WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.120 --> 00:00:02.600 Picture this. You know, you're cruising at two thousand feet 2 00:00:02.960 --> 00:00:06.080 on the state of the art jumbo jet. Right It's 3 00:00:06.080 --> 00:00:09.240 December nineteen seventy two, and it is a pitch black 4 00:00:09.359 --> 00:00:13.480 night over the Florida Everglades, just incredibly dark out there, exactly. 5 00:00:13.960 --> 00:00:17.480 But inside the cabin, I mean, it's completely peaceful. The 6 00:00:17.519 --> 00:00:22.199 massive engines are just this low, reassuring hum Passengers are chatting. 7 00:00:22.239 --> 00:00:25.280 You hear ice clinking and plastic cups. People are putting 8 00:00:25.280 --> 00:00:27.760 away their books, just getting ready to land in Miami. 9 00:00:27.960 --> 00:00:29.320 It feels completely safe. 10 00:00:29.399 --> 00:00:31.239 It really feels like the safest place in the world. 11 00:00:31.320 --> 00:00:35.359 But right below them, completely unseen in that darkness, is 12 00:00:35.439 --> 00:00:39.439 a harsh, alligator infested swamp. Yeah, and in just a 13 00:00:39.479 --> 00:00:44.200 few moments, this seemingly perfect, mechanically flawless aircraft is going 14 00:00:44.240 --> 00:00:46.679 to plunge directly into the mud at nearly two hundred 15 00:00:46.719 --> 00:00:47.280 miles an hour. 16 00:00:47.399 --> 00:00:50.960 It is a profoundly terrifying image. What always strikes me 17 00:00:51.000 --> 00:00:54.039 about that specific moment in aviation history is the absolute disconnect. 18 00:00:54.119 --> 00:00:54.640 Disconnect. 19 00:00:54.719 --> 00:00:58.079 Yeah, you have this total calm inside that pressurized aluminum tube, 20 00:00:58.079 --> 00:01:01.159 which is just completely divorced from the grim reality of 21 00:01:01.200 --> 00:01:04.840 what the aerodynamics and you know, the altimeter are actually 22 00:01:04.920 --> 00:01:06.280 doing right right. 23 00:01:06.400 --> 00:01:09.000 And that's exactly our mission for you today on this 24 00:01:09.040 --> 00:01:13.200 deep dive. Okay, let's unpack this. We are opening up 25 00:01:13.200 --> 00:01:17.280 a stack of harrowing real life aviation case. 26 00:01:17.040 --> 00:01:19.079 Files and we really need to look at them closely. 27 00:01:19.400 --> 00:01:22.959 Yeah, because we aren't just here to recount the tragedies, 28 00:01:23.159 --> 00:01:27.239 you know, we are stepping into the shoes of forensic investigators. 29 00:01:27.280 --> 00:01:32.120 We want to reconstruct these scenes, uncover the hidden, often microscopic, 30 00:01:32.280 --> 00:01:36.040 chain reactions that lead to catastrophic failures. 31 00:01:36.200 --> 00:01:38.760 Which is so important because a commercial airplane crash is 32 00:01:38.799 --> 00:01:43.120 almost never just a single, isolated failure. The redundancies that 33 00:01:43.159 --> 00:01:46.519 are built into these machines are staggering, so an investigation 34 00:01:46.640 --> 00:01:49.799 usually reveals a sequence of small, compounding errors, like a 35 00:01:49.879 --> 00:01:53.040 chain reaction. You know. It's where human psychology and mechanical 36 00:01:53.040 --> 00:01:56.159 engineering suddenly find themselves speaking completely different languages. 37 00:01:56.359 --> 00:01:58.079 I mean, that is just wild to think about. So 38 00:01:58.200 --> 00:02:00.519 to start pulling on those threads, I want to look 39 00:02:00.519 --> 00:02:03.120 at scenarios where the airframe itself was perfectly healthy, like 40 00:02:03.159 --> 00:02:06.799 the engines were firing smoothly, but the inputs, the very 41 00:02:06.920 --> 00:02:11.000 eyes and ears of the aircraft fed the crew deadly lies. 42 00:02:11.560 --> 00:02:14.800 Right, And the textbook case for this is Bursion Air 43 00:02:14.800 --> 00:02:16.759 flight three to zero one. Oh yeah, So we're in 44 00:02:16.840 --> 00:02:20.639 nineteen ninety six on a Boeing seven fifty seven and 45 00:02:20.759 --> 00:02:23.879 it's climbing out of the Dominican Republic at night. It's 46 00:02:23.879 --> 00:02:27.240 a heavy aircraft, it's full of passengers heading back to Europe. 47 00:02:27.879 --> 00:02:31.639 But almost immediately after rotation, like as they pitch up 48 00:02:31.639 --> 00:02:36.840 into the dark sky, the cockpit absolutely explodes with conflicting alarms. 