Speaker 1: Welcome to the deep dive. This time we're putting on
Speaker 1: our digital detective hats and going on a deep dive
Speaker 1: into the world of malware analysis. Oh yeah, you've shared
Speaker 1: some sections from Packed Learning malware analysis, and frankly, some
Speaker 1: of this stuff is already blowing my mind right, but
Speaker 1: I know with your help, we're going to break down
Speaker 1: these crucial insights and techniques.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, it's like learning to think like the enemy, a
Speaker 2: digital enemy, that is. We'll uncover how malware operates, the
Speaker 2: strategies attackers employ, and most importantly, the tools and methods
Speaker 2: experts use to thwart their evil plans.
Speaker 1: Okay, so before we get into the super secret spy stuff, sure,
Speaker 1: let's start with the basics. Okay, what exactly is malware
Speaker 1: and why is analyzing it's so crucial? It seems like
Speaker 1: every other day there's a new headline about some data
Speaker 1: breach or ransomware attack.
Speaker 2: You're right, it's a constant battle out there. It is
Speaker 2: malware at its core, is any software designed to wreak
Speaker 2: havoc on computer systems or steel sensitive information versus worms, trojans, ransomware,
Speaker 2: all those digital bad guys. Analyzing it is like gathering intel.
Speaker 2: It helps us understand how it spreads, what it targets,
Speaker 2: and what kind of damage it can inflict.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: This knowledge then arms cybersecurity professionals with the tools to
Speaker 2: fight back, like creating antivirus software and security patches.
Speaker 1: So it's like a digital arms race. Malware developers create
Speaker 1: new threats, yeah, exact. Security researchers develop new defenses exactly.
Speaker 2: But it's not just about protection, okay. Malware analysis also
Speaker 2: plays a crucial role in incident response.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: If a system's been compromised, it's like a digital autopsy.
Speaker 2: Analysts dissect the malware to piece together how it got in,
Speaker 2: what it did, and how to prevent it from happening again.
Speaker 2: It's like learning from our mistakes digitally speaking.
Speaker 1: Got it? So knowing your enemy is just as important
Speaker 1: in the digital world as it is in the real world. Yeah, Now,
Speaker 1: how do experts actually go about analyze these malicious programs? Well,
Speaker 1: the book mentions two main approaches, static and dynamic analysis.
Speaker 2: Yes, can you walk us through those absolutely?
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: Static analysis is like examining a suspicious package without opening it.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: We look for clues on the outside, things like markings, labels,
Speaker 2: or even the weight to assess potential threats. Okay, in
Speaker 2: the digital world, it means examining the malwaar's code without
Speaker 2: actually running it.
Speaker 1: Got it.
Speaker 2: We're looking for red flags and indicators of compromise, so.
Speaker 1: We're basically looking for telltale signs that screen this is
Speaker 1: malware exactly.
Speaker 2: One of the first things we check is the file signature.
Speaker 2: This is a unique sequence of bites at the beginning
Speaker 2: of a file that identifies its type, like a digital fingerprint.
Speaker 1: I see.
Speaker 2: Malware often tries to disguise itself with misleading file extensions,
Speaker 2: like labeling an executable file as a harmless image, but
Speaker 2: checking the file signature lets us see through the disguise.
Speaker 1: Clever those malware developers. But it sounds like security researchers
Speaker 1: are one step ahead. Yeah, what are their techniques do
Speaker 1: they use in static analysis?
Speaker 2: Well, there's actual fingerprinting, which takes the digital fingerprint analogy
Speaker 2: even further.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: We use cryptographic hash functions like MD five or SAHA
Speaker 2: two five six to create a unique identifier for the
Speaker 2: malware based on its content. Ice This helps us track
Speaker 2: specific malware samples, even if they try to change their
Speaker 2: name or location.
Speaker 1: So it's like having a database of known malware fingerprints.
Speaker 2: Exactly.
Speaker 1: I see.
Speaker 2: We can also extrapt strings from the code. Okay, think
Speaker 2: of it like searching for clues in a ransom note.
Speaker 2: These strings might reveal website addresses, the malware connects to
Speaker 2: files that tries to access wo or even hidden functionality.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: There are even tools like flaws that can decode ob
Speaker 2: puscated strings, essentially secret messages hidden within the code.
Speaker 1: Ooh, secret messages. It's like we're cracking a code. Yeah.
Speaker 1: What about those packers that malware developers use to make
Speaker 1: their code harder to analyze? Yeah, I imagine it's like
Speaker 1: trying to read a book that's been shrink wrapped.
Speaker 2: That's a great analogy. Packers compress an obfuscate malware code,
Speaker 2: making it smaller and more difficult to analyze. But just
Speaker 2: like with shrink wrap, we have tools to unpack it.
Speaker 2: Packer detection tools can identify which packer was used, and
Speaker 2: then unpacking tools can reverse the process, revealing the original code.
Speaker 1: Okay, so we can get past those pesky packers. Yes,
Speaker 1: what about the pe header?
Speaker 2: Yes?
Speaker 1: Is that another area of interest for static analysis?
Speaker 2: Absolutely? The pehader is like the table of contents for
Speaker 2: a Windows executable file. It contains essential information about the
Speaker 2: program's structure, its dependencies, and even potential anomalies that might
Speaker 2: indicate malicious intent.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: Analyzing this header it can tell us a lot about
Speaker 2: how the malware is organized and what it might try
Speaker 2: to do.
Speaker 1: It's like getting a sneak peek at the malware's blueprint
Speaker 1: before we even try to run.
