1 00:00:00,160 --> 00:00:03,040 Speaker 1: The Internet. It was pitched to our generation really as 2 00:00:03,040 --> 00:00:06,759 this ultimate promise connection freedom right. 3 00:00:06,759 --> 00:00:11,599 Speaker 2: Absolutely, a vast library, borderless collaboration. That was the dream. 4 00:00:11,720 --> 00:00:15,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, a place where distance just disappears. But what happens 5 00:00:15,560 --> 00:00:19,760 when that same tech, the anonymity it offers, when that 6 00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:23,480 gets used for something much darkness, it's primal, yet when 7 00:00:23,519 --> 00:00:25,879 it's used to carry out the most violent impulses you 8 00:00:25,920 --> 00:00:28,480 can imagine pretty much anywhere in the world. We talk 9 00:00:28,519 --> 00:00:31,760 a lot about the webs technology, but today, well today 10 00:00:31,800 --> 00:00:32,920 we're looking at something different. 11 00:00:33,079 --> 00:00:35,960 Speaker 2: We're looking at what happens when that tech makes murder 12 00:00:36,000 --> 00:00:42,560 itself seem accessible, easy, almost easy. That's terrified, it really is. 13 00:00:42,600 --> 00:00:44,399 And that's the core of this deep dive. We're taking 14 00:00:44,439 --> 00:00:48,159 a frankly incredibly unsettling look into this unique set of 15 00:00:48,280 --> 00:00:51,280 data data from rare It's a collection of sources detailing 16 00:00:51,359 --> 00:00:55,840 real world attempts to outsource assassination using the dark man. Right, 17 00:00:56,159 --> 00:00:58,960 But our mission today it's not really about the tech itself, 18 00:00:59,000 --> 00:01:01,719 you know, not the encrypt not the usual dark net 19 00:01:01,719 --> 00:01:03,479 markets for drugs or guns. 20 00:01:03,520 --> 00:01:05,200 Speaker 1: Okay, So what is the focus then? 21 00:01:05,519 --> 00:01:09,760 Speaker 2: It's the human element, the sharking reasons why people wanted this, 22 00:01:10,359 --> 00:01:14,959 and maybe the most disturbing part the unsettling normality of 23 00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:17,120 the people actually placing these orders. 24 00:01:17,159 --> 00:01:20,000 Speaker 1: Normality you mean, like regular people exactly. 25 00:01:20,439 --> 00:01:24,840 Speaker 2: We have these sources detailing years of painstaking research, investigators 26 00:01:24,840 --> 00:01:28,439 who intercepted hundreds of paid for kill orders. This wasn't 27 00:01:28,519 --> 00:01:30,079 just theory, it was live. 28 00:01:30,079 --> 00:01:33,359 Speaker 1: Live kill orders. Okay, So our mission here is what 29 00:01:34,000 --> 00:01:35,840 to understand how this even worked. 30 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:39,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, dissect the mechanics of this, this dark enterprise. Try 31 00:01:39,719 --> 00:01:42,760 to analyze the psychology of the people ordering the hits and. 32 00:01:42,719 --> 00:01:45,920 Speaker 1: Find out what connects them, because these crimes were happening globally, right. 33 00:01:45,760 --> 00:01:47,359 Speaker 2: All over the world. Yeah, and we need to find 34 00:01:47,359 --> 00:01:51,280 that common denominator. It's an investigation that, honestly, it flips 35 00:01:51,400 --> 00:01:54,799 everything you think you know about who seeks out extreme violence. 36 00:01:54,799 --> 00:01:55,079 Speaker 1: Okay. 37 00:01:55,359 --> 00:01:58,319 Speaker 2: The really astonishing thing about this data, this particular investigation, 38 00:01:58,359 --> 00:02:00,760 is that it gives you this raw, un filtered view 39 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:04,120 into desperation control issues, all playing out digitally. 40 00:02:04,200 --> 00:02:07,000 Speaker 1: So this kill list, as the sources call it, Yeah. 41 00:02:06,760 --> 00:02:09,639 Speaker 2: This kill list. It just reveals how readily people turn 42 00:02:09,680 --> 00:02:15,919 to assassination to solve everyday, messy problems, things like domestic disputes, 43 00:02:16,319 --> 00:02:18,680 custody battles, personal grudges. 44 00:02:18,319 --> 00:02:20,759 Speaker 1: Stuff that should end up in court or therapy. Maybe 45 00:02:20,800 --> 00:02:22,240 not with a hit. 46 00:02:22,159 --> 00:02:25,560 Speaker 2: Man precisely, but they saw this as a way out. 47 00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:29,599 Let's unpack that, right, Okay, first things first, we need 48 00:02:29,639 --> 00:02:33,520 to set the scene, the environment. When we talk about 49 00:02:33,520 --> 00:02:36,680 the darknet. What are we actually talking about? 50 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:39,280 Speaker 1: Right? It's not just the regular Internet? Is it not 51 00:02:39,479 --> 00:02:40,639 Google or Facebook? No? 52 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:43,039 Speaker 2: Exactly. It's a specific segment of the Internet. You can't 53 00:02:43,039 --> 00:02:45,639 get there with your normal browser. It's protected by some 54 00:02:45,680 --> 00:02:47,680 pretty sophisticated anonymity. 55 00:02:47,159 --> 00:02:50,039 Speaker 1: Tech like poor Onion rad that's the main one, yet. 56 00:02:50,080 --> 00:02:53,400 Speaker 2: Tour It basically ensures users are anonymous by balancing their 57 00:02:53,400 --> 00:02:56,520 communications through all these random relays across the globe to 58 00:02:56,560 --> 00:02:57,960 who you are, where you are. 59 00:02:58,039 --> 00:03:00,520 Speaker 1: And for years, the Darknet's been wrapped up in the spoors, 60 00:03:00,560 --> 00:03:02,560 hasn't it always sounding kind of like a Bond villain 61 00:03:02,599 --> 00:03:03,639 shopping list? Oh? 62 00:03:03,719 --> 00:03:07,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, always pantalizingly close to the truth. Maybe you heard 63 00:03:07,400 --> 00:03:12,120 you could buy literally anything, drugs, obviously, guns, some reports 64 00:03:12,159 --> 00:03:15,080 even mentioned like uranium, wild stuff. 65 00:03:15,120 --> 00:03:17,520 Speaker 1: But the rumor that really stuck, the one that felt 66 00:03:17,560 --> 00:03:21,599 both impossible and maybe just maybe plausible, was buying murder. Yeah, 67 00:03:21,639 --> 00:03:26,919 that somehow you could just transact pay someone to kill 68 00:03:26,919 --> 00:03:29,439 another person and leave no digital trail back. 69 00:03:29,319 --> 00:03:32,719 Speaker 2: To you, and that ultimate horror story. It became terrifyingly 70 00:03:32,759 --> 00:03:35,919 real when researchers stumbled onto this specific site back in 71 00:03:35,960 --> 00:03:36,599 twenty twenty. 72 00:03:36,960 --> 00:03:39,599 Speaker 1: Okay, so they found one of these Murder for Higher sits. 73 00:03:39,639 --> 00:03:42,439 What did it look like? Was it super high tech professional? 