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I want to welcome everyone back to the Peking Yona's show.
After a little detour, we are back to Thomas talking
about Thirty Years War. So how you doing, Thomas.
Speaker 2: I'm doing well. Thanks for hosting me.
Speaker 1: Of course, of course take it away.
Speaker 3: I mean dedicating a lot of thought and research to
the fact that the Thirty Years War it framed German
political consciousness in a way that was this positive. I
would go as far as to say the entire theory
of Sunderwig, which we've talked about in other episodes and series,
was approximately derivative of the Thirty Years War experience. I'll
get to know exactly what I mean in a moment.
This is important, though, and I think this is well
provide people with a a deeper and more relevant understanding
of the subject matter and simply breaking down every discrete
phase of the conflict or emphasizing military aspects and things,
whether trivia of political intrigues only the various factions. It
wasn't just a pragmatic affair that the Westphalian peace, inconceptual
terms as well as in terms of practice, has created
the modern state.
Speaker 2: This was by necessity.
Speaker 3: In terms of the historical process, there couldn't be a
I mean, the Holy Run Empire had been destroyed, but
it wouldn't have been possible to return to those sorts
of political modalities and modern military doctrine as well as
modern military science, and says it relates to political variables
and understandings of national security and what it entails. That
derived absolutely from the Thirty Years War, and the Thirty
Years were also built created the Prussian state, even though
Prussia Prussia didn't exist then it was, it was the
Brandenburg Electorate ral practical purposes, but the experience of the
Thirty Years War informed Prussian military doctrine for the you know,
duration of its existence. And it and that includes the
national socialist therap and unified Germany was really the imposition
of the Prussian modeless state craft upon the entirety of
the fatherland. This really interesting lesson known an essay by
Ernselulti called I think it's called Germany and the Cold War.
He talks about how well it makes a couple of
fascinating points. And I'll tie this back in a moment,
even if it seems tangential, Erstenaulti said, in modern conceptual terms,
the right and left gives them. It didn't emerge from
the French Revolution. He said, it emerged from the War
between the States, and like Heideger and like Adolf Hitler,
he viewed America as being at the forefront of historical potency,
not just in the fact that in terms of technological
innovations and momentum and things of that nature, but also
in conceptual terms, America is at the forefront of determining
the course of history in global terms. Literally, he said
the War between the States. He said that the Union,
which became the United States of America as we know it,
was the first truly left wing or progressive state because
of the premise entirely on abstractions and appeal to historical
concepts extricated from epistemological realities of you know, the organic
experiences of a people over time, he said, the South
was axiomatic and unconditionally right wing. It was entirely based
on this organic understanding of Americans as a discreet race
of people possessed of a Christian faith that was overwhelmingly
Protestant in nature. And it viewed political activity and essential
capacities as activity that was tailored and implemented to guarantee
the posterity of.
Speaker 2: That, you know, a.
Speaker 3: Discreete people and and their and their historically coded way
of life. And I basically agree with that. And America
and Germany were an odd dialogue. Nowhere is that more
apparent than in terms of the national economics model that
characterized America in the Gilded Age and slightly beyond, which
the Germans adopted in its entirety.
Speaker 2: You know, I think we're talked about how when you us.
Speaker 3: Grant he he toured Germany and he was viewed as
this really heroic figure there. And you know, Hamiltonian economics.
Frederick List basically represents Hamiltonian economics through through a Teutonic
conceptual lens. But anyway, the Prussian State or the Brandenburg
what became the Prussian State Prussia was almost Germany was
essentially destroyed like what was to become Germany was essentially
destroyed by the Thirty Years War. Prussia survived because it
wasn't truly a party combatant in a way that most
of the central German territories were. But what the Prussians
realized is that they had to they had to they
had to maintain a credible military capability on a permanent
perennial basis, because it was inevitable in their opinion that
an event like a thirty years War would return and
they wouldn't survive the next conflict cycle due to a
burgeining interdependence at scale with the rest of the continent
and other things as well as you know, they received
as the ongoing existential racial conflict with the Eastern peoples.
