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<v Speaker 1>So I was actually just looking at my phone this morning,

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<v Speaker 1>checking emails, you know, texting my mom, the usual routine,

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<v Speaker 1>All right, the usual, and it hit me. We always

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<v Speaker 1>talk about connectivity like it's this purely benevolent force. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>we really think everything is smart, everything talks to everything else.

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<v Speaker 1>But there's this flip side that we don't usually discuss

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<v Speaker 1>until it's way too late, which is that connectivity is

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<v Speaker 1>basically just a synonym for exposure.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh absolutely, that is the reality nobody puts on the

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<v Speaker 2>marketing brochure.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>Every connection is a door, Yeah, and the more doors

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<v Speaker 2>you have, the harder it is to make sure they're

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<v Speaker 2>all locked. Used to be that security was just for

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<v Speaker 2>you know, the IT guys in the basement protecting the server.

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<v Speaker 1>Ax right, the guys with the physical keys exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>But now if you have a log in or even

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<v Speaker 2>just a key card to get into the building, you

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<v Speaker 2>are part of the security.

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<v Speaker 1>Perimeter, which is a terrifying thought, considering I sometimes completely

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<v Speaker 1>forget my own Netflix password. Most people do, but I

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<v Speaker 1>mean that's exactly what I were doing this deep duck.

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<v Speaker 1>Today we are tackling cybersecurity fundamentals, and before anyone listening

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<v Speaker 1>rolls or eyes thinking this is going to be you know,

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<v Speaker 1>dry tech.

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<v Speaker 2>Support manuals Pleazon't you now yet?

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah? Hold on, we are decoding the actual mechanics of

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<v Speaker 1>how the digital world breaks. We're pulling all our insights

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<v Speaker 1>from the CCNP and CCIE security Core score three fifty

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<v Speaker 1>seven to one official CIRT Guide.

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<v Speaker 2>I know it's a bit of a mouthful of attich

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<v Speaker 2>a massive mouthflow, but it really is the gold standard.

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<v Speaker 2>It's the literal playbook that high level security architects use.

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<v Speaker 2>And what's great about this source material is that it

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<v Speaker 2>moves way past the buzzwords, right Like we hear hacker

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<v Speaker 2>or firewall or malware on the news all the time,

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<v Speaker 2>but we rarely stop to ask how does that actually work? Yes, like,

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<v Speaker 2>how does a literal line of code physically steal money

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<v Speaker 2>from a bank?

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<v Speaker 1>And that's exactly my goal today. I want to move

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<v Speaker 1>past the headlines and understand the actual machinery.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's do it.

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<v Speaker 1>But let's start with the basics, because I think I

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<v Speaker 1>think I've been using two terms interchangeably that are actually

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<v Speaker 1>quite different, information security and cybersecurity. Are these just corporate

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<v Speaker 1>synonyms or no?

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<v Speaker 2>There's real distinction, and it matters a lot in the

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<v Speaker 2>industry information security, or INFOSEC. That's kind of the old guard.

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<v Speaker 2>It's strictly about the data itself. Think of it like

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<v Speaker 2>a secret recipe in a physical safe. INFOSEC is obsessed

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<v Speaker 2>with what we call the CIA.

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<v Speaker 1>Triad the intelligence agency No.

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<v Speaker 2>No, it stands for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Okay, So

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<v Speaker 2>is the recipe secret? That's confidentiality. Has anyone changed the

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<v Speaker 2>ingredients without asking? That's integrity? And can the chef actually

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<v Speaker 2>get the recipe when he needs it? That's availability.

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<v Speaker 1>So INFOSEC is basically just locking the safe.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, But cybersecurity is the whole factory around it. It

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<v Speaker 2>includes infosec obviously, but it zooms way out to protect

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<v Speaker 2>the actual operations that rely on that digitized data. So

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<v Speaker 2>it's bigger, much bigger. It's about securing the delivery trucks,

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<v Speaker 2>the power grid running the ovens, the third party vendors

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<v Speaker 2>who supply flower. If your flower supplier gets hacked and

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<v Speaker 2>sends you poisoned.

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<v Speaker 1>Ingredients, you're safe, is totally fine, but your business is

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<v Speaker 1>dead exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>That is a cybersecurity problem. It's defending every single ingress

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<v Speaker 2>and egress connection.

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<v Speaker 1>That helps a lot actually, so, cybersecurity is about the

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<v Speaker 1>resilience of the whole system, not just keeping a file secret. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>But if you're trying to secure a factory that complex

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<v Speaker 1>with thousands of employees and devices, where do you even start.

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<v Speaker 1>Do you just start like patching holes randomly?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, that's the wild West approach and it almost always fails.