Speaker 2: It exactly okay, And speaking of organismation, analyzing the different
Speaker 2: sections within the executable is another key part of static analysis, Okay.
Speaker 2: I think of it like dissecting a frog and biology class.
Speaker 2: Each section has a specific purpose, either containing code to
Speaker 2: be executed or data to be used. Got it. By
Speaker 2: examining these sections, we can understand how the malware is
Speaker 2: structured and identify potential areas of interest.
Speaker 1: Fascinating. So static analysis gives us a pretty comprehensive understanding
Speaker 1: of the malware's anatomy and potential behavior. Yeah, but can
Speaker 1: we identify which family it belongs to? Just from static analysis?
Speaker 1: It seems like there must be tons of different malware
Speaker 1: strains out there.
Speaker 2: You're right, yeh. The malware world is vast and diverse, right,
Speaker 2: But we can use a technique called fuzzy hashing to
Speaker 2: identify similarities between different malware samples. Oh okay, it's like
Speaker 2: finding those long lost relatives in your family tree, but
Speaker 2: for malware. Interesting tools like steep can compare the fuzzy
Speaker 2: hashes of different samples and group them into family based
Speaker 2: on shared code or characteristics.
Speaker 1: So even if the malware tries to change its appearance
Speaker 1: slightly exactly, we can still link it to its nefarious
Speaker 1: family members exactly.
Speaker 2: Of course, there are limitations. Even closely related samples might
Speaker 2: have different hash values if they were compiled differently or
Speaker 2: slightly modified. But fuzzy hashing gives us a powerful tool
Speaker 2: for tracking malware and understanding its evolution sense.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and what about Yaiira rules? Ah, those were mentioned
Speaker 1: in the book.
Speaker 2: Our rules are a malware analyst's best friend. They're like
Speaker 2: custom made malware detectors. Think of it like creating a
Speaker 2: wanted poster for a specific type of malware. You define
Speaker 2: a set of rules based on unique characteristics like specific strings,
Speaker 2: bite patterns, or even file sizes. Okay, then you can
Speaker 2: scan files against these rules to quickly identify potential threats.
Speaker 1: So it's like having a personalized security guard for your
Speaker 1: system on the lookout for specific types of malware precisely. Wow.
Speaker 2: It helps automate threat detection and makes it much easier
Speaker 2: to find known malware families.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: However, yrray rules do have limitations. If a malwaur author
Speaker 2: knows about a particular rule, they might modify their code
Speaker 2: to evade detection. It's a constant game of cat and mouse.
Speaker 1: So it's a constant battle of wits between the malware
Speaker 1: developers and the security researchers.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, it's one of the things that makes this field
Speaker 2: so challenging and exciting it is. But with tools like
Speaker 2: Yarra rules, we can stay one step ahead of those
Speaker 2: digital bad guys.
Speaker 1: Okay, so we've explored static analysis examining the malware without
Speaker 1: running it. Yes, now it's time to get our hands
Speaker 1: dirty and see this thing in action. Yeah, but before
Speaker 1: we unleash the beast, we need to talk about the
Speaker 1: lab environment. We don't want to accidentally unleash this malware
Speaker 1: on the world.
Speaker 2: You're absolutely right. Dynamic analysis involves actually running the malware,
Speaker 2: so we need a secure and isolated environment to contain
Speaker 2: it and observe its behavior.
Speaker 1: Makes sense.
Speaker 2: The book recommends a setup with multiple virtual machines.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: One Windows VM, completely isolated from the network, acts as
Speaker 2: our digital sandbox to run the malware.
Speaker 1: Got it.
Speaker 2: A separate Linux VM serves as a gateway to simulate
Speaker 2: Internet services, allowing us to analyze the malware's network communications
Speaker 2: without any risk to the outside world.
Speaker 1: So it's like setting up a digital Petri dish to
Speaker 1: observe the malwaar's behavior precisely. I like it.
Speaker 2: This controlled environment allows us to see what the malware
Speaker 2: does in real time and gather valuable insights into its
Speaker 2: capabilities and intentions.
Speaker 1: Okay, our digital lab is all set up. Yeah, we've
Speaker 1: got our safety goggles on and we're ready to release
Speaker 1: the malware. Okay, what happens next?
Speaker 2: First, we always start with a clean snapshot of our
Speaker 2: virtual machines, ensuring a pristine system for each analysis.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: Then before executing the malware, Yeah, we fire up our
Speaker 2: monitoring tools at it. These are like our surveillance cameras, right,
Speaker 2: capturing the malwares every move I see. We want to
Speaker 2: see what files it touches, what registry keys it modifies,
Speaker 2: and what processes it spawns.
Speaker 1: I'm picturing a whole team of digital detectives huddled around
Speaker 1: their screens. Yeah, monitoring the malwares every move. Right. What
Speaker 1: kind of tools are in their arsenal?
Speaker 2: We have a whole suite of powerful tools at our disposal.
Speaker 2: Process monitor is a personal favorite. It captures real time
Speaker 2: information about virtually everything the malware does on the system. Wow,
Speaker 2: giving us a detailed timeline of its actions.
Speaker 1: That's amazing.
Speaker 2: It's like having a security camera with X ray vision.
Speaker 1: Wow. That sounds incredibly comprehensive. It is, But I imagine
Speaker 1: sifting through all that data must be overwhelming. You're right,
Speaker 1: like trying to find a needle in a haystack.
Speaker 2: You're right. Process monitor can generate a lot of data.
