Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to my second book reading.
I chose this one because this is one of the
first books I would read when I was questioning libertarianism.
I knew that Murray Rothbart had quoted it all the time,
and he always talked about John C. Calhoun, and I
had heard about this book, and so I read it
and it raised a lot of questions. Let's just put
it that way. One of the reasons I picked this
one and not someone else's. He was an American, a Southerner,
and a controversial figure. Let's just put it that way.
But just to give you some background on John C. Calhoun,
and I'm going to take this off of I'm going
to read this off of the United States SENATECE website. Okay,
so it's a featured biography. John C. Calhoun of South
Carolina first entered politics in eighteen oh eight, when he
was elected to the state legislature. He moved to the
US House of Representatives in eighteen eleven, where he served
almost four terms before resigning to become Secretary of War
under President James Monroe, a position he held from eighteen
seventeen to eighteen twenty five. In both positions, Calhoun was
known for his strong support for federally funded internal improvements.
Calhoun was an early candidate for president in eighteen twenty four,
but dropped out and sought the vice presidency instead. Although
he publicly back to Tennessee's Andrew Jackson for president, his
vice presidential candidacy received endorsements from both Jackson Jackson supporters
and those of John Quincy Adams. Calhoun easily won the
vice presidency, making him the vice making him the president
of the Senate, while the presidential election was decided by
the House of Representatives, which elected John Quincy Adams over
popular vote winner Andrew Jackson. When Jackson was elected president
in eighteen twenty eight, Calhoun was a again elected Vice president,
but his growing opposition to Jackson's policies prompted his resignation.
Elected to the Senate in December of eighteen thirty two,
Calhoun became an influential leader of the Southern States during
the Antebellum period, a period in Senate history marked by
heated debates over slavery and territorial expansion. A stadged defender
of the institution of slavery and a slave owner himself,
Calhoun was the Senate's most prominent states rights advocate, and
his doctrine of nullification professed that individual states had a
right to reject federal policies that they deemed unconstitutional. In
eighteen fifty, as the Senate debated a legislative compromise designed
to quell calls for disunion, a dying Calhoun continued to
argue for the continuation and expansion of slavery. He died
on March thirty first, eighteen fifty as that debate continued
a century later, when a special Senate committee was tasked
with choosing individuals to be included in a famous five
quote unquote famous five collection of portraits. It shows three
leaders of the pre Civil War Senate whose influence lived
after them, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and John C. Calhoun.
All right, so let's get to reading this. This is
good stuff. And I don't know if it's going to
take and take seven episodes like the last book took.
But this this really is only one hundred pages. But
let's say, all right, a disquisition on government. In order
to have a clear and just conception of the nature
and object of government, it is indispensable to understand correctly,
what that constitution or law? What the what that constitution
or law of our nature is in which government originates,
or to express it more fully and accurately, that law
without which government would not and with which it must
necessarily exist. Without this, it is as impossible to lay
any solid foundation for the science of government as it
would be to lay one for that of astronomy without
a like understanding of that constitution or law of the
material world according to which several bodies compose in the
solar system, mutually act on each other, and by which
they are kept in their respective spheres. The first question,
accordingly to be answered considered is what is that constitution
or law of our nature without which government would not exist,
and with which its existence is necessary. So obviously, here,
when he's using the term constitution, he's talking about the
makeup of something and not the written document. In considering this,
I assume and he's also assuming government. Okay, there's no
question of whether a government should exist, or that's without question.
