WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.120 --> 00:00:04.200 Picture this. You are sitting in a commercial airliner, a 2 00:00:04.280 --> 00:00:08.679 DC nine, cruising at about fourteen thousand feet. It's April 3 00:00:08.759 --> 00:00:13.560 nineteen seventy seven, Southern Airways Flight two forty two. You've 4 00:00:13.560 --> 00:00:15.560 been flying for just a few minutes, really, just a 5 00:00:15.640 --> 00:00:18.839 quick hop from Huntsville to Atlanta, and suddenly the sky 6 00:00:19.000 --> 00:00:19.920 just turns violent. 7 00:00:20.039 --> 00:00:22.239 And we're not talking about a little turbulence here. 8 00:00:22.239 --> 00:00:26.199 No, I mean baseball sized hail is just battering the fuselage. 9 00:00:26.239 --> 00:00:29.559 It's so loud that passengers later described it as like 10 00:00:29.879 --> 00:00:32.840 being trapped inside a metal barrel while someone outside just 11 00:00:32.880 --> 00:00:33.799 throws rocks at it. 12 00:00:33.799 --> 00:00:35.479 It's a terrifying image, it really is. 13 00:00:35.679 --> 00:00:39.240 And up in the cockpit that same hail completely shatters 14 00:00:39.280 --> 00:00:42.079 the thick windshield and then comes the most terrifying sound 15 00:00:42.079 --> 00:00:45.520 of all, which is just well silence. Both engines die, Yeah, 16 00:00:45.560 --> 00:00:48.399 all the electrical power cuts out. You're essentially in a 17 00:00:48.439 --> 00:00:52.000 forty ton metal tube in the pitch dark, plummeting in 18 00:00:52.079 --> 00:00:53.399 fifty six feet per second. 19 00:00:53.479 --> 00:00:56.719 I mean, it is the absolute definition of an aviation nightmare. 20 00:00:56.799 --> 00:00:58.520 You know. We like to think of commercial flight as 21 00:00:58.520 --> 00:01:01.000 this perfectly engineered, highly predictable. 22 00:01:00.679 --> 00:01:02.840 Systems, right, like everything is under control. 23 00:01:02.799 --> 00:01:05.799 Exactly, and most of the time it is. But when 24 00:01:05.799 --> 00:01:09.359 you introduce the ultimate unpredictable variable, which is just the 25 00:01:09.560 --> 00:01:13.680 raw physical power of mother nature, that illusion of total 26 00:01:13.680 --> 00:01:17.840 control can shatter just as quickly as that cockpit windshield did. 27 00:01:18.079 --> 00:01:21.719 Yeah, And to understand how highly trained professionals end up 28 00:01:21.719 --> 00:01:25.680 in these utterly terrifying scenarios, We've put together a deep 29 00:01:25.719 --> 00:01:28.599 dive today using this massive stack of sources. 30 00:01:28.719 --> 00:01:30.280 Not a lot to cover, we do. 31 00:01:30.799 --> 00:01:34.840 We're looking at declassified National Transportation Safety Board crash reports, 32 00:01:34.879 --> 00:01:38.840 some incredibly harrowing transcripts from cockit voice recorders, and this 33 00:01:39.079 --> 00:01:42.079 really fascinating MIT study on pilot psychology. 34 00:01:42.159 --> 00:01:43.879 It's some pretty heavy material, it is. 35 00:01:44.319 --> 00:01:46.760 But our mission today is to essentially put on our 36 00:01:46.799 --> 00:01:50.640 accident investigator hats and take you inside three true stories 37 00:01:50.640 --> 00:01:53.599 of commercial plane crashes. We want to understand exactly what 38 00:01:53.680 --> 00:01:59.760 happens when fierce weather, complex machinery, and human psychology all collide. 39 00:02:00.000 --> 00:02:01.680 And I think the real through line in all these 40 00:02:01.719 --> 00:02:04.640 investigations is that these aircraft were highly reliable, right, and 41 00:02:04.680 --> 00:02:06.480 the pilots were extensively drained. 42 00:02:06.519 --> 00:02:08.280 They weren't amateurs, not at all. 43 00:02:08.360 --> 00:02:11.719 We are rarely looking at a single glaring error. In 44 00:02:11.800 --> 00:02:15.039 these cases, we're looking at a cascade. We're looking at 45 00:02:15.039 --> 00:02:19.000 how advanced technology can actually create illusions and how the 46 00:02:19.080 --> 00:02:23.719 human brain processes or fails to process those illusions under 47 00:02:24.039 --> 00:02:25.479 just unimaginable pressure. 