Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the Pete Canona Show. Thomas,
it feels like we haven't talked in like four or
five weeks or like a month or so.
Speaker 2: Are you doing I'm doing well. Yeah, it's been a minute.
Even for me. I realize, I realize my content workflow
isn't what yours are or Jay Burdens or some of
the fellas is like I I I probably, I probably
look it probably makes me look like a special ed
kid or something. In my defense, I you know, even
when my health was better, I I tend to favor
highly conceptual topics and that kind of requires deep dives
like on my end to prepare that kind of stuff.
But you know it, I remain impressed by the fact
that you guys managed to be able to bang out
the content you do with the value you do, and
it's always high quality. But yeah, I'm gonna drop the
st rep on my sub stack. But yeah, since since
I've been back from Arkansas, like I haven't, I haven't
done ship, like I haven't answered people's texts or emails.
This is supposed to be my big week to catch
up on some long form stuff like like none that
I was getting done like, I'm sorry for that. I
have not been feeling well but today and I and
I and I agree a series, or at least i'd
like to over three episodes, but at least two on
the subject of Earns Noblety, not just his thought and
kind of his particular school of revisionism, but what he represents.
You know, he was a student of Heidiger, and he
became very close to the Heidiger family, and that's important.
It's important not just put Heidiger in context. And I
generally agree with people including Leo Strauss interestingly, who I
don't have nice things to say about in terms of
his ethics, but he did have insight into like the
Western intellectual tradition. Heidiger was kind of the last continental philosopher,
I think, and Nolty was very much the error to
that tradition. You know, that began with people like meister
Eckert and continued with iv Zy Hegel and Chopenhauer and Nietzsche.
And that that alone renders him a significant personage. But
it's also people don't really understand what revisionism is. It's
not just a matter of taking narratives that have been
mythologized by ideologically committed peoples and institutions that have been
able to utilize a bully pulpit, you know, to kind
of force those perspectives on you know, on I kind
of the historical canvas generally. But it's also why these
controversies came about, oh to a certain crisis in in uh,
in the Western concept itself. No, I don't just mean ontologically,
you know, in terms of you know, questions people pose
themselves severally and collectively, you know, like who are we?
Like what what what is our culture? You know, like
what do we do we believe in God? I mean,
those things are away important, but I mean the the
collision with modernity and made no mistake, it was a
collision of Western man and the catastrophes that ensued from
this that can't be overstated. Okay, and Nolty his brand
of revisionism is very much grounded in there describing that
process and identifying the twentieth century and you know, the
kind of the intellectual paradigms that were emerging in the
twentieth century and the kind of great ideologies that gave
rise to the the Second World War and beyond. Those
are those are derivative of this process. And the reason
why people develop a sort of blindness about this is
twofold in my opinion. Part of it is, obviously there's
a there's a there's a dominant narrative about the Second
World War that the current regime is a very it
has got it's got a very strong interest in sustaining,
not just because it it derives its moral legitimacy from
this narrative, but in in ontological terms, the way the
world is structured morally, politically, in just an absolute conceptual terms,
you know, derives from this narrative. But beyond that, there's
an inability, particularly in I think Anglophone intellectual traditions, to
really understand condone philosophy, like even when the even when
the variable is being described within that tradition, you know,
touching concern Anglophone cultures as much as they do you know,
Germanic or Francophone ones, there's a there's an inability to
really sort of approach those things on on the correct terms.
Like even if even if I'm not even talking about
accepting the postulists they're in, I'm saying that there's this
there's there's an entirely different conceptual vocabulary for approaching these things.
And it's not just because you know, oh the you know,
the English and the Scots are are pragmatic. That's not
That's not what it is. I mean that that's like
a shorthand for you know, kind of university type to
teach history of philosophy, your history of science courses. That's
we're talking about something both more opigue and more kind
of deliberate, deliberately maintained. You know. But really, when Nolding
dots to out revisionism, he's talking about what exactly happened
in the twentieth century, okay, And he's talking about what
exactly national socialism and fascism represented contra capitalism and communism,
you know, and this was not I mean, anybody who's
educating on the subject, you know, knows that national socialism
had nothing to do with nationalism. Whatever that means that
that got the thinking was dead anyway by you know,
by by the turn of the twentieth century. You know,
it wasn't just it, It wasn't it wasn't a matter
of you know, quote unquote scapegoating people, because that doesn't
make any sense, you know, I mean, even if even
if one accepts kind of court history claims that for
no particular reason this Habsburg, Austria and the format, Hitler
just decided he didn't like Jewish people for for some
social reason. You know, that wouldn't be people would people
wouldn't respond to some some man's like petty like personal biases,
like why would they? That's not that's not the way
things work. Okay, and uh, finally understanding how they kind
of dehumanization, the process of dehumanization at scale whereby human lives,
the horror of of human lives to the you know,
at at the level of millions, because ceremonies extinguished, like
cease to cease to be impactful, you know, like why
that happened, and why that was inevitable and how there
was a mirror of what preceded it in the case
of the Third Reich, and as the war situation deteriorated,
the onset of the categorical extermination of people who were
identified as standard bearers of the enemy idea. Okay, these
are the concerns that are already has so when we
talk about revisionism, we're not but we're not talking about
arguing over like gas chambers whether they existed, and things
like that because you already lost. You've already lost a
proverbial plot if you're doing that, Like, yes, there's a
lot of there's a lot of perjured testimony relating to
the instrumentalities of execution and things. Yes, there's a lot
of hyperbole that stands in for you know, actual documented events,
and that kind of thing should be rebutted. But that's
not what we're talking about, okay, and you're not in
the game of your own notion is basically, you know,
I accept court history, but you know this is wrong
because this many people couldn't have been killed. Like that's
now we're talking about. And if you're counting, if you're
counting casualty lists, or you're or you're aggregating estimates of
counter value attrition as as some sort of like atrocity contest,
you know that, I mean that, that's that's incredibly perverse.
But it's also not you're you're missing the point, you know,
So I know people will be like probably to them,
they're like, well, how's an oldie revision is he doesn't
do what earned his undilted or does and just claim
none of this happened, So it's not a real revisionist.
He was some kind of troll. It was some sort
of pre internet troll. And don't get me wrong, like
I there's a place for that, like Tom Metzker was
was in some ways one of those two. But that's
not that's not real history. And I realized I'm digressing,
But Fred Leuchter is a guy you should look into
if you're concerned with instrumentalities and and kind of a direct,
evidential rebuttal of some of the claims we're talking about.
I mean, Laker's got something with a tragic background owing
to uh, the fact that kind of like Alex Jones today,
Laker was very much singled out for destruction by the
regime when when his when he when he when he
when he developed a high profile which he did not
cultivate at all. But some that's kind of upset the
scope for we're talking about. Robert Fwerson is another one.
If then I guarantee in the comments section or whatever,
people are gonna say that like I'm not I'm not
giving a fair shake or whatever the to what they did.
The people that considered to be kind of like you know,
the the authors and and writers who constant divisionist Cannon
but getting into what are are subject for the day,
A lot is made of of Heidegger's purported affinity for
national socialism, and even people who are something like the
Heidiger they seems understand that the claim is, well, Heideger
was attracted to Nazism, you know, because he was a
German patriot, and then when he realized that these were
horrible people, he retreated from that. And or they or
they claim that, you know, he he coveted directorship of
Freiburg University and this is a simply a career decision
or something like. None of that even comes close to
the truth of the of the situation. Heideger was concerned, first, last,
and always with the crisis of Western civilization. Okay, and
this and his opinion had been under way at least
since the Third Years War, and probably why well before.
In terms of the kind of cultural mind. My your
notion is that the function of culture, what culture is?
The culture relates directly to the question of being. This
translating exactly what he means by being is difficult. It's
one part logos, it's one part qualia, it's one part consciousness,
it's one part sentience. But the way to understand and
the kind of short hot.
Speaker 1: Shorthand what's quality.
Speaker 2: Quillia is basically with people who study consciousness, if they
define as like that intangible factor that like makes humans human,
it goes to something beyond self awareness, but that it's
like ill defined in in quantitative terms, but it's basically
that combination of, you know, the ability to reason abstractly,
self awareness, the and the ability to act intentionally like
they're in that that that makes up like the human
consciousness has distinguished even from the most intelligent animals. Okay,
it's a neuroscience term. I believe that's its original kind
of provenance. But you know, in fundamental senses, being is
always kind of this question that that that's that, that's
that's that's ever present. Okay, You're thrust into the world,
you know, as a baby, and based the process of
your mind developing is the process by which you know,
you come to understand being. You know, and even like
even the most dullwitted human being, there's times at which
you know he's he's metaphorically speaking, startled by the strangeness
of his existence in the world. Okay, that's eye. The
most primitive societies have some notion of God. Okay, even
if it's just some idolatrous mock up of a bull
or something, because you know, we we slaughter the bulls
and from there, you know, we can eat and then
we can survive. So that is God. Okay. So being
to Heidegger and to traditionally Aryan Man or Indo European,
if you prefer, the kind of neologism was always an
open ended question. You know, it always uh, it always
it's it's the vantage point of it is uh always
involves man kind of steering into a conceptual abyss. Okay,
even that's not That doesn't mean it's intrinsically sinister, but
it's existentially disturbing because it's unknown. Okay. Now, in Heideger's view,
man comes to live historically because this is how the
question of being is answered, or at least this is
the way that it's reconciled with human existence. Moment to
moment man experiences time. You know, time is time basically
governs in both prozacon profound terms like everything man does
in an individual capacity as well as UH in a
in a an in a collective one okay, and moment
to moment man is forced to make decisions, and what
braggets all those decisions is time and thus death. Man's
always confronting his own is just oblivion generally as well
as his own death. Okay. Now, what mitigates the terror
of that, but what also allows man to kind of
conceptualize what being is in both his day to day
existence as well as in transcendental terms, is that looking
at one's existence backwards from this very moment. Now, there's
an infinite number of aggregate decisions that led to this point, okay,
rendered by my forebears, rendered by people who I've literally inherited,
you know, everything from the way I speak to my
folk ways. You know, it's like my biological aspects. There's
this chain of existence literally stretching backwards to the very
moment I wish my insistors became human. That is essentially,
again an aggregate of endless decisions rendered that constitute decisions
within that temporal bracketing and the process by which you know,
questions are posed second to second, moment to moment, hour
to hour, year to year, decade to decade, epoch to epoch,
and as we come to understand these things in aggregate
and as an aggregate process, a dialectical phenomenon comes into
conceptual view, okay, and that's what it is really to be. Okay.
It doesn't resolve obviously what it is, but it places
it in a context that is at least rational within
and it's bout it temporal terms, and that mitigates the
terror of just you know, living in a in a
world of the absolutely unknown, in which all beings and
objects and phenomenon are are just mysterious and threatening and
you know, totally unknowable according to the senses and in
the human mind. Now, that's a basically Aristotylian view. Okay.
I don't want to go off on a how how
exactly that is, because then we'll be here for weeks,
But that that understanding of of a dialectical process and
the temporal bracketing of that process is basically Aristotelian. Contra
was essentially a Platonist view, and ultimately what became the
Christian view, which is that being is this kind of presence,
this transcendental presence, okay. And you come to know that
presence through a combination of you know, pious commitment to
knowing it and through divide grace, both of which are
totally outside of temporal consideration. Okay. Now, it's not for
me to argue in order to in order to hideger
suggest that there's not preestlye type men or or or
literal prophets who can apprehend this and you know, come
to know God in this way that I there's no
reason to believe that that is not possible. Okay, But
in the terms and context, we're talking about the way
in which cultures develop around the principles that I described. Specifically,
the way the West developed it basically repudiated. It was
basically itself frompudiating postulate, you know, like as as the
scientific perspective and as the as scientism as what thing
Smith called it, and as you know, the kind of
conceptual biases of rationalism crowded out all other ways of knowing.
You know, It's like, okay, well we we we came
to understand the world is just you know, being populated
by various beings that we can empirically interpret and identify.
And like within that paradigm, where where is God? You know,
you can't identify God in those terms, not because there's
not you know, indicators of God within the you know,
the the physical world or anything like that. But you're
it's a totally conceptually, it's it's a totally different vocabulary. Okay.
So when you remove man from historical time and then
you remove him out of these practices that at one
time allowed him, you know, to apprehend being as a
divine presence, you're you're basically throwing him into chaos. Okay.
That that creates conditions whereby every decision he's rendering precedes
x niolo. Okay. This leads all kinds of pathologies. You know,
it leads to people, you know, it leads to social pathologies,
you know, in banal terms, you know, because social capital
breaks down. It leads to the deterioration of authority because
why why would people conceptualize authority as deriving from anything
other than convenience or you know, or power. Power. But
most most importantly, what it does is it forces people
to organize themselves according to what is noble and what
can allow them to recapture temporal boundaries. And that's basically
that that which is technological. Okay. And this leads to
uniquely insidious outcomes, okay, one of which was communism, which,
aside from yes within marsis within Marxism, there's absolutely athno
sectarian prejudices. They're in like you know, all throughout it,
but in absolute terms like whether the rubber meets the road.
As practice, what marcis Lennon isn't dictated was basically that,
you know, being is simply labor. You know, it's it's
this process of work and of working, you know, by
which man can shield himself from the elements and feed
himself and you know, avoid avoid pain as much as
you know, is can be reasonably as much as within
the realm of reasonable expectation, you know, until like a
actually he dies and that's it, you know, and there's
an internal object to that that is pretty remarkably consistent.
I advise people read dust Capital because I made the
point of people like Marxism, Marxism is nonsense, but it's
actually very well thought out nonsense. Uh, they're a bundle
of that as well. You know, it's completely self referencing.
But I mean that that's the shortcoming of every of
every modern ideology like capital eye, like theology, you know,
in the proper sense because by by categorically by definition
it's reference points are are beings, are are quantifiable objects
so there's really there. It's it's you're talking about the
complete ebolition of metaphysics. Okay, the kind of the kind
of mirror of commun was capitalism. Now there's there's a
problematic term. I know people will say, well, capitalism is
just occur a coin, a term coined you know, by
Marxists themselves, and it appeared to stuff like Comy's manifesto.
That's true, but there is it's shorthand for the technological perspective. Okay.
That perspective is basically that material progress is basically potentially
infinite you know, the world. It's it's it's kind of
a perversion of the anthropic principle. It's that, oh well,
you know, man can perceive how to exploit all these
objects in the world around him, and even his own
body to maximum plenty, you know, the maximum pleasure, to
basically infinite wealth. And that's that's basically the key to
being Okay is this.
Speaker 1: Where where would where would transhumanism be on that scale?
Speaker 2: It's an extreme manifestation of the latter what I just
described and key to transhumanism. It's so it's intrinsic to it.
So it's not like it's emphasized, I believe because it's
proponents just take it for granted, this idea that oh,
well there's you know, as as we advance, we're gonna
resolve all matter. As shortage could go basic people to
just kind of like create like matter from nothing. Like
it's it seems like a science fiction concept a little
less so as time goes on. You know in movies
like that movie, you know, the movie District nine. Have
you ever seen it? Yeah, definitely, Okay, Well, you know
how like the alien technology, it's basically this fluid, but uh,
it's like a smart nanotech fluid. So if like you
add it to a human body, it's gonna try and
like reak constitute according to what it knows about biolo
what has been problem to a biology. So it turns
guind to an alien if you like apply it to
like a fuel source or like it's sinuated into a
fuel source, you know, it's going to try and like
purge the impurities, you know, to make it like most
like combustible or whatever. That's I've noticed in transhumanism when
people say like, oh, but what about sustainability or what
about this? Without that, they basically always fall back and like,
well this is just going to be resolved you know,
bye bye, you know, by something by by something that
can just sort of like replicate whatever is needed, you know.
And uh, because that's the short that's the shortcoming of
the of the of the technological perspective like rid large
like at some point you like run out of stuff
to be like like kind of like it kind of
oversimplify it, you know, like there's not there's not more
things to exploit. I mean, I mean that's in like
a value neutral term, like just if they materials not there,
like what do you You're You're done? You know.
Speaker 1: Well that's also the whole thing about you know, Star Trek.
You see these machines that just create food, and it's
like yeah, yeah, what what's that machine run on? Yeah,
what happens that's taken away?
Speaker 2: Well it's interesting too, Like I don't want to digress
too much, but it's like that was the the reason
why people went crazy about nuclear power, you know, like
thinking you know, like literal like atomic age stuff like
this is you know, a brave new era of infinite energy,
like you can't like for all radical purposes, like atomic
energy is like power from nothing like eventually. Yeah, like
if your your your fuel source does burn out. But
that's but but it's it's exponentially it's got an exponentially
longer life than any other it's evil fuel source. That's why.
That's where you're gonna see colliding more and more too.
It is that these transhumanist types who think that they
who think that that's like what they're u toldia is.
