Speaker 1: Have you ever stopped to think about this, getting paid,
Speaker 1: like actual money by huge companies like Facebook or Microsoft
Speaker 1: just for finding bugs in their systems.
Speaker 2: Yeah, legally it sounds a bit like science fiction, doesn't it.
Speaker 2: But it's totally real. There's this whole community out there,
Speaker 2: ethical hackers, white hats, whatever you want to.
Speaker 1: Call them, and they're making serious money sometimes.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, definitely. Some hunters pull in thousands, even tens
Speaker 2: of thousands in a year, and they're playing a really
Speaker 2: crucial role in making the Internet safer.
Speaker 1: Absolutely, so welcome everyone to our deep dive. Today. We're
Speaker 1: plunging into the pretty fascinating world of bug bounty hunting.
Speaker 2: It's more than just finding glitches, isn't it?
Speaker 1: Way more? It's like being a digital detective, a force
Speaker 1: for good and cybersecurity. Today we're digging into the key
Speaker 1: ideas from Bug Bounty Hunting Essentials by Carlos Alazano and
Speaker 1: Shamir Amir.
Speaker 2: Great book, really practical stuff in there.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and our mission here is to give you the shortcut,
Speaker 1: the core knowledge for their work, so you walk away
Speaker 1: knowing what this field is all about, whether you're just
Speaker 1: curious or maybe even thinking about it as a path.
Speaker 2: So at its heart bug bounty hunting, it's really about
Speaker 2: formalizing this whole process, right, It's a structured way to
Speaker 2: find vulnerabilities flaws basically in applications, web apps, mobile apps, software.
Speaker 1: And companies actually pay for this. They offer rewards bounties exactly.
Speaker 2: They give bounties to hackers who find these problems and
Speaker 2: crucially report them responsibly through the proper channels.
Speaker 1: Well wait, don't be companies already have huge security teams
Speaker 1: doing this stuff.
Speaker 2: Internally they do, absolutely, but internal teams, well, they can
Speaker 2: benefit massively from having outsiders look at things, you know,
Speaker 2: real world hackers with different perspectives, like.
Speaker 1: An external audit, but way more dynamic kind of.
Speaker 2: Yeah. These are often called vulnerability rewards programs or vrps.
Speaker 2: They usually manage through these special platforms, vulnerability coordination platforms.
Speaker 2: It's essentially crowdsourcing. Security companies pay individual hackers for finding
Speaker 2: specific bugs, leveraging this huge global pool of talent.
Speaker 1: It really sounds like a marketplace for security skills. So
Speaker 1: where does this actually happen? Where are these hackers go
Speaker 1: looking for work?
Speaker 2: The book highlights the big players. You've got hacker one
Speaker 2: that was one of the first and it's still massive.
Speaker 2: Then there's bug crowd Cobalt.
Speaker 1: Cobolt's the one known for PTS right penetration testing as
Speaker 1: a service.
Speaker 2: That's the one, Yeah, PTS and Sinnak is another major platform.
Speaker 2: They handle everything they're reporting, verifying the bugs, managing the payouts.
Speaker 1: Okay, so you sign up for one of these platforms.
Speaker 1: Are all the hunting grounds the programs open to everyone?
Speaker 2: Ah, good question. There's a key difference. You have public programs,
Speaker 2: which yeah, are generally open to anyone who signs up
Speaker 2: on the platform. They list the rules, what's in scope,
Speaker 2: what's out, the bounty levels, all public.
Speaker 1: And the alternative.
Speaker 2: Then you have private programs either invite only. You usually
Speaker 2: need a proven track record, good stats on the platform,
Speaker 2: maybe specific skills the company is looking for.
Speaker 1: So reputation matters a lot hugely.
Speaker 2: Private programs often focus on specific maybe newer parts of
Speaker 2: an application, and they want experienced eyes on it, trying
Speaker 2: to avoid a flood of low severity reports.
Speaker 1: So how do these platforms and companies actually measure a
Speaker 1: hunter's reputation? What are they looking at?
Speaker 2: It's all about the stats. The book mentions three key
Speaker 2: ones signal impact and accuracy.
Speaker 1: Okay, break those down.
Speaker 2: Signal signal is basically a measure of how valid your
Speaker 2: reports are. Too many invalid or duplicate reports, your signal
Speaker 2: goes down. It's like a noise filter for the companies.
