Speaker 1: Ready July thirty, twenty twenty four, allegedly according to that
Speaker 1: thing we call a calendar.
Speaker 2: Wow, this month has gone by really quickly.
Speaker 1: Anyway, it is Tuesday, Tuesday, and it is the second
Speaker 1: broadcast day of the week because I actually did a
Speaker 1: show on Monday, which I don't normally do, and I've
Speaker 1: released the audio of it, but a special video edit
Speaker 1: of it is going to be put out later today
Speaker 1: or tomorrow, not sure which we'll get to it. I've
Speaker 1: been a little behind. But anyway, speaking about behind and
Speaker 1: what's ahead, let's get to a couple of things. First
Speaker 1: of all, the jfk lnswer conference is going to occur
Speaker 1: on the twenty second of November, exactly on the anniversary,
Speaker 1: all right, at the Downtown Marriott in Dallas, and there
Speaker 1: will be details in the show notes there. Larry Hancock
Speaker 1: is involved in that now. I believe he's going to
Speaker 1: participate remotely this year, which kind of would rather that
Speaker 1: Larry's there, but it's okay. I'm gonna be there anyway,
Speaker 1: and oh boy, look, I'm no replacement for Larry, that's
Speaker 1: for sure, but it's gonna be an interesting conference. So
Speaker 1: I have Larry with me tonight and of course he's
Speaker 1: the author of many books. And if you go to
Speaker 1: Larry dash Hancock dot com you can keep track of
Speaker 1: his blog. You can take a look at the many,
Speaker 1: many books, all of which I think I have on
Speaker 1: my sholf and he does take up more space on
Speaker 1: my shelf than anybody else.
Speaker 2: And he's not just taking up space. Now, before I.
Speaker 1: Even say hello to Larry, I gotta throw something out
Speaker 1: here because I know what he's going to discuss.
Speaker 2: And this is.
Speaker 1: Necessary because from the best to the worst of authors, bloggers, YouTubers, podcasters, everybody,
Speaker 1: I would dare say, everybody that I've ever listened to
Speaker 1: or read, you know, in recent years, especially and maybe
Speaker 1: from the nineteen eighties on. I think I think Mark
Speaker 1: Lane used to talk about this, I mean everybody. The
Speaker 1: whole idea that JFK said he was going to smash
Speaker 1: the CIA into a thousand pieces and cast it to
Speaker 1: the four Wins or some version of that quote, that sentiment,
Speaker 1: that idea. You have the Croc article, you have the
Speaker 1: various other mentions of this happening. You have his battle
Speaker 1: with the CIA, and then people do reference, you know,
Speaker 1: the firing of Allen Dallas, which was really a resignation.
Speaker 2: He just asked for a resignation. He got it.
Speaker 1: The Bay of Pigs, Cuba, Well, we've learned a lot
Speaker 1: about that over the years. And even when the book
Speaker 1: Ultimate Sacrifice was huge, people were talking about this. People
Speaker 1: were talking about this and still continue to and I
Speaker 1: say again, people reference this for all kinds of reasons.
Speaker 2: And Larry, I.
Speaker 1: Gotta tell you, I don't think the majority of people
Speaker 1: who mention it are putting it in context, understanding what
Speaker 1: it means. They just take it and use it for
Speaker 1: their own purpose. This oppositional thing the JFK was battling
Speaker 1: with the CIA. Of course, I would recommend when we're
Speaker 1: talking about this stuff books by Larry Hancock, like Tipping Point.
Speaker 1: Someone would have talked, okay, things like that, and a
Speaker 1: book which I hope will be out by the end
Speaker 1: of this year about Oswald Oswald Lee Harvey Oswald. Puzzle
Speaker 1: Pieces is that the permanent name now puzzle pieces?
Speaker 3: Larry now literally way simplified it. It is simply the Oswald.
Speaker 2: Puzzle, the Oswald puzzle.
Speaker 1: Well, either way, you're going to get the pieces of
Speaker 1: the puzzle in there, So the Oswald puzzle that's actually
Speaker 1: more concise and better. But of course Larry would do that,
Speaker 1: he's a writer. I'm not so anyway, But Larry, what
Speaker 1: are your thoughts on this? I mean, where do we
Speaker 1: begin to take this apart? Because I know I'm right
Speaker 1: almost everybody, and I do mean from the best to
Speaker 1: the worst, from the deepest researchers to the people that
Speaker 1: just seem to have a casual knowledge and are really
Speaker 1: you know, pedestrian of podcasters who go, well, I think
Speaker 1: there was a conspiracy, but they have no idea which
Speaker 1: direction to go in. They have no idea about the
Speaker 1: facts of the case. They just parrot things. And this
Speaker 1: is one of those things that's been parroted repeatedly. JFK
Speaker 1: was going to smash the CIA into a thousand pieces
Speaker 1: and cast it to the winds, to the four corners
Speaker 1: of the earth. Different versions, like I said, in different times,
Speaker 1: in different places, but the sentiment is still the same.
Speaker 1: Do you think my observation is accurate?
Speaker 3: No, it's or yes, it's absolutely accurate, Chuck. I think
Speaker 3: it comes from this urge that we seem to have
Speaker 3: to want to simplify matters to really especially we've developed
Speaker 3: a tendency I think over the years to kind of
Speaker 3: view everybody being against JFK and JFK being against everybody,
Speaker 3: and that, you know, setting up part of the context
Speaker 3: for the assassination, where in fact, if you really go
Speaker 3: back to the history, for example, JFK owed a great
Speaker 3: deal to the CIA and was very impressed with what
Speaker 3: the CIA was doing in intelligence collections. If the CI
Speaker 3: had not done an job with its photo reconnaissance actually
Speaker 3: taking command of military assets, but using the U two
Speaker 3: as well, he would not have had the data that
Speaker 3: he had to manage the Cuban missile crisis. He would
Speaker 3: not have had the data that he had to even
Speaker 3: maintain the position that the Russians had hold out their
Speaker 3: missiles because they were he was getting photographs of, you know,
Speaker 3: missiles uncovered going.
Speaker 4: Out on ships.
Speaker 3: So his respect for CIA intelligence collection and the National
Speaker 3: Photo Interpretation Center was quite high, so as well as
Speaker 3: as his analysis at that point in time, he actually
Speaker 3: respected that a lot more than the military intelligence.
Speaker 4: He was getting it during the Cuban missile.
Speaker 3: Crisis, which was quite sensationalized, exaggerated, and not nearly as
Speaker 3: good as the CIA. In conso, the fact that he
Speaker 3: was totally upset with everything about the CIA simply is
Speaker 3: not accurate. The same thing we often betray him as
Speaker 3: being somehow hostile to the military. When JEFFK himself personally
Speaker 3: entered involved themselves with more major military exercises than any president.
Speaker 3: He had been very supportive of the military. In the
Speaker 3: two years prior to his assassination, he had ordered a
Speaker 3: major military exercise in the Atlantic staging for a Cuban invasion,
Speaker 3: and had been very involved with that, And so he
Speaker 3: he wasn't any one thing. I think the answer to
Speaker 3: your question is, in our our search to simplify everything,
Speaker 3: we make it all single faceted. And that's not the
Speaker 3: way reality is, and certainly not the way JFK was.
Speaker 3: JFK just aware of the shortcomings and strengths of these
Speaker 3: various agencies.
Speaker 1: Well, look, just like life, Larry, the reality is that
Speaker 1: most things reside in the gray areas. Okay, So yeah,
Speaker 1: there was the he was definitely using the military assets.
Speaker 1: He had to manage a lot of things, from the
Speaker 1: you know, the issue over East and West Germany. Uh,
Speaker 1: you know, to problems in South what we called Southeast
Speaker 1: Asia or Endo China as it was described back then. Right, Uh,
Speaker 1: you know that area of the world, which eventually blossoms
Speaker 1: into the Vietnam conflict. But still there's a lot going on.
