Speaker 1: Welcome curious minds to another deep dive. Today, we'm marking
Speaker 1: on a journey into a field that sounds straight out
Speaker 1: of a Hollywood thriller, but is far more intricate, vital,
Speaker 1: frankly fascinating in reality. We're talking about computer forensics and
Speaker 1: incident response, the meticulous art and well the urgent science
Speaker 1: of digital detective work.
Speaker 2: That's right. And while many might, you know, associate forensics
Speaker 2: purely with the FBI or big government agencies, the reality
Speaker 2: is digital evidence is now absolutely central. Just so much
Speaker 2: there's so much crime, so many security incidents. Organizations of
Speaker 2: all sizes, big corporation, small businesses, they desperately need to
Speaker 2: understand exactly what happened on their systems after a breach
Speaker 2: or you know, some kind of anomaly. Okay, So our
Speaker 2: mission in this deep dive is really to equip you
Speaker 2: with the foundational understanding of this critical field. Yeah, we'll
Speaker 2: be revealing some surprising facts, crucial techniques that these digital
Speaker 2: sleuths use every day. And we're doing this to the
Speaker 2: ends of Computer Forensics Incident Response Essentials by Warren G.
Speaker 2: Cruz and JG. Heiser, a classic tech it really is.
Speaker 2: It's from two thousand and two, but honestly, it still
Speaker 2: offers incredibly relevant insights today.
Speaker 1: Okay, so we're dealing with a digital crime scene, but
Speaker 1: unlike a physical one where you might see obvious signs,
Speaker 1: you know, fingerprints, physical evidence. What are the fundamental challenges
Speaker 1: of even seeing a digital incident? Where do you even begin?
Speaker 2: That's a really good place to start, because the challenges
Speaker 2: are they're profound. At its heart, computer forensics involves a
Speaker 2: very structured process. You've got preservation, identification, extraction, documentation, and
Speaker 2: interpretation of computer data.
Speaker 1: Okay, break that down a bit.
Speaker 2: Sure. Think of it like this. Securing the scene that's preservation.
Speaker 2: Figuring out what's actually relevant data that's identification, Getting that
Speaker 2: data out safely that's extraction. Writing down Everything you do
Speaker 2: meticulously is documentation, criticalsolute, and then making sense of it
Speaker 2: all is interpretation. Every single step is vital to make
Speaker 2: sure the evidence actually holds up, you know, in court
Speaker 2: or for internal reviews.
Speaker 1: And the biggest challenge you mentioned volatility.
Speaker 2: Digital data is just incredibly volatile. It can change or
Speaker 2: just vanish in seconds. Even looking at it the wrong
Speaker 2: way can sometimes alter it.
Speaker 1: Wow, that volatility sounds like a real tightrope walk. The
Speaker 1: book highlights this common misunderstanding that really stuck with me.
Speaker 2: What's up?
Speaker 1: Nobody expects a prosecutor to like rebuild times square in
Speaker 1: a courtroom after a physical crime. Impossible, But in a
Speaker 1: computer crime case, there's often this almost impossible expectation to
Speaker 1: recreate the entire system exactly as it was. What's behind
Speaker 1: that huge gap in understanding?
Speaker 2: Precisely? And it really stems from a general unfamiliarity not
Speaker 2: just with the nitty gritty of digital forensics, but often
Speaker 2: with computers themselves, especially you know, in legal circles or
Speaker 2: among non technical managers.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: I can see that this lack of understanding makes the
Speaker 2: field uniquelyallenging, and it raises a key question, why is
Speaker 2: this expertise so incredibly in demand now, maybe even more
Speaker 2: than back in two thousand and two when the book
Speaker 2: came out.
Speaker 1: Billions lost?
Speaker 2: Right, billions, yes, lost annually to cybercrime, and computers are
Speaker 2: just central to everything now, fraud, ip, theft, you name it.
Speaker 1: So it's not just law enforcement, no.
Speaker 2: No, law enforcement is crucial obviously, but major corporations they
Speaker 2: also need really sophisticated internal security teams. The thing is
Speaker 2: these corporate security pros often really experienced with physical theft.
Speaker 2: They're frequently well ill prepared for the nuances of computer crime.
Speaker 1: Ah different skill set.
Speaker 2: Totally different. The book really speaks to this urgent need
Speaker 2: for system admin's corporate security staff to become these sort
Speaker 2: of digital sleuths.