But at the same time they're like terrified of of
things like nuclear power. It's like you you can't have
it full ways. But no, that's the Yeah, that's why. Yeah,
that's that's in every that's one of the reason why
Dune is smart science fiction every different kind of thing.
But you know, like Dune deals in at planetary level
like shortage economies, which eventually everything becomes a shortage economy,
you know, over on a long enough timeline, matter how
conservationist you are, you know, it's you know, like the
the ar Conans, the hardcons have become incredibly wealthy, but
the cost was basically like annihilating photosynthetic potential on their planet.
So they're like a dying society. You know, I got
to react as itself. You know, there's there's no water.
So I mean, like everything from the way people greet
one another to you know, the way like the way
military doctrine is organized, you know, is accounts for you know,
the shortage of water. You know, like the entire U
the galagic imperium runs on this narcotic that's also you know,
like a light enhancing like geriatric. But that also as
you know, the basic this like practical necessity of allowing
navigators to to perceive like what pathways could be navigated
through space without you know, losing without like fifty percent
attrition or something for their for their highlighters. But but
that's to bring it back, uh, like with Heidiggers, what
Heidiger saw in the Third Reich, it wasn't so much
that he's like what It wasn't almost like he thought
Hitler himself was a heroic figure, although he may have.
I mean, frankly, I made the point before Germans didn't
particularly like the NSDAP. They love to eat off Hitler.
It wasn't so much that he thought the National and
Socialist Program was this incredible revolutionary program. It's that this
was the first time in the modern age and almost
at the critical juncture owing to the revolutionary situation underway globally,
that there was some kind of political cadre talking about
what we just discussed. You know, Hitler was saying there
is a crisis in Western civilization. You know, nobody else
was saying that. You know, whether he was wrong or right,
or good or evil or neither. You know, it wasn't
Huey Long Wasn't wasn't saying that, you know, there's a
spiritual crisis in the West, and that's why, like our
system is breaking down and we can no longer, we
can no longer sustain you know, like a moral or
social consensus. You know, nobody in the Soviet Union, I
mean the parts they were all dead, was saying, you know, well,
this is this is a confrontation basically with God and transcendence.
You know, nobody on this planet was saying that. I
think the Japanese were. But that's the whole other subject.
And that's a fascinating topic as to why, you know,
why there was that affinity and Italian fascism had something
of a different source, and uh, we'll get into that
as we get into Nulty proper. That was related to
the kind of intellectual nexus that the national socism was,
but it was different. It was far more radical, it
was it was far more of It was far more
of of of a of a revolutionary response to conditions
immediately press easons. But so basically a Heidiger's understanding was
it the form this is going to take and in
ideological terms isn't really important. You know, the fact that
this is conceptually front and center is what is important.
And if this movement is allowed to be destroyed, there's
gonna be no more Europe, you know. And again not
not because he saw that there was something intrinsically sacred
about the National Solist movement or something like there in
Heidiger's mind, like that kind of thing wasn't even possible
through political activity. But this was the spark of that awakening, Okay,
And that's that's that's what that's what's important. I mean,
that's uh the uh so, no, after Nolty. Nolty was
he was a student of Heidegger and he became very
close to the family. Uh. He downplayed this and a
lot was a like there was something sinister or something
like I Nulty absolutely was not, you know, like running
from some sinister association. I mean, that's preposterous is that
he he didn't want to mind cloud from a man
who was, you know, really like an intellectual giant. And
I think anybody who's serious in their study of chedrophilosophy,
whether they accept all the height of his postulates or not,
acknowledges that, you know what really Uh, The book that
first put Nulty on the map was The Fascist Missing
Sign on it hook Fascism in its epoch. It was
transmitting to English as Three Faces of Fascism, okay, and
this was probably the first serious treatment of fascism of
national socialism from a critical perspective through the lens of
you know, continental philosophy and political theory. Something that became
something that had become popular in the fifties was this
idea of totalitarianism and that part of this was just
typical kind of code war vernacular extrapolated to the Academy
and passed off as as some sort of meaningful analysis
in lieu of you know, just kind of cheap polemic,
which in my opinion it was cheap polemic. But this
there's this idea, there's just kind of like pop sociological
under like understanding in the Academy that oh, well, What
really distinguishes, what really distinguishes modern states one another, is
that places like the Third Roike and the Soviet Union
were totalitarian, you know, presumably in America and in the UK.
You know, we value personal liberty and things, and so
we don't have to suffer the total state because our
people wouldn't tolerated. That's fucking stupid for all kinds of reasons.
And it also obviously doesn't account for the fact that
these these these states that supposedly share like a common
like a common value system, these totalitarian states like waged
these like utterly devastating like Ross and Creek conflicts against
one another. But you know, novelty basically is objective. Was
the kind of like robut that coition is as well
as you as well as a tackle some of them
more serious critiques and treatments of the third Right. But
that nevertheless kind of like missed the mark. Basically, what
he laid down is that the action France, say, which
who's kind of got leading intellectual was Charles and Morass.
He said, look, you know France, which had uh, France
was kind of the comperial canary in the coal mine
as regards revolutionary processes, obviously, you know it was uh,
it was at the turn of the nineteenth century. You
know that France was utterly devastated by a revolutionary historical impulse.
So he said that Noldy suggested that a kind of
a kind of deep seated reactionary tendency developed in France, okay,
and then which endures. So the opposition in France is
always going to be like radically conservative, okay, and people
like the Maestra, you know, the counter Enlightenment philosophers. There
was very much like a Francophone like stamp on this, okay.
So he says that emerging in the twentieth century kind
of like the first truly like modern like like in
twentieth century terms, like reactionary movement was like the action
frant state, okay. He said, the response to that reaction
where the Italian fascists okay, who were it was basically
a radical probletarian movement, you know that it was a
it was a form of both resistance too and reaction
against modernity, but it also embraced like certain aspects of
hyper modernity, you know, which seemed which seemed incoherent. The
people who don't really understand was underway, but there was
a I think that one of the reason that ampathized
George Sorel so much is because thinkers like him are
kind of the tie that binds what seems like opposing tendencies.
But and most significant Noldies suggested national socialism was a
synthesis of these two tendencies, you know, which themselves were
a reaction against, you know, the tendency towards Bolshevism as
the new kind of as the new uh iteration of
of you know what had was first emergent with the
Jacobin Revolution. You know, Thus, national socialism it's both it's
both radical in reactionary, it's both revolutionary and conservative. You know.
His point was, uh, this is this was actually a
very coherent, very cohesive, remarkably integral ideological program, and that's
one of the reasons people responded to it like they did.
Like this idea was just some I mean, politicians are
constantly trying to conventional politicians, they're constantly promising all these
old people, they're constantly preaching, especially in those days, some
kind of reconciliation between the classes, and they're getting absolutely nowhere,
you know whatsoever. But you're supposed to believe the National
Socialists they could just somehow like remedy these things like
good propaganda, even though there was no coherence to it,
I guess ridiculous, you know, like one of the reasons
why they were able to capture the mand that they
were was because they were uniquely astride the dialectical process
as it was either resolving or coming to pieces. Everyone
perceives it, you know, as of you know, like nineteen
twenty nine, nineteen thirty altoming the point that even people
who are partisans and standard bearers of the spirit of
the age in which they live, and even men are
willing to literally kill or die for their ideological commitments,
they may not even be fully aware of of what
of what of what phenomenon they are serving, or what
or what they're participating in and what's underway. And in
apocal terms, know, the's opinion was basically that, look, philosophy
lives on in political terms. You know, whatever you can
say about you know, philosophy is having been you know,
divorced from what's becomes scientific practice. Whatever you can say
about you know, anything related to him to uh, the
conventional sociology he politics, if anything, UH has become like
more remote from UH, the common man's ability to two
to apprehend it, you know, the meta political dimension of
politics as he was observing it. You know, in the
the early Cold War. Nolty's opinion was one of the
reasons these particularly dangerous times is not just because the
state of technics and obviously you know, like the the
development of the bomb and things like this, but you've
got people who absolutely have no no ability to perceive
what's under way, and and they're they're they're at the
helm of of of of great power states and they've
they've they're either conflating you know, rhetoric with reality or
they perceive the fact that they've been able to capture
you know, they've been able to they've been able to
rise the the front office or the or there the
or the the titular head of a state organ that
that at least can you know, manufacturing and sent to
the degree that you know they're they're they're not gonna
be removed by by force. You know, they take that
as some sort of like providential indicator that you know,
they're they're somehow fit to render decisions when they absolutely
are not. And this is important. The UH and this
was in fact, uh, this was in fact an aspect
to that I believe Heidegger I felt was present in
in fascism that uh mind you, there was plenty of
National gall Lighters who weren't particularly intelligent. Even those who
were didn't view themselves as as some kind of like
as some kind of like high priesthood and the political
or something. But these guys did view themselves is almost
an exception as initiates in two historical processes. You know
that they came to perceive either through their baptism by
fire at the front as young men, or you know,
by some sort of epiphany that a lot of people
suggested that they had, you know, in the company of Hitler.
I mean, whether you accept that or not, there was
an understanding among among National socialists, among fascists. Stuff like
the Iron Guard hasn't been different. I looked back at
the stuff as like adjacent, but not really the same phenomenon.
It was far more kind of conventionally theological and related
to to what we think of is a crusader impulse,
like literally, but just the very fact that these men
looked at themselves in the terms that I described it
says that they were conceptualizing politics in a way that
their enemies were not. Okay, like the cope of of
anti fascists. Well, that's because they were crazy, Okay, But
that's not that's that's not that's a non answer, that's
a non perspective. The way these people, like the true
national Socialist partisans, in these estimation they viewed the process
that we talked about a moment ago at the outset
of not just you know, the removal of man from
history by the and by and the removal of man
from historical time by the combination of the technological perspective
and the deterretoryation of you know, the ability to approach
God and uh, either pious or or conceptual terms. Nulty
believed that this would never like man would never recover, Okay,
if the kind of practical transcendence what he called it,
of the Soviet Union in the United States, of Sovietism
and Americanism reached full realization. What do you mean by
practical transcendence? Okay, When man is able to master things
that once were believed only to be the domain of God,
that's when that's when God is truly dead in the
in in in the collective like cultural mind Okay, like
whether you're talking about, you know, the conquest of space,
when you're talking about the humors of like a culture
that claims like we can turn like a male into
a female and vice versa, like or you're talking about
people who claim like, you know, we can, we can
we can create humans like outside of a woman's womb,
you know, just by the manipulation of the game meets
and things. Yes, okay, that kind of thing is born
of a humorous which is not remotely godly. But we're
talking about we're talking about cultural mindset, and you know,
we're talking about the way these things are, The way
these things are are are devised according to you know,
man generally, man's ability to perceive generally, And again, where
are we talking about conditions whereby man's ability to know
God has been reparably compromised. Okay, this is a basic
vulnerability here, you know, the uh, the irony being of
course that as this kind of practical transcendence is accomplished,
you know, the absence of culture and the ripping out
a man from these tem pro boundaries that facilitate culture,
that makes it more brutish, like more ignorant, like more impoverished.
You know, it breeds literal backwardness because people no longer
understand you know, race and class anymore. You know, people
no longer pursue meaningful education. You know, at best, you know,
like an educated man's a technician, you know, like it
becomes it. Uh, the like like the fruit of this
transcendence and this ability to create you know, god like
technics and presumably generate wealth out of nothing is uh,
ironically a kind of like a kind of total degradation
of the human being you know, at scale, and the
absolutely like annihilation of culture. With a few generations of
this presumably the result is what Hitler said about the
destruction of man's ability to bear culture is as being
the end result of an intention of a bolshevized planet,
whereby people won't really be people anymore, Like regardless of
the mentioned material in question, they'll have no memory of culture.
They'll be they'll be unable to bear it even if
they did. You know, you'll you'll people basically who live
on the level of the animals, just they all of
an ability to you know, speak and you know, think
abstractly in so far as you know, being able to
kind of cond ofent the next day, whether they want
to fill their belly with or satisfy whatever glandiar impulse
by accomplishing. But you know they the only thing that
really makes makes man man is culture. There not there's
not there's that's an anatomical thing or what have you,
or or some special structure in his brain that that
that makes this impossible, you know. And this is a
this is what was a fundamental concern to Nouldy, and
this is I believe why he began writing when he did,
as as the Cold War being heating up. Yeah, I
want to want to wrap this up in a minute.
I'm not feeling great. And also I I realized this
is like a long introduction man, but I think it's
important because, like I, assuming you're okay with this, this
is your show. Next episode, I want to get into
the historians debate or the historical striketh as it was
called the historians controversy. There's not putting aalty on the map,
kind of on the academic map. I mean people who
people in who had an interest in in kind of
philosophy and in serious scholarship of the third Reich New Obem.
But it was not late nineteen eighties kind of as
as philosophical would poplicarly philosophical discussion of the Third Reich
and the Soviet Union, you know, kind of as the
Cold War was winding down, this kind of thing was
at its most intense interestingly. But next episode will get
into like how that was emergent and how exactly Nolty
became affiliated or identified not affiliated, you know, with like
Holocaust revisionism, which, like I said, there's nothing all wrong
with Holocaus's revisionism, but Nolty is adjacent but a different
represents a different tendency, and we'll get into what I
mean by that. I hope that this was not too
scatter shout, I didn't bore people. Also, I'm not feeling great,
so forgiving man. If like my ideas, we're not terribly fluid,
No no problem at all. Do some plugs and we'll
end it. Yeah, man, you can always find me at
the substick. It's real Thomas seven seven seven at substick
dot com. We gotta chat there too. In addition to
like my In addition to my podcasts and like videos
and other cool stuff, you can always find me on Twitter,
at least at the time being uh, they like monetize
me Eastie. They're getting nukre but you never fucking know.
It's uh at Capital R E A L underscore number
seven h O A S seven seven seven. You always
find me on my website. It's real Thomas seven seven
seven dot com, Real Aria, or it's just Tomas seven
seven dot com. Sorry, as you can tell them with fevers,
it's just number seven hm A S seven seven seven
dot com. I'm on Telegram. I'll probably get more active
as I have less time on social media to fuck around.
You can find me on YouTube. It's Thomas TV. Do
a search of Thomas seven and seven on YouTube and
you will find me. Yeah man, that's what I got, all.
Speaker 1: Right, Thank you. Until the next episode, Thanks Thomas.
Speaker 2: Yeah man.
Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the Pea Canana Show.
Thomas is here and we're gonna jump into part two
of a dive into Earnst Snalty.
Speaker 2: Hey don, Thomas, we're doing well. The context to what
became known as the historical strike Beyond the obvious that
needs to be addressed the kind of first proverbial shots
fired across the bow, specifically relating to revisionous treatment to
the whole costs and historical historiographical terms. That conversation was started,
at least between public intellectuals, and in the Buddhist Republic
there was an active community of public intellectuals, not just
because of the peculiar and rather tragic conditions that characterize
that state, you know, sociologically and politically, but the Cold
War meant that these people had to say in policy
discussions that they wouldn't otherwise. I mean that was in
any in any combatant state to the Cold War, and
when one considers the ongoing status of mobilization and everything else,
I don't think it's hyperblele to refer to NATO and
the warsaw packed ops has combat in the States and
every country thus situated, you had a coterie of of
intellectuals who were not just permitted to speak on policy matters,
but we're expected to do so. But in Germany this
was particularly this was particularly visible at tendency, an act
of a kind of at discourse. What kicked off the
historical strike was, I mean, the immedia catalyst was Reagan's
Bittberg speech. For people who are too young to know
or don't remember, the D Day anniversary, the fortyth anniversary.
In eighty four, Reagan was Reagan was in Europe anyway
for NATO related summit type at diplomatic activities. He spoke
at Bittberg, and he went out of his way to
say that the Waffen SS and Rmacht ward had buried
there victims of the war just as much as the
Allied word and they should be respected. It's basically parodying
what Conrad ad Nower said and now are much as
people on the right dislike him. I don't have many
nice things to say about ad Hour, but he's a
complicated figure. And ad Nower said he and now insisted
that Wehrmacht veterans gont get full pension rights. The BOB
and SS was not so fortunate. But that's that's why
they established their own, you know, networks to facilitated that
kind of thing. But this sparked this kind of whole.
I mean, obviously the Reds, like the actual Reds were
still like very powerful then that their their narrative was well,
you see that this just proves that, you know that
NATO was just a fascist that like a reconstituted fascistic
block that is trying to trying to halt the advance
of history, you know, by by by military arm from
the threat of nuclear war, and of course they find
common cause with these dead fascists. You know, these guys
are the sort of military social democrats. They basically parroted that,
but for a lot more dishonest and dishonorable reasons, you know.
They Reagan was kind of Donald Trump before there wasn't Trump,
you know, I mean his he was a lot more
of a significant figure in terms of power, political phenomenon things.