Speaker 1: So he's utilizing these assets. There were adversarial relationships here,
Speaker 1: and there were problems, like we hear during some of
Speaker 1: these meetings right with his Joint chiefs and other assets
Speaker 1: that are supposed to be informing him. He's getting angry
Speaker 1: with people, they're making recommendations he doesn't want to hear sometimes.
Speaker 1: But it doesn't mean that that's all there was to it.
Speaker 3: There is and those were individuals those aren't you know,
Speaker 3: you can talk about le May, or you can talk
Speaker 3: about Commander in Chief Atlantic during the Cuban missile crisis.
Speaker 3: Certainly there were individual face offs, right, But I think
Speaker 3: I think it's fascinating.
Speaker 4: Again, we tend to look at it one facet.
Speaker 3: Somebody asked, JFK is kind of like, well, clearly you
Speaker 3: don't like le May, and le May doesn't like you. Okay,
Speaker 3: why in the world, Julet, why is he head of
Speaker 3: the Joint Chiefs of Staff if you don't And JFK said, yeah,
Speaker 3: I don't like him. But if for some unforsaken, god
Speaker 3: forsaken reason, we end up going to go war against Russia.
Speaker 3: I want him as the military commander because he's the
Speaker 3: most likely guy to win it.
Speaker 2: See that's the thing.
Speaker 4: He was a practicist. We don't give him credit for that.
Speaker 1: Well that's the thing. He might not have liked le Maay,
Speaker 1: but he knew that let's be blood. If somebody had
Speaker 1: to loose hell on an adversary, LeMay was your man.
Speaker 1: I mean, this is the guy who firebombed and did
Speaker 1: more damage with firebombing than we did with nukes.
Speaker 2: Uh you know, from the air during World War Two?
Speaker 2: Am I correct?
Speaker 4: Oh?
Speaker 2: Absolutely, So this is the guy I would pick two.
Speaker 1: I might not like him, but I would say, look,
Speaker 1: if I got my back against the wall and I've
Speaker 1: got to start bombing things, this is the guy I
Speaker 1: want in there. I want the most vicious fighter I
Speaker 1: can sin. And LeMay was definitely the guy who could
Speaker 1: plan and execute something like that.
Speaker 2: He had already proven it. This is why he ascended.
Speaker 2: Uh So.
Speaker 1: But it doesn't mean that they were going to get
Speaker 1: along all the time. Now, when we look at the CIA,
Speaker 1: that's an even more complex relationship because people, you know,
Speaker 1: they love to point to the regular characters, right, James
Speaker 1: Jesus Angleton yes, I know he's a huge looming figure,
Speaker 1: and certainly he's rather complex and fascinating. But is he
Speaker 1: the guy who's like directly interacting with Jafka at that time? No, right,
Speaker 1: And meanwhile, who is interacting with him? What kind of
Speaker 1: relationship is he having? And all these Cuban operations, people
Speaker 1: just kind of make it out like, Okay, Nixon was
Speaker 1: the operation officer, he hands it over to JFK in
Speaker 1: nineteen sixty one when JFK takes office. But that's not
Speaker 1: the tirety of the story either. Maybe he wasn't in
Speaker 1: on the planning of the Bay of Pigs, you know,
Speaker 1: per se, but it doesn't mean that he wasn't behind it.
Speaker 1: It doesn't mean that he didn't say, you know what,
Speaker 1: this is a good idea. We need to deal with
Speaker 1: this problem in the backyard. Still a cold warrior, not
Speaker 1: necessarily the dove everybody wants to make Kennedy out to be.
Speaker 1: See again, he's more than one thing. He's not all
Speaker 1: for let's go to war and let's see if we
Speaker 1: can win a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union, okay,
Speaker 1: which other people have that mindset at the time. But
Speaker 1: simultaneously he's not saying, Look, it's all about we just
Speaker 1: have to be peaceful. He might have made grand statements
Speaker 1: like that in public, and he certainly did multiple times
Speaker 1: about you know, we should be able to abolish all
Speaker 1: weapons and yeah, that's a wonderful utopian vision and an aspiration,
Speaker 1: but it doesn't mean that he's going to function that
Speaker 1: way on a day to day basis. Again, pragmatic solutions
Speaker 1: as opposed to aspirational you know, just wish it, wont
Speaker 1: do it whatever, you know, let me see if I
Speaker 1: can envision this and it'll happen.
Speaker 2: No, he wasn't like that, So yeah.
Speaker 3: Let's take another individual that really represents this multifaceted relationship.
Speaker 4: Alan Dulles. Right, okay, you mentioned Dallas already.
Speaker 3: It is I mean Alan Dulles during the Tailor Commission
Speaker 3: inquiry into the failure.
Speaker 4: The Bay of Pigs is on record and you.
Speaker 3: Can find his statements repeated in the Tailor Commission records
Speaker 3: as saying he concurs with the view that the CIA
Speaker 3: did a terrible job in covert military operations and in
Speaker 3: the future, the CIA should not be doing covert military operations.
Speaker 3: That needs to be taken from the CIA. It's not
Speaker 3: set up to do it well, it didn't.
Speaker 4: Do it well.
Speaker 3: That's Alan Dallas saying, you need, mister President, you need
Speaker 3: to take this away from the CIA. JFKs response actually
Speaker 3: is to do what Dells just told him to do,
Speaker 3: and he began a switchback project shortly after that, which
Speaker 3: he started first in Southeast Asia in Vietnam, moving CIA
Speaker 3: led covert military operations to the military, and then the
Speaker 3: following year, by Nancy sixty three, he was moving Cuban
Speaker 3: covert military operations to the to the military.
Speaker 4: And that that is for.
Speaker 3: Some reason, JFK researchers seemed to treat this as something mysterious.
Speaker 4: And you know, we don't know what's going on here.
Speaker 4: When suddenly, you know.
Speaker 3: The Joint Chief Staff people and it was probably going
Speaker 3: to end up under Commander in Chief Atlantic, which obviously
Speaker 3: she was in the Caribbean, it would be his responsibility.
Speaker 3: They start they start doing they start looking at how
Speaker 3: they're going to organize themselves for covert maritime operations, covert
Speaker 3: infiltration operations. That's when you see Army trainers start to
Speaker 3: show up in Florida. Why is brad Eyre's there? Suddenly
Speaker 3: like okay, this is going to be switched over. They
Speaker 3: better get to know the Cubans. They're going to be
Speaker 3: training and running it. And you know, you find this
Speaker 3: switchback occurring in nineteen sixty three. You even find the
Speaker 3: Joint Chief starting to inquire with the CIA. You know
Speaker 3: what about these dr people?
Speaker 4: Can we use them? What about Alpha sixty six? Can
Speaker 4: we use them?
Speaker 3: And the CI is going now Alpha sixty six we've
Speaker 3: never been able to control them, dre we can't control them.
Speaker 3: If you guys are going to do this, do it
Speaker 3: at your own risk. You know, this is what's really
Speaker 3: going on in the real world, is this switch back
Speaker 3: just as dull As recommended. And JFK is indeed breaking
Speaker 3: off a good chunk of CIA military operations, special operations,
Speaker 3: and that's going to the military, So you know it.
Speaker 3: I think it's fascinating that people don't talk about to
Speaker 3: FACK in that instance. JFK is actually doing what Alan
Speaker 3: Dulles recommended, breaking.
Speaker 4: Part of the CIA apart. But he's certainly not going
Speaker 4: to do away with ci.
Speaker 3: A intelligence collections, NSA intercept collection, CIA analysis photo interpretation,
Speaker 3: and if anything, he's adding to the whole mix by
Speaker 3: strengthening the events intelligence agency.
Speaker 1: Right, which is fairly new right at that point in time.
Speaker 1: And it's interesting because it would shrink the CIA a bit,
Speaker 1: but it doesn't change its initial mission, which you know,
Speaker 1: is to be at that clearinghouse, so yeah, go ahead.