Speaker 1: And it's always changing constantly.
Speaker 2: That's what's fascinating. The legal side, the regulatory environment, the
Speaker 2: crime methods themselves, the investigation techniques, all in constant flux.
Speaker 2: Is definitely not a feel for the complacent. It demands
Speaker 2: continuous learning, flexibility, and just a really deep grasp of technology.
Speaker 1: Okay, so, given this dynamic, fast changing environment and the
Speaker 1: extreme volatility you mentioned, it sounds like digital forensics needs
Speaker 1: some almost sacred rules. What's the absolute number one, non
Speaker 1: negotiable principle for an investigator stepping into this delicate digital
Speaker 1: crime scene.
Speaker 2: The authors are absolutely crystal clear on this, do no harm.
Speaker 1: Do no harm.
Speaker 2: You should never ever directly examine the original storage media,
Speaker 2: the original hard drive, the original USB stick if you
Speaker 2: could possibly avoid it.
Speaker 1: Why is that so fundamental?
Speaker 2: The entire process hinges on maintaining the integrity of that
Speaker 2: original evidence. Think about smudging a fingerprint or altering a
Speaker 2: physical piece of evidence at a crime scene destroys the
Speaker 2: case exactly. The digital equivalent is actually far easier to
Speaker 2: do by accident. Just booting up a machine can change
Speaker 2: hundreds of files.
Speaker 1: So the ideal is always work with copies. But what if?
Speaker 1: What if the situation doesn't allow for that You mentioned
Speaker 1: volatility earlier. Give me a real world example where an
Speaker 1: investigator might have to make a tough call. Maybe bend
Speaker 1: that do no harm rule slightly.
Speaker 2: That's where the real world complexity comes in. For instance,
Speaker 2: imagine an active Internet intrusion, a hack happening right now, Okay,
Speaker 2: crucial evidence. Maybe the attacker's commands might only exist in
Speaker 2: the computer's RAM. It's volatile temporary memory stuff.
Speaker 1: That disappears when you turn it off.
Speaker 2: Precisely turn off the computer and poof that evidence is
Speaker 2: gone forever.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: The ideal scenario would be to freeze the system's state,
Speaker 2: maybe do a live acquisition of the RAM content. But
Speaker 2: politically or for business reasons, management often refuses. They won't
Speaker 2: allow the shutdown of a critical production server even if
Speaker 2: it's compromised. Wow, so this is where an investigator has
Speaker 2: to make incredibly tough calls. You're weighing the potential loss
Speaker 2: of vital evidence against business continuity, and the absolute key
Speaker 2: in those situations. Document everything, every decision, every action won
Speaker 2: you did it meticulously.
Speaker 1: Speaking of meticulousness and documentation, the book gives some really concrete,
Speaker 1: almost step by step advice for actually safe keeping the
Speaker 1: evidence once you have it. Beyond do no harm, what
Speaker 1: are the practical things an investigator needs to do right
Speaker 1: there at the scene.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's all about comprehensive recording from the get go.
Speaker 2: Every single item related to the incident must be identified
Speaker 2: and labeled.
Speaker 1: Not just the computer itself, Oh.
Speaker 2: No, everything the main computer, every piece of media, floppy
Speaker 2: disks back then, USB drives now, every cable you unplug,
Speaker 2: every peripheral attached.
Speaker 1: And what goes on the label.
Speaker 2: The label needs specific things the case number, a brief
Speaker 2: description of the item, the investigator signature, and the exact
Speaker 2: date and time of collection, very precise and critically. You
Speaker 2: need to photograph the crime scene itself. Start wide, show
Speaker 2: the whole area, then gradually zoom in on the suspect computer.
Speaker 2: Document it stated exactly as you found it. What's on
Speaker 2: the screen? Are there any error messages? Is it on
Speaker 2: or off? This visually preserves the.
Speaker 1: Context right, that makes sense, and this detailed process, the
Speaker 1: labeling the photos, it leads directly to this absolutely critical
Speaker 1: concept you hear about the chain of custody. Why is
Speaker 1: this so vital in digital forensics? What happens if that
Speaker 1: chain is broken?
