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Speaker 1: You're listening to the Mind Over Murder podcast.

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Speaker 2: My name is Bill Thomas. I'm a writer, consulting, producer,

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and now podcaster. I am now trying to use my

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experience as the brother of a murder victim to help

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other victims of violent crime. I'm working on a book

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on the unsolved Colonial Parkway murders, and I'm the co

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administrator of the Colonial Parkway Murders Facebook group together with

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Kristin Dilly.

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Speaker 3: My name is Kristin Dilly.

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Speaker 4: I'm a writer, a researcher, a teacher, and a victim's advocate,

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as well as the social media manager and co administrator

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for the Colonial Parkway Murders Facebook page with my partner

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in crime, Bill Thomas.

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Speaker 3: Welcome to Mind Over Murder. I'm Kristin Dilly.

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Speaker 2: And I'm Bill Thomas.

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Speaker 3: And this week we have part two of our episode

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with Colleen Fitzpatrick, a genetic genealogist who was our guest

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last week. We had a fascinating, interesting conversation with her

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and we are very much looking forward to continuing that

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conversation and sharing it with you all today.

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Speaker 2: And in other true crime news.

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Speaker 4: C C.

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Speaker 2: Moore, who is another prominent forensic genealogist is going to

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be appearing on a new television series. The show is

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called The Genetic Detective and tells the story about how

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she and her team at Parabond have also broken a

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number of cold cases. The show makes its debut next Monday,

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May twenty sixth at ten pm on ABC and I

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think it's on for six weeks. It's a limited series.

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It should be very interesting, The Genetic Detective, so look

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for it Mondays at ten o'clock on ABC.

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Speaker 3: Now, we had a couple of listeners who had suggested

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that we do a true crime News wrap up or

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true Crime News Update, which we think is a great idea.

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Whenever possible, we're going to offer some insight into the

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latest news from the true Crime Escape. Today, we do

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want to very quickly make a mention of the fact

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that Denis Lee Bowman, you may recall, was indicted for

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the nineteen eighty murder of Kathleen Doyle Kennedy in Virginia Beach, Virginia,

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has now been indicted on a different crime.

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Speaker 2: Dennis Lee Bowman has now been charged in the nineteen

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eighty nine murder of his fourteen year old adopted daughter.

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Her birth name was Alexis Badger, and after she was

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adopted by Dennis Lee Bowman and his wife Brenda, her

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name was changed to Andrea Bowman. This is as an infant. Sadly,

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he murdered her and hid her body under concrete in

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the basement of his home. As part of the exploration

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of the Kathleen Doyle murder, he provided information about the

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whereabouts of his missing daughter. Alexis' birth mother, Kathy Terurcanian,

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has been searching for her daughter for years and has

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been a tremendous advocate. And we're pleased to announce that

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Kathy Turcanian will be a guest on upcoming episodes of

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Mind Over Murder in a few weeks.

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Speaker 3: Speaking of upcoming episodes, we are very much looking forward

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to sharing a three part interview with you from David Rambo,

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a writer and producer on television's hit series CSI.

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Speaker 2: So thanks again for listening to Mind Over Murder and

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we'll look forward to seeing you next time.

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Speaker 3: Welcome to mind Over Murder. I'm Kristin Dilly.

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Speaker 2: That makes me Bill Thomas.

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Speaker 3: We are back this week with part two of our

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episode with Colleen Fitzpatrick, Who's going to talk to us

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about forensic genealogy. Colleen, Welcome back to Mind over Murder.

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Speaker 5: Glad to be here.

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Speaker 3: We're talking about the Phoenix canal killer case last time

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and your very successful identification of Brian Patrick Miller as

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the suspect in the canal killer case. My question that

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I wanted to ask is, when you receive information about

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a crime such as this one, do you get the

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whole entire file or do you just get the DNA profile.

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I'm just very interested in whether you knew the full

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scope of these crimes and you've had an idea who

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the victims were. Does that affect in any way how

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you approach the case.

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Speaker 6: Actually, it depends on the agency. I tend to like

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to have a little bit background on the case. It

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really depends on the work we're doing. If it's a

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Y DNA case, having the background on the case is

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probably not as important. Why DNA only looking for the

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last name in that case. I do produce maybe a

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national perhaps an ethnicity like African American, Native American, Caucasian.

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I can come up with that, But what I produce

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is maybe even out of context. I can just do

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it without knowing anything except that string of numbers called

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a ystr profile. If it's an autosomal test like modern

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we're doing now, you really have to have more of

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a context because you do know who the matches are.

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You do know more about the geography of relatives. You

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may not know who did the crime, but from the

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matches you can deduce probably where the guy was born.

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Maybe if all the matches are from Louisiana, you're looking

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for background, somebody with a background from Louisiana.

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Speaker 2: Is it helpful to have those things? In other words,

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is it helpful for them to say, Okay, we're looking

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for a suspect from Louisiana, let's say, who may have

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family ties to New Orleans. Let's say they won't.

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Speaker 6: Tell us that because in most cases they don't know

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these are coded right, And a lot of times people

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will say, this was a murder of an elderly woman,

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let's say. And these kind of murders are typically cause

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are done by younger.

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Speaker 5: Men who live not too far away.

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Speaker 6: They drives, their kinds of cars, their educational level is

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there's some kind of profiling on the psychology and the

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kind of person that would do that crime, but typically

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they would not know the ethnic bat or they may

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know if it's a Caucasian or something because of an

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eyewitness or something, but they don't know the guy maybe

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from Louisiana or something. Police always base their investigation on

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physical evidence. And if you walk up to somebody, if

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you looked at me, you would I and I left

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something at a crime scene. You wouldn't be able to

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see from the physical evidence. I was from Louisiana. So

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we're introducing another layer on top of the physical evidence,

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more deeper investigative look at who may have done this crime.

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Speaker 3: So were you given information about the victims in this case?

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In the Canal killer case.

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Speaker 6: No, whatever I read, of course I read about Angela

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and Melanie, I read about him or was not given

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any additional information because I didn't need it. More like,

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here's some DNA from a crime scene. When this is

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what happens is the crime, the police, there's no reason

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to share that information with me.

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Speaker 5: I don't need it.

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Speaker 2: Is there any sense that having additional information like that

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would interfere with your ability to be strictly driven by

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science and the DNA matching and that kind of thing.

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Speaker 6: I'm just it wouldn't It would be neutral if I

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had it, it would be good to have. If I

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didn't have it, it wouldn't make any difference to me.

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It's interesting to me because it's something I'm working on

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and I like to know as much as I can,

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But in terms of the really method of solving it

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using why DNA, I really don't need to know that.

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Speaker 3: So if he does go to trial, I know he's

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scheduled for trial in June, and clearly we don't really

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know what's going to happen considering the COVID nineteen. But

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if he does go to trial in June twenty twenty,

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will you be called to testify? Have you been given

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that information?

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Speaker 5: I have not. Officially.

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Speaker 6: I did give what's called an interview in Arizona, and

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my understanding that's like a deposition, it's a form of

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and I went out there to talk.

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Speaker 5: To the defense.

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Speaker 6: I asked the prosecution attorney some of them to be present,

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and the defense asked me some questions and I answered him,

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it's pretty cut and dry. I've been told I most

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like you will not be called to testify, but if

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I am, I absolutely have no problems. What I did

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was cut and dry. It was a lead that I produced,

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like all genetic genealogy stories. It's a lead that I

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provided to the police department, and they ran from there.

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So I think most of the trial will be concentrated

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on and they ran from there rather than all the

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leads that they had been developing through the years, including mine.

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Speaker 2: Agreed and important for our listeners to understand that when

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someone liked doctor Fitzpatrick generates this lead, that's all then confirmed.

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In other words, they take a look at in this case,

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suspects with the name of Miller, narrowed it down to

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the person they thought was the most likely, and it's

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been reported in the media and in many other cases.

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They then went out and surreptitiously collected mister Miller's DNA.

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And typically they'll do this with something that the suspect

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has thrown away and that's already been through the court system.

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It is legal for law enforcement to watch you and

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then when you throw away a coffee cup, a cigarette,

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but a half eaten slice of pizza, as they did

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in the Grim Sleeper case in Los Angeles, which then

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presents a fresh DNA sample match that DNA sample back

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to the suspects DNA, thus confirming your scientific tip which

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said you should be looking for an individual with the

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name of Miller. That work on the back end then

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confirms your reference to a potential suspect named Miller.

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Speaker 5: It's a little bit more than that. You miss one step.

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Speaker 2: Oh thank you tell us.

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Speaker 6: In any case, no matter how this is done, I

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provide a name Miller. Okay, they think they know whoever

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it is. But there's two steps at that. At this point,

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the police can go out and collect discard at DNA

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that is legal, right, it's a collect a cigarette by

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trash whatever. And they take the DNA from that sample

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and they match it or they against the crime scene

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evidence and it's let's say it's a match.

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Speaker 5: If it's not a match, the guys rolled out.

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Speaker 6: If it is a match, they have another step that

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gives them probable call cause to go and make an arrest.

