Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the program. A
Speaker 1: few days ago, Tyler Robinson filed his memorandum that detailed
Speaker 1: why the state didn't have enough evidence to proceed to trial.
Speaker 1: According to him, well now the State of Utah has replied,
Speaker 1: So in this episode we're going to start taking a
Speaker 1: look at that State of Utah. Plaintiff First, Tyler James Robinson,
Speaker 1: the defendant case number two five one, four zero, three,
Speaker 1: five seven six reply memorandum in support of prelim hearing
Speaker 1: bindover introduction. The defendant does not challenge the substance of
Speaker 1: the evidence demonstrating that he was the person who crawled
Speaker 1: to the sniper's perch on the low See building rooftop,
Speaker 1: fired the fatal shot that killed mister Charlie Kirk, hit
Speaker 1: the rifle in a wooded area, got rid of some
Speaker 1: of the clothing he was wearing, and told his roommate
Speaker 1: to delete the texts about the shooting. Rather, he merely
Speaker 1: asserts the repeatedly rejected claim that the overwhelming evidence establishing
Speaker 1: some of the facts cannot be introduced as reliable hearsay
Speaker 1: at this prelim hearing. Defendant therefore raises no valid challenge
Speaker 1: to the evidence supporting count one as at least murder,
Speaker 1: count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury,
Speaker 1: counts three to four, obstruction of justice, or count five
Speaker 1: tampering with a witness. Defendant's challenge to the aggravating circumstances
Speaker 1: for count one that he knowingly created a great risk
Speaker 1: of death to another is based on his misrepresentation of
Speaker 1: both the evidentiary standard at a prelim hearing and the
Speaker 1: test for establishing the aggravating circumstance. As for the evidentiary standard,
Speaker 1: defendant erroneously asserts that a magistrate engages in speculation when
Speaker 1: he chooses between a reasonable inference that supports guilt and
Speaker 1: a competing innocence inference. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected
Speaker 1: that logic of fact. The Utah Court of Appeals has
Speaker 1: repeatedly recognized defendants counsel ignored this controlling case law and
Speaker 1: have therefore violated their ethical duty of candor to the court.
Speaker 1: Contrary to defendant's argument, these cases established that when a
Speaker 1: fact finder chooses between reasonable inferences at a trial, it's
Speaker 1: properly fulfilling its fact finding role, not speculating. Thus, even
Speaker 1: out of trial, a fact finder is free to choose
Speaker 1: between reasonable inferences. This is a prelim hearing where the
Speaker 1: court does not sit as a fact finder. Instead, this
Speaker 1: court is duty bound to draw all reasonable inferences in
Speaker 1: the state's favor. It's therefore even more apparent that this
Speaker 1: preceding there is nothing speculative about viewing all reasonable inferences
Speaker 1: in the state's favor. As for the great risk of
Speaker 1: death aggravating factor, defendant erroneously maintains that the test for
Speaker 1: establishing this factor depends on the presence of some minimum
Speaker 1: number of factors or circumstances. In fact, the Utah Supreme
Speaker 1: Court has expressly disavowed such an analysis. Instead, the governing
Speaker 1: test is the one that statue provides whether it deface
Speaker 1: knowingly created a great risk of death to another. The
Speaker 1: evidence here easily establishes at least probable cause to believe
Speaker 1: the defendant did so when he intentionally fired his grandfather's
Speaker 1: high powered rifle towards a crowd of thousands, several of
Speaker 1: whom were in the line of fire between him and
Speaker 1: mister Kirk, while others were in close proximity to mister Kirk. Indeed,
Speaker 1: the evidence is more than sufficient to support a finding
Speaker 1: beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendants challenges to count six witness
Speaker 1: tampering for directing mister Twiggs not to talk to police
Speaker 1: and seven violent offenses in a child's presence likewise and
Speaker 1: properly draw inferences in defendants favor not the States, while
Speaker 1: also ignoring relevant evidence. Defendant challenge the victim targeting enhancement
Speaker 1: on count seven similarly ignores the evidence. Finally, the defendant
Speaker 1: also misrepresents the holding in a prin die versus New
Speaker 1: Jersey five point thirty US for sixty six two thousand
Speaker 1: in arguing that the sentencing enhancements for committing a violent
Speaker 1: offense in a child's presence and targeting his victim must
Speaker 1: be proven Now. Neither enhancement implicates apprendai because neither increases
Speaker 1: the maximum statutorily mandated punishment. Argument one, Defendant misrepresents the
Speaker 1: governing evidentary standard because he relies on an erroneous distinction
Speaker 1: between inferences in speculation that the Utah Supreme Court has rejected.