Here he's assuming government. In considering this, I assume as
an incontestable fact that man is so constituted as to
be a social being, his inclinations and wants, physical and
moral irresistibly impel him to associate with his kind. And
he has accordingly never been found in any age or country,
in any state other than the social In no other, indeed,
could he exist, And in no other were it possible
for him to exist, could he attain to a full
development of his moral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself
in the scale of being much above the level of
the brute creation. Basically, what he's saying is man without
men without other men are brutes. Men need to come
together in order to form civilization. I next assume, also,
as a fact not less incontestable, that while man is
so constituted as to make the social state necessary to
his existence and the full development of his faculties, this
state itself cannot exist without government. The assumption rests on
universal experience. In no age or country has any society
or community ever been found, whether enlightened or savage, without
government of some description one hundred percent truth talk about
People can talk about medieval Iceland and medieval Ireland all
they want. They had a form of government. If someone
got out of line, somebody would step up, create the
exception and handle it. Having assumed these as unquestionable phenomena
of our nature, I shall, without further remark, proceed to
the investigation of the primary and important question, what is
that constitution of our nature, which, while it impels man
to associate with his kind, renders it impossible for society
to exist without government. The answer will be found in
the fact, not less incontestable than either of the others,
that while man is created for the social state, and
is accordingly so formed as to feel what affects others
as well as what affects himself, he is at the
same time so constituted as to feel more intensely what
affects him directly than what affects him indirectly through others,
or to express it differently. He is so constituted that
his direct or individual affections are stronger than his sympathetic
or social feelings. I intentionally avoid the expression selfish feelings
as applicable to the former, because, as commonly used, it
implies an unusual excess of individual over the social feelings
in the person to whom it is applied, and consequently
something depraved and vicious. My object is to exclude such reference,
and to restrict the inquiry exclusively to facts in their
bearings on the subject under consideration, viewed as mere phenomena
appertaining to our nature, constituted as it is, and which
are as unquestionable as is that gravitation or any other
phenomenon of the material world. So so far, the statement
he's making is that as much as we love our neighbor,
if it comes down to choosing, we're going to choose ourself.
But he's going to get a little more into that,
so I'll have more to say about it. In asserting
that our individual that our individual are stronger than our
social feelings. It is not intended to deny that there
are instances growing out of peculiar relations, as that of
a mother and her infant, or resulting from the force
of education and habit over peculiar constitutions in which the
latter have overpowered the former. But these instances are few
and always regarded as something extraordinary. The deep impression they
make whenever they occur is the strongest proof that they
are regarded as exceptions to some general and well understood
law of nature. Just as some of the minor powers
of the material world are apparently to world are apparently
to gravitation. So what he's saying is when you see
somebody who steps out and steps out of themselves and
sacrifices for somebody else. The fact that we have to
point that out the exception proves the rule that self
interest is more important than the interest of strangers or
or even neighbor. And he doesn't stop there. I might
go farther and assert this to be a phenomenon not
of our nature only, but of all animated existence throughout
its entire range, so far as our knowledge extends. It
would indeed seem to be essentially connected with a great
law of self preservation, which pervades all that feels, from
man down to the lowest and most insignificant reptile or insect.
In none it is stronger than in man. His social
feelings may, indeed, in a state of safety and abundance,
combined with high intellectual and moral culture, acquire great expansion
and force, but not so great as to overpower this
all pervading and essential law of animated existence. I hope
you're following. He's he's getting deep here, and really it's
very simple. It's very simple that you are going to
put yourself and your family ahead of anyone else. That's
just that's our nature, okay. And if you really look
at what has they've tried to build, you know, with
this what Jason from the two Bit podcast calls this
devouring mother culture. They want you to be more worried
about people outside, and especially who they deem to be
minorities and people who have been who've been marginalized. They
want you to believe to care more about them than
you know, if you're a female, the child that came
out of your womb, if you're if you're a man,
the seed that came out of your wife's womb. It's
truly remarkable. But that constitution of our nature, which makes
us feel more intensely what affects us directly than what
affects us indirectly through others, necessarily leads to conflict between individuals.
And here's where we start getting into it. And everybody's
going to have all sorts of comments. What I always
reading the comment because I was still very much in
a libertarian mindset of the time. All the objections were
running through my head. But stick around, Each in consequence,
has a greater regard for his own safety or happiness
than for the safety or happiness of others, and where
these come in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests
of others to his own common sense. I hope that's
common sense to everyone. And hence the tendency to a
universal state of conflict between individual and individual, accompanied by
the connected passions of suspicion, jealousy, anger, and revenge, followed
by insolence, fraud, and cruelty, and if not prevented by
some controlling power, ending in a state of universal discord
and confusion, destructive of the social state and the ends
for which it is ordained this controlling power were ever
vested or by whomsoever exercised is government. That was a list.