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Because that man's DNA matched the DNA at the crime scene,

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and that is a fact it matched. That gives them

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probable cause. They will arrest him. They will bring him

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into the and they will take another DNA sample right

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there in the station. They usually videotape it, right, They

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have a chain of custody, and that is a sample.

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The evidentiary sample that is used in court.

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Speaker 2: That's the step I overlooked because yes, that actually confirms

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one hundred percent then that this individual, this potential suspect's

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DNA does match suspect DNA left at the cracks.

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Speaker 6: And there's even one more step after that, and that

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is when it goes to trial.

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Speaker 5: It is a fact that his DNA matched the crime scene.

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That is a fact. The next step is to say,

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what is the.

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Speaker 6: Chance, the random chance that somebody out there would match

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and it's also match like it's called random man not excluded,

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or the likelihood ratio. What is the likelihood that his

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DNA matches over everyone else.

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Speaker 5: Out there that could potentially be in that.

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Speaker 6: Story there, So you have statistics, yes, he did match,

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but can you rule out the fact that it could

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have been some other guy from another neighborhood that committed

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the crime. That's where you come up with the statistics

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that his DNA is one in a trillion times more

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likely to match the DNA at the.

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Speaker 5: Crime scene to anyone else in the world. Oh, you

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have still the possibility his DNA match, but it's a coincidence.

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You have to rule that out. That's the last step.

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Speaker 2: And that's where we hear that numerical testimony word though.

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Speaker 6: So four, there's four steps in this. They give me

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a why DNA, and I come up with the NA Miller,

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all right, fine, they find Brian Patrick. Miller's a suspect

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on the list, all right. Step one, Step two they

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collect the DNA and they find his DNA matches the

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crime scene DNA.

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Speaker 5: Step three is they arrest. That gives them probable cause.

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Speaker 6: Step three they arrest him and in the police station

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they take his DNA again and they videotape that they

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chain of custody everything, and they see again that it

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matches the crime scene data that is not debate. Step

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four is to go to court and to determine what's

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the chance that his DNA is the match over anyone

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a random guy in the population. And that's where you

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get those big numbers you hear sometimes. So there's four

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steps to this.

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Speaker 2: Now, we try to learn something in every podcast, and

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I learned something just now, which is I have a

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new expression, which is also going to be the name

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of my new rock and roll band. Random man not excluded.

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Speaker 6: That is a term in forensic DNA analysis.

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Speaker 2: And we're gonna have T shirts that say random man. Yeah,

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what do you think we'll give you full credit calling

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it's good to me random woman, not excluding.

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Speaker 5: Absolutely random person.

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Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, random person doesn't have I'm.

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Speaker 5: All about random man, random man.

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Speaker 2: Random man. Especially since so many suspects are men and

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not women. It seems.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I think we've got our first piece of merchandise.

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Speaker 2: Random man.

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Speaker 5: That'd be great.

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Speaker 2: You made a really interesting reference in last week's episode.

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You talked about when you were first pursuing forensic genealogy

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and starting to show results, that you were a bit tentative.

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You and Andy, your partner, were a bit tentative about

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putting it out there too much because you've gotten so

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much pushback from genealogists.

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Speaker 6: What did you mean, I'd say pushback was a kind word,

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kind way of putting it. And when I did the

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Sarah Yarborough case, I'm just minding my own business. I

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think this is interesting to try. That was the murder

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of a young woman, a high school student in Federal Way, Washington,

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and I think it was ninety one. I have to check,

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I offered. I went to the Seattle Police Department. I said,

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I have this y DNA genetic genealogy idea, and the

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two detectives I would say.

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Speaker 5: Were less than receptive. They almost fell asleep.

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Speaker 6: They argued with me, they wouldn't give me their business

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card whatever. Okay, So the DNA lady, though, understood what

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I was talking about. So they wound up sending me

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the Y profile, and I wound up matching it through

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the method I have described with the name Fuller and

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investigating where that name came from. The Y DNA profile

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matched these genealogists that trace their ancestry to Robert Fuller

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in Massachusetts in sixteen thirty. This gives a historical kind

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for this guy. We know his name is Fuller, we

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know he's connected to say possible name Fuller.

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Speaker 5: I have to say that probably connected to Robert Fuller.

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Speaker 6: He was not on the Mayflower, but he was related

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to the Mayflower people. To add to the story, the

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girl the victim had a friend in classmate named Elizabeth Fuller.

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And Elizabeth Fuller didn't have a brother, She had four sisters,

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so of course their father, Bill Fullerd, was a person

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of interest and he was in the area at.

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Speaker 5: The time of the murder. He was jogging somewhere.

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Speaker 6: Bill Fuller went in and he was excluded. His DNA

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did not match the killer's DNA. He was excluded from

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the investigation, but his wide DNA matched the killer, and

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therefore he's also a descendant of Robert Fuller from Massachusetts

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in the sixteen.

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Speaker 2: Thirty, the same family, although Bill Fuller, the father of

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the classmate, is clearly not the perpetrator.

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Speaker 5: Correct. The CODIS markers didn't match.

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Speaker 2: No, but he's related to the killer.

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Speaker 6: Yes, but through hy DNA, not through cotis. Cotis is

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only good for a one to one or in some

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states formilial matching one to almost one, a fuzzy one.

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Hy DNA is non generational a y DNA anybody along

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the paternal lines DNA will match each other, Like your

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dad has a Y DNA, your great grandfather has the

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same y DNA along the male line, it.

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Speaker 5: Just carries on.

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Speaker 6: So Bill Fuller is a we call it patrilineal or

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male line relative. He's some kind of cousin, but considering

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the connection to Robert Fuller, he could be a fifteenth cousin,

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or a third cousin, or a tenth cousin. We don't

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know because hy DNA can't.

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Speaker 5: Tell you that.

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Speaker 2: And so even though these people could be distantly related

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to Fuller from the Mayflower from hundreds of years before,

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they might not even know they're from.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, he didn't.

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Speaker 6: I just did his genealogy right because the name Fuller,

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and he was in that same.

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Speaker 5: Family, okay, And I knew that he didn't have any

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sons that we knew about.

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Speaker 6: He didn't he had one brother, I think No, he

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was an only child. His father had one brother who

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never married. So the relationship between the killer and mister

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Fuller was not immediate, let's put it that way. When

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that happened, we're in the position where we know the

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killer's probable last name, we have his genealogy back to

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the sixteen hundreds. We have a cousin that we know

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is some kind of cousin, but we don't know who

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he is. Now this is you got to go back

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to twenty eleven.

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Speaker 5: This is weird. This is strange.

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Speaker 6: So the police department said, we can't arrest somebody because

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they weren't on the Mayflower, But this makes a great

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newspaper article. Would you be the point of contact? And

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I said, of course, I.

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Speaker 5: Would be no problem.

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Speaker 6: Let me know what else I can do to help

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in the spirit of civic duty.

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Speaker 2: You mean, no good deed goes unpunished.

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Speaker 6: Yes, it turns out that the Fuller person in charge

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of that administrating that study. I emailed her and I said,

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I couldn't tell you. Obviously it's police work. I'm not

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going to let you go on the internet on all

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the genealogists sharing the information. I said, but I want

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to thank you for making that available. I want you

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to know what happened. And this is great and nothing happened.

341
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Got no answer, But of course the media is advancing.

342
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You know that the police have their article in the

343
00:19:43,920 --> 00:19:48,160
Seattle Times because they thought maybe it'll tract attention, right,

344
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maybe somebody will come forward with some kind of clue

345
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a tip later in the evening when the news hit.

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Of course, this is flashing it.

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Speaker 5: Man.

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Speaker 6: I was just flamed. I was beaten up, I was insulted.

349
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I was unsubscribed. This person carried that hatred for me

350
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on that for years.

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Speaker 5: I saw that.

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Speaker 6: I saw comments and I saw it. And at one

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point there was a.

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Speaker 5: Story circulated that I had hired somebody, but to say

355
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his name was Fuller go to.

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Speaker 6: The police and insist or bully my way into having

357
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the police put that man's DNA and codis so that

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I could announce I saw the case.

359
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Speaker 2: This is insane. Police wouldn't cooperate with this, and you

360
00:20:35,799 --> 00:20:38,200
didn't have to be crazy, don't.

361
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Speaker 6: Even start right and and that's like the law enforcement

362
00:20:42,079 --> 00:20:46,519
equivalent of an anti gravity machine or a perpetual motion machine.

363
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It doesn't there's no way that can happen. And I

364
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saw comments fly by on the mailing list on oh

365
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my god, brig brother, has my DNA run for the hills.

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Oh my god, they're gonna they're gonna interrogate all the

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fullers in the Northwest.

368
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Speaker 5: Uh huh suena DNA, the lab owners. And I'm saying, no,

369
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they not. They just want to solve the case.

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Speaker 6: One guy commented, God, you don't know how many people

371
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have been falsely accused with DNA. And I'm like, and

372
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I'm trying to say, come on, guys, come down whatever,

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and it just I left the list. I was unsubscribed.