Speaker 4: It doesn't change his mission.
Speaker 3: But it also reflects Kennedy's pragmatism. Kennedy had been burned
Speaker 3: during his campaign the Air Force, which had been running
Speaker 3: primarily before the CIA.
Speaker 4: Got the U two.
Speaker 3: The Air Force with its long range our forty seven
Speaker 3: jets had been doing photo reconnaissance of Russia. They're the
Speaker 3: ones that came out with the bomber crisis thing that
Speaker 3: posed trouble for the Iisenower administration. Then they came up
Speaker 3: with the missile crisis thing. And it was actually the
Speaker 3: U two that disproved the missile crisis thing. Not that
Speaker 3: either Ice an Hour or Kennedy could talk about it,
Speaker 3: but Kennedy was very well aware that he needed balance
Speaker 3: and one of the whole points was for the DIA
Speaker 3: and to merge this together. It's sort of like, I
Speaker 3: need some balance. I just don't want the Air Force
Speaker 3: talking to me. I just don't want the CIA talking
Speaker 3: to me. He's trying to institute his own checks and balances. Okay,
Speaker 3: the Navy collects a lot of information in certain areas. Actually,
Speaker 3: the Navy could have told JFK about the missile crisis
Speaker 3: because they were monitoring transports, but they weren't hooked into
Speaker 3: the system that well. So he's looking for a solution,
Speaker 3: an intelligence collection that doesn't expose him to any one venue,
Speaker 3: in any one agency or services agenda. He understood the
Speaker 3: Air Force at an agenda, we need bombers, we need missiles,
Speaker 3: give us the money, not the Navy, you know. So
Speaker 3: he had a real good grasp on it. It's quite frankly,
Speaker 3: the same thing we see.
Speaker 4: Him starting to do in Vietnam. He doesn't trust just
Speaker 4: one source. On Vietnam. I'm going to send out a group.
Speaker 4: I'm going to do fact finding.
Speaker 3: Any of these people could have their own agendas, and
Speaker 3: I'm gonna I've got.
Speaker 4: To hear from multiple people. That's the way he rolled.
Speaker 3: He was the first president ever to literally open hold
Speaker 3: open Security Council meetings where everybody was invited to talk
Speaker 3: and contend with each other, which is one of the
Speaker 3: reasons why we get the feeling that you know, he
Speaker 3: was involved.
Speaker 4: In a lot of contention. He wanted that. He actually
Speaker 4: encouraged it because he figured it would shake out what
Speaker 4: was really happening.
Speaker 1: Right, because look, if you can get three people that
Speaker 1: usually don't agree on something to all agree, you can
Speaker 1: say to yourself, well, look, if the Air Force, the CIA,
Speaker 1: you know, and the Navy you're telling me the same thing,
Speaker 1: it is very likely to be true, you know. But
Speaker 1: on the other hand, if they're telling me three different things,
Speaker 1: you gentlemen, go back and figure this out, and that
Speaker 1: allows them to clarify things as opposed to going in
Speaker 1: blind or with false information. And when you mentioned the
Speaker 1: missile crisis, this is also during the time when there
Speaker 1: are bad estimations about the capabilities and the counts of
Speaker 1: weapons that the Soviet Union has and these kind of things.
Speaker 1: So there's actually a couple of intelligence failures that we
Speaker 1: don't necessarily know about. And indeed, when we look back
Speaker 1: at Cuba, there's a couple of things that didn't seem
Speaker 1: to be known at the time.
Speaker 3: Right, we didn't know where all their atomic weapons were.
Speaker 3: As a matter of fact, we never knew up until
Speaker 3: decades later, where all their atomic weapons were.
Speaker 4: But most importantly, we had no idea.
Speaker 3: That they had tactical nukes, and they actually had tactical
Speaker 3: nukes deployed around Guantanamo, I mean within a few miles
Speaker 3: range was for short range missiles. They had tactical nukes
Speaker 3: on the beaches where we would most like them not
Speaker 3: know that. And then when some warning came in of that,
Speaker 3: and Kennedy literally asked the army, it's sort of like,
Speaker 3: why am I just finding out?
Speaker 4: Are you guys prepared for this?
Speaker 3: And essentially a response to us, well, we're prepared to
Speaker 3: take the casualties. And you could see that Kennedy was
Speaker 3: just kind of like overwhelmed. It did like, nobody share
Speaker 3: this with me. So this is part of the game.
Speaker 3: The game in terms of reconciling information among different groups
Speaker 3: and making sure he was getting information. I don't think
Speaker 3: he didn't really trust any one source. So the thought
Speaker 3: that he's talking about breaking up the CIA in a
Speaker 3: way is it's too restrictive. You know, he was looking
Speaker 3: for mechanisms that would let him crosschecked and countercheck information
Speaker 3: from all these sources. He didn't want to do away
Speaker 3: with anything except I think we could safely say that
Speaker 3: he was amazingly dissatisfied with CIA.
Speaker 4: Military operations after the.
Speaker 1: Bay of Pigs, right, right, and he did accept responsibility
Speaker 1: publicly and all that. And obviously again even though he's
Speaker 1: taking Dallas's recommendations and clearly Dallas's you know, and cabal
Speaker 1: these guys, they were supposed to know exactly the business
Speaker 1: they were in, and yet the whole thing sort of
Speaker 1: didn't go right and it was a failure. Okay, So yeah,
Speaker 1: resignations come in, and it is suspect later that you know,
Speaker 1: of course Duallas has to I mean, but then again,
Speaker 1: I kind of couldn't see them putting together the Warren
Speaker 1: Commission without a control agent for the CIA on the commission, right,
Speaker 1: whether you had a congressman who was friendly or you
Speaker 1: had somebody there, there had to be somebody when.
Speaker 4: You're talking about this guy that's been to Russia.
Speaker 3: Yeah, and you know clearly there's a suspicion of foreign involvement.
Speaker 3: It would like be leaving the CIA out entirely would
Speaker 3: have been like lead FBI out entirely. That just wouldn't
Speaker 3: make much sense, right, even if you expect they're going
Speaker 3: to tell you what you know, you have to perform
Speaker 3: us say, all right, we had some of the advising
Speaker 3: us on possible ossible connections to foreign powers.
Speaker 4: You know, you had to have that right.
Speaker 1: And the other thing is, I mean, the guys out
Speaker 1: there publicly advocating for you know, the Fair Play for
Speaker 1: Cuba Committee, even though he doesn't have an official membership.
Speaker 1: I mean, the whole thing looks pretty bad if you
Speaker 1: don't have somebody who's read in on this kind of
Speaker 1: stuff there to figure it out, because I mean, that's
Speaker 1: just a I don't even know how to describe it.
Speaker 1: But believe me, you need somebody there to control that
Speaker 1: information one way or another, and not necessarily for nefarious purposes. However,
Speaker 1: I do always find it suspect that Dulls is on
Speaker 1: the Commission and so, but anyway, it doesn't mean though that.
Speaker 3: I would actually I don't find it as suspicious that
Speaker 3: Dallas is on the Commission.
Speaker 2: Oh.
Speaker 3: I find Dallas suspicious and what he did on the Commission,
Speaker 3: But in terms of why he's there, it's really suspicious.
Speaker 4: Is why Angleton is the liaison for the CIA.
Speaker 3: You know, It's like Dulles makes sense, but Angleton just
Speaker 3: just like literally shouts, hey, there's something here that we
Speaker 3: might need to cover up.
Speaker 1: Well there, you know, what that's a better way to
Speaker 1: look at it. You're right, it's not necessarily the fact
Speaker 1: that he's there. Him being there kind of makes sense
Speaker 1: if they have to interpret something strange, you know. And
Speaker 1: does the you know, chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Speaker 1: know how to deal with this, probably not. You know,
Speaker 1: does the congressman from Michigan know how to deal with it?
Speaker 1: Probably not, you know. So, okay, okay, you're right, You're right.