That was quite a list. Suspicion, jealousy, anger, revenge, insolence, fraud, cruelty.
If there were not somebody there to intercede outside of
the individuals who are experiencing this, what does the world
look like? Even if they don't and we look at
our government now, they don't. In many cases they don't.
They can't get there in time. But just people knowing
that they could be subject to an outside force that
doesn't care about their feelings, doesn't care who was right
or who was wrong is just going to look at
what the facts that are there, they how they're interpreting
the situation. It does restrain people, no matter how many
much people don't believe that people are restrained when they
think that they can actually be punished for something and
they can lose everything. It follows then that man is
so constituted that government is necessary to the existence of society,
and society to his existence and the perfection of his faculties.
It follows also that government has its origin in this
twofold constitution of his nature, the sympathetic or social feelings
constituting the remote and the individual or direct the prox cause.
If man had been differently constituted in either particular, if
instead of being social in his nature, he had been
created without sympathy for his kind and independent of others
for his safety and existence, or if, on the other hand,
he had been so created as to feel more intensely
what affected others than what affected himself, if that were possible,
or even had this supposed interest been equal, it is
manifest in either case there would have been no necessity
for government, and that none would have ever existed. But
although society and government are thus intimately connected with and
dependent on each other. Of the two, society is the greater.
It is first in the order of things and in
the dignity of its object, that of society being primary
to preserve and perfect our race, and that of government
secondary and subordinate to preserve and protect society. Both are, however,
necessary to the existence and well being of our race,
and equally of divine ordination. So what's he saying. He's
saying that if you, if you had no self interest,
if your self interests were on par with if your
feelings of self interest were on par with your feelings
of interest for your neighbor, government would have never needed
to exist. But since that's not true, since that doesn't
exist in anyone, no matter how much they want to
tell you they're a good person, and they care more
about their neighbor than they do about themselves, government is
necessary and divinely ordained. Sorry, Christian anarchists. I have said,
if it were possible for man to be so constituted
as to feel what affects others more strongly than what
affects or even as strongly, because it may be well
doubted whether the stronger feeling or affection of individuals for themselves,
combined with a feebler and subordinate feeling or affection for others,
is not, in beings of limited reason and faculties, a
constitution necessary to their preservation and existence. If reversed, if
their feelings and affections were stronger for others than for themselves,
or even as strong, the necessary result would seem to
be that all individuality would be lost and boundless and remediless.
Disorder and confusion would ensue for each at the same
moment intensely participating in all the conflicting emotions of those
around him, would of course forget himself and all that
concerned him immediately in his officious intermeddling with the affairs
of all others, which, from his limited reason and faculties
he could neither properly understand nor manage. Such a state
of things would, as far as we can see, leads
to endless disorder and confusion, not less destructive to our
race than a state of anarchy. He's saying that if
we had, if everyone had equal feelings and cared for
each other equally, we'd be in a worse state than
an anarchy, because it would be endless disorder endless confusion.