49 00:02:36.879 --> 00:02:38.919 Oh. I've actually read the transcripts for this one, and 50 00:02:38.960 --> 00:02:42.000 it is just pure sensory overload. You have the stick 51 00:02:42.039 --> 00:02:46.879 shaker activating, which physically rattles the control column to warn 52 00:02:46.919 --> 00:02:49.879 of an impending aerodynamic stall, right, because the plane thinks 53 00:02:49.879 --> 00:02:53.000 it's flying dangerously slow. Yes, But simultaneously you have this 54 00:02:53.120 --> 00:02:56.719 blaring alarms creaming overspeed, warning the crew they are accelerating 55 00:02:56.759 --> 00:02:58.639 past the structural limits of the airframe. 56 00:02:58.719 --> 00:02:59.639 It's madness. 57 00:03:00.240 --> 00:03:03.680 The instruments are essentially telling the pilots you're falling out 58 00:03:03.719 --> 00:03:05.400 of the sky, but you're also about to tear the 59 00:03:05.439 --> 00:03:08.199 wings off from going too fast. Like, how does a 60 00:03:08.280 --> 00:03:09.680 human brain even process that? 61 00:03:09.919 --> 00:03:12.360 Well, the short answer is it generally doesn't. I mean, 62 00:03:12.400 --> 00:03:15.719 it's an impossible paradox. What's fascinating here is how the 63 00:03:15.759 --> 00:03:19.360 brain reacts. The captain looks at his airspeed indicator and 64 00:03:19.400 --> 00:03:22.319 it shows them pushing three hundred and fifty knots, which 65 00:03:22.360 --> 00:03:25.199 is way too fast for that phase of flight. Right, 66 00:03:25.360 --> 00:03:28.280 But the first officer's gauge shows them dropping below two 67 00:03:28.400 --> 00:03:31.639 hundred knots, which is dangerously slow. So, in that moment 68 00:03:31.639 --> 00:03:35.360 of sheer cognitive overload, the captain decides to trust his 69 00:03:35.439 --> 00:03:36.000 own gauge. 70 00:03:36.080 --> 00:03:37.680 He assumes he's going too fast. 71 00:03:37.479 --> 00:03:40.680 Exactly, he pulls back the throttles to slow down, but 72 00:03:40.800 --> 00:03:43.240 his gauge was the one feeding him the lie. The 73 00:03:43.280 --> 00:03:46.639 plane was actually already flying too slowly, so by cutting 74 00:03:46.680 --> 00:03:50.680 the power, he inadvertently stalls the aircraft. It rolls over 75 00:03:50.800 --> 00:03:52.560 and falls into the Caribbean Sea. 76 00:03:52.680 --> 00:03:55.919 Wow, but wait, how does some modern redundant Boeing seven 77 00:03:56.080 --> 00:03:58.879 fifty seven get completely confused about its own forward speed? 78 00:03:58.919 --> 00:04:00.840 I mean, the systems are designed to cross check each other. 79 00:04:00.840 --> 00:04:03.479 Right they are. Yeah, but this wasn't a software glitch. 80 00:04:03.919 --> 00:04:08.439 It was biological biological Yeah. When investigators eventually recovered the wreckage, 81 00:04:08.479 --> 00:04:11.120 they found the culprit hiding inside the pinto tubes. 82 00:04:11.240 --> 00:04:11.639 Oh wow. 83 00:04:11.759 --> 00:04:14.080 See, the plane had been parked on the tarmac for 84 00:04:14.159 --> 00:04:17.959 several weeks, and standard maintenance procedures which involved putting these 85 00:04:18.000 --> 00:04:21.680 bright protective covers over the picto tubes, had just been ignored, 86 00:04:21.920 --> 00:04:25.759 of course, And during that time, a tiny insect called 87 00:04:25.839 --> 00:04:31.000 a mud dauber wast found this small hollow metal tube 88 00:04:31.000 --> 00:04:33.519 on the captain's side and just built a nest of 89 00:04:33.600 --> 00:04:35.120 hardened mud right inside it. 90 00:04:35.199 --> 00:04:36.600 So the tube is completely blocked. 91 00:04:36.639 --> 00:04:36.839 Yep. 92 00:04:37.079 --> 00:04:39.399 But I mean, if no air is ramming into the tube, 93 00:04:39.600 --> 00:04:41.800 shouldn't the air speed just read zero? Why did it 94 00:04:41.800 --> 00:04:42.720 scream overspeed? 95 00:04:42.759 --> 00:04:45.879 That's the fascinating physics of it, honestly. Okay, the wasp 96 00:04:46.000 --> 00:04:48.079 sealed the tube while the plane was at sea level, 97 00:04:48.160 --> 00:04:51.720 which trapped a pocket of dense sea level air inside 98 00:04:51.720 --> 00:04:52.240 the system. 