74 00:03:42,599 --> 00:03:46,759 Speaker 2: You'd think so, right, but no. What's fascinating is how 75 00:03:47,439 --> 00:03:50,479 basic the front end was. It wasn't sleek or modern 76 00:03:50,520 --> 00:03:50,759 at all. 77 00:03:50,919 --> 00:03:53,120 Speaker 1: No, the sources described it. I mean, it sounds almost 78 00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:55,439 funny if it wasn't so grim, like a website from 79 00:03:55,439 --> 00:03:56,960 the nineteen nineties exactly that. 80 00:03:57,280 --> 00:04:01,080 Speaker 2: Yeah, laughably crude, almost like someone was trying to make 81 00:04:01,080 --> 00:04:03,719 clip art as scary as possible, trying way too hard 82 00:04:03,719 --> 00:04:05,439 to look menacing with terrible designs. 83 00:04:05,479 --> 00:04:07,280 Speaker 1: So bad clip art for Murder Inc. 84 00:04:07,520 --> 00:04:09,759 Speaker 2: Got it, But that rough look might have been a 85 00:04:09,800 --> 00:04:15,719 psychological play, you know. Crude, yes, but direct intimidating this 86 00:04:15,840 --> 00:04:19,399 I claimed we're the Mafia or some similar big crime group. 87 00:04:19,360 --> 00:04:20,480 Speaker 1: Right projecting authority. 88 00:04:20,800 --> 00:04:24,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, and thanks to the darkness anonymity, it said, you 89 00:04:24,240 --> 00:04:27,800 can now deal directly with us. They made this really 90 00:04:27,839 --> 00:04:31,360 simple interface put in your alias, type out your grievance, 91 00:04:31,720 --> 00:04:33,160 pay with bitcoin. 92 00:04:32,800 --> 00:04:34,000 Speaker 1: And order an execution. 93 00:04:34,639 --> 00:04:39,720 Speaker 2: Wow, the digital shield just made the horrific seem safe, clean, 94 00:04:40,639 --> 00:04:42,920 accessible even to just an average person. 95 00:04:43,000 --> 00:04:45,759 Speaker 1: That accessibility, that's the really chilling part, isn't it. I mean, 96 00:04:45,800 --> 00:04:50,040 before this, if say a hospital administrator in Wisconsin wanted 97 00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:52,800 to hire a killer, where would they even start exactly? 98 00:04:52,839 --> 00:04:55,040 Speaker 2: You'd have to know people right be tangled up in 99 00:04:55,079 --> 00:04:58,240 the actual criminal underworld take huge personal risks. 100 00:04:58,519 --> 00:05:01,399 Speaker 1: But this website basically advertise we take all that risk 101 00:05:01,439 --> 00:05:03,519 away from you, the pair precisely. 102 00:05:03,879 --> 00:05:07,399 Speaker 2: So how did this whole operation built on secrecy actually unravel? 103 00:05:07,560 --> 00:05:09,879 You'd expect maybe a big police thing, wouldn't. 104 00:05:09,480 --> 00:05:11,600 Speaker 1: You, Yeah, some major international task force. 105 00:05:11,800 --> 00:05:14,360 Speaker 2: But it wasn't that. Not Initially it was one person, 106 00:05:15,160 --> 00:05:18,079 a hacker named Chris Montero, working independently. 107 00:05:18,240 --> 00:05:19,560 Speaker 1: Okay, what did you find? 108 00:05:20,360 --> 00:05:24,000 Speaker 2: He was probing this specific site in twenty twenty, just 109 00:05:24,120 --> 00:05:27,920 scanning it, and he found something investigators later called life changing, 110 00:05:28,199 --> 00:05:29,160 A tiny. 111 00:05:28,839 --> 00:05:31,439 Speaker 1: Flaw not likely breaking the encryption though. 112 00:05:31,279 --> 00:05:34,160 Speaker 2: No, not a cryptographic weakness. It was described as a 113 00:05:34,199 --> 00:05:37,560 little technical gap of vulnerability in how the site actually 114 00:05:37,600 --> 00:05:39,879 worked behind the scenes, A crack in the armor, a 115 00:05:40,000 --> 00:05:43,879 chink in the digital armor of this supposed mafia. Yeah, 116 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:46,839 he managed to, as the source put it, wiggle through 117 00:05:47,079 --> 00:05:50,240 this gap and got where right into the site's back end, 118 00:05:50,759 --> 00:05:53,399 the master ledger. And this wasn't just like a list 119 00:05:53,439 --> 00:05:56,959 of usernames. This was everything everything, the live orders being placed, 120 00:05:57,000 --> 00:06:01,680 exact locations, full transaction histories, and critically, the messages the 121 00:06:01,800 --> 00:06:03,000 justifications people wrote. 122 00:06:03,240 --> 00:06:06,279 Speaker 1: My god, it's like finding the secret diary of hundreds 123 00:06:06,279 --> 00:06:07,519 of potential murderers. 124 00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:10,079 Speaker 2: That's a good way to put it. The bank vault 125 00:06:10,079 --> 00:06:13,560 of a criminal enterprise, with every receipt written in blood. 126 00:06:13,800 --> 00:06:16,519 The sheer amount of data and how specific it was, 127 00:06:17,000 --> 00:06:20,680 it was immediately staggering. These were, I mean the literal 128 00:06:20,839 --> 00:06:21,959 actual kill. 129 00:06:21,879 --> 00:06:24,000 Speaker 1: Orders, not just threats, but paid. 130 00:06:23,759 --> 00:06:27,439 Speaker 2: For order paid for. Yeah, every entry had the target's name, 131 00:06:27,839 --> 00:06:31,800 their home address, their well their pattern of life information. 132 00:06:31,959 --> 00:06:35,040 Speaker 1: Pattern of life that means like their daily routine when 133 00:06:35,040 --> 00:06:37,040 they leave for work, the car they drive, that kind 134 00:06:37,079 --> 00:06:38,079 of thing exactly. 135 00:06:37,839 --> 00:06:42,120 Speaker 2: That minute mundane details, the kind of info you'd need 136 00:06:42,160 --> 00:06:45,839 to plan and ambush basically when they're vulnerable. Okay, Plus 137 00:06:46,000 --> 00:06:49,120 the bitcoin payments linked to each order, and those messages, 138 00:06:49,199 --> 00:06:53,800 those deeply unsettling personal messages explaining why the target had 139 00:06:53,839 --> 00:06:54,199 to die. 140 00:06:54,319 --> 00:06:56,519 Speaker 1: So people weren't just saying kill this person, they were 141 00:06:56,959 --> 00:06:58,160 explaining themselves. 142 00:06:58,279 --> 00:07:01,639 Speaker 2: Many were Yeah, it provides I did this incredibly granular, 143 00:07:01,839 --> 00:07:05,759 terrifying snapshot extreme violence being planned all over the world, 144 00:07:06,000 --> 00:07:08,480 often against people who seemed completely ordinary. 145 00:07:08,319 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 1: And the global reach that confirms it wasn't just one 146 00:07:10,759 --> 00:07:12,399 local gang right, this was. 147 00:07:12,399 --> 00:07:15,720 Speaker 2: Everywhere, all over the map. Literally. Just look at some 148 00:07:15,759 --> 00:07:17,800 of the examples from the sources. There was a hit 149 00:07:18,000 --> 00:07:21,600 ordered in Amsterdam. Okay, target described as a simple, easy person, 150 00:07:21,720 --> 00:07:24,000 but the orderer adds high risk of putting me in 151 00:07:24,079 --> 00:07:27,399 jail that costs nearly two thousand dollars. The risk calculation 152 00:07:27,519 --> 00:07:29,800 is just clinical chilling. 