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<v Speaker 2>You need a map, a set of guardrails. Yeah, and

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<v Speaker 2>that's where frameworks come in. This source material leans heavily

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<v Speaker 2>on two big ones, NIST and ISO.

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<v Speaker 1>I've definitely heard of NIST. That's the government one.

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<v Speaker 2>Right now, Yeah, the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

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<v Speaker 2>It's under the US Department of Commerce.

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<v Speaker 1>To be honest, when I hear government framework, my brain

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<v Speaker 1>immediately goes to bureaucracy and endless red tape. Is it

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<v Speaker 1>actually useful for a private company?

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<v Speaker 2>Surprisingly? Yeah, it's a voluntary set of standards. But the

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<v Speaker 2>NIST Cybersecurity Framework is incredibly practical. It breaks everything down

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<v Speaker 2>into just five simple functions, which are identify, protect, detect, respond,

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<v Speaker 2>and recover.

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<v Speaker 1>Identify, Protect, detect, respond, recover.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, it gives everyone a common language. So if I'm

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<v Speaker 2>a chief information security officer and I have to go

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<v Speaker 2>talk to the border directors. I don't bore them with

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<v Speaker 2>code then fall asleep exactly. I say, here's how we

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<v Speaker 2>detect a threat and here's how we recover. It's a

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<v Speaker 2>way to manage risk cost effectively without getting bogged down

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<v Speaker 2>in the technical weeds.

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<v Speaker 1>And what about ISO.

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<v Speaker 2>So ISO is the international standard, specifically the ISO twenty

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<v Speaker 2>seven thousand series.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, how does that differ from NIS.

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<v Speaker 2>If NIST is the playbook you use internally to get

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<v Speaker 2>your act together. ISO, specifically ISO twenty seven to seven

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<v Speaker 2>zero one is the actual certification you get to prove

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<v Speaker 2>to the rest of the world that you're secure. Oh,

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<v Speaker 2>I see, Yeah, it's specifications for information security management systems.

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<v Speaker 2>And then there's ISO seven zero zero two, which is

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<v Speaker 2>more like a code of practice, but generally ISO twenty

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<v Speaker 2>seven zero zero one is the stamp of approval you

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<v Speaker 2>put on your website to tell clients, Hey, we actually

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<v Speaker 2>know what we're doing.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so we have the rulebooks down, now let's talk

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<v Speaker 1>about what we're actually fighting against. The guide breaks this

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<v Speaker 1>down into basically an equation risk equals threat times vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 2>Sometimes with impact thrown in there too. Yeah, right, I.

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<v Speaker 1>Want to drill into the difference between a threat and

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<v Speaker 1>a vulnerability, because I feel like I use those words

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<v Speaker 1>to mean the exact same thing in everyday conversation.

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<v Speaker 2>Most people do think of it this way. A vulnerability

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<v Speaker 2>is a weakness. It's an unluck window in your house.

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<v Speaker 2>In tech, it's a flaw and a piece of software

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<v Speaker 2>code or even a hardware design error just passive, entirely passive.

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<v Speaker 2>It's just sitting there waiting. In the industry, we use

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<v Speaker 2>cvees Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures as the standard ID system

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<v Speaker 2>to track these flaws and the threat. The threat is

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<v Speaker 2>the potential danger. It's the burglar walking down the street

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<v Speaker 2>checking those windows. A threat is latent until it's actually realized.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So a vulnerability without a threat isn't really risky.

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<v Speaker 1>Like if you live on a desert island, you can

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<v Speaker 1>leave your front door wide open, exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>But in the digital world, you are never on a

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<v Speaker 2>desert island. The threat is always there. Risk is just

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<v Speaker 2>the probability of that threat actually exploiting that vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 1>The source material mentioned some specific hardware vulnerabilities that sounded

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<v Speaker 1>like straight up sci fi movie titles Specter and Meltdown.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, those were huge earth shattering for the industry. And

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<v Speaker 2>they weren't software bugs. They were hardware vulnerabilities baked into

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<v Speaker 2>the actual computer processors.

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<v Speaker 1>Which means you can't just download a patch to fix

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<v Speaker 1>the code. Right.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, they made software mitigations, but the flaw was physical.

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<v Speaker 2>They exploited something called speculative execution aculative execution.

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<v Speaker 1>That sounds pretty intense. What does it actually mean for

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<v Speaker 1>a CPU to do that?

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<v Speaker 2>It's actually speed hack. Modern processors are so insanely fast

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<v Speaker 2>that they literally try to guess what you're going to

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<v Speaker 2>do next. Wait really, yeah, they execute instructions before they

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<v Speaker 2>even know if they're actually needed, just to save a

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<v Speaker 2>few fractions of a millisecond. If they guessed right, great

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<v Speaker 2>things run faster. If they guessed wrong, they just discard

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<v Speaker 2>the work.

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<v Speaker 1>So the computer is trying to be psychic.