99 00:04:52.439 --> 00:04:52.720 Ah. 100 00:04:52.759 --> 00:04:54.800 I see, yeah, So as the seven to fifty seven 101 00:04:54.839 --> 00:04:58.839 climbed higher into the atmosphere, the outside ambient pressure naturally dropped, 102 00:04:59.319 --> 00:05:02.240 but that t wrapped air inside the pidow tube stayed 103 00:05:02.279 --> 00:05:02.920 at sea. 104 00:05:02.800 --> 00:05:04.839 Level pressure, so it's pushing outward. 105 00:05:04.759 --> 00:05:08.560 Exactly relative to the thin air outside. That trapped pocket 106 00:05:08.600 --> 00:05:11.519 of air acted like a balloon expanding inside the instrument. 107 00:05:11.959 --> 00:05:15.000 The higher the plane climbed, the more that trapped air 108 00:05:15.079 --> 00:05:18.279 pushed against the sensors, which trick the computer into thinking 109 00:05:18.279 --> 00:05:20.720 the aircraft was just continuously accelerating. 110 00:05:21.480 --> 00:05:24.839 That is just wild. The higher they go, the faster 111 00:05:24.959 --> 00:05:27.680 the computer thinks they are flying solely because of the 112 00:05:27.720 --> 00:05:29.439 pressure differential exactly. 113 00:05:29.560 --> 00:05:32.920 And this highlights a critical vulnerability. You know, we are 114 00:05:33.079 --> 00:05:37.360 rigorously trained to trust our instruments, but when a machine 115 00:05:37.680 --> 00:05:41.120 presents a fatal contradiction like that, the human tendency is 116 00:05:41.160 --> 00:05:43.720 to fixate on the most aggressive warning. 117 00:05:43.639 --> 00:05:46.000 Right, which in this case was the overspeed. Yep. It 118 00:05:46.040 --> 00:05:48.439 actually reminds me of another one, Southern Airways Flight two 119 00:05:48.560 --> 00:05:49.000 forty two. 120 00:05:49.120 --> 00:05:50.480 Oh, that's a classic example. 121 00:05:50.560 --> 00:05:53.240 Yeah, this is nineteen seventy seven at DC nine, flying 122 00:05:53.240 --> 00:05:56.160 over Georgia, and we see another catastrophic lie fed to 123 00:05:56.199 --> 00:05:58.439 a crew. But this time, you know, it wasn't a 124 00:05:58.560 --> 00:06:00.959 wasp blocking a censor, it was the weather radar lyning 125 00:06:01.000 --> 00:06:01.319 to them. 126 00:06:01.639 --> 00:06:05.199 Yes. So the crew is flying right toward this massive, 127 00:06:05.399 --> 00:06:09.959 violent squall line and they are analyzing their monochrome weather 128 00:06:10.079 --> 00:06:13.160 radar screen in the cockpit and they spot a dark 129 00:06:13.240 --> 00:06:15.879 area what looks to them like a clear alleyway, like 130 00:06:15.879 --> 00:06:19.279 a safe passage directly through the thunderhead. So they aim 131 00:06:19.319 --> 00:06:21.120 the DC nine right for the gap. 132 00:06:21.240 --> 00:06:24.480 But I don't understand how a commercial weather radar just 133 00:06:24.839 --> 00:06:28.399 misses a hurricane level cell. I mean, did the equipment fail. 134 00:06:28.600 --> 00:06:32.160 Well, so the equipment actually functioned exactly as designed, really, yeah, 135 00:06:32.160 --> 00:06:35.360 but it fell victim to an atmospheric illusion known as 136 00:06:35.519 --> 00:06:36.639 signal attenuation. 137 00:06:36.839 --> 00:06:37.519 Okay, what is that? 138 00:06:37.959 --> 00:06:40.639 So the radar works by sending out microwave pulses and 139 00:06:40.680 --> 00:06:44.360 measuring how they bounce off water droplets. Think of it 140 00:06:43.800 --> 00:06:46.680 like shining a flashlight into a room filled with heavy 141 00:06:46.680 --> 00:06:49.120 smoke and there's a mirror in there. Okay, the light 142 00:06:49.240 --> 00:06:51.839 hits the first dense layer and bounces right back to you, 143 00:06:52.079 --> 00:06:55.399 which blinds you to whatever is hiding behind it. In 144 00:06:55.439 --> 00:06:58.000 this squall line, the rain and hail at the leading 145 00:06:58.079 --> 00:07:01.879 edge were so violently thick that the raidarways entirely bounced 146 00:07:01.879 --> 00:07:02.680 off that front wall. 147 00:07:02.920 --> 00:07:06.480 Oh man, So the radar simply didn't have the energy 148 00:07:06.519 --> 00:07:09.839 to penetrate the storm because nothing bounced back from the center. 149 00:07:10.120 --> 00:07:12.519 The screen just panted it as empty black space. 