1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:04,040 Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. 2 00:00:04,320 --> 00:00:07,000 In this episode, we're picking right up where we left 3 00:00:07,040 --> 00:00:11,679 off in the last episode, talking about the OIG's report 4 00:00:11,960 --> 00:00:19,839 into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. Part D failure 5 00:00:19,879 --> 00:00:24,079 to assign Epstein a new cellmate on August ninth, Section 6 00:00:24,160 --> 00:00:29,640 one Daywatch staff actions on August ninth, the Shoe Lieutenant 7 00:00:29,719 --> 00:00:33,039 told the OIG that he worked at MCC New York 8 00:00:33,439 --> 00:00:37,240 on August eighth, twenty nineteen, from approximately six a m. 9 00:00:37,640 --> 00:00:41,159 Until approximately two pm, and that he was off on 10 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:45,679 August ninth, twenty nineteen. The Shoe Lieutenant, who shift ended 11 00:00:46,039 --> 00:00:49,320 over an hour before the USMS sent the second email 12 00:00:49,520 --> 00:00:53,960 regarding in May three's impending transfer, told the OIG that 13 00:00:54,039 --> 00:00:57,039 he was not aware that in May three was scheduled 14 00:00:57,039 --> 00:01:00,640 to be transferred out of MCC New York, and therefore 15 00:01:00,759 --> 00:01:04,040 he did not notify the captain that Epstein would require 16 00:01:04,079 --> 00:01:07,840 a new cell mate. According to the Shoe Lieutenant, as 17 00:01:07,879 --> 00:01:10,359 soon as the Shoe staff learned that in May three 18 00:01:10,439 --> 00:01:13,840 would be transferred, they should have notified a lieutenant on duty, 19 00:01:14,480 --> 00:01:18,120 the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the day Watch Activities 20 00:01:18,159 --> 00:01:22,640 lieutenant told the OIG on August ninth, twenty nineteen, they 21 00:01:22,640 --> 00:01:26,719 had oversight of the shoe from approximately six am until 22 00:01:26,760 --> 00:01:30,200 two pm due to their position descriptions and because of 23 00:01:30,200 --> 00:01:34,480 the shoe lieutenant's absence. According to the mcc New York 24 00:01:34,560 --> 00:01:39,079 staff roster on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Shoe Officer number 25 00:01:39,079 --> 00:01:44,000 one was listed as Senior Officer Specialist number five, although 26 00:01:44,040 --> 00:01:47,319 Shoe Officer number one is typically the officer in charge. 27 00:01:47,680 --> 00:01:52,680 Another senior Officer specialist told the OIG that in actuality 28 00:01:53,159 --> 00:01:55,560 he was the day watch shoe officer in charge on 29 00:01:55,640 --> 00:02:00,560 August ninth from approximately six am until two pm. The 30 00:02:00,640 --> 00:02:03,400 day watch shoe officer in charge said that since he 31 00:02:03,480 --> 00:02:06,879 had the most experienced and seniority, he was considered by 32 00:02:06,920 --> 00:02:10,439 everyone to be the shoe officer in charge, which the 33 00:02:10,479 --> 00:02:14,599 shoe lieutenant confirmed. The day watch shoe officer in charge 34 00:02:14,639 --> 00:02:17,599 told the OIG that he knew that Epstein had to 35 00:02:17,639 --> 00:02:20,960 have a cell mate. He said that as a general practice, 36 00:02:21,159 --> 00:02:24,759 every inmate who was transferred from suicide watch and or 37 00:02:24,840 --> 00:02:29,080 psychological observation to the shoe is placed with the cell mate. 38 00:02:29,479 --> 00:02:32,919 He also confirmed that the shoe lieutenant also instructed him 39 00:02:33,199 --> 00:02:35,439 that Epstein was to be housed with a cell mate 40 00:02:35,719 --> 00:02:38,960 at all times. According to the day Watch Shoe Officer 41 00:02:39,000 --> 00:02:43,319 in charge, between July thirtieth and August ninth, twenty nineteen, 42 00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:47,400 he told other mcc new York staff members who worked 43 00:02:47,400 --> 00:02:51,400 in the Shoe of Epstein's cellmate requirement, and further stated 44 00:02:51,560 --> 00:02:54,800 that everyone who worked in the Shoe should have known 45 00:02:54,840 --> 00:02:57,840 that Epstein was required to have a cell mate due 46 00:02:57,879 --> 00:03:02,319 to their knowledge, training, and experiens. The day Watch Shoe 47 00:03:02,360 --> 00:03:05,960 Officer in charge confirmed that on the