Obviously this was the world situation, but you know, the
narrative people, Reagan was a man that people love to hate,
you know, for the kind of permanently aggrieved opposition you know,
in America and as well as in the EU. There's
a broader context of bitt Berg though that relates the
helmet Cole. And like we talked about Cole a lot
in these series that we do, Cole was about the
only like truly kind of nationalistic minded uh consler post
war were, you know, and that like his his final
act in that role, like we talked about, was the
unconditional recognition of the infinited state of Croatia, which, like
Monkey runched a lot of the designs of Bush and
Baker and what they hoped to accomplish in Europe after
the Cold War. You know, but it wasn't just it
wasn't just placating coal like people have to understand that
there was this bizarre situation after Deyton fell apart and
and and Deyton was dead was was was dead? Is
as Dillinger really even before Reagan took the oath of office. Okay,
and a few things owed to that, which you are
kind of outside the scope of our media discussion here,
but such said it was the Cold War was back
on in earnest. The Buddhist Republic had a military draft.
They weren't just expect did to participate in the defense
of Europe from warsaw pacts. They were they were the
main line of resistance. Okay, So we were drafting these guys,
you know, directly out of high school. We were putting
them on what was to be the front line of
World War three. In nuclear command and control terms, the
NATO Charter demanded and what operations Protocol was was that
American nuclear weapons based in the Boonies Republic warheads would
always be in the possession of of American forces, but
their launch vehicles would be under control of the bundess Republic,
and in order to be married to those vehicles there
had to be an agreement on a legitimate launch order.
So basically we were relying on these people who essentially
commit suicide to stop the Soviet Union when the Warsaw
Pack ancelaught came. Now, if you're gonna do that, While
at the same time saying Germany is basically a constitutionally
evil country like race of people, and German militarism is
the source of all all woes in the world. There's
there's a there's a cognitive dissonance there that can't be
sustained in policy terms, and that's been going more and
more clear, you know. And for context, the main the
mainline of resistance. If Warsaw Packed had in fact assaulted,
obviously the Battle of Berlin would have been a mailstrom.
The Buddhist fair had to defend. They're respected to defend Berlin.
They're respected to reinforce the Benelux and the British and
the North German plane, and they're expected to defend the
folded gap at all calls to the last man with
nuclear weapons if necessary, and to reinforce and reconstitute forces
there it basically until they could no longer do so.
So they're talking about a million dead Germans within a
few days. Okay, And again you can't if that's if
that's standing policy and you're public about that policy, because
that's the only way that you can maintain credibility contra
Op four. You've got to be willing to back it
up politically, and if you're Ronald Rigg, and that means
you can't go to Bittberg and say that these men
buried here who died resisting communism, I might add, you know,
are the scum of the earth, and they're evil and
we must never let them rise again. I mean, this
should be obvious to anybody. But you know, one of
the perverse ATHLETs of the Cold War, I think, was
that there was a there was an aspect of the
laft who are truly like Warsaw Pact sympathizers. I mean, obviously,
I mean though that that that element was always far
stronger and more organically constituted in Europe than it was
in America. But there was some of that in America
even after the sixty eight kind of schism. But like
a lot of these people were just the I mean
they were just they were just disengaged morons, like they
had no like It's like it didn't compute that right there.
Wrong with America was in the Cold War. It couldn't
just be stopped, you know. And I mean unless unless
America is gonna call it off or seed you know, uh,
the inner German border to the communists. I mean this
the uh, not just the the mainline resistance in the
share punk of NATO's military capability, but also the political
will to resist Warsaw Pact in political terms, you know,
came down to Germany's continued willingness to contribute, you know.
So this is kind of what opened the door to
what became known as you know, the historic or strife.
And I mean the point in the first episode. The
reason why A Deep Dive so much in an Eli's background,
It's not just because I've got my own interests in
political theory and philosophical things. It's because the reason why
Nolty's blunked in with you know, all revision is so
they're talking about people like Fred Leikter or Ernes Zundel
or David Irving. Like basically ever just limped into the
revisionists camp if they reject this claim at the German
people are the atavistic population that is prone to homicidal
racial hatred scale, that the Third Reich was the spontaneous,
unprovoked criminal conspiracy to carry out those aforementioned tendencies against
escapegoaded population again for no particular reason other than hostility,
like ambiguous hostility. And also that the reason why the
twentieth century was characterized by these deep crises that culminated
in you know, to global conflagrations and then a half
century of nuclear brinksmanship is because of some sort of
sunder vague within Germany cultural trajectory that makes them prone
to militarism. Like none of that makes any sense, okay,
I mean it should be clear to anybody who's at
all sophisticated on political or military matters. This is not
how This is not how populations behave at scale and politically,
that's just not how things work. And Multi's starting point
was basically like long before eighty forty five eighty six,
when the historic of strife really jumped off in earnest
like Noulti made that point in his earlier books. He said,
if you're gonna claim that national socialism was just this
sort of was just sort of like the private prejudices
of Adolf Hitlers policy. He's like well pretty much every
German executive, whether they're talking about you know, Carl Luger,
the mayor of hal for post Hafs for Vienna, whether
you're talking about Bismarck or you're talking about Heindenburg. Like,
none of these people could have been said to have
like have like liked Jews or like not dislike Jews. Categorically,
the idea there's some weird thing in policy terms that
people hadn't heard before but all deeply felt that doesn't
make any sense. And secondly, again that's just not because
racism isn't isn't that's not, that's not that's not an explanation,
and that's just that's just not how politics are conducted.
And finally, as I've said before, some of this is
deliberately misconstrued. It it's because people are remote enough from
the epoch they don't really understand this. The Germans weren't
obsessed with race in a way that other people weren't.
Germans talking about Jews, is this race that's different than them.
That's the way everybody thought, like, not necessarily about Jews,
but that's the way they thought about human behavior. You know,
human behavior is biological, if you want to understand you know,
political behavior, it's racial. You know, what makes it possible
where people live among each other is this kind of
like blood compatibility. You know. So, oh, obviously there's tension
between Germans and Jews, or between Poles and Jews, or
Poles and Russians because they're different races. That's what they meant.
They weren't saying Jews are this evil race that's different
than us because we're obsessed with race and we figured
this all out. That's the way everybody talked. That's the
way everybody thought, and that doesn't make any sense. And
that's weird. Like I'm not saying it's not racial difference
between people. I'm saying in those terms, that's not the
way people think about politics anymore. That's the way everybody
thought about politics in the nineteen twenties, thirties and forties.
America was singly obsessed with this idea that you know,
eugenics could had selective intervention, whether it's sterilizing people who
are deemed to be criminal incorrigibles or whether it was
you know, facilitating you know, large families among high IQ people.
The people weren advanced that this is gonna usher into
some utopia. Okay, So that's not an explanation to say
that like, oh, Germans had race on the brain and
just decided they didn't like Jews because they were an
impure race or something. That's totally the wrong way to
look at it. Like you can say that that kind
of thinking is bullshit and it's and it's nonsense. But
to characterize it as like evil German thought or some
crazy thing German people thought, you know, that was exclusive
to their cultural pathologies or something, that's complete nonsense.
Speaker 1: So there's that too, and it's it survived. I mean
you see it today with this whole candae Owan's Daily
Wire thing. Yeah. You even have people who you never
would have thought come out and say things like the
cause of anti Semitism is Jewish behavior.
Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, yeah, the term itself too, Like why what
so there's tension between Germans and Jews because because Germans
hate Semitism? Like what what do they mean mean? Like
what the fuck is Semitism? You know, Like that's like
saying that's like saying like, yeah, you know the Koreans
and the Chinese, are they they dislike each other because
of epicantic follism, Like I mean that doesn't like, uh,
it suggests that there's some immutable trait, like unrelated to politics,
that that people just you know, somehow decided that it's
a basis for animosity and like it's not. That's not
the way things work, you know. That's why that's why
I discourage people from using that term. Like anti Semitism
is even moremaningless than racism. I mean, at least like
at least canna say like I mean, race obviously exists,
and it's conceivable that, like you know, there's people who,
for no regular reason, you know, just have certain preferences
and prejudices, you know, and because race isn't is an
essentially and characteristic and we're talking about humans, like that
makes sense, Like you know, Pep Germans just opposed Semitism.
But the best is that Palestinians are anti Semitic, so
like they're anti themselves. I mean, like like what it's
it's it's literally retarded. But anyway, but Noulty Nolty was
basically I mean I think he was. He was a
remarkable guy. I mean that goes out saying and he
had a far more he had a far greater aptitude
for analysis of the historical process than than most people
even even kind of who are of his class and caliber.
But his view of Germany's sort of tragedy and heritage,
that's that's basically like a right, hey, alien view. It's
not it's not this like aut landish thing. And one
of the reasons why he was so sort of savagely
excoriated by his enemies, you know, the degree to which
legal reasoning becomes a self fulfilling prophecy. And I invoke
Alan went to Holmes a lot who I think I'll
went to Homes Junior. I think a lot of people
want to read because I like, maybe it's because I
was a lawyer, and like a I spent a lot
of time with legal theory and case law and things.
People have this idea that home Junior is like this
big liberal or something like. You know, Holmes point out
legal realism is that it's no such thing, and that
the law is not a science. It's not this process
by which you know, a kind of like science and
ethics can be discovered or by which you know, outcomes
can be guaranteed that on a long enough timeline or
assuming good faith among actors potential actors to to the
controversy at bar, you know, the best possible outcomes for
all parties can be realized. His whole point was that
all the law is as political preferences that are totally arbitrary.
And then he give an epoch, you know, dressed up
as as some sort of some sort of logical like like,
as some sort of imperative base on a science of logic,
and that's complete horseship. And because world order was so
much structured according to the letter of according to not
just not just not just a letter of rhetoric, but
to but like legitimacy was so much bound up with language,
you know, laid down by supposedly by supposedly objective international tribunals.
First Forrest Nuremberger, this idea that oh, this, this, this
is just an absolute truth. You know that well obviously
you know, there was there was this, there's this massive
conspiracy to murdered Jewish people for no reason, perhaps in
nineteen twenty three. By this, by this criminal cadre, I
mean that the court said, so, you know, and if
they're gonna base, if we're gonna base, what succeeded the
moral consensus as regarded war in peace on what amounts
to an ideological statement dressed up as a criminal court
decision that kind of tortured logic and and and sort
of like non reasoning is is going to take on
this outside significance. So that's part of it, you know,
so pointing out obvious and not so obvious but troubling
facts of history related to the reality of you know,
kind of the anthropological and sociological origins of conflict at scale.
This is like outraged people because you know, they like
the like the simpletons kind of intellectual sanctuary is always legalism,
you know. And I made that point too that by
by the time uh, strategic parody had set in, I
mean even beforehand, probably by the time the Single Integrated
Operation Plan, which is America's strategic war fighting doctrine, I mean,
by the time like that just became openly accepted that
the fighting win a nuclear war, We're gonna kill eighty
million people. I mean, like you know, you no longer
can talk about, you know, you know what we're gonna
invoke this kind of foam moral out age or anything
that went on in World War two, and you you
certainly can't declare that, you know that men who devise
the technologies of mega death or who implement them at
scale and executive capacities, or are somehow the end music humanity.
I mean it like nobody, even even though that child
can see like why that's ridiculous. But but that's why
that that that that was the context, and that's the
inner thing today too, because people still try to tear down, know,
these postulates, but they increasingly they can't do it. I mean,
first of all, I mean there's just people an acting
beam are just lacking and then they're not built for it.
But there also there's not like really a context anymore,
you know, like they can't there's like without the without
sort of the Cold War, you know, not just as
an existential sort of reality around which things just orbit,
you know, politically and sociologically in existential terms. You know,
there's not there's not the contextual focus in order to
kind of provide people with ethical like like ontological sort
of pull stars is where like the situate themselves are
like what the starting point should be for for such
a discussion. But some thing I wanted to get into
a little bit too, is uh, you know, the the
historians who did who were basically viewed as as sympathetic
to the Bundesa as ah like as an institution and
it's it's political and military mission. These were guys, i'd say,
a guy who kind of most exemplified that position with
Jachham fest And it shows you how sort of like
perverted discourse had become and remains. All thankully, it's not
quite as bad around the issue with Germany and German
the German historical experience. Like Festu, his father was this
was this anti government extremist in the Third Reich. Best
actually he either served in the Vermont to the vass
in the finalized of the war, which I think is
quite heroic, but he hid this fact until the day
he died. He was this big anti fascist. He was
definitely a proponent of the sunder veg or a special
way or special path theory of German historical development. But
he also acknowledged that the German people were facing oblivion,
not just psychologically and culturally, but biologically. He was very
anti Soviet. You know, when he cast he said Hitler
basically was almost like a shamanistic sort of figure who
reflected the will of the body politic. You know, he
wasn't simply leading people at stray or something. That's a
pretty weak argument and a Milk Coast argument, but like
that was considered to be this kind of like extreme
apologia or like some sort of like a hard right
dangerous idea I mean, which which is totally insane. A. J. P. Taylor,
He's another guy who's and he's well worth reading. He's
a typical kind of German hating Englishman of the epoch.
He's got this irrational house stility to all to Germany,
all into German. But his take was that, you know,
Churchill brought the war in the West out upon himself
and upon his country. Why on earth did Germans want
a war in the West, which obviously they didn't. I mean,
the fact that that was used is some sort of
minority take is absurd too. But his uh, he had
a unique kind of or he had him rather ye
had him, and he hit his own kind of disgree
understanding of Saunder vague and that it was there was
a unique German trajectory in the modern era that became
aggravated in earnest after eighteen forty eight and particularly after
unification in eighteen seventy nine. But that you know, Hitler
geostrategic terms, acted like any other German executive, would you know.
And again he had a computative view of the Germans
as a people. But he completely rejected this idea that
you know, Hitler was this evil mad man and and
just some kind of some kind of outlier. And interestingly,
one of the one of the one of the contributors
was then pretty I think it was. I think it was.
Speaker 1: Uh.
Speaker 2: I can'tmemer his name, the guy with two thousand and
eight he wrote a pretty he wrote, uh, he wrote
a very good biography of Vladimir Putin, which of course
was like, you know, it was like hysterically, it was
hysterically attacked by these people who see Russians under their
bed and and think that Vladimir Putin is an evil
mad man for not inviting NATO to point nuclear weapons
at him into cavitation range. But I I can't remeber
the guy's name.
Speaker 1: Doctor Matthew Fael Johnson.
Speaker 2: What's that was it?
Speaker 1: Doctor Matthew Rafael.
Speaker 2: He's a German guy. And he he was what the
historic historic Astrikee in total constituted about like two dosand
academics like on the right or the left, Nolty and
Harid Moss, like Petra harrimoas with a primary kind of
theorists that people associate with it. But there's a lot
of people and some pretty diverse opinions forward it. But
this guy's name will come to me. But the if
the there's something of a korma guys to Fritz Fisher
among them. He uh, he had a a functionalist viewpoint
of things, and this was in vogue based with like neorealism,
you know, like traditional realism, real politique, and besides anthropological
and organic you know, causes of conflict and of state
behavior in human behavior at scale, you know, really from
the sixties onward, it became in vogue, uh, you know,
talking about institutional behavior, you know how you know, structural
phenomenon and alternatively and sometimes concominantly functionalist explanations you know,
are you know, reveal revealed data, meaningful data about you know,
war and peace, but also you know political behavior scale,
you know, and and of course too that.
Speaker 1: That that that.
Speaker 2: That shares some common ground with some of these moderate
left to Galiens and things, but in other ways, you know,
they objected to that too, So it's some interesting there
was some interesting opinions being bandied back and forth. But
what the reason it became this censorious controversy was for
all the wrong and most predictable reasons, you know it
and obviously any any any any German truly right wing,
you know, not even particularly pro nacial socialists, but remotely
patriotic or unwilling to kind of take a knee before
you know, proverbialated before you know, NATO and Zionist and
interest in the things they're going to view the sounder
of a conception as well as you know, the the
functionalist explanations as it's basically you know, left wing and
nature and and and intrinsically cunative, which they were, you know,
but it's also again, you know, by the by the
mid nineteen eighties, you know, you're talking about four decades
having passed. Even if even if the Third Reich had
been this totally brutish regime, and even if even if
it's fewer had been you know, the second Coming of
Dracula or something, it's like, well again you know, if
you're expecting us, us being us being the German people,
you know, to take a million dead in seventy two hours,
you know, fighting off the Ivans, and you expect our land,
which you know, for the record, has been occupied now
for forty years. It's the designated nuclear battlefield of World
War three. You know, see what you want, you want
it's basically be you know, like kind of the holy
warriors of of what you considered civilization is communism. But
then you're gonna turn on and say that, you know,
we're evil pieces of shit like that doesn't that that
doesn't treat you know, But it's also I think uh
and Nola himself made this point, you know, as I
get a lot of hate mail for a lot of reasons,
and a lot of which surprisingly relates to the Vietnam War.
I think American issupposedly an older American is they feel
they got they got strong emotions bound up with this.