150 00:07:12.680 --> 00:07:16.319 Precisely, so they flew directly into the most destructive core 151 00:07:16.399 --> 00:07:19.360 of a monster storm. Thinking it was a gap wow, 152 00:07:19.399 --> 00:07:23.079 and suddenly the aircraft is being hammered by baseball sized hail. 153 00:07:23.879 --> 00:07:27.040 The sound on the cockpit voice recorder is just deafening. 154 00:07:27.279 --> 00:07:30.519 Like survivors described it as being trapped inside a tin 155 00:07:30.600 --> 00:07:32.839 drum while someone throws boulders at it. 156 00:07:33.079 --> 00:07:34.600 That sounds absolutely terrifying. 157 00:07:34.759 --> 00:07:38.480 It was. The hail actually shattered the thick, multi layered 158 00:07:38.519 --> 00:07:44.040 cockpit windshield, But the fatal blow was aerodynamic. 159 00:07:43.600 --> 00:07:46.720 Right, because jet engines are basically massive vacuums. I mean, 160 00:07:46.759 --> 00:07:49.519 I know they can handle heavy rain, but solid ice 161 00:07:49.560 --> 00:07:50.800 blocks of that size, it. 162 00:07:50.759 --> 00:07:53.360 Was just way too much mass. The engines ingested so 163 00:07:53.480 --> 00:07:56.160 much hail and water that it disrupted the smooth laminar 164 00:07:56.199 --> 00:07:59.839 airflow through the intake. Oh no, yeah, the hail physically 165 00:08:00.120 --> 00:08:03.120 form the engine towelings and damage the internal bleed valves. 166 00:08:03.839 --> 00:08:06.279 When that smooth flow of air breaks down inside a 167 00:08:06.319 --> 00:08:08.720 jet engine, you get what's called a compressor stall, which 168 00:08:08.800 --> 00:08:13.639 is bad, very bad. The internal pressure violently surges backward. 169 00:08:13.920 --> 00:08:16.839 It's kind of like a controlled explosion going the wrong way, 170 00:08:17.120 --> 00:08:20.920 which bent and shattered the heavy steel compressor blades. So 171 00:08:21.120 --> 00:08:23.600 both engines flamed out completely, meaning. 172 00:08:23.360 --> 00:08:27.360 They turned a fully loaded forty ton commercial airliner into 173 00:08:27.399 --> 00:08:31.199 a glider at fourteen thousand feet exactly. I know. The 174 00:08:31.240 --> 00:08:34.200 crew made an incredibly desperate dead stick landing onto a 175 00:08:34.279 --> 00:08:38.000 rural highway in New Hope, Georgia, and tragically seventy two 176 00:08:38.000 --> 00:08:38.639 people died. 177 00:08:38.759 --> 00:08:40.320 It's a heartbreaking case, it is. 178 00:08:40.480 --> 00:08:43.679 I mean, imagine driving down a pitch black highway. Your 179 00:08:43.759 --> 00:08:46.919 GPS is screaming at you to turn right. Your speedometer 180 00:08:47.039 --> 00:08:48.879 says you're going one hundred and fifty miles an hour, 181 00:08:49.120 --> 00:08:52.120 but your car is physically shaking like it's about to stall. 182 00:08:52.200 --> 00:08:54.440 You just don't know what to believe. If the sensors lie, 183 00:08:54.480 --> 00:08:55.320 the humans die. 184 00:08:55.360 --> 00:08:58.200 And that's exactly why these crashes revolutionize the industry. You know, 185 00:08:58.240 --> 00:09:01.720 burgeon are changed how we train pilts to isolate unreliable 186 00:09:01.759 --> 00:09:04.720 airspeed data and just fly the aircraft using known peugein 187 00:09:04.799 --> 00:09:08.360 power settings and Southern airways directly led to the FAA 188 00:09:08.480 --> 00:09:13.440 mandating high definition color weather radar. Today, the radar differentiates 189 00:09:13.480 --> 00:09:17.279 between moderate rain and severe hail cores, which virtually eliminates 190 00:09:17.320 --> 00:09:19.519 that deadly shadow of signal attenuation. 191 00:09:20.200 --> 00:09:23.039 So we see how bad data can freeze a pilot's brain. 192 00:09:23.840 --> 00:09:25.759 But what happens when the data in the cockpit is 193 00:09:25.799 --> 00:09:28.720 completely accurate, and the brain just chooses to ignore it, 194 00:09:29.519 --> 00:09:31.960 which brings us back to the flight from the beginning 195 00:09:31.960 --> 00:09:34.440 of our deep dive Eastern Airlines Flight four oh one 196 00:09:34.679 --> 00:09:35.679 in nineteen seventy two. 197 00:09:36.000 --> 00:09:39.120 This is perhaps the ultimate study and fatal distraction. As 198 00:09:39.159 --> 00:09:42.039 you mentioned that L ten eleven was the absolute pinnacle 199 00:09:42.120 --> 00:09:43.600 of aviation tech at the time. 200 00:09:43.759 --> 00:09:44.960 State of the r exactly. 