morning of August ninth, 48 00:03:06,039 --> 00:03:09,599 twenty nineteen, the Shoe staff received an inmate call out 49 00:03:09,599 --> 00:03:14,319 list that listed in May three as WAB, which he explained, 50 00:03:14,599 --> 00:03:18,080 meant that in May three was being removed from mcc 51 00:03:18,280 --> 00:03:22,439 new York. He told the OIG that sometime between eight 52 00:03:22,479 --> 00:03:25,840 am and nine am, he escorted Epstein to the Shoe 53 00:03:26,080 --> 00:03:30,080 to the attorney conference room for Epstein's daily legal visit, 54 00:03:30,800 --> 00:03:34,159 during which time Epstein joked around with him. The day 55 00:03:34,159 --> 00:03:37,159 Watch Shoe Officer in charge said that he and Epstein 56 00:03:37,240 --> 00:03:40,560 were accompanied by CO one who was escorting in May 57 00:03:40,599 --> 00:03:45,280 three to receiving and discharge. The day Watch Shoe Officer 58 00:03:45,319 --> 00:03:48,719 in charge and co One both told the OIG that 59 00:03:48,800 --> 00:03:53,520 in May three was escorted to Receiving and discharge with 60 00:03:53,599 --> 00:03:56,759 all of his belongings, and both said that during the escort, 61 00:03:56,879 --> 00:04:00,680 the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge informed Epso that 62 00:04:00,719 --> 00:04:03,080 he would be assigned a new cellmate due to in 63 00:04:03,240 --> 00:04:07,039 May three's departure and the requirement that Epstein have a cellmate. 64 00:04:08,080 --> 00:04:11,360 In his interview with the OIG, CO One confirmed this 65 00:04:11,520 --> 00:04:15,599 conversation between the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and Epstein, 66 00:04:15,919 --> 00:04:20,360 but he did not provide any additional information regarding notifications 67 00:04:20,759 --> 00:04:24,120 made either by him or the day Watch Shoe Officer 68 00:04:24,399 --> 00:04:28,519 in charge. The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge told 69 00:04:28,560 --> 00:04:31,839 the OIG that when he and the CO one left 70 00:04:31,879 --> 00:04:34,560 the Shoe with Epstein and in May three, both the 71 00:04:34,639 --> 00:04:38,600 day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant 72 00:04:39,160 --> 00:04:42,600 should have been physically present in the Lieutenant's office and 73 00:04:42,639 --> 00:04:45,319 should have seen that in May three was departing the 74 00:04:45,360 --> 00:04:49,360 institution when they passed the office. The day Watch Shoe 75 00:04:49,360 --> 00:04:52,319 Officer in Charge said that while he did not expect 76 00:04:52,360 --> 00:04:56,000 in May three to return to mcc New York, there 77 00:04:56,000 --> 00:04:58,759 had been times when inmates had been escorted to receiving 78 00:04:58,800 --> 00:05:02,759 in discharge and as an expected removal, only to be 79 00:05:02,839 --> 00:05:05,839 returned to the shoe later the same day due to 80 00:05:05,959 --> 00:05:11,000 unforeseen circumstances. According to the day watch Shoe officer in charge, 81 00:05:11,240 --> 00:05:13,399 he did not select a new cell mate for Epstein 82 00:05:13,680 --> 00:05:16,360 because he was not certain that in May three had 83 00:05:16,399 --> 00:05:20,680 been discharged from the institution, although he assumed that in 84 00:05:20,720 --> 00:05:23,959 May three would not return to the shoe. The day 85 00:05:23,959 --> 00:05:27,879 watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that when 86 00:05:27,920 --> 00:05:31,560 his shift ended at approximately two pm, he informed the 87 00:05:31,639 --> 00:05:35,480 evening watch Shoe officer in charge and Senior Officer Specialist 88 00:05:35,519 --> 00:05:38,639 five that if in May three did not return to 89 00:05:38,680 --> 00:05:41,600 the shoe, Epstein would need a new cell mate. Upon 90 00:05:41,639 --> 00:05:46,160 Epstein's return from his attorney visit, the day watch shoe 91 00:05:46,160 --> 00:05:50,000 officer in charge said he specifically recalled telling the evening 92 00:05:50,040 --> 00:05:53,439 watch shoe officer in charge, in the presence of a 93 00:05:53,519 --> 00:05:57,399 senior Officer Specialist five, make sure this guy gets a bunkie, 94 00:05:57,759 --> 00:06:00,839 to which the Evening Shoe watch officer in charge replied, 95 00:06:01,079 --> 00:06:01,560 all right. 