153 00:07:30,120 --> 00:07:33,120 Speaker 1: Wow, okay two grand for a simple person with risk? 154 00:07:33,240 --> 00:07:33,639 What else? 155 00:07:33,720 --> 00:07:37,360 Speaker 2: Jump continents Paris in order for just one thousand dollars 156 00:07:37,399 --> 00:07:40,560 to kill someone, but the instructions had this specific extra 157 00:07:40,600 --> 00:07:43,839 bit her apartment needs to be set on fire. 158 00:07:43,800 --> 00:07:45,759 Speaker 1: One thousand dollars for murder and arson. 159 00:07:45,800 --> 00:07:49,079 Speaker 2: That seems low, It does, doesn't it? Then you see 160 00:07:49,120 --> 00:07:53,560 these huge price jumps. A large order in Slovakia target 161 00:07:53,800 --> 00:07:56,680 one guy that costs fourteen thousand dollars fourteen thousand. 162 00:07:56,759 --> 00:07:58,399 Speaker 1: What made him so expensive, It's. 163 00:07:58,240 --> 00:08:01,439 Speaker 2: Not clear, maybe perceived difficulty or maybe just what the 164 00:08:01,480 --> 00:08:04,639 site thought they could get. Then Berlin target probably working 165 00:08:04,639 --> 00:08:07,800 from home price tag twenty one thousand dollars for that hit. 166 00:08:07,759 --> 00:08:10,759 Speaker 1: Twenty one grand. Working from home makes it harder maybe, 167 00:08:10,839 --> 00:08:13,160 or again maybe just charging what they could could be 168 00:08:13,199 --> 00:08:14,319 either or both. 169 00:08:15,000 --> 00:08:17,319 Speaker 2: And we saw orders pop up in place like Hydrobad, 170 00:08:17,399 --> 00:08:20,439 India too. It really was a global market serving these 171 00:08:20,720 --> 00:08:22,959 very local, very personal vendettas. 172 00:08:23,000 --> 00:08:25,040 Speaker 1: And the way people wrote the orders that varied, too, 173 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:27,000 didn't it tells you something about them. 174 00:08:27,120 --> 00:08:31,160 Speaker 2: Definitely. Some orders were really short and curt and clipped, 175 00:08:31,519 --> 00:08:35,879 just business like, like ordering a pizza, almost an unpleasant expense, 176 00:08:36,000 --> 00:08:42,120 transactional exactly, while others others wrote essays, long, detailed, lurid 177 00:08:42,279 --> 00:08:46,960 justifications explaining all the target's supposed moral failings, why their 178 00:08:47,000 --> 00:08:49,960 death was absolutely necessary for the orderer's life to get 179 00:08:50,000 --> 00:08:50,559 back to normal. 180 00:08:50,679 --> 00:08:55,279 Speaker 1: That sounds like obsession, years of festering anger, maybe. 181 00:08:55,000 --> 00:08:59,039 Speaker 2: Deep personal obsession. Absolutely. But then there was this other category, 182 00:08:59,519 --> 00:09:02,120 the ones that must have set off immediate alarm bells 183 00:09:02,120 --> 00:09:03,039 for the investigators. 184 00:09:03,080 --> 00:09:03,879 Speaker 1: Which ones were those? 185 00:09:03,960 --> 00:09:07,440 Speaker 2: The perpetrators who logged back into the site almost every day, every. 186 00:09:07,279 --> 00:09:08,879 Speaker 1: Day after placing the order. 187 00:09:09,159 --> 00:09:11,799 Speaker 2: Why they weren't just ordering and walking away. They were 188 00:09:11,919 --> 00:09:16,120 actively monitoring their targets in real time. They were feeding 189 00:09:16,159 --> 00:09:17,200 information back to the. 190 00:09:17,159 --> 00:09:19,279 Speaker 1: Site operators, like what kind of information. 191 00:09:18,919 --> 00:09:23,480 Speaker 2: Tiny details targets just left the house, or describing the 192 00:09:23,559 --> 00:09:26,600 exact route the target took to work that morning, the 193 00:09:26,639 --> 00:09:27,519 car they were driving. 194 00:09:27,559 --> 00:09:31,480 Speaker 1: So they weren't just outsourcing it. They were participating managing 195 00:09:31,559 --> 00:09:32,519 the hit from afar. 196 00:09:32,399 --> 00:09:35,960 Speaker 2: Acting like a surveillance operative. Yeah, micro managing the astanzination 197 00:09:36,080 --> 00:09:40,080 plot from potentially thousands of miles away, fueled by this 198 00:09:40,159 --> 00:09:41,279 relentless obsession. 199 00:09:41,399 --> 00:09:43,879 Speaker 1: Okay, that's a whole other level of disturbing. 200 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:46,159 Speaker 2: This whole collection of data. The investigators called it the 201 00:09:46,240 --> 00:09:49,679 kill list. The person who first accessed it described it as, 202 00:09:50,399 --> 00:09:55,759 and this is a direct quote, the single most grotesque, disgusting, horrible, 203 00:09:55,840 --> 00:09:57,320 frightening thing they had ever read. 204 00:09:57,440 --> 00:09:59,679 Speaker 1: I can only imagine. It's not just abstract data at 205 00:09:59,679 --> 00:10:03,639 that point. It's a blueprint for hundreds of potential murders, right, 206 00:10:03,720 --> 00:10:05,840 real people, real addresses. 207 00:10:05,440 --> 00:10:08,919 Speaker 2: Exactly, And the ethical weight of just possessing that information, yea, 208 00:10:09,279 --> 00:10:11,200 knowing who was on the clock, who was in danger. 209 00:10:11,440 --> 00:10:13,320 It must have been absolutely paralyzing. What do you even 210 00:10:13,360 --> 00:10:13,679 do with that? 211 00:10:14,559 --> 00:10:17,000 Speaker 1: Well, the first most obvious step with a list like 212 00:10:17,039 --> 00:10:18,720 that so immediate you go to law. 213 00:10:18,679 --> 00:10:21,320 Speaker 2: Enforcement, right, absolutely, you take it straight to the police. 214 00:10:21,519 --> 00:10:25,039 So the investigators did. They took the website diagram, the 215 00:10:25,080 --> 00:10:28,039 details of the hack, the raw orders. They went to 216 00:10:28,039 --> 00:10:30,320 the Metropolitan Police in the UK Okay. 217 00:10:30,320 --> 00:10:33,799 Speaker 1: And they basically arrived saying, look, we found proof of 218 00:10:33,879 --> 00:10:37,600 a global murder for higher ring operating on the darknet. 219 00:10:37,639 --> 00:10:41,000 Paid in bitcoin. Should be straightforward, right, you'd think. 220 00:10:41,759 --> 00:10:46,679 Speaker 2: But the police reaction, well maybe understandable in hindsight, but 221 00:10:46,720 --> 00:10:49,039 it created this huge immediate problem. 222 00:10:49,080 --> 00:10:50,559 Speaker 1: What happened. They didn't believe it. 223 00:10:50,720 --> 00:10:54,600 Speaker 2: The story was just too much, too fantastic, too far 224 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:59,120 outside normal crime fighting. Remember this was also peak COVID pandemic. 225 00:10:58,679 --> 00:11:00,879 Speaker 1: Time, right, Everything was chaos, and. 226 00:11:00,879 --> 00:11:03,919 Speaker 2: Here come these people claiming they've hacked the digital mafia 227 00:11:03,960 --> 00:11:06,039 and have a list of targets all over the world. 228 00:11:06,159 --> 00:11:09,240 The sources say the police were genuinely quite concerned the 229 00:11:09,240 --> 00:11:12,879 messengers were actually well insane. 230 00:11:13,080 --> 00:11:16,200 Speaker 1: They thought the investigators were crazy, not the people ordering hits. 231 00:11:16,279 --> 00:11:19,159 Speaker 2: It seems so initially the whole thing just sounded too bizarre. 