<v Speaker 2>a big old sixteen you need an external box for it.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow.

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<v Speaker 2>Weighed about two hundred and thirty pounds and cost about

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<v Speaker 2>twenty thousand dollars when it first shipped in nineteen sixty six.

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<v Speaker 2>And finally, yeah, very relevant for the time. In nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>sixty six, a scientist be the name of Joseph Wisenbaum

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<v Speaker 2>working at MIT, released a piece of software called Eliza.

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<v Speaker 1>That was so fascinating to me.

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<v Speaker 2>There Rogerian chatter bought, as they called it at the time,

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<v Speaker 2>ran on an IBM seventy foot ninety four. Whisenbaum talked

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<v Speaker 2>about it doing language transformations, which is interesting to think

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<v Speaker 2>about sixty years later.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, so the real story is that the term

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<v Speaker 1>artificial intelligence was being bounced around, and he knew that

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<v Speaker 1>these were just programs, and to prove it, he wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to say, you know, this might seem like a human,

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<v Speaker 1>but it's just looking for keywords and spinning out wrote

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<v Speaker 1>answers and actually not even answers, answering questions with.

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<v Speaker 2>Questions questions, the Rogerian approach.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, yeah, so if you say, you know, I hate

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<v Speaker 1>my brother or whatever, it would say, tell me more

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<v Speaker 1>about your family. But he did it as a goof really, yes,

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<v Speaker 1>he did. He did it to show how ridiculous it was,

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<v Speaker 1>how ridiculous.

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<v Speaker 2>And people spent hours with it.

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<v Speaker 1>It's true. Yeah, I have witnessed it.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, they did run it through a Turing test. And

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<v Speaker 2>it failed. Of course, not that the Turing test is

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<v Speaker 2>particularly meaningful, but this is in the early days of it,

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<v Speaker 2>but it was one of the they later on to

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<v Speaker 2>come on to define this idea called the Eliza effect,

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<v Speaker 2>which is this a tendency for humans to overvalue language

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<v Speaker 2>interactions as especially intelligent answer promatively. You know, language is

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<v Speaker 2>a pretty profound thing in this sort of sentient space, right,

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<v Speaker 2>so we're kind of wired to respond to that for

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<v Speaker 2>better or worse. But hi, golly, aren't we battling these

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<v Speaker 2>same problems right now?

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<v Speaker 1>Oh, one hundred thousand times more.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Now we call it chat GPT psychosis.

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<v Speaker 1>It really is too, isn't it. I mean, it's very serious.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to say who it is, but somebody

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<v Speaker 1>that you and I both know what. You know. He

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<v Speaker 1>was trying to talk to his mother about AI or whatever,

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<v Speaker 1>and to impress her he basically spit out a document.

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<v Speaker 1>He went to chat GPT and spit out a document,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, in minutes, and she was amazed by it.

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<v Speaker 1>And I said to him, I said, did you check

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<v Speaker 1>the facts? Heause, no, no, I didn't. It was actually

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<v Speaker 1>an application. It was like something that you would send

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<v Speaker 1>to somebody to apply for something, right, and it had

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<v Speaker 1>all sorts of facts and did you check it? Because

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<v Speaker 1>you know, the thing does get stuff wrong. He goes

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<v Speaker 1>fabricate stuff whole cloth.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and he.

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<v Speaker 1>Didn't even think about it.

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<v Speaker 2>Right.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like, you know, and this is an intelligent because

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<v Speaker 1>the computer is always right, right. This is an intelligent

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<v Speaker 1>person that you and I both know, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>just forgetting to fact check. Yeah, yeah, yep, scary all right.

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<v Speaker 1>End of Soapbox nineteen sixty six, you know, sixty years ago.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, Shall we introduce our guest, Michael Levan. Michael

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<v Speaker 1>translates technical complexity into practical value. He's a seasoned engineer, consultant, trainer,

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<v Speaker 1>and content creator in the Kubernetes, security, DevOps and platform

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<v Speaker 1>engineering space, spending his time working with startups and enterprises

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<v Speaker 1>around the globe. Michael is also a Microsoft MVP in

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<v Speaker 1>the Azure space, in AWS community builder three times, a

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<v Speaker 1>four times published author, a podcast host, an international public speaker,

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<v Speaker 1>CNCF ambassador, and he was part of the Kubernetes version

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<v Speaker 1>one point two eight and version one point three to

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<v Speaker 1>one release team. Welcome to the.

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<v Speaker 3>Show, Michael, Thank you so much for having me now,

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<v Speaker 3>I have the friendly reminder that I need to cut

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<v Speaker 3>down my bio a little bit.

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<v Speaker 1>Actually it's quite impressive and I wouldn't leave anything out.

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<v Speaker 2>And he's knocked out a couple of run answers with

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<v Speaker 2>me over the years too.

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<v Speaker 1>Yep. Yeah, but your first time on this show.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, yeah, thank you guys so much for having me

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<v Speaker 3>really appreciate it and worries.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, you know, part of DevOps is dev so oddly enough,

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<v Speaker 1>you do you do have your hand in that space

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<v Speaker 1>as well?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, no, absolutely, I mean, ironically enough, I feel like

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<v Speaker 3>I kind of live in two worlds. I do a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of you know, the devopsy cloud based stuff, but

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<v Speaker 3>I would say probably as a consultant, half of my

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<v Speaker 3>a year or so is spent doing a lot of

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<v Speaker 3>back end software engineering. So I've been doing a lot

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<v Speaker 3>of Python lately. Before that, I was doing a lot

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<v Speaker 3>of Go in my free time, you know, outside of

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<v Speaker 3>client work. I'm diving deeper and deeper into Rust. So

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<v Speaker 3>I'm definitely in all the worlds ironically enough, so.

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<v Speaker 2>All the worlds. Yeah, it's good to be a polyglot, right,

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<v Speaker 2>to exercise the different languages and sort of see how

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<v Speaker 2>the various sides live, although I just went through a

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<v Speaker 2>process where we took a sample ap of an MVP

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<v Speaker 2>and regenerated in six languages in a matter of days.

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<v Speaker 2>It's like, here's what it looks like in Swift, Here's

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<v Speaker 2>what it looks like in Rust. Like, I mean, you're

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<v Speaker 2>don't even wonder what language even means anymore.

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<v Speaker 3>The irony of it is, I've been thinking about this

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<v Speaker 3>a lot, is that I wonder if we'll reach a

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<v Speaker 3>point where like natural language will be the language.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you know.

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<v Speaker 3>I wonder if we'll hit a time where it's like, yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, I want to write a memory, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>sensitive application, and then you have two choices. You say, well,

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<v Speaker 3>you can go with you know, this language, which is

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<v Speaker 3>maybe Go, or you go with this language, which is

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<v Speaker 3>maybe you Russ. And then you say, okay, this is

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<v Speaker 3>what I wanted to do, and then it goes and

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<v Speaker 3>it does it. I don't know, maybe we reach a

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<v Speaker 3>point where it's like, you know, everything's just bytecode and

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<v Speaker 3>we just kind of don't see it. It's all natural language.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, well, if you never look at the code, what

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<v Speaker 2>do you care what it was generated?

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<v Speaker 1>Unless it's job ASCRIPT, then I would protest, Yeah, do care? Hardily.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, mostly it's about understanding what's going on. I

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<v Speaker 2>was thinking about cucumber the other day. Remember this testing

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<v Speaker 2>lie where you're supposed to sort of write natural language tests,

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<v Speaker 2>and it's kind of you know, we've always tried, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>what is specifications or requirements, but natural language that describes code,

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<v Speaker 2>that is ultimately our measure for how we provided a

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<v Speaker 2>solution which it seemed to be moving further up there.

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<v Speaker 2>And it's not like any of this stuff doesn't take

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of skill to do.

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<v Speaker 1>Well.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you know, it's you know, this is not a

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<v Speaker 2>trivial practice, but certainly evolving without it.

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<v Speaker 1>So Michael has DevOps I don't know changed in the

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<v Speaker 1>last three years. For you, what's been the most significant

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<v Speaker 1>change in DevOps in the last few years.

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<v Speaker 3>I think, you know, the obvious answer is AI, right,

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<v Speaker 3>But I think conceptually, like I always look at it

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<v Speaker 3>in two different ways. I look at it in the

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<v Speaker 3>positions and like what you're doing in your day to

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<v Speaker 3>day at your job. And then I also look at

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<v Speaker 3>it from a like underlying technology perspective. And I always

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<v Speaker 3>say this to everybody, like, if you have good fundamental knowledge,

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<v Speaker 3>like you know, if you have a decent fundamental knowledge

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<v Speaker 3>and you know, the computer science and stuff, right, so

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<v Speaker 3>like data structures, standard algorithms, all that fun stuff. And

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<v Speaker 3>then if you have a good base of you know,

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<v Speaker 3>standard IT networking systems, how all that works. The irony

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<v Speaker 3>is ninety percent of what you're doing is kind of

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<v Speaker 3>staying the same, and you're just sprinkling different abstractions and

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<v Speaker 3>different tools on top of it. I often think about

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<v Speaker 3>like service measures as well in the realm of kubernetes.

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<v Speaker 3>You know, they bring your network observability, your traffic routing,

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<v Speaker 3>your MTLs, encryption between service and service, all that stuff

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<v Speaker 3>we had already. We just now have this layer of

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<v Speaker 3>abstraction that this program that sits on top of a

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<v Speaker 3>service versus embedding you know, TLS code within your application code.

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<v Speaker 3>So point being is I think a lot of it

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<v Speaker 3>is still the same. I think what's just changing is

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<v Speaker 3>like the different tools that we're putting top on top

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<v Speaker 3>of Okay, cloud based environment systems all that.

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<v Speaker 1>Certainly the human aspect of DevOps, which is you know, people,

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<v Speaker 1>processes and tools. I guess the thing that Richard likes

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<v Speaker 1>to talk about all the time, the people stuff. Has

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<v Speaker 1>that changed because of AI or are the people skills

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<v Speaker 1>still there and required.

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<v Speaker 3>Oh one hundred percent still required? Totally, totally. I think

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<v Speaker 3>that with bringing an AI into DevOps and anything right

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<v Speaker 3>like software engineering, maybe we could say security as well,

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<v Speaker 3>but I don't think it's it's there yet, but a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of it is around, like DevOps and software engineering.

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<v Speaker 3>And in my opinion, I think I need to work

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<v Speaker 3>harder now using an LLM uh than I did before,

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<v Speaker 3>and I think that the level of effort is just

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<v Speaker 3>changed a little bit as the human operator. So like before,

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<v Speaker 3>for example, maybe I'm sitting there looking at a line

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<v Speaker 3>of code for an hour saying to myself, like what

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<v Speaker 3>is going on here? And then I finally found it

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<v Speaker 3>and I say, hooray, I have fixed all my life's problems.

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<v Speaker 3>Now now I'm.

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<v Speaker 2>Where can I get me some of that?

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<v Speaker 3>Now I'm generating, you know, this part of my application

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<v Speaker 3>with an LM. But now I'm looking through the whole

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<v Speaker 3>thing and I'm saying, this isn't right. I'm going to

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<v Speaker 3>change this, this isn't right. I had a scenario the

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<v Speaker 3>other day where I wanted to build on an MVP

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<v Speaker 3>of something and I built it and I used claud

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<v Speaker 3>code and I was running it, and I'm like, why

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<v Speaker 3>am I result? Why are my results the same across

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<v Speaker 3>every system that I test this on? And I looked

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<v Speaker 3>at it turns out Claude cod I didn't ask it

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<v Speaker 3>to do this. By the way, claud Code created a

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<v Speaker 3>bunch of mock data within it and with a bunch

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<v Speaker 3>of print statements, so like I literally had to go

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<v Speaker 3>in and refactor everything because it was just all fake

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<v Speaker 3>data that was getting printed out to me on the terminal.