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<v Speaker 2>It tries, but Specter and Meltdown found a way to

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<v Speaker 2>snoop on that discarded work. They could trick the processor

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<v Speaker 2>into speculatively reading secret memory like your passwords, and then

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<v Speaker 2>reading the tiny physical traces left behind on the chip.

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<v Speaker 2>That is wild. It proved that even the silicon chips

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<v Speaker 2>themselves can be vulnerable.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so you have the vulnerability, the chip flaw. You

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<v Speaker 1>have the threat, the bad actor, and then the exploit

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<v Speaker 1>is the tool they use to actually connect the two precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>The exploit is the crowbar. It's the specific tool or

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<v Speaker 2>technique written to take advantage of that specific weakness. And

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<v Speaker 2>here's the really scary part. What's that You don't even

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<v Speaker 2>have to write your own exploits anymore.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the guide mentioned something called exploit dB. It sounded

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<v Speaker 1>almost like an Amazon marketplace for hackers.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a massive archive, the exploit database. Security researchers actually

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<v Speaker 2>post exploits there to help companies see how the flaws

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<v Speaker 2>work so they can fix them.

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<v Speaker 1>But I'm guessing bad actors use them too.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh constantly. You can literally pull up a command line

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<v Speaker 2>tool called search bloit and just search the database like

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<v Speaker 2>show me an exploit for Windows ten boom, here's the

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<v Speaker 2>exact code you need.

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<v Speaker 1>So the tools are completely democratized at this point, which

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<v Speaker 1>brings us perfectly to the who the adversaries themselves, because

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<v Speaker 1>I think pop culture still has this stubborn image of

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<v Speaker 1>the thread actor, as you know, a lone wolf and

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<v Speaker 1>a hoodie drinking a monster energy drink and a dark basement.

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<v Speaker 2>And I mean that guy does exist. We call them

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<v Speaker 2>script kitties.

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<v Speaker 1>Script kitties.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, they're relatively unskilled individuals who just download those existing

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<v Speaker 2>tools from places like exploit dB and fire them off

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<v Speaker 2>without really understanding how the underlying code works.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're dangerous, but maybe not the main problem.

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<v Speaker 2>They're annoying and they cause dan image, but they aren't

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<v Speaker 2>the biggest danger. The biggest danger is organized crime.

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<v Speaker 1>Like digital mafias exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>This is big, big business. They run actual call centers,

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<v Speaker 2>they have HR departments, they have profit sharing models. They

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<v Speaker 2>are motivated purely by money.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow. And then there are nation states right.

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<v Speaker 2>Right governments, and they are usually looking for a quick

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<v Speaker 2>buck from stolen credit cards. They want intellectual property, state secrets,

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<v Speaker 2>or they want to plant malware in critical infrastructure for

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<v Speaker 2>future espionage or defense.

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<v Speaker 1>Their tools must be on a whole other level.

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<v Speaker 2>Custom built, highly sophisticated, and then kind of occupying a

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<v Speaker 2>weird middle ground between all these, you have activists and

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<v Speaker 2>terrorist groups.

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<v Speaker 1>Activists are they the ones who view themselves as kind

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<v Speaker 1>of digital robin hoods.

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<v Speaker 2>In their own minds. Maybe they're motivated by political or

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<v Speaker 2>social causes. They want to embarrass a target or leak

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<v Speaker 2>data to make a point. And then terrorist groups similarly

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<v Speaker 2>are motivated by ideology, usually aiming for disruption and fear.

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<v Speaker 1>So we know who they are and we know they

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<v Speaker 1>have exploits ready to go. Let's talk about their weapon

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<v Speaker 1>of choice, malware, the Fund's duck. The guide distinguishes between viruses, worms,

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<v Speaker 1>and trojans, and I have to admit I just call

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<v Speaker 1>literally everything a virus. What is the actual mechanical difference?

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<v Speaker 2>It mostly comes down to how they spread and operate.

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<v Speaker 2>A virus needs a host.

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<v Speaker 1>File like a word document exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It attaches itself to a spreadsheet or a document. But crucially,

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<v Speaker 2>a virus needs human interaction to work. You have to

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<v Speaker 2>actively double click the file to trigger the payload.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so if I don't click the attachment, the virus just.

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<v Speaker 2>Sleeps, right. It relies on you making a mistake. A worm,

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<v Speaker 2>on the other hand, is entirely different. It's kind of

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<v Speaker 2>the stuff of it nightmares because it does not need

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<v Speaker 2>human help.

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<v Speaker 1>It just moves on its own.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, Once a worm breaches a network, it replicates itself

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<v Speaker 2>and spreads to other vulnerable computers automatically. It just crawls

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<v Speaker 2>across the network connections. You be fast asleep and a

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<v Speaker 2>worm is systematically infecting.