201 00:09:45.519 --> 00:09:47.759 So, they are on approach to Miami. The crew drops 202 00:09:47.840 --> 00:09:51.440 the landing gear, but one single twenty cent light bulb 203 00:09:51.480 --> 00:09:54.240 on the instrument panel fails to illuminate. Oh Man, the 204 00:09:54.279 --> 00:09:57.679 green light indicating the nose gears locked down just stays. 205 00:09:57.480 --> 00:10:00.960 Dark a twenty cent bulb. So the crew borts the landing, 206 00:10:01.200 --> 00:10:04.480 climbs up to two thousand feet, puts the plane on autopilot, 207 00:10:04.679 --> 00:10:07.159 and they just circle out over the pitch black Everglades 208 00:10:07.159 --> 00:10:11.200 to troubleshoot. And then the entire flight crew, the captain, 209 00:10:11.279 --> 00:10:14.080 the first officer, the flight engineer, and even a visiting 210 00:10:14.159 --> 00:10:16.399 maintenance specialist who happened to be in the jump seat, 211 00:10:17.120 --> 00:10:20.559 they all become hyper fixated on this one tiny piece 212 00:10:20.600 --> 00:10:21.159 of plastic. 213 00:10:21.279 --> 00:10:24.919 Yeah, they really do. The flight engineer actually physically climbs 214 00:10:24.960 --> 00:10:28.759 down into this small avionics bay beneath the cockpit called 215 00:10:28.759 --> 00:10:32.200 the hell hole to try and visually confirm the gear 216 00:10:32.279 --> 00:10:35.039 is down through a tiny window. Wow, and up in 217 00:10:35.039 --> 00:10:38.120 the cogpit, the captain is violently tugging at the jammed 218 00:10:38.200 --> 00:10:41.080 light bulb assembly, and in his frustration, you know, he 219 00:10:41.159 --> 00:10:43.799 turns around to speak to the engineer, and as he does, 220 00:10:43.919 --> 00:10:46.879 he leans on his control yoke. It was just a 221 00:10:46.919 --> 00:10:49.159 slight inadvertent pressure on the column. 222 00:10:49.399 --> 00:10:51.919 But wait, why did the autopilot fight him? Like if 223 00:10:51.919 --> 00:10:53.799 I try to steer my car out of the lane 224 00:10:53.799 --> 00:10:56.240 while anisis is on, it actively pushes back. 225 00:10:56.399 --> 00:10:59.159 That's a great point. It's because of how autopilots were 226 00:10:59.159 --> 00:11:02.080 designed in the early nineteen seventies. The L ten eleven 227 00:11:02.159 --> 00:11:05.480 had a mode called control wheel steering or CWS. Yeah, 228 00:11:05.639 --> 00:11:08.519 the logic programmed into the computer was that if a 229 00:11:08.559 --> 00:11:11.720 pilot applies a specific amount of physical force to the yoke, 230 00:11:12.279 --> 00:11:17.080 the autopilot just assumes the human actively wants manual control. Interesting, 231 00:11:17.200 --> 00:11:19.519 it doesn't blare a warning horn or anything. It just 232 00:11:19.720 --> 00:11:23.279 quietly disconnects the altitude hold, assuming the pilot is now 233 00:11:23.320 --> 00:11:24.879 flying the pitch of the aircraft. 234 00:11:25.159 --> 00:11:29.159 So the plane just starts a painfully slow, uncommanded descent, 235 00:11:29.960 --> 00:11:32.480 dropping from two thousand feet down to one thousand down 236 00:11:32.519 --> 00:11:35.320 to five hundred yep. And because it's a moonless night 237 00:11:35.440 --> 00:11:38.879 over a totally dark swamp, they are basically flying in 238 00:11:38.919 --> 00:11:41.879 a black hole. There are no city lights rising in 239 00:11:41.919 --> 00:11:43.720 the window to give them a sense of the horizon. 240 00:11:43.840 --> 00:11:45.879 But the thing is, the aircraft actually did try to 241 00:11:45.919 --> 00:11:46.360 warn them. 242 00:11:46.480 --> 00:11:46.919 It did. 243 00:11:47.279 --> 00:11:50.639 Yeah, As they drifted below their assigned altitude, a chime, 244 00:11:51.080 --> 00:11:54.200 the sea cord altitude alert sounded in the cockpit. It's 245 00:11:54.320 --> 00:11:57.279 clearly audible on the cockpit voice recorder, just ringing out 246 00:11:57.279 --> 00:11:59.799 from the speaker right behind the flight engineer's seat. 247 00:12:00.080 --> 00:12:02.600 Nobody reacted. I mean, why did they just not care? 248 00:12:02.919 --> 00:12:05.080 No, their brains literally deleted the sound. 249 00:12:05.200 --> 00:12:05.679 What do you mean. 250 00:12:05.960 --> 00:12:09.720 It's a psychological phenomenon called inattentional blindness or, in this 251 00:12:09.799 --> 00:12:11.919 specific case, inattentional deafness. 