Speaker 1: It's more like the activity is suspicious. The way he
Speaker 1: cuts off questions and things like that is a little weird,
Speaker 1: all right, especially when you're talking about people that he
Speaker 1: should have had no real involvement with in any way,
Speaker 1: shape or form. Sometimes he's even seeming to direct questioning
Speaker 1: during sessions. But anyway, we'll leave that alone.
Speaker 4: Still, I go back, he gets retired. I mean, the
Speaker 4: other guys have jobs.
Speaker 1: Just kidding giously, Yeah, well, okay, you know, yeah, maybe,
Speaker 1: but what was he running a bank? No, he wasn't
Speaker 1: running a bank. McCloy was running a bank or at whatever. Anyway, Look,
Speaker 1: it doesn't matter because these were the you know, the
Speaker 1: Seven Esteemed Americans or whatever you know, of of high
Speaker 1: you know, the Blue Ribbon Panel all right. So back
Speaker 1: to it, though, this idea that people presented in one
Speaker 1: way or another, I think it's it's one of those again,
Speaker 1: those things that that is subject to interpretation.
Speaker 2: Now, what about the idea that he made that statement?
Speaker 1: I mean, does it mean anything other than I'm just
Speaker 1: going to change things up, I mean, or does it
Speaker 1: go further? I mean, do you think that he really
Speaker 1: was gonna cripple and sort of marginalize the CIA? Do
Speaker 1: the actions look like that's going to happen or that
Speaker 1: was on its way to happening at the time, I mean,
Speaker 1: transferring responsibilities to the d I A seems obvious and
Speaker 1: we've talked about that before on here. But what about that,
Speaker 1: I mean, is there a serious effort to marginalize the CIA?
Speaker 3: Even well, first of all politically, I mean, this is
Speaker 3: the height of the cod War, and in essence, the
Speaker 3: CIA to some extent has just saved his rear during
Speaker 3: the Cuban missile crisis.
Speaker 4: You know.
Speaker 3: That they're the ones that's been They have been on television.
Speaker 3: You know, it's like, oh, these are the aerial photographs
Speaker 3: of the missiles. This is how I'm gonna explain. You know,
Speaker 3: we know exactly what's going on now, whether we did,
Speaker 3: you know, but the CIA is looking pretty good in
Speaker 3: the public's estimate. You know, they helped get us through this,
Speaker 3: They've been they've been very involved in helping.
Speaker 4: Us get through the missile crisis.
Speaker 3: I don't think there's and you know, he's not going
Speaker 3: to go into an election, you know, and be accused
Speaker 3: by Goldwater of you know, gutting the c i A
Speaker 3: at the height of the Cold War. That that's not
Speaker 3: Kennedy politically, That's not going to happen.
Speaker 4: No, He's he's going.
Speaker 3: To make tweaks. He's going to make He's gonna he
Speaker 3: is he's in he's going to be in control of
Speaker 3: the situation in terms of who's in meetings and who
Speaker 3: he listens to. And he is going to shift responsibility,
Speaker 3: shift responsibilities, not break things apart. Does Does the CIA
Speaker 3: still need a core of you know, special military personnel
Speaker 3: to collect information? You know, I don't think that would
Speaker 3: go what what the real thing is what they did
Speaker 3: not need to be doing was being involved in major
Speaker 3: military activities requiring military assets boats, ships, planes. The Tailor
Speaker 3: Commission documented the fact that one of the major failures
Speaker 3: of the Cuba Project initially was that it didn't have.
Speaker 4: The right resources.
Speaker 3: It didn't even have boats, you know, initially to infiltrate
Speaker 3: people into Cuba, and when it shifted to this invasion,
Speaker 3: it had to go find boats, bottle boats. Up to
Speaker 3: that previously, at that point in time, there had been
Speaker 3: a mechanism in place within the military for the military
Speaker 3: to provide all of those resources for covert operations. There
Speaker 3: was a special Air Force squadron detailed to fly supplies
Speaker 3: and drop CIA special guies individually, small teams into Tibet,
Speaker 3: into China, into the Philippines, and they did a really
Speaker 3: good job at it if you look at the way
Speaker 3: actions were carried out into bet even though in the
Speaker 3: long run they lost because the Chinese overwhelmed them. That
Speaker 3: went very well relying on the military for logistics. The
Speaker 3: big problem in Vietnam that Macnamara actually reported back to
Speaker 3: Kennedy on is like the CIA always tries to create
Speaker 3: all of this with them in charge of everything. They
Speaker 3: get the boats, they get the you know, they get
Speaker 3: the planes, they're doing everything. They're not the ones that
Speaker 3: are skilled in those kinds of activities. We need to
Speaker 3: let the military do it, which is why in Vietnam.
Speaker 3: Starting in sixty two, they switch We're switching back all
Speaker 3: of those operations against North Vietnam covert military operations from
Speaker 3: the CIA to the military, which is yeah, we'll not
Speaker 3: even saying all of that. But the point is it
Speaker 3: was clear that the CIA often got itself in over
Speaker 3: its head in terms of logistics supports for larger activities.
Speaker 1: Right, I mean, and when you need stuff in Vietnam,
Speaker 1: like the little speedboats to go up and down the rivers,
Speaker 1: I mean, you're better off with Navy personnel handling that.
Speaker 1: You know, you need infiltration, you need to just direct
Speaker 1: troop infiltration. Why not use the specialized troops that are
Speaker 1: trained by the army Army intelligence units.
Speaker 2: These guys are ready to go already.
Speaker 1: They don't need to be you know, or at least
Speaker 1: you know, hypothetically, they don't need to be trained to
Speaker 1: do this, and they just happen to be CIA guys.
Speaker 2: They're ready to go. So what are you going to do?
Speaker 1: They were already using these guys in support, and they
Speaker 1: would have to acquire them from the military. I mean,
Speaker 1: this is the way I'm interpreting it. And why not
Speaker 1: just use the people there? Look, they already have coherent units,
Speaker 1: send them in on their own, and.
Speaker 4: Yeah, there you go exactly.
Speaker 3: And it got really, it really got confusing because it's like, well,
Speaker 3: the CIA would get itself into a fix where it
Speaker 3: needed military, Well we're going to detail them from their
Speaker 3: military branch into the CIA, or we're going to recruit retirees.
Speaker 4: And this hint is like a huge logistics It always
Speaker 4: amazes me.
Speaker 3: It's like later on in Laos had to have a
Speaker 3: lot of military pilots flying into Laos because it was
Speaker 3: secret and deniable, right sure, and they all had to
Speaker 3: be vetted and detailed to the CIA. You know how
Speaker 3: how much that adds to the confusion and the process.
Speaker 3: One of the things that again not to go too
Speaker 3: far a feel, is one of the things that we're
Speaker 3: talking about here, everything that Kennedy was trying trying to
Speaker 3: do to overcome some of these issues, you know, get
Speaker 3: the CIA out of these large scale military operations. When
Speaker 3: Jens Johnson took over, it died because and who goes
Speaker 3: into Laos and sets up its own military empire in Laos? CIA,
Speaker 3: who goes next door in Cambodia and does that on
Speaker 3: its own?
Speaker 4: Ci A, does any of it ever work. Know.
Speaker 3: I mean that's when we find the former chief at
Speaker 3: j M WAVE essentially in charge of Laotian military operations.
Speaker 3: You want to talk about something sad and what he
Speaker 3: did to the Homong people. So I just have to
Speaker 3: insert that sort of like all of the things that
Speaker 3: were about to be fixed.
Speaker 4: It just like recent and the CIA.
Speaker 3: It's like everybody goes back to normal and the CIA
Speaker 3: gets back all those large scale military tasks that it does.
Speaker 3: It already said it didn't know how to handle, and
Speaker 3: once again we proved it in Southeast Asia.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and tell you the truth.
