WEBVTT 1 00:00:01.320 --> 00:00:05.879 Chapter twenty six of Public Opinion by Walter Littman. This 2 00:00:05.919 --> 00:00:09.480 is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the 3 00:00:09.480 --> 00:00:13.599 public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit 4 00:00:13.640 --> 00:00:19.679 LibriVox dot org. Recorded by the Progressing America Project. Public Opinion, 5 00:00:19.839 --> 00:00:24.879 Chapter twenty six. Intelligence work. The practice of democracy has 6 00:00:24.920 --> 00:00:27.920 been ahead of its theory. For the theory holds that 7 00:00:27.960 --> 00:00:31.160 the adult electors, taken together, make decisions out of a 8 00:00:31.199 --> 00:00:34.039 will that is in them. But just as there grew 9 00:00:34.119 --> 00:00:37.520 up governing hierarchies which were invisible in theory, so there 10 00:00:37.560 --> 00:00:41.479 has been a large amount of constructive adaptation also unaccounted for. 11 00:00:41.600 --> 00:00:45.079 In the large image of democracy. Ways have been found 12 00:00:45.079 --> 00:00:48.439 to represent many interests and functions that are normally out 13 00:00:48.439 --> 00:00:51.240 of sight. We are most conscious of this in our 14 00:00:51.320 --> 00:00:54.520 theory of the courts when we explain their legislative powers 15 00:00:54.560 --> 00:00:57.200 and their vetos on the theory that there are interests 16 00:00:57.240 --> 00:00:59.799 to be guarded which might be forgotten by the elected 17 00:00:59.799 --> 00:01:04.239 offas officials. But the Census Bureau, when it counts, classifies, 18 00:01:04.280 --> 00:01:08.079 and correlates people, things, and changes, is also speaking for 19 00:01:08.200 --> 00:01:12.519 unseen factors in the environment. The geological survey makes mineral 20 00:01:12.560 --> 00:01:16.560 resources evident. The Department of Agriculture represents in the Councils 21 00:01:16.599 --> 00:01:19.519 of the nation factors of which each farmer sees only 22 00:01:19.519 --> 00:01:25.159 an infinitesimal part. School authorities, the Tariff Commission, the Consular Service, 23 00:01:25.599 --> 00:01:29.760 the Bureau of Internal Revenue give representation to persons, ideas, 24 00:01:29.760 --> 00:01:33.680 and objects which would never automatically find themselves represented in 25 00:01:33.760 --> 00:01:37.319 this perspective by an election. The Children's Bureau is the 26 00:01:37.359 --> 00:01:40.560 spokesman of a whole complex of interests and functions not 27 00:01:40.680 --> 00:01:44.640 ordinarily visible to the voter, and therefore incapable of becoming 28 00:01:44.680 --> 00:01:48.560 spontaneously a part of his public opinions. Thus, the printing 29 00:01:48.599 --> 00:01:52.200 of comparative statistics of infant mortality is often followed by 30 00:01:52.239 --> 00:01:55.959 a reduction of the death rate of babies. Municipal officials 31 00:01:55.959 --> 00:01:59.439 and voters did not have, before publication a place in 32 00:01:59.480 --> 00:02:03.439 their picture of the environment for those babies. The statistics 33 00:02:03.439 --> 00:02:06.239 made them visible, as visible as if the babies had 34 00:02:06.280 --> 00:02:10.199 elected an aldermen to air their grievances in the State Department. 35 00:02:10.479 --> 00:02:14.000 The government maintains a division of Far Eastern Affairs. What 36 00:02:14.159 --> 00:02:17.800 is it for The Japanese and the Chinese governments both 37 00:02:17.840 --> 00:02:21.919 maintain ambassadors in Washington. Are they not qualified to speak 38 00:02:21.960 --> 00:02:26.439 for the Far East? They are its representatives. Yet nobody 39 00:02:26.439 --> 00:02:29.360 would argue that the American government could learn all that 40 00:02:29.400 --> 00:02:32.319 it needed to know about the Far East by consulting 41 00:02:32.360 --> 00:02:36.159 these ambassadors. Supposing them to be as candidate as they 42 00:02:36.159 --> 00:02:40.719 know how to be, they are still limited channels of information. Therefore, 43 00:02:40.840 --> 00:02:44.400 to supplement them, we maintain embassies in Tokyo and Peking 44 00:02:44.800 --> 00:02:48.800 and consular agents at many points. Also, I assume some 45 00:02:48.960 --> 00:02:53.159 secret agents. These people are supposed to send reports which 46 00:02:53.199 --> 00:02:55.680 pass through the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the 47 00:02:55.719 --> 00:02:59.560 Secretary of State. Now what does the Secretary expect of 48 00:02:59.599 --> 00:03:03.000 the division? I know one who expected it to spend 49 00:03:03.039 --> 00:03:07.360 its appropriation, But there are secretaries to whom special revelation 50 00:03:07.479 --> 00:03:10.280 is denied, and they turn to their divisions for help. 51 00:03:11.199 --> 00:03:13.319 The last thing they expect to find is a neat 52 00:03:13.439 --> 00:03:17.879 argument justifying the American position. What they demand is that 53 00:03:17.919 --> 00:03:20.719 the experts shall bring the Far East to the Secretary's desk, 54 00:03:21.120 --> 00:03:23.800 with all the elements in such relation that it is 55 00:03:23.840 --> 00:03:26.400 as if he were in contact with the Far East itself. 