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<v Speaker 3>So like I had to spend probably more time fixing

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<v Speaker 3>that than I would if I just wrote it myself.

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<v Speaker 3>So yes, I think the Humanator, the Humanator, the human.

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<v Speaker 1>That was my nickname in high school.

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<v Speaker 2>It's nice.

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<v Speaker 3>I think that piece is actually probably more important now

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<v Speaker 3>than ever, to be honest.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, And unfortunately this is another one of those shows

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<v Speaker 1>where we're talking about AI. But you know that we

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<v Speaker 1>catch some flak for that and our listeners like it

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<v Speaker 1>when we just get back to real development. But but

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<v Speaker 1>you can't deny that. You know things are changing, and

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<v Speaker 1>this is one of those things we've been saying this

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<v Speaker 1>a bunch that you have to you now have to

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<v Speaker 1>think of yourself if you're going to embrace these tools.

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<v Speaker 1>You have to think of yourself as sort of a

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<v Speaker 1>manager of lower level engineers and fact checker, right or

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<v Speaker 1>or code checker, you know, code reviewer. If that's the

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<v Speaker 1>role that you're taking, you know, and hearing we have

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<v Speaker 1>a situation where it's even taking longer because of that

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<v Speaker 1>than if you did it yourself.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean, and we aren't you know, like having

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<v Speaker 3>these layer of layers of abstraction isn't new, right, Like

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<v Speaker 3>in the beginning, if you wanted to test something out,

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<v Speaker 3>you had to write your own compiler and you had

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<v Speaker 3>to write your own editor just to run this thing.

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<v Speaker 3>And now I pop open VS code and you know,

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<v Speaker 3>I run my high level programming language and I and

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<v Speaker 3>it's good to go. So like there was a time

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<v Speaker 3>I'm sure where everybody was like, oh, we're gonna humans

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<v Speaker 3>are going to go away, and we're going to lose

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<v Speaker 3>all of our knowledge because you know, we're not writing

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<v Speaker 3>our own editors to run this application anymore. So it's

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<v Speaker 3>we've seen this countless at times, you know, through the

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<v Speaker 3>last sixty five years of software engineer.

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<v Speaker 1>Also, I think that there's a an expertise that gradually

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<v Speaker 1>grows when you're interacting with these things so that you

422
00:22:37.119 --> 00:22:39.640
<v Speaker 1>know how to interact with them. The problem is that

423
00:22:39.680 --> 00:22:42.480
<v Speaker 1>they change so quickly and change so often that it's

424
00:22:42.519 --> 00:22:46.759
<v Speaker 1>hard to know. You know. We we live with a

425
00:22:46.799 --> 00:22:50.640
<v Speaker 1>single compiler, a single ide for years and we finally

426
00:22:50.680 --> 00:22:52.720
<v Speaker 1>get it figured out, and then they make a switch,

427
00:22:52.839 --> 00:22:54.680
<v Speaker 1>and then we have to figure something out. But it

428
00:22:54.720 --> 00:22:59.200
<v Speaker 1>takes years. Now these things, who knows, they could have

429
00:22:59.279 --> 00:23:01.319
<v Speaker 1>changed in the back while you were taking a nap

430
00:23:01.720 --> 00:23:05.759
<v Speaker 1>or drinking coffee, and and the way that you interact

431
00:23:05.799 --> 00:23:08.799
<v Speaker 1>with it to be most productive has changed. Totally awesome.

432
00:23:09.039 --> 00:23:11.000
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, yeah, but you know, it's all part of the

433
00:23:11.119 --> 00:23:12.240
<v Speaker 2>evolution of things too.

434
00:23:12.400 --> 00:23:12.519
<v Speaker 1>Right.

435
00:23:13.119 --> 00:23:17.319
<v Speaker 2>I'm I got concerns. I do have problems with the

436
00:23:17.359 --> 00:23:22.000
<v Speaker 2>hype cycle. But what I like about DevOps is it

437
00:23:22.039 --> 00:23:24.319
<v Speaker 2>is in the product, right. It is a set of

438
00:23:24.359 --> 00:23:27.319
<v Speaker 2>disciplines that make a better team. It's another one of

439
00:23:27.359 --> 00:23:29.720
<v Speaker 2>those terms that's kind of fading away in the sense

440
00:23:29.799 --> 00:23:32.880
<v Speaker 2>that this is just what a high functioning team looks like.

441
00:23:33.160 --> 00:23:36.279
<v Speaker 2>That everybody's pulling towards the same goal of delivering solutions

442
00:23:36.319 --> 00:23:39.720
<v Speaker 2>to customers that we care about, both its creation and

443
00:23:39.759 --> 00:23:42.799
<v Speaker 2>its deployment and its operations and the telemetry and how

444
00:23:42.799 --> 00:23:45.319
<v Speaker 2>that feeds back to making a better product. The fact

445
00:23:45.319 --> 00:23:48.799
<v Speaker 2>that the tooling shuffles around underneath us par for the course, right,

446
00:23:48.839 --> 00:23:51.279
<v Speaker 2>you could hope these things are only going to get better.

447
00:23:51.440 --> 00:23:53.440
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, And I think you know to that point, a

448
00:23:53.480 --> 00:23:56.440
<v Speaker 3>couple of years ago, five six years ago, maybe if

449
00:23:56.440 --> 00:23:58.240
<v Speaker 3>you went and you wanted to do a talk on

450
00:23:58.319 --> 00:24:01.119
<v Speaker 3>DevOps at a conference, I mean, that was the thing, right,

451
00:24:01.200 --> 00:24:05.480
<v Speaker 3>like every conference shows, right, Yeah, that was it.

452
00:24:05.640 --> 00:24:06.200
<v Speaker 1>That was it.

453
00:24:06.680 --> 00:24:09.799
<v Speaker 3>Now you know it's different because to your point, Richard,

454
00:24:09.920 --> 00:24:12.759
<v Speaker 3>it's just all kind of there in the background. It's

455
00:24:12.759 --> 00:24:14.880
<v Speaker 3>just everybody's just kind of doing the thing.

456
00:24:15.359 --> 00:24:15.480
<v Speaker 1>Uh.

457
00:24:15.519 --> 00:24:18.759
<v Speaker 3>You know, we we're we're seeing it very similar with Kubernetes.

458
00:24:18.799 --> 00:24:22.680
<v Speaker 3>Like Kubernetes from a container orchestration perspective, that's just the

459
00:24:22.799 --> 00:24:24.440
<v Speaker 3>thing that you run it on. It's not it's not

460
00:24:24.519 --> 00:24:27.519
<v Speaker 3>the hot sexy topic anymore, but the stuff that you're

461
00:24:27.519 --> 00:24:28.680
<v Speaker 3>building on top of it is.

462
00:24:29.119 --> 00:24:29.279
<v Speaker 1>Uh.

463
00:24:29.319 --> 00:24:31.680
<v Speaker 3>And I'm sure you know I will go through that

464
00:24:32.279 --> 00:24:35.720
<v Speaker 3>same thing. The one thing that I will say though,

465
00:24:36.119 --> 00:24:42.759
<v Speaker 3>is when you're not programming day to day, you get

466
00:24:42.839 --> 00:24:43.640
<v Speaker 3>rusty quick.

467
00:24:44.000 --> 00:24:44.519
<v Speaker 2>Oh sure.

468
00:24:45.119 --> 00:24:48.880
<v Speaker 3>So if you're constantly using you know, whatever your favorite

469
00:24:49.319 --> 00:24:51.720
<v Speaker 3>m is to generate your code for you, you may

470
00:24:51.759 --> 00:24:54.279
<v Speaker 3>be able to like, of course, still look at it,

471
00:24:54.839 --> 00:24:57.319
<v Speaker 3>you know, figure figure out this is breaking here. I

472
00:24:57.359 --> 00:25:00.000
<v Speaker 3>got to put some air handling over there. Blah blah blah.

473
00:25:00.119 --> 00:25:03.240
<v Speaker 3>But like if you're just staring at a blank ide,

474
00:25:04.279 --> 00:25:07.720
<v Speaker 3>you may have some trouble after a while, like getting

475
00:25:07.759 --> 00:25:09.400
<v Speaker 3>something out on paper, so to speak.

476
00:25:09.559 --> 00:25:12.039
<v Speaker 2>Sure humans are better at editing than they are to

477
00:25:12.119 --> 00:25:15.799
<v Speaker 2>creating out a whole cloth anyway, yea, And Heaven help

478
00:25:15.839 --> 00:25:18.319
<v Speaker 2>you if you try and build a CICD pipeline from

479
00:25:18.400 --> 00:25:21.039
<v Speaker 2>scratch and YAML on a blank screen. I'm sorry. I

480
00:25:21.200 --> 00:25:24.200
<v Speaker 2>cut and paste it all and then I go through

481
00:25:24.240 --> 00:25:26.200
<v Speaker 2>it and try and understand what I just paste it

482
00:25:26.240 --> 00:25:29.960
<v Speaker 2>in and make the tweaks accordingly, like we build on

483
00:25:30.000 --> 00:25:31.160
<v Speaker 2>the shoulders of giants.

484
00:25:31.319 --> 00:25:33.559
<v Speaker 1>It's the same for writing pros or poetry. Is that

485
00:25:33.720 --> 00:25:38.519
<v Speaker 1>totally You don't write, you brainstorm and then edit. Writing

486
00:25:38.559 --> 00:25:39.960
<v Speaker 1>isn't about writing, it's about editing.

487
00:25:41.039 --> 00:25:43.680
<v Speaker 2>Yea, and all these things are the same. I'm just

488
00:25:43.720 --> 00:25:47.240
<v Speaker 2>realizing we talked about in the earlier versions of Visual

489
00:25:47.240 --> 00:25:50.039
<v Speaker 2>Studio how hard it was to build out the tooling,

490
00:25:50.119 --> 00:25:52.880
<v Speaker 2>all the bits and pieces you need to actually automate

491
00:25:52.880 --> 00:25:55.880
<v Speaker 2>the deployment pipeline. Today it's almost like we have an

492
00:25:55.880 --> 00:25:59.160
<v Speaker 2>abundance of riches, like you're gonna get hub action this

493
00:26:00.160 --> 00:26:03.880
<v Speaker 2>as you're devopsing this, yes or terrorforming this, like you

494
00:26:03.880 --> 00:26:04.960
<v Speaker 2>have a lot of choices.

495
00:26:05.119 --> 00:26:07.559
<v Speaker 1>I remember when customers would hire app Phenex to create

496
00:26:07.599 --> 00:26:11.359
<v Speaker 1>a CICD pipeline as a you know, a consultancy because

497
00:26:11.400 --> 00:26:12.880
<v Speaker 1>they didn't really know how to do it. And now

498
00:26:12.920 --> 00:26:14.359
<v Speaker 1>it's just click click click boom boom.

499
00:26:14.400 --> 00:26:16.240
<v Speaker 2>Well, and it was kind of a one off thing too,

500
00:26:16.359 --> 00:26:18.279
<v Speaker 2>Like why would you want to get good at this?