48 00:02:25.680 --> 00:02:28.400 So let's start by going right back into that terrifying 49 00:02:28.439 --> 00:02:30.680 cockpit of Southern Airways Flight two forty two. 50 00:02:30.800 --> 00:02:31.599 Okay, let's do it. 51 00:02:32.280 --> 00:02:36.120 The pilots were flying toward this massive thunderstorm system. They're 52 00:02:36.120 --> 00:02:39.039 looking at their weather radar and they spot what looks 53 00:02:39.080 --> 00:02:42.159 like a clear hole right like a safe passage straight 54 00:02:42.199 --> 00:02:45.560 through these towering thunderheads. So they steered directly for it. 55 00:02:45.919 --> 00:02:48.960 But that hole, it actually did not exist. 56 00:02:49.120 --> 00:02:51.719 Yeah, and this is where we encounter a physical phenomenon 57 00:02:51.759 --> 00:02:53.000 called radar attenuation. 58 00:02:53.199 --> 00:02:54.400 Okay, break that down for us. 59 00:02:54.680 --> 00:02:56.879 So in nineteen seventy seven, the weather radar on that 60 00:02:56.960 --> 00:02:59.800 GC nine it worked by sending out radio waves. Those 61 00:02:59.800 --> 00:03:03.080 ways bounce off precipitation like rain or hail, and then 62 00:03:03.120 --> 00:03:05.719 they returned to the receiver, which basically paints a picture 63 00:03:05.879 --> 00:03:06.960 of the storm. 64 00:03:06.639 --> 00:03:07.560 On the pilot screen. 65 00:03:07.759 --> 00:03:10.960 That makes sense, But the rain and the hail in 66 00:03:11.000 --> 00:03:14.680 this specific storm cell were so incredibly dense that the 67 00:03:14.719 --> 00:03:18.000 wall of water actually absorbed the radar signal entirely. 68 00:03:18.360 --> 00:03:20.960 Wait, let me take sure and visualizing this right, So 69 00:03:21.439 --> 00:03:24.919 the radar waves hit the storm, but instead of bouncing 70 00:03:25.000 --> 00:03:27.319 back to the plane to say, hey, there's a huge 71 00:03:27.360 --> 00:03:29.439 storm here, they just got swallowed up. 72 00:03:29.520 --> 00:03:31.800 That is the tragic irony of the whole thing. The 73 00:03:31.879 --> 00:03:34.240 waves couldn't penetrate the wall of water to see what 74 00:03:34.319 --> 00:03:36.759 was behind it, and the water was just too thick 75 00:03:36.800 --> 00:03:38.759 to reflect the signal back properly. 76 00:03:39.000 --> 00:03:39.280 Wow. 77 00:03:39.639 --> 00:03:42.120 So to the radar receiver, a lack of a returning 78 00:03:42.159 --> 00:03:44.719 signal just means a lack of weather. It painted a 79 00:03:44.759 --> 00:03:48.840 blank black space right in the absolute most violent core 80 00:03:48.919 --> 00:03:49.599 of the storm. 81 00:03:49.879 --> 00:03:51.800 So it's basically like a mirage in the desert. You 82 00:03:51.840 --> 00:03:53.960 know you're dying of thirst, you see a shimmering oasis, 83 00:03:53.960 --> 00:03:55.719 you run toward it, but it's just a trick of 84 00:03:55.759 --> 00:03:56.000 the light. 85 00:03:56.120 --> 00:03:57.120 That's a great way to put it. 86 00:03:57.199 --> 00:04:01.680 Only here the pilot saw a safe, clear passage precisely 87 00:04:01.719 --> 00:04:05.479 because the danger was so overwhelmingly dnse that it actually 88 00:04:05.520 --> 00:04:08.960 blinded their instruments. They flew directly into a monster. 89 00:04:09.000 --> 00:04:14.479 They really did, and that decision triggered this massive mechanical cascade. 90 00:04:15.080 --> 00:04:17.759 The Pratt and Whitney investigator who looked at the engines 91 00:04:17.800 --> 00:04:21.720 after the crash, a guy named Al Weaver. He uncovered 92 00:04:21.720 --> 00:04:24.439 a really fascinating mechanical failure. 93 00:04:24.120 --> 00:04:25.240 Right because the engines. 94 00:04:24.959 --> 00:04:28.439 Dined exactly and the hail didn't actually fly into the 95 00:04:28.480 --> 00:04:32.480 engine and destroy the internal workings directly, which is what. 96 00:04:32.399 --> 00:04:33.000 You might think. 97 00:04:33.120 --> 00:04:34.839 Yeah, I assumed you just shreded the insides. 98 00:04:35.079 --> 00:04:38.079 No, what the massive hail did was it dented the 99 00:04:38.120 --> 00:04:41.759 engine cowlings, you know, the aerodynamic outer casings, and that 100 00:04:41.839 --> 00:04:44.360 physical denting is what blocked the bleed valves. 