232 00:11:19,240 --> 00:11:22,080 Speaker 1: Wow, that must have been absolutely crushing. You have the 233 00:11:22,080 --> 00:11:25,600 proof names addresses, bitcoin wallets, but the whole context is 234 00:11:25,639 --> 00:11:27,679 so sci fi that the authorities just passed. 235 00:11:27,679 --> 00:11:30,919 Speaker 2: They basically declined to take up an active investigation or 236 00:11:30,960 --> 00:11:34,639 said it was outside their jurisdiction, maybe outside their expertise. Yeah, 237 00:11:34,679 --> 00:11:36,360 and frankly, it just sounded made up. 238 00:11:36,559 --> 00:11:39,039 Speaker 1: So what do you do? Then? You know these people 239 00:11:39,120 --> 00:11:40,960 are potentially in terrible danger. 240 00:11:41,159 --> 00:11:43,600 Speaker 2: Exactly, you can't just delete the data and walk away, 241 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:47,399 not in good conscience. So they made this incredibly difficult 242 00:11:47,480 --> 00:11:52,080 professional decision, a really fraught ethical choice, which was to 243 00:11:52,200 --> 00:11:55,639 bypass the official channels since they weren't working, and try 244 00:11:55,639 --> 00:11:57,639 to warn the targets directly themselves. 245 00:11:57,679 --> 00:12:02,159 Speaker 1: WHOA, Okay, that's a massive stuff. You're essentially becoming not 246 00:12:02,320 --> 00:12:06,240 law enforcement, but the bearer of unbelievably bad news. 247 00:12:06,320 --> 00:12:09,799 Speaker 2: And dangerous news. You're about to drop what the sources 248 00:12:09,879 --> 00:12:12,879 called an emotional hand grenade into someone's life out of 249 00:12:12,879 --> 00:12:16,039 the blue, a phone call saying Hi, a stranger on 250 00:12:16,080 --> 00:12:18,720 the dark net knows your commute and paid bitcoin to 251 00:12:18,759 --> 00:12:19,360 have you killed. 252 00:12:19,639 --> 00:12:21,279 Speaker 1: How do you even prepare for that call? 253 00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:23,759 Speaker 2: I can't imagine They didn't take it lightly. They actually 254 00:12:23,759 --> 00:12:26,960 worked with a psychologist scorpt at a specific script to 255 00:12:27,000 --> 00:12:30,879 try and soften the blow as much as humanly possible. 256 00:12:30,679 --> 00:12:35,519 Speaker 1: Trying to sound credible, serious but also empathetic while telling 257 00:12:35,559 --> 00:12:36,720 someone the unbelievable. 258 00:12:36,840 --> 00:12:40,399 Speaker 2: Yeah, and the immediate result, total crushing failure. 259 00:12:40,480 --> 00:12:42,720 Speaker 1: Really, what happened For a whole week. 260 00:12:42,799 --> 00:12:46,720 Speaker 2: The investigator making the calls just got hung up on repeatedly. 261 00:12:46,799 --> 00:12:47,960 Speaker 1: People just didn't believe it. 262 00:12:48,000 --> 00:12:52,159 Speaker 2: The story itself, We're from an organization, we hacked darknet assassins, 263 00:12:52,159 --> 00:12:54,559 You're on a kill list. Yeah, it was just too much. 264 00:12:55,080 --> 00:12:58,480 People weren't reacting emotionally to the threat. They were reacting rationally, 265 00:12:58,559 --> 00:12:59,519 dismissing the messenger. 266 00:12:59,559 --> 00:13:01,840 Speaker 1: They thought it was a prank call or some kind 267 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:02,720 of weird scam. 268 00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:06,480 Speaker 2: Probably the anonymity of the warning mirrored the anonymity of 269 00:13:06,480 --> 00:13:08,720 the web itself. It was just a voice on the 270 00:13:08,759 --> 00:13:11,840 phone claiming this terrifying secret. Why believe it? 271 00:13:12,080 --> 00:13:16,360 Speaker 1: Right? So direct calls weren't working. What next? They couldn't 272 00:13:16,399 --> 00:13:17,039 just give up? 273 00:13:17,440 --> 00:13:21,480 Speaker 2: No, they realized they needed to somehow validate the threat, 274 00:13:21,559 --> 00:13:24,000 make it real. They needed physical presence, so. 275 00:13:23,960 --> 00:13:25,159 Speaker 1: They shifted strategy. 276 00:13:25,279 --> 00:13:27,960 Speaker 2: Yeah, they started reaching out to local journalists around the world, 277 00:13:28,799 --> 00:13:31,519 journalists who did believe the story, maybe because they were 278 00:13:31,559 --> 00:13:34,279 used to investigating stranger things, okay, And the plan was 279 00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:37,679 to send these local journalists to meet the people on 280 00:13:37,720 --> 00:13:39,120 the kill list face to face. 281 00:13:39,399 --> 00:13:41,720 Speaker 1: Ah, so a real person showing up at their door 282 00:13:41,799 --> 00:13:42,440 saying this. 283 00:13:42,519 --> 00:13:46,840 Speaker 2: Is real exactly, offering that tangible confirmation that, yes, this 284 00:13:47,039 --> 00:13:50,080 insane story you might have heard on the phone, it's 285 00:13:50,200 --> 00:13:51,120 actually true. 286 00:13:51,279 --> 00:13:55,360 Speaker 1: That change in strategy. It must have saved lives, but 287 00:13:55,440 --> 00:13:58,320 you said it also unlocked something else, another layer to this. 288 00:13:58,600 --> 00:14:01,399 Speaker 2: It did it led to under understanding what was really 289 00:14:01,440 --> 00:14:05,200 going on with the website itself. So the first successful 290 00:14:05,240 --> 00:14:09,039 contact made through a local journalist was absolutely key. It 291 00:14:09,120 --> 00:14:12,159 led the investigators to this woman, Elena, living near Zurich 292 00:14:12,200 --> 00:14:13,679 in Switzerland, and. 293 00:14:13,639 --> 00:14:15,799 Speaker 1: The journalists connected her with the investigator. 294 00:14:15,919 --> 00:14:19,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, they finally spoke via zoom. The investigator delivered that 295 00:14:19,399 --> 00:14:20,360 awful warning, and. 296 00:14:20,360 --> 00:14:24,360 Speaker 1: Her reaction was it shock, disbelief, anger, none. 297 00:14:24,240 --> 00:14:27,159 Speaker 2: Of the above really, which was maybe the most shocking part. 298 00:14:27,440 --> 00:14:30,519 Her response was simply, I'm actually not really surprised, not 299 00:14:30,600 --> 00:14:33,440 surprised why the context she was in the middle of 300 00:14:33,519 --> 00:14:37,679 this absolutely horrific, ugly divorce three years that had been 301 00:14:37,720 --> 00:14:40,000 going on involved quite a lot of money. 302 00:14:40,039 --> 00:14:42,080 Speaker 1: Ah, money her husband didn't want to. 303 00:14:42,080 --> 00:14:45,799 Speaker 2: Pay exactly, He refused to pay and for her this 304 00:14:45,960 --> 00:14:49,879 darknet hit order, Yeah, it just seemed like the next logical, 305 00:14:50,200 --> 00:14:53,639 terrifying step in his long campaign to control her. Wow. 306 00:14:53,759 --> 00:14:55,720 Speaker 1: So she immediately knew who was likely behind it. 307 00:14:55,799 --> 00:14:58,759 Speaker 2: She had a very strong suspicion. Now, while all this 308 00:14:58,799 --> 00:15:02,360 warning was happening, the investigators were also still monitoring the 309 00:15:02,360 --> 00:15:06,639 website's back end, specifically the communication between the people placing 310 00:15:06,679 --> 00:15:07,919 the orders and the site. 311 00:15:07,679 --> 00:15:09,759 Speaker 1: Operators, a messages going back and forth. 