501
00:26:18.440 --> 00:26:23.519
<v Speaker 2>Although let's be clear you should, although today, like you said,

502
00:26:23.559 --> 00:26:25.920
<v Speaker 2>it's just a set of checkboxes, Like the real crazy

503
00:26:25.920 --> 00:26:28.079
<v Speaker 2>part is that you didn't. I still feel like the

504
00:26:28.160 --> 00:26:32.039
<v Speaker 2>automated tests aren't great, although I gotta say looking at

505
00:26:32.039 --> 00:26:34.640
<v Speaker 2>the prompt magicians, the guys that are really good at

506
00:26:34.680 --> 00:26:40.160
<v Speaker 2>using these tools, they they are generating tests as part

507
00:26:40.200 --> 00:26:43.559
<v Speaker 2>of the code and iterating on the test, passing with

508
00:26:43.720 --> 00:26:47.839
<v Speaker 2>the code using the tools. Like arguably, if you do

509
00:26:47.880 --> 00:26:50.160
<v Speaker 2>a good job with this, like you're doing that, you're

510
00:26:50.200 --> 00:26:53.279
<v Speaker 2>you're insisting that these tools do the ideal case you

511
00:26:53.400 --> 00:26:55.079
<v Speaker 2>never even measured up to yourself.

512
00:26:56.160 --> 00:26:56.960
<v Speaker 3>It is very true.

513
00:26:57.319 --> 00:26:59.839
<v Speaker 2>There's nothing like nothing like one hundred percent code coverage

514
00:27:00.119 --> 00:27:01.440
<v Speaker 2>when you don't have to do.

515
00:27:01.400 --> 00:27:05.279
<v Speaker 3>It and it's all about the templates, right. It's like,

516
00:27:05.400 --> 00:27:07.640
<v Speaker 3>you know, do I have to write my one hundred

517
00:27:07.720 --> 00:27:10.920
<v Speaker 3>thousandth unit test or mock test or integration test or

518
00:27:10.960 --> 00:27:13.960
<v Speaker 3>functional test. No, it would be really great if I

519
00:27:13.960 --> 00:27:17.039
<v Speaker 3>could just offload that to my AI friend, whichever one

520
00:27:17.079 --> 00:27:17.880
<v Speaker 3>I decided to go with.

521
00:27:18.079 --> 00:27:19.640
<v Speaker 2>You know, the one that I really struggle with is

522
00:27:19.640 --> 00:27:22.240
<v Speaker 2>good telemetry. It's easy to collect a lot of data,

523
00:27:22.559 --> 00:27:24.759
<v Speaker 2>it's hard to collect the data that really tells you

524
00:27:25.000 --> 00:27:27.240
<v Speaker 2>what's going right and what's going wrong m hm.

525
00:27:27.400 --> 00:27:29.880
<v Speaker 1>And particularly know how to make sense of it.

526
00:27:30.119 --> 00:27:33.960
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, we're clearly getting some sense of messages coming back here.

527
00:27:34.119 --> 00:27:35.839
<v Speaker 2>We have reams and reams of data coming in and

528
00:27:35.839 --> 00:27:38.640
<v Speaker 2>we're paying for all that. But are we learning anything

529
00:27:38.720 --> 00:27:41.200
<v Speaker 2>about how people are using our app or are they

530
00:27:41.440 --> 00:27:42.960
<v Speaker 2>what their frustrations are?

531
00:27:43.039 --> 00:27:43.119
<v Speaker 1>Like?

532
00:27:43.240 --> 00:27:45.200
<v Speaker 2>I think this takes a lot of thought.

533
00:27:45.759 --> 00:27:47.920
<v Speaker 1>Yeah. Are you still seeing the same problems in twenty

534
00:27:47.960 --> 00:27:50.960
<v Speaker 1>twenty five with DevOps that you were three or four

535
00:27:51.039 --> 00:27:51.799
<v Speaker 1>years ago? Yeah?

536
00:27:51.799 --> 00:27:53.680
<v Speaker 3>I mean I feel like I'm seeing the same problems

537
00:27:53.680 --> 00:27:58.680
<v Speaker 3>that I saw, you know, fifteen years ago. I think

538
00:27:59.160 --> 00:28:02.880
<v Speaker 3>so many of the the fundamental problems don't change all

539
00:28:02.920 --> 00:28:07.319
<v Speaker 3>that much because the fundamental problems are honestly typically people problems,

540
00:28:07.599 --> 00:28:10.119
<v Speaker 3>right It's you know, I think that's just how it

541
00:28:10.160 --> 00:28:12.519
<v Speaker 3>always is, which is why I you know, a lot

542
00:28:12.519 --> 00:28:14.920
<v Speaker 3>of people are nervous right now because you know, they think, hey,

543
00:28:15.000 --> 00:28:17.079
<v Speaker 3>I'm going to take jobs in this now, blah blah blah.

544
00:28:17.079 --> 00:28:22.319
<v Speaker 3>But that fundamental thing doesn't change, you know, until the

545
00:28:23.559 --> 00:28:27.039
<v Speaker 3>terminator like universe is fully in play here. I think

546
00:28:27.079 --> 00:28:29.960
<v Speaker 3>we're all all right. But you know, in terms of

547
00:28:30.000 --> 00:28:33.200
<v Speaker 3>like DevOps as a whole, I think the biggest things

548
00:28:33.240 --> 00:28:38.079
<v Speaker 3>honestly right now, phinops is a huge one that everybody's

549
00:28:38.079 --> 00:28:40.000
<v Speaker 3>trying to figure out, like the whole idea around cost

550
00:28:40.079 --> 00:28:45.599
<v Speaker 3>optimization and with that performance optimization and resource optimization. Things

551
00:28:45.599 --> 00:28:48.240
<v Speaker 3>are moving, I mean, and I know we always say this, right,

552
00:28:48.279 --> 00:28:51.079
<v Speaker 3>but it feels more so now that things are moving,

553
00:28:51.079 --> 00:28:55.480
<v Speaker 3>you know, quote faster than ever. And with that, there's

554
00:28:55.599 --> 00:28:59.119
<v Speaker 3>just four more resources being used. And now we're seeing

555
00:28:59.599 --> 00:29:02.440
<v Speaker 3>a lot of of like actual like cost optimization or

556
00:29:02.480 --> 00:29:06.240
<v Speaker 3>finops engineers or whatever the title is getting hired in

557
00:29:06.400 --> 00:29:10.599
<v Speaker 3>organizations specifically to do this job. And that's very interesting.

558
00:29:10.640 --> 00:29:12.960
<v Speaker 3>So I'm definitely seeing a lot of that. But in

559
00:29:13.039 --> 00:29:16.200
<v Speaker 3>terms of you know, the general what DevOps is doing.

560
00:29:17.680 --> 00:29:20.119
<v Speaker 3>I don't think much of it has changed recently. I

561
00:29:20.200 --> 00:29:22.440
<v Speaker 3>think the I don't know if you would call this

562
00:29:22.559 --> 00:29:24.960
<v Speaker 3>a DevOps change per se, but the whole idea around

563
00:29:25.039 --> 00:29:28.200
<v Speaker 3>platform engineering, I think really what they're trying to do

564
00:29:28.240 --> 00:29:32.480
<v Speaker 3>with that is, say, I have engineers that are managing

565
00:29:32.519 --> 00:29:37.240
<v Speaker 3>and building and maintaining this particular tool that we're utilizing

566
00:29:37.359 --> 00:29:41.119
<v Speaker 3>internally like a product. Right, So they're putting their customer

567
00:29:41.160 --> 00:29:44.720
<v Speaker 3>service hats on because you know, their internal engineers are

568
00:29:44.799 --> 00:29:49.079
<v Speaker 3>the customers of the platform. You know, they're building it

569
00:29:49.119 --> 00:29:52.359
<v Speaker 3>in a way where they're thinking more about architecture than

570
00:29:52.400 --> 00:29:54.920
<v Speaker 3>they are about let me go write the code, and

571
00:29:54.920 --> 00:29:56.799
<v Speaker 3>then they're building this thing for use to be able

572
00:29:56.839 --> 00:30:00.640
<v Speaker 3>to move faster inside. Now, we've always kind of had

573
00:30:00.680 --> 00:30:03.839
<v Speaker 3>tools like that, or you know, rather engineers that would

574
00:30:03.839 --> 00:30:06.279
<v Speaker 3>build stuff like that. You know, when I had a

575
00:30:06.400 --> 00:30:09.640
<v Speaker 3>senior Principal Infrastructure engineer title years ago, when I was

576
00:30:09.680 --> 00:30:13.839
<v Speaker 3>building out little automation tools in Python, which would maybe

577
00:30:13.920 --> 00:30:17.480
<v Speaker 3>look like you know, platform engineering today. But I would

578
00:30:17.480 --> 00:30:20.960
<v Speaker 3>say that's probably the biggest shift that I've seen recently

579
00:30:21.000 --> 00:30:22.000
<v Speaker 3>in this space overall.

580
00:30:22.279 --> 00:30:24.400
<v Speaker 1>Sure, it seems like a good place to take a break,

581
00:30:24.480 --> 00:30:27.000
<v Speaker 1>So we'll be right back after these very important messages

582
00:30:27.039 --> 00:30:31.039
<v Speaker 1>stick around. Did you know that you can work with

583
00:30:31.200 --> 00:30:37.039
<v Speaker 1>AWS directly from your ide AWS provides toolkits for visual studio,

584
00:30:37.359 --> 00:30:41.319
<v Speaker 1>visual Studio, code, and jet brains rider Learn more at

585
00:30:41.359 --> 00:30:50.519
<v Speaker 1>AWS dot Amazon dot com, slash net slash tools. Now

586
00:30:50.519 --> 00:30:52.960
<v Speaker 1>we're back. It's dot NetRocks. I'm Carl Franklin. That's my

587
00:30:53.000 --> 00:30:56.519
<v Speaker 1>friend Richard Campbell, Hey, and this is our friend Michael Levan,

588
00:30:56.839 --> 00:31:01.160
<v Speaker 1>And we're talking about DevOps in twenty twenty five. Because

589
00:31:01.200 --> 00:31:03.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, some things have changed, but some things have not.

590
00:31:05.279 --> 00:31:09.400
<v Speaker 2>Uh. Security, I'm just going to drop that bomb out there,

591
00:31:09.440 --> 00:31:13.440
<v Speaker 2>because yeah, you know it's the battle a. It's way

592
00:31:13.480 --> 00:31:15.880
<v Speaker 2>more difficult these days. The black hat's gotten way smarter.

593
00:31:16.039 --> 00:31:18.279
<v Speaker 2>Oh god, it's got to be part of the equation.

594
00:31:18.759 --> 00:31:21.119
<v Speaker 2>A lot of this generated software people are not putting

595
00:31:21.200 --> 00:31:23.720
<v Speaker 2>enough consideration in. They're much less. Not that they did

596
00:31:23.880 --> 00:31:26.000
<v Speaker 2>but when they were writing it all by hand. But

597
00:31:26.200 --> 00:31:27.920
<v Speaker 2>how do you see a fitting in the pipeline, Like

598
00:31:27.960 --> 00:31:30.400
<v Speaker 2>what's the culture like when to make this work? Well,

599
00:31:30.640 --> 00:31:31.160
<v Speaker 2>I like to.

600
00:31:31.119 --> 00:31:34.519
<v Speaker 3>Look at it from the software side and then from

601
00:31:34.599 --> 00:31:39.119
<v Speaker 3>the networking side. So from a software from an application perspective,

602
00:31:40.000 --> 00:31:42.960
<v Speaker 3>how you're securing your application, whether you're going with you know,

603
00:31:43.480 --> 00:31:46.039
<v Speaker 3>your standard app set stuff like your SaaS stuff and

604
00:31:46.079 --> 00:31:50.000
<v Speaker 3>your SCA stuff, what libraries you're using, you know, are

605
00:31:50.039 --> 00:31:53.440
<v Speaker 3>you encrypting traffic? What does the code quality actually look like?