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I was bounced off of it, but I didn't stop.

375
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I just said I went under the radar, and in truth,

376
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the Phoenix Police Department, when I saw that case, asked

377
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me not to go to the media, asked me not

378
00:21:34,559 --> 00:21:37,799
to say anything because it was so new. They didn't

379
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know what to do about it either. I didn't know

380
00:21:40,200 --> 00:21:43,440
how it would developed, so I was pretty quiet. And

381
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it took a journalist doing a four year request and

382
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getting the emails and all the backstory before she broke

383
00:21:51,279 --> 00:21:51,839
the story.

384
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Speaker 2: Do you want to say, who that wash?

385
00:21:54,480 --> 00:21:57,400
Speaker 5: The journalist? I'd have to look her up. She's now

386
00:21:57,559 --> 00:22:00,720
in the Bay Area, Michelle. I tell you later.

387
00:22:01,279 --> 00:22:04,039
Speaker 6: When she finally broke the story, it was very well written,

388
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and I was around Thanksgiving.

389
00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:07,720
Speaker 5: I called her. I had to leave a message and

390
00:22:07,759 --> 00:22:10,319
I said, I'm really relieved that this all came out.

391
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Speaker 6: The police department said I could talk to you whatever.

392
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I'm just relieved because I really did want to talk

393
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to you. But I didn't know what to do either.

394
00:22:18,200 --> 00:22:20,720
They told me keep it quiet, and then I had

395
00:22:20,759 --> 00:22:24,039
the media, yes, and I did. The news got around

396
00:22:24,039 --> 00:22:26,799
the forensic community, which kind of rallied me a little

397
00:22:26,799 --> 00:22:28,319
bit because I didn't know what to do with those

398
00:22:28,359 --> 00:22:31,160
people either. And I could have got front and center

399
00:22:31,240 --> 00:22:34,799
stage waving flags and I'm sure the police departments, but

400
00:22:34,880 --> 00:22:38,160
I really had to honor their request, right. I worked

401
00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:40,319
with the agency. I don't work to get out there

402
00:22:40,400 --> 00:22:44,039
on TV or the stage. That's good when it happens.

403
00:22:44,160 --> 00:22:47,079
I'm really glad to get recognized. But that's not why

404
00:22:47,119 --> 00:22:50,119
I did that, And I had to abide by their

405
00:22:50,160 --> 00:22:54,759
wishes because now it's a death penalty case that's very serious.

406
00:22:54,839 --> 00:22:57,480
And if I had come out and said something, how

407
00:22:57,480 --> 00:22:59,920
are they going to find a jury? What effect is

408
00:23:00,039 --> 00:23:03,920
I have on having a fair judicial process.

409
00:23:04,279 --> 00:23:08,039
Speaker 3: Sure, let me go back to something that you alluded

410
00:23:08,079 --> 00:23:11,039
to earlier. You used the term big brother and so,

411
00:23:11,160 --> 00:23:13,519
of course, as the English teacher, I can't let that

412
00:23:13,559 --> 00:23:17,039
reference to nineteen eighty four go by without mentioning without

413
00:23:17,079 --> 00:23:19,799
mentioning it. But you've brought up something that I know

414
00:23:19,880 --> 00:23:21,759
has come up quite a lot in the last couple

415
00:23:21,799 --> 00:23:26,960
of years, which is privacy. Privacy concerns. Big brothers going

416
00:23:27,000 --> 00:23:28,519
to be able to watch me. They're going to have

417
00:23:28,559 --> 00:23:30,799
my DNA, They're going to have all the information about me,

418
00:23:30,839 --> 00:23:34,079
They're going to do terrible things in ruin my life.

419
00:23:34,759 --> 00:23:37,839
How do you respond to the concerns that people raise

420
00:23:37,920 --> 00:23:41,519
about privacy that comes along with forensic genealogy.

421
00:23:42,400 --> 00:23:45,160
Speaker 5: My statement is that's the world we live in, so

422
00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:47,599
get used. I tell people, if.

423
00:23:47,480 --> 00:23:51,119
Speaker 6: You are concerned about your privacy. You have nothing to

424
00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:54,400
be concerned about because we don't have any privacy. You

425
00:23:54,480 --> 00:23:58,599
walk onto those video cameras and all the grocery stores,

426
00:23:58,680 --> 00:24:02,279
and the ATM picture you up on their camera, Allmark.

427
00:24:01,960 --> 00:24:03,400
Speaker 5: Costco, wherever you go.

428
00:24:03,960 --> 00:24:09,200
Speaker 6: You walk under twenty surveillance cameras a day, the traffic lights.

429
00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:11,920
Speaker 5: You don't even see that. You don't even think about that.

430
00:24:12,440 --> 00:24:16,359
Speaker 6: You use the Internet, Yeah, and you ad mint. I

431
00:24:16,400 --> 00:24:19,400
log in just to look at any plane flights. I

432
00:24:19,440 --> 00:24:22,079
was interested on any more planes operating. I looked at

433
00:24:22,160 --> 00:24:25,720
planes in New Orleans. Five minutes later I get ads.

434
00:24:25,599 --> 00:24:30,599
Speaker 2: Yeah, offering you specials to fly to New Orleans.

435
00:24:30,839 --> 00:24:33,079
Speaker 5: And people say to me, oh, I don't have anything.

436
00:24:33,119 --> 00:24:36,839
I'm not, Oh, and I am. I don't want people.

437
00:24:37,680 --> 00:24:40,519
Speaker 6: Okay, I don't care if somebody knows I'm taking a

438
00:24:40,519 --> 00:24:42,319
plane in New Orleans, but I do care.

439
00:24:42,759 --> 00:24:45,039
Speaker 5: That's my business, not the Internet's business.

440
00:24:45,119 --> 00:24:45,759
Speaker 2: Absolutely no.

441
00:24:45,960 --> 00:24:50,559
Speaker 6: And when and even you see Cambridge Analytica leveraging their

442
00:24:50,880 --> 00:24:55,119
the whole Facebook phenomenon to try and influence elections, you

443
00:24:55,599 --> 00:24:58,759
can see that they have tipped elections in the Caribbean

444
00:24:58,839 --> 00:25:02,359
several times and lots countries by using social media.

445
00:25:02,839 --> 00:25:04,720
Speaker 2: We think they may have done that in the United

446
00:25:04,759 --> 00:25:05,480
States as well.

447
00:25:05,799 --> 00:25:09,000
Speaker 6: Oh yeah, you look at a program called a Big

448
00:25:09,039 --> 00:25:11,039
Hack and you can see.

449
00:25:12,279 --> 00:25:14,880
Speaker 2: Not to mention the fact that because I wanted to

450
00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:18,039
talk about this as well, all of us are carrying

451
00:25:18,079 --> 00:25:24,160
around powerful computers in our pockets with GPS built in

452
00:25:25,319 --> 00:25:30,279
Christen's holding up her cell phone that literally track your

453
00:25:30,480 --> 00:25:35,559
every movement, and people seem to forget that when we

454
00:25:35,599 --> 00:25:38,960
all got excited about all this World Wide Web stuff

455
00:25:39,119 --> 00:25:42,200
way back when, and then we decided, oh, we got

456
00:25:42,240 --> 00:25:45,839
to get a smartphone. And I love this convenience and

457
00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:51,839
this technology, but it comes with tethers, which we don't

458
00:25:51,880 --> 00:25:53,359
even think about anymore.

459
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:58,640
Speaker 6: Right, it's privacy versus convenience and efficiency. I mean, you

460
00:25:58,680 --> 00:26:02,720
want your privacy, Do you want convenient convenience and efficiency?

461
00:26:03,200 --> 00:26:03,440
Speaker 2: Yeah?

462
00:26:03,480 --> 00:26:03,920
Speaker 5: You know that.

463
00:26:04,000 --> 00:26:08,680
Speaker 6: And you can't even avoid I could send somebody, hire

464
00:26:08,799 --> 00:26:12,359
somebody to go and buy groceries for me, because I

465
00:26:12,400 --> 00:26:14,799
don't want to be under any surveillance cameras.

466
00:26:15,400 --> 00:26:17,640
Speaker 5: I don't want to go to a shopping mall. How

467
00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:19,119
can I live in the world like that?

468
00:26:19,839 --> 00:26:24,200
Speaker 2: You can't. But people flip out and my experience and

469
00:26:24,319 --> 00:26:27,240
I have a lot less experience than you do, Colleen.