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<v Speaker 1>Your entire That is genuinely terrifying. And the trojan, like

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<v Speaker 1>the trojan horse, exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Like the myth, it relies entirely on the uninformed user deception.

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<v Speaker 2>It masquerades is something you actually want, a free game,

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<v Speaker 2>a PDF invoice, a software.

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<v Speaker 1>Update, so you willingly install it.

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<v Speaker 2>You invite it right through the front door, but inside

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<v Speaker 2>it carries a malicious payload. The source specifically highlights rats

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<v Speaker 2>or remote access trojans.

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<v Speaker 1>That sounds extremely bad.

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<v Speaker 2>It's the worst case scenario for a user. Arat like

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<v Speaker 2>the famous poison ivy toolkit, for example, gives the attacker

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<v Speaker 2>total control over your machine.

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<v Speaker 1>Define total control.

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<v Speaker 2>It's like they are sitting in your computer chair. They

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<v Speaker 2>can turn on your webcam, they can record your keystrokes,

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<v Speaker 2>browse your files, move your mouse. You've essentially become a puppet.

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<v Speaker 1>There was a specific physical delivery method mentioned for these

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<v Speaker 1>prosians that really stuck with me. The poison Apple. Uh yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it sounds like a fairy tale, but it's actually just

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<v Speaker 1>a USB drive.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a classic, incredibly effective social engineering attack. An attacker

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<v Speaker 2>just drops an infected USB drive somewhere obvious, a company

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<v Speaker 2>parking a lot, cafeteria.

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<v Speaker 1>And they make it look tempting exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh, maybe they label it executive Salaries twenty twenty four,

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<v Speaker 2>or they put it on a physical keychain with a

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<v Speaker 2>cute photo of a puppy attached to it.

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<v Speaker 1>They just wait, and human curiosity becomes the vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 2>The strongest vulnerability we have. An employee picks it up,

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<v Speaker 2>their curiosity gets the better of them, and they plug

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<v Speaker 2>it into their work laptop just to see what's on it.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's it.

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<v Speaker 2>The moment they plug it in, the script auto runs,

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<v Speaker 2>the RT installs, and the attacker is inside the network.

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<v Speaker 2>No million dollar firewall can stop a curious employee from

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<v Speaker 2>plugging in a piece of plastic.

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<v Speaker 1>That is so simple and so devious. But okay, that's

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<v Speaker 1>how they get in. Once they're inside, what are they doing,

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<v Speaker 1>because lately it feels like the answer in the news

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<v Speaker 1>is almost always ransomware.

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<v Speaker 2>Ransomware has completely upended the entire economy of cybercrime. It

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<v Speaker 2>used to be all about quietly stealing data to sell

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<v Speaker 2>it on the black market. Now it's about holding the

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<v Speaker 2>data hostage in plain sight.

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<v Speaker 1>Because they encrypt your files right right.

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<v Speaker 2>They scramble all your documents so you can't read them,

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<v Speaker 2>and then they demand a massive payment for the digital

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<v Speaker 2>decryption key.

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<v Speaker 1>But the guide talked about a specific evolution in ransomware

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<v Speaker 1>that I found really disturbing us. Ransomware as a service.

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<v Speaker 2>This is that industrialization of prime I mentioned earlier. In

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<v Speaker 2>the old days, a hacker had to be somewhat of

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<v Speaker 2>a genius. They had to write the complex encryption code,

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<v Speaker 2>build a secure payment portal in the dark web, manage

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<v Speaker 2>the decryption keys. It was a lot of work, it was.

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<v Speaker 2>But now you have highly skilled developers who build the ransomware,

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<v Speaker 2>groups like the ones behind wanacry CONTI your dark side, right.

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<v Speaker 2>But they don't actually use the tools themselves. They rent

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<v Speaker 2>them out.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's literally a franchise model, like opening a fast

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<v Speaker 1>food restaurant.

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<v Speaker 2>It's exactly like that. You the criminal affiliate sign up,

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<v Speaker 2>You get a sleek dashboard, you get a two four

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<v Speaker 2>seven tech support hotline, and a built in payment processing system.

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<v Speaker 1>Tech support for criminals unbelievable.

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<v Speaker 2>You conduct the attack, the victim pays the ransom, and

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<v Speaker 2>the developer software automatically takes a twenty percent commission off

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<v Speaker 2>the top before routing the restu.

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<v Speaker 1>Which means any random person with bad intentions and a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit of cryptocurrency can become a high level thread actor.

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<v Speaker 2>It lowers the barrier to entry to almost zero. That's

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<v Speaker 2>exactly why we're seeing such a massive, sustained spike in

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<v Speaker 2>attacks on targets like hospitals and school districts. It's not

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<v Speaker 2>usually masterminds, it's unskilled affiliates using rented military grade tools.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's pivot slightly. Let's say the attacker isn't using ransomware.