So the Prussian Kingdom not only did they create the
first modern standing army as we think of it, they
also implemented taxation at scale of everybody, you know. And
this is very highly controversial, but the notion was, well,
we face existential threats to not just our political but
our racial survival at all times. So if people are
gonna benefit from the protection of you know, that this
mighty military apparatus affords able bodied manner required to serve
in it, but also everybody's required to sustain it, you know,
with a proportion of their wealth or their earnings. And
I shouldn't need to elaborately explicate the degree to which
America internalized this idea, except it's perverse here because America
doesn't face those challenges, and you can't extricate this sort
of strong central state apparatus, the purpose of which is
social engineering in part, you know, to inculcate people with
a patriotic sensibility. And you know, in the Athenian sense
like Sorell talked about. You can't make that some derationated
postulate and make it work. And also you can't justify
it just on propositional grounds like America tries to, because
then you have a tyranny. Then it's doing the opposite
of what it's intended, and that's perverse. These things only exist.
They're admittedly extreme measures that force people to sacrifice substantial
aspects of their own liberties. The reason why that can
be rationalized ethically as well as and you know, as
well as every other way is because it serves the
posterity of of the racial community. That's it, you know,
and of course too it was very cynical and remains
so today. I mean, it's unconsortably this idea that America
needs this massive standing army as if there's some sort
of as if there's existential threat constantly in the in
the wings, you know. I mean, don't get me wrong,
America does face threats, but not not. But the regime
won't acknowledge that those threats even exist, and they certainly
aren't ones of a conventional military major So this is important,
you know, but so and in a very indirect way.
But in there these capacities that were again literally just positive.
Speaker 2: And how.
Speaker 3: The United States of America developed after the war between
the States, there is a linear trajectory from the Thirty
Years War to you know, to No, it's not just
a matter of trivia and it's it's it's not it
doesn't just relate to you know, how the Germans does
a people viewed that we would amounted to a tragedy
the commons or there you know, or their unfortunate historical
fate owing to this kind of collective experience of trauma.
And if people require just anecdotally, if you're not, if
anybody requires more data or more concrete understanding of the
conflict within the European psyche, I mean, from the end
of hostilities, you know, in sixteen forty eight until really
even beyond nineteen forty five, because in the DDR this
would continue to loom large. Just incidentally, there was another
point nolt He made in his Cold War essay. He
reiterated that East Germany was the real Germany, even though
they were under hostile occupation and the seed only existed
by design of the Soviet Union. He said that there
was a There was both a potency to East Germany
because communism was dictating the course of power, political events,
and conceptual reality, especially in the early Cold War and Germany.
East Germany was a purely ideological state, but it also
claimed that it was the result of a German historical
process that had resolved in socialism, which was being realized,
which would bring about the end of history, you know,
and I think there's something to that. He viewed the
He viewed the Buddhist Republic as an absolute contrivance, you know.
Speaker 2: It was.
Speaker 3: It was neither German nor European, nor was it nor
was it just some mirror of America. It was it
was this ideological construct that didn't purport to represent any
kind of history resolution of processes. It simply represented, you know,
an opposition to what was claimed to be perverse aspects
of the German national character or some sort of economic
engine and military arsenal contra communist aggression. There wasn't any
potency there in the terms Noalty was talking about, and
there were there weren't. There was only really one potentiality,
you know, and even that even that potentiality of evaporated
after the inner German border came down, you know, but
to bring it back, and forgive me if I'm jumping
around too much, the German stage in the eighteenth century
was a big deal.
Speaker 2: You know.
Speaker 3: It's not as storied as as the as the London
stage is, but I argue that it was just as important,
and a lot of plays were historically coded and oriented.
Frederick Schiller, he was about the play right and historian.
He He produced a series of plays based on the
sacking and quite literal rape of Magdeburg. A joint force
of the Imperial Army and the Catholic League assaulted Magdeburgh
under the command of this upstart count.
Speaker 2: And the men.
Speaker 3: Who constituted this force they were half starved. They they've
been in heavy action for months on end. And when
they laid sieged mag the Berg and then finally breached
the city walls, it was like when the Red Army
laid siege to the German Reich. You know, little girls
to old women were you know, we're raped over and
over again. Old men and and little boys were slaughtered.
Speaker 2: You know. It was this orgy of violence. And when.