Speaker 1: Makes sense. Impact that sounds like the severity pretty much.
Speaker 2: It reflects the average bounty amount you've been awarded per
Speaker 2: valid report. Higher impact generally means you're finding more critical
Speaker 2: vulnerabilities and accuracy. That's your hit rate, the percentage of
Speaker 2: your reports that get accepted, divided by the total number
Speaker 2: you submit. It so like ninety one percent accuracy. That
Speaker 2: tells a company you're consistently finding real valid issues.
Speaker 1: Right, So that reputation system is key for trust. Okay,
Speaker 1: let's shift hears Someone listening might be thinking this sounds cool,
Speaker 1: But where do I even start. Do you absolutely need
Speaker 1: a string of security SERTs or a fancy degree.
Speaker 2: That's one of the biggest myths the book tackles head on.
Speaker 2: You don't need formal certifications or a specific degree. Age
Speaker 2: isn't really a factor either.
Speaker 1: Really, that's quite empowering it is.
Speaker 2: But and this is a big butt, you absolutely do
Speaker 2: need a deep understanding of how applications are built, how
Speaker 2: they work, and where the common security weaknesses lie.
Speaker 1: So less about the paper, more about the practical knowledge exactly.
Speaker 2: The real starting point the kickstart is learning web and
Speaker 2: mobile application technologies inside and out.
Speaker 1: Okay, So if degrees aren't the gatekeepers, what's the actual roadmap?
Speaker 1: How does someone build that practical knowledge?
Speaker 2: It's a hands on journey, The book suggests, starting by reading.
Speaker 2: Get good books on website hacking, then maybe mobile hacking.
Speaker 2: Focus on areas that genuinely interest you.
Speaker 1: Then what just reading isn't enough? Right?
Speaker 2: Definitely? Step two is practice. Set up virtual environments with
Speaker 2: deliberately vulnerable applications. There are loads available and test the
Speaker 2: techniques you're reading about. Break things safely?
Speaker 1: Okay, read practice? What else?
Speaker 2: Read reports, look at the proof of concepts, the polsies
Speaker 2: that other successful hunters have published. The security community is
Speaker 2: surprisingly open. Blogs like hacker one's own or famous researchers
Speaker 2: like Franz Rosen. They share a ton, learning from the
Speaker 2: winds of others precisely, and finally connect with people, network,
Speaker 2: join online communities, maybe even team up with other learners,
Speaker 2: bouncing ideas off others that can really accelerate.
Speaker 1: Things that sounds like a solid plan. Beyond the technical
Speaker 1: learning curve, What about mindset? Are there specific rules or
Speaker 1: ways of thinking that help people succeed here?
Speaker 2: Oh? Absolutely, mindset is huge. The book has some crucial pointers.
Speaker 2: First off, start small, seriously, don't try to hack Google
Speaker 2: or Microsoft on your first.
Speaker 1: Day out, because they're like fortresses.
Speaker 2: Exactly, they have armies of security people. Instead, look for programs,
Speaker 2: maybe smaller ones or parts of bigger programs, that get
Speaker 2: less attention. Find those bounties that go ignored. As the
Speaker 2: book puts.
Speaker 1: It, find the path less traveled makes sense. What else?
Speaker 2: Approach with clarity before you even start poking around. Really
Speaker 2: understand what the application is supposed to do, What are
Speaker 2: its features, what can different users do? Check the documentation
Speaker 2: if it's available, Know your target right, and keep expectations low,
Speaker 2: especially at first. Don't go in thinking you'll find a
Speaker 2: critical bug where thousands in your first week. Report what
Speaker 2: you find, learn from it, move on. Develop a mindset
Speaker 2: of just hunting bugs, not hunting bugs in a matter
Speaker 2: of hours.
Speaker 1: Patients and persistence again totally.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Also, really learn the vulnerabilities, understand why they happen
Speaker 2: in the code before you try exploiting them and stay
Speaker 2: up to date. Things change constantly, new frameworks, new attack technique.
Speaker 1: It's a continuous learning game.
Speaker 2: Always and remember, even finding something that doesn't qualify for
Speaker 2: a bounty, that's still valuable experience. You learn something, and finally,
Speaker 2: think about chaining vulnerabilities.
Speaker 1: Combining smaller issues.
Speaker 2: Yes, sometimes two or three low impact bugs combined can
Speaker 2: create a critical risk. Look for the biggest overall impact,
Speaker 2: not just isolated flaws.