96 00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:04,279 Speaker 2: The day watch Shoe officer in charge. 97 00:06:04,240 --> 00:06:07,800 Speaker 1: Said that at some point that day it was likely 98 00:06:08,240 --> 00:06:11,560 that he also informed the day Watch Operations Lieutenant but 99 00:06:11,680 --> 00:06:14,639 he could not specifically recall if he had done so. 100 00:06:15,720 --> 00:06:18,639 The day Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG 101 00:06:19,199 --> 00:06:22,240 that a replacement cell mate should have been identified as 102 00:06:22,279 --> 00:06:24,959 soon as it was confirmed that in May three had 103 00:06:25,040 --> 00:06:28,800 left the institution. He said a new cellmate could have 104 00:06:28,879 --> 00:06:32,199 been reassigned before the four PM shoe count if it 105 00:06:32,240 --> 00:06:34,480 was known that in May three was not coming back, 106 00:06:35,040 --> 00:06:38,240 but the Shoe staff members had until Epstein returned from 107 00:06:38,240 --> 00:06:42,759 his attorney visit to assigned Epstein a new cellmate. According 108 00:06:42,759 --> 00:06:45,759 to the day Watch Shoe officer in charge, Shoe staff 109 00:06:46,240 --> 00:06:50,000 definitely should have realized that in May three was not returning, 110 00:06:50,199 --> 00:06:53,720 both during the four PM count and when Epstein returned 111 00:06:53,720 --> 00:06:57,160 from his attorney visit later that evening. The day Watch 112 00:06:57,199 --> 00:07:00,439 Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that at Ebstein's 113 00:07:00,519 --> 00:07:03,319 daily routine was that he would be with his attorneys 114 00:07:03,519 --> 00:07:07,680 in the attorney conference room until approximately eight pm, so 115 00:07:07,839 --> 00:07:11,279 Shoe personnel had time to make a new cellmate assignment. 116 00:07:12,000 --> 00:07:15,439 He had all Shoe staff members share the responsibility to 117 00:07:15,519 --> 00:07:18,639 find a replacement cell mate, and that anyone assigned to 118 00:07:18,680 --> 00:07:21,800 the Shoe could have found another inmate to replace in 119 00:07:21,839 --> 00:07:25,959 May three. However, he also said that due to Epstein's 120 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:29,560 high profile, the Shoe personnel should have asked a lieutenant 121 00:07:29,759 --> 00:07:33,399 to contact the psychology department to see which inmate should 122 00:07:33,439 --> 00:07:38,079 have been placed with Epstein. On August twelfth, twenty nineteen, 123 00:07:38,319 --> 00:07:41,800 following Epstein's death, the day watch Shoe Officer in charge 124 00:07:41,879 --> 00:07:45,839 wrote a memorandum to the wardens dating on Friday, August ninth, 125 00:07:45,879 --> 00:07:51,160 twenty nineteen, at approximately one fifty pm. Iss the day 126 00:07:51,199 --> 00:07:54,800 Watch Shoe Officer in Charge passed on to the oncoming 127 00:07:54,879 --> 00:07:58,439 staff members the evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and 128 00:07:58,639 --> 00:08:02,519 President Shift staff Senior Officer Specialist five in CO two 129 00:08:02,920 --> 00:08:06,519 that in May three was going wab Ie with all 130 00:08:06,560 --> 00:08:11,360 of his belongings and possibly he may not return. Also 131 00:08:11,480 --> 00:08:15,360 that inmate Epstein number seven sixty three one eight DASH 132 00:08:15,480 --> 00:08:18,079 zero five to four will be needing a cell mate 133 00:08:18,160 --> 00:08:22,079 upon arrival from his attorney visit. The day watch Shoe 134 00:08:22,079 --> 00:08:25,800 Officer in charge departed the Shoe at approximately two PM 135 00:08:26,279 --> 00:08:29,439 and worked an overtime shift as a driver for mcc 136 00:08:29,639 --> 00:08:32,519 New York. He stated that he did not follow up 137 00:08:32,559 --> 00:08:35,720 with the Shoe staff to verify that Epstein had been 138 00:08:35,759 --> 00:08:41,080 assigned another cell mate mcc new York staff with responsibility 139 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:45,039 for oversight and staffing of the Shoe during the day watch, 140 00:08:45,320 --> 00:08:49,519 including the Warden Associate Warden I, the Captain, the Shoe Lieutenant, 141 00:08:49,679 --> 00:08:53,440 the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant, 142 00:08:53,639 --> 00:08:56,320 and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, told the 143 00:08:56,360 --> 00:08:59,519 OIG that they all knew Epstein was required to have 144 00:08:59,559 --> 00:09:04,519 a cell mate pursuant to the Psychology Department's determination. They 145 00:09:04,559 --> 00:09:08,360 also confirmed that everyone who regularly worked in the Shoe 146 00:09:08,679 --> 00:09:11,679 knew of this requirement, and that it was the responsibility 147 00:09:11,720 --> 00:09:15,360 of all Shoe staff to notify a supervisor upon learning 148 00:09:15,559 --> 00:09:19,039 that Epstein needed to be assigned the new cellmate due 149 00:09:19,120 --> 00:09:21,679 to Inmate three's transfer to another prison. 