Speaker 3: A Protestant minister approached the count and he begged him
to halt the violence, the count in so many words
he said, I can't, I can't control it. It's in
the hands of God or maybe the devil. But he said,
if I don't let the routine and the murder rights course,
I can't control these men at all. This is their reward.
And uh the uh.
Speaker 2: This is apocryphal.
Speaker 3: But the Protestant minister said something to the effect of, well,
then we're in hell. And this play about the sacking
of Magda Bird coupled with this trilogy that Schiller also wrote,
called the Vallenstein Trilogy, that sort of became the canon
of the national traumatic experience of the Thirty Years War.
And to be clear that there wasn't really a sectarian
overlay to this, obviously, I mean, it so happens that
in the case of Magdeburg, it was the it was
the Imperial army in the Catholic League that was engaged
in this orgy of rapine and violence, but Protestant militias
did the same thing. And on an individual basis, the
Calvinists under arms were probably the most extreme of anybody
except the Croats and some of the Italians who with
the vanguard of of of Roman Catholic forces. The Cross
developed a reputation as being utterly savage fighters during this
during the conflict cycle, which is interesting, you know what
I mean that that endures this day, and I mean
that Cross are great people. I'm not saying that pejoratively,
mean quite the contrary, but.
Speaker 2: You know, and the U Shillers.
Speaker 3: Plays developed a following and during the Warriors and the
Third Reich, which isn't surprising.
Speaker 2: And of course Herman Lahnes varvof.
Speaker 3: That's a great novel and Imperium Press just published an
edition of it, which is which is fantastic. I mean
that wasn't published until just before the Great War. I
think it's it first went to print in nineteen ten.
But that that was about this freehold farmer and his
family's mass occurred by marauding mercenaries. So he he swears
he's going to get revenge on these men. So him
and a bunch of the other villagers, you know, like
men of the village, they developed their own militia and
they savagely attack any any of these mercenary bands who
threaten the peace of the village, and he becomes this
legendary citizen killer, you know, which obviously is deeply resident
in the German psyche. And that's another thing too that
you can take away from this. There's this sort of
idiot caricature of German military violence and German military culture
as being this kind of slavishly you know, almost it's
being this kind of like institution that worships authority for
its own sake and disdains personal initiative. I mean, that's
nonsensral kinds of reasons, including the fact that German's literally
invented mission oriented tactics. But the German ideal is a
citizen soldier. It's the opposite of what the United States
holds out, is the ideal as this kind of professional
cast of you know, guys who are basically like a
swat team with the permanent shoot to kill clearance that's
deliberately discreete from the rest of the population.
Speaker 2: You know.
Speaker 3: The I think a point again and again that the
folks kind of gears that concept that wasn't just very
forward looking in terms of how modern war developed. And
it's fascinating, you know, if you look at their kit
and stuff. They look like they could be in Vietnam
or Nicaragua in the sixties and the eighties respectively, sixties,
seventies or eighties. But it's also that concept that worked
in a way. I don't think it would have been
in France, or in Russia or in England. It would
have worked in Scotland or Ireland, but the class divide
and the peculiar dynamics they're in, I don't think that's
sort of organization would have played out in a way
that facilitated operational needs. But you know, all these things
culminated in a very tragic course for Germany, you know,
and that history does not repeat itself. That's an idiot's canard.
But there is a clear trajectory that is determined by
the historical experience, and nowhere is that more evident than
the experience of Germany in the modern world, I.
Speaker 2: Believe too, you know. And obviously.
Speaker 3: The conditions on the ground and on the continent didn't
impact Britain in direct capacities, although there were plenty of English,
Irish and Scots and Wells who fought in the Thirty
Years War as mercenaries. Owing to the fact that that's
where the action was if you were a professional soldier
or owing to sectarian motivations. You know what the modern
UK is as well as Britain in the distant in
ancient past. It's sort of a microcosm of what goes
on on the continent. I view the War three Kingdoms
and Cromwell's ascendency as a microcosm of what happened in
the Thirty Years of War in a lot of ways.
And obviously when people speculate on Hobbes's conceptual horizon, they
tend not to even mention the conflict variables that were
extant in the Thirty Years of War. But he was
absolutely impacted by those things. You know, there's less distance
there that I think is often allowed, particularly by court
history these days, is so anglophone and character, not just
because it's become the global Lingua franco of academ but
inconceptual terms.