Speaker 2: That's where a tool like norabin comes in. The Python
Speaker 2: script that works alongside process monitor, applying predefined filters to
Speaker 2: highlight the most suspicious events I see. It helps us
Speaker 2: separate the signal from the noise and focus on the
Speaker 2: malware's footprints.
Speaker 1: Love it like a digital magnifying glass. Yes, what other
Speaker 1: tools are in our digital detective kit?
Speaker 2: Process hacker is another essential tool. It lets us peek
Speaker 2: into the system's running processes, examine their attributes, and even
Speaker 2: terminate them if necessary.
Speaker 1: Got it.
Speaker 2: It's like having a direct line to the brain of
Speaker 2: the operating system.
Speaker 1: And what about the malwaar's attempts to communicate with the
Speaker 1: outside world. I imagine we need to keep a close
Speaker 1: eye on its network traffic.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, Wireshark is our go to tool for that. It
Speaker 2: captures packets traveling over the network, allowing us to dissect
Speaker 2: the malwar's communications in detail. We can see which servers
Speaker 2: it tries to connect to, what data it sends or receives,
Speaker 2: and even what protocols it uses.
Speaker 1: So even though we've isolated the malware in a virtual
Speaker 1: environment exactly, we can still see its attempts to phone
Speaker 1: home exactly.
Speaker 2: And to make that simulated environment even more realistic, we usetsim.
Speaker 2: It runs on our Linux VM and simulates various Internet
Speaker 2: services like web servers, DNS servers, and email servers. This way,
Speaker 2: the malware thinks it's communicating with the real world, but
Speaker 2: we can intercept and analyze its traffic safely within our lab.
Speaker 1: So it's like setting a chap and then watching the
Speaker 1: malware walk right into it exactly. Okay, our monitoring tools
Speaker 1: are running, the malware is executed we're gathering data. What
Speaker 1: happens next?
Speaker 2: We let the malware run for a specific period, depending
Speaker 2: on its nature and our goals. Then we stop the
Speaker 2: monitoring tools and begin the most exciting part, analyzing the results.
Speaker 2: We sift through the logs, reports, and captured network traffic,
Speaker 2: piecing together the malware story.
Speaker 1: It's like solving a digital puzzle. Yes, connecting the dots,
Speaker 1: finding patterns, and figuring out what it all means.
Speaker 2: Precisely. By correlating data from different tools, we can reconstruct
Speaker 2: the malware's actions, understand its goals okay, and identify potential
Speaker 2: vulnerabilities it exploits got it. For instance, if we see
Speaker 2: process monitor flagging, file system changes, and wire sharks showing
Speaker 2: data being sent to a specific server, we can infer
Speaker 2: that the malware is stealing information.
Speaker 1: Amazing, So we can track the malwares every move and
Speaker 1: piece together its modis exactly, but to understand them how
Speaker 1: it actually accomplishes these tasks, we need to go even
Speaker 1: deeper into the world of assembly code.
Speaker 2: You're absolutely right, Okay.
Speaker 1: I'm ready to level up our analysis skills. Okay, but
Speaker 1: before we dive into that world, maybe you can give
Speaker 1: me a crash course in assembly code and what it
Speaker 1: all means.
Speaker 2: Imagine you have a program written in a language like
Speaker 2: C plus plus, something that's relatively easy for humans to
Speaker 2: read and understand.
Speaker 1: Right, I vaguely remember something about that from my computer
Speaker 1: science dasee.
Speaker 2: Well, assembly language sits between those two extremes. Okay, it's
Speaker 2: a human readable representation of that machine code, using knemonics
Speaker 2: or short codes to represent different instructions. Disassemblers like IDA
Speaker 2: pro translate machine code back into this assembly language, making
Speaker 2: it easier for us to understand what the program is doing.
Speaker 1: So it's like translating a secret code into something we
Speaker 1: can decipher exactly.
Speaker 2: And then debuggers like by sixty forty BG allow us
Speaker 2: to step through the program's execution, one instruction at a time.
Speaker 2: We can watch how the data changes in memory, identify
Speaker 2: which functions are called, and even modify the program's behavior
Speaker 2: to see how it reacts.
Speaker 1: So we're like digital puppeteers controlling the malware's strings.
Speaker 2: That's one way to put it. I like it, But
Speaker 2: of course, to be effective puppeteers, we need to understand
Speaker 2: the language the malware speaks. A solid grasp of assembly
Speaker 2: language and the by eighty six architecture, the instruction set
Speaker 2: used by most processors is crucial for this type of analysis.
Speaker 1: It sounds challenging, but incredibly rewarding. It is learned how
Speaker 1: to analyze malware from a high level with static and
Speaker 1: dynamic analysis. Yes, and now we're ready to go deep
Speaker 1: into the code itself. We've unlocked a whole new level
Speaker 1: of malware analysis expertise.
Speaker 2: Exactly, and with these skills we can start to uncover
Speaker 2: the advanced techniques that malware authors use to evade detection
Speaker 2: and achieve their nefarious goals. We can learn how they
Speaker 2: hide themselves, yeah, spread to other systems, and steal sensitive information.
Speaker 1: Wow.
Speaker 2: It's a fascinating and constantly evolving field, it is.
Speaker 1: Yeah, welcome back to the deep dive. We're still neck
Speaker 1: deep in the world of malware analysis, and last time
Speaker 1: things got pretty intense. With static and dynamic analysis techniques,
Speaker 1: we even took a peek at the inner workings of
Speaker 1: malware through the lens of the assembly code.
Speaker 2: That's right. We laid a solid foundation for understanding how
Speaker 2: malware behaves and how experts analyze it.