Speaker 1: Okay, so you've put in the work, you've learned, you've practiced,
Speaker 1: and bam, you've found a valid bug. Now what the
Speaker 1: book calls report writing and art? Why is the report
Speaker 1: itself so important?
Speaker 2: Because that report that's your communication channel, it's your your
Speaker 2: calling card. Really, a good report gets you noticed how
Speaker 2: so well, It leads to faster responses from the security team,
Speaker 2: It builds your reputation on the platform, helps you build
Speaker 2: relationships with the program owners, and yeah, it often leads
Speaker 2: to better payouts. It shows your professional.
Speaker 1: So it's not just what you find, but how you
Speaker 1: present it.
Speaker 2: Absolutely. Yeah, But before you even start writing that report,
Speaker 2: there's homework to do on the program itself.
Speaker 1: Right, understanding the rules of engagement, What do you need
Speaker 1: to know.
Speaker 2: You need to read their program policy carefully. What's their mission,
Speaker 2: Which specific services or websites are actually in scope, and
Speaker 2: just as important, what's out of scope.
Speaker 1: Don't want to accidentally test something you shouldn't be touching.
Speaker 2: Definitely not that can get you kicked out or worse.
Speaker 2: You also need to check their reward structure. They usually
Speaker 2: have tables showing bounty ranges for different vulnerability types like critical, high, medium, low.
Speaker 1: What else is in the policy.
Speaker 2: Eligibility rules like age or location restrictions, connect guidelines, what
Speaker 2: not to do like public disclosure before fixing, accessing other
Speaker 2: users data, physical attacks, social engineering, the no nos okay,
Speaker 2: And often a list of non qualifying vulnerabilities stuff they
Speaker 2: already know about or don't consider severe enough, like self
Speaker 2: exss sometimes or missing security headers on nonsensitive pages. Knowing
Speaker 2: this saves you time.
Speaker 1: Good point, save you writing a report they'll just close instantly.
Speaker 2: Exactly and finally, look at their commitment to research matures,
Speaker 2: how quickly they aim to acknowledge reports, investigate and fix things.
Speaker 1: It sets expectations, all right, groundwork done. Now the report itself?
Speaker 1: What makes it good? Beyond just the technical details?
Speaker 2: Clarity is key. It needs to be easy to follow,
Speaker 2: even if the person reading it first isn't deeply technical. Depth. Yes,
Speaker 2: focus on the technicals, but avoid bragging or being arrogant,
Speaker 2: and be respectful. Always be respectful to the vendor team.
Speaker 2: You're trying to build a positive working relationship. It pays
Speaker 2: off in the long run.
Speaker 1: So what's the structure? The blueprint for a solid report?
Speaker 2: Pretty standard format, usually a clear descriptive title, a description
Speaker 2: section giving context what the bug is, where you found it.
Speaker 2: Then the crucial part, the proof of concept or PAYC,
Speaker 2: step by step instructions so they can replicate exactly what
Speaker 2: you did. Screenshots, videos highly recommend it visuals make it
Speaker 2: so much easier for them to see the issue. After
Speaker 2: the PAYC, you need an impact section.
Speaker 1: This is where you explain why it matters.
Speaker 2: Exactly what are the real world consequences data theft account takeover.
Speaker 2: This helps them understand the severity and justifies the bounty
Speaker 2: and finally remediation.
Speaker 1: Suggesting fixes.
Speaker 2: Yeah, offer specific suggestions if you can, maybe point to resources.
Speaker 2: Don't just say fix the bug. Show you've thought about
Speaker 2: the solution too, and.
Speaker 1: What if the team comes back with questions after you submit.
Speaker 2: Be prompt, be polite, be thorough with your answers, stick
Speaker 2: to the technical facts. The book advice is waiting to
Speaker 2: ask about the bounty until after the issue is confirmed
Speaker 2: or resolved.
Speaker 1: Good tip. And if they reject it.
Speaker 2: Accept it gracefully. But if you genuinely believe they've misunderstood
Speaker 2: something critical, you can respectfully explain your reasoning again providing
Speaker 2: more detail, but don't argue endlessly.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's pivot to some of the actual bugs hunters
Speaker 1: look for. The book dies into several classics. SEQL injection
Speaker 1: or slukewile always seems to be top of the list,
Speaker 1: like the oas B Top ten. What's the core idea.