Speaker 2: The chain of custody is well, it's a paramount. It's
Speaker 2: the documented trail that proves the evidence you collected is
Speaker 2: the exact same evidence being presented later, maybe in court,
Speaker 2: and crucially that it hasn't been tampered with, altered or
Speaker 2: swapped out along the way. And if it's not perfect,
Speaker 2: the consequences can be dire. The book gives this powerful
Speaker 2: real world example from the CD Universe website intrusion case.
Speaker 1: What happened there?
Speaker 2: Apparently the evidence was reportedly tainted simply because the chain
Speaker 2: of custody was not established properly. Someone involved was even
Speaker 2: quoted saying it's like the OJ Simpson case. The evidence
Speaker 2: is tainted oof high stakes, scremely high stakes. So to
Speaker 2: prevent this, evidence must be stored in sealed containers I
Speaker 2: think pamper evident bags or boxes in the secure area
Speaker 2: with strictly limited access ideally you have one primary custodiane
Speaker 2: responsible for it and maybe one alternate. Every single time
Speaker 2: that evidence moves or is accessed, it must be logged. Who, what, when? Why?
Speaker 1: Okay, So you've meticulously secured the physical items, the hard drive,
Speaker 1: the laptop, whatever it is, and you've established that rock
Speaker 1: solid chain of custody log how do you then prove
Speaker 1: that the digital data itself hasn't been messed with, either
Speaker 1: by accident or intentionally. This sounds like it needs some
Speaker 1: serious digital wizardry. What's the main tool the authors talk about?
Speaker 2: This is where cryptographic hash values become absolutely essential. Hashes Okay,
Speaker 2: think of them as an electronic fingerprint for data. Algorithms
Speaker 2: like MB five though we less used now, and more
Speaker 2: commonly SAHA. Like SAHA two fifty six, they produce a unique,
Speaker 2: fixed size string of characters for any given piece of
Speaker 2: data you need. Cow if even one single bit a
Speaker 2: zero or a one changes in that data, the resulting
Speaker 2: hash value will be completely different, dramatically different. So calculate
Speaker 2: this hash value when you first collect the data, ideally
Speaker 2: from the original media, before you even make a copy.
Speaker 2: Then any copies you make for your examination, you hash
Speaker 2: those two By comparing the hash of the copy to
Speaker 2: the hack of the original, you can mathematically prove they
Speaker 2: are identical. That's clever, it is, and it's worth noting.
Speaker 2: Even back in two thousand and two, the authors were
Speaker 2: really prescient. They anticipated that MB five, which was common then,
Speaker 2: would likely become obsolete in a few years.
Speaker 1: And it has.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, it's considered broken now for forensic integrity because
Speaker 2: of something called collisions, where different data can produce the
Speaker 2: same hash. So now we use stronger algorithms like SAJA
Speaker 2: two fifty six.
Speaker 1: That foresight itself is pretty insightful about the field, isn't it.
Speaker 2: It absolutely is. It underscores that what's considered forensically sound
Speaker 2: today might not be tomorrow. Investigators have to constantly validate
Speaker 2: their tools and methods adapt to new cryptographic standards. It
Speaker 2: really demands this continuous skepticism, even about your own tools.
Speaker 1: Okay, so you've got your perfect copy, it's been hashed,
Speaker 1: the original is safely locked away. You're moving into the
Speaker 1: analysis phase. What are the key things to keep in
Speaker 1: mind there?
Speaker 2: Well, first, the analysis phase is where you actively dig in.
Speaker 2: You start looking for evidence, but critically, always with that
Speaker 2: verified digital copy. Never the original.
Speaker 1: Right, protect the original at all costs always, and you
Speaker 1: should always make a hash maybe MD five or SAHA
Speaker 1: of any newly created drive images.
Speaker 2: Before you start analyzing them. It's another layer of integrity
Speaker 2: checking throughout your process.
Speaker 1: Makes sense? Any other interesting tips from the book about
Speaker 1: the analysis itself.
Speaker 2: Yeah, there's a fascinating psychological or maybe legal insight they offer.
Speaker 2: They actually warn against using rigid checklists during forensic analysis.
Speaker 1: Really, why not checklists sound like a good way to
Speaker 1: be thorough you'd.
Speaker 2: Think so, right, But imagine being cross examined in court,
Speaker 2: a lawyer asks why didn't you check box number seven
Speaker 2: on your standard procedure checklist? Even if box seven was
Speaker 2: totally irrelevant to this specific investigation.
Speaker 1: It creates an opening, exactly.