Speaker 1: I mean, Larry might not agree with this statement, but
Speaker 1: quite frankly, I think that's exactly what leads to the
Speaker 1: larger drug trade and everything else that went on after that,
Speaker 1: because these are guys who are trying to figure out
Speaker 1: how to work with the indigenous population based on what
Speaker 1: they have to work with. And hello, you know, you
Speaker 1: can send the military to guard a poppy field, but
Speaker 1: but you know, when you got to move that stuff around,
Speaker 1: the CIA is a little better equipped to do that.
Speaker 2: Okay, Because well.
Speaker 4: I would agree with you then that's yeah, obviously, when you.
Speaker 3: Make something deniable, yes, when you make something deniable and
Speaker 3: start using covers and start using law locals.
Speaker 4: Uh, there's money to be made.
Speaker 3: And as I said in Shadow Warfare and that in
Speaker 3: the chapters on the drug trade, it's sort of like, Look,
Speaker 3: whenever you officially send something in, whether it's on a
Speaker 3: jeep or a donkey or a mule or a private aircraft,
Speaker 3: you know, if you sent something in, I got to
Speaker 3: tell you something's going to come back.
Speaker 1: Right, No, And that's the way it rolls. But if
Speaker 1: you do this with the CIA, nobody ever gets to
Speaker 1: hear about it. It's clearly mark military assets. I mean,
Speaker 1: it's a little difficult to hide.
Speaker 3: So they have Yeah, some stuff is going to get smuggled,
Speaker 3: but the military would also have some authority. I mean
Speaker 3: I've I've read interviews and I've actually talked to some
Speaker 3: people that work for Air America. I mean, if if
Speaker 3: among tribes started loading on bricks of illegal substance under
Speaker 3: the aircraft, the guy from America Air America doesn't like, well,
Speaker 3: you know, the CIA is working with these people. You know,
Speaker 3: I'm not going to raise any objections. And by the way,
Speaker 3: they've got guns, you know, and I don't. I'm just
Speaker 3: the pilot right, So there's no authority involved either.
Speaker 4: And let's face it, as a as.
Speaker 3: A noted drug trader in Miami once said, everybody says
Speaker 3: they're CIA, and everybody says this is.
Speaker 1: Okay, right, So, but you can't do the same thing
Speaker 1: with a bunch of guys in army uniforms that have
Speaker 1: orders that are traceable, you know. Again and again, although
Speaker 1: the military does have its covert people as well, but
Speaker 1: it's not the same thing. It's not as loose out
Speaker 1: there the way I see it. Besides, they were already
Speaker 1: well established, you know, so that's what makes sense to me.
Speaker 1: And again, so this whole idea about you know, oh
Speaker 1: he was going to destroy the CIA, it doesn't really
Speaker 1: hold water, is the weird thing now, But you can't
Speaker 1: deny that that statement was made in a couple of
Speaker 1: different ways. So was that the aspirational thing to like, look,
Speaker 1: I'm going to overstate my case. And then when I
Speaker 1: just dragged back a couple of responsibilities, then nobody's going
Speaker 1: to freak out because they're going to say, oh, look,
Speaker 1: he might look to dismantle the CIA.
Speaker 2: And all he did was shift a few.
Speaker 1: Responsibilities around, you know, smooth things out with the military assets,
Speaker 1: you know, actually being in charge of the military or
Speaker 1: excuse me, the military actually being in charge of military assets.
Speaker 2: I mean, is that what you think that is? Maybe
Speaker 2: it's an overstatement so that there's less of a reaction JFK,
Speaker 2: because I'm thinking about this politically. Politically.
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's just, you know, there is no doubt in
Speaker 3: my mind that there were points in time where he
Speaker 3: was pissed enough to say exactly that, and then probably more.
Speaker 4: I suspect there were longer tirade.
Speaker 3: If I'd have been there, there would have been longer tirades,
Speaker 3: like you.
Speaker 4: Know, So I think this is one of those cases
Speaker 4: where we.
Speaker 3: Have to take an expression and evaluate it in terms
Speaker 3: of actions.
Speaker 4: Okay, he said that in the heat of the moment.
Speaker 3: We all know JFK did things in the heat of
Speaker 3: the moment, Okay, mine.
Speaker 4: But what did he actually do?
Speaker 3: Is there any evidence, I mean that he was moving
Speaker 3: in that direction into breaking it all apart any plans.
Speaker 4: And now there's nothing we see in the.
Speaker 3: Record that he was intending to replace it with the DIA,
Speaker 3: which would have been insane. But because that's not the
Speaker 3: way the services were structured, there's no So there's no
Speaker 3: sign that he was moving towards anything more than optimizing roles.
Speaker 3: I guess is probably the better part of you know,
Speaker 3: what these guys do well and what can I use?
Speaker 4: And what do they don't do well that somebody else
Speaker 4: might use.
Speaker 3: There's no sign of anything beyond that, so it's a reality.
Speaker 2: Check right now.
Speaker 1: One thing does come to me from a live reaction
Speaker 1: bias Skype, and the question is pretty direct. Do you
Speaker 1: think this maybe had something to do with the idea
Speaker 1: that the Kennedys find out that the mafia was utilized
Speaker 1: at certain points in the Cuban operations Because many writers,
Speaker 1: and this is the question from the listener, many writers
Speaker 1: have made a big deal out of Bobby Kennedy and
Speaker 1: John Kennedy both becoming upset when they found out that
Speaker 1: there were organized crime assets utilized by the CIA in
Speaker 1: Cuban operations. Is it possible that this statement about smashing
Speaker 1: the CIA was made out of frustration during that time
Speaker 1: period and that is what evoked it. That's the questions
Speaker 1: that's Kevin. But yeah, psyches Kevin for that. What are
Speaker 1: your thoughts on that question?
Speaker 4: Mark, Well, there's no I'm not sure to what extent.
Speaker 4: John knew about that. Bobby certainly did.
Speaker 3: I mean, Bobby's the one that actually asked the question
Speaker 3: and was read into the fact that mobsters had been
Speaker 3: used in the poison plans, you know, circum Bay of pigs,
Speaker 3: and he was the one that was told it was done,
Speaker 3: it was no more, it would never be done again,
Speaker 3: and he was the one that said it better not be.
Speaker 4: So we absolutely knew know that Bobby knew about it.
Speaker 4: There's no sign that he The.
Speaker 3: Interesting thing is, there's no real sign that he engaged
Speaker 3: any further, he did really pursue it. I think one
Speaker 3: of the things that kind of like, there's no sign
Speaker 3: that he asked for an extent, did briefing.
Speaker 4: That.
Speaker 3: You know, it's kind of like CIA doing anything more
Speaker 3: with the mob There's not no sign that he really
Speaker 3: pursued it.
Speaker 4: I think one of the one of the things that
Speaker 4: we might not like it, but.
Speaker 3: Bobby was so immersed in the get rid of Castro
Speaker 3: thing that I don't think that might have been the
Speaker 3: top of his mic, like, well, Okay, I don't like
Speaker 3: what they were doing, I want them to do it
Speaker 3: anything more. Now, let's talk about how we're going to
Speaker 3: get rid of Castro. That was his obsession, right, and
Speaker 3: it truly was. He inserted himself personally, as far as
Speaker 3: I can tell, probably more into the anti Castro effort,
Speaker 3: especially during late sixty two and into sixty three, and
Speaker 3: in sixty three, inserted himself more into the anti Castro
Speaker 3: effort than he he actually did in the anti organized
Speaker 3: crime thing or a Justice Department thing. That's where he
Speaker 3: really was paying attention. So I can't but John shows
Speaker 3: up nowhere in any of this. The only thing JFK
Speaker 3: ever really says is that he makes an allusion to
Speaker 3: one of his friends, something on the order of, what
Speaker 3: would you say if I told you we had been
Speaker 3: trying to assassinate, you know, Castro, you know, like he
Speaker 3: or he heard from Bobby that we had been trying.
Speaker 4: To do it.