Speaker 1: But today we're going even deeper into a realm that
Speaker 1: sounds straight out of a crime procedural memory forensics.
Speaker 2: It's exactly like a digital crime scene investigation, but instead
Speaker 2: of dusting for fingerprints, we're digging into a computer's RAM,
Speaker 2: that Voldel memory that holds the system's current state to
Speaker 2: find those crucial bits of evidence.
Speaker 1: So even if the malware tries to cover its tracks,
Speaker 1: erase files, or cleanup registry entries, we might still find
Speaker 1: its digital footprints and memory precisely.
Speaker 2: Think of it like finding a discarded cigarette butt or
Speaker 2: a muddy footprint at a crime scene. The culprint might
Speaker 2: have vanished, but they've left behind traces of their presence.
Speaker 2: Memory forensics helps us uncover these digital remnants and reconstruct
Speaker 2: what happened.
Speaker 1: Okay, that's a powerful image. So memory forensics is our
Speaker 1: secret weapon, our digital magnifying glass for catching those sneaky
Speaker 1: malware actors. But how do we actually get access to
Speaker 1: this memory. It's not like we could just crack open
Speaker 1: a computer and peer inside.
Speaker 2: You're right. Accessing RAM directly is tricky, but we can
Speaker 2: capture a snapshot of it a memory gump, at a
Speaker 2: specific moment in time. This dump is saved to a
Speaker 2: file on disc, which we can then analyze in detail.
Speaker 2: It's like freezing the crime scene and then meticulously examining
Speaker 2: every detail.
Speaker 1: But memory is volatile, right, meaning its contents disappear when
Speaker 1: the computer shuts down. So we need to act fast
Speaker 1: and use the right tools to capture this memory dump
Speaker 1: before it vanishes.
Speaker 2: Exactly. We need to be quick on the draw. Digitally speaking,
Speaker 2: The book mentions a tool called dump it, which is
Speaker 2: part of the Comy toolkit. It's incredibly easy to use.
Speaker 2: Run it with administrator privileges, and it'll create a memory
Speaker 2: dump file for you. It's like having a digital camera
Speaker 2: that can capture the state of the entire system in.
Speaker 1: An instant snapshot taken. Now, when we have this memory
Speaker 1: dumb file, what do we do with it?
Speaker 2: That's where the real fund begins the analysis. We use
Speaker 2: a powerful open source framework called volatility to extract all
Speaker 2: sorts of valuable information from these memory dumps. It's like
Speaker 2: having a Swiss Army knife for memory analysis. It's packed
Speaker 2: with plugins that allow us to examine processes, loaded modules,
Speaker 2: network connections, and even user activity all from that snapshot
Speaker 2: of ram.
Speaker 1: Wow, it sounds incredibly versatile. What kind of insights can
Speaker 1: we actually gain from this memory analysis? What are we
Speaker 1: looking for.
Speaker 2: Well, one of the first things we do is check
Speaker 2: which processes we're running at the time of the dump.
Speaker 2: Volatility has a plug in called slist that essentially gives
Speaker 2: us a task manager for the memory dump. We can
Speaker 2: see all the running processes, their process IDs, parent processes,
Speaker 2: the whole family tree.
Speaker 1: So we can see what was running, who started it,
Speaker 1: and when. But how does this help us identify malware?
Speaker 2: Often malware tries to hide in plain sight by mimicking
Speaker 2: legitimate processes. It might use a slightly altered name or
Speaker 2: masquerade as a system process. But with slist we can
Speaker 2: scrutinize the process lists and look for those subtle discrepancies
Speaker 2: that might betray a malicious actor.
Speaker 1: It's like spotting a counterfeit bill amongst the stack of
Speaker 1: real ones. You need a keen eye for detail exactly.
Speaker 2: The book actually gives a great example of this. In
Speaker 2: a memory image infected with the Presese malware. The slist
Speaker 2: output revealed two suspicious processes, svose dot ex and such
Speaker 2: chos dot ex.
Speaker 1: With those look almost identical to the legitimate sv cos
Speaker 1: dot exx process, which I know handles a bunch of
Speaker 1: system services. It's like they just added an extra dot precisely.
Speaker 2: That's a classic tactic for malware trying to blend in
Speaker 2: by mimicking the names of legitimate processes. But even a
Speaker 2: single extra character can be a dead giveaway for a
Speaker 2: trained eye.
Speaker 1: So SLISS helps us spot those subtle differences and identify
Speaker 1: potential malware lurking in the process list. But what if
Speaker 1: the malware is even more clever and tries to hide
Speaker 1: its processes altogether, like a digital ninja disappearing into the shadows.
Speaker 1: Can we still catch it?
Speaker 2: Absolutely? Attackers might use a technique called direct kernel object
Speaker 2: manipulation or DKM for short, to make their processes invisible
Speaker 2: to traditional detection methods.
Speaker 1: DKM that sounds serious, what's going on there?
Speaker 2: Imagine a puppet master controlling the strings of a puppet show.
Speaker 2: With DKM, malware can essentially manipulate the operating system's kernel
Speaker 2: its core to hide processes from view. It's like cutting
Speaker 2: the strings, so the puppet disappears from the stage, so it's.
Speaker 1: Like the malware is tampering with the operating system itself.
Speaker 1: That's some next level stuff. But if SLISS relies on
Speaker 1: the kernel to provide the process list, how can we
Speaker 1: find those hidden processes. Is it even possible?
Speaker 2: It is. Thankfully Volatility has another plug in called Scan.