Speaker 2: It gives the other side an easy question you don't
Speaker 2: want to answer. So instead they recommend using cheat sheets, guides, reminders,
Speaker 2: but without checkboxes. It's about maintaining that investigative rigor without
Speaker 2: creating easily exploitable gaps for opposing council. It really shows
Speaker 2: the legal tightrope these professionals walk.
Speaker 1: That's a subtle but really important point. Okay, so you've
Speaker 1: got your pristine digital copy you've hashed it, you've got
Speaker 1: your cheat sheet ready, you're ready to analyze. But what
Speaker 1: if the attackers were really clever? What if they didn't
Speaker 1: want you to find anything? It sounds like this is
Speaker 1: where the game of digital hide and seek truly begins.
Speaker 2: That's precisely it. A core principle, really, a mindset in
Speaker 2: forensics is you must always assume that any system you're
Speaker 2: examining might contain hidden data. Don't just look at the
Speaker 2: obvious files.
Speaker 1: So where do people hide things?
Speaker 2: Well? A prime example the book talks about is slack
Speaker 2: space slackspear. Yeah, it's that leftover, unused portion of a
Speaker 2: storage cluster and a hard drive. When you save a
Speaker 2: five file, the operating system allocates space in fixed chunks
Speaker 2: called clusters. If your file doesn't perfectly fill up the
Speaker 2: last cluster, there's leftover space exactly, and that space often
Speaker 2: contains fragments of previously deleted files or other orphan data
Speaker 2: that the OS just hasn't overwritten yet. It just sits there. Wow,
Speaker 2: even applications could contribute. The book mentions word ninety seven
Speaker 2: was notorious for vacuuming up stray data from memory into
Speaker 2: dot doc file data. You couldn't see inside word itself.
Speaker 1: But if you looked at the raw file.
Speaker 2: Right, if you viewed it with a hex editor, a
Speaker 2: tool that shows the raw bytes of a file, you
Speaker 2: might find interesting snipvets.
Speaker 1: So data just lurking in plain sight, sort of if
Speaker 1: you know where to look. But the book reveals even
Speaker 1: more sophisticated ways data can be tucked away right, not
Speaker 1: just in unused corners, but like within the file system
Speaker 1: structure itself, totally hidden from normal view.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, and this next one is particularly insidious, especially for
Speaker 2: Windows users. NTFS streams or alternate data.
Speaker 1: Streams NTFS streams those It's.
Speaker 2: A capability built into the NTFS filesystem, which is standard
Speaker 2: on most Windows machines, but basically allows you to attach
Speaker 2: arbitrary data, even entire programs, to an existing.
Speaker 1: File attached to a file not in it, kind.
Speaker 2: Of like a hidden sidecar. The amazing and scary thing
Speaker 2: is that this attached data is completely invisible to normal
Speaker 2: tools like Windows Explore or if you just list files
Speaker 2: in the command prompt no way. Yes. The book shows
Speaker 2: examples like creating myfile dot txt dot hidden stuff, where
Speaker 2: dot hidden stuff is the stream name you could put
Speaker 2: secret notes in there a directory listing, or they even
Speaker 2: show hiding and then executing notepad dot ex from within
Speaker 2: a stream attached to a seemingly harmless text file.
Speaker 1: That's crazy. How do you even find those?
Speaker 2: You need specialized forensic tools or even some command line
Speaker 2: utilities like der R or dedicated tools like s FIN
Speaker 2: that are designed specifically to look for these alternate data streams.
Speaker 2: They would just show up as separate files. It's a
Speaker 2: classic example of attackers using a legitimate system feature from
Speaker 2: all purposes.
Speaker 1: That's incredible, completely hidden from plain sight. How often do
Speaker 1: investigators actually run into this in real cases? Is it common?
Speaker 2: It's definitely something experienced investigators check for. Maybe not the
Speaker 2: first place malware always hindes, but it's common enough that
Speaker 2: a thorough examination has to include checking for ADSs. It
Speaker 2: just shows attackers will use any means available within the
Speaker 2: OS itself to stay hidden, right.
Speaker 1: Okay, So, moving beyond hiding data locally, when you're tracking offenders,
Speaker 1: email often comes up, right. It seems like a gold mine.
Speaker 2: It can be a rich source, yes, but it can
Speaker 2: also be a minefield of deception. How so, well, the
Speaker 2: book demonstrates how incredibly easy it is to fake the
Speaker 2: frum address in an Internet email message.