150 00:09:22,399 --> 00:09:24,679 Speaker 2: The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and CO. 151 00:09:24,919 --> 00:09:28,240 Speaker 1: One, however, were the only two mcc new York staff 152 00:09:28,279 --> 00:09:32,279 members working the day watch on August ninth, twenty nineteen, 153 00:09:32,600 --> 00:09:35,519 who told the OIG that they were aware of Inmate 154 00:09:35,519 --> 00:09:39,279 three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate. 155 00:09:40,360 --> 00:09:44,200 CO one's immediate superior, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, 156 00:09:44,480 --> 00:09:47,080 was already aware of the need to assign Epstein a 157 00:09:47,120 --> 00:09:50,519 new cellmate, while the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge 158 00:09:50,519 --> 00:09:53,720 told the OIG that he made a number of notifications. 159 00:09:54,080 --> 00:09:58,279 Other witnesses cannot confirm that he passed on information regarding 160 00:09:58,440 --> 00:10:02,919 Epstein's need or a new cell mate. The day Watch 161 00:10:02,960 --> 00:10:06,720 Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant both told 162 00:10:06,759 --> 00:10:09,559 the OIG that they did not know in May three 163 00:10:09,679 --> 00:10:13,200 had been transferred out of the facility, despite the fact 164 00:10:13,200 --> 00:10:17,000 that both were recipients of the second email the USMS 165 00:10:17,000 --> 00:10:20,679 sent out on August eight that included the information about 166 00:10:20,720 --> 00:10:24,480 in May three's and pending transfer out of mcc New York. 167 00:10:24,679 --> 00:10:28,679 On August ninth, rather, the day Watch Operations Lieutenant and 168 00:10:28,799 --> 00:10:32,519 the day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that they 169 00:10:32,559 --> 00:10:35,879 believed in May three had been removed from mcc New 170 00:10:35,960 --> 00:10:40,200 York for a court appearance. The day Watch Activities Lieutenant 171 00:10:40,399 --> 00:10:43,639 did not recall in May three departing the institution with 172 00:10:43,840 --> 00:10:47,840 all of his belongings, or having any conversations with day 173 00:10:47,879 --> 00:10:51,600 Watch Shoe Officer in charge or anyone else regarding Inmate 174 00:10:51,639 --> 00:10:55,919 three's departure from mcc New York. According to the day 175 00:10:55,919 --> 00:10:59,320 Watch Activities Lieutenant, he did not know that Epstein was 176 00:10:59,360 --> 00:11:04,039 without a cell Other senior officials, including the Warden Associate 177 00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:07,799 Warden I and the captain, were also unaware of Inmate 178 00:11:07,840 --> 00:11:11,159 three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new 179 00:11:11,200 --> 00:11:15,600 cell mate. These officials concurred that while all shoe staff 180 00:11:15,600 --> 00:11:19,480 and supervisors were responsible for notifying a supervisor in the 181 00:11:19,559 --> 00:11:22,200 chain of command of the need to assign Epstein a 182 00:11:22,240 --> 00:11:25,720 new cellmate, the day watch shoe officer in charge bore 183 00:11:25,720 --> 00:11:29,919 a primary responsibility for the notification because he was the 184 00:11:29,960 --> 00:11:32,840 shoe officer in charge and one of the two people 185 00:11:32,879 --> 00:11:36,200 who saw the Inmate three leave the facility with all 186 00:11:36,240 --> 00:11:40,879 of his belongings. The Captain told the OIG that since 187 00:11:40,960 --> 00:11:44,240 Epstein was in the attorney conference room all day, no 188 00:11:44,279 --> 00:11:47,159 one may have even thought about it, and may have 189 00:11:47,200 --> 00:11:49,960 only