Speaker 2: Unlike slist, Scan doesn't solely rely on the kernel's process list.
Speaker 2: It uses a technique called pool tag scanning, which is
Speaker 2: like having a bloodhound that can sniff out those hidden
Speaker 2: processes even if they've gone off the grid.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm intrigued. How does this pool tag scanning work.
Speaker 2: The Windows kernel manages memory in chunks called pools. Think
Speaker 2: of them like containers for data, and each pool is
Speaker 2: tagged with a unique identifier, a pool tag like a
Speaker 2: label on a container. Certain kernel objects, including processes, are
Speaker 2: always allocated from pools with specific pool tags.
Speaker 1: So it's like knowing that all the bananas are stored
Speaker 1: in containers labeled B and all the apples are in
Speaker 1: containers labeled.
Speaker 2: A exactly, and scan can look for those containers with
Speaker 2: specific pool tags to find processes even if they've been
Speaker 2: unlinked from the main process list. It's like knowing where
Speaker 2: to look for the evidence, even if someone has tried
Speaker 2: to hide it.
Speaker 1: That's brilliant. So even if malware uses dkom to go
Speaker 1: stealth mode, scan can still track it down. But you
Speaker 1: mentioned that pool tags themselves can be manipulated. Right, it
Speaker 1: seems like it's a constant back and forth, attackers trying
Speaker 1: to hide an analyst developing tools to find them.
Speaker 2: You're absolutely right, it's a constant arms race. But we
Speaker 2: have even more tools in our arsenal. Volatility has a
Speaker 2: plug in called Sexview, which is like the ultimate processed detective.
Speaker 2: It uses seven, yes, seven different methods to enumerate processes.
Speaker 1: Seven methods. That's overkill, isn't it not at all?
Speaker 2: By comparing the results from these different sources, peace View
Speaker 2: can detect discrepancies that might indicate manipulation. It's like having
Speaker 2: seven witnesses to a crime. If their stories don't match up,
Speaker 2: you know something fishy is going on.
Speaker 1: So if one method shows a process but another doesn't,
Speaker 1: that's a big red flag.
Speaker 2: Precisely, it's a powerful way to expose hidden or manipulated processes,
Speaker 2: even if attackers have gone to great links to cover
Speaker 2: their tracks.
Speaker 1: Okay, Volatility is officially blowing my mind. It's like having
Speaker 1: a superpower that lets us see through the matrix of
Speaker 1: a computer system. We've learned how to enumerate processes, identify
Speaker 1: suspicious activity, and even uncover those processes that have gone
Speaker 1: into hiding. But we've been talking about processes as these
Speaker 1: sort of abstract entities. Can we peek inside them and
Speaker 1: see what they're actually doing?
Speaker 2: Absolutely, each process has its own private memory space, kind
Speaker 2: of like its own apartment in the computer's memory building,
Speaker 2: And inside this memory space we can find all sorts
Speaker 2: of interesting artifacts. The executable code, the data the process
Speaker 2: is working with, the stack used for function calls, and
Speaker 2: the heap for dynamic memory allocation.
Speaker 1: So we can see what files the process is accessing,
Speaker 1: what data it's dealing, and even what code it might
Speaker 1: be injecting.
Speaker 2: Precisely, it's like having x ray vision to the malwares operations.
Speaker 2: We can see what it's doing step by step.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm ready to put on those x ray goggles.
Speaker 1: Where do we start?
Speaker 2: Analyzing loaded modules? Is a good place to begin. Remember
Speaker 2: those deal wells we talked about, those libraries of shared
Speaker 2: code that programs use. Well, by examining which modules are
Speaker 2: loaded into a process as memory space, we can get
Speaker 2: valuable in sites into its behavior.
Speaker 1: So if we see a process loading a module that's
Speaker 1: known to be malicious, bingo, we've got our culprit exactly.
Speaker 2: Volatility has a plug in called DLI list that lists
Speaker 2: all the modules loaded by a specific process. It's like
Speaker 2: taking inventory of the tools in a suspects toolbox.
Speaker 1: Makes sense, But what if the malware is trying to
Speaker 1: be sneaky and hides those malicious modules? Can we still
Speaker 1: find them?
Speaker 2: Of course, remember how we talked about the PE the
Speaker 2: process environment block. It's like a processes ID card that,
Speaker 2: among other things, lists its loaded modules. Well, malware can
Speaker 2: try to manipulate this ID card, removing the malicious modules
Speaker 2: from the list.
Speaker 1: So it's like the malware is trying to forge its
Speaker 1: own documents. But surely we can see through this deception.
Speaker 2: Right absolutely. Volatility has another plug in called Elder Modules
Speaker 2: that doesn't just rely on the PB's list of modules.
Speaker 2: It digs deeper, analyzing the processes memory space using something
Speaker 2: called virtual address descriptors or VADs VADs.
Speaker 1: Those sound familiar, but refresh my memory.
Speaker 2: Think of VADs as a detailed map of a process's
Speaker 2: memory space. Each VAD describes a specific region of memory,
Speaker 2: whether it's code, data, or something else. By analyzing these VADs,
Speaker 2: alger modules can identify discrepancies between the actual memory usage
Speaker 2: and the modules listed in the PEB. It's like comparing
Speaker 2: the blueprint of a house to the actual structure and
Speaker 2: finding a hidden room that wasn't on the plan.
Speaker 1: So even if the malware tries to forge its ID card,
Speaker 1: we can still find those hidden modules by looking at
Speaker 1: the actual memory layout correctly.