101 00:04:44.399 --> 00:04:46.560 Okay, wait, I'm stuck on this part. I mean, hail 102 00:04:46.680 --> 00:04:49.680 is just ice right, It's a metal casing. How does 103 00:04:49.720 --> 00:04:53.480 a dented outer casing cause an entire jet engine to 104 00:04:53.720 --> 00:04:56.720 literally shut down? That seems like a pretty massive design flaw. 105 00:04:57.000 --> 00:04:59.680 It definitely sounds counterintuitive, but it all comes down to 106 00:04:59.720 --> 00:05:03.680 flu dynamics. Jet engines operate by sucking in air, compressing 107 00:05:03.680 --> 00:05:07.000 it incredibly tightly with these spinning blades, mixing it with fuel, 108 00:05:07.040 --> 00:05:08.160 and then igniting. 109 00:05:07.800 --> 00:05:11.120 It right sucks, squeeze, bang, blow right exactly. 110 00:05:11.199 --> 00:05:14.120 So to keep that immense pressure balanced, engines have these 111 00:05:14.160 --> 00:05:18.439 bleed valves that release the excess pressurized air. Okay, when 112 00:05:18.560 --> 00:05:21.399 those valves got blocked by the hail damage, the air 113 00:05:21.560 --> 00:05:24.199 just couldn't vent. So the pressure built up inside the 114 00:05:24.199 --> 00:05:28.079 compressor stage until it became so great that the airflow 115 00:05:28.240 --> 00:05:31.879 violently reversed direction. It literally blasted forward. 116 00:05:31.480 --> 00:05:32.439 Out the front of the engine. 117 00:05:32.600 --> 00:05:33.199 Oh wow. 118 00:05:33.519 --> 00:05:36.120 In aviation, this is called an engine surge or a 119 00:05:36.160 --> 00:05:39.680 compressor stall. The engines basically start violently choking. 120 00:05:39.800 --> 00:05:41.680 Okay, so the engines are choking, they aren't getting the 121 00:05:41.759 --> 00:05:45.079 right airflow. But why did they completely destroy themselves? Like 122 00:05:45.079 --> 00:05:48.360 couldn't the pilots just I don't restart them once they 123 00:05:48.439 --> 00:05:49.360 glid it out of the hail. 124 00:05:49.480 --> 00:05:51.759 And that brings us to the fatal human factor in 125 00:05:51.800 --> 00:05:55.120 this chain. When an engine surges and chokes like that, 126 00:05:55.519 --> 00:05:58.519 the standard procedure is to pull the throttles back to 127 00:05:58.639 --> 00:06:00.560 reduce the fuel and clear the surge. 128 00:06:00.519 --> 00:06:01.839 I don't want to ease off. 129 00:06:01.800 --> 00:06:04.279 Exactly, but you have to put yourself in that cockpit. 130 00:06:04.319 --> 00:06:07.199 They are being battered by a massive storm, They're losing 131 00:06:07.240 --> 00:06:10.759 altitude rapidly, and air traffic control has literally just instructed 132 00:06:10.759 --> 00:06:12.639 them to climb to fifteen thousand feet. 133 00:06:12.759 --> 00:06:14.959 Oh man, So they need power. 134 00:06:15.040 --> 00:06:18.680 Right under intense psychological pressure to just keep the plane 135 00:06:18.720 --> 00:06:22.519 in the sky, the captain advanced the throttles to gain power. 136 00:06:22.680 --> 00:06:24.920 He pushed the throttles up when the engine was already 137 00:06:24.920 --> 00:06:25.759 actively choking. 138 00:06:25.920 --> 00:06:28.399 He did, and it forced the engines to try and 139 00:06:28.519 --> 00:06:32.040 suck in even more air, which exacerbated that pressure build 140 00:06:32.120 --> 00:06:34.519 up to truly catastrophic levels. 141 00:06:34.199 --> 00:06:36.040 Because the air still has nowhere. 142 00:06:35.720 --> 00:06:40.120 To go exactly, So, this intense blocked pressure bent the 143 00:06:40.160 --> 00:06:44.759 internal steel compressor blades back and forth, vibrating them violently 144 00:06:44.879 --> 00:06:48.120 until the metal suffered fatigue and just snapped oh cock. 145 00:06:48.279 --> 00:06:51.800 The engines then ingested their own broken steel blades. They 146 00:06:51.920 --> 00:06:55.160 literally shredded themselves from the inside out. In a matter 147 00:06:55.199 --> 00:06:58.319 of seconds, they had turned a commercial jet into a 148 00:06:58.360 --> 00:07:00.000 forty ton glider. 149 00:06:59.800 --> 00:07:02.120 With what maybe six minutes of glide time. 150 00:07:01.959 --> 00:07:03.480 Left, Yeah, barely anything. 