606
00:31:53.799 --> 00:31:57.000
<v Speaker 3>So that's one piece of it. But from a DevOps perspective,

607
00:31:57.279 --> 00:32:01.640
<v Speaker 3>ironically enough, I feel like the majority of security issues

608
00:32:01.720 --> 00:32:05.119
<v Speaker 3>are around networking. So you know, if there are any

609
00:32:05.279 --> 00:32:09.200
<v Speaker 3>network admins or network engineers listening, you know, the whole

610
00:32:09.240 --> 00:32:12.200
<v Speaker 3>idea around what does ingress look like, what does egress

611
00:32:12.240 --> 00:32:15.640
<v Speaker 3>look like? How are services talking to each other? So like,

612
00:32:15.680 --> 00:32:19.559
<v Speaker 3>for example, in the realm of Kubernetes, are you using

613
00:32:19.559 --> 00:32:22.119
<v Speaker 3>a service mesh? Are you encrypting the traffic going back

614
00:32:22.160 --> 00:32:24.759
<v Speaker 3>and forth at the L seven layer? Are you doing

615
00:32:25.039 --> 00:32:27.440
<v Speaker 3>pod to pod encryption? Are you, you know, encrypting at

616
00:32:27.440 --> 00:32:30.839
<v Speaker 3>the L three and the L four layer within your cluster? So,

617
00:32:30.920 --> 00:32:33.559
<v Speaker 3>and that's just an example, of course, but like I

618
00:32:33.559 --> 00:32:36.960
<v Speaker 3>think that's honestly, in my opinion, the biggest part of

619
00:32:36.960 --> 00:32:41.240
<v Speaker 3>it is what traffic is coming in, what traffic is leaving,

620
00:32:41.599 --> 00:32:46.799
<v Speaker 3>and perhaps even most importantly in the world of containerization,

621
00:32:47.720 --> 00:32:51.279
<v Speaker 3>how are these containers, are these pods talking to each other,

622
00:32:51.759 --> 00:32:54.440
<v Speaker 3>and how does the traffic look. Is this pods supposed

623
00:32:54.440 --> 00:32:57.160
<v Speaker 3>to be talking to that pod or that container? Are

624
00:32:57.200 --> 00:32:59.960
<v Speaker 3>these services supposed to be calling out to this database?

625
00:33:00.359 --> 00:33:03.519
<v Speaker 3>And I would say, honestly, that's a majority of the

626
00:33:03.559 --> 00:33:06.720
<v Speaker 3>security issues in the realm of debops and platform engineering.

627
00:33:07.240 --> 00:33:09.039
<v Speaker 3>The other big thing is and this is I think

628
00:33:09.079 --> 00:33:12.640
<v Speaker 3>just across any realm of it. I think one of

629
00:33:12.680 --> 00:33:15.400
<v Speaker 3>the red hat reports that I read maybe last year

630
00:33:15.480 --> 00:33:18.480
<v Speaker 3>or the year before, it was like seventy four seventy

631
00:33:18.480 --> 00:33:21.680
<v Speaker 3>six percent of security issues are due to misconfigurations. Yea,

632
00:33:22.160 --> 00:33:23.599
<v Speaker 3>and that's just everywhere.

633
00:33:23.720 --> 00:33:26.440
<v Speaker 2>And then I'm patch servers, you know, throwing on my

634
00:33:26.519 --> 00:33:29.119
<v Speaker 2>run ass hat, like for honest the goodness, I think

635
00:33:29.160 --> 00:33:33.759
<v Speaker 2>we're actually making headway on on SQL injection these days,

636
00:33:34.279 --> 00:33:36.240
<v Speaker 2>so that it's I think it's a third now. It

637
00:33:36.319 --> 00:33:41.559
<v Speaker 2>used to be first forever. But it's like, you know, misconfiguration.

638
00:33:41.720 --> 00:33:43.720
<v Speaker 2>You haven't secured the thing properly in the first place,

639
00:33:44.200 --> 00:33:46.519
<v Speaker 2>and you didn't get the patch donet a time. Like

640
00:33:46.519 --> 00:33:50.519
<v Speaker 2>we've had huge discussions on run ass about what's higher risk,

641
00:33:50.640 --> 00:33:54.039
<v Speaker 2>deploying a bad patch or not deploying the patch as

642
00:33:54.119 --> 00:33:56.759
<v Speaker 2>quickly as possible. And it seems like that sort of

643
00:33:56.759 --> 00:33:59.279
<v Speaker 2>flip that I'd rather the outage because I deployed the

644
00:33:59.279 --> 00:34:03.119
<v Speaker 2>patch fat than the exploit that comes from not getting

645
00:34:03.119 --> 00:34:05.319
<v Speaker 2>that patch out there quickly, which is crazy, but it

646
00:34:05.319 --> 00:34:06.559
<v Speaker 2>seems to be the new reality.

647
00:34:06.640 --> 00:34:09.639
<v Speaker 1>So it seems to me that you've got two sort

648
00:34:09.639 --> 00:34:12.280
<v Speaker 1>of realms of security when it comes to DevOps. You

649
00:34:12.320 --> 00:34:16.440
<v Speaker 1>have the configuration of the topography itself, and once that's

650
00:34:16.480 --> 00:34:19.360
<v Speaker 1>done and everything is secure and working, now you have

651
00:34:19.440 --> 00:34:22.599
<v Speaker 1>a continuous job, which is you need a software bill

652
00:34:22.639 --> 00:34:24.760
<v Speaker 1>of materials. You need to know what devices you have,

653
00:34:24.880 --> 00:34:28.679
<v Speaker 1>what their versions are, and update them every chance you get.

654
00:34:28.960 --> 00:34:30.920
<v Speaker 1>So you need to keep on top of that, and

655
00:34:30.960 --> 00:34:34.280
<v Speaker 1>on top of that the software, the libraries and dependencies

656
00:34:34.320 --> 00:34:37.719
<v Speaker 1>that you're on. You need the graph of dependencies so

657
00:34:37.760 --> 00:34:41.039
<v Speaker 1>that and you have to watch the news. So if

658
00:34:41.079 --> 00:34:43.119
<v Speaker 1>there's an exploit in one of those things, you need

659
00:34:43.159 --> 00:34:45.920
<v Speaker 1>to know that, and you need to you know, if

660
00:34:45.960 --> 00:34:48.920
<v Speaker 1>it's hardware, you either have to patch it right away.

661
00:34:49.400 --> 00:34:52.440
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes the only thing you can do is take it

662
00:34:52.480 --> 00:34:56.400
<v Speaker 1>off the network because there's no patch available and you're vulnerable.

663
00:34:56.519 --> 00:34:59.519
<v Speaker 2>Worst case scenario. Yeah yeah, but hopefully you're going to

664
00:34:59.559 --> 00:35:03.400
<v Speaker 2>security Microsoft and you're watching the CVE stream, like exactly,

665
00:35:03.400 --> 00:35:07.239
<v Speaker 2>that's probably the first place to look, Michael, are you

666
00:35:07.280 --> 00:35:09.760
<v Speaker 2>big on things like the actual API management? Like that

667
00:35:09.920 --> 00:35:12.239
<v Speaker 2>saved my bacon a couple of times now just using

668
00:35:12.280 --> 00:35:15.880
<v Speaker 2>those tools, Yeah, to show I know who uses my APIs,

669
00:35:15.960 --> 00:35:19.320
<v Speaker 2>I can set thresholds per user. So when somebody got

670
00:35:19.360 --> 00:35:24.239
<v Speaker 2>exploited and started doing mass extraction of data, the API

671
00:35:24.320 --> 00:35:27.159
<v Speaker 2>limits kicked in and kicked up a bunch of warnings.

672
00:35:27.400 --> 00:35:29.599
<v Speaker 2>You know, they had legit credentials. Everything looked fun. It's

673
00:35:29.599 --> 00:35:31.679
<v Speaker 2>just the traffic was out of shape because it was

674
00:35:31.920 --> 00:35:32.559
<v Speaker 2>an exploit.

675
00:35:32.639 --> 00:35:34.599
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, one hundred percent. And I think tools like that

676
00:35:35.280 --> 00:35:38.559
<v Speaker 3>we all need to be looking at constantly because the

677
00:35:38.920 --> 00:35:41.760
<v Speaker 3>problem is, well it's not even a problem, it's just

678
00:35:41.760 --> 00:35:44.119
<v Speaker 3>something that maybe we all still have to get used to,

679
00:35:44.320 --> 00:35:48.639
<v Speaker 3>is that there are way more endpoints now and way

680
00:35:48.639 --> 00:35:52.840
<v Speaker 3>more layers to networking than there were before. You know,

681
00:35:52.920 --> 00:35:55.400
<v Speaker 3>to take because we're talking about DevOps, right, take the

682
00:35:55.639 --> 00:35:58.719
<v Speaker 3>Kubernetes example again, Like there was a time where you

683
00:35:58.800 --> 00:36:01.800
<v Speaker 3>just had this monolithic app and like there was a

684
00:36:02.159 --> 00:36:05.719
<v Speaker 3>server and there was one entry point, right, and everything

685
00:36:05.840 --> 00:36:09.280
<v Speaker 3>was there and it was all good. Now they're just

686
00:36:09.400 --> 00:36:13.280
<v Speaker 3>multiple layers, like you know, you're looking at the Kubernetes cluster.

687
00:36:13.400 --> 00:36:16.079
<v Speaker 3>You have your host networking layers like your virtual machines

688
00:36:16.079 --> 00:36:18.800
<v Speaker 3>and stuff and everything running it. And then you have

689
00:36:19.079 --> 00:36:22.159
<v Speaker 3>the container networks, the pod networks. That's another layer that

690
00:36:22.199 --> 00:36:25.000
<v Speaker 3>you have to manage. Then you have your Kubernetes services,

691
00:36:25.280 --> 00:36:27.880
<v Speaker 3>which are another networking layer, and that's where you know

692
00:36:28.199 --> 00:36:31.320
<v Speaker 3>your security centric cni's and your service match like histio

693
00:36:31.360 --> 00:36:32.079
<v Speaker 3>and stuff will come.

694
00:36:32.039 --> 00:36:35.320
<v Speaker 2>To Gee, I wonder why we have configurations problem, Michael,

695
00:36:35.360 --> 00:36:39.239
<v Speaker 2>I'm confused. I'm on my seventeenth layer and I feel

696
00:36:39.280 --> 00:36:40.000
<v Speaker 2>really good.

697
00:36:40.239 --> 00:36:45.159
<v Speaker 3>Well, and that's that's honestly the Again, it's not a problem.

698
00:36:45.199 --> 00:36:48.519
<v Speaker 3>It's just something that we all have to really get

699
00:36:48.599 --> 00:36:52.199
<v Speaker 3>used to because as where you can call it decoupled

700
00:36:52.199 --> 00:36:55.920
<v Speaker 3>applications or your micro services or whatever whatever phrasing you

701
00:36:55.960 --> 00:36:59.199
<v Speaker 3>want to call it, everything is split up now and

702
00:36:59.280 --> 00:37:01.199
<v Speaker 3>everything is taught to each other. It's not just in

703
00:37:01.239 --> 00:37:05.199
<v Speaker 3>one box anymore. And because of that, you now have

704
00:37:05.440 --> 00:37:09.159
<v Speaker 3>not only multiple layers, but a lot of east west traffic,

705
00:37:09.239 --> 00:37:12.000
<v Speaker 3>a lot of north south traffic. Like everything is talking

706
00:37:12.039 --> 00:37:15.920
<v Speaker 3>to everything inside of a cluster, but then also outside.

707
00:37:15.960 --> 00:37:19.119
<v Speaker 3>Maybe it's hitting a public endpoint, maybe it's hitting a database.

708
00:37:19.559 --> 00:37:22.760
<v Speaker 3>There's a lot of traffic going back and forth, and

709
00:37:22.800 --> 00:37:26.000
<v Speaker 3>that's why I think, you know, outside of the software

710
00:37:26.000 --> 00:37:29.719
<v Speaker 3>engineering security stuff, I certainly hope AppSec gets more and

711
00:37:29.719 --> 00:37:32.239
<v Speaker 3>more popular, especially with AI right now. It needs to.