56 00:03:27.159 --> 00:03:31.719 The expert must translate, simplify, generalize, but the inference from 57 00:03:31.719 --> 00:03:34.439 the result must apply in the East, not merely on 58 00:03:34.479 --> 00:03:37.800 the premises of the report. If the Secretary is worth 59 00:03:37.800 --> 00:03:40.560 his salt, the very last thing he will tolerate in 60 00:03:40.639 --> 00:03:43.719 his experts is the suspicion that they have a policy. 61 00:03:44.680 --> 00:03:46.719 He does not want to know from them whether they 62 00:03:46.840 --> 00:03:50.360 like Japanese policy in China. He wants to know what 63 00:03:50.400 --> 00:03:54.960 different classes of Chinese and Japanese, English, Frenchmen, Germans and 64 00:03:55.039 --> 00:03:57.840 Russians think about it, and what they are likely to 65 00:03:57.919 --> 00:04:01.120 do because of what they think. He wants all that 66 00:04:01.199 --> 00:04:04.599 represented to him as the basis of his decision. The 67 00:04:04.680 --> 00:04:08.479 more faithfully the division represents what is not otherwise represented 68 00:04:08.879 --> 00:04:12.599 either by the Japanese or American ambassadors or the senators 69 00:04:12.599 --> 00:04:15.879 in congressmen from the Pacific coast, the better secretary of 70 00:04:15.919 --> 00:04:19.000 State he will be. He may decide to take his 71 00:04:19.079 --> 00:04:21.879 policy from the Pacific Coast, but he will take his 72 00:04:21.959 --> 00:04:25.439 view of Japan from Japan. It is no accident that 73 00:04:25.480 --> 00:04:28.319 the best diplomatic service in the world is the one 74 00:04:28.319 --> 00:04:31.040 in which the divorce between the assembling of knowledge and 75 00:04:31.079 --> 00:04:34.920 the control of policy is most perfect. During the war, 76 00:04:35.240 --> 00:04:37.959 in many British embassies and in the British Foreign Office, 77 00:04:38.319 --> 00:04:42.600 there were nearly always men permanent officials or else special appointees, 78 00:04:42.959 --> 00:04:47.639 who quite successfully discounted the prevailing war mind. They discarded 79 00:04:47.639 --> 00:04:50.720 the regamarole of being pro and khan of having favorite 80 00:04:50.800 --> 00:04:55.480 nationalities and pet aversions and undelivered perorations in their bosoms. 81 00:04:56.360 --> 00:04:59.560 They left that to the political chiefs. But in an 82 00:04:59.560 --> 00:05:02.639 America an embassy, I once heard an ambassador say that 83 00:05:02.720 --> 00:05:05.959 he never reported anything to Washington which would not cheer 84 00:05:06.040 --> 00:05:09.160 up the folks at home. He charmed all those who 85 00:05:09.199 --> 00:05:12.279 met him, helped many a stranded war worker, and was 86 00:05:12.319 --> 00:05:16.079 superb when he unveiled a monument. He did not understand 87 00:05:16.079 --> 00:05:19.439 that the power of the expert depends upon separating himself 88 00:05:19.439 --> 00:05:22.839 from those who make the decisions, upon not caring in 89 00:05:22.920 --> 00:05:26.639 his expert self what decision is made. The man who, 90 00:05:26.959 --> 00:05:29.720 like the ambassador, takes a line and meddles with the 91 00:05:29.759 --> 00:05:34.199 decision is soon discounted. There He is just one more 92 00:05:34.240 --> 00:05:37.319 on that side of the question. For when he begins 93 00:05:37.319 --> 00:05:39.839 to care too much, he begins to see what he 94 00:05:39.879 --> 00:05:42.800 wishes to see, and by that fact, ceases to see 95 00:05:42.839 --> 00:05:45.600 what he is there to see. He is there to 96 00:05:45.639 --> 00:05:49.800 represent the unseen. He represents people who are not voters, 97 00:05:50.120 --> 00:05:53.000 functions of voters that are not evident. Events that are 98 00:05:53.000 --> 00:05:57.319 out of sight, mute people, unborn people, relations between things 99 00:05:57.360 --> 00:06:01.959 and people. He has a constituency of intangibles, and intangibles 100 00:06:02.000 --> 00:06:05.519 cannot be used to form a political majority, because voting is, 101 00:06:05.720 --> 00:06:09.560 in the last analysis, a test of strength, a sublimated battle, 102 00:06:09.879 --> 00:06:13.120 and the expert represents no strength