151 00:07:03.639 --> 00:07:06.319 So they are frantically searching for an airport. And this 152 00:07:06.360 --> 00:07:09.439 is where the technological illusions strike again, because they were 153 00:07:09.439 --> 00:07:12.680 actually quite close to Cornelius Moore Airport, which had a 154 00:07:12.759 --> 00:07:15.439 runway that probably would have saved them. It was right there, 155 00:07:15.759 --> 00:07:18.560 but the Atlanta air traffic controllers couldn't direct them there 156 00:07:18.920 --> 00:07:22.800 because Cornelius More didn't have a specific beacon to show 157 00:07:22.920 --> 00:07:26.720 up on the controllers' radar screens. The controllers literally could 158 00:07:26.720 --> 00:07:29.680 not see the airport on their scopes to guide this 159 00:07:29.920 --> 00:07:31.000 crippled plane to it. 160 00:07:30.920 --> 00:07:32.480 Which is just heartbreaking. 161 00:07:32.560 --> 00:07:36.439 So, left with absolutely no radar guidance and zero engine power, 162 00:07:37.000 --> 00:07:39.839 the first officer, who was actually a former Navy pilot, 163 00:07:40.240 --> 00:07:44.279 he had to attempt a completely improvised visual landing on 164 00:07:44.360 --> 00:07:47.360 a rural stretch of Highway ninety two in New Hope, Georgia. 165 00:07:48.040 --> 00:07:51.040 And the touchdown, from what I read it was initially smooth, 166 00:07:51.079 --> 00:07:53.040 but they were just coming in way too fast, yeah, 167 00:07:53.079 --> 00:07:55.399 with obviously no engine reverse thrust to slow. 168 00:07:55.279 --> 00:07:56.720 Round because the Asians were gone. 169 00:07:56.959 --> 00:07:59.560 Yeah, so they bounced, they hit a gas station, and 170 00:07:59.600 --> 00:08:02.480 the plane just broke apart in a massive fireball. 171 00:08:02.560 --> 00:08:02.639 Ye. 172 00:08:02.800 --> 00:08:04.480 Seventy two people lost their lives that day. 173 00:08:04.560 --> 00:08:05.319 It's a tragedy. 174 00:08:05.519 --> 00:08:07.720 So on flight two forty two, we really see what 175 00:08:07.839 --> 00:08:10.639 happens when technology, you know, the weather radar of the 176 00:08:10.639 --> 00:08:14.560 air traffic control scopes, essentially goes blind. But what happens 177 00:08:14.560 --> 00:08:18.319 when the technology doesn't just go blind but actively masks 178 00:08:18.399 --> 00:08:22.160 the danger, like pretending everything is perfectly fine. That's what 179 00:08:22.199 --> 00:08:25.519 we see decades later, way up at thirty three thousand feet. 180 00:08:25.680 --> 00:08:28.759 Right, Let's move to August two thousand and five. This 181 00:08:28.839 --> 00:08:31.519 is West Caribbean Airways flight seven oh eight. We are 182 00:08:31.560 --> 00:08:34.399 on a late night charter flight from Panama to Martinique. 183 00:08:34.679 --> 00:08:37.720 The plane is an MD eighty, heavily loaded with passengers 184 00:08:37.720 --> 00:08:38.639 returning from vacation. 185 00:08:39.120 --> 00:08:41.039 A very different scenario. 186 00:08:40.799 --> 00:08:44.440 Very different, But the atmosphere in the cockpit is really heavy. 187 00:08:44.559 --> 00:08:47.519 The airline itself is in deep financial trouble. The captain 188 00:08:47.519 --> 00:08:48.960 actually hasn't been paid in six. 189 00:08:48.799 --> 00:08:51.240 Months, six months, it's unbelievable. 190 00:08:51.360 --> 00:08:53.399 Yeah, he is actually working a second job at a 191 00:08:53.440 --> 00:08:56.320 local bar just to feed his family. So you have 192 00:08:56.320 --> 00:08:59.279 a crew that is financially stressed, deeply exhausted, and they're 193 00:08:59.279 --> 00:09:01.000 flying right through hurricane. 194 00:09:00.600 --> 00:09:04.279 Season weather, and you really cannot separate that psychological backdrop 195 00:09:04.279 --> 00:09:07.000 from the mechanical events that follow. You have a captain 196 00:09:07.000 --> 00:09:10.799 whose cognitive bandwidth is just already stretched to the absolute limit. 197 00:09:10.879 --> 00:09:13.960 Oh absolutely, So as they encounter this stormy weather, they 198 00:09:14.000 --> 00:09:16.799 decide to climb to thirty three thousand feet to try 199 00:09:16.840 --> 00:09:19.840 and get above the worst of the turbulence. The outside 200 00:09:19.879 --> 00:09:23.399 temperature plummets, and the captain notices ice starting to form 201 00:09:23.440 --> 00:09:27.000 on the windshield wipers. So to protect the plane, he 202 00:09:27.120 --> 00:09:28.559 turns on the anti icing. 