become aware when they put Epstein back in his 190 00:11:50,039 --> 00:11:54,039 cell after his attorney visit that evening. The Captain said 191 00:11:54,080 --> 00:11:57,000 as soon as the shoe staff became aware that Epstein 192 00:11:57,080 --> 00:11:59,440 was without a cell mate, they should have notified the 193 00:11:59,440 --> 00:12:03,320 evening watch Operations lieutenant. The Captain said that if he 194 00:12:03,360 --> 00:12:06,519 had been informed, he would have taken immediate action to 195 00:12:06,679 --> 00:12:09,759 ensure that Epstein was either assigned a new cell mate 196 00:12:10,039 --> 00:12:15,480 or monitored until that assignment occurred. The Captain, however, was 197 00:12:15,559 --> 00:12:18,840 one of the recipients of the USMS August eighth email 198 00:12:19,159 --> 00:12:23,720 that notified members of mcc New York supervisory staff of 199 00:12:23,799 --> 00:12:28,279 inmate three transfer to another facility. The warden and associate 200 00:12:28,320 --> 00:12:31,639 warden did not receive this email. The warden told the 201 00:12:31,639 --> 00:12:35,600 OIG that he was off duty on August ninth, twenty nineteen. 202 00:12:36,320 --> 00:12:39,320 The warden said that in the event Epstein was without 203 00:12:39,320 --> 00:12:42,080 a cell mate, the plan was to review the situation 204 00:12:42,519 --> 00:12:45,960 and decide who should replace inmate three, but that no 205 00:12:46,080 --> 00:12:49,440 inmate in the shoe was pre selected to replace in 206 00:12:49,480 --> 00:12:53,600 May three if this event occurred. All right, So we're 207 00:12:53,600 --> 00:12:56,240 going to wrap up this episode right here, and then 208 00:12:56,320 --> 00:12:58,480 in the next episode we're going to pick up where 209 00:12:58,519 --> 00:13:01,120 we left off, and and that's going to be with 210 00:13:01,519 --> 00:13:06,440 section two Evening watch staff actions on August ninth. All 211 00:13:06,480 --> 00:13:08,840 of the information that goes with the episode can be 212 00:13:08,919 --> 00:13:13,480 found in the description box pig. What's up, everyone, and 213 00:13:13,519 --> 00:13:18,480 welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're 214 00:13:18,480 --> 00:13:21,399 going to pick back up with the OIG report and 215 00:13:21,559 --> 00:13:24,679 we're going to take a look at chapter six. 216 00:13:25,039 --> 00:13:28,200 Speaker 2: So let's get started. Chapter six. 217 00:13:28,679 --> 00:13:32,960 Speaker 1: The availability of limited recorded video evidence due to the 218 00:13:33,000 --> 00:13:38,799 security camera recording system failure. In August twenty nineteen, the 219 00:13:38,840 --> 00:13:43,120 Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York. MCC 220 00:13:43,279 --> 00:13:47,120 New York had approximately one hundred and fifty video security 221 00:13:47,200 --> 00:13:50,600 cameras no audio placed throughout the institution. 222 00:13:51,360 --> 00:13:52,159 Speaker 2: The Office of the. 223 00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:56,480 Speaker 1: Inspector General found that approximately eleven cameras were located in 224 00:13:56,600 --> 00:14:00,759 and around the Special Unit housing unit where where Epstein 225 00:14:01,000 --> 00:14:04,080 was confined at the time of his death on August tenth, 226 00:14:04,200 --> 00:14:07,559 twenty nineteen, including one at the end of the l 227 00:14:07,600 --> 00:14:11,679 tier where Epstein was housed that showed any movement in 228 00:14:11,799 --> 00:14:15,080 or out of inmate cells and in the tiers hallway. 229 00:14:15,799 --> 00:14:20,200 In addition to broadcasting live video, MCC New York had 230 00:14:20,240 --> 00:14:24,559 a system that recorded the live video feeds. Following Epstein's death, 231 00:14:24,639 --> 00:14:29,440 MCC New York officials and FBI investigators attempted to review 232 00:14:29,559 --> 00:14:33,600 video recordings related to the incident and discovered that although 233 00:14:33,639 --> 00:14:38,399 the security cameras were working and transmitting live video, recorded 234 00:14:38,480 --> 00:14:41,840 video from most of the cameras in the Shoe area 235 00:14:42,080 --> 00:14:45,080 was not available due to a malfunction of the video 236 00:14:45,159 --> 00:14:49,960 recording system that had occurred on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, 