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<v Speaker 1>Say they want to quietly steal secrets, maybe a nation

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<v Speaker 1>state trying to steal blueprints for a new jet engine. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>they're inside the network, how do they actually get that

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<v Speaker 1>massive amount of data out without the company's security team noticing?

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<v Speaker 2>The guide calls this exfiltration, right.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, xfiltration, And this is where we get into real

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<v Speaker 1>high level spycraft. If you just tried to eat email

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<v Speaker 1>a terabyte of proprietary data to evildash haacker dot com,

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<v Speaker 1>the corporate firewalls could catch it and block it immediately, obviously,

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<v Speaker 1>so they use a technique called tunneling. They hide the

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<v Speaker 1>stolen data inside normal traffic that the network explicitly allows wait.

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<v Speaker 2>Allowed traffic mean like just regular web browsing exactly. Take DNS,

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<v Speaker 2>for example, the domain name system. Every single time you

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<v Speaker 2>type Google dot com into your browser, your computer sends

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<v Speaker 2>a tiny request out to a DNS server, asking, Hey,

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<v Speaker 2>what is the IP address for Google dot com?

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<v Speaker 1>Right, it's the Internet's phone book.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and the server replies, no, company blocks DNS requests

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<v Speaker 2>because if you block DNS, the Internet effectively stops working

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<v Speaker 2>for your whole company.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, but how do you hide a massive jet engine

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<v Speaker 1>blueprint inside a tiny phone book request?

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<v Speaker 2>You chop the blueprint up into tiny, tiny pieces, then

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<v Speaker 2>you encode those pieces into the web address itself. Oh wow,

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<v Speaker 2>So the malware on the infected computer sends a DNS

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<v Speaker 2>request for something like secret dash part dash one dot

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<v Speaker 2>evildash hacker dot com.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah. I see, so the company's DNAs server just thinks

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<v Speaker 1>it's looking up a normal website, right.

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<v Speaker 2>It dutifully forwards the request out to the Internet. But

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<v Speaker 2>the attacker actually owns the domain evildashacker dot com. So

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<v Speaker 2>when that request hits their server, they just love that

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<v Speaker 2>first part secret part one and send back a fake

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<v Speaker 2>IP address.

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<v Speaker 1>And then the malware sends Part two.

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<v Speaker 2>Secret Part two dot evildashacker dot com. They do this

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<v Speaker 2>thousands and thousands of times.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like smuggling a massive dictionary out of a prison

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<v Speaker 1>by asking the guard to mail one single letter of

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<v Speaker 1>a word every day.

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<v Speaker 2>That is a perfect analogy to the guard the firewall.

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<v Speaker 2>It just looks like someone really likes looking up long,

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<v Speaker 2>weirdly named websites. But effectively you are tunneling gigabytes of

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<v Speaker 2>data right through the front door.

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<v Speaker 1>That's incredible. And the guide mentioned tools for this too, right,

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<v Speaker 1>like iodine.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, iodine is a popular tool for DNS tunneling and

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<v Speaker 2>for HTTP or TCP tunneling. Attackers use tools like netcap.

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<v Speaker 1>So if the malware is that sneaky, how does the

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<v Speaker 1>blue team, the defenders, how do they catch this stuff?

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<v Speaker 1>How do you even figure out what a piece of

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<v Speaker 1>malwaar is programmed to do?

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<v Speaker 2>You have to capture a sample of it and dissect it.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>We generally use two main methods. First is static.

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<v Speaker 1>Analysis, static meaning it's not moving.

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<v Speaker 2>It's like an autopsy. You don't actually run the code.

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<v Speaker 2>You use decompilation tools like ida pro or Gidra, which

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<v Speaker 2>fun fact, was actually developed and released by the NSA.

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<v Speaker 1>Really, the NSA gave away a hacking.

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<v Speaker 2>Tool, well, reverse engineering tool. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>You use it to look at the DNA of the

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<v Speaker 2>virus to see exactly what is programmed to do, looking

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<v Speaker 2>for recognizable functions or.

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<v Speaker 1>Strings of text, and what if the code is scrambled

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<v Speaker 1>or you can't tell just by looking at it.

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<v Speaker 2>Then you move to dynamic analysis. You put the malware

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<v Speaker 2>in a sandbox or a secure virtual machine. It's basically

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<v Speaker 2>a fake isolated computer environment that looks real. Then you

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<v Speaker 2>actually execute the virus and just watch what.

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<v Speaker 1>Happens, like putting it in an interrogation room. Does it

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<v Speaker 1>try to delete files? Does it try to phone home?

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly? But malware authors are smart, they know all about sandboxes,

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<v Speaker 2>so modern malware often has anti sandbox feed is built

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<v Speaker 2>right in.