Speaker 2: Right, Swile's a big one. Essentially, it's tricking the application
Speaker 2: into running malicious sequel code by sneaking it into user
Speaker 2: input fields like a search box or a log inform.
Speaker 2: It works when the application doesn't properly clean or validate
Speaker 2: that input before using it in a database.
Speaker 1: Query, and the impact can be huge, oh critical.
Speaker 2: You can potentially bypass logins, dump entire user databases, usernames, passwords,
Speaker 2: credit card info sometimes or even modify or delete data.
Speaker 2: It's really bad news for the company.
Speaker 1: If found the book mentions a really interesting uber example
Speaker 1: not in a log inform.
Speaker 2: Though, Yeah, that was wild. A four thousand dollars bounty
Speaker 2: for sequel found by Orange SI in an unsubscribed link
Speaker 2: in an advertising email.
Speaker 1: And unsubscribed links.
Speaker 2: Seriously, seriously, he found a time based blind sequel. He
Speaker 2: injected a command like sleep into a parameter in the link.
Speaker 2: User read. I think it was if the page took
Speaker 2: twelve seconds longer to load. He knew the database executed
Speaker 2: his command. He used that to figure out datase names
Speaker 2: and users.
Speaker 1: Wow, what's the lesson there?
Speaker 2: The critical bugs can lurk in the most unexpected places.
Speaker 2: Don't just test the obvious login forms. Test everything, even
Speaker 2: email links, background processes, everywhere.
Speaker 1: Incredible. Okay, so segle hits the database. What about attacks
Speaker 1: that target the user's logged in session that brings us
Speaker 1: to CSRF Cross Site Request forgery right?
Speaker 2: CSRS is sneaky. It basically tricks a logged in user's
Speaker 2: browser into making a request to a website they trust,
Speaker 2: but the request actually performs an action the attacker wants,
Speaker 2: not the user.
Speaker 1: How does it even work?
Speaker 2: It abuses the trust relationship your browser stores session cookies
Speaker 2: for sites you're logged into. If you visit a malicious site,
Speaker 2: it might contain hidden code, maybe an image tag with
Speaker 2: a weird URL, or a hidden form that submits automatically
Speaker 2: that sends a request to say, your bank site using
Speaker 2: your existing session cookie.
Speaker 1: So the bank thinks you made the request exactly.
Speaker 2: It could be used to transfer funds, change your email address,
Speaker 2: to delete your account, anything you can normally do wle
Speaker 2: logged in. The classic example used to be like clicking
Speaker 2: a link on a forum that secretly makes your Facebook
Speaker 2: profile post spam nasty stuff.
Speaker 1: How do attackers usually deliver the payload?
Speaker 2: Common ways are get CSRF, maybe hiding the malicious URL
Speaker 2: in an MG tag, or POSTDSRF using a hidden HTML
Speaker 2: form with JavaScript dismitted automatically when you load the page.
Speaker 1: And the book had a serious example from Badu.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that was a critical one. Full account takeover was
Speaker 2: possible by exploiting a CSRF vulnerability to add a recovery
Speaker 2: email address to the victim's account. The twist was how
Speaker 2: they bypassed the usual protection.
Speaker 1: The anti CSRF token right.
Speaker 2: Usually forms include a unique hidden token to prevent CSRF,
Speaker 2: but in this Bidue case, the researcher found the token
Speaker 2: wasn't properly protected. It was actually accessible within a separate
Speaker 2: JavaScript file, so they could grab the token and then
Speaker 2: forge their request. Choose.
Speaker 1: You need to protect those tokens properly too, okay. Next up,
Speaker 1: Cross site scripting XSS, another perennial favorite on the OAS
Speaker 1: Top ten YEP.
Speaker 2: XSS is everywhere. It's another input validation failure, but this
Speaker 2: time the attacker in ject's malicious JavaScript or other client
Speaker 2: side script into a web page, which then gets executed
Speaker 2: in the browser of other users who view.
Speaker 1: That page, so it attacks the user directly via their browser.
Speaker 2: Pretty much. It often requires some user interaction, like clicking
Speaker 2: a link or just loading a compromised page.
Speaker 1: What are the main flavors of XSS?
Speaker 2: The book outlines the main three. You've got reflected XSS,
Speaker 2: which is kind of immediate. The malicious script is in
Speaker 2: the URL or input, the server reflects it back, and
Speaker 2: it runs in the user's browser right then, like a
Speaker 2: malicious link in an email, affects only the person who.