And I understand that I invote the Vietnam War for
comparative purposes, not not not for some cynical reason, but
for the reason Nolty did. If you want to understand,
in the ethical terms set out by the victors in
World War Two and by their their ethical metrics and
by what was considered until the end of the Westphalian
era to be you know, the moral consensus relating the
laws and customs of war. The Vietnam War made us,
it made hash with that all those things as much
as the Second World War did. And the entire internal
logic of a free fire zone is not any different
than that of the mandate of of an mindset's group
and formation saying that, you know, designating an area a
free fire zone, and saying that there are no civilians here,
and regardless of age, sex, overall health, everybody is a
fair target. Because anybody who remains here after this, you know,
they've been put on notice and give an opportunity to
be evacuated, is obviously, you know, an act in communist
or a sympathizer with the enemy idea. And because you know,
as the mentioned material that is literally the what you know,
the bearer of that idea, it's got to be annihilated.
It being human beings. Welcome to the Welcome to warfare
of the twentieth century, where all wars are a total wars,
and all total wars are ideological wars. You know, so
when you've got every week America dropping you know, the
body count as their victory metric, like literally measuring measuring
whether we're winning the Cold War where it's gone hot
and mountains of corpses we're counting, you know, when the
victory metric and nuclear war is can we kill an
enemy society, you know, by annihilating eighty million of its people,
when you've got the Chinese, who after sixty eight, according
to a lot of these same academics, we're doing things
like breaking nolity of the cols. This was you know,
kind of the true progressive regime that was, you know,
realizing communism. They were deliberately killing off tens of millions
of their own people as useless eaters. Okay, you can't.
It's as laughable to turn around and and start and
started and start spitting like number lies or trying to
declare that, you know, yes, the world is a wicked
place and and war is terrible. But you know those Germans,
you know, they're they're they're just you know, they're they're
they're just in league with Lucifer, and you know we
we can never forgive them for this. So I mean,
I think it was all of those things. You know,
now that doesn't that's that's not to say that, I mean, obviously,
that's not to say that what sort of political biases,
you know, gain momentum and and and become like consensus,
consensus reality and in conceptual terms as has any kind
of bearing on unreasonable things or or reasonable ass itself
or anything like that. But you know, we're not. We
weren't talking about you know, some sort of are between
the hoy ploye or we weren't talking about some policy
initiative that like the official trying to convince people of
through television media or something. We're talking. We were talking.
This was a very that this was an argument between
and this was like a controversy between you know, like
a very narrow quartery coterie of academics who, you know,
all of whom knew better than what they were alleging
those contract multi I mean, so that's important. That's important
to keep in mind. And I'll also say, and I
actually wrote them. I wrote about this, and I I
wasn't jumping around a bit, but uh, just I mean
for clarity too. Here's here's what these are. The four
questions are the four like, how is according to according
to Nolty himself as well as Harber Moss, and according
to according to the people who populated most of these forums,
were these these debates are being had between you know,
eighty four, eighty five and like eighty nine, it was
were the were the crimes of the Third Reich uniquely
evil or were they comparable, you know, to the scaled
violence of the Soviet Union other communist countries. Secondly, what
is sounder vague a meaningful concept at all?
Speaker 1: Okay?
Speaker 2: Was the violence of the Third Reich or crimes if
you want to abide Nuremberg logic, a reaction you know,
to the Soviet violence like an equal and opposing reaction, okay.
And and finally, you know, should the Germans, like as
a people or as like a national group, like bear
some some some generational burdening guilt, you know, for the
supposed national socialist crimes or or should they be permitted
you know, to participation in some sort of you know,
cultural and national life. And that really I mean regardless,
like even if one accepts the kind of however preposterous.
The yeah, the aforementioned postules this idea, that this this
idea that conflicts that are global in scale, can just
be caused by you know, some national group of bad actors.
I mean, that's that's the way a child would think,
you know. I mean, that's just it's on his face,
that's just that's just incredibly stupid, you know. And I
emphasize that again and again, like it's not even you know,
just not that. That's not a serious people or irrational
adults talk about historical cause and effect or or or
discuss political concepts, you know, whether you know with practice
or or you know, matters of pure theory such as
pure theory can exist in uh in in in discussion
of politics. But you know, Nolty, one of the reason
I respected him, is he or one of the reasons
I he got my attention initially. I mean it was
like pre internet talking, even before I became a lawyer.
I put a lot of stock in direct testimony and
discrete psychological aspects of within, you know, the mind of
the key decision makers. And you know, Nulty cited Hitler's
table talk, you know, where Hitler would talk about repeatedly
the rat cage torture, you know, and saying in the
context of you know, this is what the communists do
to people, and you know, also talking about his own fate.
You know, I'm not I'm not gonna the communists capture
me and and subject me to the rat cage torture. Now,
people like Harrimas said, oh, this is absurd, This was
this is just Hitler suggesting that you know that you
dave a bullsheit again to me that apparently, you know,
going to be like Harvard must existed only in Hitler's imagination.
We're prone to these barbaric acts. But the Soviets actually
did that. You know people, or well I assume college
kids will still read. That's quite literally a plot, like
a major plot point of nineteen eighty four. You know,
Smith sells out Julia and and his comrades, and what
breaks his mind is that O'Brien threatens to ratcage him.
You know, it's this idea that is this something that
Hitler made up or it was you know, the sort
of fever dreams of a madman. I mean, that's the
entire point of doing things like the rad cage torture.
You do you do something like that for one of
two reasons. Either you're a disgusting status who likes to
torture people, or you're devising things that are so terrifying
to the human being kind of universally regardless of you know, sex,
or background or national or like ethnic psychology. Like you
divide things that are so horrible to human beings that
you know people instinctively will will kind of bend to
your will. And obviously you publicize those things to terrify
people at scale, Like that was the whole point, you know.
And it's this idea that you know, and Robert Conquest,
who I'm relying a lot upon for my own writing
on this topic. You know, the Soviet Union had death
camps decades before a shot was fired in World War Two.
You know, they they annihilated ten million of their own
people as of September third, nineteen thirty nine. I mean,
like what you can't get away from this and the
idea that, oh, well Hitler couldn't have known about that,
that's nonsense. You know. On my own sub stack, I
wrote about max On shooting or Richter he fell at
at the Munich Pooch like he he'd actually when the
National Soldialist charged the police court On He'd locked arms
with a Hitler and uh he got shot and he
died instantly, like his his heart got pierced. And when
Richter f well, he had actually dislocated Hitler's shoulder. And
Hitler later said he said Richter was the He's like,
he's the only man we couldn't afford to lose at
at Munich. You know, he's like our party, the party
like never recovered.
Speaker 1: Now.
Speaker 2: I wrote a whole series on Richter because here's where
there's background was he was a Baltic German like Rosenberg, okay,
and the Baltic Germans instrumentally kind of shaping the early
like for the post Drexler Party, the post Drexler but
pre but pre uh electoral path National Socialist Party Okay,
when it was still in a very revolutionary phase. But
but a phase that nonetheless was was was being shaped
by Hitler, you know, Doc. Finally he was a free
Corps veteran who you know, been fighting, you've been fighting
the communists and in the Baltic but he also he
was a aristocrat of somewhere known he was in uh Turkey.
When you're meetings, when you're meeting genicide jumped off and
the way the world came to know of it was
Richter was issuing these dispatches back to Berlin from the
German diplomatic mission, and the Kaiser's representative finally said, you
got to stop doing this. You know, we need we
need to try and get these people, these people being
the terms like back in the war and whatever whatever
government succeeds assault in it, we've got to have good
offices with them. But so Richter went to the Red
Cross and he started publicizing what he was seeing to
anybody who would listen. And he was directly responsible for
him to rescue a lot of vulnerable persons among this population,
the targeted people, you know, like women, elderly, little children.
So the Nanstolls, this party, supposedly the only reason it convened,
the only reason to constituted itself, The only reason to
guys like Richter clicked up with Hitler was because they
were racists who wanted to devise a criminal conspiracy to
murder Jews. But Richter, like he spent his spare time
like worrying about ethnic cleansing. I mean, like what was
you there just for show? Like they just really really
like Turkish people, Like I don't, I mean, it doesn't track,
like none of the tracks, you know, and that's what's important, okay,
is that's what the big lie is. You know, the
big lie is about stuff like Sunderbag. It's about stuff
like you know, making Adolf Hitler some sort of stand
in for Lucifer and this like secular religion, is this
idea that the Germans, unlike every you know, exclusive to
themselves and like everybody else on this planet, where's obsessed
with race and originally decided Jews or a bad race.
Like that's what matters. Instrumentalities of homicide don't matter, Like
arguing about like did four million people die? You're eight
million people die? That's I mean that that's that's literally demented.
It's also retarded, you know, I mean decides even if
that is, even if that is something that people I mean,
people can reacharch anything want, but I mean, if that
is kind of like your your emphasis. You should be
reading people like conquests. You should be reading about the
logic of the free fire zone in the Vietnam conflict.
You should be reading about, you know, the Soviet death
camp system. You know, and like Nolty himself said, if
you accept, if you accept everything alleged by court history
in total including this idea of you know, homicidal gas chambers.
The Soviet Union literally did everything that the Third Reich
allegedly did, you know, a decade beforehand, with the possible
exception of utilizing nerve gases scale, which I hardly think matters.
If I'm not saying doesn't matter if people die. I'm saying,
you know that what we're talking about, you know, the
preferred instrumentality of of of murderers scale. You know, we're
not talking about something of grand like substance of import
you know. So a lot of people are a lot
of people are just kind of like tripping over themselves,
not just by allowing the opposition to defind the parameters
at discourse, but also define like what is important. You know.
So it's like you don't court historians and people sympathetic
to Zionism or whatever, or people that have some kind
of like peculiar fixation with this idea that Third Reich
is the epitome of you. They don't get to decide,
you know, what is what what the terms of discourse are.
They don't get to decide what the parameters are of
of research. They don't get to decide, you know, what
needs to be proved or rebutted, you know, as if
they're you know, they're like like a judge in a
in a in a case at bar or something, you know,
dictating the what against you know, what the what their
respective burdens are and things like that. That the uh.
And it's also I mean what at the end of
the day at uh, you know, and ultimate at this
point too, at the end of the day, like the
past becomes the past at some point, you know. I mean,
I this is all I do. Is is study playable
theory and you know, the historical process and things and
is you know, it's and so I mean, I'm the
last person obviously would say like, oh, you know, it's
studying the struggle pross doesn't matter. But it's idea that
even if, even if truly horrible things occur, that they
can't be justified by any exigency or by any appeal
to anything other than you know, the kind of universal
depravity of man. I mean, it's kind of a so
what I mean, we we don't we don't spend we
don't spend decades of centuries wring our hands because we
inherited some guilt because people are bad. You know or
or our ancestors are bad. That's just not, that's not
the way we do things in the West, among other things,
you know. I mean, yeah, obviously an underpentent sinner is
there's a few things kind of more obtuse and ugly
than that. But you know, one sin isn't greater than
another sin or less than another. You know, it's just
not that's a bizarre way to look at the world,
as if you know, some sins are worse than others,
some historical events or criminal offenses. Others are just you know,
spontaneous occurrences, and certain ones you inherit a kind of
liability for them that you have to atone for symbolically
or ritually. Like that's that's that's really really really strange conceptually,
you know, And I put it. I put that to
people too, like even if even if even if these
people I have rams or are these people like kind
of poor little unfortunate w Lipstott, He's he's incredibly stupid.
I mean, having ussel isn't stupid, but I mean she is, yea,
even if other things she said was true, I mean,
it'd be kind of a big so what you know,
I mean, am I so jump off a building because
my answers just did bad things. I should I should
I wear a hair shirt, might go to sleep or something?
Or should I should I get like half of my
money is a teeth like the local synagogue. Like I
don't what executive people want, you know, But I'm not.
I'm not just being up to so I can actually
put this to people and they will get me like
I'm an Elien. But I mean maybe I am pretty weird,
but I don't.
Speaker 1: I mean, they pretty much tell you what they want.
They want you not to just say that you know,
what happened was bad and that it was the worst
thing that ever happened. But they want you to go
out of your way to say the evil that was
done to them was unique above what every other evil
ever done in history.
Speaker 2: Was no legit. But then that plus five dollars will
get you a coffee. It's Starbucks, you know what I mean.
It's just it just doesn't I mean, you can give
in symbiltons of things like that, and but where the
rubber Measter road. I mean that doesn't really that doesn't
matter even in the president I mean, that's the point
to make the people who who go nuts about Israel
and stuff. It's like even if you're you know, if
you're someone like in passion Zionists or or some somebody
with the slave mentality is like not Jewish, but just
as decided like take on those prejudices for some unconstable reason.
I mean, it's like, okay, like you know, the the Palestinians,
his your ops, aren't They're not all gonna like put
down their clashing the costs and be like, you know what,
you're right, you know, specialficums of the history. I'm a
terrible person. I'm gonna stop. Now. You can convince like
a billion rooms and you know, the rest of the
world that you're right. That's great, that being right doesn't
win wars.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you're gonna It's easy to get people who live
in a first world country, who you know, can have food,
you can have food delivered for them to be to
adopt these things because you know, they don't really have
anything bad going on in their life. But when you
have people in other countries who have in Arab countries,
who have real problems, they're like, well, fuck you, Well.
Speaker 2: It's just a weird. Yeah, I mean, it's it's somewhat
it's somewhat uh well, people will say like it's nuts that,
uh you know. I'm like, I'm around a lot of
like non white people. I mean it's because like where
I live obviously, but like some of these guys I
like record with and stuff, and I'm happy they like
let me record with them, you know, because they have
interesting stuff to say. And like if people are interesting,
you know, I I I feel lucky if they let
me record what they got to say. But there's like
all these weirdos of semi hate mail, and even if
there's some who aren't so much haters, but they're just like,
you know, how do those people possibly let you in
their house? I'm like, well, would they care what I'm into? Like,
that's not the way normal people think. It's like you
think that wakes you're a weirdo. It's like if you like,
if you'd like if you think that, like black people
like look at some guy, like, oh, that guy's got
a nutsy shirt on. I can't let him in my house.
Like no one thinks the way with total weirdos, you know,
or like bitch made like like suburbanit people who lived
through their television or something like, I don't even know
what it's like. No one thinks that way man, like
in the real world, you know. And I guess that's
like my point, you know, it's so you can the
uh what the and in mind, that's the point always
made to people too, like partic eaments and noualty. It's
that what It's not what the way you judge these things,
the way you judge kind of like what's shaping the
conceptual horizon. It's not what. It's not what Ben Shapiro
is saying or tweeting out. It's not what MSNBC is saying.
It's not it's not like how things being presented in
Hollywood movies. You know, it's like a matter of zeitgeist,
and once and once things like lose their kind of
evocative power and like lose their like monumental power, like
like that they're done. They can't be like recaptured, you know,
and like nobody, like no serious historian would take something
like Shindler's List like seriously today, you know, like and
that and that that that then that's not going to change,
that's not coming back, you know, and nobody's people like
people basically unless you're a and like's in one of
these kinds of like weird zip codes where where people
attend some some crazy like like non denom church that
like worships Israel or unless you're you know, like in Scoche, Illinois,
like like basically like nobody likes Israel, and like that's
not going to change. That's not going back to the
way it was, you know, twenty years ago. You know,
like this can't the like zeitgeist when when they preceding
this is a conceptual structure, like psychological constitution is gone,
like it's gone, you know, and everything is different now.
I mean, that's that's why I was emphasized that people
who say that things are so terrible today that it's
it's practically like mainstreaming to be somewhat right wing, you know,
like that that's a sea change from thirty years ago.
That was like one thing thirty years ago, you know,
and and things can things are never going to go
back to the way they were, you know. And that's
the way to look at it. It's not it's not
it's not what people who have access to remains of
the bully pulp that are like shouting out kind of
into the into the abyss or whatever, just to hear
their own echoes. I don't know.
Speaker 1: But uh, the book you were trying to think of
earlier was that Putin in the Rise of Russia by
Michael Sturmer.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's well worth reading. And it's it's
actually like a very balanced biography. It's not something like
put hagiography. I don't understand how people like speaking of
bizarre sort of conceits like the sighting you randomly hate
Bladmir Putin is incredibly strange, especially when you consider he's
like a moderate liberal, if anything, like a typical cop,
which is what he was. He's obsessed with, you know,
kind of the appearance of a biting the rules based order.
But it's it's actually a really interesting book. And yeah,
that Muller Miller was a he he wasn't a leading
light like Nolty, but he's a guy who during the
historical strike he was. He was a younger academic and
interesting things to say. Oh a book RHS. Stoffley who
wrote that book, the Biography of Hitler, that I think
is so great. Hitler beyond evil and tyranny. He wrote
this book with this retired Wehrmacht general officer called NATO
Under Attack. It was published in nineteen eighty four and
it got a lot of attention from war college types.