Speaker 1: Defendant misrepresents the evidentary standard that governs this prelim hearing
Speaker 1: because he relies on an erroneous distinction between inferences and
Speaker 1: speculation from the State versus Crystaball Utah two twenty eight,
Speaker 1: twenty ten, and the Utah Supreme Court soundly rejected over
Speaker 1: a decade ago. In State versus Ashcroft, Utah twenty fifteen,
Speaker 1: the Supreme Court explained to Ashcroft that when a jury
Speaker 1: chooses between reasonable inferences to reach its verdict, it does
Speaker 1: not engage in speculation. This is even more true at
Speaker 1: a prelim hearing, where the magistrate must draw all reasonable
Speaker 1: inferences in the state's favor. Because he ignores the case
Speaker 1: law that rejects the logic on which his argument depends.
Speaker 1: Defendant erroneously labels his speculation many of the State's arguments
Speaker 1: about the evidence and the reasonable inferences this Court must
Speaker 1: draw from that evidence. Defense Memorandum at. Eleven sixteen nineteen
Speaker 1: through twenty two, twenty nine through thirty thirty two through
Speaker 1: thirty three, for example, although the evidence demonstrates one that
Speaker 1: a clear line of sight existed between defendant sniper Perch
Speaker 1: and mister Kirk's seat, and two that others were near
Speaker 1: mister Kirk when defendant fired the fatal shot, defendant asserts
Speaker 1: that this court would be engaging in speculation to infer
Speaker 1: from this evidence that Defendant actually observed security personnel or
Speaker 1: others standing near or directly between him and mister Kirk. Similarly,
Speaker 1: although the evidence shows that defendant voted his rifle with
Speaker 1: four cartridges and had previously done some target practice where
Speaker 1: he seldom hit the bullseye and sometimes sames missed the
Speaker 1: target completely, defendant asserts that it would be speculative to
Speaker 1: infer that he knew he could miss his target. Defendant
Speaker 1: relies on state verse crystal Ball twenty ten to justify
Speaker 1: his argument at eleven. Quoting crystal Ball, defendant asserts that
Speaker 1: when evidence supports more than one possible conclusion, none more
Speaker 1: likely than the other, the choice of one possibility over
Speaker 1: another can be more than speculation. Excuse me, can be
Speaker 1: no more than speculation, quoting crystal Ball, twenty ten, Utah
Speaker 1: Appendix two, twenty eight. But the Utah Supreme Court rejected
Speaker 1: crystal Ball's logic in Ashcroft twenty fifteen. A fact that
Speaker 1: the Utah Court of Appeals has expressly and repeatedly recognized
Speaker 1: these cases may clear that choosing between competing reasonable inferences
Speaker 1: is not speculation, but rather exactly what a jury must do.
Speaker 1: The defendant in Ashcroft argue that the existence of innocent
Speaker 1: inferences for his presence in a known drug area late
Speaker 1: out at night with a large amount of cash rendered
Speaker 1: the evidence insufficient to support a jury verdict that he
Speaker 1: constructively possessed drugs, consistent with the Court of Appeals reasoning
Speaker 1: in Crystal Ball, Ashcroft asserted that his jury engaged in
Speaker 1: speculation when it accredited the inculpatory inferences from the evidence
Speaker 1: over the exculpatory ones. The Supreme Court rejected Ashcroft's argument,
Speaker 1: explaining that the fact that a court could identify an
Speaker 1: equally plausible alternative inference is not nearly enough to set
Speaker 1: a verdict aside. This is because the law is well
Speaker 1: established that the existence of one or more alternative reasonable
Speaker 1: hypothesis does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that
Speaker 1: a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt state versus
Speaker 1: Cardona Wayton twenty twelve, Utah three thirty six. Rather, the
Speaker 1: jury's exclusive province is to weigh the computing theories in
Speaker 1: case in light of the evidence presented and the reasonable
Speaker 1: inferences drawn therefrom and to canclude which one they believe
Speaker 1: the Supreme Courts holding in Ashcroft therefore necessarily overruled the
Speaker 1: very logic from the Crystal Ball upon which defendant now relies.