712
00:37:32.960 --> 00:37:36.159
<v Speaker 3>But aside from that, from a purely DevOps perspective, and

713
00:37:36.360 --> 00:37:39.800
<v Speaker 3>I think the majority of it is networking. Like you

714
00:37:39.840 --> 00:37:42.039
<v Speaker 3>have your patches, of course, and you want to be

715
00:37:42.039 --> 00:37:45.360
<v Speaker 3>able to update your APIs like from a you know,

716
00:37:45.440 --> 00:37:48.199
<v Speaker 3>let's say like you're utilizing a specific API within an

717
00:37:48.199 --> 00:37:51.480
<v Speaker 3>application running. You're not managing that application, but you want

718
00:37:51.519 --> 00:37:53.800
<v Speaker 3>to be able to upgrade those versions. That's one thing.

719
00:37:53.840 --> 00:37:56.960
<v Speaker 3>But yeah, I mean I'm going off on a tangent here,

720
00:37:57.000 --> 00:37:58.920
<v Speaker 3>but a big part of it is networking, honestly.

721
00:37:59.079 --> 00:38:01.599
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I arties like why haven't I set up an

722
00:38:01.599 --> 00:38:05.440
<v Speaker 2>agent that's watching the CVE stream from Microsoft and just

723
00:38:05.519 --> 00:38:08.800
<v Speaker 2>evaluating against every project that I've got they exist, Yeah,

724
00:38:08.840 --> 00:38:11.440
<v Speaker 2>I appresume they do. It's this is non dirigional line idea.

725
00:38:11.559 --> 00:38:13.519
<v Speaker 3>Well, the MCP stuff, but it's.

726
00:38:13.400 --> 00:38:16.039
<v Speaker 1>A great idea. M M Yeah, you don't necessarily want

727
00:38:16.039 --> 00:38:18.960
<v Speaker 1>to give it the ability to update your firmware, but no,

728
00:38:19.360 --> 00:38:22.039
<v Speaker 1>but certainly I just want to heads up right a

729
00:38:22.159 --> 00:38:24.840
<v Speaker 1>heads up because would be good. Yeah, just reading all

730
00:38:24.880 --> 00:38:27.719
<v Speaker 1>those things like reading a CVE is painful. What right,

731
00:38:28.719 --> 00:38:32.119
<v Speaker 1>They're not fun to read. But before you can get

732
00:38:32.119 --> 00:38:34.719
<v Speaker 1>that list effectively, you need to have software building.

733
00:38:34.480 --> 00:38:37.239
<v Speaker 2>Materials are at the other side of this, right, Yeah.

734
00:38:37.280 --> 00:38:41.000
<v Speaker 1>So are you seeing s BOMs slowly creeping into the

735
00:38:41.039 --> 00:38:45.320
<v Speaker 1>culture or still no? I mean last time I checked

736
00:38:45.400 --> 00:38:49.320
<v Speaker 1>that there's not not everybody's doing those. Yeah.

737
00:38:49.519 --> 00:38:53.599
<v Speaker 3>I don't think as much like it. It hasn't grown

738
00:38:54.039 --> 00:38:57.559
<v Speaker 3>in the same way as like your general security practices,

739
00:38:57.639 --> 00:39:00.559
<v Speaker 3>like for example, like policy as code, you know, making

740
00:39:00.639 --> 00:39:03.880
<v Speaker 3>sure that you're following all the best practices and you're

741
00:39:03.960 --> 00:39:07.679
<v Speaker 3>using something like open Policy Agent or or you know,

742
00:39:07.840 --> 00:39:10.960
<v Speaker 3>Kaiburno or one of the other policy as code tools.

743
00:39:11.320 --> 00:39:13.760
<v Speaker 3>I think stuff like that we're seeing more so, but

744
00:39:14.920 --> 00:39:17.239
<v Speaker 3>things like s BOM, things like you know, your your

745
00:39:17.360 --> 00:39:21.719
<v Speaker 3>overarching cybersecurity pieces. I don't you know what it is.

746
00:39:21.760 --> 00:39:23.679
<v Speaker 3>I just don't think it's like it's not like a

747
00:39:23.719 --> 00:39:25.280
<v Speaker 3>hot topic, you know what I mean.

748
00:39:25.320 --> 00:39:27.559
<v Speaker 2>It is it's very preventative, but like it.

749
00:39:27.519 --> 00:39:29.519
<v Speaker 3>Doesn't sound good, you know what I mean, And people

750
00:39:29.559 --> 00:39:31.000
<v Speaker 3>are like, ah, you know, we don't have to worry

751
00:39:31.039 --> 00:39:33.400
<v Speaker 3>about that. Because it's not you know, a top five

752
00:39:33.519 --> 00:39:35.719
<v Speaker 3>thing in the realm of cloud native or whatever, and

753
00:39:36.199 --> 00:39:38.800
<v Speaker 3>that's just that those are the hype cycles and all

754
00:39:38.840 --> 00:39:39.559
<v Speaker 3>that fun stuff.

755
00:39:39.599 --> 00:39:43.039
<v Speaker 2>So well, sbom got more love when log for Jay

756
00:39:43.159 --> 00:39:46.519
<v Speaker 2>got exploited. How bit exposed are we? Right? Like how

757
00:39:46.519 --> 00:39:49.079
<v Speaker 2>many of these things only get dealt with after something's

758
00:39:49.079 --> 00:39:49.679
<v Speaker 2>on fire?

759
00:39:50.000 --> 00:39:53.880
<v Speaker 3>Right, And that's the general security unfortunately, is that it's

760
00:39:54.000 --> 00:39:58.000
<v Speaker 3>really important when things go bad and richer to your

761
00:39:58.000 --> 00:40:00.159
<v Speaker 3>point of like you know, hey, I want to set

762
00:40:00.199 --> 00:40:02.079
<v Speaker 3>up an agent to be able to listen for, you know,

763
00:40:02.119 --> 00:40:04.920
<v Speaker 3>any TVs that are coming in or whatever. Then you

764
00:40:05.840 --> 00:40:08.840
<v Speaker 3>then you got another security issue, right, is what the

765
00:40:08.920 --> 00:40:10.679
<v Speaker 3>agent telling you accurate?

766
00:40:10.800 --> 00:40:10.880
<v Speaker 1>Right?

767
00:40:11.000 --> 00:40:11.800
<v Speaker 2>Yeah? Even correct?

768
00:40:11.840 --> 00:40:12.239
<v Speaker 1>And then.

769
00:40:13.639 --> 00:40:17.039
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, around and around. Well, but this is you know,

770
00:40:17.840 --> 00:40:20.119
<v Speaker 2>who puts on the tinfoil hat in your organization?

771
00:40:20.320 --> 00:40:20.480
<v Speaker 1>Right?

772
00:40:20.639 --> 00:40:22.800
<v Speaker 2>Like where We're lucky, there's somebody wears it all the

773
00:40:22.800 --> 00:40:25.360
<v Speaker 2>time and they like it, which is rare. Uh, And

774
00:40:25.400 --> 00:40:28.920
<v Speaker 2>that's a strange person. And I you know, I'm very

775
00:40:28.960 --> 00:40:32.000
<v Speaker 2>aware that there in a few places like Okay, one

776
00:40:32.159 --> 00:40:34.199
<v Speaker 2>some month, I'm going to put the hat on and

777
00:40:34.239 --> 00:40:36.880
<v Speaker 2>like today I'm the security guy, I look a little

778
00:40:36.960 --> 00:40:39.840
<v Speaker 2>more nervous and I'm angry all the time, you know,

779
00:40:39.920 --> 00:40:42.440
<v Speaker 2>but you know, and you put your foot often you

780
00:40:42.480 --> 00:40:45.360
<v Speaker 2>find yourself focusing on preventative work, right, and maybe that's

781
00:40:45.400 --> 00:40:46.519
<v Speaker 2>the time when you build that thing.

782
00:40:46.639 --> 00:40:50.280
<v Speaker 1>The tinfoil hat guys are generally focused on conspiracies, but

783
00:40:50.400 --> 00:40:54.960
<v Speaker 1>fortunately for them, you know, hacks and exploits are conspiracies

784
00:40:54.960 --> 00:40:55.480
<v Speaker 1>against you.

785
00:40:57.039 --> 00:41:01.639
<v Speaker 2>Is it still a conspiracy if it's really happening, Because

786
00:41:01.639 --> 00:41:03.880
<v Speaker 2>you're looking at the logs and just watching them hammer

787
00:41:03.920 --> 00:41:06.039
<v Speaker 2>away at you, it's like, is this a conspiracy or

788
00:41:06.039 --> 00:41:07.079
<v Speaker 2>it's just a log file?

789
00:41:07.280 --> 00:41:10.440
<v Speaker 1>Like, I'm pretty sure the tinfoil hat guys think people

790
00:41:10.440 --> 00:41:12.880
<v Speaker 1>are inherently evil and then they get proof of it

791
00:41:12.960 --> 00:41:15.880
<v Speaker 1>and it makes them happy to reinforces their tinfoil hatness.

792
00:41:16.159 --> 00:41:19.280
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it just but if nobody's looking, then you find

793
00:41:19.280 --> 00:41:19.960
<v Speaker 2>out the hard way.

794
00:41:20.119 --> 00:41:23.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah sure, yeah, Like I'm greeing with you, Richard. I

795
00:41:23.480 --> 00:41:25.480
<v Speaker 1>think you got to put those guys to work.

796
00:41:25.519 --> 00:41:28.199
<v Speaker 2>And I've included a link to the gethup repository of

797
00:41:28.199 --> 00:41:30.079
<v Speaker 2>the s bomb tools that Microsoft put together.

798
00:41:30.280 --> 00:41:30.519
<v Speaker 1>Cool.

799
00:41:30.800 --> 00:41:34.320
<v Speaker 2>Oddly enough, I think it was around the time of CrowdStrike.

800
00:41:34.440 --> 00:41:39.000
<v Speaker 2>I don't know one of those you know, conspiracy another

801
00:41:39.039 --> 00:41:43.400
<v Speaker 2>one gees, how could that have happened. It was earlier

802
00:41:43.400 --> 00:41:45.239
<v Speaker 2>than that. Maybe it was it was one of the

803
00:41:45.280 --> 00:41:48.000
<v Speaker 2>other like supply chain acts, like there's been a few.

804
00:41:48.679 --> 00:41:52.320
<v Speaker 2>It's just you know, it's frightening. But it's of course

805
00:41:52.440 --> 00:41:54.320
<v Speaker 2>this is not actually a security show. This is just

806
00:41:54.320 --> 00:41:57.119
<v Speaker 2>how do we include this in our overall life cycle

807
00:41:57.159 --> 00:42:00.639
<v Speaker 2>of making software that it does get going And you know,

808
00:42:00.719 --> 00:42:02.480
<v Speaker 2>again it's in some ways it's like we're going to

809
00:42:02.519 --> 00:42:04.559
<v Speaker 2>be the better version of ourselves because we're writing this

810
00:42:04.599 --> 00:42:07.360
<v Speaker 2>as a prompt for tools, for these tools to actually

811
00:42:07.440 --> 00:42:10.840
<v Speaker 2>try and implement it right up until it gets hard

812
00:42:11.119 --> 00:42:13.000
<v Speaker 2>and it's like, no, you actually now have to work

813
00:42:13.000 --> 00:42:15.360
<v Speaker 2>on this just because you found a CV that might

814
00:42:15.360 --> 00:42:17.400
<v Speaker 2>be relevant and it relates to a UNK code that

815
00:42:17.519 --> 00:42:19.320
<v Speaker 2>is deployed in your organization. Now you got to figure

816
00:42:19.320 --> 00:42:20.000
<v Speaker 2>out what to do.