470
00:26:27,359 --> 00:26:30,079
But in the last two years since the Golden State

471
00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:35,200
killer case broke, there's been a lot of discussion about

472
00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:39,440
the use of forensic genealogy. Some people now it's going

473
00:26:39,480 --> 00:26:43,160
to be calling it investigative genetic penealogy, which is even

474
00:26:43,240 --> 00:26:46,240
more of a mouthful. But even in my limited experience,

475
00:26:46,279 --> 00:26:53,559
when I've jumped onto genealogy websites and forums and so

476
00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:57,319
on in an effort to learn, I'm very upfront about

477
00:26:57,319 --> 00:27:00,319
what my agenda is. I want to solve my sister

478
00:27:00,400 --> 00:27:04,079
Kathy's murder together with their girlfriend, Rebecca Dowski, as part

479
00:27:04,079 --> 00:27:07,039
of the Colonial Parkway murders. And I'm real upfront about that,

480
00:27:07,640 --> 00:27:11,480
and I try to treat everybody with respect and hear

481
00:27:11,519 --> 00:27:14,640
what they've got to say. But oh my gosh, even

482
00:27:14,759 --> 00:27:21,000
in my limited experience, people attacked me on these genealogy

483
00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:27,079
forums for daring to promote the idea that you understand

484
00:27:27,119 --> 00:27:31,079
that there are worthwhile things that are coming out of

485
00:27:31,119 --> 00:27:33,880
this kind of work. We have two hundred thousand cold

486
00:27:33,880 --> 00:27:36,960
case murders in the United States, and these tools could

487
00:27:36,960 --> 00:27:41,839
be used to help solve those cases. Heresy people referred

488
00:27:41,880 --> 00:27:48,039
to jedmatch as their database like they owned something which

489
00:27:48,200 --> 00:27:51,839
they didn't and that they hadn't even established. It went

490
00:27:52,000 --> 00:27:57,480
on and on. Some people were just beyond the beyond nasty.

491
00:27:57,599 --> 00:28:02,839
And then people keep insisting that somehow there's people's people

492
00:28:02,839 --> 00:28:06,920
are going to be cloned without their it's you just

493
00:28:06,920 --> 00:28:12,079
get into insane self involved naval gazing drivel.

494
00:28:12,279 --> 00:28:14,960
Speaker 6: Why well, let's go back to the definition of a

495
00:28:15,039 --> 00:28:21,039
rocket scientist. Okay, the genealogy community is not a community

496
00:28:21,039 --> 00:28:24,599
of rocket scientists. I want to I do have to say,

497
00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:26,839
I'm really relating to what you're saying.

498
00:28:27,039 --> 00:28:27,640
Speaker 5: I get it.

499
00:28:27,720 --> 00:28:31,519
Speaker 6: And even with your case, it's even more important because

500
00:28:31,559 --> 00:28:34,960
that's your family, that's your sister that you're concerned about.

501
00:28:35,359 --> 00:28:41,000
Go back to Sarah Yarborough. It was like nonsense, emotionalism, ignorance.

502
00:28:41,200 --> 00:28:44,000
Let's say, being uninformed is a better way of saying it.

503
00:28:44,119 --> 00:28:45,799
Not even wanting to be informed.

504
00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:48,720
Speaker 2: No, they don't care. They don't even care to be informed.

505
00:28:48,839 --> 00:28:52,359
Speaker 6: Right, it's all emotions. A big community, it's unregulated. You

506
00:28:52,400 --> 00:28:55,519
can say anything you want and you and I know,

507
00:28:55,680 --> 00:28:59,680
I underwent a cyberbullying campaign a few years ago by

508
00:29:00,279 --> 00:29:01,279
a genealogist.

509
00:29:02,359 --> 00:29:04,000
Speaker 5: That's it, that's the community.

510
00:29:04,279 --> 00:29:08,079
Speaker 6: And so fortunately I have to say that The current

511
00:29:08,759 --> 00:29:14,759
atmosphere of using genetic genealogy for forensic words has forced

512
00:29:15,319 --> 00:29:20,759
the community in some regard to some intelligent discussions. It

513
00:29:20,839 --> 00:29:25,880
has brought out the more literate, concerned, and well read

514
00:29:26,000 --> 00:29:30,519
and interested people than it did before that understand issues.

515
00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:34,839
These Some of us have been invited to important discussions

516
00:29:34,880 --> 00:29:37,559
and meetings on what the meaning.

517
00:29:37,319 --> 00:29:40,240
Speaker 5: Is, what do we do? What is privacy? What do

518
00:29:40,279 --> 00:29:42,799
you think? So? I see that is.

519
00:29:42,759 --> 00:29:45,519
Speaker 6: A good thing, as a good part of the evolution

520
00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:49,200
here in spite of all of there and what you

521
00:29:49,319 --> 00:29:51,599
call naval gazers, I.

522
00:29:51,680 --> 00:29:57,920
Speaker 2: Just was shocked at the level of vitriol and nastiness

523
00:29:59,240 --> 00:30:04,599
directed at the families of murder victims, and just the

524
00:30:04,799 --> 00:30:10,079
dripping condescension directed it at me. And I was trying

525
00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:12,559
to be respectful, and for the most part, I think

526
00:30:12,559 --> 00:30:16,319
I succeeded where I was just trying to explain. You

527
00:30:16,519 --> 00:30:21,759
have to understand there's a significant societal benefit here, much

528
00:30:21,759 --> 00:30:26,640
in the same way searching for long lost relatives or

529
00:30:26,680 --> 00:30:30,960
helping people that have been adopted find their birth parents,

530
00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:35,880
and all the other sorts of mysteries and human concerns

531
00:30:35,960 --> 00:30:40,160
that can be addressed through genealogy. The response that I

532
00:30:40,240 --> 00:30:45,359
got from a not a majority, but a significant minority,

533
00:30:45,480 --> 00:30:50,119
and boy with a vocal was that, how dare I

534
00:30:50,240 --> 00:30:55,359
try to promote the idea that genealogy can also be

535
00:30:55,480 --> 00:31:00,599
used to solve America's two hundred thousand cold cases murders

536
00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:04,200
and two to four hundred thousand untested rape kits, and

537
00:31:04,279 --> 00:31:07,039
so that there was a potential for a whole nother

538
00:31:07,279 --> 00:31:13,240
aspect of good to come from genealogical databases. I was

539
00:31:13,279 --> 00:31:16,880
basically treated by some people as some sort of heretic.

540
00:31:17,039 --> 00:31:21,920
It was incredible, and they wouldn't even acknowledge why I

541
00:31:22,200 --> 00:31:27,039
was seeking this information. In other words, very rarely would

542
00:31:27,039 --> 00:31:29,680
someone say, and I'm not expecting people to cry in

543
00:31:29,720 --> 00:31:32,240
my beer about the fact that my sister's a murder victim,

544
00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:36,319
but you might want to at least acknowledge that this

545
00:31:36,359 --> 00:31:39,519
has happened, because I brought it up repeatedly, and it

546
00:31:39,559 --> 00:31:41,720
was very rare for someone to say, I'm sorry for

547
00:31:41,799 --> 00:31:45,480
your loss, or I understand Bill's concern, or I understand

548
00:31:45,519 --> 00:31:50,279
why the Thomas family and all of the eight families

549
00:31:50,440 --> 00:31:53,880
impacted by the Colonial Parkway murders would be interested in

550
00:31:54,720 --> 00:32:01,440
potentially identifying suspects through the use of forensic genealogy. That

551
00:32:01,599 --> 00:32:05,160
was rare. Yeah, the fact that you've had to put

552
00:32:05,240 --> 00:32:07,000
up with what you've had to put up with for

553
00:32:07,039 --> 00:32:09,400
all these years. I only had two years worth of it,

554
00:32:09,480 --> 00:32:11,319
and by the end of it all, I was just

555
00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:15,240
rolling my eyes and I ended up being so turned

556
00:32:15,279 --> 00:32:19,960
off by the vocal minority in the genealogy community. I'm

557
00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:21,359
still angry thinking about it now.

558
00:32:21,799 --> 00:32:24,880
Speaker 6: Yeah, I would be, because it's your sister, and there's

559
00:32:24,960 --> 00:32:29,839
not even any in your case, there's not any compassion.

560
00:32:30,039 --> 00:32:32,119
I really I understand where you're coming from.

561
00:32:32,119 --> 00:32:33,160
Speaker 5: Bill, that's your sister.

562
00:32:33,599 --> 00:32:36,680
Speaker 6: I still think there's some privacy concerns you. There's not

563
00:32:36,720 --> 00:32:41,039
even any professionalism, there's not even any thought. In many cases,

564
00:32:41,160 --> 00:32:45,079
it's just knee jerk reaction. Big brother has my DNA.

565
00:32:45,359 --> 00:32:48,039
Oh my god, I can't get it back. Let's go

566
00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:50,960
back to the fact you post something on the internet,

567
00:32:51,119 --> 00:32:52,759
it is no longer yours.

568
00:32:53,039 --> 00:32:56,559
Speaker 5: So if you post it, don't worry about it later.

569
00:32:57,039 --> 00:32:59,880
Speaker 6: If you worry about it while you're sitting there with

570
00:33:00,119 --> 00:33:03,799
your finger on the enter key or submit key, that's

571
00:33:03,839 --> 00:33:08,160
your decision point. It's not later when somebody else either

572
00:33:08,599 --> 00:33:12,000
uses it in some way, used for the Golden state killer,

573
00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:15,680
et cetera. Don't be upset even they hack it and

574
00:33:15,720 --> 00:33:19,000
they steal it. Be upset when you decide you're going

575
00:33:19,079 --> 00:33:21,319
to post it on the internet. Don't even be upset.