Speaker 1: Clicks okay, one off. What else?
Speaker 2: Then there's stored XSS, which is often more dangerous. The
Speaker 2: malicious script gets permanently saved on the server, maybe in
Speaker 2: a comment thread, a user profile, a product.
Speaker 1: Review, so anyone who views that page gets.
Speaker 2: Hit potentially yes. Every time that infected data is displayed,
Speaker 2: the script runs. The book mentions a funny sort of example,
Speaker 2: a QA tester entering scripteller script into a field crashes
Speaker 2: a market app with pop ups later that stored XSS
Speaker 2: and the third type DOM based EXSS. This one's tricky
Speaker 2: because the vulnerability exists entirely in the client side code,
Speaker 2: in the browser's document object model DOM. The server might
Speaker 2: not even see the malicious script, but the JavaScript on
Speaker 2: the page takes input, maybe from the ural fragment like hashtag,
Speaker 2: and handles it insecurely, allowing the script to.
Speaker 1: Run right, And the book mentions a massive ten thousand
Speaker 1: dollars payout for a Yahoo Mail stored XSS. What was
Speaker 1: special there?
Speaker 2: That was a really clever one. In the Yahoo Mail editor,
Speaker 2: when you attached a file, it generated some htmil automatically,
Speaker 2: a parameter within that HTML data EARL wasn't properly sanitized. Yeah,
Speaker 2: by crafting a special email fragment, an attacker could inject
Speaker 2: JavaScript into that data EARL and would execute for anyone
Speaker 2: viewing the email high impact because it's in the mail client.
Speaker 2: Great explanation in the report Big Bounty showed how complex
Speaker 2: interactions can hide EXSS.
Speaker 1: Okay, moving beyond these more classic vulnerability types, the book
Speaker 1: talks about app implication logic vulnerabilities. These sound different, they
Speaker 1: really are.
Speaker 2: Unlike SQL or XSS, where you're often looking for specific
Speaker 2: code patterns or lack of sanitization, logic flaws are about
Speaker 2: breaking the intended process or rules of the application. How So,
Speaker 2: developers build an application with a certain workflow in mind,
Speaker 2: a specific paradigm, as the book calls it. Logic flaws
Speaker 2: happen when a user does something unexpected that the developer
Speaker 2: didn't anticipate bypassing controls or achieving an unintended outcome. Automated
Speaker 2: scanners usually miss these completely.
Speaker 1: Because they're not looking for does this make sense? They're
Speaker 1: looking for does this match a known bad pattern?
Speaker 2: Exactly? Finding logic flaws requires you to really understand the
Speaker 2: business logic, the user journey. You map out how things
Speaker 2: should work and then try to subvert it. Look at forms,
Speaker 2: API calls, processes involving email or SMS, anywhere state changes
Speaker 2: or assumptions are made.
Speaker 1: Can you give an example. The Starbucks one sounded intriguing.
Speaker 2: That was a great example of thinking out side the box.
Speaker 2: A race condition the hunter bought multiple gift cards, initiated
Speaker 2: transfers between them, but then use command line tools like
Speaker 2: CURL to send simultaneous request really fast.
Speaker 1: What did that do?
Speaker 2: It basically confused the applications process for finalizing the transfer
Speaker 2: and updating balances. By hitting it rapidly, they prevented the
Speaker 2: session from clearing correctly, effectively tricking the system into giving
Speaker 2: them free credit before the balance is properly updated.
Speaker 1: Because the developer assumed someone would just use a slow
Speaker 1: human operated browser.
Speaker 2: Percisely, they didn't account for programmatic high speed interaction by
Speaker 2: passing the expected sequence of operations. Logitflaws often exploit these
Speaker 2: kinds of assumptions.
Speaker 1: Very clever. What about subdomain takeovers sounds like digital squatting?
Speaker 2: It kind of is. It's a configuration mistake. Imagine a
Speaker 2: company sets up a subdomain like blog, dot company, dot
Speaker 2: com and points its DNS record maybe a CNAM record
Speaker 2: to a third party service like Heroku or GitHub pages. Okay,
Speaker 2: now what if they stop using that service or delete
Speaker 2: their account there? But forget to remove the DNS record.
Speaker 1: Ah, so the CNA man still points to a service,
Speaker 1: but it's now unclaimed exactly.