817
00:42:20.599 --> 00:42:24.000
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, And I think a big thing is it's really

818
00:42:24.039 --> 00:42:29.039
<v Speaker 3>hard for organizations, specifically management to like specify an ROI

819
00:42:29.119 --> 00:42:33.159
<v Speaker 3>on we're going to take the week or whatever it'll

820
00:42:33.199 --> 00:42:36.639
<v Speaker 3>take to make this application a little bit more secure,

821
00:42:36.639 --> 00:42:39.760
<v Speaker 3>and no, sorry, we have something something deadlined. Sorry, something

822
00:42:39.800 --> 00:42:41.639
<v Speaker 3>something needs to be out this week at the end

823
00:42:41.679 --> 00:42:42.119
<v Speaker 3>of the quarter.

824
00:42:42.239 --> 00:42:44.320
<v Speaker 2>When you're also avoiding the big thing, which is that

825
00:42:44.599 --> 00:42:47.719
<v Speaker 2>the consequences to the company getting exploited never seem to

826
00:42:47.760 --> 00:42:51.239
<v Speaker 2>be that significant either. You know, you if you engage

827
00:42:51.239 --> 00:42:53.800
<v Speaker 2>your PR crisis team, you do your make help us

828
00:42:53.840 --> 00:42:55.880
<v Speaker 2>on TV if you if you're a large enough scover

829
00:42:55.960 --> 00:42:58.599
<v Speaker 2>that thing. All of the customers that got exploited, you

830
00:42:58.639 --> 00:43:00.639
<v Speaker 2>sign them up to some kind of monitor during service

831
00:43:00.679 --> 00:43:04.039
<v Speaker 2>and say sorry, and then you go on with your day.

832
00:43:04.599 --> 00:43:04.840
<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

833
00:43:05.039 --> 00:43:08.519
<v Speaker 3>And I've even heard, like quite literally, I've heard we

834
00:43:08.599 --> 00:43:09.320
<v Speaker 3>don't want to know.

835
00:43:09.639 --> 00:43:11.679
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, yeah, because he represents liability.

836
00:43:11.719 --> 00:43:15.519
<v Speaker 1>Yeah. If I don't know, if you knew, you know,

837
00:43:15.599 --> 00:43:16.679
<v Speaker 1>it's gonna blame me. Yeah.

838
00:43:16.719 --> 00:43:19.880
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's so. And I'm not a big on willful ignorance,

839
00:43:19.920 --> 00:43:28.719
<v Speaker 2>but holy man, right, like come on, yeah, and again

840
00:43:28.760 --> 00:43:30.599
<v Speaker 2>it so the side effective the run last time of

841
00:43:30.679 --> 00:43:33.639
<v Speaker 2>dealing with real security guys where quit a job because

842
00:43:33.639 --> 00:43:36.199
<v Speaker 2>they refused to deal with it and then when it

843
00:43:36.239 --> 00:43:38.440
<v Speaker 2>went down big time, they got sa panted.

844
00:43:38.360 --> 00:43:43.159
<v Speaker 3>Right right, yep. Yeah, it's not a uh, it's actually

845
00:43:43.239 --> 00:43:47.800
<v Speaker 3>not an uncommon thing. I mean it's very Yeah. Security

846
00:43:48.119 --> 00:43:51.519
<v Speaker 3>is securing your application in general, securing your your DevOps

847
00:43:51.519 --> 00:43:54.800
<v Speaker 3>piece of the puzzle. I mean, it's for for everybody listening.

848
00:43:54.920 --> 00:43:56.880
<v Speaker 3>If you're wondering like, oh, do I have to go

849
00:43:56.920 --> 00:44:01.400
<v Speaker 3>and dive into security full time? Or you know, what

850
00:44:01.400 --> 00:44:04.679
<v Speaker 3>do I gotta do here? Really, it's just when you're

851
00:44:04.719 --> 00:44:09.199
<v Speaker 3>designing your your pipeline, or you're designing your Kubernetus cluster,

852
00:44:09.280 --> 00:44:13.159
<v Speaker 3>you're designing your application stack, whatever it is, just take

853
00:44:13.199 --> 00:44:16.559
<v Speaker 3>the extra five to ten minutes to think it through,

854
00:44:16.880 --> 00:44:19.199
<v Speaker 3>you know, and a lot of it again, it's it's

855
00:44:19.239 --> 00:44:24.239
<v Speaker 3>so many just simple misconfigurations. Oopsies. I left root access

856
00:44:24.239 --> 00:44:26.599
<v Speaker 3>on these r back permissions when I was testing something

857
00:44:26.599 --> 00:44:28.639
<v Speaker 3>and I forgot they were there. I mean that's probably

858
00:44:28.679 --> 00:44:32.440
<v Speaker 3>like in the top three things that happened, right, you know, Yeah.

859
00:44:32.400 --> 00:44:35.679
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, deployed with it with the dbug still on, and

860
00:44:35.719 --> 00:44:38.079
<v Speaker 2>people can stap in back black hat stap in it

861
00:44:38.079 --> 00:44:40.320
<v Speaker 2>and take advantage of it. Liketh, it's it, Yeah, well

862
00:44:40.440 --> 00:44:42.119
<v Speaker 2>were I'm not clever enough to think of these things.

863
00:44:42.159 --> 00:44:43.519
<v Speaker 2>All I have is the case studies.

864
00:44:45.599 --> 00:44:49.760
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it's really, honestly, so much of it, especially especially

865
00:44:49.840 --> 00:44:53.679
<v Speaker 3>from a DevOps perspective, is just yeah, take the extra

866
00:44:53.920 --> 00:44:56.639
<v Speaker 3>you know, breathing through your nose and out through your

867
00:44:56.679 --> 00:45:00.840
<v Speaker 3>mouth and just say okay, does does the look okay?

868
00:45:01.519 --> 00:45:04.800
<v Speaker 3>And honestly, if you if you just take that couple

869
00:45:04.880 --> 00:45:09.880
<v Speaker 3>of minutes, I can guarantee that you're gonna find some stuff.

870
00:45:09.920 --> 00:45:11.760
<v Speaker 3>And you're like, oh, this would have been bad.

871
00:45:12.000 --> 00:45:15.280
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, well that's the standard cycle of development too. You know,

872
00:45:16.119 --> 00:45:19.800
<v Speaker 1>when I'm developing, I always when I'm done, okay, there,

873
00:45:20.079 --> 00:45:22.440
<v Speaker 1>I get up and I walk away for fifteen to

874
00:45:22.599 --> 00:45:25.000
<v Speaker 1>twenty minutes, and I come back and I go through

875
00:45:25.000 --> 00:45:28.000
<v Speaker 1>it again and just you know, take a deep breath

876
00:45:28.000 --> 00:45:30.800
<v Speaker 1>to think. But you know, now now you have to

877
00:45:30.800 --> 00:45:36.119
<v Speaker 1>think about it from the perspective of security, you know,

878
00:45:36.400 --> 00:45:38.920
<v Speaker 1>and everything else, not just development.

879
00:45:39.920 --> 00:45:41.960
<v Speaker 3>And that's that's tough for a lot of teams, right,

880
00:45:42.039 --> 00:45:45.159
<v Speaker 3>especially for DevOps teams, because honestly, I think that the

881
00:45:45.199 --> 00:45:48.119
<v Speaker 3>biggest problem is I've spoken to a lot of people,

882
00:45:48.119 --> 00:45:49.440
<v Speaker 3>and a lot of people are like, yeah, I wish

883
00:45:49.440 --> 00:45:51.480
<v Speaker 3>we could do this, but we don't have the time.

884
00:45:51.559 --> 00:45:53.079
<v Speaker 3>Yeah I wish we could do this, but we got

885
00:45:53.119 --> 00:45:54.639
<v Speaker 3>to get this done tomorrow. Yeh, I wish we could.

886
00:45:54.880 --> 00:45:57.199
<v Speaker 3>And that that's it's always what it is. So sometimes

887
00:45:57.280 --> 00:46:00.400
<v Speaker 3>you have to manage up as well. Again, and it's

888
00:46:00.840 --> 00:46:04.719
<v Speaker 3>it's never a technology problem. It's it's always a people thing,

889
00:46:05.079 --> 00:46:07.760
<v Speaker 3>not even a problem, right, It's just you need to

890
00:46:07.760 --> 00:46:09.199
<v Speaker 3>be able to and this is going to be different

891
00:46:09.199 --> 00:46:12.599
<v Speaker 3>across every organization. You need to be able to think

892
00:46:12.599 --> 00:46:17.800
<v Speaker 3>about what your manager, how your manager receives information, and

893
00:46:18.599 --> 00:46:21.079
<v Speaker 3>mold what you want to tell them in a way

894
00:46:21.119 --> 00:46:24.239
<v Speaker 3>that gets them to understand, ooh, this is important, we

895
00:46:24.280 --> 00:46:27.840
<v Speaker 3>need the extra day because usually a manager can find

896
00:46:27.880 --> 00:46:30.519
<v Speaker 3>the extra day or the extra couple of hours as

897
00:46:30.559 --> 00:46:33.440
<v Speaker 3>long as you present the information in a way that

898
00:46:33.920 --> 00:46:36.159
<v Speaker 3>they can digest it and it's important to them. If

899
00:46:36.199 --> 00:46:39.400
<v Speaker 3>you're frantically running around and saying, oh, this thing needs

900
00:46:39.400 --> 00:46:41.079
<v Speaker 3>to be done because of this and that and technical

901
00:46:41.159 --> 00:46:44.159
<v Speaker 3>jargon here and technical jargon there, chances are a manager's

902
00:46:44.199 --> 00:46:46.360
<v Speaker 3>going to say, yep, just another person that you know

903
00:46:46.599 --> 00:46:49.079
<v Speaker 3>just wants extra time to do this thing and to put,

904
00:46:49.119 --> 00:46:51.480
<v Speaker 3>you know, a couple of extra sprinkles on top. I've

905
00:46:51.480 --> 00:46:54.880
<v Speaker 3>seen this a thousand times in my career. But if

906
00:46:54.880 --> 00:46:57.280
<v Speaker 3>you're the person that goes to your manager and explains

907
00:46:57.280 --> 00:47:00.159
<v Speaker 3>it in a way that makes them realize just how

908
00:47:00.199 --> 00:47:02.320
<v Speaker 3>important it is, and hopefully you know your manager well

909
00:47:02.440 --> 00:47:05.039
<v Speaker 3>enough to know how to do that, If you don't learn,

910
00:47:05.400 --> 00:47:08.400
<v Speaker 3>then your outcome is going to be very different. So really,

911
00:47:08.480 --> 00:47:11.719
<v Speaker 3>I mean implementing all the security implementations can be as

912
00:47:11.719 --> 00:47:16.119
<v Speaker 3>simple as just understanding what the other person needs to

913
00:47:16.119 --> 00:47:19.440
<v Speaker 3>be able to hear to make it an effective decision.

914
00:47:19.519 --> 00:47:22.519
<v Speaker 1>You know, one thing we haven't talked about is social

915
00:47:22.599 --> 00:47:28.079
<v Speaker 1>engineering from outside forces into you know, the staff on

916
00:47:28.159 --> 00:47:32.119
<v Speaker 1>the edge of the of the organization, you know, clicking

917
00:47:32.159 --> 00:47:35.079
<v Speaker 1>on emails and all of that stuff, and then somebody

918
00:47:35.079 --> 00:47:38.360
<v Speaker 1>getting control of your network inside. I mean, the way

919
00:47:38.400 --> 00:47:41.679
<v Speaker 1>to prepare for that isn't necessarily with technology, but education

920
00:47:41.960 --> 00:47:45.599
<v Speaker 1>of your staff. And I wonder how how often that

921
00:47:45.679 --> 00:47:49.119
<v Speaker 1>creeps up in your line of work.