203 00:09:28.399 --> 00:09:31.840 System, which is totally standard procedure. You do not want 204 00:09:31.879 --> 00:09:35.759 ice accumulating on the wings and destroying your aerodynamic lift. 205 00:09:35.879 --> 00:09:37.039 No ice is lethal. 206 00:09:37.639 --> 00:09:39.879 But turning on the anti icing system on a jet 207 00:09:39.919 --> 00:09:41.840 like the MD eighty, yeah, it isn't like you know, 208 00:09:41.840 --> 00:09:44.600 flipping on the electric rear defroster in your sedan. It 209 00:09:44.639 --> 00:09:45.799 relies on bleed air. 210 00:09:46.200 --> 00:09:50.000 Yes, those exact same compressor stages we talked about earlier. 211 00:09:50.639 --> 00:09:52.960 To heat the wings and the engine cowlings to actually 212 00:09:53.000 --> 00:09:56.559 melt the ice, the plane physically bleeds off intensely hot 213 00:09:56.720 --> 00:09:59.679 compressed air from the engines and routes it right through 214 00:09:59.679 --> 00:10:00.039 the wing. 215 00:10:00.159 --> 00:10:01.759 Okay, hold on, I want to make sure you understand 216 00:10:01.759 --> 00:10:04.399 the physics here too. Yeah, if you are stealing compressed 217 00:10:04.440 --> 00:10:07.240 air from the engine to heat the wings, doesn't that 218 00:10:07.279 --> 00:10:09.840 mean you have less air going into the combustion chamber 219 00:10:10.080 --> 00:10:11.519 to create actual thrust. 220 00:10:11.720 --> 00:10:13.840 You've hit the nail on the head. You are directly 221 00:10:13.960 --> 00:10:16.200 robbing the engines of thrust to generate heat. 222 00:10:16.360 --> 00:10:16.639 Wow. 223 00:10:16.799 --> 00:10:19.759 And because the plane was incredibly heavy with passengers and 224 00:10:19.799 --> 00:10:22.639 fuel and the air at thirty three thousand feet is 225 00:10:22.720 --> 00:10:26.399 extremely thin. Anyway, the engines were already working near their 226 00:10:26.399 --> 00:10:28.679 maximum capacity just to maintain altitude. 227 00:10:28.679 --> 00:10:30.080 They're already struggling. 228 00:10:29.639 --> 00:10:32.720 Exactly, so when they turned on the anti ice, they 229 00:10:32.840 --> 00:10:36.799 essentially stole the last remaining horsepower. The plane just didn't 230 00:10:36.799 --> 00:10:38.200 have enough thrust to stay at. 231 00:10:38.120 --> 00:10:41.200 Thirty three thousand feet. It slowly began to loose speed, 232 00:10:41.320 --> 00:10:41.600 but the. 233 00:10:41.559 --> 00:10:44.679 Pilots didn't notice because of the autopilot. 234 00:10:44.159 --> 00:10:48.200 Right, and this is the invisible trap. The autopilot's primary directive, 235 00:10:48.279 --> 00:10:50.720 which was programmed by the crew, was to maintain an 236 00:10:50.720 --> 00:10:53.120 altitude of thirty three thousand feet no matter what. 237 00:10:53.159 --> 00:10:53.639 No matter what. 238 00:10:53.879 --> 00:10:56.279 As the plane lost speed from the lack of thrust, 239 00:10:56.360 --> 00:10:58.919 it naturally started to sink. So to stop the sink, 240 00:10:59.200 --> 00:11:02.720 the autopilot quietly angled the nose of the plane higher 241 00:11:02.799 --> 00:11:06.080 and higher. It increased the angle of attack to generate more. 242 00:11:05.960 --> 00:11:07.799 Lift, so it's compensating. 243 00:11:07.919 --> 00:11:11.440 Yes, the autopilot was trading speed for altitude and entirely 244 00:11:11.519 --> 00:11:14.279 masking the decay and speed from this exhausted crew. 245 00:11:14.879 --> 00:11:15.559 It pitched the. 246 00:11:15.480 --> 00:11:17.720 Nose up so high that the plane was pushed to 247 00:11:17.799 --> 00:11:20.159 the absolute brink of an aerodynamic stall. 248 00:11:20.440 --> 00:11:22.240 And the stall is basically the point where the air 249 00:11:22.279 --> 00:11:24.720 can no longer flow smoothly over the wings, and the 250 00:11:24.720 --> 00:11:26.559 wings simply stopped flying exactly. 251 00:11:26.639 --> 00:11:27.480 They become dead weight. 