576
00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:23,839
Make an informed decision and.

577
00:33:23,839 --> 00:33:25,720
Speaker 5: Go with it. But you're going to have to live

578
00:33:25,759 --> 00:33:26,119
with that.

579
00:33:26,559 --> 00:33:29,079
Speaker 6: If you want to use those tools, you're going to

580
00:33:29,079 --> 00:33:30,799
give up something for that. And if you don't want

581
00:33:30,799 --> 00:33:34,160
to use the tools, you can retain your privacy sure.

582
00:33:34,039 --> 00:33:36,319
Speaker 2: And you can stay off this thing called the World

583
00:33:36,319 --> 00:33:40,359
Wide Web, as you said, the convenience that is made

584
00:33:40,400 --> 00:33:41,359
available to us.

585
00:33:41,880 --> 00:33:43,960
Speaker 5: Yeah, it's gonna be. Let me tell you I have

586
00:33:44,359 --> 00:33:44,960
a story.

587
00:33:45,039 --> 00:33:50,680
Speaker 6: I wind up giving participating in seminars where I'm not

588
00:33:50,720 --> 00:33:54,000
the only speaker that there are other topics covered. And

589
00:33:54,039 --> 00:33:57,279
there was a guy who was giving a talk on

590
00:33:57,799 --> 00:34:00,480
security electronic balance.

591
00:34:00,559 --> 00:34:02,079
Speaker 5: He was in the army, that was a.

592
00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:04,440
Speaker 6: Specialty, and he was getting ready to get out to

593
00:34:04,559 --> 00:34:07,680
his own company, and it was very fascinating talk. And

594
00:34:07,720 --> 00:34:10,639
he right before I heard him. This was last year.

595
00:34:10,880 --> 00:34:15,280
There was an interview on NPR with the CEO of

596
00:34:15,400 --> 00:34:20,079
Ford Motor Company, and the CEO stated that Ford Motor

597
00:34:20,119 --> 00:34:22,960
Company made more money on the data the.

598
00:34:22,880 --> 00:34:26,880
Speaker 5: Car collects about you in the car than the car itself.

599
00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:31,559
Interesting and he gave the example.

600
00:34:31,960 --> 00:34:34,840
Speaker 6: He flashed to Hope. He said that I think it

601
00:34:35,039 --> 00:34:38,920
was BMW and one of the American cars, maybe it

602
00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:42,719
was Ford. When they download the data the car has

603
00:34:42,760 --> 00:34:45,880
collected over a period of time, it takes a whole day.

604
00:34:46,039 --> 00:34:46,960
Speaker 5: It's massive.

605
00:34:47,800 --> 00:34:50,719
Speaker 6: And he's flashed on the screen slides just a few

606
00:34:50,760 --> 00:34:53,840
pages of the data that winds up, and he stopped

607
00:34:53,880 --> 00:34:55,800
for a minute. He was making a comment and was

608
00:34:56,360 --> 00:34:59,360
it happened? The slide stopped on a page with just

609
00:34:59,440 --> 00:35:03,280
one line on some kind of data, and it said Starbucks.

610
00:35:03,840 --> 00:35:08,000
So this car had been in the Starbucks parking lot

611
00:35:08,039 --> 00:35:11,719
and it had logged into the Starbucks server. It had

612
00:35:11,800 --> 00:35:17,559
pinged the wireless your car pinged every wireless and it

613
00:35:17,679 --> 00:35:21,360
was known that car was near that Starbucks at that time. Okay,

614
00:35:21,440 --> 00:35:25,000
So he cited a case where there was a woman

615
00:35:25,039 --> 00:35:28,320
who was at a bar and she claimed she talked

616
00:35:28,360 --> 00:35:30,400
to a guy at the bar. They went home to

617
00:35:30,519 --> 00:35:33,679
her place together, and she claimed he sexual assaulted her

618
00:35:33,679 --> 00:35:34,480
and beat her up.

619
00:35:34,920 --> 00:35:37,199
Speaker 5: She called the police. He was gone, call the police.

620
00:35:37,239 --> 00:35:38,559
They go track the guy down.

621
00:35:38,639 --> 00:35:41,199
Speaker 6: He said home, he didn't have his cell phone that night,

622
00:35:41,280 --> 00:35:43,079
and he says, yes, I met her in the bar.

623
00:35:43,000 --> 00:35:44,679
Speaker 5: But I didn't go to her house with her.

624
00:35:44,880 --> 00:35:47,639
Speaker 6: We didn't even leave together. They went back to the

625
00:35:47,719 --> 00:35:51,280
surveillance camera in the bar and they saw them talking,

626
00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,000
but they didn't cover the door of the bar, so

627
00:35:54,039 --> 00:35:57,079
they couldn't see whether they left together or not. However,

628
00:35:57,679 --> 00:36:01,840
the way they caught him was that a car registered

629
00:36:01,880 --> 00:36:05,599
that the passenger door and the driver door had opened

630
00:36:05,599 --> 00:36:06,480
at the same time.

631
00:36:06,960 --> 00:36:09,039
Speaker 2: Wow, And that's why.

632
00:36:09,280 --> 00:36:11,880
Speaker 5: They confronted him with it. He confess. That was how

633
00:36:11,920 --> 00:36:12,760
they solved the case.

634
00:36:12,840 --> 00:36:16,760
Speaker 2: And I didn't even know a car did that? You

635
00:36:16,960 --> 00:36:17,840
know me either?

636
00:36:18,559 --> 00:36:19,079
Speaker 5: You do now?

637
00:36:19,559 --> 00:36:23,440
Speaker 6: Yeah, make sure that you both get in the same.

638
00:36:23,480 --> 00:36:24,320
Speaker 5: Side of the car.

639
00:36:25,079 --> 00:36:28,360
Speaker 2: And it's funny. We have seen any number of cases

640
00:36:28,400 --> 00:36:32,239
solved in recent years, including a number of prominent murders

641
00:36:32,239 --> 00:36:37,039
in Virginia that we both followed, where the GPS tracking

642
00:36:37,239 --> 00:36:40,239
of the cell phones and the cell phones as they move,

643
00:36:40,440 --> 00:36:44,280
pinging it off the various towers, and the triangulation that's

644
00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:47,840
capable as your cell phone, which is effectively a radio,

645
00:36:48,599 --> 00:36:52,199
sends out signals and receives signals from the various towers.

646
00:36:52,519 --> 00:36:55,440
If you're a killer, you better leave your cell phone

647
00:36:55,440 --> 00:36:58,800
at home, because that is now a method by which

648
00:36:58,800 --> 00:36:59,679
you can be tracked.

649
00:37:00,440 --> 00:37:03,639
Speaker 6: In fact, it's called geo fencing, and there are companies

650
00:37:03,639 --> 00:37:06,840
that specialize in geofencing and what you can do. This

651
00:37:06,960 --> 00:37:10,400
was another seminar I talk I set in. What they

652
00:37:10,519 --> 00:37:13,280
do is when you go anywhere, your cell phone pings

653
00:37:13,519 --> 00:37:17,400
the wireless networks in the area. Now normally in an

654
00:37:17,719 --> 00:37:22,400
urban environment, there's massive amounts of cell phones all around you.

655
00:37:22,480 --> 00:37:26,199
It's very hard to decipher some of that. A company

656
00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:29,280
or an agency can I don't know the word subpoena

657
00:37:29,519 --> 00:37:31,960
records from Google, or ask for a search warm or

658
00:37:31,960 --> 00:37:34,880
something I don't know the legal term. And if they

659
00:37:34,960 --> 00:37:40,079
provide a time frame and a geographical area, they will

660
00:37:40,119 --> 00:37:43,800
provide the It's almost like a real time map of

661
00:37:43,960 --> 00:37:46,679
all the phones and where they were flying around in

662
00:37:46,760 --> 00:37:50,480
this area at this time, so that they can trace them.

663
00:37:50,840 --> 00:37:54,920
He gave the example of a case where a woman

664
00:37:55,039 --> 00:37:57,960
had a farm, and she had several houses on the farm,

665
00:37:58,440 --> 00:38:01,760
and she opened like a play where brides could come

666
00:38:01,880 --> 00:38:04,079
and get married in one of the big houses, and

667
00:38:04,159 --> 00:38:06,800
the outlying houses were for the family of the bride,

668
00:38:06,800 --> 00:38:09,840
the family of the groom, and the wedding party. So

669
00:38:09,960 --> 00:38:12,840
this woman, the bride, goes eight o'clock in the morning

670
00:38:12,840 --> 00:38:15,159
the day of her wedding. He goes to the main

671
00:38:15,199 --> 00:38:18,760
house to make sure everything's set up, and she finds

672
00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:22,440
that the owner is murdered in the house. The owners

673
00:38:22,480 --> 00:38:25,320
not there, but there's blood all over the houses in chaos.

674
00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:30,079
She calls the police. This is not a very urbanized area.