Like the sub the subtitle was, uh, how NATO can
win in Europe without nuclear weapons? And if you're if
you're a late Cold War geek like I am, who
I find it re emergence of conventional force structures as
as a major this positive variable to be fascinating just
because it's cool, But uh, this relates very much on
what we're talking about and how as the tent ended
in the final phase of the Cold War really heated up,
you know, this sort of punitive view of the Wehrmacht
the and of the Germans as a people who just
could no longer be abided. That's I mean, it's just
like a fascinating kind of like period piece about what
war planner types were thinking and stophe a was a
really freaking smart guy and who grasped political and historical
like he grasped the philosophy of history and and political
theory in a way most like military types don't. But
he also was a very brilliant, like you know, military writer.
But yeah, that's uh, I'm gonna ask to wrap it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you want to you want to end it and
uh get plugs and get out of here.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, and I'll in part three, I'll uh, I'll
take up I know people because they've been asking me.
They've been asking me, what if any relationship there is
between like Nolty and like some of these some of
these guys I mentioned, like David Irving, like Fred Leuchter,
like like even Zundel, who people think I'm I'm too
punitive on what that's we'll get into the kind of
revisionism generally, and like Nolty's sort of like place in
it in the third episode. Yeah you can. You can
always find me on Twitter or not always. I mean,
I think I think they've gotten tired of like nuking
me there. It's a real capital R E L underscore
number seven hm me S seven seven seven. My substack
has been popping a lot lately. I really appreciate that
people are very generous and in signing up and throwing
me a lot of love, not just in the form
of like subscriptions and don'ts, but you know, sending me
encouraging emails and stuff. And I actually really do appreciate that.
I mean, I'm not trying to sound like some sentimental slob,
but you know I I I feel a very moved
to get that kind of love from people. You can
always find my continent at my website. It's number seven
h on as seven seven seven dot com. I'm on
t gram, I'm on Instagram. You know I'm I'm here
there see can you shall find all?
Speaker 1: Right? So Part three, Thank you very much, Thomas. I
want to welcome everyone back to the Pegana Show. Thomas
is here again and we're going to get into part
three of Thomas to talk about Ernst Nelty. How you doing, Thomas.
Speaker 2: Doing very well? Thanks for hosting me. Of course. What
I want to get into a bit today. I want
to address some things that people have been asking over
email and things, which is great. There's been a tremendous
amount of feedback on this series and I was pleasantly
surprised by that. It's it's something of a heavy topic,
like I'm not suggesting that like people aren't smart enough
to comprehend it. It's just that, frankly, not like you know,
deep diving into into political philosophy and sort of the
history of ideas and in a very abstract capacity, that's
that's not something that you know, a great number of
people are taken in by and I totally understand that,
but it's essential to understanding the development of of of
concrete political realities in the twentieth century. And if you
want to understand the are present and it's it's it's
nuances therein you've you've got to you've got to understand
these things as legacy structures and legacy phenomenon of the
twentieth century. Not just because as we talk about there's
been a basic stagnation in America and you know, the
former West. Even if that were not the case, even
if there was an authentic dynamism to American government, and
even if there had been you know, truly forward looking
and in far reaching and workable sort of path forward
in policy terms after the classing or German border. You know,
I'm thinking in terms of what you know, mister Nixon
wrote about in his final years and as well as
you know, kind of the Bush Baker model. Like I'm
not suggesting people should look at that as you know,
some ideal model or something, but there was like a
dynas to it, and it was relevant to you know,
Postcold War realities. You know, even if there was even
if there was something like that extent, you know, in
terms of intellectual occurrence as well as political will and
conceptual ambition, this would still be informed almost entirely by
you know, twentieth century structures phenomenon relationships like different as
things are today. As much as I agree with people
including mister Musk, who say that historical time is speeding
up along the technology, that is one hundred percent true.
So today I want to get into some of these
things and what's key to understanding about novelty and German
idealism generally. You know, people, especially Anglophone types who have
are marinated with a certain disdain for continal philosophy. Okay, man,
it's just a fact. There's a tendency to dismiss these
things as well. That's so much sophistry, you know, That's
that that's just uh, you know, a not particularly lucid
interpretation of political realities, you know, that extrapolates the musings
of of closer intellectuals to populations at scale. That's the
wrong way to look at it. Even if you don't
accept the postuitz ontological and otherwise of Pagel of of
nulty of Heidegger. Even if this is nothing more than
a conceptual horizon that became a kind of self fulfilling
prophecy in terms of how it shaped the European political mind,
that's nonetheless a causal variable that isn't arguably just positive
of how con is. Okay, I take it a step further, obviously,
I mean, I think it's clear to everybody that you know,
I'm very much a Hegelian. I think Urson Old was
the most profound historical thinker and a writer of the
twentieth century. But the way I understand German idealism is
it's people who deal in and studies the consciousness and
things will be familiar with the anthropic principle. This is
extraordinarily complicated, Okay, on like its own terms. But we
can't talk about political realities without talking about the events
within within the human mind. Okay, It's not like there's
some it's not like some actual political reality remote from
human psychology that is existing outside of our purview or something. Okay,
we're not We're not talking about astronomical phenomenon, talking about
you know, events of of of of a natural scientific
you know nature. Obviously, you know, so that renders that
that that that renders the study of of of political
philosophy unique, Okay, because you can't you can't. You can't
do away with with mind as a prime move on. Okay,
even if you reject the postulates of somebody like Noldy
and it come bat this again and again. All right,
But it's also to understand the entirety of the war.
Speaker 1: You know, this.
Speaker 2: Zeitgeist was the cause of the war, okay. And there
was obviously like concrete variables you know, relating to things
like war technology and capabilities they're in that upset balances
of power that basically been constants in sixteen forty eight
or so. There's economic realities that you know, affected and
impacted the ability to manage populations at scale that in turn,
you know, we're decisive and as regards you know, the
capacity to mobilize those aforementioned populations, which in turn, you know,
had a tremendous impact on the perception of states engaged
in a hard power competition. That goes without saying, but
all of these things it key points the decision as
well as in terms of broad conceptual horizon of what
the end game of these political ambitions were you can
only understood in terms of the Zeitgeist and the way
that practical transcendence was changing the way humans live their
lives and identify themselves and quite literally how they lived
and died. Nobody was more insinuated into that Modelitia thought
and Hadolf Hiller. Okay, I'm going to begin a series
on this book in the next week. This is an
incredibly ballsy book and it was kind of underneath the radar.
It's basically a breakdown of Hitler's second book, The Secret Book,
And what Sims emphasizes is that Hitler very well understood
the situation geostrategically as well as historically. And I've always
made the point before that Hitler's primary op was Franklin Roosevelt,
not Stalin. Sims hammers that point home absolutely, okay. And
in terms of Germany's mobilization paradigm, in terms of the
technologies Hitler emphasized in terms of his entire timetable, tactical
and strategic from September ninety thirty nine until December nineteen
forty one, was oriented towards facilitating Germany's ability to defend
it against a massive assault by the United States. That
can't be that can't be overemphasized. Anybody who denies it
is not in the game. However, what was happening to
European peoples and what was threatening to render the culture
extinct was uh, what was? What was? What was was
uh was purely conceptual, okay, and it's uh, it's the
uh sphare punkd of that devastating idea or psychological tendency.
Was was Bolshevism. You know, Bolshevism wasn't just a way
of ordering labor. You know, it wasn't just uh, a
matter of depriving people of of certain freedoms you know
that they become habituated to do. It wasn't just a
question of breaking down traditional modalities of order, you know,
whether we're talking about you know, within the family unit,
or you know, in terms of how you know, the
races or ethnic populations relate to one another, or the
way you know, the sex is you know, kind of
relate to one another in as regards you know, duties
and responsibilities and things, and in ontological terms, it was
it was sharing the bases of of of of identity,
and when you remove people from any identitarian pole stars
when you literally rip them out of history, they're no
longer living as human beings in basic terms. Okay. And
despite what people claim, and SEMs emphasizes this too, Hitler
did not claim that Europeans or some master race. Quite
the contrary. Hitler said Germany's rachel stock has precipitously declined
since the Thirty Years War. He looked at that as
the sharing event, okay, that Germany never really recovered from.
He said that the best European stock was in England,
and their leadership cast basically was able to dominate a
good portion of the planet as well as preside over
a divided society that had no kind of like organic
like national underpinning, you know. And they managed to do
this with like a combination of of tremendous foresight, you know,
on unrestrained ruthlessness, and you know, an ability to sort
of manipulate subjugated cultures in a way that incentivized you know, cooperation,
but also quite literally you know, rendering like the best
that those cultures could provide to this you know, imperial whole. Okay.
Hitler further said that the best European stock had emigrated
to America, you know, so Hitler's like, we're basically left
like this kind of like shattered remnant of what's what
was potentially you know, like a like like a master race. Okay,
and thus it was all the more critical. Germany would
like literally die from this onslaught of of of suicidal
for lack of a better way to characterize it. Okay.
Now this wasn't just like Hitler actually believed this. Okay,
this wasn't I mean, this wasn't just you know, stuff
fit for the bully pulpit, or you know, before the
national social has had anything approaching a bully pulpit. This
wasn't just you know, these weren't just like scare concepts
or or something a nightmare scenario to to bring ignorant
people the polls out of fear or something like that.
The degree in which communism in practice, like literally the
practice of communism marsis Leninism. It can only it can
only exist, let aloning door and perpetuate itself if it
annihilates all competing conceptual horizons. You've got to deprive people
of the ability to conceptualize some alternative ontology. Okay, there's
no other ideology like that. As long as it's miss laced.
When we talked about an earlier episode, this kind of
a Simpleton's paradigm that's fromoted during the Cold War, of Oh,
there's totalitarianism and then there's democracy. Something like Franco Spain
had nothing in common with the Soviet Union, a revolutionary
communsm generally, nor did you know some some tinpot dictatorship
in the Third World regimes like that forcing compliance or
enforcing supervisial compliance, you know, by by use of the
penal apparatus or or some or or some kind of
you know, use of military force as an extra judicial
means of punishing people. And you know, as a spectacle
that communism is not interested in that for its own terms.
One of the things I think in some ways is
the very overrated writer but or Well captured the true
essence of Marsus Leninism in nineteen eighty four. And that's
exactly what the book's about. It's not about totalitarianism or
fascism or government generally. It is about Marcus Leninism. What
O'Brien says, I need you to love a big brother.
I don't you know. I'm not interested in super visual compliance.
I'm not interested in forcing you to do things. You know,
in fact, quite the contrary, you know, I need you
to not be able to conceive of anything other than
prostrating yourself in kind of like odd and terrified reverence
of this megalithic state. You know, And not only do
you not, you know, the reason why you don't resist
it isn't out of terror. It's because you can't even
conceptualize resisting it. It's like resisting God. Okay, and iably
the best example of this was in Romania immediately after
the war. There's I can't remember his name now, but
there was a Romanian Orthodox priest who when somebody has
made a saint, are they beatified? Is that the term? Okay,
I believe it was beatified? Yeah, for his resistance the communists.
But uh, there was this what came even known is
uh the poteste e butchering that pronunciation again, forgive me
the Potetsi prison experiments. Okay, Ptetsi prison Now. Romania is
a fascinating example because it's usc was was was he
was viewed kind of in the west of this bizarre
eccentric obviously, you know, him and his wife were were
nearly executed on on live television and that was shocking.
I think we've talked about before, you know, as a
teenager seeing then on this. This was long before a
live league and anything like three guys one hammer or
any of this horrible stuff that you can anybody can
see on the internet. And but I mean, obviously it's
the only violent overthrow of of of an East Block regime.
But you know, for all pradical purposes, Romania had seceded
from Warsaw Pact. You know, Chusysku himself, he negotiated with
Kennedy to remove Romania from the SIOP target list and
a nuclear war. But in terms of that, despite kind
of like seceding entirely from Veldt politique, were Mania kind
of perfected Mars's Leninism as regardless internal situation. I mean,
purists will say, well, it was a personality cult, but
that's not what I'm talking about. Most of the detainees
at the Poteste prison were men wud served in the
Iron Guard, you know, they were they were you know
uh os front veterans who you know, we're company level officers,
are higher. They were priests who hadn't done anything wrong.
I mean, even of a you know, political nature and
they were psychologically tortured. According to this phase paradigm, the
first phase would involved this kind of like endless interrogation
over days and weeks, with torture liberally applied under the
auspices of revealing intimate details. This was called external unmasking.
But the interrogators, I mean, they obviously that any any
kind of anything relating to somebody's intimate, moral, or or
sexual behavior, they'd find that valuable to exploit against them.
But this wasn't this wasn't the purpose of external unmasking.
They'd forced people to do things like, you know, they'd say,
you know, it's come to our attention that you know,
like your father was actually like it like a trader,
you know, and or like you know, it's it's you
you were actually born at Bastard, you know, and then
we we've we've discovered this, or like you know, your
your sister was a prostitute, you know, and and she
had many men, you know, and we we we we've
talked to men who who you know, who visited her
and and in relations with her for money, and they'd
insist on it over and over and over and over again,
and you know, they torture people into signing confessions and
stuff that seems apparently meaningless from a political perspective, but
victims subsequently attested that you start losing touch of reality
in these conditions and you start wondering, you know, like
is that actually true? You know what I mean, I'm
sure people will say, like, well that that would never
happen to me. Very very strange things happen when people
are incarcerated, and add to that, literal court.
Speaker 1: It doesn't even have to be incarceration. I've witnessed people
in my own life who went to group therapy started
started adopting stories that they heard other people tell as
their own.
Speaker 2: And they probably they believe it. Yeah, of it.
Speaker 1: It's the human mind. Is I don't know what that is.
It's hard for me to uh to understand, to understand that,
but I've seen it.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, No, I mean you're a worldly guy, and
I mean obviously, I mean, frankly, you spend a fair
amount of time with with with matters of the human
psyche because it relates to you know what, our mutual
emphasies and things. But yeah, it's you know, the second
the second phase. It was called uh like internal unmasking.
Now this would this was us at least uhh nominally
it was uh the torture slash interrogator. He'd demand to
know what guards or trustees or other interrogators had been
lenient with the subject. So basically this was you know
and say like, you know, basically like you know, I
now in this perverse way, you know, it's it's a
way of trying to trying to literally create like Stockholm syndrome,
or to generate those sorts of misplaced sympathies in the
mind of the victim, you know. Uh, So it came
to the uh, you know, the victim in some cases
begin to look at his torture is truly benevolent, you know,
because even if it was totally a charade, you know,
the fact that he would disclose, you know, persons who'd
shown him leniency, and then he'd be rewarded with you know,
maybe if he'd been subjected to a starvation diet, he'd
be rewarded with food or something or even just you know,
the appearance of of of affection like perversa. It sounds
you know, people do need affection or or approval in
some basic sense, and somebody who's somebody who's been utterly destroyed,
whose internal constitution has been destroyed by a deliberate and purposeful,
you know, regime of torture, even even even the approval
of of their torture, you know, who's cast himself in
in some kind of fatherly roll. You know. You see
you see the police do this too, and it's been
sued to the police interrogation. Obviously they it's not nearly
this extreme, okay, but that's that's basically what good cop,
bad cop is, and some very dumb down and obviously
much less insidious and and and literally figuraibly violent the
sense it's the uh, the third stage was h in
the third phase, it was this. It was just it
was this kind of public humiliation ritual. If the person
was uh, you know, if they were if they were
a priest or a or a a lay person in
the other US church, you know, the interrogator would do
something like you know, laying out a crucifix and like
demanding the urinate on it. You know, if it was
a political partisan or like a former like Hrmacht officer
or Iron Guard revolutionary, you know, they might like force
him to like like drink urine or like literally like
lick the boots of his interrogator or something, or like
you know, claim to have engaged in in like disgusting
sexual acts or something, you know, in this like Michael
Joanes not specifically about this in this context, but you know,
he's talked about how part of the subtext of the
kind of like normalization of pornography is uh, the kind
of like assault the intimate world core of the person,
you know, and and and and and rip away any
any kind of private and any kind of truly like
private boundaries they have, you know, and that that's a
real thing too, you know, but this was you know,
these uh people were people were permanently and profoundly damaged
by this. I mean beyond the obvious. I mean, like
he said, you don't the things people think they take
for granted, they they they no longer can like they're
not they'y're not capable of it. I'm not talking about
and I'm not talking about like trust in in authority
and in some basic way, I mean like they're not
fully human anymore. There's no photo on their own obviously,
but it this guy, Ned Robert Graves is you know,
an english Man of letters type of you know, like
a great war veteran. His memoir was called Goodbye to
All that. Robert Conquest cited him and for comparative purposes
in his in his book on a Communist Megaside, Graves
was talking about the experience at the front, okay, during
World War One, and he said that, he said, Graves
said that like the squalor and danger of the front lines,
being under constant bombardment, you know, like living in filth.