Speaker 2: An attacker can then go to that third party service,
Speaker 2: claim that specific host name blog dot company, dot com,
Speaker 2: and suddenly they control the content served on that official
Speaker 2: looking subdomain.
Speaker 1: Oof. What's the danger there?
Speaker 2: It's critical they get host phishing pages, steal session cookies
Speaker 2: for the main domain if cookies are scoped improperly bypass
Speaker 2: security policies like CSP, intercept emails if it's an MX record,
Speaker 2: takeover loads of bad stuff. Uber and Starbucks both had
Speaker 2: instances mentioned where subdomains pointed to unclaimed cloud resources, easy
Speaker 2: points for attackers if not monitored.
Speaker 1: A reminder to clean up your digital loose ends. Okay.
Speaker 1: Next vulnerability xxse XML external entity XML feels a bit
Speaker 1: old school. Is this still a thing?
Speaker 2: Oh? Definitely, Lots of systems still process XML, especially in
Speaker 2: back end integrations or file uploads. Xx happens when an
Speaker 2: application parses XML input from a user, and that XML
Speaker 2: contains references to extraternal resources external.
Speaker 1: Entities, and the parser just fetches them.
Speaker 2: If it's poorly configured, Yes, an attacker my craft XML
Speaker 2: like in its oofs system file dot it's CP PASSWD
Speaker 2: and then a reference and oaths later. If the parser
Speaker 2: allows external entities, it might actually read these ecopasswood file
Speaker 2: from the server and include its contents in the response.
Speaker 1: Yikes, so it can read local files.
Speaker 2: It can read local files, make network requests from the
Speaker 2: server's perspective, acting like a proxy, or even cause denial
Speaker 2: of service by making the parser consume huge amounts of resources.
Speaker 2: A billion lass attack.
Speaker 1: What's a Surprising place XXC has shown up.
Speaker 2: The book mentions a Facebook case involving a dot docks file.
Speaker 1: Upload a word document, how is that XML?
Speaker 2: Modern office documents dot dox, dot xlsx, et cetera are
Speaker 2: actually zip archives containing multiple XML files. By embedding a
Speaker 2: malicious DTD document type definition referencing an external entity within
Speaker 2: one of those XML files inside the dot dos, an
Speaker 2: attacker could trigger xx E when Facebook process the uploaded document.
Speaker 2: Show that even seemingly benign file uploads can be vectors.
Speaker 1: Wow. Okay. Last one in the section template injection, specifically
Speaker 1: server side template injection SSTI. Sounds complex, It can be, and.
Speaker 2: The impact is often severe. Many web frameworks use template
Speaker 2: engines like GINGA two, Python free marker Java twig php
Speaker 2: to dynamically generate HTML pages by embedding data into templates.
Speaker 1: Right like inserting the username into welcome.
Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly, the sesdi happens when user supplied input gets
Speaker 2: embedded directly into the template itself without proper sanitization, rather
Speaker 2: than just being treated as data within the template.
Speaker 1: What's the difference?
Speaker 2: If the user input is treated as part of the
Speaker 2: template code, the template engine might execute it, so instead
Speaker 2: of just displaying the user's input, it interprets commands within it,
Speaker 2: leading to best case maybe cross site scripting, worst case
Speaker 2: full remote code execution RCE on the server. Because template
Speaker 2: engines often have access to powerful back end objects and.
Speaker 1: Functions, how would you even spot that.
Speaker 2: You try injecting characters or sequences that the template engine
Speaker 2: uses for its syntax. A common test payload is something
Speaker 2: like if the application responds with forty nine instead of
Speaker 2: just echoing, you know, the template engine evaluated it.
Speaker 1: And the book had an Uber example for this too.
Speaker 2: Yeah, jingitwo ssti uh hunter put seven foot seven, which
Speaker 2: in Python jingitw repeats the string seven seven seven seven
Speaker 2: times into a name field on writer dot uber dot com.
Speaker 2: An email sent by the system then contained seven seven
Speaker 2: seven seven seven seven seven in the body, confirming the
Speaker 2: injection and evaluation. That opened the door to extracting more
Speaker 2: info from the server environment.
Speaker 1: Fascinating stuff. Okay, we've covered a lot of ground on vulnerabilities.
Speaker 1: What about the tools of the trade. What's in a
Speaker 1: bug bounty Hunter's digital.