237 00:14:50,639 --> 00:14:53,440 including video from the camera at the end of EL Tier. 238 00:14:54,240 --> 00:14:57,399 As a result, while the L tier video camera was 239 00:14:57,480 --> 00:15:00,759 transmitting a live video feed on the night of August ninth, 240 00:15:00,799 --> 00:15:04,879 twenty nineteen and the morning of August tenth, twenty nineteen, 241 00:15:05,399 --> 00:15:08,879 the video was not being recorded. One of the cameras 242 00:15:08,919 --> 00:15:12,200 that had available recordings from August ninth and tenth was 243 00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:16,960 a camera located outside a housing unit adjacent to the shoe. 244 00:15:17,000 --> 00:15:20,399 That camera captured video of a large part of the 245 00:15:20,440 --> 00:15:23,759 common area of the shoe, including the shoe officer station 246 00:15:24,200 --> 00:15:28,000 and portions of the stairways leading to the different shoe tiers, 247 00:15:28,480 --> 00:15:32,080 including the L Tier. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to 248 00:15:32,240 --> 00:15:35,360 enter the L Tier from the common area of the shoe, 249 00:15:35,799 --> 00:15:39,080 including on August ninth and tenth, would have been picked 250 00:15:39,120 --> 00:15:42,440 up by the video recorded by that camera. In addition, 251 00:15:42,519 --> 00:15:45,879 the recording showed the shoe officer station, where the two 252 00:15:45,960 --> 00:15:49,440 shoe staff were seated at a desk immediately outside the 253 00:15:49,600 --> 00:15:53,639 entrance to the L Tier and diagonally across from Epstein's cell, 254 00:15:53,919 --> 00:15:56,600 which was the first cell on the right hand side 255 00:15:56,759 --> 00:16:00,639 of the L Tier. Section one back round round on 256 00:16:00,759 --> 00:16:04,759 the security camera system at MCC new York. All video 257 00:16:04,840 --> 00:16:09,440 surveillance from mcc new York's cameras was connected to a 258 00:16:09,559 --> 00:16:13,840 DVR system. The DVR system had two data storage systems 259 00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:17,799 that were labeled DVR one and DVR two, and each 260 00:16:17,879 --> 00:16:22,320 consisted of sixteen hard drives used for storing digital recordings. 261 00:16:22,960 --> 00:16:26,600 Roughly half of mcc new York security cameras were assigned 262 00:16:26,600 --> 00:16:29,360 to record to DVR one and the other half were 263 00:16:29,360 --> 00:16:33,840 assigned to record to DVR two. Cameras assigned to DVR 264 00:16:33,919 --> 00:16:37,519 one only recorded to the DVR one hard drives, and 265 00:16:37,639 --> 00:16:41,360 cameras assigned to DVR two only recorded to the DVR 266 00:16:41,399 --> 00:16:45,399 two hard drives. Therefore, if DVR one crashed, no video 267 00:16:45,480 --> 00:16:49,279 from the DVR two assigned cameras could be retrieved from 268 00:16:49,399 --> 00:16:54,080 DVR one, and vice versa. The OIG's investigation revealed the 269 00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:58,120 history of camera problems at MCC new York. In August 270 00:16:58,159 --> 00:17:02,799 twenty nineteen, the electro technician was the only such technician 271 00:17:03,080 --> 00:17:07,240 at MCC new York. The electronics technician told the OIG 272 00:17:07,799 --> 00:17:10,319 that when he began to work at mcc new York 273 00:17:10,519 --> 00:17:14,319 in twenty sixteen, he found that the facility's security camera 274 00:17:14,400 --> 00:17:18,519 system needed to be upgraded. According to the electronics technician, 275 00:17:18,799 --> 00:17:22,880 the system had not properly been maintained prior to his arrival, 276 00:17:23,200 --> 00:17:26,960 The hard drives in the DVRs frequently malfunctioned and needed 277 00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:30,839 to be replaced, and the overall system was outdated, in 278 00:17:30,920 --> 00:17:35,519 part because the cameras were analog and not digital. The 279 00:17:35,599 --> 00:17:39,559 electronics technician told the OIG that throughout his tenure at 280 00:17:39,640 --> 00:17:43,799 mcc new York, the camera system was subject to frequently 281 00:17:43,839 --> 00:17:47,559 recurring failures, particularly with the respect. 282 00:17:47,279 --> 00:17:48,759 Speaker 2: To the DVR hard drives. 