252 00:12:11.919 --> 00:12:13.080 Oh wow. Yeah. 253 00:12:13.120 --> 00:12:15.879 When the human brain dedicates one hundred percent of its 254 00:12:16.000 --> 00:12:19.879 cognitive bandwidth to a single high stress focal point, like 255 00:12:19.919 --> 00:12:23.039 a jammed light bulb assembly, it acts like a filter. 256 00:12:23.159 --> 00:12:26.159 It actively blocks out secondary sensory inputs. 257 00:12:26.320 --> 00:12:27.240 That is wild. 258 00:12:27.360 --> 00:12:29.799 They didn't just ignore the chime, their conscious minds never 259 00:12:29.840 --> 00:12:31.679 even heard it until it was too late. 260 00:12:31.879 --> 00:12:35.320 I mean, the plane glided right into the swamp and 261 00:12:35.360 --> 00:12:40.080 the aftermath was horrific, jet fuel everywhere, Survivors trapped in 262 00:12:40.120 --> 00:12:44.080 the mud, facing down alligators and deadly swamp bacteria in 263 00:12:44.120 --> 00:12:44.840 the pit's black. 264 00:12:44.960 --> 00:12:46.159 It was a nightmare scenario. 265 00:12:46.360 --> 00:12:49.679 It really was. Real life. Heroes like Bob Marcus rushed 266 00:12:49.679 --> 00:12:52.399 out on airboats to pull people from the water. And 267 00:12:52.559 --> 00:12:55.120 you know, the absolute tragic irony of it all is 268 00:12:55.159 --> 00:12:57.600 that the NTSB found the landing gear was perfectly fine. 269 00:12:57.799 --> 00:12:59.879 It was locked the whole time. Only the twenty cent 270 00:13:00.039 --> 00:13:03.639 bulb had burned out. Here's where it gets really interesting, though, 271 00:13:04.080 --> 00:13:07.159 because this crash changed how crews operate. 272 00:13:06.919 --> 00:13:12.519 Right, absolutely, This tragedy exposed a massive cultural flaw in aviation. 273 00:13:13.360 --> 00:13:18.960 You had a highly experienced crew but completely flatlined situational awareness. Yeah, 274 00:13:19.039 --> 00:13:24.440 it birthed CRM crew resource management. It fundamentally restructured cockpit hierarchy. 275 00:13:24.919 --> 00:13:28.639 Before CRM, the captain's word was absolute law, right, he 276 00:13:28.720 --> 00:13:30.279 was basically God on the flight deck. 277 00:13:30.360 --> 00:13:32.240 Right. Whatever he says goes exactly. 278 00:13:32.720 --> 00:13:35.279 So if the captain focused on a light bulb, everyone 279 00:13:35.320 --> 00:13:37.879 focused on the light bulb. CRM mandated that no matter 280 00:13:37.919 --> 00:13:41.320 what goes wrong, someone must be explicitly assigned to fly 281 00:13:41.399 --> 00:13:44.919 the airplane, and junior crew members are required to vocalized threats. 282 00:13:45.200 --> 00:13:48.440 That makes total sense. But you know, distraction isn't just 283 00:13:48.480 --> 00:13:51.039 a danger inside the cockpit. It's just as fatal when 284 00:13:51.080 --> 00:13:51.879 it happens on the ground. 285 00:13:52.000 --> 00:13:52.759 Oh, without a doubt. 286 00:13:52.879 --> 00:13:55.600 Let's look at nineteen eighty six Aero Mexico flight four 287 00:13:55.679 --> 00:13:58.759 ninety eight. It's a beautiful, crystal clear Labor Day weekend 288 00:13:58.759 --> 00:14:02.159 over Cirito's California and Air Mexico DC nine is descending 289 00:14:02.159 --> 00:14:06.720 toward Lax, but simultaneously, a private Piper Cherokee strays directly 290 00:14:06.759 --> 00:14:11.159 into the highly restricted terminal control area around Lax without clearance. 291 00:14:11.519 --> 00:14:13.879 Right and down on the ground, an air traffic controller 292 00:14:13.960 --> 00:14:17.480 named Walter White is managing the radar screen. But just 293 00:14:17.519 --> 00:14:20.120 as the DC nine and the Piper Cherokee are converging, 294 00:14:20.480 --> 00:14:23.600 White's attention is abruptly hijacked by a third plane. 295 00:14:23.639 --> 00:14:25.759 Wait, a third plane, Yeah, a. 296 00:14:25.679 --> 00:14:28.759 Grumm and Tiger that also wandered into his restricted airspace 297 00:14:28.799 --> 00:14:30.840 and is actively calling for help on the radio. 