922
00:47:49.360 --> 00:47:53.239
<v Speaker 3>I would say not as much as like, if you're

923
00:47:53.280 --> 00:47:55.480
<v Speaker 3>on the help desk or you're you know, in the

924
00:47:55.480 --> 00:47:58.519
<v Speaker 3>cisadmin space or something right now, you're probably going to

925
00:47:58.599 --> 00:48:01.480
<v Speaker 3>see that a lot more. The only time that I

926
00:48:01.559 --> 00:48:04.559
<v Speaker 3>personally see it is like if I accidentally click on

927
00:48:04.840 --> 00:48:09.880
<v Speaker 3>a phishing scan, which I'm human like, sometimes things look legit,

928
00:48:09.960 --> 00:48:12.519
<v Speaker 3>you know, and I'm like, oh, this was one of

929
00:48:12.519 --> 00:48:14.599
<v Speaker 3>those no before tests or something like that.

930
00:48:15.679 --> 00:48:20.199
<v Speaker 1>But I guess, like the standard backup practices protect against ransomware, right,

931
00:48:20.280 --> 00:48:23.519
<v Speaker 1>so if something does happen, what do you do? And

932
00:48:23.599 --> 00:48:27.320
<v Speaker 1>you could spend an ordinate amount of money on protecting

933
00:48:27.320 --> 00:48:29.920
<v Speaker 1>yourself with multiple backups and off site and all of

934
00:48:29.960 --> 00:48:33.199
<v Speaker 1>this stuff. How do you how do you prepare for

935
00:48:33.239 --> 00:48:35.400
<v Speaker 1>the or do you even prepare for ransomware? Are you

936
00:48:35.599 --> 00:48:38.400
<v Speaker 1>just like, now, if that happens, we're screud.

937
00:48:38.000 --> 00:48:41.960
<v Speaker 3>Should you prepare for it? Absolutely? Like taking the backup example.

938
00:48:42.639 --> 00:48:45.320
<v Speaker 3>Last week, I actually with a client, I did a

939
00:48:45.599 --> 00:48:48.840
<v Speaker 3>dr strategy test where we were on the call for

940
00:48:48.880 --> 00:48:51.679
<v Speaker 3>about three hours and we blew a database away and

941
00:48:51.719 --> 00:48:53.840
<v Speaker 3>we tested to make sure that things were going to

942
00:48:53.920 --> 00:48:57.239
<v Speaker 3>work as expected to luckily you know we you know,

943
00:48:57.280 --> 00:48:59.880
<v Speaker 3>they test recoveries. They don't just back things up and

944
00:49:00.039 --> 00:49:00.719
<v Speaker 3>hope for the best.

945
00:49:01.199 --> 00:49:03.639
<v Speaker 1>Now, you don't have backups unless you test.

946
00:49:03.440 --> 00:49:06.679
<v Speaker 3>Them exactly, that's it. So things like that, I mean, yeah,

947
00:49:06.719 --> 00:49:10.760
<v Speaker 3>like you can absolutely sit there and prepare for But again,

948
00:49:12.239 --> 00:49:15.239
<v Speaker 3>it's one of those things where you want to do it,

949
00:49:15.320 --> 00:49:18.599
<v Speaker 3>and you can do it from a technology perspective. It

950
00:49:18.679 --> 00:49:21.440
<v Speaker 3>is there and it's readily available, but now you have

951
00:49:21.519 --> 00:49:25.400
<v Speaker 3>to go in convince your manager that you need to

952
00:49:25.400 --> 00:49:27.280
<v Speaker 3>take to three to four hours to go and test

953
00:49:27.320 --> 00:49:29.760
<v Speaker 3>this thing and confirm that it's going to work as expected.

954
00:49:30.280 --> 00:49:33.239
<v Speaker 3>Ironically enough, in the realm of DevOps and in the

955
00:49:33.280 --> 00:49:36.599
<v Speaker 3>realm of a lot of engineering. When you get to

956
00:49:36.639 --> 00:49:39.840
<v Speaker 3>the senior at to principal level and you're the one

957
00:49:39.840 --> 00:49:42.760
<v Speaker 3>that's supposed to be making these decisions and calling these

958
00:49:42.800 --> 00:49:46.400
<v Speaker 3>things out, your job is a lot more sales than

959
00:49:46.440 --> 00:49:49.199
<v Speaker 3>it is engineering. You have to go and sell this

960
00:49:49.360 --> 00:49:51.840
<v Speaker 3>idea and you can do it, and the technology is

961
00:49:51.880 --> 00:49:55.000
<v Speaker 3>there and there is trust me, there are twenty vendors

962
00:49:55.000 --> 00:49:57.840
<v Speaker 3>as we speak that want to sell you their solution

963
00:49:58.000 --> 00:49:59.719
<v Speaker 3>that can do this thing, and they can do it

964
00:50:00.239 --> 00:50:03.199
<v Speaker 3>very very well. Now you've got to go sell that

965
00:50:03.320 --> 00:50:05.119
<v Speaker 3>idea to upper management.

966
00:50:05.239 --> 00:50:06.920
<v Speaker 1>Well, the best way to do that is put a

967
00:50:06.960 --> 00:50:10.840
<v Speaker 1>dollar figure around it, Like if we got ransomwared, what

968
00:50:10.880 --> 00:50:12.840
<v Speaker 1>would it be worth to you to get all this

969
00:50:12.960 --> 00:50:15.400
<v Speaker 1>data back? You know? And they're going to know that.

970
00:50:15.519 --> 00:50:18.760
<v Speaker 1>So ten million dollars, twenty million, thirty, one hundred million

971
00:50:18.800 --> 00:50:21.480
<v Speaker 1>dollars like those aren't out of the out of the

972
00:50:21.519 --> 00:50:24.280
<v Speaker 1>realm of the ransoms that we've seen paid totally. And

973
00:50:24.920 --> 00:50:27.960
<v Speaker 1>so you convince the management with dollar figures, what is

974
00:50:28.000 --> 00:50:29.880
<v Speaker 1>the risk if we don't do this? Yeah?

975
00:50:29.920 --> 00:50:30.719
<v Speaker 3>A thousand percent?

976
00:50:30.840 --> 00:50:34.000
<v Speaker 2>Always yeah, And it's always good to bring this numbers

977
00:50:34.039 --> 00:50:38.079
<v Speaker 2>to the CFO and bring scary headlines to the CEO.

978
00:50:40.480 --> 00:50:40.840
<v Speaker 1>That's it.

979
00:50:41.119 --> 00:50:43.800
<v Speaker 3>Yep, yep, yeah, and you just you really just got

980
00:50:43.840 --> 00:50:45.719
<v Speaker 3>to be able to sell the idea of like what

981
00:50:45.800 --> 00:50:49.239
<v Speaker 3>can happen. And for your manager it could be those

982
00:50:49.320 --> 00:50:53.079
<v Speaker 3>dollar figures. For another manager, it could be, well, if

983
00:50:53.119 --> 00:50:56.119
<v Speaker 3>this happens, we're going to have to hire a consulting

984
00:50:56.159 --> 00:50:58.800
<v Speaker 3>firm and we're going to pay them five hundred thousand

985
00:50:58.840 --> 00:51:01.280
<v Speaker 3>dollars to do this, Or could be we need well,

986
00:51:02.000 --> 00:51:04.920
<v Speaker 3>we're going to have compliance issues, right, and we're gonna

987
00:51:05.000 --> 00:51:06.840
<v Speaker 3>you know, we're going to mess up and we're not

988
00:51:06.880 --> 00:51:08.880
<v Speaker 3>going to be able to get our High Trust serve

989
00:51:09.079 --> 00:51:11.599
<v Speaker 3>or our SoC two compliance or whatever it is. So

990
00:51:11.639 --> 00:51:13.440
<v Speaker 3>you just got to figure out what's important.

991
00:51:13.519 --> 00:51:15.559
<v Speaker 2>Could end up in an audit, you know, if your

992
00:51:15.760 --> 00:51:19.519
<v Speaker 2>financial services he gets hairy.

993
00:51:19.360 --> 00:51:22.280
<v Speaker 1>And it's something as simple as how much would it

994
00:51:22.320 --> 00:51:26.679
<v Speaker 1>cost us per day to not have our data exactly right?

995
00:51:26.840 --> 00:51:30.599
<v Speaker 1>To be offline in one day would cost x amount? Right,

996
00:51:30.639 --> 00:51:34.039
<v Speaker 1>And now you're so you're more likely to pay the

997
00:51:34.119 --> 00:51:35.760
<v Speaker 1>ransom to get your data back.

998
00:51:35.880 --> 00:51:38.039
<v Speaker 2>Accept it. Often when you pay the ransom, you don't

999
00:51:38.039 --> 00:51:38.760
<v Speaker 2>get your data back.

1000
00:51:38.840 --> 00:51:41.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's true. You know, there's no guaranteed failure rate is.

1001
00:51:41.840 --> 00:51:44.960
<v Speaker 2>Failure rate's pretty high you know, we have taken that

1002
00:51:45.079 --> 00:51:49.159
<v Speaker 2>story where we're a certain security person actually had to

1003
00:51:49.320 --> 00:51:58.159
<v Speaker 2>fix the decryptor when decrypt files larger than two gigs. Yeah,

1004
00:51:59.239 --> 00:52:01.400
<v Speaker 2>and the reality and we've done this show and run

1005
00:52:01.440 --> 00:52:05.440
<v Speaker 2>as as well. It's a year minimum. You know, you're

1006
00:52:05.440 --> 00:52:07.199
<v Speaker 2>going to have people involved, You're going to be cleaning

1007
00:52:07.239 --> 00:52:09.599
<v Speaker 2>up messes like it's just nothing's fast. It takes a

1008
00:52:09.639 --> 00:52:11.599
<v Speaker 2>long time. And it takes the same amount of time

1009
00:52:11.599 --> 00:52:13.800
<v Speaker 2>where you paid, where you paid the ransom or you did.

1010
00:52:13.880 --> 00:52:18.679
<v Speaker 1>I've heard of companies doing testing their staff by sending

1011
00:52:18.760 --> 00:52:23.480
<v Speaker 1>out phishing emails, you know, and seeing if they actually

1012
00:52:23.639 --> 00:52:25.880
<v Speaker 1>click on them, and you know, when they get there,

1013
00:52:25.960 --> 00:52:28.440
<v Speaker 1>you say, congratulations, you just ransom.

1014
00:52:28.960 --> 00:52:30.639
<v Speaker 2>You just signed up for additional training.

1015
00:52:31.320 --> 00:52:33.639
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, exactly, And a lot of them.

1016
00:52:33.480 --> 00:52:37.039
<v Speaker 3>Are actually pretty good. Like you know, the old method,

1017
00:52:37.079 --> 00:52:39.719
<v Speaker 3>for example, used to be, you know, hover over the

1018
00:52:40.559 --> 00:52:42.599
<v Speaker 3>email and make sure that the domain doesn't have like

1019
00:52:42.639 --> 00:52:43.280
<v Speaker 3>a zero.

1020
00:52:43.199 --> 00:52:44.639
<v Speaker 1>Instead of an ozer exactly.

1021
00:52:45.519 --> 00:52:49.039
<v Speaker 3>And now it's you know, everything's legit and you're like, yep,

1022
00:52:49.119 --> 00:52:51.159
<v Speaker 3>this is a legit email and you click it and

1023
00:52:51.199 --> 00:52:53.000
<v Speaker 3>it's like oop, sorry, so.