283 00:17:49,880 --> 00:17:53,400 Speaker 1: The warden, who assumes his responsibilities at mcc new York 284 00:17:53,640 --> 00:17:56,799 in May of twenty eighteen, told the OIG he was 285 00:17:56,920 --> 00:17:59,960 generally aware that there were problems with the security GUS 286 00:18:00,079 --> 00:18:04,359 camera system throughout the institution. He further stated that efforts 287 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:08,880 were undertaken to determine which cameras were working and which 288 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:12,440 needed to be fixed, and that mcc new York officials 289 00:18:12,720 --> 00:18:18,759 intended to ultimately seek funding to replace the entire system. 290 00:18:19,000 --> 00:18:22,599 Federal Bureau of Prisons records reflect that on September sixth, 291 00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:27,000 twenty eighteen, the warden submitted a memorandum to the BP's 292 00:18:27,079 --> 00:18:31,000 Northeast Regional Director to request eight hundred thousand dollars in 293 00:18:31,039 --> 00:18:36,200 funding to replace the entire camera system. The memorandum identified 294 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:40,119 an estimated project start date of December one, twenty eighteen, 295 00:18:40,440 --> 00:18:44,960 and an estimated completion date of February ninth, twenty nineteen. 296 00:18:45,640 --> 00:18:49,279 The BOP approved the funding request, and on September twenty first, 297 00:18:49,559 --> 00:18:53,039 twenty eighteen, a contract in the amount of six hundred 298 00:18:53,359 --> 00:18:56,359 ninety eight thousand, one hundred eight dollars and ninety nine 299 00:18:56,480 --> 00:19:00,440 cents was awarded to Company one to provide various equipment 300 00:19:00,480 --> 00:19:05,240 for the project and associated labor. On September twenty fourth, 301 00:19:05,279 --> 00:19:08,920 twenty eighteen, a separate contract in the amount of thirty 302 00:19:08,920 --> 00:19:12,759 four thousand, eighty nine dollars and twenty eight cents was 303 00:19:12,799 --> 00:19:16,720 awarded to Company two to provide a sorted networking, equipment 304 00:19:16,960 --> 00:19:21,200 and wiring needed to install the camera system. As the 305 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:25,920 camera upgrade project was beginning, BOP officials recognized that mcc 306 00:19:26,079 --> 00:19:30,440 new York's mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems were also in 307 00:19:30,480 --> 00:19:33,880 need of major repairs. Mcc new York did not have 308 00:19:33,960 --> 00:19:38,000 enough qualified technicians on staff to complete both the camera 309 00:19:38,079 --> 00:19:42,720 installation and other repairs needed at the facility, so beginning 310 00:19:42,759 --> 00:19:47,200 the week of March seventeenth, twenty nineteen, the GOP's Northeast 311 00:19:47,319 --> 00:19:51,920 Regional Office arranged for technicians from the BP institutions to 312 00:19:52,000 --> 00:19:56,880 conduct temporary duty assignments at MCC New York to perform 313 00:19:56,920 --> 00:20:01,000 the work. During the course of the TDY rotatetions, work 314 00:20:01,079 --> 00:20:05,160 was not consistently conducted on the camera upgrades because sometimes 315 00:20:05,200 --> 00:20:08,680 TDY staff assigned to the project were used to cover 316 00:20:08,720 --> 00:20:13,039 shortages at MCC New York's custody posts, and sometimes there 317 00:20:13,039 --> 00:20:17,359 were not enough TDY volunteers who possess the skills required 318 00:20:17,559 --> 00:20:21,160 to do the camera work. At the time of Epstein's 319 00:20:21,160 --> 00:20:25,319 death on August tenth, twenty nineteen, the camera system upgrade 320 00:20:25,480 --> 00:20:30,039 had not been completed. Immediately following Epstein's death, Company one 321 00:20:30,079 --> 00:20:33,640 officials arrived at MCC New York and installed the new 322 00:20:33,680 --> 00:20:37,880 recording system within a couple of days, and recording functionality 323 00:20:38,000 --> 00:20:42,279 was restored using the existing cameras. The majority of the 324 00:20:42,319 --> 00:20:46,720 new cameras did not arrive to the facility until October 325 00:20:46,799 --> 00:20:50,559 twenty nineteen, and they were installed in stages as the 326 00:20:50,640 --> 00:20:55,519 wiring work was