298 00:14:31.120 --> 00:14:34.559 Oh man, So White gets into a long drawn out 299 00:14:34.679 --> 00:14:38.799 radio conversation with this Grumman pilot to guide him out. Yes, 300 00:14:39.080 --> 00:14:42.120 and while his eyes are locked on that one radar target, 301 00:14:42.159 --> 00:14:46.240 he completely misses the piper Cherokee merging with the Aero 302 00:14:46.320 --> 00:14:51.159 Mexico jet. And here's my question. This was a perfectly clear, 303 00:14:51.440 --> 00:14:55.159 sunny California day. I know we talk about radar limitations, 304 00:14:55.399 --> 00:14:57.559 but why didn't the pilots just look out the window? 305 00:14:57.679 --> 00:15:00.240 I mean it seems obvious, right, but the human eye 306 00:15:00.240 --> 00:15:04.759 has severe biological imitations, specifically regarding angular resolution and something 307 00:15:04.799 --> 00:15:06.159 called empty field myopia. 308 00:15:06.200 --> 00:15:07.200 Empty field myopia. 309 00:15:07.399 --> 00:15:10.039 Yeah, so when pilots scan a futureless blue sky, the 310 00:15:10.120 --> 00:15:12.600 eyes naturally focus at a resting distance of just a 311 00:15:12.600 --> 00:15:16.039 few meters, making it incredibly difficult to spot a distant object. 312 00:15:16.080 --> 00:15:16.720 Oh, I see. 313 00:15:16.759 --> 00:15:20.320 Furthermore, a piper Cherokee and a DC nine approaching each 314 00:15:20.360 --> 00:15:23.120 other at a combined closure rate of over four hundred 315 00:15:23.120 --> 00:15:26.919 miles an hour means they cover a mile in just seconds. 316 00:15:27.080 --> 00:15:27.480 Wow. 317 00:15:28.039 --> 00:15:31.799 The piper just remains this microscopic speck on the windshield. 318 00:15:32.399 --> 00:15:35.960 It doesn't trigger the brain's motion detection peripheral vision because 319 00:15:35.960 --> 00:15:38.879 they are on a direct collision course, meaning there is 320 00:15:39.000 --> 00:15:40.840 no relative lateral movement. 321 00:15:41.080 --> 00:15:42.879 It just looks stationary exactly. 322 00:15:43.080 --> 00:15:45.360 By the time the piper blossoms in the windshield into 323 00:15:45.360 --> 00:15:48.840 a recognizable shape, the pilots had less than two seconds 324 00:15:48.879 --> 00:15:49.799 to react. 325 00:15:49.440 --> 00:15:54.039 And aerodynamically, two seconds is nothing. The piper slammed directly 326 00:15:54.080 --> 00:15:57.320 into the horizontal stabilizer of the DC nine's tail. It 327 00:15:57.519 --> 00:16:00.320 ripped the entire tail assembly clean off the airline. 328 00:16:00.440 --> 00:16:01.639 Which is catastrophic. 329 00:16:01.720 --> 00:16:03.919 Yeah. Once you lose the horizonal stabilizer, you lose all 330 00:16:03.960 --> 00:16:07.399 pitch control. Yeah, the DC nine essentially becomes a lawn dart. 331 00:16:07.759 --> 00:16:11.600 Both aircraft plummeted into a suburban neighborhood, killing eighty two people, 332 00:16:11.840 --> 00:16:13.240 including fifteen on the ground. 333 00:16:13.399 --> 00:16:16.320 It was a horrific wake up call. That collision proved 334 00:16:16.360 --> 00:16:19.799 that the FAA's see and avoid strategy was just completely 335 00:16:19.840 --> 00:16:21.240 inadequate for modern speeds. 336 00:16:21.320 --> 00:16:21.879 Yeah. Clearly. 337 00:16:22.159 --> 00:16:26.320 It actually forced Congress to mandate TCS, the traffic Collision 338 00:16:26.360 --> 00:16:30.559 Avoidance system. It required all commercial jets to actively interrogate 339 00:16:30.639 --> 00:16:32.360 the transponders of nearby aircraft. 340 00:16:32.360 --> 00:16:33.039 How does that work? 341 00:16:33.240 --> 00:16:35.879 The computers basically calculate the closure rate and if a 342 00:16:35.879 --> 00:16:38.960 collision is imminent, TCAs physically speaks to the pilots and 343 00:16:39.000 --> 00:16:42.200 the copkit, commanding one to climb climb and the other 344 00:16:42.320 --> 00:16:46.840 to descend, descend. It completely removes the distracted human from 345 00:16:46.840 --> 00:16:47.639 the detection loop. 346 00:16:47.720 --> 00:16:51.960 That is brilliant. So, okay, we've covered humans being fed 347 00:16:52.000 --> 00:16:55.320 bad data and human suffering from fatal distraction. I wanted 348 00:16:55.320 --> 00:16:59.039 to transition into our final phase. What happens when the 349 00:16:59.120 --> 00:17:03.440 human does everything perfectly right, but the machine itself harbors 350 00:17:03.480 --> 00:17:05.759 a deadly microscopic flaw right. 