Speaker 2: I mean, that's what.
Speaker 3: Determines thought patterns and the sort of parameters of my policies.
That's one of the reasons why I emphasized continental influences
so much. It's not just because I'm a Hegeli and
I believe these things will be true this is a
a an analytical model that is deliberately neglected. There's a
deep conceptual bias there. So I'd like to think my own,
very small way, I'm contributing to that being rectified.
Speaker 2: But it's also.
Speaker 3: Tragedy and as the thirty years were, it was, and
don't get me wrong, it almost destroyed the Germans as
a race of people, if you want to live it
like that. Hitler famously said that the German people were
scattered to the four winds, and you know, about a
third of them are just annihilated, you know, maybe like
thirty to forty percent, they just died. And obviously in
the early twentieth century people were far more oriented towards
understanding race and ethnos in biological terms. Hitler included as
a man of that of his epoch, so he spoke
of that kind of different racial types in Europe being
uprooted from their land of origin and mixed and scattered,
and in Hitler's viewed had taken almost three centuries for
the German people to reconstitute in essential capacities, including biological
But the other side of that was owing to Prussian
ascendency in the aftermath of sixteen forty eight, and the
fact that the conflict cycle approximately caused or at least
facilitated at least was an essential condition precedent the Prussian
ascendency that did create the Prussian master cast narrative, I think,
and the second Reich, the kaiser Reich, that was viewed
as the ongoing process of realizing the destiny of the
German folk after the destruction of the Empire. And that's
one of the reasons. And I'm not saying this is
a positive thing, because sectarianism is always ugly, but you know,
the Coulter komp which originally described the holmes will learned
effort to purge Catholic influence from public life. You know,
this endured until the end of the kaiser Reich. In
some sense, supposedly Veilhelm's Wilhelm the Second's wife wouldn't let
Catholics in her house. But Prussia viewing itself not just
as the master element of the German people and the
first among the vogue, but they also they're committed to
never again allowing a supranational imperative or authority or power
to set the vogue against itself, you know. And confidence
in the state, and confidence in the national narrative that
I mean, don't get me wrong, there was very bad
blood owing to excess to the culture comp and a
lot of catalogs are treated very badly, but that didn't deteriorate,
that did that never deteriorated or unraveled into uh the
kind of sectarian hatred that that happened in in the UK,
which is interesting. But Germany also, the kaiser Reich was
also far more of a united polity than the UK,
and even and even in England, you know, within that structure,
you know, and that's one of the things that's I mean,
I've made this point again and again.
Speaker 2: Hitler was a Halfsburg Austrian.
Speaker 3: Whose furtive experiences were you know, being taught and kind
of raised by priests. You know, he had abusive father
who then proceeded to die of a heart event when
Hitler was you know, a little kid, not even a teenager.
You know, Hitler was a Habsburg Austrian who I identified
the National Socialists mandate as being the heir to Prussian
political culture. And you know, he had the confidence of
of his own tribe and they're adjacent coreligionists in Bavaria
as well as the unconditional loyalty of these northern Protestants
and these Prussians. You know, like we've talked about the
national Socialist heartland in terms of the electoral map was
the it was the semi rule Protestant North. You know,
that's remarkable because the Hitler Coalition really shouldn't have existed
if you look at things and conventional terms and what
people generally take for granted about European identity and how
the sectarian divide places into that among the things, and
that also there during the war, during the conflict cycle,
there was this you've probably seen them, I think most
people have. You know, if you spend any time in
museums or read books about the early modern period of Europe,
there's these engravings and carvings, both on metal and wood,
and that became the subject matter of those tended to
be historical. Sometimes they were iconographic and religious in nature,
but generally these etchings that dealt with political events and warfare,
and a tremendous amount were produced by these master engravers.
Jacques Callot. He produced a really famous one called The
Great Miseries of War that depicted atrocities in a way
that was shocking for the time. And there's another one
called terrors of the Thirty Years War, you know, and this,
of course a lot of people then weren't literate. But
you know, that's that's something too, that it tells you
something because.
Speaker 2: There weren't.
Speaker 3: You didn't find that kind of thing associated with the
Seven Years War or even with some of the crusades
in the East against the indigenous vends and things. And
don't get me wrong, there was extreme brutality there too.