He said that, like young officers, he said, they said,
after after several weeks, they begin to deteriorate a little.
He's like, after six months, he's like most men, we're
basically all right. But they were starting to show cracks, okay,
said after a nine or ten months, these guys became
a drag on fellow officers and NCOs. You know, like
they were no longer thinking clearly, you know, they they
they'd become desocialized owing to constant anxiety. You know, he'd say,
after a year or fifteen months to continuous service, he said,
even like the most robust and healthy junior officer would
basically be useless. You know, he was no longer fit
for command, you know, at best, you know, oh it
was experience and whatnot. You know, if he still had
the nerve and the gumption for direct action, you know,
he might be able to utilize and like the equivalent
of stormtrooper role, but in a command role. Not not
even close, he said. The real tragedy, though, he said,
guys over the age about thirty or thirty five, and
especially over forty. He said that these guys had less resistance,
you know, and in his estimation, it's because they had,
you know, decades of normal life to compare their current situation, dude,
he said. Officers over forty, he said that the six
months more almost unfamily became you know, obvious alcoholics. You know,
they'd only be able to you know, assuming they've survived
multiple assault operations. They could only they could only function
if they were totally drunk. He said that they started
seeming you know, complete like he said, they started seeming literally,
you know, like in a state of shock at all times.
You know. He said, some of them lost their ability
to communicate in basic terms, like their ability to their
command of language had left them, you know. And Conquest
says that something that developed in Soviet society, especially after
about nineteen thirty six to thirty eight, about ninety thirty six,
ninety thirty eight onwards until about nineteen fifty seven. He
said it was something he said, it was something completely comparable,
particularly guys who were in roles that were somewhat coveted
where they were in contact with commissars at all times
and responsible for their people, but they weren't protected by
you know, the lar guests or the patronage of party men.
Like a good example would be, you know, like a
doctor at a hospital, you know who like like a
surgeon who was responsible for you know, more junior doctors
and nurses obviously, or like a professor of geology, you know,
or like a guy who worked at one of the
design bureaus, you know, like over seeing other engineers. You know.
He'd be under constant pressure of the commissars. You know
he is, and so it is, his whole family would
constantly be under surveillance. He'd be subjected to things like
you know, when people he worked closely with or taken
away and either executed summarily or sentenced to sentenced to
the death camp system. He'd be ordered he'd be directed
to sign a statement saying that he fully approved of
these measures. Against people who were engaged in countervolutionary activities,
regardless of his personal feelings about them. And like, over time,
this just broke people down, you know, and the workers
and pet the workers and peasants who supposed that the
Soviet state was directly was was was oriented towards, you know,
like elevating you know, these people, a huge amount of them,
and we'll get in some of these figures in a minute,
had cycled through the forced labor system and they and
they begin acting, They just they began behaving like convicts,
you know, in all in all the pathological ways that
you know people who are in and out of the
prison system do you know, And even if they didn't
have you know, pathologies going in despite being branded as criminals,
they certainly had them when they were released. And that's
what I mean, that's what's unique about Sovietism, and that's
what's unique about communism, you know. And the people who
I mean, it'd be easy for it it's either people
to say like, oh, well, that's their own fault. You know,
why weren't their cadres of people who who were who
were cultivating resistance to this, to this this regime, they
were all dead. They were slaughtered. The Soviets slaughtered ten
million people by the time by by, you know, before
a shot was fired in the World War, you know,
And that's nobody's all point. That people who were capable
of of harboring a conceptual vista of some alternative system.
They they they were, they were They were killed categorically
regardless of age, sex, overall health, national origin, because they
were the they were the standard. Even if they weren't
the standard bearers of the enemy idea, you know, they
they they weren't malleable in the way that they needed
to be. You know, the Khmarra rouge actually perfected this.
I think year zero is you know, left revisionists who
like Saratra, who actually understood Marci's Leninism. You know, they
were constantly trying to extricate the commute riage experience from
revolutionary communism as like a postulant to itself. This is
some bizarre outlier. This is an example of oriental barbarism.
You know, this has nothing to do with with with
with rational state behavior. You know, there's nothing being extra
away from that. He knew that that was not true, Okay,
aside from the kind of atavistic mythologies that you know,
the Khmer Rouge threw in to kind of woo the
the peasantry towards their perspective and you know, and whatever,
like racial mythologies that were emphasized when they were fighting
the Vietnamese like that. Notwithstanding, Paul Pott was actually a
very learned man and what he aside from the fact
that you know, Cambodia Democratic Campuccia, as it was so dubbed,
it was a was a backwater that was devoid of
the prayer, was an industry to facilitate, you know, the
realization of true communism. And in political terms, he was
absolutely a pure communist and that's what's required in order
to facilitate its realization that it's not an outlier in
the least, and people who are honest, like orthodox Marxists
who remained in you know, Moscow adjacent after the after
you know, the ninety sixty schism. They it's subtle, but
it's there, like they acknowledge that I find this fascinating,
but not for the reason something like the think, no,
not merely sucking wave it around as some you know,
gotcha like I obviously it's like grotesque people think that way,
but it's it's entirely consistent with uh, the overall paradig
I mean, it would be dishonest for anyone who describes
that perspective to claim otherwise. But you know, the end
result as all these points too, when you're talking about
these monumental ideas, you know, there you can just look
at them as historical contingencies. You know, you've got to
look at them as not just as as as as
causal as ultimate causal variables in and of themselves, but
as phenomena that uh, it's that, but phenomena that endure
until their full realization or until they are annihilated because
the the because the bearers of the idea are annihilated.
I mentioned material of it. The purpose of communism is
to realize communism. It's not just to alleviate tensions inherent
to you know, opposing classes amidst historically he wal, It's
not just a way to you know, kind of placate
a radicalized proletariat, you know, in the short term and
until you know, some sort of new structure that has
more equitable outcomes can be realized. Like the point of
it quite literally is it's it's self contained realization. And
the end result of the Communist center prizes is the
eradication of culture. And that was the great horror in
the minds of all who opposed it. And you know,
like I said, one of the only meaningful things in
absolute terms you can take from my comf is when
Hitler says that a Bolshevis planet is a plan without culture,
where all men you know, live basically as basically as
animals with the power of speech. You know, and the
or the earth is uh the the the earth is
basically this, you know, this ball of mud like spinning
through the void, with no with no with no higher life.
You know, everything you associate with culture, the from the
comparatively prosaic is the most profound no longer exists. You know,
it's it's it's the world as labor. You know, there
is no past, there's no future, there's only the present.
And you know the realization of work quotas or you know,
the homogenization of life such that it's rendered indistinguishable. But
for you know geographic location, which anymore has no meaning
other than you know, the signature on a map. And
that much much as people might have misanthropic fantasies about
Earth without people. I think those are actually like some
corny show. Like decades ago, it was like it was
like Earth without people or like the world without man,
and it was I think it was not discovery or something.
I forget the tangent, and it was you know, there
was these like cgi rendered landscapes where uh, you know,
like skyscrapers are all over grown and and just like
animals or have free reign and there's no more man
to you know, corrupt like the pure sanity in nature
or something. But that you know, people have this idea
that somehow like without like the without without the human
mind to perceive things, that these things might may well
as not not exist. You know, I'm a sure go
without saying, but it's I think it's like the way
people like can imagine like what their own funeral would
look like because if they have some kind of some
kind of vantage point or something, you know, and and
and in the terms you would you know, as in
you know, and and as a as a living human
with you know, optic nerves and things.
Speaker 1: But let mean you you said that the purpose of
communism is its realization. What's the purpose of national socialism?
Speaker 2: The posterity of the of the voc and more immediately,
That's what I'm gonna get into when uh, this pod
series is gonna do the regeneration of the European form
of life to meet the challenges of the twenty first century,
you know too render its mentioned material competitive at least
able to survive onslaught by what Hitler identified as you know,
kind of like the nasc and Anglo Saxon hegemony or hegemon.
Hitler accurately. That's another thing about it about the same
as book that I think needs to be emphasized. Hitler
was incredibly and he he knew exactly what was underway
in terms of the strategic historical situation. And the second
book makes the point that America contains about fully fifty
percent of the world's like actual like capital and resources.
You know, he says that once fully mobilized America will
be unstoppable. He said, it will be unlike any hedgemond
in the world's ever seen. And he said that, you know,
unless unless some sort of total regeneration occurs in Europe.
He wasn't talking in some kind of strasserist notion of
you know, like the United States of Europe like literally
like a palogenetic revival of the race, you know, and
he had Hitler had no use for petted nationalism, but
his idea of a European superpower is very different. And
what people like Distress were suggested, is my point. But
he said that, you know, unless this happens, assuming that
assuming Germany could fend off a Soviet assault, which at
present then present being you know, nineteen thirty three, it
could not. But he said, even if it could, he
said that Europe would basically become, you know, the battleground
between the United States and the Soviet Union for world
of gemity, which is exactly what happened. And he said that,
you know, the danger of the Soviet Union is the
danger that's always when presented by Europe, which is essentially
an indefensible peninsula, you know, populated by a world minority
of peoples facing uh without without any without any you know,
there's no Sahara desert in Europe. There's no sort of
like natural rampart. You know. They're the you know, the
the immediate physical threat the European civilization is the billion
strong hordes of the of the Barbarian East, you know.
But he said that this is you know, the uh,
the the graver like absolute like literally global threat is
is America, you know, because it's it's a complete because
it's completely it completely like neutralizes everything people had there
to be taken for granted about hard power and the
capacity to marshall capital and the service of hard power.
How he viewed the American people is nuanced and fascinatingly
and Sims gets into this too, despite this kind of
like like this liberal fixation with like, oh, Hitler was
a Confederate and he loved slavery and hated black people.
There said almost nothing about black people other than that.
He said that transplanting you know, one hundreds of thousands
of African slaves to the New World, he said, was
he said, was something that reminiscent of an artifact of
a barbaric civilization. And he said it was beneath America
to do that and totally unnecessary, you know. He admired
the kind of northern industrial might of the Union. He
said that, you know, the cream of German racial stock,
the tune of five point nine million people over a
few centuries, had emirrated to America. He's like these people
in the backbone of American power, you know. And he
said that, uh, you know, some of the best of
of a of the anglophone leadership cast has sort of
like assimilated them into their own ranks. Like he's basically
saying like this is this is a recipe for utterly
like unstoppable power and like full spectrum dominance like economic, military, cultural,
and every can seeable way, you know. But he said
that there's like an underlying rootlessness there that's ring which
been co opted, you know, by a Jewish modernist perspective.
This is different than the threat. It's different but related
in terms of a constellation of of of of Zeitgeist
related factors, like writ large, it's different than you know,
the Soviet threat, but it's it's derived from the same
it's derived from the same historical crisis. Okay. And he
makes the point in the second book that it's not
accidental that, you know, Americanism and Sovietism will like find
common cost for limited purposes because they're not actually manikey
in opposites. There's a there's irreconcilele differences between them, you know,
he said, giving conditions to parody, they destroy each other.
But but they're they're not like moratal enemies or something,
you know, in absolute terms. And but that's I didn't
mean to go so far like a field, but it's
the uh what I did want to get a little
bit into. When if I'm jumping around a bit, a
lot of people over uh over email and whatnot, they've
been asking in comparative terms about like to what degree
like the Soviet Union had like a camp system. And
I make the point and I'm we're lying on Robert
Conquest for this. The Soviets had a death camp system
rit large. Its purpose was to categorically exterminate people. There
were there were hundreds of these camps purpose towards that
end in the frozen you know, tundra of h what
was the Soviet Far East. This is the territory I
mean for people came to like geology and you know
that like or a science and stuff. I mean, this
is uh, this is literally you know, like the ice age,
you know, like World Island. You know, this is where
the this is the this is where the polar bear develops.
This is the this is where mammoths stalked the land,
you know, until fifty thousand years ago or whatever. You know,
Conquest called it an empire of camps that existed from
nineteen thirty one until approximately nineteen fifty seven. And I
mean the scale of this, uh in nineteen thirty mid
nineteen thirty, as this as the security apparatus was sort
of consolidating and leaving behind the revolutionary phase and developing
into a like a true kind of penal system, an
extermination system to categorically manipulate population outcomes in mortal mortal terms.
By that point, the OGPU was the precurs of the
NKVS with the precursor to the KGB. It was constantly
reconstituting itself in these days, is which I believe it
was very purposeful to make it difficult to identify what
series of responsibility were in the the The communists were
singularly obsessed with manipulating the historical record for reasons that
are obvious. I mean we've before, we've been talking about
this past hour, but you know this was uh, I
mean Stalin famously literally you know, like would redact people
from the record, you know, only photographic evidence of them.
But one of the reasons why, I mean any rigorous
historian really like it's if I understand that, if anything,
the the death soul presented even by rigorous revisionists like
Conquest is understated. But superficially, this kind of contant manipulation
of vernacular and nomenclature provided provided the Soviets with an alibi.
And there and there are stortbell apologies today and in
some sense despite the abiquity of information that it has
the same function. But what's an arguable is that by
mid nineteen thirty there's approximately one hundred and forty thousand
prisoners already in these camps run by the GPU. Initially
these sort of huge labor projects, the first of which
was digging a canal from connecting the White seat of
the Baltic which, for perspective this alone required well over
one hundred thousand lavers. Okay, and what better way to
avail a labor pool, and you know, to to to
capture tens of thousandans of of of able bodied men
you know who either are categorized as you know, putical
unreliables or members of ethnic groups that have been you know,
determined to be you know, unassimilable or or resistant to
you know, the uh, the kind of a de ethnic
ethnicfication of people's you know, you you can brand these
many criminals and then you know, you can essentially work
them to death on these on these massive public work projects,
you know, as as slaves literally even worse. I mean,
they're spendables. You know, you don't you don't work your
slaves to death, you know, if I under you know,
under ordinary conditions of a channel slavery. But from nineteen
thirty onward, the number of peoples even some kind of
custodial sentence just astronomically rose. In nineteen twenty nine there
was summerly fifty and sixty thousand people who were sentenced
by the OGPU. A year later this was there was
over two hundred thousand, But in nineteen thirty one it
was one million, two hundred and thirty thousand. I mean,
this is this is astronomical, okay. And we're talking about
you know, we're not talking about a matter of decades.
We're talking about the span of a year. You know,
the camp the population in these camps, you know, labor
camps and death camps, you know, increasing fivefold over you know,
a million people there was within this far eastern camp system.
There's between one hundred and one hundred and sixty camps
at any given time. This absolutely dwarfs the camp system
that the Third Reich, I mean, absolutely dwarfs it. Even
if you accept at face value everything alleged a numberg.
You know, it's it's it's it's comparing an ant to
an elephant. The o GPU further in nineteen thirty two,
absorbed seven hundred small penal colonies and and uh jails
and prisons you know, where the people have been serving
sentences from anything from petty theft to homicide. These camps
and prisons have formerly been run by what it's called
the People's Commissariat of Justice, and OGPU declared that, you know,
these were being inefficiently administered, so they absorbed you know,
what amounted to the conventional you know, prison population and
began working these people to death, you know, on these
public works projects. On January first, in New Year's Day,
nineteen thirty five, this newly unified system, according to Soviet records,
there was nine one thousand prisoners in it. Over seven
hundred thousand are in work camps and two hundred and
forty thousand are in work colonies. Now, mind you, and
reading between the lines and kind of was made this point.
There was these discrete, smaller units, and there's no explanation
for why they were so organized. Presumably that's where actual
dangerous criminals were housed. But everybody else, the oldly majority,
had done nothing at all wrong. But everything in the
Soviet Union under what was called Article fifty eight will
just catch all penal law. Absenteeism from work was a crime.
Destroying Soviet property was a crime. Poganism, which translates approximately
to like disorderly conduct, that was a crime. You know.
So that's one of the reasons why I get really
really irritated when people who some of them don't know
any better, I guess even in our own circles like talk,
they refer to people as criminals. I'm like, don't. I'm like, don't,
don't start doing that. Okay. I mean, maybe I feel
strong about this one background, but you've lost your kind
of grounded this when you start calling people criminals or
some categorical elements. Okay, but you know, for perspective, this
was that this this this this was well known. You know.
One of the things people that attacked Nolty and his
thesis claiming like, oh, nobody knew it was underway in
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a nascent superpower,
and this was it was nothing like today, but film
was ubiquitous. There was an international newswire. You know, It's
not like Moscow was thousands of miles away from Europe.
This is well known, you know, people and people, uh,
these cadres who had fought in Bavaria, you know, and
in the Baltic against the Free Corps. I mean, these
people would have been trained in the Soviet Union, you know.