available in the immediate 103 00:06:13.879 --> 00:06:16.600 But he can exercise force by disturbing the line up 104 00:06:16.639 --> 00:06:20.920 of the forces. By making the invisible visible, he confronts 105 00:06:20.920 --> 00:06:23.920 the people who exercise material force with a new environment, 106 00:06:24.360 --> 00:06:27.519 sets ideas and feelings at work in them, throws them 107 00:06:27.519 --> 00:06:31.079 out of position, and so in the profoundest way, affects 108 00:06:31.079 --> 00:06:34.439 the decision. Men cannot long act in a way that 109 00:06:34.480 --> 00:06:37.000 they know is a contradiction of the environment as they 110 00:06:37.040 --> 00:06:39.399 conceive it. If they are bent on acting in a 111 00:06:39.439 --> 00:06:42.759 certain way, they have to reconceive the environment. They have 112 00:06:42.800 --> 00:06:46.519 to censor out to rationalize. But if in their presence 113 00:06:46.879 --> 00:06:49.560 there is an inconsistent fact which is so obtrusive that 114 00:06:49.600 --> 00:06:52.720 they cannot explain it away, one of three courses is open. 115 00:06:53.560 --> 00:06:56.639 They can perversely ignore it, though they will cripple themselves 116 00:06:56.639 --> 00:06:59.920 in the process, will overreact their part and come to grief. 117 00:07:00.800 --> 00:07:03.199 They can take it into account, but refuse to act. 118 00:07:03.680 --> 00:07:07.920 They pay an internal discomfort and frustration, or, and I 119 00:07:08.000 --> 00:07:10.800 believe this to be the most frequent case, they adjust 120 00:07:10.839 --> 00:07:14.519 their whole behavior to the enlarged environment. The idea that 121 00:07:14.560 --> 00:07:17.879 the expert is an ineffectual person because he lets others 122 00:07:17.879 --> 00:07:22.000 make the decisions is quite contrary to experience. The more 123 00:07:22.040 --> 00:07:24.959 subtle the elements that enter into the decision, the more 124 00:07:25.000 --> 00:07:29.399 irresponsible power the expert wields. He is certain moreover to 125 00:07:29.519 --> 00:07:32.480 exercise more power in the future than ever he did before, 126 00:07:32.959 --> 00:07:36.079 because increasingly the relevant facts will elude the voter and 127 00:07:36.160 --> 00:07:40.439 the administrator. All governing agencies will tend to organize bodies 128 00:07:40.439 --> 00:07:44.120 of research and information which will throw out tentacles and expand, 129 00:07:44.600 --> 00:07:47.199 as have the intelligence departments of all the armies in 130 00:07:47.240 --> 00:07:51.680 the world. But the experts will remain human beings. They 131 00:07:51.720 --> 00:07:54.800 will enjoy power, and their temptation will be to appoint 132 00:07:54.839 --> 00:07:58.240 themselves censors and so absorb the real function of decision. 133 00:07:59.199 --> 00:08:02.360 Unless their function is correctly defined. They will tend to 134 00:08:02.360 --> 00:08:05.199 pass on the facts they think appropriate and to pass 135 00:08:05.240 --> 00:08:08.920 down the decisions they approve. They will tend, in short 136 00:08:09.079 --> 00:08:13.079 to become a bureaucracy. The only institutional safeguard is to 137 00:08:13.120 --> 00:08:15.759 separate as absolutely as it is possible to do so, 138 00:08:16.240 --> 00:08:20.279 the staff which executes from the staff which investigates. The 139 00:08:20.319 --> 00:08:23.000 two should be parallel, but quite distinct bodies of men, 140 00:08:23.399 --> 00:08:27.759 recruited differently paid, if possible, from separate funds, responsible to 141 00:08:27.800 --> 00:08:33.240 different heads, intrinsically uninterested in each other's personal success. In industry, 142 00:08:33.399 --> 00:08:37.759 the auditors, accountants and inspectors should be independent of the manager, 143 00:08:38.000 --> 00:08:42.039 the superintendents foreman, and in time, I believe we shall 144 00:08:42.039 --> 00:08:44.320 come to see that, in order to bring industry under 145 00:08:44.360 --> 00:08:47.360 social control, the machinery of record will have to be 146 00:08:47.399 --> 00:08:51.240 independent of the boards of directors and the shareholders. But 147 00:08:51.360 --> 00:08:54.600 in building the intelligence sections of industry and politics, we 148 00:08:54.679 --> 00:08:58.200 do not start on cleared ground, And apart from insisting 149 00:08:58.200 --> 00:09:01.519 on this basic separation of function, it would be cumbersome 150 00:09:01.559 --> 00:09:04.399 to insist too precisely on the form which, in any 151 00:09:04.440 --> 00:09:08.080 particular instance the principle shall take. There are men who 152 00:09:08.120 --> 00:09:11.320 believe in intelligence work and