Speaker 2: And this technique is particularly effective for uncovering rootkits, which
Speaker 2: often go to great lengths to hide their presence in
Speaker 2: the system.
Speaker 1: Root kits those sound like the ultimate malware ninjas. We'll
Speaker 1: definitely need to dive into those later, but for now,
Speaker 1: we've talked about processes and loaded modules. What about services?
Speaker 1: Those background programs that run on Windows. Can malware abuse
Speaker 1: them as well?
Speaker 2: Absolutely, malware can create its own malicious services or hijack
Speaker 2: existing ones to gain a foothold in the system and
Speaker 2: stay hidden. Analyzing services is crucial for understanding how malwur
Speaker 2: might be achieving PERC systems its ability to stick around
Speaker 2: even after reboots.
Speaker 1: So if the malware is like a squatter trying to
Speaker 1: stay in a house, services are its way of getting
Speaker 1: the utilities turned on and making itself at home.
Speaker 2: That's a great analogy, and Volatility has a plug in
Speaker 2: called SVC scam that can help us identify these squatters.
Speaker 2: It lists all the services running in the system, their
Speaker 2: configuration settings, and the processes that are hosting them. We
Speaker 2: can see which services are running, how they're configured, and
Speaker 2: who's responsible for them, so.
Speaker 1: We can see if any services are behaving suspiciously, like
Speaker 1: starting automatically when they shouldn't, or running from an unusual
Speaker 1: location exactly.
Speaker 2: Those are all red flags that weren't further investigation, and
Speaker 2: the book gives some great examples of malware abusing services.
Speaker 2: One is win thirty two share process, which uses a
Speaker 2: technique called service DLL injection to hide itself within the
Speaker 2: SVHOS dot exx process. That process responsible for hosting multiple
Speaker 2: system services, so it's.
Speaker 1: Like hiding in a crowd, making it harder to stand out.
Speaker 2: Precisely. An SBC scan can help us spot these hidden
Speaker 2: and true by analyzing the service's configuration settings. If we
Speaker 2: see a service that's loading a DLL from a suspicious location,
Speaker 2: that's a strong indicator of malicious activity.
Speaker 1: Clever malware, but even clever analysts and the book mentioned
Speaker 1: another malware, Black Energy, that uses a different tactic to
Speaker 1: hijack services.
Speaker 2: Right, that's right, Black energy is a bit more stealthy.
Speaker 2: Instead of creating a new service, it replaces the legitimate
Speaker 2: driver associated with an existing service with its own malicious driver. Remember,
Speaker 2: drivers are those low level programs that allow the operating
Speaker 2: system to interact with hardware devices.
Speaker 1: So it's like swapping out the engine of a car
Speaker 1: with a different one. The car still looks the same
Speaker 1: on the outside, but it's now running on a completely
Speaker 1: different system exactly.
Speaker 2: And this type of driver manipulation can be incredibly difficult
Speaker 2: to detect.
Speaker 1: So how do we catch these sneaky driver swappers?
Speaker 2: One method is to compare the services and drivers from
Speaker 2: a clean memory image to those in a suspect image.
Speaker 2: If we see a driver that's different from what we expect,
Speaker 2: that's a strong indicator of tampering.
Speaker 1: Makes sense. It's like having a reference manual for a
Speaker 1: car engine and then comparing it to the actual engine
Speaker 1: to see if any parts have been modified.
Speaker 2: That's a great analogy. Having a baseline of known good
Speaker 2: configurations is essential for identifying these subtle deviations.
Speaker 1: We've talked about processes, loaded modules, and services. What other
Speaker 1: clues can we uncover in memory? It seems like a
Speaker 1: treasure troll of information.
Speaker 2: Let's talk about handles. Remember, handles are those pointers that
Speaker 2: programs use to interact with system resources like files, registry keys,
Speaker 2: and even other processes.
Speaker 1: Right. They're like keys that give programs access to different
Speaker 1: parts of the system exactly.
Speaker 2: And by analyzing handles, we can see what resources a
Speaker 2: process is accessing and how it's interacting with them. Volatility
Speaker 2: has a plugin called appropriately enough Handles, which can list
Speaker 2: all the handles held by a process. It's like looking
Speaker 2: at a suspect's keyring and seeing which keys they're carrying.
Speaker 1: So we can see if a process is opening suspicious files,
Speaker 1: accessing sensitive registry keys, or even manipulating other processes.
Speaker 2: Precise It's a powerful way to understand a process's interactions
Speaker 2: with the operating system and identify potentially malicious activities.
Speaker 1: This is all incredibly insightful. It's amazing how much information
Speaker 1: we can extract from a computer's RAM. It's like having
Speaker 1: a time machine that lets us rewind and see exactly
Speaker 1: what was happening at a specific moment in time.
Speaker 2: It's a powerful tool for incident response and malware analysis.
Speaker 2: And we've only just scratched the surface of what's possible
Speaker 2: with memory. Forensics.
Speaker 1: Well, my mind is officially blown. We've gone from analyzing
Speaker 1: suspicious files to dissecting the very memory of a computer system.
Speaker 1: It's clear that memory forensics is a crucial weapon in
Speaker 1: the fight against malware.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, and in the next part of our deep dive,
Speaker 2: we'll explore even more advanced techniques like root kit analysis
Speaker 2: and wrap up our exploration of this fascinating field.
Speaker 1: Welcome back to the deep Dive. We've been on this
Speaker 1: incredible journey exploring the world of malware analysis, learning how
Speaker 1: to think like both the malware developers and the security
Speaker 1: experts who hunt them down.