Speaker 3: But it was very low key, you know. So I
Speaker 3: don't see them as much as I see it.
Speaker 4: I don't see them really appalled or pursuing.
Speaker 3: The fact that the CIA might have used the Mafia,
Speaker 3: when in nineteen sixty three, Bobby's pretty much for anything
Speaker 3: they can do to get rid of Castro, it just needs.
Speaker 4: To be done deniably.
Speaker 3: And I will tell you not AFK, but Bobby would
Speaker 3: have seen paperwork that included proposals within am World and
Speaker 3: actual am.
Speaker 4: World documents that he could have seen.
Speaker 3: I don't know that I saw him that he did
Speaker 3: that that talked about assassination, but that was not using
Speaker 3: the mob that at all.
Speaker 4: That had all gone away other than John Rosellie.
Speaker 3: Other than John Rosellie, that had all gone away after
Speaker 3: Bobby expressed his issue with it, after he learned about it, truly,
Speaker 3: other than Roselle, the mob was not in the picture
Speaker 3: any longer.
Speaker 4: No, that's a really good answer to your question or
Speaker 4: his question. Shock.
Speaker 2: Yeah, No, that's his quest. I wasn't going there.
Speaker 1: But you know, just pragmatically again, Roselli could still be
Speaker 1: useful in that intelligence collection could still be viable among
Speaker 1: organized crime, just don't use them in the assassination plots.
Speaker 1: That's a possibility too. We don't don't necessarily know that.
Speaker 1: That wasn't the answer, by the way, because they might
Speaker 1: have had information that would have been relevant to infiltration,
Speaker 1: right because they had businesses there, and yeah, could yeah, and.
Speaker 4: That's very personal to Roselle.
Speaker 3: I mean, Roselli is the guy that had been in Cuba,
Speaker 3: that he'd been in the casinos in Cuba. Right, he
Speaker 3: had the contacts, he knewed people like Verona, so it's
Speaker 3: a very personal thing.
Speaker 4: Well that's Roselli.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, that's why I'm saying, Yeah, that's why I'm
Speaker 1: saying he's still viable as an asset to collect intelligence. See,
Speaker 1: I'm being very specific about specific about that because you
Speaker 1: don't have to involve him in the assassination plots. You
Speaker 1: can still collect information and Roselli has some and also
Speaker 1: has some people that they could collect from, so it's
Speaker 1: not like he's useless. Just don't use him in the
Speaker 1: assassination plots seem to be the main objection, right, let's
Speaker 1: not use criminals to the criminal stuff, which you know,
Speaker 1: to me makes no sense. Not very pragmatic on Bob's part,
Speaker 1: but you know, look we can disagree. But then again,
Speaker 1: they had also failed so far, so there's another issue.
Speaker 1: And you know, maybe that had something to do with
Speaker 1: some of the personnel they selected, but hey, it is
Speaker 1: what it is, because there were better guys to do
Speaker 1: things there. I mean, there were people still running guns
Speaker 1: that were not connected to the CIA. There were still
Speaker 1: people running you know, illegal stuff in and out of Cuba,
Speaker 1: right that you know, even the band cigars, those things
Speaker 1: made it out.
Speaker 2: You know what I'm saying.
Speaker 1: Please, there was always going to be some business element there, okay, goohd.
Speaker 3: And even among the Cubans, I think it's interesting through
Speaker 3: into sixty four and sixty five, we find a number
Speaker 3: of documents that are intelligence documents that are being connected
Speaker 3: on the Cuban community where wealthy Cubans in the US
Speaker 3: are trying to make deals with crime figures in Cuba
Speaker 3: to assassinate Castro. So it's like nobody that's an ongoing thing,
Speaker 3: but it's among the Cubans themselves.
Speaker 4: Not the CIA. The CIA is actually trying to stop.
Speaker 1: It, right, I mean, there's all kinds of but there's
Speaker 1: different interactions going on here, right, And there are various
Speaker 1: contraband operations. There are people coming in and out of there,
Speaker 1: some of them independently trying to leave. You know, the
Speaker 1: old trope of here comes a Cuban floating on a
Speaker 1: door into Florida. You know, all of that is true,
Speaker 1: but it's not all one thing, and it's not all
Speaker 1: being conducted by you know, the intelligence agencies, unlike some
Speaker 1: people want to make it sound. And again, you know
Speaker 1: this idea that the you know, well, okay, they had
Speaker 1: to cover up the mafia thing and all that, and
Speaker 1: I go, all right, I get that, and nobody would.
Speaker 2: Want to bring it out.
Speaker 1: But also the mob wouldn't want to come out and
Speaker 1: say they were working with the government, you know, to
Speaker 1: do their bidding either. That wasn't something that was like
Speaker 1: really advertised. You know, when did we find out about it?
Speaker 1: Ten years later? Fifteen years later?
Speaker 2: Basically? Right? I mean by the time we get to you.
Speaker 1: Know, z R Rifle going public and stuff like that,
Speaker 1: what is that seventy four, seventy three, I forget what
Speaker 1: year that was, do you.
Speaker 4: Remember, Yeah, ZR Rifle. Yeah, not until the seventies.
Speaker 3: But I was just going to say, that's one of
Speaker 3: the things, the rumor when Roselle in the seventies, when
Speaker 3: Roselle got involved in this court case and that sort
Speaker 3: of stuff. This whole thing did not help. For example,
Speaker 3: Giancana in Chicago, the word that he had been working
Speaker 3: with the government with the CIA was one of the
Speaker 3: things that lost him his godfather's position in Chicago, and
Speaker 3: he had to leave the country and go to Mexico.
Speaker 4: You know, so you're totally right.
Speaker 3: Check that's like who's working with the government, and can
Speaker 3: we trust him?
Speaker 1: You know, I'm not else Yeah, and I'm not gonna
Speaker 1: I'm not gonna say it for sure, but I've read
Speaker 1: reports that he was you know, shot six times in
Speaker 1: the mouth too, you know, just saying, yeah, I'm not
Speaker 1: saying that that's a direct correlation, but you know, it
Speaker 1: could be a hint that. I mean, I'm just speculating
Speaker 1: that who else is he willing to out?
Speaker 3: You know, like, Okay, if that was, if he was
Speaker 3: willing to cut a deal to do that to make
Speaker 3: himself look good, who.
Speaker 4: Else might he be willing to sacrifice? Makes me nervous?
Speaker 1: Well, there you go. And if you're willing to work.
Speaker 1: And that's the other thing is that you know, there
Speaker 1: is an acknowledgment that they're there to do their job, yes,
Speaker 1: but the idea that you're actually cooperating with them is
Speaker 1: another issue. See, there's a difference between cooperating and acknowledging.
Speaker 1: And these guys acknowledge them all the time, even when
Speaker 1: they're following them around. You know, they do funny things
Speaker 1: by him a sandwhich a Christmas present, you know, stuff
Speaker 1: like that, and and things like that. But when they
Speaker 1: find out. You know, you're you're part of a secret organization, remember, okay,
Speaker 1: and you're not keeping that secret too well if now
Speaker 1: you're letting the government know that. Listen, I got some
Speaker 1: men I can give over to you. I got some assets,
Speaker 1: I got some inroads. You're not really keeping it all
Speaker 1: that secret.
Speaker 2: Are you. Nope?
Speaker 1: So you know, just saying and I'm not even saying
Speaker 1: that's why he was killed. I think he was just
Speaker 1: in a weak position and somebody took advantage of it personally.
Speaker 1: But it doesn't mean that somebody didn't think about that
Speaker 1: when they decided to, you know, shoot him so many
Speaker 1: times in certain parts of his body. Just a consideration,
Speaker 1: not necessarily a conclusion anyway. Back to this thing about
Speaker 1: the CIA, though, So ultimately, where should we conclude with this?