will adopt it. There are 153 00:09:11.360 --> 00:09:13.840 men who do not understand it but cannot do their 154 00:09:13.879 --> 00:09:16.679 work without it. And there are men who will resist, 155 00:09:17.600 --> 00:09:20.440 but provided the principle has a foothold somewhere in every 156 00:09:20.440 --> 00:09:23.639 social agency, it will make progress. And the way to 157 00:09:23.720 --> 00:09:27.720 begin is to begin in the federal government. For example, 158 00:09:28.039 --> 00:09:31.000 it is not necessary to straighten out the administrative tangle 159 00:09:31.320 --> 00:09:34.720 and the illogical duplications of a century's growth in order 160 00:09:34.759 --> 00:09:37.159 to find a neat place for the intelligence bureaus, which 161 00:09:37.320 --> 00:09:41.519 Washington so badly needs. Before election, you can promise to 162 00:09:41.600 --> 00:09:45.000 rush bravely into the breach. But when you arrive there, 163 00:09:45.039 --> 00:09:47.720 all out of breath, you find that each absurdity is 164 00:09:47.759 --> 00:09:52.559 invested with habits, strong interests, and chummy congressmen attack all 165 00:09:52.600 --> 00:09:55.279 along the line, and you engage every force of reaction. 166 00:09:56.360 --> 00:09:58.879 You go forth to battle, as the poet said, and 167 00:09:59.039 --> 00:10:02.840 you always fall. You can lop off an antiquated bureau here, 168 00:10:03.240 --> 00:10:06.360 a covey of clerks. There, you can combine two bureaus, 169 00:10:07.120 --> 00:10:09.240 and by that time you are busy with the tariff 170 00:10:09.240 --> 00:10:13.120 in the railroads, and the era of reform is over. Besides, 171 00:10:13.399 --> 00:10:16.679 in order to effect a truly logical reorganization of the government, 172 00:10:17.000 --> 00:10:19.840 such as all candidates always promise, you would have to 173 00:10:19.879 --> 00:10:23.279 disturb more passions than you have time to quell. And 174 00:10:23.440 --> 00:10:26.840 any new scheme supposing you had one ready, would require 175 00:10:26.879 --> 00:10:30.600 officials to man it. Say what one will about office holders. 176 00:10:30.879 --> 00:10:33.279 Even Soviet Russia was glad to get many of the 177 00:10:33.279 --> 00:10:36.200 old ones back. And these old officials, if they are 178 00:10:36.240 --> 00:10:41.759 too ruthlessly treated, will sabotage utopia itself. No administrative scheme 179 00:10:41.840 --> 00:10:45.080 is workable without good will, and good will about strange 180 00:10:45.120 --> 00:10:49.559 practices is impossible without education. The better way is to 181 00:10:49.639 --> 00:10:53.360 introduce into the existing machinery wherever you can find an opening, 182 00:10:53.679 --> 00:10:56.159 agencies that will hold up a mirror week by week, 183 00:10:56.399 --> 00:10:59.799 month by month. You can hope then to make them 184 00:10:59.759 --> 00:11:02.399 Miss Machen visible to those who work it, as well 185 00:11:02.480 --> 00:11:04.840 as to the chiefs who are responsible, and to the 186 00:11:04.879 --> 00:11:08.679 public outside. When the office holders begin to see themselves, 187 00:11:08.960 --> 00:11:12.080 or rather when the outsiders, the chiefs, and the subordinates 188 00:11:12.360 --> 00:11:15.399 all begin to see the same facts, the same damning facts, 189 00:11:15.440 --> 00:11:19.679 if you like, the obstruction will diminish. The reformer's opinion 190 00:11:19.720 --> 00:11:22.559 that a certain bureau is inefficient is just his opinion, 191 00:11:22.919 --> 00:11:24.759 not so good, an opinion in the eyes of the 192 00:11:24.759 --> 00:11:27.519 bureau as its own. But let the work of that 193 00:11:27.639 --> 00:11:30.600 bureau be analyzed and recorded, and then compared with other 194 00:11:30.679 --> 00:11:34.159 bureaus and with private corporations. And the argument moves to 195 00:11:34.200 --> 00:11:38.440 another plane. There are ten departments at Washington represented in 196 00:11:38.519 --> 00:11:42.799 the cabinet. Suppose then there was a permanent intelligence section 197 00:11:42.919 --> 00:11:45.840 for each. What would be some of the conditions of 198 00:11:45.879 --> 00:11:50.320 effectiveness beyond all others, That the intelligence officials should be 199 00:11:50.320 --> 00:11:53.960 independent both of the congressional committees dealing with the department 200 00:11:54.320 --> 00:11:56.759 and the secretary at the head of it. That they 201 00:11:56.799 --> 00:11:59.559 should not be entangled, either in decision or in action. 