Speaker 2: That's right. We've covered a lot of ground, from examining
Speaker 2: suspicious files without even running them to dissecting the very
Speaker 2: memory of a compromised computer.
Speaker 1: And last time we left off talking about memory forensics,
Speaker 1: which blew my mind. We learned how to extract all
Speaker 1: sorts of valuable evidence from a computer's ram, even if
Speaker 1: the malware tried to cover its tracks.
Speaker 2: Memory forensics is a powerful tool. But today we're going
Speaker 2: even deeper into the trenches of malware analysis to tackle
Speaker 2: a particularly stealthy and dangerous type.
Speaker 1: Of threat, root kits.
Speaker 2: Root kits they sound like something straight out of a
Speaker 2: spy movie. What makes them so different from other types
Speaker 2: of malware.
Speaker 1: Rootkits are the ultimate stealth weapon in the malware arsenal.
Speaker 1: They're designed to burrow deep into the operating system's core,
Speaker 1: the kernel, and operate in the shadows the kernel. That's
Speaker 1: like the control center for the entire operating system, right
Speaker 1: the place where all the important decisions.
Speaker 2: Are made exactly, And if malware can gain control of
Speaker 2: the kernel, it can essentially control the entire system. Wow,
Speaker 2: it's like having a mole inside a top secret them
Speaker 2: an agency. They can manipulate information, sabotage operations, and stay
Speaker 2: hidden from view.
Speaker 1: So root kits are basically the elite hackers of the
Speaker 1: malware world. Yeah, those who can bypass all the normal
Speaker 1: security measures and operate with complete control.
Speaker 2: That's a good way to put it. They're incredibly difficult
Speaker 2: to detect and even harder to remove.
Speaker 1: Wow.
Speaker 2: Traditional security tools might not even be able to see
Speaker 2: them because they operate at such a low level.
Speaker 1: Okay, now I'm starting to get a little nervous. How
Speaker 1: do they actually manage to gain access to this kernel
Speaker 1: space and remain undetected.
Speaker 2: Well, they use some incredibly clever techniques.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: One common method is to hook kernel functions.
Speaker 1: Wait hooking. We talked about that before with user level hooking.
Speaker 1: But you're saying root kits can hook functions within the
Speaker 1: kernel itself.
Speaker 2: Exactly. Remember how hooking lets malware intercept function calls and
Speaker 2: redirect them right well in the kernel. This gives them
Speaker 2: the power to manipulate the operating system's core FI functions.
Speaker 2: Oh wow, hide processes, make files invisible, even conceal network connections.
Speaker 2: It's like rewiring the control panel of a spaceship. They
Speaker 2: can make the instruments show whatever.
Speaker 1: They want, so they're basically rewriting the rules of the
Speaker 1: game to.
Speaker 2: Their advantage exactly. They can also directly modify kernel data
Speaker 2: structures like the process list and the handle table we
Speaker 2: talked about earlier, Those.
Speaker 1: Lists that tell us what's running and what resources are
Speaker 1: being accessed. So they're essentially forging documents to hide their presence.
Speaker 2: Precisely, they can make themselves and their malicious activities disappear
Speaker 2: from the system's logs and monitoring tools.
Speaker 1: That's scary.
Speaker 2: And if that's not enough, they can even patch the
Speaker 2: kernel code itself.
Speaker 1: Patching the kernel code isn't incredibly risky. What if they
Speaker 1: mess something up?
Speaker 2: It is risky both for the attacker and for the system.
Speaker 2: But skilled rootkit developers know exactly which parts of the
Speaker 2: code to modify to achieve their goals without causing a
Speaker 2: system crash. It's like performing open heart surgery on the
Speaker 2: operating system while it's still running.
Speaker 1: I'm starting to understand why root kits are considered such
Speaker 1: a serious threat. But if they're so stealthy and operate
Speaker 1: at such a low level, how does security experts even
Speaker 1: begin to analyze them?
Speaker 2: Root kit analysis is incredibly challenging, but it's essential for
Speaker 2: understanding how they work and developing countermeasures. The book emphasizes
Speaker 2: that analyzing drivers is a crucial starting point.
Speaker 1: Drivers, right, those pieces of software that allow the operating
Speaker 1: system to talk to hardware devices. But how are drivers
Speaker 1: connected to root kits.
Speaker 2: Root kits often install their own malicious drivers to gain
Speaker 2: that low level access to the system. By examining these drivers,
Speaker 2: we can uncover the root kit's functionality and how it
Speaker 2: interacts with the system. It's like finding the blueprints for
Speaker 2: the root kit's secret layer hidden within the operating system's infrastructure.
Speaker 1: Interesting analogy, So we need to understand how drivers work
Speaker 1: to understand how root kits use them for their nefarious purposes.
Speaker 1: Where do we even begin with driver analysis?
Speaker 2: One key concept is the IO request flow. The journey
Speaker 2: US takes from a user level application through the kernel
Speaker 2: to the device driver, and finally to the hardware.
Speaker 1: So it's like tracking a package from the sender through
Speaker 1: all the sorting centers and delivery trucks to its final
Speaker 1: destination exactly.
Speaker 2: And by understanding this flow, we can identify potential points
Speaker 2: where a routkit might be intercepting or manipulating requests to
Speaker 2: hide data, steel information, or even control devices.
Speaker 1: It's like setting up roadblocks along the delivery route to
Speaker 1: catch the package thief. The book also mentioned that examining
Speaker 1: specific kernel structures is important, right, things like the driver objects. Right.