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<v Speaker 1>What does that mean? It knows it's being watched.

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<v Speaker 2>It wakes up and does a quick environment check. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>it asks, is my hard drive remarkably small? Is the

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<v Speaker 2>user's mouse moving in a perfectly straight line instead of naturally?

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<v Speaker 2>Does my network card have a generic virtual sounding MSc address?

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<v Speaker 1>It literally checks to see if it's trapped in the matrix.

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<v Speaker 2>That's exactly what it's doing, and if it detects that

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<v Speaker 2>it's in a virtual machine, it just plays dead. It

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<v Speaker 2>does absolutely nothing malicious. The analyst looks at it and says, oh,

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<v Speaker 2>this is totally safe and lets it through.

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<v Speaker 1>And then when it gets onto a real employee laptop,

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<v Speaker 1>it detonates. Man, that is devious. Okay, we've covered the network,

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<v Speaker 1>the hardware, and the malware, but we have to talk

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<v Speaker 1>about the web. We basically live in our browsers. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>what are the big technical threats there? Because the guide

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<v Speaker 1>went really deep into SEQL injections.

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<v Speaker 2>Golah. Yeah, this is the absolute granddaddy of web vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>It targets the database sitting behind the website.

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<v Speaker 1>The guide used the snow example, which I found really helpful.

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<v Speaker 1>But let's try to visualize for the listener. Say you're

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<v Speaker 1>at a normal login screen. It asks for a username.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, Normally, you'd type in a name like Smith. The

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<v Speaker 2>website takes that name and talks to its database using

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<v Speaker 2>a language called SQL. It basically says select the user

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<v Speaker 2>record where the name equals smith.

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00:19:16.240 --> 00:19:19.799
<v Speaker 1>But in an injection attack, you don't type a normal name, No.

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<v Speaker 2>You type actual database commands into the user name box.

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<v Speaker 2>This specific example in the book is typing snow, then

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<v Speaker 2>an apostrophe, then O R one equals one.

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<v Speaker 1>Walk me through why that specific string breaks things snow

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<v Speaker 1>or R one with one.

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<v Speaker 2>The apostrophe tricks the database into thinking the name input

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<v Speaker 2>is finished. Then comes the injected command or R one

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<v Speaker 2>equals one. In basic logic, the number one always equals

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<v Speaker 2>the number one. That statement is universally true. Okay, so

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<v Speaker 2>you fundamentally changed the core question. The database is asking itself.

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<v Speaker 1>Instead of asking, fine, user snow, it's now asking.

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<v Speaker 2>What it asked The database find the user snow or

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<v Speaker 2>return any record where one equals one. Since one always

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<v Speaker 2>equals one, the database evaluates that is true for every

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<v Speaker 2>single entry it has. Oh no, yep, it dumps the

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<v Speaker 2>entire database passwords, credit cards, emails, everything, right under the screen.

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<v Speaker 2>This is what we call an inband SQL injection, where

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<v Speaker 2>you see the results directly. There's also blind sickly, where

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<v Speaker 2>you have to guess based on how the server behaves.

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<v Speaker 2>But the concept is the same, and all.

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<v Speaker 1>That happens just because the website developers didn't configure the

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<v Speaker 1>log inbox to reject special characters exactly.

428
00:20:25.759 --> 00:20:29.039
<v Speaker 2>It's a massive failure of what we call input sanitization.

429
00:20:29.319 --> 00:20:32.400
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so that attacks the database directly. What about XSS

430
00:20:32.640 --> 00:20:33.559
<v Speaker 1>cross sit scripting?

431
00:20:33.720 --> 00:20:36.920
<v Speaker 2>So XSS flips the script. It attacks the user, not

432
00:20:37.000 --> 00:20:40.200
<v Speaker 2>the server. The website server is perfectly fine, but the

433
00:20:40.240 --> 00:20:43.200
<v Speaker 2>attacker uses the website as a delivery mechanism to attack

434
00:20:43.200 --> 00:20:43.759
<v Speaker 2>the visitors.

435
00:20:43.880 --> 00:20:45.359
<v Speaker 1>How does that work in practice?

436
00:20:45.720 --> 00:20:48.759
<v Speaker 2>Imagine a forum or a blog with a comment section.

437
00:20:49.640 --> 00:20:52.839
<v Speaker 2>If the website is vulnerable to XSS, I can post

438
00:20:52.880 --> 00:20:55.599
<v Speaker 2>a comment that isn't just regular text, it's actually a

439
00:20:55.720 --> 00:20:58.920
<v Speaker 2>hidden the line of jagascript code. That specific type is

440
00:20:58.920 --> 00:21:01.519
<v Speaker 2>called stored X or persistent EXSS.