But something happened to the to the continental psyche, you know,
particularly in in Germany and in particularly in German lands
and in in parts of France, that habituated them a
horror of a certain sort, and that I believe inculcated
German political life and understanding that when war arrives, really
anything is possible if the conflict cycle reaches a critical intensity,
you know, and that that's one of the things that
people don't understand. I was telling to some people the
other day over at dinner about the posts and speed,
which is you know, that was Himmler's sort of direct
acknowledgment of the ethnic cleansing, particularly of Jews, and a
lot of mainstream historians aside from whatever idiotic mythologies and
ideological conceiche they include within their narrative. They act like, well,
Hitler's talking about these horrible acts with this dispassionate tenor
what a monster. I said, no, that, And people are
gonna misunderstand. I'm saying, you're if I say that's within
the German political character, They're gonna say, oh, you're saying
that the Germans are monstrous. No, no, no, no, no, no,
I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that the
German political mind and the German ontological sensibility about the
ethics of warfare is resigned to the fact that truly
monstrous acts become not just normalized with characteristic And yes,
there was a lot of unprecedented variables in the Second
World War, but Europe Central was also habituated to a
degree of existential brutality, really sight unseen save some of
the horrors brought to bear on the American frontier and
in the racial wars with the most sanguinary and savage tribes.
Speaker 2: But you know, in this.
Speaker 3: What's culturally resonant as regards were in peace questions. I mean,
this is this is important not just for the sake
of standing on ceremony, and not just for clarity and
the historical record. This is how people understand themselves as
a nation and as an ethnos and you know, with
within the terms of their confession and what the meaning
is of their own uh, their own you know, shared
memory within their racial group, epigenetically and spiritually and otherwise.
I think that can't be overstated. And that's one of
the reasons why these lies about history have had such
a catastrophic effect on.
Speaker 2: The American character.
Speaker 3: And how and why the punitive social engineering regime to
literally deculturate the Germans as a people has had such
a catastrophic effect on them.
Speaker 2: You know.
Speaker 3: But to understand, I mean relatively, to understand the cultural
personae or the historical personae probably more accurately, of a
people is to decipher their historical memory.
Speaker 2: And as late as.
Speaker 3: Nineteen forty four or forty five, and even subsequent in
the DDR until the nineteen eighties, references both direct and
oblique to the Thirty Years War and the phenomena they're
in was a regular part of German national life. And
that's not accidental or some kind of curiosity. But the
they're also two if we're gonna if people accept what
it postulated about the Thirty Years War being this outsized
causal factor in conceptual state craft in the modern era,
particularly as regards military affairs, but not but not exclusively.
There was this destructive fury to the Thirty Years War
that was and I mean, I know some people, the
Summer visionists, say that that became sort of mythical, and
it did because myth making is always part of the
process of historical memory and aggregate. But it bore a
real relation to reality, and that changed things. The modern
state again was born out of warcraft and high politics
and the exigencies presented by national security imperatives. You know,
that's one of the things. And again I'm no libertarian,
but that's one of the things that's wrong with the
progressive mindset. And that's one of the things that's wrong
with the United States as government developed after the War
between the States, and particularly after nineteen thirty three. The
state doesn't exist to teach children how to read or
to give them one shit school. The state doesn't exist
to help men and women get along better. The state
doesn't exist to make black people feel better about themselves
or to get girls interested in studying engineering or to
make you a better man or woman. The state exists,
as structured in the modern era, to guarantee the posterity
of the national community and to manage military affairs and
guarantee the existential security of the national community and adjacent
peoples who are legitimately under its dominion.
Speaker 2: That's it.
Speaker 3: And this was always the understanding until very recently in
comparative terms. And so when we say that the Thirty
Years War, well, which that Prussia, the Prussian state is
the project, was the progeny of the Thirty Years War,
and that the Prussian state was the model of all
state craft at scale in the Western world. I mean
that that's what we're talking about, and the significance of
that can't be denied. And they were a buddle of that.
Or the criticism and ethical terms, there's all. There's there's
a there's an empirical criticism too that i is a
little bit outside the scope at least for today today's discussion.