252 00:11:27.879 --> 00:11:30.720 And the really tragic detail in the crash report here 253 00:11:31.159 --> 00:11:35.480 is that the manufacturer Boeing had actually issued a bulletin 254 00:11:35.559 --> 00:11:40.279 warning about this exact scenario, you know Autopilot's masking speed 255 00:11:40.360 --> 00:11:43.759 decay at high altitudes in the MD eighty. But the 256 00:11:44.200 --> 00:11:48.720 financially troubled airline apparently never passed that vital bulletin down 257 00:11:48.759 --> 00:11:49.440 to their pilots. 258 00:11:49.519 --> 00:11:52.399 It's infuriating. So the trap is set by the technology, 259 00:11:52.559 --> 00:11:55.039 and then the weather is what finally springs it. The 260 00:11:55.080 --> 00:11:57.840 plane is barely hanging in the thin air, pitched up, 261 00:11:58.080 --> 00:12:02.200 flying nangerously slow. They fly over the storm system and 262 00:12:02.320 --> 00:12:04.559 suddenly encounter a twenty mile. 263 00:12:04.399 --> 00:12:07.000 Per hour updraft, just a sudden gust of wind, yeah. 264 00:12:06.879 --> 00:12:09.440 Gust of vertical wind, and it pushes the nose up 265 00:12:09.480 --> 00:12:11.799 just a fraction more, and that's all it takes. The 266 00:12:11.840 --> 00:12:16.000 airflow over the wings completely separates. The plane enters a full. 267 00:12:15.840 --> 00:12:18.679 Stall, and because of the violent disruption of air entering 268 00:12:18.720 --> 00:12:21.639 the engines during the stall, both engines experience what's called 269 00:12:21.639 --> 00:12:25.080 a rollback right, like they automatically throttle down to protect themselves. 270 00:12:25.360 --> 00:12:28.720 So the captain, who's already exhausted, he's stressed about his finances, 271 00:12:29.120 --> 00:12:33.000 he hears this blaring stall warning. He feels the violent 272 00:12:33.039 --> 00:12:36.120 shaking of the aircraft, and he looks down to see 273 00:12:36.120 --> 00:12:39.879 his engine dials dropping, and he immediately assumes he has 274 00:12:39.879 --> 00:12:41.960 suffered a dual engine flame out. 275 00:12:42.000 --> 00:12:45.120 And this is just a textbook tragic case of a 276 00:12:45.200 --> 00:12:49.639 cognitive tunnel vision. Under extreme stress, the human brain latches 277 00:12:49.639 --> 00:12:54.320 onto a narrative and it simply discards all contradictory. 278 00:12:53.600 --> 00:12:56.039 Evidence, like he made up his mind instantly he did. 279 00:12:56.480 --> 00:12:59.000 The twenty one year old co pilot, meanwhile, looks at 280 00:12:59.000 --> 00:13:02.399 his instruments, sees the extreme nose up attitude and the 281 00:13:02.399 --> 00:13:06.240 decaying speed, and he correctly identifies the real problems. 282 00:13:06.360 --> 00:13:07.759 It's a stall. It's a stall. 283 00:13:07.840 --> 00:13:09.399 But the captain doesn't listen. 284 00:13:09.159 --> 00:13:10.480 He doesn't even acknowledge him. 285 00:13:10.519 --> 00:13:14.320 Because to recover from an aerodynamic stall, you have to 286 00:13:14.320 --> 00:13:16.559 push the nose down, You have to point the plane 287 00:13:16.559 --> 00:13:18.799 toward the ground to pick up speed and get the 288 00:13:18.799 --> 00:13:20.600 air flowing smoothly over the wings. 289 00:13:20.600 --> 00:13:22.919 Again, yes, you have to fight your instincts, but. 290 00:13:22.919 --> 00:13:25.159 The captain, thinking he's lost his engines and wanting to 291 00:13:25.159 --> 00:13:27.240 stay in the air as long as possible, he does 292 00:13:27.279 --> 00:13:30.399 the exact opposite. He pulls back on the control column. 293 00:13:30.600 --> 00:13:32.559 He wrestles the plane to hold the nose. 294 00:13:32.440 --> 00:13:36.320 Up, and by pulling back he destroyed any chance of recovery. 295 00:13:36.720 --> 00:13:40.279 The plane plummeted nine thousand feet in just thirty seconds. 296 00:13:40.320 --> 00:13:43.559 Oh my god, nine thousand feet Because. 297 00:13:43.279 --> 00:13:46.120 The nose was held aggressively up. The plane didn't really 298 00:13:46.159 --> 00:13:48.559 die of like a dart. It fell flat, almost like 299 00:13:48.600 --> 00:13:52.200 a leaf dropping from a tree. For three agonizing minutes. 300 00:13:52.639 --> 00:13:55.440 It crashed in a remote region of Venezuela, claiming the 301 00:13:55.440 --> 00:13:57.559 lives of all one hundred and sixty people on board. 