The for the more, you know, by nineteen thirty six
there was a truly international proxy conflict in Spain. You know,
this this idea that information somehow was was quarantined, you know,
and didn't cross national frontiers. I mean that, that's that,
that's laughable, you know, it's this was this is common knowledge,
you know. And plus I mean how exactly you know,
one hundred thousands of people over the words of the decade,
millions of people were categorically disappearing. You think people weren't
noticing that, you know, upon the Soviet assault on Poland,
you know, a huge number about a quartering onlyion polls
disappeared in once you know, not just because I mean
that the Russians there were there was there was ethnic
hostility between the Russians and Poles anyway, that was arguably
as severe as that between you know that the Germans
and the Polls, or the Poles and the Jews, or
the Germans and the Jews. But you know you think, uh, people,
people weren't noticing that. You know, the tens of thousands
of Poles were just disappearing. Their entire officer corps just disappeared,
you know, the entire like Warsaw clergy just disappeared. I
mean like, but it's I'm not trying to be up
to so like mak it out like it's funny or something,
you know, or every flippant rather about these kinds of
human tragedies. But it's it's it's like a non argument.
It's not it's it's on its face, it's it's laughable.
But the uh, you know, I I epaesize this too,
And I mean again, I the first person make the
point that it's not you know, like a like a
his or historical revisionism is not some kind of numbers game,
but because what is in contention is the degree of
attrition in comparative terms. And this really was not just
the subtext but kind of the part of the core
controversy of the historical striketh. I want people to contemplate
again the degree with which the Soviet can't apparatus utterly
dwarfed that of the German Reich, and like Nolty said,
other than other than homicidal gas chambers, the degree to
which they were employed is arguable. I don't want to
get into that in this series, not because I'm afraid
to or something reverse to. We can talk about Fred
Leuchter and Robert Farreson and the entire controversy if people
want to. But that's but the point is, even if
you accept all of that at face value, every single
thing that the Third Reich did was precedented by the
Soviet Union, with the exception of homicidal gas chambers employed
against civilian populations. So the entire kind of notion of
oh Saundervig led to this unique and intractable evil. Just
look at you know, look look at the Third Reich.
This this regime that existed for the sole purpose of
realizing a homicidal conspiracy. I mean, it's it's laughable. I mean,
it's there's something funny about it, but it's it's preposterous. Rather,
that's about this. I got some more stuff to say
about this, but I don't want to. I would you
be agreeable or amenable if we did a part four
about we fielded questions from subscribers and I could just
kind of tie up loose ends. Man, I don't want
to tell you your business with content. Okay, Yeah, I
appreciate that, man, And I hope this wasn't too lake scattershot,
but yeah, I prefer that, man.
Speaker 1: Okay, yeah, we'll do that. We'll schedule that. Do your
plugs and blendles.
Speaker 2: You can always find me on my website. It's Thomas
seven seven seven dot com, number seven h on the
S seven seven seven dot com. You can find me
on Twitter. It's a at real Thomas at Capital r
E A L underscore number seven H on a S
seven seven seven. I'm on Instagram. My main My main
platform is substack. If you can find my long form
stuff and the podcast, and you can find me on
YouTube it's at Thomas TV. Also excuse me. Also links
from my website alwayso links from substack seeking you shall
find I'm I I dropped a video sit rep today
on my substack, not because I love hearing myself talk,
but I felt I owed the subscribers an explanation for
kind of where we're going with things, So I, if
you are a subscriber, please check that out. I take
this very seriously and very personally, and I do not
take a granted the love and support I get from
all of your people's. It's it's tremendous, Okay, but that's
that's all I got.
Speaker 1: Same. We have some great people on our side. Thomas.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think I.
Speaker 1: Want to welcome everyone back to the Pekana Show. Hey, Thomas,
how are you dead?
Speaker 2: Oh no, well thanks for hosting.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Are are we going to finish up on Nulty today?
Speaker 2: Yeah? I wanted to talk about current events a little bit.
I mean, not just for their own stake, but how
they relate to how they relate to Nolty's model of
their paradigm of historicism. Nolte said and something that I
think should have been more deeply controversial, not should have
been in the sense I think that what he said
was was wrong in any way, but it goes to
show you that as kind of anglophone academy has eclipsed
the continent. You know, people don't really pay attention to
continal philosophy, and in the way that they do, you know,
kind of anglophone treatments of ethics and things. You know,
both in concrete terms is applied to the world situation
in any given moment, but also in more abstract terms,
you know, postulating, you know, what is a legitimate active state,
you know, what is permissible under conditions of war, things
like that. Something I think was more at least more
sweeping in terms of what was being asserted than what
was postulated during the historical strike was an Oldie's nineteen
ninety one book. It was It was a history of
the twentieth century, okay, from essentially a right Hegelian perspective,
and specifically specifically he talked about how the common nucleus
of acts and historical phenomenon gave rise to three totally
abnormal political cultures, and that was the Soviet Union, the
Third Reich in Israel and a lot of people in
this country, not so much in Europe for reasons that
should be obvious, but a lot to people must understand
what Israel is like. I'm not saying that I'm speaking
in purely objective terms, not at all punatively. I think
they few Israel like they do like the independent state
of Croatia or something, or like they view you know,
even Ukraine like some kind of they think, Oh, a
bunch of a bunch of Jewish people lived in the
Middle East and decided they wanted their own state. That's
not how it developed. And it's also why there's tensions
between you know, the ruling Leekud regime contra you know
who the people they call the ultra Orthodox, as well
as others. Like Zionism. Isn't just this organic move of
you know, like nationalists mighty Jewish people indigenous to the
Middle East. It was very much a European ideology that
came out of, you know, born up sort of like
the intellectual culture of of people whose origins were in
this we're in the pale settlement, you know, and who
found their way kind of you know, far and wide
in European urban centers and and and and and intellectual corridors,
you know, whether you're talking about you know, Mensk or
Berlin or Warsaw or Zagreb or wherever. But the whole
idea was that for the Jewish people to survive like
as a race. And again this is you know, very
much grounded in the kind of twentieth century sensibility of
people's heritage being you know, born of blood and material quantities.
You know, the idea was, well, the Jewish people need
to stop being this kind of you know, they need
to stop being this kind of nation without a country.
We need a national state, you know, we need that
that that that guards you know, Jewish racial blood at
all costs. You know, it's got to, uh, it's got
to be premised on this kind of like communitarian you know,
like like like military socialism. You know, it's got to uh,
it's it's got to basically inundate people in this kind
of new way of thinking. You know that Jews aren't
habituated do owing to owing to their kind of peculiar heritage,
not like like politically, I mean, you know, in the
terends of modes of life. And that's why for example,
you know, and again I'm not I'm not saying this
cunatively like why why why is why do people speak Hebrew?
What is real? They'd be like if people like me
said suddenly decided we're gonna start like writing and Viking rooms,
Like why don't they speak Aramaic, you know, like why
why don't they speak like Yiddish or even or even
you know, whatever dialectic German was common to. It was
common to the Jewish ghetto, like white Hebrew. You know,
like it's very much this is very much that kind
of mythologize. It's like a view of themselves. Okay, And
I'm not even saying that, like like and Zion go ahead.
Speaker 1: Even a lot of scholars point to the fact that
Hebrew really wasn't even spoken amongst shoes, that it was
resurrected in the late nineteenth century because you know, if
you're going to have a people, you have to have
a language.
Speaker 2: No, exactly, And so that was yeah, exactly, that's that's
exactly it. So I mean it and and again too,
I mean there's ZIONI is you know, like heim Weissman,
they were self consciousness. It's not like they were pretending
it was something else. But this this this kind of
revolutionary sort of you know, like top down restructuring of
the Jewish form of life. You know, that's very much
a boring again of the same, the same historical, historically driven,
uh ideological phenomena that that gave rise the you know
Marxist Leninism and national socialism, you know, and that's one
of the reasons Israel is anachronistic. Okay, and I don't
want to go too far afield, but I'm writing some
long form stuff right now about what I call the
German Cold War. You know, the DVR, they pursued an
independent course in a lot of ways, I mean, very
different than that pursued by you know, Crusiski's Romania or
like Heuzyugoslavia. Like they were one hundred and ten percent
in the worst offpack camp. And but you know, they
they were, they were, they were. They were kind of
like more of a vanguard of the Stalinist perspective than
even the Soviet Union was, and kind of fascinatingly and ironically,
you know, as Gorbachev started implementing pera Strika, like the
Socialist Unity Party in the d DR started banning Soviet
publications that they considered to be like revisionists and not
adequately orthodox in terms of the ideological line they towed.
But one of the big the DDR, like the Cubans,
they pursued this aggressive revolutionary foreign policy overseas. You know,
in the modern Syria is very much, very much owes
to East German assistance and development, like everything from like
a military doctrine to their kind of like mixed economy
to you know, their to the kind of nomenclature that
the Syrian Bath Party, which was very different than the
Iraqi Bath Party. I mean, that's one of the reasons
why they went to war with Saddam's at Iraq in
ninety one. But they were very much in some ways
in some critical power political ways, you know, the progeny
of East Germany and UH, the East Germans really targeted Israel, Okay,
Like that's indisputable now, of course, the UH if you
read stuff from the era on even some of these
academic articles about you know, Cold War anti Semitism, like
there were people at like the bottom Minehoff faction like
they praised UH, like the execution of the Israeli athletes
at Munich, you know, like the Japanese army faction like
they assaulted UH. You know, they assaulted the Israeli airport
and stuff, and UH, I can't remember his name, but
one of the guys who he wasn't a direct action operator,
but he was kind of the court intellectual of uh
of the bottom Minehoff crew. He would openly call he
would openly call Israelis like Youudenschwein, like literally Jewish pigs
and like that was that was like unthinkable, It would
be unthinkable to talk about like any other like population
like in East Germany. You know. But uh so there's
something I mean obviously, I mean I I basically accept
one hundred percent like Yaqui's paradigm about what happened in
the Cold War and and how Zionism was the was
it was the final catalyst to put you know, the
Eastern Block and and the Israelis and arguably the Jews
as a people, you know, like an enemy footing. But
it's but you know, the uh one of the things
I was keeping Israel alive in terms of it's raised
on Detra, but also in practical terms it's sort of
conceptual existence was the Cold War. One of the reasons
why Israel's having the problems it is now. It's not
wokeism or what people seem to think, you know, like
in like these kind of commentary ists circles. It's not
because people suddenly have developed some like you know, quote
unquote like liberal idea of a Palestine and racism or something.
I mean it might, I mean that there might be
some aspect of that, but you know that nothing's changed
in that regard. It's not like suddenly people are aware
of the racial dynamic and they weren't, you know, ten
twenty fifty years ago. What happened was as as the
Soviet Union and especially the Third Right, you know, like
like fade into memory and there's just you know, and
it's just not something that figures into people's conceptual horizon,
even historically in terms of living memory. You know, like
this kind of like this literally like Jewish racial state,
you know, talking about invoking these kinds of the apocalyptic
kind of scenarios to rationalize why it's got to sustain
this kind of bizarre and anomaloust existence and the kind
of globalized planet like that doesn't people can't conceptualize that anymore,
you know. And one of the things, you know, like
we talked about one of the things that killed the
Soviet Union, you know, it wasn't just the fact that
it's because I mean, like like authoritarian and dysfunctional regimes
like Shambalon indefinitely or they can. I mean, it happens
all the time. Like what killed the Soviet Union wasn't
that people didn't have freedom, or that it had a
basket case economy, or that you know, it lacked popular
legitimacy in a way that you know, could be could
only be remedied by you know, over reliance on punitive measures.
I mean, those things didn't help any But at the
end of the day, the class struggled paradigm as like
an ontological reality, like regardless of like the credibility of
that explanation for for human political life and sociological existence,
regardless of whether there's any merit to that or not.
The punctuated disturbances of of modernity, like you know, really
really disruptive people's lives, you know, And that's one of
the things that gave Marcus Leninism it's momentum as well
as its credibility. And when those conditions abated and people
couldn't even really conceptualize of them anymore, you know, because
two thirds of the population had been born after those
occurrences took place, and things, you know, there's no longer
a context of Sovietism you know, it's it's just pictating
incoherent and in large part that's where Israel is now,
you know. And that's one of the things that's one
of the reasons why the Holocaust narrative was so essential,
because when that had this like monumental power, like totemic power,
you know, regardless even even with the Inner German border
no longer existing, and even even with the Cold War
no longer dividing the planet, it could be said like, well,
you know, the jew as a people, like Jewish people,
qua Jewish people, you know, they were they were availed
the most catastrophic evil that ever existed. And you know
this could re emerge at any time, you know, owing
to the basic moral frailties of of of everybody else
and their unique enmity towards the Jews as a people.
So you know, Zionism is essentially like the defensive ramparts
that they need, you know, Like, I mean, that's nonsense,
but this had a tremendous totemic power. Again, I mean,
only to a number of variables. I don't think something
like that could be I don't think something like that
could be constructed now, like such an ideological narrative that
had that kind of staying power, another kind of total
and and was kind of that like totally insinuated into
political life and get sexual terms the way that particular
narrative was. But you know, you look at the history
of Israel, can.
Speaker 1: I ask you one so you said it had nothing
to do with woke. But I look at like Israel,
and I look at what they're you know, what what
comes out of the government, what they're trying to do.
And then I look at like tel Aviv, the gayest
city on Earth. Those those two things, those seem to
be that's a clash to me. That is Oh no,
it is, yeah, Israel the government and then you have
tel Aviv over here, which is just you know, decadences,
sodom and gomorrah. That that doesn't seem like it's going
to work.
Speaker 2: Oh no, their internal situation, absolutely, that's true. I was
talking more in terms of world opinion, the reason why
people suddenly in the in the like people apparently like
suddenly turned against the Jewish state, like I mean in
terms of I mean, I mean, I mean like in
America and in the EU and things. That's no, absolutely,
it's uh, it feels a basket case. What's also too,
it's kind of the point I was making is that
the people who are kind of like perpetuating Jewish life,
you know, they're these like hard line religious elements who
really aren't Zionists, Like they're super hardcore like in their
identitarian commitments, but not because of the Zionism. I think
Zionism is nonsense, you know, and at worst they think
it's you know, like blasphemous and like a kind of idolatry,
you know, the it's uh, and then that's a whole
other that's a whole other paradigm that's rather complicated.
Speaker 1: But one could actually say that Israel is multicultural. Yeah
it is, and a multicultural society is not going is
not going to last.
Speaker 2: Well that's why I like racialism on its own fate,
like just on its own terms, like doesn't work, you
know what I mean. Like it's not not because like
racism real or something, or that it's not an essential
component of identity and everything else, but that they can't
just be like the exclusive basis of you know, your
communitarian mandate, you know, because yeah, it just it doesn't,
it doesn't, it doesn't lead anything other than other than
some kind of superficial how much in neity it's you know,
like a mile wide and half an inch deep. But
the what's also what people have to understand is that,
you know, kind of the and I'll get into briefly,
I'll kind of break down what white white multis description
is apropos. I think a lot of people don't truly
understand what happened in the nineteen forty eight war. But
you know, Israel, Israel is always had a problem with
getting people who are willing to go live there, like
Israel's kind of a shithole. Like I'm not again, I'm
not saying that like, oh fuck those people. I'm saying,
do you want to go Do you want to go
live in some uh? Do you want to go live
in in some unstable uh? In geostrategic terms, you know,
like densely massed, like like overpopulated, uh, you know, country
in the desert where you know, the cost of living
basically to to to afford the kinds of luxuries we're
used to in America. And you know the e or Japan,
you know, can be astronomical depending on the world situation.
You know, where you know it's your day to day
activities are kind of limited by the security situation, which
is which is one of like permanent emergency. And also
again too, it's not we're not talking about We're not
talking about like a guy who you know, was born
in Japan or like born in Spain or something like
going back to the old country. Like Israel is an
ideological state, you know, like it's not. Again, it's not
it's not kind of like the Jewish way of law
because it's been for you know, thousands of years in
the EU eas just like fully realized or something. So
there was always this problem with getting people to move
to Israel, you know, and that was one of the
reasons for the huge push of the jag and Vanic Amendment,
you know, which was obviously premised done you know, the
need to treat Jews as a refugee from Soviet anti Semitism.
You know, nobody actually believed that, you know, Brezhnev or
and drop what was gonna subject these people to a program.
The the underlying impetus was this is a way to
literally get people to Israel, you know, like the Soviets,
you know, basically like basically like bribing the Soviets to
to the hand out visas for free you know, to
any to any ethnic Jew within Soviet borders. You know,
but they're but but they're you know, they're they're they're
only with the understanding that their destination was Israel, you know,
I mean that. And on top of that too, you know,
I've always maintained one of the reasons where a Bean
was murdered, uh and Ehud Barak, who's a pretty sensible guy.