202 00:12:00.519 --> 00:12:05.360 Independence then would turn mainly on three points on funds, tenure, 203 00:12:05.559 --> 00:12:09.360 and access to the facts. For clearly, if a particular 204 00:12:09.399 --> 00:12:13.639 congress or departmental official can deprive them of money, dismiss them, 205 00:12:13.879 --> 00:12:17.480 or close the files, the staff becomes its creature. The 206 00:12:17.559 --> 00:12:21.679 question of funds is both important and difficult. No agency 207 00:12:21.679 --> 00:12:24.759 of research can be really free if it depends upon 208 00:12:24.840 --> 00:12:27.159 annual doles from what may be a jealous or a 209 00:12:27.200 --> 00:12:31.480 parsimonious Congress. Yet the ultimate control of funds cannot be 210 00:12:31.519 --> 00:12:35.639 removed from the legislature. The financial arrangement should insure the 211 00:12:35.720 --> 00:12:40.200 staff against left handed joker and writer attack against slight destruction, 212 00:12:40.639 --> 00:12:43.879 and should at the same time provide for growth. The 213 00:12:43.919 --> 00:12:46.840 staff should be so well entrenched that an attack on 214 00:12:46.919 --> 00:12:49.159 its existence would have to be made in the open. 215 00:12:49.960 --> 00:12:53.360 It might perhaps work behind a federal charter, creating a 216 00:12:53.399 --> 00:12:56.080 trust fund and a sliding scale over a period of 217 00:12:56.159 --> 00:12:59.519 years based on the appropriation for the department to which 218 00:12:59.559 --> 00:13:03.240 the Intelli Diligence Bureau belonged. No great sums of money 219 00:13:03.240 --> 00:13:07.039 are involved anyway. The trust fund might cover the overhead 220 00:13:07.039 --> 00:13:10.320 and capital charges for a certain minimum staff. The sliding 221 00:13:10.360 --> 00:13:14.559 scale might cover the enlargements at any rate. The appropriation 222 00:13:14.639 --> 00:13:17.399 should be put beyond accident, like the payment of any 223 00:13:17.440 --> 00:13:21.120 long term obligation. This is a much less serious way 224 00:13:21.200 --> 00:13:23.840 of tying the hands of Congress than is the passage 225 00:13:23.840 --> 00:13:27.399 of a constitutional amendment or the issuance of government bonds. 226 00:13:28.120 --> 00:13:30.639 Congress could repeal the charter, but it would have to 227 00:13:30.679 --> 00:13:34.399 repeal it, not throw monkey wrenches into it. Tenure should 228 00:13:34.399 --> 00:13:37.799 be for life, with provision for retirement on a liberal pension, 229 00:13:38.080 --> 00:13:41.120 with sabbatical years set aside for advanced study and training, 230 00:13:41.440 --> 00:13:44.679 and with dismissal only after a trial by professional colleagues. 231 00:13:45.519 --> 00:13:48.799 The conditions which apply to any non profit making intellectual 232 00:13:48.840 --> 00:13:52.559 career should apply here. If the work is to be salient, 233 00:13:52.960 --> 00:13:56.000 the men who do it must have dignity, security, and 234 00:13:56.120 --> 00:13:58.879 in the upper ranks at least that freedom of mind 235 00:13:59.240 --> 00:14:02.000 which you find only where men are not too immediately 236 00:14:02.039 --> 00:14:06.000 concerned in practical decision. Access to the materials should be 237 00:14:06.120 --> 00:14:09.519 established in the organic Act. The Bureau should have the 238 00:14:09.639 --> 00:14:12.799 right to examine all papers and to question any official 239 00:14:13.000 --> 00:14:17.480 or any outsider. Continuous investigation of this sort would not 240 00:14:17.559 --> 00:14:21.360 at all resemble the sensational legislative inquiry and the spasmodic 241 00:14:21.399 --> 00:14:24.840 fishing expedition which are now a common feature of our government. 242 00:14:25.679 --> 00:14:28.279 The Bureau should have the right to propose accounting methods 243 00:14:28.320 --> 00:14:32.000 to the Department, and if the proposals rejected or violated 244 00:14:32.080 --> 00:14:35.000 after it has been accepted, to appeal under its charter 245 00:14:35.080 --> 00:14:39.120 to Congress. In the first instance, each intelligence Bureau would 246 00:14:39.159 --> 00:14:42.159 be the connecting link between Congress and the Department, a 247 00:14:42.200 --> 00:14:45.399 better link, in my judgment, than the appearance of Cabinet 248 00:14:45.440 --> 00:14:48.279 officers on the floor of both House and Senate, though 249 00:14:48.279 --> 00:14:51.519 the one proposal in no way excludes the other. The 250 00:14:51.559 --> 00:14:54.120 Bureau would be the congressional eye on the execution of 251 00:14:54.159 --> 00:14:59.159 its policy. It would be the departmental answer to Congressional criticism, 252 00:14:59.399 --> 00:15:03.159 and then, since operation of the department would be permanently visible. 