302 00:13:57.679 --> 00:14:00.000 It is chilling. I mean, the radar hit the storre 303 00:14:00.120 --> 00:14:02.759 arm on flight two forty two, the autopilot hit the 304 00:14:02.759 --> 00:14:04.799 stall on flight seven oh eight. We've looked at the 305 00:14:04.840 --> 00:14:07.799 mirage of radar and the invisible trap of the autopilot 306 00:14:07.840 --> 00:14:11.799 at cruising altitude. But you know, the most dangerous phase 307 00:14:11.840 --> 00:14:14.279 of flight isn't necessarily up in the clouds. 308 00:14:14.360 --> 00:14:15.120 No, it's really not. 309 00:14:15.240 --> 00:14:16.799 It's when the runway is right in front of you, 310 00:14:16.840 --> 00:14:19.399 and the psychological pressure to just finish, the job becomes 311 00:14:19.440 --> 00:14:20.399 totally overwhelming. 312 00:14:20.519 --> 00:14:23.399 And that brings us to American Airlines Flight fourteen twenty 313 00:14:23.440 --> 00:14:25.080 in June nineteen ninety nine. 314 00:14:25.200 --> 00:14:26.200 Let's get into this one. 315 00:14:26.279 --> 00:14:29.120 The flight is delayed over two hours, leaving Dallas Fort 316 00:14:29.159 --> 00:14:32.519 Worth for Little Rock, Arkansas. The crew is bumping right 317 00:14:32.600 --> 00:14:36.000 up against their fourteen hour legal duty limit, so the 318 00:14:36.000 --> 00:14:39.360 clock is ticking loudly. If they don't get this plane 319 00:14:39.360 --> 00:14:42.759 on the ground soon, they will legally time out. They'll 320 00:14:42.759 --> 00:14:45.440 have to cancel the flight and strand all the passengers. 321 00:14:45.519 --> 00:14:48.440 You can just feel the pressure mounting. You have dispatchers 322 00:14:48.480 --> 00:14:52.159 back at airline headquarters playing this high stakes global game 323 00:14:52.200 --> 00:14:56.120 of chess right trying to squeeze flights through tightening weather 324 00:14:56.200 --> 00:14:58.159 windows just to keep the network moving. 325 00:14:58.240 --> 00:15:00.759 Everyone wants to get it done, and you just want. 326 00:15:00.600 --> 00:15:03.320 To get home. The crew is exhausted and wants to 327 00:15:03.320 --> 00:15:07.399 go to a hotel. It's this massive invisible weight pressing 328 00:15:07.440 --> 00:15:09.759 down on the slight deck. And you know you've probably 329 00:15:09.759 --> 00:15:12.399 felt a mild version of this yourself. Oh absolutely, You're 330 00:15:12.480 --> 00:15:15.960 driving home late at night, you're exhausted, and a blizzard starts. 331 00:15:16.879 --> 00:15:19.279 You know you should pull over at a motel, but 332 00:15:19.360 --> 00:15:22.000 your brain insists I'm only ten miles away. I can 333 00:15:22.000 --> 00:15:25.960 make it. Now. Multiply that pressure by one hundred passengers 334 00:15:26.159 --> 00:15:28.679 and a massive corporation breathing down your neck. 335 00:15:28.639 --> 00:15:31.799 Right, and in aviation psychology, this is known as get 336 00:15:31.799 --> 00:15:36.159 their itis. It is a mission oriented mindset where the 337 00:15:36.200 --> 00:15:41.559 intense desire to complete the task completely overrides rational safety protocol. 338 00:15:41.639 --> 00:15:43.279 It's a deadly mindset. 339 00:15:42.919 --> 00:15:43.960 Extremely so. 340 00:15:44.039 --> 00:15:46.639 As flight fourteen twenty approaches Little Rock, the pilots are 341 00:15:46.720 --> 00:15:50.679 navigating what the dispatcher called a bowling alley, basically a 342 00:15:50.759 --> 00:15:54.440 narrow clear path between two massive, violent thunderstorms. 343 00:15:54.639 --> 00:15:55.799 But storms move. 344 00:15:55.759 --> 00:15:58.679 Exactly as they get closer to the airport, those storm 345 00:15:58.720 --> 00:16:01.159 cells start merging right over the runway, and. 346 00:16:01.159 --> 00:16:04.759 The passengers describe the approach as terrifying. The cabin was 347 00:16:04.840 --> 00:16:08.519 pitch black, and then suddenly these massive kaboom type lightning 348 00:16:08.559 --> 00:16:10.240 strikes just illuminated everything. 349 00:16:10.320 --> 00:16:12.240 Yeah, horizontal rain battering the windows. 