441
00:21:01.640 --> 00:21:03.720
<v Speaker 1>So I post my malicious comment and the website just

442
00:21:03.759 --> 00:21:04.559
<v Speaker 1>saves it to the page.

443
00:21:04.599 --> 00:21:06.799
<v Speaker 2>It saves it. It thinks it's just a normal comment.

444
00:21:07.359 --> 00:21:09.799
<v Speaker 2>Now you come along later to read the blog. Your

445
00:21:09.799 --> 00:21:12.440
<v Speaker 2>browser downloads all the comments to display them on your screen.

446
00:21:12.960 --> 00:21:15.480
<v Speaker 2>But when it hits my comment, it doesn't just display text.

447
00:21:15.680 --> 00:21:18.359
<v Speaker 2>Your browser actually executes my JavaScript code.

448
00:21:18.440 --> 00:21:20.000
<v Speaker 1>And what could that code do to me?

449
00:21:20.160 --> 00:21:22.559
<v Speaker 2>Almost anything your browser can do the most common goal

450
00:21:22.599 --> 00:21:25.759
<v Speaker 2>is stealing your session cookies, which are basically your temporary

451
00:21:25.759 --> 00:21:28.680
<v Speaker 2>digital ID cards, and quietly sending them back to me.

452
00:21:28.960 --> 00:21:31.519
<v Speaker 2>Now I can log into that site as you bypassing

453
00:21:31.599 --> 00:21:35.079
<v Speaker 2>your password completely. There's also reflected XSS, where the script

454
00:21:35.079 --> 00:21:37.000
<v Speaker 2>comes from a militia of link you click, like in

455
00:21:37.000 --> 00:21:40.880
<v Speaker 2>a fishing email. But stored XSS is terrifying because it's

456
00:21:40.880 --> 00:21:44.240
<v Speaker 2>like planting a landmine on a public road. Everyone who

457
00:21:44.359 --> 00:21:45.880
<v Speaker 2>visits the page gets hit.

458
00:21:46.400 --> 00:21:51.240
<v Speaker 1>And finally, there was CSRF cross site request forgery. The

459
00:21:51.319 --> 00:21:53.119
<v Speaker 1>guide also called this session writing.

460
00:21:54.039 --> 00:21:57.160
<v Speaker 2>This one is incredibly sneaky because it weaponizes the trust

461
00:21:57.200 --> 00:21:59.839
<v Speaker 2>a website has in your browser. Let's say you log

462
00:21:59.880 --> 00:22:02.400
<v Speaker 2>in to your banking website, you check your balance, and

463
00:22:02.440 --> 00:22:04.039
<v Speaker 2>you just leave the tab open in the background.

464
00:22:04.079 --> 00:22:05.480
<v Speaker 1>Okay, totally normal behavior.

465
00:22:05.640 --> 00:22:08.680
<v Speaker 2>Then in a new tab you click a completely different

466
00:22:08.720 --> 00:22:09.839
<v Speaker 2>link I sent you in an email.

467
00:22:09.880 --> 00:22:12.359
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so now I'm on your malicious site. In tab two.

468
00:22:12.599 --> 00:22:16.440
<v Speaker 2>That malicious site has a hidden automatic script that essentially

469
00:22:16.519 --> 00:22:20.039
<v Speaker 2>shouts over to your browser, Hey tell the bank and

470
00:22:20.119 --> 00:22:22.640
<v Speaker 2>the other tab to transfer one thousand dollars to account

471
00:22:22.720 --> 00:22:23.279
<v Speaker 2>x right now.

472
00:22:23.400 --> 00:22:25.640
<v Speaker 1>But wait, why would the bank actually listen to a

473
00:22:25.720 --> 00:22:26.759
<v Speaker 1>random command like that?

474
00:22:27.039 --> 00:22:29.920
<v Speaker 2>Because the request is technically coming from your browser and

475
00:22:29.960 --> 00:22:33.480
<v Speaker 2>you are currently logged in, the bank sees your valid

476
00:22:33.480 --> 00:22:36.279
<v Speaker 2>session cookie attached to the request and just assumes that

477
00:22:36.319 --> 00:22:38.440
<v Speaker 2>you pushed a button to make that transfer.

478
00:22:38.160 --> 00:22:40.839
<v Speaker 1>So I forged your request without even knowing I did it.

479
00:22:40.759 --> 00:22:43.400
<v Speaker 2>Exactly you were writing on your own valid session.

480
00:22:43.559 --> 00:22:46.359
<v Speaker 1>That makes the logout buttons seem so much more critical

481
00:22:46.400 --> 00:22:47.559
<v Speaker 1>than I ever realized.

482
00:22:47.640 --> 00:22:50.279
<v Speaker 2>It really really is. Closing the tab isn't always enough.