Speaker 1: You mean, make it look like it came from someone
Speaker 1: else exactly.
Speaker 2: You can manually connect to an email server using something
Speaker 2: basic like Telnet on port twenty five and just type
Speaker 2: the commands to send an email. You can put pretty
Speaker 2: much whatever you want in the mail.
Speaker 1: From part Why is that possible seems like a huge
Speaker 1: security hole.
Speaker 2: It's because the core email protocols basically has no strong
Speaker 2: authentication for the sender built in. It kind of operates
Speaker 2: on trust.
Speaker 1: So how do you trace a fake email? Then?
Speaker 2: By carefully deciphering the email headers, those blocks of text
Speaker 2: at the top of an email that most people ignore. Yeah,
Speaker 2: the gibberish, it's not gibberish. It contains routing information showing
Speaker 2: the servers the email passed through. By analyzing those you
Speaker 2: can often trace the real originating IP address, especially if
Speaker 2: it came from a big free email service like Gmail
Speaker 2: or Hotmail. Though actually getting the user behind that IP
Speaker 2: usually requires a subpoena to the provider for their logs, so.
Speaker 1: It's a constant game of cat and mouse digital spy
Speaker 1: versus spy. The book even gives tipsy mentioned on how
Speaker 1: investigators can hide their tracks when they're tracking someone. What's
Speaker 1: the advice there?
Speaker 2: Don't want to tip off the suspect, right right.
Speaker 1: It's all about operational security for the investigator or OPSEC.
Speaker 1: When you're using network tools like ping to see if
Speaker 1: a suspects machine is online, or trace route to map
Speaker 1: the path to it, don't do it from your main
Speaker 1: corporate network. Perform those scans from a system that's not
Speaker 1: obviously linked to your organization. Maybe use a temporary anonymous
Speaker 1: dial up ISP account or some other non attributable network.
Speaker 2: The goal is to make sure the suspect doesn't suddenly
Speaker 2: see corporate probing back, doesn't see connection attempts from your
Speaker 2: company's IP range, and realize they're being watched. That could
Speaker 2: spook them into destroying evidence or going completely dark.
Speaker 1: Makes sense, be the ghost okay. And for the really determined,
Speaker 1: really sophisticated adversaries, the authors introduce something even more sinister,
Speaker 1: root kits. What exactly are these and why are they
Speaker 1: considered so dangerous?
Speaker 2: Root kits are well, they're essentially suites of tools toolkits
Speaker 2: that attackers deploy after they've already gained initial access to
Speaker 2: a system. They're not usually the entry methods.
Speaker 1: So what do they do once they're in?
Speaker 2: Their main purpose is to escalate privileges, get admin rights,
Speaker 2: hide the attackers' activities, their files, the running processes, their
Speaker 2: network connections, and gather more information, maybe installed back doors.
Speaker 2: It lets them maintain persistent control over the system.
Speaker 1: Undetected, hiding their trackstep inside.
Speaker 2: Exactly Unix rootkits have been around for years, and the
Speaker 2: book noted back in two thousand and two that Windows
Speaker 2: and T versions were emerging. What makes them particularly dangerous
Speaker 2: is when you get a kernel root kit.
Speaker 1: Kernel that sounds bad.
Speaker 2: It is. It means the root kit embeds itself deep
Speaker 2: within the operating system's core. The kernel itself the very
Speaker 2: heart of how the system functions, and a system compromised
Speaker 2: with a well written kernel root kit could be impossible
Speaker 2: to detect from within the hacked system itself. Why impossible
Speaker 2: because the rootkit subverts the very tools an administrator would use.
Speaker 2: If you run taskless to see processes, the rootkit intercepts
Speaker 2: that command and filters out its own malicious processes from
Speaker 2: the list it lies to the administrator about what's actually running.
Speaker 1: WHOA, So the system itself can't be trusted.
Speaker 2: Correct You often need external tools like booting from a
Speaker 2: trusted forensic CD or analyzing the hard drive offline to
Speaker 2: even stand a chance of detecting a sophisticated Colonel rootkit.
Speaker 1: That's a chilling thought. Okay, So beyond the purely technical,
Speaker 1: what does this all mean for the people involved? The
Speaker 1: digital evidence is just one piece. There's the human element too.