He's he's he's kind of a man without allies, because
I mean he was he was just like a hard line,
like IDF military guy. So people on the left, including
you know, like Israeli labor types, don't like him. He's
a hugely critical of Lekud. So these are cardcore designists
don't like him. But he all but admits that, you know,
Barack was, Rabine was assassinated, and Raban was essentially going
to end in the permanent emergency, you know, but they
but Israel sees to to exist and that emergency ever
goes away, you know, Like I'm not even saying this
is consciously within the within the contemplation of of of
the inner party of Leekud or something I think some
people understand this very well, you know, and on a
very conscious level. But you know, Israel needs that. They
need the they need the threat of existential siege. They
need the threat or at least the the conceptual specter,
realistic or not, so long as it's so long as
it has credibility within the minds of you know, the
national community. There this this idea that you know, they're
facing oblivion unless uh, you know, they they remains, they
sustain this constant vigilance that's uh facilitated by you know,
this this kind of like spartan socialism. You know, that's
without that, Israel doesn't have anything, you know, without that.
It's it's it uh, it's it's going to like evaporate
into the pages of history, you know. And I think
that's inevitable, but its and it's already happening. But that's
that's what that's what Nolty was getting at about Israel.
And that's hugely important and I mean, just like briefly too,
like for people who don't accept what accept that whole
kind of the whole kind of paradigm, you know, the
the nineteen forty eight war. Well, first of all, as
as any Zionists, so enthusiastically remind you the Arab forces
and being and the men with real comet experience, they'd
either been the ops to the British Empire or they've
been fighting on the side of the Third Reich, you know,
and including the move the al Husseini who was had
been branded a war criminal and had fled Berlin at
the eleventh hour, and you know, was was basically it
was basically like living a living a vagrant life of
a wanted man or an tenorantal life or ether. So
there's a unique vulnerability in terms of in terms of
the Arab popular a Palestine and their ability to defend themselves,
you know, at least contra their their's Zionists adversaries. What
we think of as like the nineteen forty eight uh
War or the you know, the Deliberation War or the
War of Israeli Independence or whatever court history calls it,
were essentially talking about Hagana's what they called Plane D,
which was the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Even though it
was clear they were going to get their way in
some sense with the UN partition, Truman was not enthusiastic
about it. And ironically, the only people who were were
the Soviet Union, and that rapidly they were there were
Soviets rapidly reversed course on that. But that's outside the
scoreboard is talking about right now. But the uh Hagana Ergun,
this this stern gang, they all they all realized that
even if they got even if they got like you know,
fully half of uh the land in question, they still
had a demographic problem. You know, they still they still
have their backs against the wall in terms of you know,
as regards to the bounty rationaley of what they were
trying to accomplish, and that was, you know, a Jewish
racial state where in you know, the entirety of a
Manic Palestine was in their hands, you know, demographically, militarily
and otherwise. So in in March nine and forty eight,
Plan D kicks off and Zionist paramilitary elements. This was
the first time they were under a unified command. Really, uh.
All the Palestinian Arabs had was they had the al
Kadar al Husseini and a man named Hassan Salom. They
succeeded in cutting the road look can tell Aviv and Jerusalem,
and had there been the forces in being to assault,
they might have had the man power to seize Jerusalem,
and that would have been a game changer in my opinion.
But because it may, Designers leadership realized they they had
to act systematically, and they had to act now, not
just because of the possible Palestinian offensive to preempt what
they were planning, but they discerned that there might very
well be a change in the in the international situation,
in particular kind of like washing the DC's mood towards
the concept of a Jewish state. And you know, just
as as kind of the Cold War hardened in terms
of you know, the nation and alliance structure, they thought
that their ambitions would probably be sacrificed. I mean, you
can argue that either way. But again in terms of
what in terms of in terms of Zionism as an idea,
you know, and like we talked about in Noblty's view,
which I think is correct, ideas of their own animating force.
You know, this design Is project had to be seen
through or would die, especially at that juncture. So the
the Clindic of pales Dye it really went into full
operation in April and May of forty eight. It had
two and really only two like basic objectives. The first
was to swiftly and systematically take any any installations at
Vaca by the British civilian, military or infrastructural you know,
to occupy them, repurposed them as the infrastructure for the
NASA state and in the short term, you know, employ
them and as needed and you know, the duration of
the military operation at hand, which also gave them a
huge advantage. They also they were able to facilitate this
because there was a minority of prosign as British officers
on the ground and there's still this element you know
in the British ruling establishment which and people could run
entire valumes under. Why that is, you know, especially in
this era, especially in the era in question, when British
soldiers and civilians had died at the hands of Urgun
and other Zionist elements. I mean this, this completely stupefies me.
But there was enough support on the ground for Zionists
among the British garrison which was in the process of
bugging out. You know that this this eased them the
kind of tactical burden on accomplishing these things the Palestinians
had no I had no such advantage, okay, and they're
also again you know, the palaest what was the Palestinian leadership. Uh,
they were access adjacent, you know, so they were if
they were wanted men and if they weren't formally wanted,
you know, they they certainly would have become targeted if
they re emerged. You know. So this idea that oh
the Palestinians are just you know, just they're just fools.
There's just you know, savages who couldn't mobilize. That complete bullshit,
regardless of anybody feels about the Palestinian cause or anything,
that's just not that this is not true. The second
and the most important obviously aspects or ambition of a
plant d and of the war. Generally, it was to
ethnically cleanse what was to be the future Jewish state
of as many Palestinians as possible. The main direct action
element of the Zionis was Hagana, which had several brigrides.
They had several brigades. Each each brigade was assigned a
village or a township to occupy, and almost all of
these villages were ordered to be destroyed. And you know,
the people, the people expelled or or outright killed, and uh,
some of these uh. This led to some difficult situations,
especially in mixed areas where there wasn't great support for
the Zionist cause. I think for obvious reasons, where you know,
you had you had, Zion's paramilitary is literally extricating people's
Arab neighbors. In some cases they're inner marriages and things,
you know, like very ugly stuff. There was the most uh,
what really was kind of a game changer in terms
of in terms of world opinion as well as in
in terms of what we truly radicalized, not just the
Palestinians that ground, but sympathetic Arab regimes, especially those populated
by you know, by Sunnies, and you know, Palestine is
a Sunni majority. April twentieth, auspicious date, nineteen forty eight,
the dry Yasin massacre and Haifa had Gana assaulted Haifa
and everybody, everybody was everybody was killed, regardless of age, sex,
overall health, you know, women and children, it didn't matter.
And it was it was very it was very chaotic.
There's some reports of trophy taking from the dead, mumulation
of the dead, like people taking noses and ears. There
were reports that were phileral substantiated of of of young
girls and women being raped. This was not This was
not some well executed you know, like clean kind of
like idef operation or something. Okay, it was. It was
an ugly and brutal rasc and cree in all the
worst ways. And the response to that was as this
kind of as world opinion kind of became outraged by this,
you know, Desigonist leadership, they took to these kinds of
they took to these sort of performative endeavors of you know,
publicly encouraging Palestinians to remain in these mixed areas, you know,
saying you know, you'll have come to any harm, and
you know, everybody's rights are going to be honored in
the future Jewish state. I mean, which was I mean,
even if that was sincere on the art of political cadres,
I do not reason I think it was. But I mean,
let's say it was. You know, the situation on the
ground was what it was, and it had its own
momentum and it couldn't be stopped at that point in
my opinion, you know. But all told, all told, about
three quarters of a million Palestinians were you know, expelled
from the land. You know, probably about twenty thousand people
were killed outright. And again this was not excluding the
military age males. Quite the contrary. It was, you know,
categorically but that you know, the h and again the
the British had an arms embargo on Mandate Palestine. Truman
again was no friends of the Zionist regime. I mean,
even after you know, victory was declared in May of
forty eight, Truman issued it the fact of recognition that
you know of the zign Oft state, you know, but
he refused a dejiree acknowledgment of their legitimacy. The Soviet
Union was the first state to provide that. And the
designist elements in the ground, you know, Haganah first among them.
They'd gotten the small arms that they were able to
procure real largely from the East Block, you know. And
it goes to show you how the reason why Moscow
envisioned Israel Zionist Israel, is being adjacent to them ideologically,
I mean part of it is. I mean it is
because again I mean an old these points you know,
Zionism wasn't is the progeny of the same nexis of
causation as where the other you know, great European ideologies
of the twentieth century. I mean, I believe where Stalin
was sitting, he probably viewed he probably viewed the treatment
of the Palestinians and the way that he viewed his
own treatment to the nationalities, and well, you know this,
this is a way of creating a tabula rocess that
you know, some kind of Israeli socialism can be built,
you know. And the reason why, and again I mean
the the reason why that was an idea that could
be entertained, you know, and Stalin was the consummate realist
and it wasn't plumbing prone to flights of fantasy. It
made sense why you would think that, you know, but
ultimately developed you know again too, with the East Block
being uh, you know, rapidly anti Zionists, and and the
DDR carrying on and like literally an active war against
the Jewish state, you know, I think that, I mean,
that's that's demonstrative of Nolty's point two. I mean, all
all this stuff, I don't see how people can reject
the kind of the kind of Hegelian view of history.
I mean, with some qualifications, obviously, when they look at
how these things actually developed, you know, I mean, we're
not We're not just talking about arguments between historians and
kind of academic I've retier cloisters, you know, we're talking
about you know, war and peace phenomenon that actually developed
and was just positive and in terms of the outcome of.
Speaker 1: The Old War.
Speaker 2: It's uh, you know, and I think one of the uh,
one of the reasons, you know, one of the reasons
why it was such a parious state, you know, was
was for that reason. It wasn't just because you know,
in order to it was a it was a convenient
sort of ideological framing for the Eastern Block to say,
you know, oh, this is this is this is a
this is a fascist state like the bundest Republic, but
even worse because it's premised that overtly you know, racialist principles.
You know, it was because on some level everybody discerned
that there was something unseemly about Zionism, you know that
not not because like it's Jewish or not not because
you know of anything intrinsic to the Jewish character. If
people make that case that they want, I'm saying, that's
not what that that's not why it was a kind
of natural target the Soviet propaganda. It's because the the
first half of the twentieth century was it was was
catastrophic that was left saying, okay, and even somebody who
doesn't accept in an ethical or or conceptual terms, you know,
the claims the International War Crimes Tribunal Nuremberg or the
claims of you know, coreni historians who posit this, you know,
thunder Big theory of Germany and in folcdof Hitler is
as some kind of a it's some going to stand
in for Lucifer. Even somebody doesn't accept that at all,
you know, saying you've got to accept this sort of
exceptional state that's premised on this sort of like rabid
racial nationalism, the structures of which, although superficially similar to
familiar ones, are basically all oriented towards, you know, the
maintenance of this totally abnormal, you know, sociological and military paradigm.
You just got to accept all this, you know, because
it's essential going to you know, these uh, and the
reasons presented are things that you know kind of like
remind people the darkest kind of like the darkest times,
the Inner War years, and and what was suggested is
as being necessary for the survival of the race or
or the assent in working class or whatever else. I mean,
it's not something that people wanted to think about, you know,
and it's not something that people felt comfortable with, you know,
kind of raising at the banner of legitimacy, regardless of
they felt about or if they had any opinion about,
you know, like Jewish people and Zionism. And that's some
and that's also something Nolty said in one of his
last collection of essays. He said that ultimately, you know,
Zionism has to either fulfill it's sort of internal mission,
you know, as a monumental idea. It's not historically contingent,
you know, because Nulty agreed with Carl Schmid in that
regard and Heideger you know, I I I ideas of
their own self attained revelation, you know, and that's either
realized or it's not. And in the case of Israel,
that's only realized really by some kind of an end
sigue and the end in in in in context, that
would that would basically mean, you know, the the annihilation
of the Palestinians as a people, you know, is that
possible today? I mean physically, yeah, is there the political
will there. I mean to your point about Israel being
I mean not to sound like some sort of like
Marxist or something, but is is it? Is it fatally
compromised by its own internal contradictions? Like yeah, I think
actually maybe it is. But even were it not, you know,
I think, uh, I don't think they could. Uh I
don't think. I don't think the Israelis can start categorically
exterminating the people at Gaza any more than in nineteen
eighty resident could have assaulted Poland, you know, like the
Soviets did Hungary in fifty six, Like this would have
been like unthinkable considering the state of not even just
like world opinion. It's like conceptually like what people can tolerate,
you know, morally, But.
Speaker 1: It's also I mean, you talk about it being an anachronism.
It seems like, you know, one hundred million people were
killed in the first half of the century to prevent
states like Israel from existing.
Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly, exactly. So it's this case of special pleading
where it's like, oh, but you know this is the
case of this is the case of Israel, because you know,
there's all these exceptional circumstances that threaten it, but without
you know, without without the neum narrative having like truly
kind of punctuated cachet in the collective memory, Like yeah,
that just doesn't the people that that that means nothing
to people. So yeah, exactly exactly, like why And that's
the point it make of people too, you know, like
when people like me or you know, some of our
right wing Palestinian and Iranian and Lebanese friends, when they
raise the issue is raelly race racialism, they're not saying like, oh,
Israel is they're real racialists. What they're saying is that
the regime tells you that everything Israel does is utterly
unacceptable in all cases, but Israel, Like that's the point,
Like the point isn't on its own terms, like is
racism bad? That that's totally that there's nothing to do
with it. It's why this special pleading and you know,
and and and even and and even notwithstanding that, like
why is this such an impat narrative? You know, like
you can't make the claim like people did during the
Cold War, that this is an absolute strategic necessity because
for better or worse, you know, America was in the
Cold War and its enemies were you know, the client
states of the Soviet Union, which were Israel's enemies. Now,
how much that over to the fact of America provoking
these circumstances and not practicing balanced diplomacy and regardless whether
the Cold or Whipment fought or not, Like that's not
important because like America was in the Cold War and
take like nineteen sixty seven or seventy three, you know,
like the die was cast. You know, it's not as
if like the brakes could be put on the geo
strategic situation as it had developed. So yeah, there's you're
absolutely right. Yeah, that's about There's some other stuff want
to take up, but again it's it's it's I kind
of want to conclude this like multi discussion, so I
want to say that for next time I want to
do I haven't decided yet. I'm I'm I'm rereading the
Sims Excuse me, I'm sorry biography of Hitler, which raises
really important concepts, including you know, Hitler contract Roosevelt, and
Hitler's understanding of America as not just you know, Germany's
primary addressary, but also of you know, the like like
the future of this planet hinging on you know, the
ability of civilizations to constitute themselves as superpowers, and how
like Europe is coming up short, you know, in every
in every category of criteria contra America. And this wasn't
just a question of a practical of a military ambition
or or a practical war planning and things that it
had to do with the entirety of Europe's historical mission
and which would, in Hitler's mind, would either succeed or
Europe would simply perish. And to understand that is essential
understanding Hitler and the war. It's essential understanding Roosevelt. And
that that the fact that Roseneld and Hitler and their
radio addresses were always like in dialogue with each other,
you know, not with Churchill, not with Stalin, not you know,
with not with the world generally, so we could I
was playing with.
Speaker 1: A you wanna do you wanna do? Uh do a
few of those with me?
Speaker 2: And uh, yeah, that's what I's getting at. I think
it'd be better suited to a series that we do
rather than me just like doing it on the podcast.
But I'd also want to I also don't want to
tell your business in terms of no.
Speaker 1: No, that sounds great and Yeah, I wanted to mention
everyone to hear this too. Thomas dropped uh the first
episode of season two of Mind Phaser with Jay Benden
and yeah as a banger. Yeah that was good, Thank
you man.
Speaker 2: The Burden's a prince man like he's he's a He's
a great guy and a great kind creator. He's also
a dear friend and he's nice to everybody. Always really
likes his appearances. Man, So that helps me obviously.
Speaker 1: He's uh, he's also he doesn't allow himself to be
trapped inside a box. He has a lot of different influences,
and I don't think he really cares what anybody thinks
about you know, about any of them either. He's just
you know, he has his opinions and I think they're solid.
Speaker 2: No, he's a great guy, man, he really is. I
can't I can't. I can't praise him effusively enough. Yeah, No,
this is great man. Thanks again.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so we'll plan that. We'll plan that out privately,
and yeah, hit some plugs real quick and while on this.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the best place to find me is in my website.
It's Thomas seven seven seven dot com number seven hl
A S seven seven seven dot com. If you're gonna
like find that's the link to my Twitter. It's a
link to my Instagram, it's a link to my substick,
it's a link to my t gram and just like
random other stuffs on there. But uh, the substick is
where the pot is. It's capital R E A L
underscore Thomas seven seven seven. That's substack dot com. Because
we've launched season two of My Phaser, I'm gonna make
the season one content free. I'm gonna I'm probably gonna
do that on Monday, like like all season one, you'll
be able to ask it for free. I may or
may not upload it to YouTube or rumble, but for
now you can, Like you don't need any special app
for any thing you can just listen on. Just go
go to substack dot com and anything that's that's that's
not by a paywall. I mean you can just click
it and listen to it. But yeah, that's that's that's
what I got.
Speaker 1: All right, until the next time, Thank you as all
human