How would you be able to run your life if
somebody was constantly someone from the outside was constantly interrupting
and coming in and saying, no, no, I'm seeing I
can feel your pay I mean, it's insane. It's insane
when you think about it. When he puts it that way,
it's almost inarguable. It would besides be remediless, for government
would be impossible, or if it could, by possibility, as
its object would be reversed. They're saying, it would be
impossible to govern a people like that. Selfishness would have
to be encouraged and benevolence discouraged. Individuals would have to
be encouraged by rewards to become more selfish and deterred
by punishments from being too benevolent, and this too by
a government administered by those who, on the supposition, would
have the greatest aversion for selfishness and the highest admiration
for benevolence. To the infinite being, the creator of all,
belongs exclusively the care and superintendence of the whole. He
in his infinite wisdom and goodness, has allotted to every
class of animated beings its condition and appropriate functions and
has endowed each with feelings, instincts, capacities, and faculties best
a adapted to its allotted condition to man. He has
assigned the social and political state as best adapted to
develop the great capacities and faculties, great capacities and faculties
intellectual and moral, with which he has endowed him, and
has accordingly constituted him so not only to impel him
into the social state, but to make government necessary for
his preservation and well being. It's amazing to me that
at one time I would have thought that this was garbage,
that I would have argued against this. This isn't and
this isn't saying because this is where the whole straw
man comes in. It's like the straw man argument right
now as well, government doesn't do that. Not the point.
No one is saying that government does that. As a
matter of fact. Wait, wait, you think Calhoun's stupid. Stop.
But government, although intended to protect and preserve society, has
itself a strong tendency to disorder and abuse of its powers,
as all experience in almost every page of history testify.
The cause is to be found in the same constitution
of our nature which makes government indispensable. I remember people saying,
if man can't govern themselves, why if if man is
so terrible at governing themselves, why would they why would
you want them to govern others? What's what? Okay? If
man is so terrible at governing themselves, why would you
want no restraints, no restraints except the guns that you
can carry. I never understood that the whole, the whole idea,
that's somebody was going to be on their farm and
you know, a horde of people comes and they're going
to be up on the roof with they're three to
zero eight, just picking them all off. That's not how
that works. It just that's not how that would work.
It sounds like a great fantasy. And you know, I've
seen Walking Dead to I've seen Revolution those TV shows. Yeah,
it's not how it works. Get real people. The powers
which it is necessary for government to possess in order
to repress violence and preserve order cannot execute themselves. They
must be administered by men in whom, like others, the
individual are stronger than the social feelings, and hence the
powers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression on
the part of others will if left unguarded be by
them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community.
That by which this is prevented, by whatever name, by
whatever name called, is what is meant by constitution in
its most comprehensive sense, when applied to government, having its
origin in the same principle of our nature, constitution stands
to government as government stands to society, and as the
end for which society is ordained would be defeated without government,
So that for which government is ordained would in a
great measure be defeated without constitution. But they differ in
the striking particular. There is no difficulty in forming government.
It is not even a matter of choice whether there
shall be one or not. Like breathing, it is not
permitted to depend on our volition. Necessity will force it
on all communities in some one form or another. Very
different is the case as to constitution. Instead of a
matter of necessity, it is one of the most difficult
tasks imposts on man to form a constitution worthy of
the name, while to form a perfect one one that
would completely counteract the tendency of government to oppression and abuse,
and hold this strictly to the great ends for which
it is ordained has thus far exceeded human wisdom, and
possibly ever will From this. Another striking difference results. Constitution
is the contrivance of man, while government is of divine ordination.
Man is left to perfect what the wisdom of the
infinite ordained as necessary to preserve the race. No matter
where you go, no matter what you do, it's one
failure after another. It's our self interests. This is something
that this is something I would hear about free trade
when you would talk to any economist, like an Austrian economist,
they would say, well, you know, the reason will have
you know, in a in a free trade society or
an anarchist society, the reason we'll have all all of
these things is, you know, it's a matter of self interest.
The manufacturer of the business owner, they're self interested. So
they're going to create it and they're going to sell it.
You know, they won't just they won't just you know,
create it and use it just for themselves. Why wouldn't they?
I mean they could, Okay, and then what's going to happen.
They're gonna get raided, they're gonna get killed, and people
are going to steal the stuff is that sounds like
a violation of the nap It does. Maybe I'm wrong,
But for the same reason why Calhoun says we need
a government, they'll always be a government. Anarchists will say
that an anarchist society can can exist because of self interest.
What happens when that self interest gets pushed? What happens
when that? What happens? What happens if there's scarcity? Do
you think all of these rational human beings are going
to rely upon self interest? They're all going to come
together and figure it out that now we have a commune.