253 00:15:03.519 --> 00:15:05.799 Perhaps Congress would cease to feel the need of that 254 00:15:05.879 --> 00:15:09.519 minute legislation born of distrust and a false doctrine of 255 00:15:09.559 --> 00:15:12.440 the separation of powers, which does so much to make 256 00:15:12.480 --> 00:15:16.840 efficient administration difficult. But of course, each of the ten 257 00:15:16.879 --> 00:15:20.320 bureaus could not work in a watertight compartment. In their 258 00:15:20.360 --> 00:15:22.639 relation to one another lies the best chance for that 259 00:15:22.720 --> 00:15:25.480 co ordination in which so much is heard and so 260 00:15:25.600 --> 00:15:29.559 little seen. Clearly, the various staffs would need to adopt, 261 00:15:29.679 --> 00:15:33.919 wherever possible, standards of measurement that were comparable. They would 262 00:15:33.960 --> 00:15:37.480 exchange their records. Then, if the War Department and the 263 00:15:37.480 --> 00:15:41.639 Post Office both by lumber higher carpenters or construct brick walls, 264 00:15:42.120 --> 00:15:44.960 they need not necessarily do them through the same agency, 265 00:15:45.360 --> 00:15:49.000 for that might mean cumbersome overcentralization. But they would be 266 00:15:49.039 --> 00:15:51.399 able to use the same measure for the same things, 267 00:15:51.840 --> 00:15:55.080 be conscious of the comparisons, and be treated as competitors. 268 00:15:55.960 --> 00:15:59.480 And the more competition of this sort the better, for 269 00:15:59.559 --> 00:16:02.480 the value of competition is determined by the value of 270 00:16:02.480 --> 00:16:06.639 the standards used to measure it. Instead, then of asking 271 00:16:06.679 --> 00:16:10.080 ourselves whether we believe in competition, we should ask ourselves 272 00:16:10.399 --> 00:16:13.480 whether we believe in that for which the competitors compete. 273 00:16:14.240 --> 00:16:17.559 No one in his senses expects to abolish competition, For 274 00:16:17.639 --> 00:16:21.200 when the last vestige of emulation had disappeared, social effort 275 00:16:21.240 --> 00:16:24.759 would consist in mechanical obedience to a routine, tempered in 276 00:16:24.799 --> 00:16:28.600 a minority by native inspiration. Yet no one expects to 277 00:16:28.639 --> 00:16:32.000 work out competition to its logical conclusion, in a murderous 278 00:16:32.000 --> 00:16:35.240 struggle of each against all. The problem is to select 279 00:16:35.279 --> 00:16:37.799 the goals of competition and the rules of the game. 280 00:16:38.679 --> 00:16:42.320 Almost always, the most visible and obvious standard of measurement 281 00:16:42.360 --> 00:16:46.720 will determine the rules of the game, such as money, power, popularity, 282 00:16:46.919 --> 00:16:51.679 applause or mister Veblin's conspicuous waste. What other standards of 283 00:16:51.679 --> 00:16:57.919 measurement does our civilization normally provide? How does it measure efficiency, productivity, service, 284 00:16:58.279 --> 00:17:01.559 for which we are always clamoring. By and large, there 285 00:17:01.559 --> 00:17:04.799 are no measures, and there is therefore not so much 286 00:17:04.839 --> 00:17:08.799 competition to achieve these ideals. For the difference between the 287 00:17:08.839 --> 00:17:11.839 higher and the lower motives is not as men often assert, 288 00:17:12.200 --> 00:17:16.559 a difference between altruism and selfishness footnote c. Chapter twelve. 289 00:17:17.400 --> 00:17:20.279 It is a difference between acting for easily understood aims 290 00:17:20.559 --> 00:17:23.920 and for aims that are obscure and vague. Exhort a 291 00:17:23.960 --> 00:17:26.400 man to make more profit than his neighbor, and he 292 00:17:26.480 --> 00:17:29.480 knows that what to aim? Exhort him to render more 293 00:17:29.519 --> 00:17:32.119 social service? And how is he to be certain? What 294 00:17:32.240 --> 00:17:36.039 service is social? What is the test? What is the measure? 295 00:17:36.799 --> 00:17:40.839 A subjective feeling, somebody's opinion. Tell a man in time 296 00:17:40.880 --> 00:17:43.200 of peace that he ought to serve his country, and 297 00:17:43.279 --> 00:17:46.160 you have uttered a pious platitude. Tell him in time 298 00:17:46.200 --> 00:17:49.000 of war, and the word service has a meaning. It 299 00:17:49.079 --> 00:17:52.559 is a number of concrete acts enlistment or buying bonds, 300 00:17:52.920 --> 00:17:55.640 or saving food, or working for a dollar a year. 301 00:17:56.079 --> 00:17:59.079 And each one of these services he sees definitely as 302 00:17:59.119 --> 00:18:01.279 part of a concrete purpose to put at the front 303 00:18:01.599 --> 00:18:05.440 an army larger and better armed than the enemies. So 304 00:18:05.599 --> 00:18:08.640 the