675
00:38:30,679 --> 00:38:33,920
So what they do is they subpoena the records from

676
00:38:33,960 --> 00:38:37,599
Google the cell phones, and they wind up finding the

677
00:38:37,639 --> 00:38:40,480
owner of a cell phone that appeared on the porch

678
00:38:40,519 --> 00:38:43,159
of that house at one o'clock in the morning, and

679
00:38:43,199 --> 00:38:45,800
they follow him and he's a construction guy.

680
00:38:46,400 --> 00:38:49,639
Speaker 5: They trace him for three days. They found out that

681
00:38:49,920 --> 00:38:51,400
the owner of the phone.

682
00:38:51,800 --> 00:38:54,599
Speaker 6: Was a construction guy, and he would get up in

683
00:38:54,599 --> 00:38:57,559
the morning, he'd go to his storage shed look at

684
00:38:57,559 --> 00:39:00,599
his supplies. He'd go to a home deep pick up

685
00:39:00,599 --> 00:39:02,880
a few things, and then go do a job all day,

686
00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:05,800
go home, he'd eat dinner, he'd watched TV, and he

687
00:39:06,159 --> 00:39:08,920
pretty much that was his routine. So in the night

688
00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:11,360
of the murder, he dave the murder. He did all that,

689
00:39:11,480 --> 00:39:13,960
but then after dinner he went to go to a

690
00:39:13,960 --> 00:39:14,559
friend's house.

691
00:39:14,599 --> 00:39:16,840
Speaker 5: They probably watched the movie, and then he drove in

692
00:39:16,880 --> 00:39:21,159
the direction of this compound and he stopped, actually stopped

693
00:39:21,159 --> 00:39:24,280
at a church parking lot for about ten minutes, and

694
00:39:24,320 --> 00:39:26,880
then he proceeded to the woman's house and wound up

695
00:39:26,880 --> 00:39:27,559
on her porch.

696
00:39:28,360 --> 00:39:31,079
Speaker 6: So that doesn't mean he killed her, but he's a

697
00:39:31,079 --> 00:39:33,840
person of interest. They didn't tell him that that. They

698
00:39:33,880 --> 00:39:37,039
pulled him in for questioning and they played up. They said,

699
00:39:37,159 --> 00:39:40,599
if you really did this, you're a Christian, you really

700
00:39:40,639 --> 00:39:43,840
need to come clean and confess and make things right.

701
00:39:44,360 --> 00:39:47,360
And over a period of time he did. He confessed

702
00:39:47,400 --> 00:39:50,679
to the point he wanted to meet the family and apologize.

703
00:39:51,079 --> 00:39:53,320
So they said that's probably not a good idea, but

704
00:39:53,400 --> 00:39:56,639
why don't you write a letter to him and explain

705
00:39:56,840 --> 00:39:58,840
and tell how sorry you are. Of course that's a

706
00:39:58,880 --> 00:40:03,280
written confession. And then her body wasn't there, and they said,

707
00:40:03,360 --> 00:40:05,239
to make it all right, you're going to have to

708
00:40:05,280 --> 00:40:07,519
show us where the body is. And he had driven

709
00:40:07,599 --> 00:40:10,159
some distance and dumped her in the But that was

710
00:40:10,280 --> 00:40:15,280
geo fencing, and of all of the phones, wasn't so

711
00:40:15,760 --> 00:40:19,679
crowded like where I am now. There's probably so many

712
00:40:19,719 --> 00:40:22,239
phones it's not funny, but'd be hard to deal with that,

713
00:40:22,760 --> 00:40:24,639
but in this area where it.

714
00:40:24,559 --> 00:40:27,159
Speaker 5: Was crowded enough but not too crowded.

715
00:40:26,719 --> 00:40:29,039
Speaker 6: And she lives on a big farm. So there was

716
00:40:29,039 --> 00:40:31,719
the cell phones of the wedding party. But he was

717
00:40:31,760 --> 00:40:33,360
the only one that wanted up at the house at

718
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:34,639
an unusual time that he.

719
00:40:34,639 --> 00:40:35,559
Speaker 5: Shouldn't have been there.

720
00:40:35,760 --> 00:40:38,599
Speaker 6: He had painted the house two weeks earlier, so they

721
00:40:38,800 --> 00:40:41,719
realized he had a connection to the victim for some reasons.

722
00:40:41,960 --> 00:40:46,039
Speaker 3: Right, So, in a nutshell, we have more privacy concerns

723
00:40:46,079 --> 00:40:49,400
associated with our cell phone and all of its tracking

724
00:40:49,480 --> 00:40:54,760
technology than we should have with genetic genealogy or any

725
00:40:54,800 --> 00:40:57,239
associated type of technology. It sounds like.

726
00:40:58,039 --> 00:41:01,880
Speaker 6: You can say that DNA spelled it's special, right because

727
00:41:01,920 --> 00:41:04,920
it's part of me, it's my But DNA to the

728
00:41:04,960 --> 00:41:08,639
world out there is data. It's just more different kind

729
00:41:08,639 --> 00:41:12,840
of data. So how are you going to protect DNA

730
00:41:13,000 --> 00:41:16,960
data from everything else, put it aside and treat it

731
00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:19,480
as special. While I'm driving down the street and my

732
00:41:19,559 --> 00:41:22,719
cell phone pings everything in the area. How are you

733
00:41:22,760 --> 00:41:25,679
going to corral DNA and make it sacred and so

734
00:41:25,719 --> 00:41:29,400
that nobody touches, especially since you put it on the internet,

735
00:41:29,559 --> 00:41:33,519
especially since you chose to give that DNA to a company.

736
00:41:33,559 --> 00:41:37,360
You chose to download it, you chose to put it

737
00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:40,880
on jed match, and you expect it to be kept

738
00:41:41,119 --> 00:41:42,360
completely confidential.

739
00:41:42,599 --> 00:41:45,360
Speaker 2: Yeah, this one always floored me, and I tried to

740
00:41:45,400 --> 00:41:49,679
make this argument in a respectful way. You put your

741
00:41:49,760 --> 00:41:54,880
DNA on an open source database with over a million

742
00:41:55,199 --> 00:42:00,639
other people, so potentially millions of people could have looked

743
00:42:00,719 --> 00:42:04,480
at and used your DNA in an effort to find

744
00:42:04,639 --> 00:42:08,960
long lost loved ones, et cetera. You put that out

745
00:42:09,000 --> 00:42:15,840
there voluntarily, and now you're complaining because someone utilized your

746
00:42:15,960 --> 00:42:21,159
DNA which you put out there voluntarily. And it isn't

747
00:42:21,199 --> 00:42:25,920
like they're doing something nefarious with this. They are helping

748
00:42:26,000 --> 00:42:30,760
to solve cold case murders and sexual assaults, some of

749
00:42:30,800 --> 00:42:34,119
the most heinous crimes ever, many of which have gone

750
00:42:34,239 --> 00:42:38,559
decades without being solved. Yeah, so, why is it okay

751
00:42:39,199 --> 00:42:44,440
for someone to find long lost relatives using your DNA

752
00:42:44,519 --> 00:42:48,079
that you put out there voluntarily, and it's not okay

753
00:42:48,199 --> 00:42:52,679
for someone else to find out who killed or rape

754
00:42:53,079 --> 00:42:54,239
their relatives.

755
00:42:54,639 --> 00:42:57,599
Speaker 6: Let's go back to the definition of rocket scientists.

756
00:42:58,159 --> 00:43:01,000
Speaker 2: This is one of your favorites. We can tell just.

757
00:43:01,199 --> 00:43:01,840
Speaker 5: Let's say this.

758
00:43:01,880 --> 00:43:05,760
Speaker 6: It's come up twice in this discussion. It probably hasn't

759
00:43:05,760 --> 00:43:08,119
come up in a couple of years, but it so happens.

760
00:43:08,280 --> 00:43:09,119
Speaker 5: It's appropriate.

761
00:43:09,800 --> 00:43:12,880
Speaker 6: I'm saying that it's not supposed to make sense. Don't

762
00:43:12,920 --> 00:43:16,920
try and make it make sense. This is emotionalism. When

763
00:43:16,920 --> 00:43:20,239
I did the back to the Fuller situation, that data

764
00:43:20,360 --> 00:43:25,960
was publicly accessible, I didn't crack into the Fuller DNA study.

765
00:43:25,960 --> 00:43:28,000
Speaker 5: Put Yeah, I was right.

766
00:43:27,880 --> 00:43:30,320
Speaker 6: There in front of me, and I could even visually

767
00:43:30,440 --> 00:43:33,760
see that it all matches in this corner of the

768
00:43:33,760 --> 00:43:37,360
Fuller study. The owner of that study suddenly made it private.

769
00:43:37,400 --> 00:43:40,360
You had to contact her to get access to that day.

770
00:43:40,639 --> 00:43:42,320
Speaker 5: What do you expect that she's.

771
00:43:42,159 --> 00:43:45,239
Speaker 6: Going to put an electronic gate around her data? Public

772
00:43:45,400 --> 00:43:48,440
data displayed on the Internet with a little disclaimer. If

773
00:43:48,440 --> 00:43:51,840
you law enforcement, please click away from my website, then.