But oh, as long as it's done voluntarily. Right now,
you're going to have a commune that's going to come together.
It's a voluntary commune. No, no, where was I Okay,
let me just start over that paragraph with these remarks.
I proceeds to the consideration of the important and difficult
question is how is this tendency of government to be
counteracted or to express it more fully? How can those
who are invested with the power of government be prevented
from employing them as the means of a grandizing themselves
instead of using them to protect and preserve society. It
cannot be done by instituting a higher power to control
the government and those who administer it. That this would
be but to change the seat of authority, and to
make this higher power in reality the government with the
same tendency on the part of those who might control
its powers, to pervert them into instruments of aggrandizement. Nor
can it be done by limiting the powers of government
so as to make it too feeble to be made
an instrument of abuse, for passing by the difficulty of
so limiting its powers without creating a power higher than
the government itself to enforce the observance of the limitations,
it is a sufficient objection that it would, if practicable,
defeat the end for which government is ordained by making
it too feeble to protect and preserve society. The powers
necessary for this purpose will ever prove sufficient to aggrandize
them those who control it, at the expense of the
rest of the community. Immediately, if you've read Schmidt, you
think of his exceptions, exceptions need to be made. Somebody
has to be able to say, somebody has to be
able to make a decision that other people can't make.
Get into a state of exception. In estimating what amount
of power would be requisite to secure the objects of government.
We must take into the reckoning what would be necessary
to defend the community against external as well as internal dangers.
Government must be able to repel assaults from abroad, as
well as to repress violence and disorders within. It must
not be overlooked that the human race is now comprehended
in a single society or community. The limited reason and
faculties of men, the great diversity of language, customs, pursuits,
situation and complexion, and the difficulty of intercourse with various
other causes, have by their operation, formed a great many
separate communities, acting independently of each other. Between these, there
is the same tendency to conflict and from the same
constitution of our nature as between men individually, and even stronger,
because the sympathetic or social feelings are not so strong
between different communities as between individuals of the same community.
So powerful, indeed, is this tendency that it has led
to almost incessant wars between contiguous communities for plunder and
conquests or to avenge injuries, real or suppose it. So
long as the state of things continues, exigencies will occur
in which the entire powers resources as a community will
be needed to defend its existence. When this is at stake,
every other consideration must yield to it self. Preservation is
a supreme law as well with communities as individuals, and
hence the danger of withholding from government the full command
of the power and resources of the state, and the
great difficulty of limiting its powers consistently with the protection
and preservation of the community and the community. And hence
the question recurs by what means can government, without being
divested of the full command of the resources of the community,
be prevented from abusing its powers? Because that's what everyone reading,
everyone who was listening to this or reading along with me,
is thinking. It's like sure, but then they're just going
to start wars because you have special interests, you have
the military industrial complex, you have this, you have that.
He's not stupid. The question involves difficulties which from the
earliest ages, wise and good men have attempted to overcome,
but hitherto with but partial success. For this purpose, many
devices have been resorted to suited to the various stages
of intelligence and civilization through which our race has passed,
and to the different forms of government to which they
have been applied. The aid of superstition, ceremonies, education, religion,
organic arrangements, both of the government and the community, has
been from time to time appealed to. Some of the
most remarkable of these devices, whether regarded in reference to
their wisdom and the skill displayed in their application, or
to the permanency of their effects, are to be found
in the early dawn of civilization in the institutions of
the Egyptians, the Hindus, the Chinese, and the Jews. The
only materials which that early age afforded for the construction
of constitutions, when intelligence was so partially diffused or applied
with consummate wisdom and skill to their successful application may
be fairly traced to subsequent advance of our race and
civilization and intelligence of which we now enjoy the benefits.