conducted. According to the electronics technician, as 327 00:20:55,519 --> 00:20:59,079 of August twenty twenty one, when the MCC closed the 328 00:20:59,160 --> 00:21:03,920 wiring work had still not been fully completed. Part two 329 00:21:04,279 --> 00:21:08,519 Discovery of security camera system recording issues in August of 330 00:21:08,559 --> 00:21:13,359 twenty nineteen. Part A discovery on August eighth of the 331 00:21:13,440 --> 00:21:18,160 DVR two failure that occurred on July twenty ninth. According 332 00:21:18,200 --> 00:21:22,359 to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death, 333 00:21:22,799 --> 00:21:26,480 disc failures occurred in MCC New York's DVR two system 334 00:21:26,880 --> 00:21:30,519 on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, which resulted in the 335 00:21:30,559 --> 00:21:35,200 system being unable to record. According to BOP records and 336 00:21:35,400 --> 00:21:39,559 OIG interviews, the BOP did not learn about the failure 337 00:21:39,799 --> 00:21:44,599 until August eight, twenty nineteen, when the Special Investigative Services 338 00:21:44,839 --> 00:21:49,599 Lieutenant and Dissociate ward I attempted to review recorded surveillance 339 00:21:49,680 --> 00:21:55,039 video for a matter unrelated to Epstein. The SIS lieutenant 340 00:21:55,240 --> 00:21:59,480 told the OIG she discovered that no recorded video was 341 00:21:59,519 --> 00:22:03,920 available for several of the institution's cameras, so she reported 342 00:22:03,960 --> 00:22:07,960 the matter to the communications office, and the electronics technician 343 00:22:08,079 --> 00:22:11,640 arrived to assess the problem sometime before his shift was 344 00:22:11,680 --> 00:22:16,240 scheduled to end. The electronics technician told the OIG that 345 00:22:16,359 --> 00:22:20,599 he found that roughly half of the institutions approximately one 346 00:22:20,640 --> 00:22:23,720 hundred and fifty cameras which were assigned to record to 347 00:22:23,839 --> 00:22:27,960 DVR two were displaying a live video but were not recording. 348 00:22:28,880 --> 00:22:32,920 The electronics technician told the OIG that before Epstein's death, 349 00:22:33,400 --> 00:22:36,759 no one was specifically tasked with ensuring that the video 350 00:22:36,839 --> 00:22:41,440 from the cameras was being recorded. The electronics technician said 351 00:22:41,480 --> 00:22:45,200 that he therefore did not perform any daily checks to 352 00:22:45,319 --> 00:22:48,960 ensure that the video is being recorded. The warden indicated 353 00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:53,400 that SIS staff are usually responsible for checking the system 354 00:22:53,720 --> 00:23:00,799 for recording functionality and reporting any problems to the communications office. However, 355 00:23:01,039 --> 00:23:04,279 the SIS lieutenant told the OIG that it was her 356 00:23:04,319 --> 00:23:07,839 belief that the electronics technician should have been checking the 357 00:23:07,880 --> 00:23:12,359 system daily to ensure it was recording. The OIG found 358 00:23:12,359 --> 00:23:16,839 that there are no BOP policies that specifically state that 359 00:23:16,920 --> 00:23:21,599 institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure the camera 360 00:23:21,680 --> 00:23:26,359 system is fully functional or that security camera systems have 361 00:23:26,480 --> 00:23:30,799 the capacity to record. The facility manager told the OIG 362 00:23:31,160 --> 00:23:34,319 that since Epstein's death, he now checks to ensure that 363 00:23:34,359 --> 00:23:38,039 all cameras and the recording system are working on a 364 00:23:38,119 --> 00:23:42,319 daily basis, and he subsequently provides a report about the 365 00:23:42,359 --> 00:23:46,200 status of the system to the facilities, executive staff, the 366 00:23:46,279 --> 00:23:50,960 SIS and electronics technicians. All right, folks, we're going to 367 00:23:51,079 --> 00:23:53,680 end this episode right there, and then in the next 368 00:23:53,680 --> 00:23:57,880 episode we're going to pick up with section B of 369 00:23:58,039 --> 00:24:01,960 Chapter six and keep it moving. All of the information 370 00:24:02,240 --> 00:24:04,920 that goes with the episode can be found in the 371 00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:05,920 description box.