350 00:16:12.320 --> 00:16:15.159 The plane is being violently thrown around. The wind on 351 00:16:15.200 --> 00:16:17.720 the ground is shifting so wildly that air traffic control 352 00:16:17.720 --> 00:16:20.240 has to switch their landing runway at the very last minute, 353 00:16:20.639 --> 00:16:24.200 which forces the pilots to execute a complex turning visual 354 00:16:24.240 --> 00:16:27.320 approach right as the weather goes from bad to severe. 355 00:16:27.000 --> 00:16:29.960 And the crosswinds are gusting up to forty five miles 356 00:16:30.000 --> 00:16:30.360 per hour. 357 00:16:30.399 --> 00:16:31.159 That's huge. 358 00:16:31.279 --> 00:16:33.960 It is well beyond the airline's safety limit for landing 359 00:16:33.960 --> 00:16:36.399 on a wet runway that was capped at ten knots 360 00:16:37.039 --> 00:16:38.440 or about eleven miles per hour. 361 00:16:38.519 --> 00:16:39.440 They were at forty five. 362 00:16:39.840 --> 00:16:43.039 Yes, but in the chaos of the shifting runway and 363 00:16:43.080 --> 00:16:47.000 the blaring alarms, the pilots get confused about the dry 364 00:16:47.080 --> 00:16:51.279 versus wet wind limits. They become entirely task saturated, They 365 00:16:51.320 --> 00:16:53.519 lose sight of the airport in the rain, and. 366 00:16:53.440 --> 00:16:55.879 The cockpit voice recorder captured a quote that just stops 367 00:16:55.919 --> 00:16:59.080 you in your tracks. The captain, who has over ten 368 00:16:59.159 --> 00:17:03.039 thousand hours of flight experience, gets frustrated wrestling the plane 369 00:17:03.039 --> 00:17:06.279 and says, out loud, I hate droning around visual at 370 00:17:06.359 --> 00:17:10.000 night in weather without having any clue where we are. Yeah, wait, 371 00:17:10.039 --> 00:17:13.160 I have to stop here. If an incredibly experienced veteran 372 00:17:13.200 --> 00:17:15.119 cat it admits out loud that he has no clue 373 00:17:15.119 --> 00:17:17.960 where he is while getting battered by a severe storm, 374 00:17:18.279 --> 00:17:21.160 Why on earth didn't he abort the landing? Why not 375 00:17:21.240 --> 00:17:24.079 push the throttles up, go around and fly to another airport. 376 00:17:24.119 --> 00:17:27.079 Well, that is the million dollar question that investigators had 377 00:17:27.079 --> 00:17:29.680 to answer. And to understand why he didn't pull up, 378 00:17:29.720 --> 00:17:32.839 we have to look at a truly fascinating and terrifying 379 00:17:32.880 --> 00:17:34.759 study conducted by MIT. 380 00:17:34.960 --> 00:17:35.960 Okay, what did they find. 381 00:17:36.240 --> 00:17:39.880 Researchers tracked two thousand encounters between commercial jets and severe 382 00:17:39.960 --> 00:17:43.400 thunderstorms at Dallas Fort Worth Airport. They found that out 383 00:17:43.400 --> 00:17:46.759 of those two thousand encounters, two out of three pilots 384 00:17:46.799 --> 00:17:51.000 deliberately flew into the thunderstorms rather than diverting around them. 385 00:17:51.160 --> 00:17:53.799 Two out of three commercial pilots chose to fly into 386 00:17:53.839 --> 00:17:55.720 a severe storm. That is staggering. 387 00:17:55.880 --> 00:17:58.720 It is the MIT researchers dug into the data to 388 00:17:58.759 --> 00:18:01.799 find the risk factors what made a pilot more likely 389 00:18:01.839 --> 00:18:05.319 to press on into danger, and they found three main triggers. 390 00:18:06.160 --> 00:18:08.440 If the flight was running behind schedule, if the flight 391 00:18:08.519 --> 00:18:11.319 was taking place at night, and if the plane immediately 392 00:18:11.319 --> 00:18:13.119 in front of them had successfully landed. 393 00:18:13.160 --> 00:18:15.599 And in flight fourteen twenty had almost all of those right. 394 00:18:15.640 --> 00:18:18.079 They were two hours late, it was pitch black, and 395 00:18:18.119 --> 00:18:21.200 they felt an overwhelming compulsion to finish the job. The 396 00:18:21.240 --> 00:18:25.000 psychology of get their itis completely normalized the danger they 397 00:18:25.000 --> 00:18:26.960 felt they simply had to land, so. 398 00:18:26.880 --> 00:18:29.839 They forced the jet down through the storm. But in 399 00:18:29.880 --> 00:18:34.400 the frantic overloaded moments right before touchdown, you know, fighting 400 00:18:34.400 --> 00:18:37.039 the violent crosswind, trying to spot the runway lights, and 401 00:18:37.119 --> 00:18:41.119