Speaker 1: The Court of Appeals has so recognized as our Supreme
Speaker 1: Court in Ashcroft has since clarified the fact that we
Speaker 1: can identify an equally plausible alternative inference is not nearly
Speaker 1: enough to set aside the verdict state verse Wall, twenty twenty,
Speaker 1: Utah thirty six, and citing Wall, the Court of Appeals
Speaker 1: has repeatedly recognized that Ashcroft is a complete repudiation of
Speaker 1: crystal Ball. If the existence of an alternative inference is
Speaker 1: not enough to justify setting aside a jury verdict of
Speaker 1: guilt see Ashcroft twenty fifteen, Utah five, then it certainly
Speaker 1: is not enough to justify denying bind over. At a
Speaker 1: prelim hearing, a jury is free to pick and choose
Speaker 1: reasonable inference in reaching the verdict. A prelim hearing magistrate
Speaker 1: is not. The magistrate must view all evidence in light
Speaker 1: of most favorable to the prosecution and draw all reasonable
Speaker 1: inferences in favor of the prosecution state verse Schmidt, Utah
Speaker 1: twenty fifteen. At a prelim hearing, the prosecution is not
Speaker 1: required to eliminate alternative inferences that could be drawn from
Speaker 1: the evidence in favor of the defense state Verse Ramirez,
Speaker 1: twenty twelve, Utah. Thus, viewing all reasonable inferences in the
Speaker 1: state's favor at a prelim hearing is not speculation. It's
Speaker 1: precisely what the law requires this court to do. Defendant's
Speaker 1: argument otherwise is based on overruled case law that he
Speaker 1: refuses to acknowledge and bring to this court's attention. See
Speaker 1: Defense Memorandum at eleven, twenty to twenty one, quoting Crystaball
Speaker 1: twenty ten, Utah Appeals to twenty eight. This blatant omission
Speaker 1: violates counsel's duty of candor to the court. See Utah
Speaker 1: Rules Professional Conduct, Section three three a two. A lawyer
Speaker 1: must not knowingly or recklessly fail to disclose the tribunal
Speaker 1: legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse to the
Speaker 1: position of the client and not disclosed by the opposing council. Moreover,
Speaker 1: an inference is reasonable as opposed to speculative when it's
Speaker 1: based on evidence. As the Utah Supreme Court is acknowledged,
Speaker 1: there is no black line between inference and speculation, but
Speaker 1: a reasonable inference exists when there is at least a
Speaker 1: foundation in the evidence upon which the ultimate conclusion is based,
Speaker 1: while in the case of speculation, there is no underlying
Speaker 1: evidence to support the conclusion state verse tran quoting Heslop
Speaker 1: vers Bear River, twenty seventeen, Utah. Thus, a reasonable inference
Speaker 1: not amounting to speculation is a conclusion reached by considering
Speaker 1: other facts in deducing a logical consequence from them, quoting
Speaker 1: Salt Lake City first Carrera, twenty fifteen, Utah. As the
Speaker 1: state's opening memorandum demonstrated, and as further detailed below, all
Speaker 1: inferences the state has identified or grounded in the evidence
Speaker 1: they are not speculative, and the support bind over on
Speaker 1: all accounts. All right, folks, we're gonna wrap up right here,
Speaker 1: and in the next episode, we're gonna pick up with
Speaker 1: part two. All the information that goes with this episode
Speaker 1: can be found in the description box.