Speaker 1: Like I said, I've heard it used for all sorts
Speaker 1: of reasons, all sorts of justifications. Oh, he was going
Speaker 1: to do this, So the CIA, out of self preservation,
Speaker 1: needed to strike back at him. And frankly, even though
Speaker 1: I used to sort of believe this, Larry, I really did.
Speaker 1: I felt like that was the best possible ability, not
Speaker 1: just because he made that statement, but because it just
Speaker 1: seemed to make sense to me. For a very long
Speaker 1: time I thought this, and as time has gone on,
Speaker 1: I gotta tell you, I lack of evidence starts to
Speaker 1: you know, peel away at some of these things that
Speaker 1: look good to me. And there is a serious lack
Speaker 1: of evidence that CIA proper struck back at him.
Speaker 2: There is a serious lack.
Speaker 1: Of evidence that even the people that you know, he
Speaker 1: allegedly fired because they love to point to Cable and
Speaker 1: Dulles and even though they resigned because they were asked
Speaker 1: to resign, let's get that straight. And you know, indeed,
Speaker 1: I also find a creepy that walking out of Dallas
Speaker 1: the one year, on my way to the Greyhound bus station,
Speaker 1: I look up to light a cigarette and realize I'm
Speaker 1: standing in front of the Charles Cable, you know, CIA building,
Speaker 1: right next to the Greyhound station in Dallas, Texas. You know,
Speaker 1: just saying it's one of those things that made me
Speaker 1: go huh. But at the same time, I don't think
Speaker 1: the CIA struck back out of meta self defense in
Speaker 1: order to protect itself, to keep it from being smashed
Speaker 1: into a thousand pieces. I think that's been overused.
Speaker 2: I think that's too convenient.
Speaker 1: With a lack of evidence to back it up that
Speaker 1: it was a serious statement. And when we look at
Speaker 1: what was happening here, like you said, switch back transference,
Speaker 1: even let's try and make this more pragmatic. All of
Speaker 1: these words make a lot more sense when we take
Speaker 1: a look at, especially the things that we've discovered in
Speaker 1: the aftermath of all this. And again, it would have
Speaker 1: been a political nightmare to turn around and say, you know,
Speaker 1: those guys who basically helped us find the missiles in Cuba, Yeah,
Speaker 1: I'm going to destroy that agency now.
Speaker 2: A year later.
Speaker 1: I don't think so that that makes no political sense.
Speaker 1: And one thing you got to guarantee here is that
Speaker 1: John F. Kennedy was certainly a political animal and was
Speaker 1: definitely looking to be elected, and that would not have
Speaker 1: helped Larry. I got to tell you, if you smash
Speaker 1: the people that you know warned us effectively as far
Speaker 1: as the public is concerned, gave us the only warning
Speaker 1: that there were missiles ninety miles away from our coast,
Speaker 1: I think you would have taken a serious political hit. Jeez,
Speaker 1: you must be weak on communism, which of course was
Speaker 1: already an argument in some circles then, and you're giving
Speaker 1: the enemy and advantage because you're taken away from the
Speaker 1: people who actually saved our next year. One way or another,
Speaker 1: the CIA was kind of a hero in that scenario,
Speaker 1: even in public at that time. Or Am I wrong
Speaker 1: about that?
Speaker 4: Oh?
Speaker 3: Absolutely, it was still it was still in a very
Speaker 3: strong position. We might think differently the way we have
Speaker 3: come to look at things, but in the popular view
Speaker 3: of the time, the CIA was, you know, a major
Speaker 3: part of our defense against the communist menace.
Speaker 4: Is kind of it would be.
Speaker 3: Saying I'm going to break apart the CIA is kind
Speaker 3: of like saying, well, I'm going to break apart the
Speaker 3: FBI in nineteen sixty three. That would have given overwhelming
Speaker 3: support to the argument that you must be a communist
Speaker 3: in your betraying the country.
Speaker 4: That would have been impossible to do. I think what
Speaker 4: it does is it takes us back.
Speaker 3: To where I normally tend to go, is you have
Speaker 3: to dial it down where they're individuals who might have had,
Speaker 3: you know, severe concerns about what JFK was doing. You know,
Speaker 3: individuals within the CIA who might have had when they
Speaker 3: saw him, you know, taking away the things that they
Speaker 3: were doing, thinking what taking away the things that they
Speaker 3: felt they were the best people to do. You know,
Speaker 3: could could his transferring paramilitary operations, covert military operations to
Speaker 3: the army have had an impact on the mindset down
Speaker 3: in Florida, JM Wave.
Speaker 4: In Key West.
Speaker 3: Absolutely, you know, they already had, They already had concerns
Speaker 3: about him for many reasons. This would have just further
Speaker 3: inflamed the opinions like man, he just really he doesn't
Speaker 3: know how good. He keeps making bad decisions. The Army
Speaker 3: doesn't know how to do this kind of stuff. They'll
Speaker 3: be front pages and the papers, you know. So on
Speaker 3: a personal level, it could well have.
Speaker 4: Had an impact.
Speaker 3: At an agency level, I don't think there's any sign
Speaker 3: that the CIA itself felt that as an agency it
Speaker 3: was at risk.
Speaker 4: It was still in a preeminent position.
Speaker 3: The director of the Director of the CIA was the
Speaker 3: guy that reported intelligence to the National Security Council. He
Speaker 3: was the guy that did the daily briefings for the president.
Speaker 3: None of that was changing or was going to change.
Speaker 3: So as an institution, there's nothing to suggests the CIA
Speaker 3: would have felt that it would be threatened. Individual attitudes
Speaker 3: or something else entirely.
Speaker 1: No, look, individual attitudes. I mean, we could sit here
Speaker 1: and speculate and calculate and come up with all sorts
Speaker 1: of differing, you know, possibilities about that. I mean, God
Speaker 1: only knows what some people's thought process was at that
Speaker 1: point in time, and we've talked about that before, you know,
Speaker 1: whether it's King or Angleton or whoever. I mean, there's
Speaker 1: a wide variety of reactions to everything happening.
Speaker 2: But you also don't see.
Speaker 1: The preemptive propaganda to sort of protect the CIA coming
Speaker 1: out in the press at the time. Either I looked
Speaker 1: for it, No, because that would have been part of.
Speaker 4: It, right, that's an excellent point. We know they knew
Speaker 4: how to do that.
Speaker 1: Yeah, So like you're not seeing these articles that basically
Speaker 1: make the case that I just made, which is, you know,
Speaker 1: the CIA is your hero man. If it wasn't for them,
Speaker 1: we wouldn't have known about the missiles and Cuba. We
Speaker 1: would have been you know, they might have made up
Speaker 1: other stories. We might have been nuked already. If it
Speaker 1: wasn't for the CIA, they might have come out with editorials, stories,
Speaker 1: speculations in fiction and in the news media to prop
Speaker 1: up the CIA if they had felt threatened at all,
Speaker 1: and we do now know they had plenty of assets
Speaker 1: to do this, so you don't see that they.
Speaker 4: Had done it before. CIA was very good at self promotion.
Speaker 3: They had done it under Eisenhower, very effectively in regard
Speaker 3: to Iran.
Speaker 4: Right, So yeah, you're right.
Speaker 3: It would have been no problem for them to put
Speaker 3: together a campaign.
Speaker 4: And we don't see any signs at that good point.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that campaign is non existent, but but we do
Speaker 1: know it was done before. And again, like I said,
Speaker 1: we're well aware that they had assets everywhere. I mean
Speaker 1: in television. We learned later they have, you know, people
Speaker 1: at CBS and this I mean it's you know, a yes,
Speaker 1: Operation Mockingbird, everybody brings that up. But they had assets,
Speaker 1: it's all over the place, and friendly, friendly authors that
Speaker 1: were in perfect positions to get well read. And all
Speaker 1: you would have had to do is, you know, ghost
Speaker 1: write something for somebody who needed a little something, and
Speaker 1: that would have been it. I mean, even if somebody
Speaker 1: was like say, you know, formerly a well read author
Speaker 1: and hadn't been well read recently. You give them something
Speaker 1: a little special, You hand it to him, let him
Speaker 1: tweak it, and bang, they have something for their career.