But the uh, the ethical objection is that, well, a
state that's self constantly views its existential mandate as entirelygreative
of war is going to is going to be this
war mongering state. No not, I mean, there's always that potentiality,
but a state that a state born of military necessity,
there's going to be natural checks on the reckless exercise
of military violence. Just going to the reality of this
strategic balance and the existence of near peer competitors in
immediate proximity. But also one of the reasons why these
uh normy sociologists and social science types who I mean,
first of all, like their big kink is pretending that
democracy has a meaning and isn't a floating signifier, particularly
after nineteen ninety ninety one. But they also the have
this idea that the internal situation of the state somehow
impacts in this positive ways the external environment. That's ridiculous.
That's like saying that somebody who has cancer is making
the external environment toxic. You know, like I the state
is always unless you're talking about a true hedgemon, which
are something approaching that. America is not a conventional hedgemond,
but it the impact it has on the wider paradigm
is like that of a hedgemon. But globalism changes things.
But with that exception, and there's it's more complicated than
I'm permitting. Admittedly, for this example. With that exception, it's
the strategic landscape that determines the form and structure of
the internal situation. It can't really can't be any other way.
And you know, but like I said, the it's complicated
in the case of America. And but also the way,
the way I mean this is this is a discussion
for another eighty to the the way that America approaches
military affairs.
Speaker 2: Is is it odds with is it odds with extant realities?
But you know that.
Speaker 3: Did present something of unique danger, and in the American case,
even before America achieved through superpower capabilities, just by vertu
of the fact, even if you were to extricate the
ideological motives of the New Dealers, I'm not singling them
out to burn an effigy. The New Deal revolution was
truly revolutionary, okay, I mean that, and it totally altered
American national life and the structure of the American state.
It was the realization of the process that began when
we were up in the States. As in terms of
what Nold he was talking about, but attempting to extrapolate
those Prussian structural aspects to a purely ideological and propositionally
abstract political culture. You don't have any concrete or organic
or historical variables.
Speaker 2: To appeal to.
Speaker 3: To unify the body politic or to command its loyalty
or at least its obedient compliance.
Speaker 2: And that.
Speaker 3: Conveys a grossly outside significance on warfare and its function within.
Speaker 2: The state and.
Speaker 3: Its usefulness in managing the internal situation if you follow
me there, and I think that's exactly what happened, and
it's not the whole story, but it's it's undeniable and
at base two, I mean I I hope to write
some law and form stuff on this too. Americans the
core of America, there's a strongly Germanic aspect to it. Regionally,
America differs in terms of the culture bearing and native element.
But you know, a major aspect of the founding mythology,
according to the Hamiltonian faction, was that Americans are Anglo Saxon,
We're Germanic people, and we're casting off this sort of
alien tyranny of of of the Roman Church and of
this Latin overcast that ruled us in Britain. I mean,
part of that was ideological myth making, but I mean
that's that's not incorrect either. You know, you add in
the uh, the Celtic aspects and the fact of Ulster
blood that changes things too. And the descendants of the
cavaliers in substantial measure constituted the aristocracy of the South,
and they obviously were descended from Normans, so it's complicated.
Speaker 2: But you know there's.
Speaker 3: This Germanic blood intermingled with you know, the Ulcer Scotts
as well. You know they they we are in part,
you know, the bastard offspring of Vikings, So.
Speaker 2: You can't.
Speaker 3: That's what I make the point a lot too, that
the kind of Calvinist diaspra of uh, you know, America, Ulster,
South Africa, Australia, New Zealand that represents the unique heritage
that's not just some mirror of you know, the United
Kingdom or something. I mean obviously, but that's a bit
outside this goal. I'm gonna stop there as I fear
that I'm rambling a bit. I'll wrap this up next
episode and get more in a sort of the concrete
military aspects of the conflict and things. I hope that
this was useful and interesting to the subs.
Speaker 1: I think it will be. I took I took some notes. Awesome,
all right, head on over to Thomas's substack. It's real
Thomas seven seven seven dot substack dot com and you
can connect to him from there. You can go to
Thomas seven seven seven dot com. The t is A
seven and yeah, I think he posts links. Everything is
linked there, I believe. Yeah, I mean, so, go support Thomas.
Do that on substack or whichever way he has linked
on his website. And thank you Thomas. I look forward
to the next episode.
Speaker 2: Yeah, thank you, My friend s