Speaker 2: The driver object is a data structure that holds all
Speaker 2: sorts of essential information about a loaded driver. It's entry point,
Speaker 2: its dispatch routines, basically everything we need to understand how
Speaker 2: it works. So it's like the driver's ID card exactly,
Speaker 2: and by analyzing this ID card we can learn a
Speaker 2: lot about the driver's capabilities and potential for malicious activity.
Speaker 2: And then there are devite objects which represent physical or
Speaker 2: virtual devices connected to the system.
Speaker 1: Like hard drive network that sort of thing.
Speaker 2: Exactly, and drivers create and manage these device objects to
Speaker 2: communicate with the corresponding hardware. But root kits can also
Speaker 2: manipulate these device objects to hide their presence or intercept
Speaker 2: io requests.
Speaker 1: It's like the root kit is creating fake devices to
Speaker 1: deceive the operating system.
Speaker 2: That's a great way to think about it. It's all
Speaker 2: about deception and manipulation at the kernel level.
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm starting to see how complex and challenging root
Speaker 1: kit analysis can be. It's like trying to solve a
Speaker 1: puzzle where pieces are constantly shifting and changing.
Speaker 2: It definitely requires a deep understanding of the operating system
Speaker 2: and a specialized set of tools.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: One of the most powerful tools in our arsenal is
Speaker 2: wind abig Oh, a debugger from Microsoft.
Speaker 1: Windabig That sounds familiar. We talked about debuggers before, but
Speaker 1: I thought those were for analyzing user level programs.
Speaker 2: You're right, but wind abig is special. It allows us
Speaker 2: to debug the kernel itself.
Speaker 1: Wow.
Speaker 2: We can examine kernel structures, set breakpoints on kernel functions,
Speaker 2: and essentially step through the execution of kernel code, so.
Speaker 1: It's like having a backstage pass to the entire operating
Speaker 1: system exactly.
Speaker 2: It's an indispensable tool for reverse engineering drivers, analyzing rootkit
Speaker 2: behavior and understanding how they manipulate the system at such
Speaker 2: a low level.
Speaker 1: Wow, wind to being sounds incredibly powerful. The book also
Speaker 1: mentioned something called the object Manager name space. What's that
Speaker 1: all about?
Speaker 2: The object manager is a core component of the Windows
Speaker 2: kernel that manages all the objects in the system, processes, files, devices,
Speaker 2: you name it. The name space is like a hierarchical
Speaker 2: file system for these objects, organizing them in a tree
Speaker 2: like structure.
Speaker 1: So it's like the Dewey decimal system for the operating
Speaker 1: system exactly.
Speaker 2: And root kits can manipulate this name space to hide objects,
Speaker 2: redirect access, and generally make it difficult to understand what's
Speaker 2: really going on. It's like a digital magician performing sleight
Speaker 2: of hand tricks. Things appear and disappear as they manipulate
Speaker 2: this invisible structure.
Speaker 1: Rootkit analysis definitely sounds like it requires a high level
Speaker 1: of expertise.
Speaker 2: It does, but thankfully, tools like Volatility and wind a
Speaker 2: Big give us the power to analyze these complex interactions
Speaker 2: and uncover the root kit secrets. The book even gives
Speaker 2: an example of extracting a hidden zero access rootkit driver
Speaker 2: from memory.
Speaker 1: Hold on hidden drivers. Yeah, so, even if a driver
Speaker 1: doesn't show up in the list of loaded drivers, we
Speaker 1: can still find it exactly.
Speaker 2: Skilled analysts can use various techniques like analyzing memory patterns
Speaker 2: or examining kernel structures to uncover these hidden drivers. Okay,
Speaker 2: once they know the driver's location and memory, they can
Speaker 2: use Volatility's modemp plug in to extract it and analyze
Speaker 2: its code.
Speaker 1: So it's like those scenes in crime shows where they
Speaker 1: enhance a blurry photo to reveal the suspect's face, except
Speaker 1: here we're enhancing the memory dump to reveal the hidden driver.
Speaker 2: That's a perfect analogy. Memory forensics can be incredibly powerful
Speaker 2: for analyzing even the most stealthy root kits. It's like
Speaker 2: shining a light into the darkest corners of the operating
Speaker 2: system to expose those who are trying to hide.
Speaker 1: This entire deep dive into malware analysis has been an
Speaker 1: incredible journey. We've gone from basic static analysis to reverse
Speaker 1: engineering assembly code to delving into the depths of memory
Speaker 1: forensics and rootkit analysis. It's clear that it's a constantly
Speaker 1: evolving field full of challenges and rewards.
Speaker 2: It's a fascinating area of research and it's crucial for
Speaker 2: protecting our systems and data from those who would seek
Speaker 2: to exploit them.
Speaker 1: Absolutely, by understanding how malware works, how it hides, and
Speaker 1: how to analyze it, we could build better defenses and
Speaker 1: stay one step ahead of the attackers.
Speaker 2: That's the ultimate goal, to create more secure digital world
Speaker 2: where users can competently navigate the online landscape without fear
Speaker 2: of these malicious threats.
Speaker 1: Well, thank you for guiding me through this deep dive.
Speaker 1: It's been an eye opening experience and for our listeners,
Speaker 1: if you're intrigued by the world of malware analysis, I
Speaker 1: highly recommend checking out Packed Learning Malware Analysis. It's packed
Speaker 1: with even more detail and insights than we could cover here.
Speaker 2: It's a great resource for anyone interested in learning more
Speaker 2: about this crucial field.
Speaker 1: So keep exploring, stay curious, and stay safe in the
Speaker 1: digital world. Until next time.