Speaker 1: The book had some fascinating insights on interviewing suspects, didn't
Speaker 1: it It did.
Speaker 2: It's a great reminder that human psychology remains absolutely critical
Speaker 2: in investigations.
Speaker 1: What was the tip?
Speaker 2: The author suggests that even if you haven't actually recovered definitive,
Speaker 2: incriminating evidence yet, just bringing a thick, official looking file
Speaker 2: folder into an interview room, yeah, and simply laying your
Speaker 2: hand on it while you talk, maybe glancing through it
Speaker 2: occasionally like you know something. Yeah, that can sometimes be
Speaker 2: enough psychological pressure to get a confession.
Speaker 1: Really just a prop folder.
Speaker 2: It plays on the suspects fear of what you might
Speaker 2: already know, taps into their guilt. It shows the investigator
Speaker 2: needs to be part technologist part psychologist.
Speaker 1: Absolutely, it seems like a good investigator needs both skill sets.
Speaker 1: Any other interesting bits on that human side, or maybe
Speaker 1: how these digital investigations ultimately connect with the broader legal system.
Speaker 2: Definitely, yeah. Beyond the individual suspect, the whole investigation eventually
Speaker 2: interacts with the kerninal justice system. And here time is
Speaker 2: absolutely critical.
Speaker 1: Why is time so important?
Speaker 2: The book really stresses that the longer the delay in
Speaker 2: reporting a computer crime, the less likely it is that
Speaker 2: a suspect can even be located, let alone successfully prosecuted.
Speaker 2: A big reason is simply that computer logs the records
Speaker 2: of who did what when don't last forever, they get overwritten.
Speaker 1: The trail goes cold fast.
Speaker 2: Very fast. And for investigators working inside companies, a key
Speaker 2: legal takeaway is the vital importance of having clear, unambiguous
Speaker 2: company policies that authorize the company to access company owned equipment.
Speaker 2: This provides the legal basis for internal investigations.
Speaker 1: Right avoiding legal challenges.
Speaker 2: Leter Precisely, the book mentions the Northwest Airlines case where
Speaker 2: flight attendants home computer re subpoenaed because they potentially contained
Speaker 2: company data relevant to a dispute. It's a stark reminder
Speaker 2: of how these legal boundaries were evolving even then, sometimes
Speaker 2: extending beyond company hardware and.
Speaker 1: The different standards in court.
Speaker 2: Yes. The chapter clearly differentiates between criminal court, which requires
Speaker 2: proof beyond a reasonable doubt of very high bar, in
Speaker 2: civil court, which typically uses the standard of preponderance of
Speaker 2: the evidence. Basically, is it more likely than not that
Speaker 2: the defendant is responsible? Easier to mean generally yes, Yeah,
Speaker 2: And crucially for investigators in the private sector, pursuing a
Speaker 2: case in civil court is often an option they have,
Speaker 2: perhaps seeking damages, which isn't always the primary route for
Speaker 2: law enforcement. It gives companies another avenue.
Speaker 1: Wow. Okay, So from the absolute basics like do no harm,
Speaker 1: to the intricacies of ntfs, streams and root kits, and
Speaker 1: then all the way to the court room and human psychology,
Speaker 1: we've really covered a huge metal ground in this deep
Speaker 1: dive we have. It's so clear that computer forensics is
Speaker 1: this fascinating blend. It's as much about understanding human ingenuity, deception,
Speaker 1: and behavior as it is about mastering complex technology. And
Speaker 1: as you said, it's a world that's constantly shifting beneath
Speaker 1: our feet, new tech, new legal precedence all the time.
Speaker 2: It truly is that interplay between digital crime and the
Speaker 2: evolving tools, techniques and legal frameworks used to combat it.
Speaker 2: It's incredibly dynamic. It demands constant vigilance adaptability from anyone
Speaker 2: involved in this field. So maybe after today's deep dive,
Speaker 2: here is a provocative thought to leave you with every
Speaker 2: single digital interaction you make leave some kind of trace.
Speaker 2: What data are you leaving behind right now? And who
Speaker 2: might be able to uncover it if they really knew
Speaker 2: how and where to look?
Speaker 1: A very compelling question to ponder. Thank you for joining
Speaker 1: us on this deep dive into the fascinating world of
Speaker 1: computer forensics. Until next time, keep digging, keep learning, and
Speaker 1: stay curious.