Speaker 2: Backpack tools are definitely crucial assistance. You absolutely need an
Speaker 2: HTTP proxy. BURP Suite is kind of the industry standard.
Speaker 2: It lets you intercept, inspect, and modify all the traffic
Speaker 2: between your browser and the target application. Zap Ze Attack
Speaker 2: Proxy from OAS is a great free alternative.
Speaker 1: So you can see exactly what's being sent and received precisely.
Speaker 2: Then maybe network analyzers like wire Shark for looking at
Speaker 2: raw network packets, especially if non standard ports are involved.
Speaker 2: For scanning, you've got things like squall map, which is
Speaker 2: amazing for automating SQL injection, detection and exploitation.
Speaker 1: What about finding targets or mapping them out?
Speaker 2: End map is essential for ports scanning and service discovery.
Speaker 2: For broader reconnaissance, Showdian is like a search engine for
Speaker 2: Internet connected devices. Tools like reconning help automate finding subdomains
Speaker 2: and related infrastructure and simple browser extensions for managing proxies
Speaker 2: or cookies are super helpful to.
Speaker 1: It's quite the arsenal. But tools alone aren't enough right
Speaker 1: this field change is so fast? How important is continuous learning?
Speaker 2: It's absolutely paramount. You cannot rest on what you knew
Speaker 2: last year or even last month.
Speaker 1: Sometimes, so how do people stay sharp?
Speaker 2: Manyways? Formal training and certifications can be valuable. The book
Speaker 2: mentions gisserts like GPN or dwopped for web apps and
Speaker 2: Ends of Securities OSCP or OSWA are highly respected for
Speaker 2: their practical, hands on.
Speaker 1: Approach beyond formal searts.
Speaker 2: Reading always reading classic books like The Web Application Hacker's
Speaker 2: Handbook are foundational. Engaging and capture the flag CTF competitions
Speaker 2: and playing on vulnerable practice platforms like Hack the Box
Speaker 2: or DVWA. Damn Vulnerable Web Application is amazing hands.
Speaker 1: On practice learning by doing essentially exactly.
Speaker 2: Plus follow blogs. Port Twigger, the makers of Burp, has
Speaker 2: a great one. Watch YouTube channels dedicated to hacking and security,
Speaker 2: and participate in the community. Go to conferences like Defcon
Speaker 2: or black Hat. If you can join local OSS chapter meetings,
Speaker 2: connect online. It's an ecosystem you need to be part of.
Speaker 1: That makes total sense. It's a journey, not a destination.
Speaker 2: Definitely.
Speaker 1: Well, we have certainly covered a lot today. We've journeyed
Speaker 1: through the world of bug bounty hunting, figuring out what
Speaker 1: it is, the platforms like hacker one and bug crowd,
Speaker 1: why reputation metrics like signal and impact matter, yeah, and the.
Speaker 2: Path to getting started, emphasizing learn and practice over formal SERTs,
Speaker 2: the importance of starting small and that crucial mindset.
Speaker 1: Then we dug into the art of the report, why
Speaker 1: clarity and proof of concept are so vital, and of
Speaker 1: course the vulnerabilities themselves.
Speaker 2: SIEGWI in surprising places like unsubscribed links CSRF bypassing tokens
Speaker 2: hidden in JS files, the different flavors of XSS and
Speaker 2: that big Yahoo.
Speaker 1: Male payout, the cleverness needed for logic flaws like that
Speaker 1: Starbucks race condition, the risks of forgetting dns with subdomain takeovers,
Speaker 1: finding xxx and word docs, and the power of server
Speaker 1: side template injection.
Speaker 2: Plus the tools like Burke Suite and school Map, and
Speaker 2: the absolute necessity of continuous learning through books CTFs in
Speaker 2: the community.
Speaker 1: It really paints a picture of a hidden digital landscape,
Speaker 1: doesn't It where tiny oversights can cascade into major problems,
Speaker 1: but also where sharp eyes and ethical reporting are genuinely rewarded.
Speaker 2: It's a constant cat and mouse game, and these hunters
Speaker 2: are on the front lines.
Speaker 1: So a final thought for everyone listening. As you go
Speaker 1: about your day using app, browsing websites, think about those
Speaker 1: hidden paths. What assumptions are being made, what processes could
Speaker 1: be subverted? How might knowing about these potential vulnerabilities change
Speaker 1: how you interact with technology every single day.