483
00:22:50.480 --> 00:22:51.720
<v Speaker 2>You need to kill the session.

484
00:22:51.960 --> 00:22:55.039
<v Speaker 1>We have covered a truly massive amount of ground today,

485
00:22:55.720 --> 00:22:59.079
<v Speaker 1>from the high level governance stuff like NIST and ISO,

486
00:22:59.400 --> 00:23:02.160
<v Speaker 1>all the way down to the gritty details of SQL

487
00:23:02.200 --> 00:23:06.559
<v Speaker 1>code tunneling and dropping poisoned USB drives and parking lots.

488
00:23:06.599 --> 00:23:08.680
<v Speaker 2>It's a vast ecosystem.

489
00:23:08.079 --> 00:23:10.480
<v Speaker 1>It is. If we zoom out for a second, what

490
00:23:10.559 --> 00:23:12.799
<v Speaker 1>does the core takeaway from all this material?

491
00:23:13.119 --> 00:23:15.440
<v Speaker 2>The big picture is that security isn't a wall you

492
00:23:15.519 --> 00:23:18.279
<v Speaker 2>build once and just walk away from. It's a living,

493
00:23:18.440 --> 00:23:22.799
<v Speaker 2>breathing operation because the attackers are constantly innovating. Look at

494
00:23:22.880 --> 00:23:26.880
<v Speaker 2>ransomware as a service. They are quite literally turning cybercrime

495
00:23:27.000 --> 00:23:28.880
<v Speaker 2>into a scalable franchise model.

496
00:23:29.160 --> 00:23:31.559
<v Speaker 1>That was definitely the most striking part for me, the

497
00:23:31.559 --> 00:23:36.079
<v Speaker 1>democratization of the threat. It's not just nation state superspies anymore.

498
00:23:36.559 --> 00:23:41.240
<v Speaker 1>It's literally anyone who can afford to rent the software exactly.

499
00:23:41.279 --> 00:23:45.759
<v Speaker 2>And because the threat is democratized, the defense has to

500
00:23:45.799 --> 00:23:48.000
<v Speaker 2>be democratized too. It can't just fall in the IT

501
00:23:48.279 --> 00:23:51.519
<v Speaker 2>department's shoulders. It has to be the entry level employee

502
00:23:51.759 --> 00:23:54.440
<v Speaker 2>who knows not to plug in that random USB drive.

503
00:23:54.880 --> 00:23:57.640
<v Speaker 2>It has to be the web developer who double checks

504
00:23:57.640 --> 00:23:59.599
<v Speaker 2>that they sanitize the log inbox.

505
00:23:59.279 --> 00:24:02.759
<v Speaker 1>Input, the average user who actually clicks log out on

506
00:24:02.799 --> 00:24:03.559
<v Speaker 1>their bank account.

507
00:24:03.599 --> 00:24:05.160
<v Speaker 2>Please always log out of your bank account.

508
00:24:05.200 --> 00:24:07.599
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to go do that immediately after we finish recording,

509
00:24:07.640 --> 00:24:09.359
<v Speaker 1>but I want to leave everyone listening with a thought

510
00:24:09.519 --> 00:24:12.319
<v Speaker 1>based on what we just discuss. If we're entering an

511
00:24:12.400 --> 00:24:16.680
<v Speaker 1>era where sophisticated, military grade ransomware is sold as a

512
00:24:16.720 --> 00:24:20.440
<v Speaker 1>service to unskilled criminals, are we reaching a point where

513
00:24:20.480 --> 00:24:23.200
<v Speaker 1>anyone can be a high level threat actor? And if so,

514
00:24:23.960 --> 00:24:26.960
<v Speaker 1>what does that mean for our own personal digital security

515
00:24:27.079 --> 00:24:27.839
<v Speaker 1>moving forward.

516
00:24:28.039 --> 00:24:30.039
<v Speaker 2>It's a very sobering question to think about.

517
00:24:30.200 --> 00:24:32.160
<v Speaker 1>It really is. Thank you so much for guiding us

518
00:24:32.200 --> 00:24:33.799
<v Speaker 1>through this digital mindfield today.

519
00:24:34.079 --> 00:24:35.720
<v Speaker 2>My pleasure stay safe out there.

520
00:24:35.599 --> 00:24:38.359
<v Speaker 1>And thank you for listening. Hopefully you are looking at

521
00:24:38.359 --> 00:24:40.480
<v Speaker 1>your phone a little differently right now, not just as

522
00:24:40.519 --> 00:24:43.440
<v Speaker 1>a magic connection machine, but as something that is actively

523
00:24:43.480 --> 00:24:47.519
<v Speaker 1>worth protecting until next time, keep your firewalls up and

524
00:24:47.559 --> 00:24:50.599
<v Speaker 1>your curiosity open. This has been the deep dive