312 00:15:09,840 --> 00:15:12,960 Speaker 2: Yeah, and this is where they uncovered the huge deception 313 00:15:13,039 --> 00:15:15,879 at the heart of the whole thing. Deception How they 314 00:15:15,919 --> 00:15:19,919 realized the shadowy people running the site were constantly replying 315 00:15:19,960 --> 00:15:23,799 to their clients, reading these long conversation threads. Sometimes they 316 00:15:23,840 --> 00:15:26,519 went on for weeks, even months. They saw a pattern. 317 00:15:26,759 --> 00:15:31,600 The supposed hitmen were just impossibly incompetent. 318 00:15:31,080 --> 00:15:33,159 Speaker 1: And competent like how their. 319 00:15:33,000 --> 00:15:36,080 Speaker 2: Excuses were almost comical if it wasn't so serious. They 320 00:15:36,080 --> 00:15:39,960 were always constantly losing their weapons or getting lost on 321 00:15:39,960 --> 00:15:40,600 the way to the target. 322 00:15:40,639 --> 00:15:42,360 Speaker 1: Seriously lost hitmen. 323 00:15:43,039 --> 00:15:46,159 Speaker 2: Or they'd claimed the target was suddenly too well protected 324 00:15:46,399 --> 00:15:48,159 right at the last minute, so they had to pull out. 325 00:15:48,519 --> 00:15:51,559 It was just excuse after excuse after excuse, never any 326 00:15:51,600 --> 00:15:52,279 actual action. 327 00:15:52,559 --> 00:15:55,840 Speaker 1: Okay, that sounds suspicious. 328 00:15:55,279 --> 00:15:59,159 Speaker 2: Extremely And here's the critical part. Yeah, every single time 329 00:15:59,440 --> 00:16:01,080 they faded filled and pulled out. 330 00:16:01,120 --> 00:16:04,159 Speaker 1: Let me guess the price went up bingo. 331 00:16:05,080 --> 00:16:08,600 Speaker 2: They'd demand more Bitcoin for new equipment, for more travel, 332 00:16:08,679 --> 00:16:10,240 for extra reconnaissance fees. 333 00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:12,000 Speaker 1: Ah, I see where this is going. 334 00:16:12,080 --> 00:16:15,559 Speaker 2: And that was the defining, shocking revelation. The site had 335 00:16:15,639 --> 00:16:18,440 absolutely no interest in killing any of these people. It 336 00:16:18,519 --> 00:16:22,639 was all a scam, purely, an elaborate, sophisticated extortion racket 337 00:16:23,039 --> 00:16:25,759 designed only to squeeze as much Bitcoin as possible out 338 00:16:25,799 --> 00:16:28,720 of these desperate, vengeful people placing the orders. 339 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:31,399 Speaker 1: Wow. So on one hand, that's a massive relief, right 340 00:16:31,480 --> 00:16:34,840 the immedia threat from these professional assassins was actually zero. 341 00:16:34,919 --> 00:16:35,960 They were chasing ghosts. 342 00:16:36,120 --> 00:16:39,720 Speaker 2: Huge relief. Initially, they'd stumbled into a highly effective global 343 00:16:39,840 --> 00:16:41,000 con artistry operation. 344 00:16:41,159 --> 00:16:42,200 Speaker 1: I sense a butt coming. 345 00:16:42,519 --> 00:16:46,240 Speaker 2: But that relief was immediately followed by this chilling realization 346 00:16:47,360 --> 00:16:49,639 the people placing the orders, they weren't part of the con. 347 00:16:50,039 --> 00:16:51,759 They were deadly serious. 348 00:16:51,840 --> 00:16:54,840 Speaker 1: Their intent was real, absolutely. 349 00:16:54,120 --> 00:16:57,480 Speaker 2: Real, their intent to commit murder was total, even if 350 00:16:57,519 --> 00:17:01,360 the method they chose turned out to be a scam. 351 00:17:01,519 --> 00:17:04,200 Speaker 1: The darknet site had given them the psychological green light, 352 00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:07,559 you know, permission to cross that line into planning violence, 353 00:17:07,599 --> 00:17:09,279 whether the site worked or not, and. 354 00:17:09,240 --> 00:17:12,039 Speaker 2: Elena's case in Switzlan improved that seriousness. 355 00:17:11,480 --> 00:17:15,839 Speaker 1: Didn't it Tragically? Yes, After the investigators told the Swiss 356 00:17:15,880 --> 00:17:19,559 police about the order targeting Elena, the authorities arrested her 357 00:17:19,680 --> 00:17:21,039 strange husband. 358 00:17:21,079 --> 00:17:22,799 Speaker 2: And when they searched his place. 359 00:17:22,720 --> 00:17:26,000 Speaker 1: They found something that turned the threat from digital fantasy 360 00:17:26,079 --> 00:17:28,640 into immediate, terrifying physical reality. 361 00:17:28,960 --> 00:17:29,519 Speaker 2: What was it? 362 00:17:29,759 --> 00:17:31,960 Speaker 1: He had went to a secret room right next door 363 00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:34,359 to her apartment next door. Why it wasn't for storage, 364 00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:37,799 It was an operational base, an arsenal specifically set up 365 00:17:37,799 --> 00:17:39,079 for kidnapping and murder. 366 00:17:38,920 --> 00:17:41,480 Speaker 2: An arsenal like a Mexicans. 367 00:17:40,799 --> 00:17:44,680 Speaker 1: A massive collection. Police found a flip knife, a telescopic baton, 368 00:17:44,720 --> 00:17:48,359 a submachine gun, a glock nine milimeter pistol, an AK 369 00:17:48,480 --> 00:17:52,440 forty seven assault rifle. Oh my god, he wasn't messing around, 370 00:17:52,519 --> 00:17:53,039 not at all. 371 00:17:53,119 --> 00:17:57,240 Speaker 2: Plus all the tools, zip ties, a big black bin bag, 372 00:17:57,960 --> 00:18:01,160 black rubber gloves, GPS track even lock picks. 373 00:18:01,359 --> 00:18:03,279 Speaker 1: He was fully equipped to do it himself. 374 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:07,680 Speaker 2: That evidence confirmed the terrible truth the individuals writing these 375 00:18:07,759 --> 00:18:11,839 murder orders, driven by their grudges and control issues, they 376 00:18:11,839 --> 00:18:15,039 were often just as dangerous, maybe even more dangerous, than 377 00:18:15,079 --> 00:18:16,799 any mythical dark net hit. 378 00:18:16,720 --> 00:18:20,519 Speaker 1: Man, because they had the means, the motive, and the proximity. 379 00:18:20,359 --> 00:18:23,279 Speaker 2: Exactly, they could carry out the act themselves if the 380 00:18:23,319 --> 00:18:27,160 outsourced job failed or stalled, and that's when the investigation 381 00:18:27,279 --> 00:18:30,240 really shifted. It wasn't just about tracking a digital crime anymore. 382 00:18:30,319 --> 00:18:35,400 Speaker 1: It was about preventing real imminent violence, often intimate partner violence. 