774
00:43:51,719 --> 00:43:53,679
Speaker 2: Don't put it out there on the world Wide Web.

775
00:43:54,159 --> 00:43:59,159
Speaker 6: Police use Facebook, police use Instagram. I saw that I've

776
00:43:59,159 --> 00:44:01,800
been sitting in remember all these seminars.

777
00:44:02,079 --> 00:44:04,039
Speaker 2: Absolutely, so you want.

778
00:44:03,920 --> 00:44:06,480
Speaker 6: To take away Facebook because the police are using it.

779
00:44:06,639 --> 00:44:09,559
Tell the police don't go on Facebook, but they do.

780
00:44:10,039 --> 00:44:13,400
Speaker 2: We both know from cases that we've worked on that's

781
00:44:13,440 --> 00:44:16,599
one of the first places they go is does someone

782
00:44:16,719 --> 00:44:18,480
have a social media platform?

783
00:44:18,840 --> 00:44:19,239
Speaker 5: Yes?

784
00:44:19,480 --> 00:44:24,159
Speaker 2: Are they on Facebook, Twitter, you name it? And what

785
00:44:24,599 --> 00:44:27,840
does their Instagram profile look like? And all of us

786
00:44:28,039 --> 00:44:31,679
put up more information? And Kristin and I are as

787
00:44:31,679 --> 00:44:34,639
guilty of this as anybody. Oh yeah, for sure, we

788
00:44:34,719 --> 00:44:39,079
put up a ton of information about ourselves. There's no

789
00:44:39,199 --> 00:44:43,519
such thing as privacy. There hasn't been anything called privacy

790
00:44:43,639 --> 00:44:44,880
for decades.

791
00:44:45,559 --> 00:44:48,360
Speaker 5: Right, if you're worried about your privacy, you have nothing

792
00:44:48,400 --> 00:44:49,119
to worry about.

793
00:44:49,320 --> 00:44:52,239
Speaker 2: You can go live in the woods like Ted Kaczynski

794
00:44:52,719 --> 00:44:57,079
and try to live off the grid and then maybe

795
00:44:57,679 --> 00:44:59,000
you'll have some privacy there.

796
00:44:59,480 --> 00:45:01,880
Speaker 6: And going back to my original statement, this is the

797
00:45:01,920 --> 00:45:04,679
world we live in. Why are you worrying about it now?

798
00:45:05,159 --> 00:45:09,039
We're way downstream now with the Internet and the convenience

799
00:45:09,079 --> 00:45:13,920
and the emails and the Facebook, Instagram, even jedmatch. Why

800
00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:15,280
are you concerned now?

801
00:45:15,840 --> 00:45:19,920
Speaker 5: Why? Now? Sure, the DNA has come up to the forefront, but.

802
00:45:20,079 --> 00:45:24,239
Speaker 6: The DNA is only like the I'd say, the one

803
00:45:24,239 --> 00:45:27,719
of the more obvious cooks into this argument.

804
00:45:27,840 --> 00:45:30,239
Speaker 5: This world we live in, this light, we lead.

805
00:45:30,480 --> 00:45:36,039
Speaker 2: And my response is self involvement and arrogance in the extreme,

806
00:45:36,159 --> 00:45:38,880
because that was the kind of reaction I got how

807
00:45:39,000 --> 00:45:42,000
dare you? I do want to switch gears for a

808
00:45:42,039 --> 00:45:44,039
second here, We've only got a couple of minutes left,

809
00:45:44,119 --> 00:45:47,840
and we failed to ask you about the DNA dope project,

810
00:45:47,880 --> 00:45:51,800
which is another really worthwhile endeavor. Tell us about the

811
00:45:51,920 --> 00:45:53,599
DNA dope project please.

812
00:45:54,360 --> 00:45:57,320
Speaker 6: That project was formed with Margaret Press and I in

813
00:45:57,480 --> 00:46:02,159
early twenty seventeen. Margaret approached me saying, why can't we

814
00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:05,960
use autosomal snip testing to identify John and Jane does

815
00:46:06,559 --> 00:46:09,039
At first I had the knee jerk Ancestry won't work

816
00:46:09,079 --> 00:46:13,039
with forensic cases, but after considering it, the wait, maybe

817
00:46:13,079 --> 00:46:16,480
there is a way to do this, and we eventually

818
00:46:16,599 --> 00:46:19,800
worked out a way through an independent lab. Everybody knows

819
00:46:19,840 --> 00:46:23,440
that now we couldn't go to Ancestry to get Ancestry

820
00:46:23,559 --> 00:46:27,320
data done. So we got DNA sent to an independent

821
00:46:27,400 --> 00:46:30,719
lab saying, we know what Ancestry twenty three. We know

822
00:46:30,920 --> 00:46:33,760
what the data looks like because we downloaded our own data.

823
00:46:33,760 --> 00:46:37,719
We own it, So could you take DNA, convert it or.

824
00:46:37,840 --> 00:46:40,320
Speaker 5: Process it so that you can get data to look

825
00:46:40,400 --> 00:46:43,159
like Ancestry data? And of course it's doable.

826
00:46:43,239 --> 00:46:48,280
Speaker 6: That technology is full of readily available, and so we

827
00:46:48,599 --> 00:46:52,280
managed to do a couple of cases. The real challenge

828
00:46:52,760 --> 00:46:56,320
first working out how to get those jet match kits

829
00:46:56,400 --> 00:47:00,280
done independently. Also, you had to understand this we were

830
00:47:00,280 --> 00:47:03,480
a different environment. Then we had to go to law

831
00:47:03,559 --> 00:47:06,800
enforcement agencies that had no idea what we were talking about.

832
00:47:07,159 --> 00:47:11,360
Here's two little old ladies approaching agency and Jusley saying,

833
00:47:11,880 --> 00:47:12,480
we can.

834
00:47:12,320 --> 00:47:14,840
Speaker 5: Solve your thirty year old case. Just give us your.

835
00:47:14,800 --> 00:47:17,440
Speaker 6: DNA and we're going to do like ancestry and find

836
00:47:17,559 --> 00:47:20,480
the relatives and okay whatever. We have no idea what

837
00:47:20,519 --> 00:47:22,280
you're talking about, but it sounds good.

838
00:47:22,960 --> 00:47:25,119
Speaker 2: One of the little old ladies was a rocket scientist

839
00:47:25,159 --> 00:47:26,119
though to be fair.

840
00:47:26,079 --> 00:47:28,559
Speaker 6: Yes, correct, to be fair, and I had been through

841
00:47:28,599 --> 00:47:31,119
the y DNA you know, the people that didn't know

842
00:47:31,159 --> 00:47:33,519
what I was talking about, but took a risk because

843
00:47:33,519 --> 00:47:35,480
they really wanted to solve their case and they were.

844
00:47:35,360 --> 00:47:39,400
Speaker 5: At a dead end. One of those was Pete Elliott.

845
00:47:39,119 --> 00:47:43,519
Speaker 6: The US Marshall from Northern Ohio. Fabulous guy, and I

846
00:47:43,559 --> 00:47:46,239
had worked with him on the y DNA on the

847
00:47:46,320 --> 00:47:50,159
Joseph Newton Chandler case. So that became our first case

848
00:47:50,239 --> 00:47:53,480
and he trusted us with There was almost no DNA

849
00:47:53,639 --> 00:47:57,519
left in the entire world for that mister X it

850
00:47:57,559 --> 00:48:00,280
was a fraud case, and he trusted us with that,

851
00:48:00,880 --> 00:48:03,679
and for months all we said we could say is, yeah, Pete,

852
00:48:03,679 --> 00:48:04,920
we're doing We're going to get him.

853
00:48:04,920 --> 00:48:06,199
Speaker 5: Don't worry. We're working hard.

854
00:48:06,599 --> 00:48:08,559
Speaker 6: And if we even said, hey, we just found a

855
00:48:08,559 --> 00:48:11,559
pair of third cousins, he would have absolute blank Okay,

856
00:48:11,639 --> 00:48:15,159
I'm really glad he didn't get it. So we also

857
00:48:15,239 --> 00:48:18,159
went to the Marriage and Police Department because I had

858
00:48:18,159 --> 00:48:20,239
been working on them on the David Paul case.

859
00:48:20,239 --> 00:48:21,760
Speaker 5: It was a baby case, and.

860
00:48:21,719 --> 00:48:24,760
Speaker 6: I knew that Margaret and I put our funds together

861
00:48:24,880 --> 00:48:29,159
to finance these pilot studies, so we knew that would

862
00:48:29,199 --> 00:48:33,400
be more than happy to risk something. Eventually we realized

863
00:48:33,480 --> 00:48:36,679
baby cases were not might lead to criminal charges. We

864
00:48:36,719 --> 00:48:39,480
wanted to shy away from that. With DNA DOE, we

865
00:48:39,519 --> 00:48:43,079
wanted to position that as a more humanitarian effort getting

866
00:48:43,119 --> 00:48:46,880
back to the reaction of the genogenic genealogy community. So

867
00:48:46,960 --> 00:48:49,599
I wound up doing that one under Identifyinders.