more you are able to analyze administration and work 305 00:18:08.640 --> 00:18:11.519 out elements that can be compared, the more you invent 306 00:18:11.640 --> 00:18:14.920 quantitative measures for the qualities you wish to promote, The 307 00:18:14.920 --> 00:18:18.480 more you can turn competition to ideal ends. If you 308 00:18:18.519 --> 00:18:22.079 can contrive the right index numbers. Footnote I am not 309 00:18:22.240 --> 00:18:25.039 using the term index numbers in its purely technical meaning, 310 00:18:25.480 --> 00:18:28.160 but to cover any device for the comparative measurement of 311 00:18:28.240 --> 00:18:33.200 social phenomenon. You can set up a competition between individual 312 00:18:33.240 --> 00:18:37.759 workers in a shop, between shops, between factories, between schools. 313 00:18:38.279 --> 00:18:42.000 Footnote see for example, an index number for state school 314 00:18:42.039 --> 00:18:46.920 systems by Leonard p Ayres russell Sage Foundation, nineteen twenty. 315 00:18:47.240 --> 00:18:50.079 The principle of the quota was very successfully applied in 316 00:18:50.119 --> 00:18:53.480 the Liberty loan campaigns, and under very much more difficult 317 00:18:53.559 --> 00:18:59.440 circumstances by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, between government departments, 318 00:18:59.599 --> 00:19:05.559 between regiments, between divisions, between ships, between states, counties, cities, 319 00:19:05.960 --> 00:19:09.359 and the better you index numbers, the more useful to competition. 320 00:19:10.359 --> 00:19:13.559 The possibilities that lie in the exchange of material are evident. 321 00:19:14.440 --> 00:19:17.279 Each department of government is all the time asking for 322 00:19:17.359 --> 00:19:20.960 information that may already have been obtained by another department, 323 00:19:21.440 --> 00:19:25.279 though perhaps in a somewhat different form. The state department 324 00:19:25.319 --> 00:19:27.920 needs to know let us say, the extent of the 325 00:19:27.960 --> 00:19:30.839 Mexican oil reserves, their relation to the rest of the 326 00:19:30.880 --> 00:19:34.839 world's supply, the present ownership of Mexican oil lands, the 327 00:19:34.880 --> 00:19:38.240 importance of oil to warships now under construction or planned, 328 00:19:38.680 --> 00:19:42.519 the comparative costs in different fields. How does it secure 329 00:19:42.559 --> 00:19:46.720 such information. Today, the information is probably scattered through the 330 00:19:46.759 --> 00:19:51.960 departments of Interior, Justice, Commerce, Labor, and Navy. Either a 331 00:19:52.000 --> 00:19:54.599 clerk in the State department looks up Mexican oil in 332 00:19:54.640 --> 00:19:57.480 a book of reference, which may or may not be accurate, 333 00:19:57.799 --> 00:20:00.799 or somebody's private secretary telephones some way body else's private 334 00:20:00.799 --> 00:20:04.119 secretary asks for a memorandum, and in the course of 335 00:20:04.200 --> 00:20:08.440 time a darky messenger arrives with an armful of unintelligible reports. 336 00:20:09.079 --> 00:20:11.359 The department should be able to call on its own 337 00:20:11.359 --> 00:20:14.720 intelligence bureau to assemble the facts in a way suited 338 00:20:14.759 --> 00:20:18.599 to the diplomatic problem up for decision. In these facts, 339 00:20:18.640 --> 00:20:23.200 the Diplomatic Intelligence Bureau would obtain from the Central Clearinghouse. Footnote. 340 00:20:23.440 --> 00:20:26.119 There has been a vast development of such services among 341 00:20:26.119 --> 00:20:30.599 the trade associations. The possibilities of a perverted use were 342 00:20:30.640 --> 00:20:33.680 revealed by the New York Building Trades Investigation of nineteen 343 00:20:33.680 --> 00:20:37.559 twenty one. This establishment would pretty soon become a focus 344 00:20:37.559 --> 00:20:41.400 of information of the most extraordinary kind, and the men 345 00:20:41.440 --> 00:20:43.559 in it would be made aware of what the problems 346 00:20:43.559 --> 00:20:47.400 of government really are. They would deal with problems of definition, 347 00:20:47.559 --> 00:20:52.000 of terminology, of statistical technique of logic. They would traverse 348 00:20:52.079 --> 00:20:55.799 concretely the whole gamut of the social sciences. It is 349 00:20:55.880 --> 00:20:58.960 difficult to see why all this material, except a few 350 00:20:59.000 --> 00:21:02.200 diplomatic and military secrets, should not be opened to the 351 00:21:02.240 --> 00:21:05.559 scholars of the country. It is there that the political 352 00:21:05.599 --> 00:21:08.119 scientists would find the real nuts to crack and the 353 