383 00:18:35,559 --> 00:18:38,839 Speaker 2: Precisely, the scam site was dangerous not because it killed people, 384 00:18:38,880 --> 00:18:41,440 but because it empowered people who were already willing to kill. 385 00:18:41,480 --> 00:18:44,160 Speaker 1: Okay, this brings us back to that really unsettling question 386 00:18:44,200 --> 00:18:47,279 you raised earlier. Who are these people ordering hits? Because 387 00:18:47,319 --> 00:18:52,880 you expect, you know, mob bosses, cartel figures, maybe isolated sociopaths, right, 388 00:18:53,119 --> 00:18:54,079 that's the stereotype. 389 00:18:54,319 --> 00:18:57,640 Speaker 2: But the sources revealed something much much more common, and frankly, 390 00:18:57,720 --> 00:19:01,200 that makes it far more terrifying. How So, the profiles 391 00:19:01,240 --> 00:19:04,960 of the actual perpetrators are shocking, precisely because they seemed 392 00:19:05,000 --> 00:19:08,960 so normal. Yeah, these people had respectable jobs, friends, families, 393 00:19:09,440 --> 00:19:12,039 They live lives that looked from the outside pretty much 394 00:19:12,079 --> 00:19:14,359 indistinguishable from yours or mind. 395 00:19:14,319 --> 00:19:17,720 Speaker 1: But secretly they were plotting murder simultaneously. 396 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:20,519 Speaker 2: Let's look at a few cases. There's Kelly Harber. 397 00:19:20,640 --> 00:19:21,640 Speaker 1: Okay, who was she? 398 00:19:21,640 --> 00:19:23,960 Speaker 2: She paid twenty two hundred dollars for a hit on 399 00:19:24,000 --> 00:19:27,480 a man described as five o't five mail with blue eyes. 400 00:19:27,599 --> 00:19:31,440 Her job hospital administrator, a key part of the healthcare system. 401 00:19:31,119 --> 00:19:34,400 Speaker 1: A hospital administrator, not exactly a hard and criminal. What 402 00:19:34,519 --> 00:19:35,640 was the connection to the target? 403 00:19:35,920 --> 00:19:38,559 Speaker 2: He was her former college sweetheart, and the motive It 404 00:19:38,599 --> 00:19:42,319 apparently stemmed from what started as a really common, painful situation, 405 00:19:42,759 --> 00:19:46,519 a bitter years long custody battle. It was raging through 406 00:19:46,519 --> 00:19:49,640 the courts, the schools in sun Prairie, Wisconsin. 407 00:19:49,880 --> 00:19:53,240 Speaker 1: So a family dispute, a really nasty one, clearly, so. 408 00:19:53,319 --> 00:19:56,359 Speaker 2: Nasty, so frustrating for her that she reached this point 409 00:19:56,440 --> 00:20:01,359 of choosing violence, seeing the darknet, this final high tech 410 00:20:01,440 --> 00:20:03,599 option to resolve a custody fight. 411 00:20:03,799 --> 00:20:06,200 Speaker 1: That's what you mean by the normalization of extreme violence 412 00:20:06,319 --> 00:20:09,440 using assassination as a tool in family court exactly. 413 00:20:09,839 --> 00:20:13,720 Speaker 2: Then there's Christopher Pence. This profile is just it creates 414 00:20:13,799 --> 00:20:15,279 intense cognitive dissonance. 415 00:20:15,440 --> 00:20:16,599 Speaker 1: Why who was he? 416 00:20:16,599 --> 00:20:19,440 Speaker 2: He was a forty year old IT security technician. 417 00:20:19,720 --> 00:20:21,640 Speaker 1: We're from Microsoft, Okay, professional job. 418 00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:25,519 Speaker 2: But the sources emphasize he was also a deeply religious man, 419 00:20:26,079 --> 00:20:30,519 biological father of eleven children and remarkably the adoptive father of. 420 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:35,200 Speaker 1: Five more eleven biological five adoptive. Wow, big family, deeply 421 00:20:35,279 --> 00:20:37,880 religious IT guy? Where was he living in a. 422 00:20:37,920 --> 00:20:41,960 Speaker 2: Large house in Utah? Outwardly seemed dedicated to faith, family, 423 00:20:42,359 --> 00:20:46,440 his tech career, but secretly he plotted to kill the 424 00:20:46,440 --> 00:20:50,559 biological parents of his five adopted children. No why he 425 00:20:50,599 --> 00:20:53,599 paid sixteen thousand dollars in bitcoin to have the couple removed. 426 00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:56,799 His justification was incredibly vague, just that he wasn't seeing 427 00:20:56,799 --> 00:20:57,680 eye to eye on something. 428 00:20:57,720 --> 00:21:01,119 Speaker 1: With him not seeing eye to eye means now over 429 00:21:01,160 --> 00:21:03,000 what a custody or a guardianship issue. 430 00:21:03,039 --> 00:21:07,039 Speaker 2: Presumably it's this insane understatement for plotting a double homicide. 431 00:21:07,079 --> 00:21:10,799 Speaker 1: The ability to just compartmentalize that, to live this life 432 00:21:10,880 --> 00:21:14,880 of piety and professional competence and IT security techno less 433 00:21:15,359 --> 00:21:16,720 while planning murder. 434 00:21:16,480 --> 00:21:18,880 Speaker 2: It's chilling. They mastered living these dual lives. 435 00:21:19,039 --> 00:21:21,720 Speaker 1: Okay, who else there was a doctor mentioned. 436 00:21:21,720 --> 00:21:25,599 Speaker 2: Ah, yes, doctor Ronald Ilg maybe the most bizarre and 437 00:21:25,640 --> 00:21:28,839 clinically sinister example of this control motive. 438 00:21:29,079 --> 00:21:30,160 Speaker 1: What was his field me. 439 00:21:30,200 --> 00:21:35,240 Speaker 2: Anatologist, a doctor specializing in newborns, and ironically he ran 440 00:21:35,279 --> 00:21:38,400 a clinic that held vulnerable women struggling with addiction issues. 441 00:21:38,480 --> 00:21:39,680 Speaker 1: Helping women with addiction. 442 00:21:39,920 --> 00:21:42,359 Speaker 2: Okay, yeah, he apparently pulled himself up from a poor 443 00:21:42,440 --> 00:21:45,680 rural background in Oregon, became a senior clinician in the city. 444 00:21:46,119 --> 00:21:48,000 His darknet alias was Scar two. 445 00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:52,079 Speaker 1: Fifteen Scar two fifteen, and his order it wasn't for murder, 446 00:21:52,240 --> 00:21:52,480 was it? 447 00:21:52,480 --> 00:21:55,119 Speaker 2: It was something else, correct, something arguably, as you said, 448 00:21:55,319 --> 00:21:57,039 more torturous, more controlling. 449 00:21:57,079 --> 00:21:57,759 Speaker 1: What did he want? 450 00:21:58,000 --> 00:22:01,000 Speaker 2: He explicitly ordered the target, a woman, to be kidnapped, 451 00:22:01,240 --> 00:22:02,960 h and then forcibly addicted to. 452 00:22:02,880 --> 00:22:06,119 Speaker 1: Heroin, forcibly addicted, not killing. 453 00:22:05,839 --> 00:22:09,680 Speaker 2: Her, explicitly not killed. He wanted her power, her agency 454 00:22:10,039 --> 00:22:15,319 completely neutralized through addiction and coercion, permanently silenced, controlled. 455 00:22:15,440 --> 00:22:18,920 Speaker 1: That says so much about the motive, doesn't it. Murder 456 00:22:19,000 --> 00:22:22,880 ends it? This was about ongoing absolute control over her life, 457 00:22:23,079 --> 00:22:25,119 her choices, her future. 458 00:22:24,880 --> 00:22:28,279 Speaker 2: Precisely, and he treated it like a business transaction. He 459 00:22:28,359 --> 00:22:32,400 meticulously laid out this bonus structure for the darknet operators. 