1024
00:52:53.360 --> 00:52:56.400
<v Speaker 2>Yeah now and the well, now you get into the

1025
00:52:56.440 --> 00:52:58.800
<v Speaker 2>other out level of this, which is that be more

1026
00:52:58.800 --> 00:53:02.079
<v Speaker 2>careful next time? Is not a strategy now that we

1027
00:53:02.119 --> 00:53:03.679
<v Speaker 2>actually have got a.

1028
00:53:03.360 --> 00:53:06.840
<v Speaker 1>Lot Another big one is you know, here, copy this

1029
00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:12.000
<v Speaker 1>file off my USB stick right oops. So in the

1030
00:53:12.079 --> 00:53:14.920
<v Speaker 1>studio here, I have customers that come and go with

1031
00:53:15.000 --> 00:53:18.079
<v Speaker 1>their own data all the time, and I have a

1032
00:53:18.119 --> 00:53:21.400
<v Speaker 1>machine that is not on the Internet, that that has

1033
00:53:21.559 --> 00:53:23.639
<v Speaker 1>you know, malware bytes and all that stuff on it.

1034
00:53:24.519 --> 00:53:26.840
<v Speaker 1>So I get the latest updates, I unplug it from

1035
00:53:26.880 --> 00:53:29.239
<v Speaker 1>the Internet, stick the thing and run a scan on it,

1036
00:53:29.320 --> 00:53:31.639
<v Speaker 1>and if it's okay, I feel comfortable enough that I

1037
00:53:31.639 --> 00:53:34.760
<v Speaker 1>can put it in my real computer, right right. Yeah.

1038
00:53:35.039 --> 00:53:39.119
<v Speaker 1>So cynical, Yeah, I wish I didn't have to be,

1039
00:53:39.199 --> 00:53:40.320
<v Speaker 1>but yeah yeah.

1040
00:53:40.360 --> 00:53:42.440
<v Speaker 2>But is this the pain point these days? Really just

1041
00:53:42.480 --> 00:53:44.480
<v Speaker 2>think it's the security side of things when it comes

1042
00:53:44.480 --> 00:53:48.440
<v Speaker 2>to software, Like I feel like a lot of the

1043
00:53:49.159 --> 00:53:51.840
<v Speaker 2>a lot of stuff has been well automated deployments automated

1044
00:53:51.880 --> 00:53:54.679
<v Speaker 2>now like that part works, Continuous deployment like that, that

1045
00:53:54.760 --> 00:53:56.639
<v Speaker 2>seems to work pretty well. If you put in the time,

1046
00:53:56.679 --> 00:53:59.480
<v Speaker 2>you can get your results. Total testing still seems to

1047
00:53:59.480 --> 00:54:03.559
<v Speaker 2>be a strugg but that's evolving. But actually having a

1048
00:54:03.599 --> 00:54:06.880
<v Speaker 2>sense of the security quality of your app, I don't

1049
00:54:06.920 --> 00:54:09.159
<v Speaker 2>have good measures man like that. You only find that

1050
00:54:09.199 --> 00:54:10.719
<v Speaker 2>out in the field, it seems.

1051
00:54:10.559 --> 00:54:13.280
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, And I think to that point, the biggest thing

1052
00:54:13.360 --> 00:54:15.440
<v Speaker 3>right now, going back to what I was saying before,

1053
00:54:16.440 --> 00:54:20.119
<v Speaker 3>is the networking aspect, like where are my packets going?

1054
00:54:21.280 --> 00:54:24.760
<v Speaker 3>There's so many different layers now, yeah, east west traffic,

1055
00:54:24.800 --> 00:54:27.199
<v Speaker 3>north south traffic, so many different layers that it's like,

1056
00:54:27.840 --> 00:54:30.400
<v Speaker 3>where is this going? And do I know where it's

1057
00:54:30.480 --> 00:54:32.880
<v Speaker 3>going and what it's doing and who can hit it?

1058
00:54:32.920 --> 00:54:36.360
<v Speaker 2>Did it really need to go there right right doing

1059
00:54:36.559 --> 00:54:37.639
<v Speaker 2>unnecessary things?

1060
00:54:37.760 --> 00:54:42.679
<v Speaker 3>And I guarantee, I guarantee that can fix ninety percent

1061
00:54:43.440 --> 00:54:45.440
<v Speaker 3>of the security issues that you see in like a

1062
00:54:45.519 --> 00:54:49.800
<v Speaker 3>devop slash platform engineering environment right now where there's a

1063
00:54:49.800 --> 00:54:52.679
<v Speaker 3>lot of you know, Kubernetes and there's a lot of cloud.

1064
00:54:52.519 --> 00:54:55.880
<v Speaker 2>But it speaks to whitelisting, allow no traffic except the

1065
00:54:55.920 --> 00:54:59.119
<v Speaker 2>paths I've specified, and I don't see very many folks working.

1066
00:54:58.920 --> 00:55:02.800
<v Speaker 3>That way totally the defense and depth, but you know,

1067
00:55:02.880 --> 00:55:06.159
<v Speaker 3>it's it's all that stuff. It's least privilege right, like

1068
00:55:06.760 --> 00:55:12.239
<v Speaker 3>block everything and then open up as necessary. The problem

1069
00:55:12.320 --> 00:55:14.920
<v Speaker 3>is again that's that's that takes a lot of time

1070
00:55:15.199 --> 00:55:17.920
<v Speaker 3>and people are like, hey, I got you know something

1071
00:55:18.000 --> 00:55:24.079
<v Speaker 3>something deadline, that's it. That's it, yep, yep, yeah, and

1072
00:55:24.119 --> 00:55:27.960
<v Speaker 3>it's it's it's wild to see even even like let's

1073
00:55:27.960 --> 00:55:31.599
<v Speaker 3>say you're setting up different metrics toolings, right like maybe

1074
00:55:31.599 --> 00:55:35.400
<v Speaker 3>you're you're setting up Jaeger, you're setting up Prometheus, and

1075
00:55:35.440 --> 00:55:38.719
<v Speaker 3>you're you're collecting you know, end to end app metrics,

1076
00:55:38.760 --> 00:55:43.199
<v Speaker 3>you're collecting standard server metrics. Whatever you're collecting. Go look

1077
00:55:43.239 --> 00:55:47.599
<v Speaker 3>at those sometime and see what's talking to what from

1078
00:55:47.639 --> 00:55:50.559
<v Speaker 3>a networking perspective, and your mind is going to be blown.

1079
00:55:51.840 --> 00:55:55.119
<v Speaker 2>You know, it's not not even controlling it, just monitoring it.

1080
00:55:55.199 --> 00:55:55.960
<v Speaker 3>You just look at it.

1081
00:55:56.000 --> 00:55:57.840
<v Speaker 2>You'll be surprised even.

1082
00:55:57.599 --> 00:55:59.400
<v Speaker 3>Like every once in a while, you know, I'll I'll

1083
00:55:59.719 --> 00:56:03.280
<v Speaker 3>open up this this fancy new tool called wire shark.

1084
00:56:04.079 --> 00:56:08.199
<v Speaker 3>Yeah crazy, and I'll look at what's talking to what,

1085
00:56:08.360 --> 00:56:09.679
<v Speaker 3>and I'm like, I don't even know.

1086
00:56:09.639 --> 00:56:10.199
<v Speaker 1>What this is.

1087
00:56:10.440 --> 00:56:13.320
<v Speaker 2>Although I'm minutely wire sharks better at marking updata now

1088
00:56:13.360 --> 00:56:15.480
<v Speaker 2>than it's ever been before. The problem with wire sharks

1089
00:56:15.519 --> 00:56:17.239
<v Speaker 2>you turned that on one. Okay, there's a lot of stuff.

1090
00:56:17.320 --> 00:56:19.480
<v Speaker 2>I have no idea what it means. It's overwhelming.

1091
00:56:19.559 --> 00:56:23.599
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, yeah, it's all fun.

1092
00:56:25.119 --> 00:56:29.639
<v Speaker 1>Until somebody loses an eye exactly, sure enough. So Michael,

1093
00:56:29.679 --> 00:56:32.679
<v Speaker 1>what's in your inbox? What's coming up for you? What's next?

1094
00:56:32.880 --> 00:56:36.960
<v Speaker 3>So really still focused in the Kubernetes realm, I'm going

1095
00:56:37.039 --> 00:56:40.719
<v Speaker 3>to be focusing more and more on the networking aspects

1096
00:56:40.840 --> 00:56:46.639
<v Speaker 3>of things, Securing networks, observing networks, making sure that proper

1097
00:56:46.679 --> 00:56:49.480
<v Speaker 3>traffic routing is going where it's supposed to go. Is

1098
00:56:49.519 --> 00:56:51.119
<v Speaker 3>this thing is supposed to be talking to this thing?

1099
00:56:51.960 --> 00:56:54.159
<v Speaker 3>And then also in the realm of AI, you know,

1100
00:56:54.639 --> 00:56:58.840
<v Speaker 3>looking at various agents, how are these agents talking to

1101
00:56:58.920 --> 00:57:02.000
<v Speaker 3>one another? How are you talking to agents? Really everything

1102
00:57:02.119 --> 00:57:06.800
<v Speaker 3>around the Kubernetes networking security realm, and then of course

1103
00:57:06.880 --> 00:57:11.519
<v Speaker 3>just overall platform engineering, making sure that what tools are

1104
00:57:11.519 --> 00:57:15.559
<v Speaker 3>implemented are necessary, which I call in my head just

1105
00:57:15.880 --> 00:57:18.360
<v Speaker 3>proper architecture. I think what's next for me is just

1106
00:57:18.440 --> 00:57:19.519
<v Speaker 3>proper architecture.

1107
00:57:20.960 --> 00:57:24.719
<v Speaker 1>That's good, good, Okay, Well, thanks for hanging out with

1108
00:57:24.800 --> 00:57:25.360
<v Speaker 1>us for an hour.

1109
00:57:25.400 --> 00:57:26.119
<v Speaker 2>We learned a lot.

1110
00:57:26.239 --> 00:57:29.920
<v Speaker 1>I know I did anyway, and thanks again.

1111
00:57:29.719 --> 00:57:30.760
<v Speaker 3>Thank you so much for having me.

1112
00:57:30.880 --> 00:57:33.280
<v Speaker 1>You bet, and we'll talk to you next time on

1113
00:57:33.440 --> 00:57:56.000
<v Speaker 1>dot net rocks. Dot net Rocks is brought to you

1114
00:57:56.039 --> 00:58:00.960
<v Speaker 1>by Franklin's Net and produced by Pop Studios Service audio,

1115
00:58:01.079 --> 00:58:05.519
<v Speaker 1>video and post production facility located physically in New London, Connecticut,

1116
00:58:05.760 --> 00:58:10.559
<v Speaker 1>and of course in the cloud online at PWOP dot com.

1117
00:58:10.760 --> 00:58:12.880
<v Speaker 1>Visit our website at d O T N E t

1118
00:58:13.119 --> 00:58:17.159
<v Speaker 1>R O c k S dot com for RSS feeds, downloads,

1119
00:58:17.280 --> 00:58:20.960
<v Speaker 1>mobile apps, comments, and access to the full archives going

1120
00:58:21.000 --> 00:58:24.400
<v Speaker 1>back to show number one, recorded in September two thousand

1121
00:58:24.440 --> 00:58:27.079
<v Speaker 1>and two. And make sure you check out our sponsors.

1122
00:58:27.239 --> 00:58:30.239
<v Speaker 1>They keep us in business. Now go write some code.

1123
00:58:30.599 --> 00:58:34.000
<v Speaker 1>See you next time. You got javans

1124
00:58:36.159 --> 00:58:40.840
<v Speaker 2>And