00:21:08.160 --> 00:21:11.799 real researches for his students to make. The work need 354 00:21:11.839 --> 00:21:14.119 not all be done in Washington, but it could be 355 00:21:14.160 --> 00:21:18.759 done in reference to Washington. The Central Agency would thus 356 00:21:18.799 --> 00:21:22.000 have in it the makings of a national university. The 357 00:21:22.039 --> 00:21:24.960 staff could be recruited there for the bureaus from among 358 00:21:25.039 --> 00:21:29.039 college graduates. They would be working on thesies selected after 359 00:21:29.079 --> 00:21:33.279 consultation between the curators of the National University and teachers 360 00:21:33.319 --> 00:21:37.279 scattered over the country. If the Association was as flexible 361 00:21:37.319 --> 00:21:39.839 as it ought to be, there would be, as a 362 00:21:39.839 --> 00:21:43.440 supplement to the permanent staff, a steady turnover of temporary 363 00:21:43.440 --> 00:21:47.359 and specialist appointments from the universities and exchange lectures called 364 00:21:47.400 --> 00:21:50.960 out from Washington. Thus, the training and the recruiting of 365 00:21:50.960 --> 00:21:54.200 the staff would go together. A part of the research 366 00:21:54.240 --> 00:21:57.319 itself would be done by students, and political science in 367 00:21:57.359 --> 00:22:01.440 the universities would be associated with politics and in America in 368 00:22:01.519 --> 00:22:05.519 its main outlines. The principle is equally applicable to state governments, 369 00:22:05.680 --> 00:22:09.720 to cities, and to rural counties. The work of comparison 370 00:22:09.759 --> 00:22:13.240 and interchange could take place by federations of state, city 371 00:22:13.440 --> 00:22:18.440 and county bureaus, and within those federations any desirable regional 372 00:22:18.480 --> 00:22:22.599 combination could be organized. So long as the accounting systems 373 00:22:22.599 --> 00:22:25.920 were comparable, a great deal of duplication would be avoided. 374 00:22:26.799 --> 00:22:31.759 Regional coordination is especially desirable for legal frontiers often do 375 00:22:31.880 --> 00:22:35.720 not coincide with the effective environments, yet they have a 376 00:22:35.720 --> 00:22:38.519 certain basis and custom that it would be costly to disturb. 377 00:22:39.359 --> 00:22:43.519 By co ordinating their information, Several administrative areas could reconcile 378 00:22:43.559 --> 00:22:48.279 autonomy of decision with co operation. New York City, for example, 379 00:22:48.680 --> 00:22:51.480 is already an unwieldy unit for good government from the 380 00:22:51.480 --> 00:22:56.079 city Hall, yet for many purposes such as health and transportation, 381 00:22:56.559 --> 00:23:00.559 the metropolitan district is the true unit of administration in 382 00:23:00.640 --> 00:23:08.519 that district. However, there are large cities like Yonkers, Jersey City, Patterson, Elizabeth, Hoboken, Bayon. 383 00:23:09.440 --> 00:23:11.880 They could not all be managed from one center, and 384 00:23:12.000 --> 00:23:16.759 yet they should act together for many functions. Ultimately, perhaps 385 00:23:16.799 --> 00:23:19.960 some such flexible scheme of local government, as Sydney and 386 00:23:20.000 --> 00:23:24.079 Beatrice Webb have suggested, may be the proper solution footnote 387 00:23:24.200 --> 00:23:28.319 the Reorganization of local government Chapter four in a Constitution 388 00:23:28.400 --> 00:23:31.599 for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain. But the first 389 00:23:31.599 --> 00:23:34.559 step would be a co ordination, not a decision in action, 390 00:23:34.960 --> 00:23:38.480 but of information and research. Let the officials of the 391 00:23:38.519 --> 00:23:41.799 various municipalities see their common problems in the light of 392 00:23:41.839 --> 00:23:45.039 the same facts. It would be idle to deny that 393 00:23:45.079 --> 00:23:48.119 such a network of intelligence bureaus in politics and industry 394 00:23:48.599 --> 00:23:52.279 might become a dead weight and a perpetual irritation. One 395 00:23:52.319 --> 00:23:55.119 can easily imagine its attraction for men in search of 396 00:23:55.160 --> 00:24:00.039 soft jobs, for pedants, for mettlers. One can see red tape, 397 00:24:00.160 --> 00:24:06.599 mountains of papers, questionnaires, ad nauseum, seven copies of every document, endorsements, delays, 398 00:24:06.839 --> 00:24:10.000 lost papers, the use of Form one thirty six instead 399 00:24:10.039 --> 00:24:12.920 of Form two g B, the return of the document 400 00:24:12.960 --> 00:24:15.880 because pencil was used instead of ink, or black ink 401 00:24:15.960 --> 00:24:19.319