460 00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:35,680 Speaker 1: A bonus structure for kidnapping and forced addiction, yep, like 461 00:22:35,759 --> 00:22:36,599 project management. 462 00:22:36,759 --> 00:22:39,440 Speaker 2: An additional ten thousand dollars if they could force her 463 00:22:39,440 --> 00:22:43,079 to permanently withdraw certain court motions. Another extra ten thousand 464 00:22:43,079 --> 00:22:44,920 dollars to make sure she kept her mouth shut and 465 00:22:44,960 --> 00:22:45,559 told no one. 466 00:22:45,599 --> 00:22:48,400 Speaker 1: He was literally trying to buy legal outcomes through extreme 467 00:22:48,480 --> 00:22:49,480 violence and degradation. 468 00:22:49,759 --> 00:22:52,920 Speaker 2: The irony is just staggering, isn't it. A doctor dedicated 469 00:22:52,960 --> 00:22:57,440 professionally to helping vulnerable women overcome addiction plotting that exact 470 00:22:57,480 --> 00:23:00,680 same fate for someone in his personal life, all driven 471 00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:04,400 by this obsession with controlling the outcome of some dispute. 472 00:23:03,880 --> 00:23:07,359 Speaker 1: And the lack of remorse afterwards, trying to sell book rights. 473 00:23:07,200 --> 00:23:10,640 Speaker 2: Calling his story fifty shades of Gray on steroids. It 474 00:23:10,799 --> 00:23:14,559 just highlights the profound self absorption, the pathology of control, 475 00:23:15,160 --> 00:23:16,880 absolutely zero contrition. 476 00:23:17,440 --> 00:23:21,599 Speaker 1: So these cases, the hospital administrator, the IT tech, the doctor, 477 00:23:22,519 --> 00:23:25,480 they force you to confront something really uncomfortable. 478 00:23:25,000 --> 00:23:27,680 Speaker 2: Don't they? They really do that. Extreme violence isn't just 479 00:23:27,720 --> 00:23:32,480 planned by obvious monsters. It's plotted by seemingly upstanding professionals. 480 00:23:32,519 --> 00:23:35,559 People living among us who just can't handle losing. They 481 00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:38,480 feel backed into an emotional corner and are unwilling to 482 00:23:38,480 --> 00:23:40,000 accept compromise or defeat. 483 00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:43,440 Speaker 1: We've talked about cases in the US, Switzerland, but you 484 00:23:43,480 --> 00:23:45,839 mentioned this was global. The kill list wasn't just confined 485 00:23:45,839 --> 00:23:47,319 to a few countries. 486 00:23:47,000 --> 00:23:49,799 Speaker 2: Not at all. The geographical diversity was huge. It really 487 00:23:49,839 --> 00:23:52,839 proved this was a phenomenon enabled by the anonymity of 488 00:23:52,880 --> 00:23:55,839 the tour network itself accessible anywhere. 489 00:23:55,480 --> 00:23:57,039 Speaker 1: Where else were orders coming from? 490 00:23:57,079 --> 00:23:59,559 Speaker 2: The list was extensive. We saw, for example, a woman 491 00:23:59,599 --> 00:24:02,400 in camber To, Australia trying to order hits on her own. 492 00:24:02,440 --> 00:24:05,839 Two parents were parents. Wow, Okay, a really bizarre case 493 00:24:05,880 --> 00:24:08,519 involving a love triangle at a sports Direct store in 494 00:24:08,599 --> 00:24:12,000 Milton Keynes in the UK that resulted in an order. 495 00:24:12,000 --> 00:24:15,079 Speaker 1: A workplace love triangle ending in a darknet hit. 496 00:24:15,039 --> 00:24:19,519 Speaker 2: Order apparently so. We also saw orders placed in Nevada, Tampa, 497 00:24:19,599 --> 00:24:24,599 in the US, Spain, Italy. The orders were quite literally, 498 00:24:24,640 --> 00:24:27,039 as the source says, almost. 499 00:24:26,559 --> 00:24:30,240 Speaker 1: Everywhere, reflecting just how universal these kinds of conflicts are, 500 00:24:30,279 --> 00:24:33,119 I guess, and how universal the desire for a clean 501 00:24:33,240 --> 00:24:35,480 solution became thanks to this site. 502 00:24:35,279 --> 00:24:38,759 Speaker 2: Exactly now dealing with this massive, dispersed list of threats. 503 00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:43,279 The initial investigators couldn't handle it alone. They needed institutional. 504 00:24:42,680 --> 00:24:46,119 Speaker 1: Backup, right, especially after the initial police response wasn't helpful. 505 00:24:46,240 --> 00:24:47,720 Did they find partners eventually? 506 00:24:47,880 --> 00:24:51,839 Speaker 2: Yes, They ended up working secretly, carefully with organizations like 507 00:24:51,880 --> 00:24:55,440 the FBI, passing over every single intercepted kill order that 508 00:24:55,519 --> 00:24:56,880 seemed credible and imminent. 509 00:24:56,960 --> 00:24:59,279 Speaker 1: That must have been a huge undertaking. How many orders 510 00:24:59,279 --> 00:25:00,480 are we talking about in total? 511 00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:03,480 Speaker 2: Over the years this operation was running and being monitored, 512 00:25:03,640 --> 00:25:06,640 the investigators disclosed one hundred and seventy five paid for 513 00:25:06,839 --> 00:25:10,559 kill orders around the world that required urgent intervention. 514 00:25:10,160 --> 00:25:13,119 Speaker 1: One hundred and seventy five by a lot of potential victims. 515 00:25:13,359 --> 00:25:16,839 Did this collaboration lead to actual results arrests? 516 00:25:17,240 --> 00:25:21,559 Speaker 2: It did, incredible results actually. The sources state thirty two 517 00:25:21,680 --> 00:25:26,799 arrests so far directly linked to these orders, twenty eight convictions. 518 00:25:26,480 --> 00:25:27,359 Speaker 1: And prison time. 519 00:25:27,279 --> 00:25:30,160 Speaker 2: Approximately one hundred and eighty years of prison time sentenced 520 00:25:30,559 --> 00:25:34,839 collectively for those convicted, So real consequences for the people 521 00:25:34,839 --> 00:25:35,720 placing the orders. 522 00:25:35,759 --> 00:25:39,759 Speaker 1: That's significant. What about the people running the website, the scammers? 523 00:25:39,759 --> 00:25:40,680 Did they ever get caught? 524 00:25:40,880 --> 00:25:44,079 Speaker 2: Yes, satisfyingly they did. Believed to be a group of 525 00:25:44,160 --> 00:25:47,599 Romanian cyber criminals. They were eventually arrested in a rash 526 00:25:47,599 --> 00:25:48,759 of raids some years. 527 00:25:48,640 --> 00:25:52,039 Speaker 1: Later, so the site itself, the extortion racket, was finally 528 00:25:52,039 --> 00:25:52,599 shut down. 529 00:25:52,680 --> 00:25:56,240 Speaker 2: Yes, eliminating that specific channel for this kind of darkneck crime. 530 00:25:56,440 --> 00:26:00,119 Speaker 1: Okay, so arrests made site shut down. But you're saying 531 00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:03,079 the real meaning here isn't just about catching criminals, right. 532 00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:06,480 Speaker 2: That's important obviously, But the deeper meaning goes beyond the stats. 