Speaker 1: You have something for propaganda. And then the cycle continues right,
Speaker 1: I mean they.
Speaker 3: Or were they doing any dirty tricks against JFK, which
Speaker 3: they certainly could have done. What were those same media
Speaker 3: assets the other thing?
Speaker 4: I mean, we're talking about really dirty.
Speaker 1: Tricks, right, because there could have been leaks, There could
Speaker 1: have been you know, I mean because we've all heard
Speaker 1: about people speculating about what Hoover had on JFK, and
Speaker 1: we know that that existed, but Hoover was more about
Speaker 1: you know, self preservation in his job. I think it's
Speaker 1: seems like anyway, that's the evidence that we know of,
Speaker 1: and the fact that those files disappeared after his death
Speaker 1: means that, you know what, I guess, what was meant
Speaker 1: to be achieved was achieved.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: But it's not like the CIA couldn't have made a
Speaker 1: deal with Hoover, or the CIA didn't have their own
Speaker 1: files on Kennedy guarantee.
Speaker 3: It's not that, not like the CIA did not know
Speaker 3: about romage.
Speaker 4: There you are no and data.
Speaker 3: You know, they had plenty if they had chosen to
Speaker 3: start rumors and gossip campaigns, and there's no sign of.
Speaker 1: That, right, So they weren't attacking him or defending themselves,
Speaker 1: which means that to me, there's no evidence that they
Speaker 1: in public anyway, there's no evidence that there was a
Speaker 1: need for self preservation, because otherwise those two things would
Speaker 1: have been a necessary asset to deploy, not the only asset.
Speaker 1: And in that case, if I had seen a lot
Speaker 1: of that static in the media at the time, and
Speaker 1: I really don't. I've searched through it a bit, you know,
Speaker 1: to see things, and to see what was being published
Speaker 1: and by former you know, political figures and all that
Speaker 1: kind of stuff. It's a couple of interesting things get said,
Speaker 1: but nothing is to this extreme where it looks like
Speaker 1: the CIA is trying to defend itself. Like I can't
Speaker 1: make that, I can't even make that narrative.
Speaker 4: Yep.
Speaker 3: If the CIA is in combat with anyone at this
Speaker 3: point in time in the fall of nineteen sixty three, yes,
Speaker 3: it's the military in Vietnam. If you want to look
Speaker 3: for the CIA, you know, where do they feel threatened?
Speaker 3: Where are they doing whispering campaigns? Who are they where
Speaker 3: are they trying to preserve their influence in their grounds.
Speaker 3: That was going on in Southeast Asia as we can see,
Speaker 3: and you can see it when when Kennedy sends out
Speaker 3: a delegation and they come back and he talks to
Speaker 3: four different people, and here's four totally different stories, and
Speaker 3: it's like, did.
Speaker 4: You people all even go to the same place. I
Speaker 4: know you were on the same plane. What's going on?
Speaker 3: If there's some contention and combat going on, it's it's
Speaker 3: inter service and interagency in Southeast Asia.
Speaker 4: It's not focused on JFK.
Speaker 3: There interesting warfare is going on in Southeast Asia.
Speaker 1: Right, So ultimately, the CIA is not defending itself against
Speaker 1: the concept of being smashed into a thousand pieces, although
Speaker 1: as I said, it could have been a political thing
Speaker 1: to let that float and then to minimize the effect
Speaker 1: of a few things getting shifted around so that nobody overreacts.
Speaker 2: I mean, I don't know.
Speaker 1: That sounds like a clear strategy to me, is to
Speaker 1: let it be known that he's upset with the agency
Speaker 1: and then he just moves a few things and maybe
Speaker 1: that's the end of it.
Speaker 4: Oh you know, yeah, absolutely.
Speaker 2: So, Larry.
Speaker 1: I've had you on for just about an hour discussing this.
Speaker 1: I think we've handled it pretty well. But it's just
Speaker 1: one of these things that constantly comes up though, right
Speaker 1: where I swear people use it for a lot of
Speaker 1: different reasons, and it does make sense if you lay
Speaker 1: it out as like he said this, he was definitely
Speaker 1: threatening the agency, so they had to defend themselves.
Speaker 2: And I get it, but it doesn't.
Speaker 1: Really hold up to scrutiny because there's a whole bunch
Speaker 1: of things missing here that should have come along with it.
Speaker 1: But anyway, if you check out Larry's Larry's work and
Speaker 1: his blog of course Larry Dashhandcock dot com, go there
Speaker 1: any of his books. Highly recommend all of them. But
Speaker 1: you mentioned Shadow Warfare during this discussion. There's a book
Speaker 1: Stu Wexler co authored, that one with you, I think Ray. Yes, Yes,
Speaker 1: Stu Wexler's co author on that one. Larry has co
Speaker 1: authored many books with Stu, but also many on his own,
Speaker 1: and a new one hopefully coming out by the end
Speaker 1: of the year, The Oswald Puzzle.
Speaker 2: Did I get that right? That time?
Speaker 4: With David Boyling?
Speaker 1: Yes, with David Boilet, which is another interesting guy. Is
Speaker 1: he doing a presentation at Lancer this year?
Speaker 2: By the way, I.
Speaker 3: Yes, he will be excellent and I think you'd be
Speaker 3: amused by check just a tidbit David might be good
Speaker 3: to have talk about this. Dave was just sending me
Speaker 3: a message. David's really become the document geek. I am not,
Speaker 3: but he's just run across the fact that uh and
Speaker 3: and found the document trails themselves. That the CIA had
Speaker 3: two three sets of files that you could have on
Speaker 3: an individual. One was there two to one personality file,
Speaker 3: but then separately some people would have either a unwitting
Speaker 3: asset file or a witting asset file that you kind of.
Speaker 1: Love it nice, nice by the two one we're familiar with.
Speaker 3: But yeah, these are pr Q files different, totally different filestream.
Speaker 4: I was not aware of it. I don't think. I'm
Speaker 4: not sure any of us were aware of it. David
Speaker 4: was digging into that.
Speaker 2: Now, I was just gonna I was all he had
Speaker 2: to do was.
Speaker 3: Find Oswell's pr Q twenty one unwitting asset file and
Speaker 3: we just really be done.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that would be great. So please David, if you can,
Speaker 1: I would love to see that. Uh And that would
Speaker 1: end a lot of discussions. Uh, because you know, you
Speaker 1: can't be James Bond if you're an unwitting asset Okay.
Speaker 4: And uh, I don't even give you weapons. You don't
Speaker 4: get deducted anyway.
Speaker 2: No, you don't get to talk to anybody.
Speaker 1: They just kind of go, you know, what we do
Speaker 1: is we just kind of, you know, give this guy
Speaker 1: a little push and kind of Korea.
Speaker 2: Okay. Anyway, that's the way it goes. And uh, that's
Speaker 2: the way this went.
Speaker 1: So anyway, Larry dash Hancock dot com go there, and
Speaker 1: I do highly recommend all of Larry's work.
Speaker 2: So that's that.
Speaker 5: Enjoy In Denial, Secret Wars with air Strikes and Tanks
Speaker 5: by Larry Hancock. Secret wars became a staple of US
Speaker 5: Covert Operation Center, still happening today. Larry Hancock's book In
Speaker 5: Denial rips the cover off many of them, using new
Speaker 5: five else it exposes things about the Bay of Pigs
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Speaker 5: why it really failed and why the United States did
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Speaker 5: today are doing secret operations with more success. This is
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Speaker 1: Con you've expressed my caller, schools there anyone else who
Speaker 1: happens to get on the air of Jelly.
Speaker 2: Dot Com do not necessarily reflect the views or Kelly,
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Speaker 6: Ensue Revelation through Conversation.
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