868
00:48:50,400 --> 00:48:51,639
Speaker 5: We solved it last year.

869
00:48:51,920 --> 00:48:55,719
Speaker 6: Going back, Margaret and I had several challenges we had

870
00:48:55,719 --> 00:48:58,079
to meet, and as we developed it, we had to

871
00:48:58,079 --> 00:49:01,079
be very careful about who knew what we were doing

872
00:49:01,159 --> 00:49:03,760
and why we were doing it, and occasionally we'd have

873
00:49:03,800 --> 00:49:06,519
to ask if it was a distant cousin. We never

874
00:49:06,599 --> 00:49:10,199
asked immediate relatives on any of the JED match kids.

875
00:49:10,679 --> 00:49:11,800
Speaker 5: It was very distant.

876
00:49:11,880 --> 00:49:15,559
Speaker 6: Would say, we're trying to reunite somebody with their family,

877
00:49:15,760 --> 00:49:19,559
would you mind sharing your ancestry with us, your JED

878
00:49:19,639 --> 00:49:22,880
match kit, your family tree with us? And we were

879
00:49:23,000 --> 00:49:26,519
very careful and so people were okay with that. And

880
00:49:26,519 --> 00:49:29,440
then as this kind of got more and more known,

881
00:49:29,800 --> 00:49:33,280
we were asking and they were going They started answering.

882
00:49:33,280 --> 00:49:36,559
Speaker 5: Oh, you must be from the DNA dough project. How

883
00:49:36,559 --> 00:49:37,519
do I volunteer?

884
00:49:37,760 --> 00:49:40,119
Speaker 2: Ah, your fame preceded you. Yeah.

885
00:49:40,400 --> 00:49:43,519
Speaker 6: So we kind of turned the corner with that attitude

886
00:49:43,599 --> 00:49:47,480
because we did not do suspect cases, criminal cases. We

887
00:49:47,480 --> 00:49:50,719
were doing John and Jane Doe cases. And when we

888
00:49:50,760 --> 00:49:53,880
started solving them that it gained momentum. And of course,

889
00:49:54,239 --> 00:49:57,079
when Barbara did the Golden State Killer, that's the one

890
00:49:57,119 --> 00:49:59,400
that really hit the news, and of.

891
00:49:59,280 --> 00:50:00,559
Speaker 5: Course that hell us.

892
00:50:00,679 --> 00:50:03,840
Speaker 6: We all advanced at that point and that's the beginning

893
00:50:04,079 --> 00:50:07,320
of where we are now, the real splash and the

894
00:50:07,400 --> 00:50:11,320
real all the discussions about concerns with privacy and where

895
00:50:11,360 --> 00:50:14,519
are we going with this? And that really triggered that

896
00:50:14,719 --> 00:50:17,880
discussion the beginning of the revel We were there beginning

897
00:50:17,920 --> 00:50:19,639
the revolution, but it got.

898
00:50:19,559 --> 00:50:22,079
Speaker 5: Known through the Golden State Killer. In Barber's work.

899
00:50:22,519 --> 00:50:25,880
Speaker 2: It's amazing all the work that you've done is really

900
00:50:25,960 --> 00:50:28,639
only in the last decade, and then it's only the

901
00:50:28,719 --> 00:50:32,000
last two years since the Golden State Killer case pushed

902
00:50:32,119 --> 00:50:35,239
this kind of discussion, if you will, to the forefront.

903
00:50:35,559 --> 00:50:38,519
But it's actually been a good thing in your opinion.

904
00:50:39,039 --> 00:50:41,239
Speaker 5: Yeah, I asked Barbara. I said, Barbara, when you did

905
00:50:41,239 --> 00:50:44,960
the Golden State Killer, were you how did you feel?

906
00:50:45,000 --> 00:50:48,320
Speaker 6: Were you afraid you'd be attacked or something? And she said, yeah,

907
00:50:48,360 --> 00:50:50,840
I was afraid gangs or something would come after me.

908
00:50:51,239 --> 00:50:52,199
Speaker 5: I said, no, I'm not.

909
00:50:52,199 --> 00:50:54,840
Speaker 6: Interested in the gangs and stuff like that. I'm interested

910
00:50:54,880 --> 00:50:57,239
in the genealogists attacking it.

911
00:50:57,280 --> 00:50:59,880
Speaker 2: Those violent Yeah, genealogists.

912
00:51:00,360 --> 00:51:01,400
Speaker 5: Yeah, I laughed.

913
00:51:01,760 --> 00:51:04,920
Speaker 6: I said, I've never really been concerned with personal safety.

914
00:51:04,960 --> 00:51:08,960
Should I be, thinking it's too late now? But that

915
00:51:09,119 --> 00:51:14,440
being said, I was more concerned with the ongoing genealogy attitude.

916
00:51:14,599 --> 00:51:17,880
Oh my god, big brother has my DNA? You wicked person?

917
00:51:17,920 --> 00:51:18,880
How could you do this?

918
00:51:19,159 --> 00:51:20,199
Speaker 5: Whereas and betray you.

919
00:51:20,559 --> 00:51:22,880
Speaker 2: When I met with Barbara ray Venner a few years

920
00:51:22,880 --> 00:51:27,000
ago in northern California, she actually told me one of

921
00:51:27,039 --> 00:51:29,920
the reasons why she had maintained the low profile was

922
00:51:30,480 --> 00:51:33,599
when this was so new, she actually was concerned. She

923
00:51:33,639 --> 00:51:38,079
didn't want to really be identified as the person, single woman,

924
00:51:38,159 --> 00:51:43,960
no less, who helps catch serial killers. Yeah, that initially

925
00:51:44,159 --> 00:51:46,519
was a kind of a frightening concept. And I think

926
00:51:46,519 --> 00:51:49,760
it's Paul Holes, who was on the team that helped

927
00:51:49,760 --> 00:51:54,199
break the GSK case, eventually convinced her to come forward

928
00:51:54,920 --> 00:51:58,480
and accept credit for the good work that she and

929
00:51:58,519 --> 00:52:00,599
the team of volunteers had done.

930
00:52:00,880 --> 00:52:04,719
Speaker 6: And doing that really I think helped. It helped the

931
00:52:04,760 --> 00:52:05,719
whole community.

932
00:52:05,880 --> 00:52:07,840
Speaker 5: I think it was good that she did that.

933
00:52:08,239 --> 00:52:10,519
Speaker 6: It's not good to live in fear and you have

934
00:52:10,599 --> 00:52:13,440
to protect yourself. But I think doing that was really

935
00:52:13,480 --> 00:52:16,960
gotsy and she got the credit. She does deserve the

936
00:52:17,000 --> 00:52:20,000
credit for what she did, and it helped, but helped

937
00:52:20,039 --> 00:52:22,800
with all these issues we're discussing with the privacy and

938
00:52:22,840 --> 00:52:26,440
the attitude, and even though let's say it's uncomfortable, we

939
00:52:26,519 --> 00:52:29,559
have a long way from resolving it, it helped.

940
00:52:30,079 --> 00:52:31,960
Speaker 2: So will you come back and talk with us again.

941
00:52:32,639 --> 00:52:35,400
We've believe it or not, we've actually run out of time.

942
00:52:36,480 --> 00:52:38,280
Speaker 5: I'm just getting started.

943
00:52:38,119 --> 00:52:39,119
Speaker 2: With your permission.

944
00:52:39,800 --> 00:52:44,559
Speaker 6: We'd love to have you back absolutely anytime. And I've

945
00:52:44,599 --> 00:52:47,280
never really been asked some of these questions, so I

946
00:52:47,320 --> 00:52:50,440
appreciate them. I've thought a lot about it, and I

947
00:52:50,840 --> 00:52:53,000
never really have shared a lot of those thoughts, so

948
00:52:53,039 --> 00:52:56,000
I would more than welcome being on the show again.

949
00:52:56,679 --> 00:52:58,440
Speaker 3: Thank you so much for joining us.

950
00:52:59,280 --> 00:53:00,559
Speaker 2: Forward to having you one again.

951
00:53:01,320 --> 00:53:02,840
Speaker 5: Yes, thank you guys so much.

952
00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:18,400
Speaker 1: Mind Over Murder is a production of Absolute Zero and

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Another Dog Productions.

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Speaker 2: Our executive producers are Bill Thomas and Kristin Dilley.

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Speaker 1: Our logo art is by Pamela Arnois.

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Speaker 2: Our theme music is by Kevin McLoud.

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Speaker 1: Mind Over Murder is distributed in partnership with crawl Space Media.

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Speaker 2: You can follow us on Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram.

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Speaker 1: You can also follow our page on the Colonial Parkway

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Murders on Facebook.

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Speaker 2: And finally, you can follow Bill Thomas on Twitter at

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Bill Thomas five six.

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Speaker 1: Thank you for listening to mind Over Murder.

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Speaker 2: Att