533 00:26:06,599 --> 00:26:09,640 When the investigators started, remember they expected to find what 534 00:26:10,240 --> 00:26:13,640 big organized crime plots, drug deals gone bad, maybe even 535 00:26:13,680 --> 00:26:14,720 state sponsored stuff. 536 00:26:14,799 --> 00:26:17,119 Speaker 1: Yeah, the usual suspects for assassination plots. 537 00:26:17,279 --> 00:26:20,160 Speaker 2: But the reality, as we've seen through these cases, was 538 00:26:20,240 --> 00:26:24,599 so much more mundane and therefore more disturbing. 539 00:26:24,920 --> 00:26:28,559 Speaker 1: Because the site's real function in the minds of the users. 540 00:26:28,319 --> 00:26:31,359 Speaker 2: Was simply to make ordering a hit seem convenient and 541 00:26:31,440 --> 00:26:35,960 clean and safe and easy. It removed all the traditional 542 00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:39,079 messiness and risk involved in trying to hire a killer 543 00:26:39,079 --> 00:26:40,000 in the physical world. 544 00:26:40,160 --> 00:26:44,359 Speaker 1: It effectively lowered the barriers to entry to ordering an assassination, 545 00:26:44,640 --> 00:26:47,400 made it feel like just another online transaction. 546 00:26:47,160 --> 00:26:51,119 Speaker 2: Took it from something requiring deep criminal contacts and huge 547 00:26:51,119 --> 00:26:54,559 personal risk to something you could potentially manage on your 548 00:26:54,599 --> 00:26:57,160 laptop during your lunch break. That's the scary part. 549 00:26:57,000 --> 00:26:59,400 Speaker 1: And that ultimately forces us back to looking at the 550 00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:02,240 users them, not as outliers. 551 00:27:01,599 --> 00:27:05,599 Speaker 2: But as fundamentally normal people. That's the most unsettling takeaway. 552 00:27:05,599 --> 00:27:09,799 People with jobs, friends, families, people living lives just like 553 00:27:09,839 --> 00:27:11,880 you and I, as the source material puts it. 554 00:27:11,880 --> 00:27:16,000 Speaker 1: Holding down jobs, going to church, raising kids while secretly 555 00:27:16,160 --> 00:27:18,839 constantly coldly plotting murder online. 556 00:27:19,200 --> 00:27:22,519 Speaker 2: And the common thread the thing linking that hospital admin 557 00:27:22,559 --> 00:27:26,119 in Wisconsin, the IT guy in Utah, the doctor in Oregon, 558 00:27:26,200 --> 00:27:29,359 the person in Paris. It wasn't huge criminal ambition. 559 00:27:29,480 --> 00:27:31,599 Speaker 1: No, it was something much more personal, wasn't it. 560 00:27:31,599 --> 00:27:35,519 Speaker 2: It was almost always this pervasive, desperate desire for control, 561 00:27:36,519 --> 00:27:39,559 and coupled with that an absolute inability to lose it. 562 00:27:39,680 --> 00:27:43,640 Speaker 1: Control over what, money, relationships, custody. 563 00:27:43,359 --> 00:27:48,319 Speaker 2: All the above financial outcomes, custody arrangements, romantic relationships. When 564 00:27:48,319 --> 00:27:52,759 they felt that control slipping, the desperation manifested, often as 565 00:27:52,799 --> 00:27:57,279 the sources suggest, as intimate partner violence, spiraling out of control. 566 00:27:56,960 --> 00:27:59,599 Speaker 1: And the dark net site just offered this false promise, 567 00:28:00,079 --> 00:28:04,839 clean easy button to get that control back permanently exactly. 568 00:28:04,599 --> 00:28:07,440 Speaker 2: A way to reassert absolute control over a situation they 569 00:28:07,480 --> 00:28:10,240 felt was escaping them without getting their own hands dirty. 570 00:28:10,279 --> 00:28:14,079 Speaker 1: They thought, It's just a truly stunning and deeply terrifying 571 00:28:14,200 --> 00:28:16,720 piece of research when you lay it all out, the 572 00:28:16,880 --> 00:28:19,440 unbelievable lengths people will go to when they feel that 573 00:28:19,480 --> 00:28:20,799 control is slipping away, and. 574 00:28:20,680 --> 00:28:24,319 Speaker 2: That these extreme plots weren't over vast fortunes or state secrets, 575 00:28:24,640 --> 00:28:29,720 but over simple, albeit painful things a divorce, a custody fight, 576 00:28:29,839 --> 00:28:30,839 a workplace. 577 00:28:30,440 --> 00:28:34,680 Speaker 1: Dispute, plotted by doctors. It texts administrators, people who are 578 00:28:34,680 --> 00:28:36,559 part of the fabric of society. 579 00:28:36,279 --> 00:28:39,559 Speaker 2: Which tells you the biggest threat here wasn't really the technology, 580 00:28:39,599 --> 00:28:42,799 the code, the encryption that just enabled it. The real 581 00:28:42,839 --> 00:28:45,839 threat was how easily a bitter divorce escalated into a 582 00:28:45,839 --> 00:28:49,400 global assassination attempt. Yeah, the biggest takeaway for me, I think, 583 00:28:49,519 --> 00:28:53,960 is about the fragility of well of community, of normalcy, 584 00:28:54,279 --> 00:28:57,279 how thin that veil can be between everyday life and 585 00:28:57,319 --> 00:28:59,799 someone actively plotting violence in secret. 586 00:29:00,160 --> 00:29:04,720 Speaker 1: Because the perpetrators weren't these shadowy figures from some criminal underworld. 587 00:29:05,000 --> 00:29:07,480 Speaker 2: No, in their day to day lives, they were people 588 00:29:07,680 --> 00:29:09,920 just like you. And I living in our neighborhoods, working in. 589 00:29:09,880 --> 00:29:14,079 Speaker 1: Our offices, and that suggests what this kind of darkness 590 00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:15,319 is closer than we think. 591 00:29:15,519 --> 00:29:17,759 Speaker 2: It suggests we might all be just a little bit 592 00:29:17,880 --> 00:29:20,599 closer to being affected by or perhaps even seeing the 593 00:29:20,680 --> 00:29:23,119 kind of desperation that drives this. Then we might like 594 00:29:23,160 --> 00:29:27,279 to believe the anonymity of the internet just it made 595 00:29:27,279 --> 00:29:30,400 the unthinkable feel doable for them. It turned personal grudges 596 00:29:30,440 --> 00:29:31,720 into these global plots. 597 00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:33,960 Speaker 1: A really sobering thought to end on. 598 00:29:34,160 --> 00:29:36,839 Speaker 2: It is, and maybe an important thing to reflect on 599 00:29:36,960 --> 00:29:40,759 is just how quickly conflict can escalate when one person 600 00:29:40,799 --> 00:29:46,200 becomes absolutely unwilling to accept loss, unwilling to compromise. Understanding 601 00:29:46,279 --> 00:29:49,200 that mechanism, that need for control on how it escalates. 602 00:29:49,359 --> 00:29:51,480 That might be the most vital lesson from this whole 603 00:29:51,519 --> 00:29:52,480 difficult deep dive. 604 00:29:52,759 --> 00:29:55,359 Speaker 1: Okay, a lot to think about there. We encourage you 605 00:29:55,519 --> 00:29:57,960 the listener to reflect on that nature of control of 606 00:29:58,119 --> 00:30:01,079 escalation and conflict and maybe continue you your own deep dive. 607 00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:03,400 We'll leave it there for today. Thanks for us, We'll 608 00:30:03,440 --> 00:30:04,079 see you next time.