351 00:17:05.799 --> 00:17:08.519 We call this the ghost in machine. To understand it, 352 00:17:08.559 --> 00:17:11.160 we look at China Airlines flight zero zero six in 353 00:17:11.240 --> 00:17:11.960 nineteen eighty five. 354 00:17:12.000 --> 00:17:13.160 Okay, set the scene for us. 355 00:17:13.279 --> 00:17:15.680 So a massive seven forty seven is cruising over the 356 00:17:15.680 --> 00:17:17.880 Pacific Ocean and the dead of night at forty one 357 00:17:17.880 --> 00:17:20.559 thousand feet and suddenly engine number four flames out. 358 00:17:20.680 --> 00:17:23.880 Now, obviously a seven forty seven can fly perfectly fine 359 00:17:23.880 --> 00:17:27.480 on three engines right, but the loss of thrust on 360 00:17:27.559 --> 00:17:30.640 the far right wing means the plane naturally wants to 361 00:17:30.720 --> 00:17:34.440 yaw or twist heavily to the right exactly. The standard 362 00:17:34.440 --> 00:17:37.119 procedure is to manually step on the left rudder pedal 363 00:17:37.160 --> 00:17:39.799 to counter that twisting force and keep the nose pointed 364 00:17:39.799 --> 00:17:43.759 straight but the captain leads the autopilot engaged for too long. 365 00:17:44.720 --> 00:17:45.960 Why didn't the autopilot just. 366 00:17:45.960 --> 00:17:48.359 Step on the rudder for him, Because on that generation 367 00:17:48.440 --> 00:17:51.160 of the seven forty seven, the autopilot was completely isolated 368 00:17:51.200 --> 00:17:52.240 from the rudder controls. 369 00:17:52.480 --> 00:17:52.759 Really. 370 00:17:52.880 --> 00:17:55.519 Yeah, couldn't move the tail at all to fight the yaw. 371 00:17:55.759 --> 00:17:59.000 The autopilot only used the ailerons, you know, the control 372 00:17:59.039 --> 00:18:01.319 surfaces on the trailing edge of the wings, to try 373 00:18:01.359 --> 00:18:04.519 and bank the plane level. Yeah, but aero dynamic forces 374 00:18:04.519 --> 00:18:08.759 are unforgiving. The ailerons eventually hit their maximum mechanical deflection 375 00:18:09.200 --> 00:18:11.640 and they simply weren't strong enough to fight the massive 376 00:18:11.720 --> 00:18:13.400 asymmetric thrust of the engines. 377 00:18:13.640 --> 00:18:17.000 Wow. So the plane slowly banks steeper and steeper to 378 00:18:17.039 --> 00:18:20.519 the right until it literally rolls over onto its back. Yeah. 379 00:18:20.559 --> 00:18:24.279 It plunges into a terrifying graveyard spiral, dropping thirty thousand 380 00:18:24.319 --> 00:18:25.960 feet in mere seconds. 381 00:18:25.640 --> 00:18:27.400 Just a total loss of control. 382 00:18:27.200 --> 00:18:30.480 And the g forces build so intensely that passengers are 383 00:18:30.519 --> 00:18:33.680 pinned flat against the floorboards, pulling up to five g's 384 00:18:34.599 --> 00:18:37.599 up in the cockpit, the crew is completely disoriented in 385 00:18:37.599 --> 00:18:40.240 the thick clouds. I mean, a seven forty seven is 386 00:18:40.279 --> 00:18:43.599 not designed to fly inverted, so their instruments are spinning wildly. 387 00:18:43.839 --> 00:18:46.960 They are totally blind, but then plummeting through nine thy 388 00:18:47.039 --> 00:18:49.920 five hundred feet they punch through the bottom of the 389 00:18:49.920 --> 00:18:53.359 cloud deck. In goodness, Yeah, the captain finally sees the 390 00:18:53.359 --> 00:18:56.680 faint line of the ocean horizon, and in a masterpiece 391 00:18:56.720 --> 00:19:01.359 of sheer physical flying, Captain hoe wrestles this massively damaged, 392 00:19:01.440 --> 00:19:05.079 structurally tearing aircraft out of the dive just seconds before 393 00:19:05.119 --> 00:19:06.000 impacting the water. 394 00:19:06.119 --> 00:19:08.359 It's an absolute miracle the wings didn't snap off. 395 00:19:08.440 --> 00:19:09.079 It really is. 396 00:19:09.240 --> 00:19:12.519 But the NTSB investigation had to answer why a veteran, 397 00:19:12.640 --> 00:19:16.160 highly experienced captain made the fundamental error of letting the 398 00:19:16.200 --> 00:19:18.680 autopilot hold the plane until it rolled. 399 00:19:18.480 --> 00:19:21.480 Over right, and to answer that, the NTSB introduced a 400 00:19:21.480 --> 00:19:25.359 totally new physiological factor into their reports, circadian rhythms like 401 00:19:25.440 --> 00:19:29.640