For without a constitution, something to counteract the strong tendency
of government to disorder and abuse, and to give stability
to political institutions, there can be little progress or permanent
improvement in answering the important question under consideration. It is
not necessary to enter into an examination of the variance
contrivances adopted by these celebrated governments to counteract this tendency
to disorder and abuse, nor to undertake to treat of
constitution in its most comprehensive sense, what I propose is
far more limited to explain on what principles government must
be formed in order to resist by its own interior structure,
or to use a singular term, organism, the tendency to
abuse of power. This structure or organism is what is
meant by constitution in its strict and more usual sense,
and it is this which distinguishes what are called constitutional
governments from absolute It is in this strict and more
usual sense that I propose to use the term hereafter.
How government then must be constructed in order to counteract
through its organism this tendency on the part of those
who make and execute the laws to oppress those subject
to their operation is the next question which claims attention.
There is but one way in which this can possibly
be done, and that is by such an organism as
will furnish the rule with the means of resisting successfully.
This tendency on the part of the rulers to oppression
and abuse. No where he's going. Power can only be
resisted by power and tendency. By tendency, those who exercise
power and those subject to its exercises, the rulers and
the ruld stand in antagonistic relations to each other. The
same constitution of our nature which leads rulers to oppressed
a ruled, regardless of the object for which government is ordained,
will with equal strength lead the rule to resist, when
possessed of the means of making peaceable and effective resistance.
Such an organism, then as will furnish the means by
which resistance may be systematically and peacefully peaceably made on
the part of the ruled. To oppression and abuse of
part on the part of the rulers is the first
and indispensable step toward forming a constitutional government, and as
this can only be affected by or through the right
of suffrage, the right of the people on the part
of the rule, to choose the rulers at proper intervals
and to hold them thereby responsible for their conduct. The
responsibility of the rulers to the ruled through the r
of suffrage is the indispensable and primary principle of the
foundation of a constitutional government. When this right is properly
guarded and the people sufficiently enlightened to understand their own
rights and the interests of the community, and duly to
appreciate the motives and conducts so those appointed to make
and execute the laws. It is all sufficient to give
to those who elect effective control over those they have elected. Again,
somebody can just stop and say, well, I mean, look
at the elections we have nowa YadA, nobody the last
election was stolen, this and that. Yeah, well he also,
what else is he saying here? I mean that just
goes without saying elections have been stolen since a dyna mankind,
all right, but what else is he saying here? He's
saying that it's the people who are voting have to
be sufficiently in laws, understand their own rights and the
interests of the community. They have to be intelligent, and
they have to have skin in the game. I call
the right of suffrage the indispensable and primary principle. For
it would be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose,
as many do, that it is of itself sufficient to
form constitutional governments. To this erroneous opinion may be traced
one of the causes why so few attempts to form
constitutional governments have succeeded and why of the few, which
have so small a number have had durable existence? It
has excuse me, it has led not only to mistakes
in the attempts to form such governments, but to their
overthrow when they have, by some good fortune, been correctly formed.
I wonder what he's thinking of. So far from being
of its self sufficient, however well guarded it might be,
and however enlighten the people it would unaided by other provisions,
leave the government as absolute as it would be in
the hands of irresponsible rulers, and with a tendency at
least as strong toward oppression and abuse of its powers.
As I shall next proceed to explain, the right of
suffrage itself can do no more than give complete control
to those who elect over the conduct of those they
have elected. In doing this, it accomplishes all it possibly
can accomplish. This is its aim, and when this is attained,
its end is fulfilled. It can do no more. However
enlightened it can do no more, however enlightened the people,
or however widely extended or well guarded the right may be.
This might may be the sum total, then, of its effects.
When most successful is to make those elected the true
and faithful representative of those who elected them, instead of
irresponsible rulers, as they would be without it. And thus,
by converting it into an agency and the rulers into agents,
to divest government of all claims to sovereignty and to
remain it unimpaired to the community. But it is manifest
that the right of suffrage in making these changes transfers,
in reality the actual control over the government from those
who make and execute the laws to the body of
the government, and thereby places the powers of the government
as fully in the mass of the community as they
would be if they in fact had assembled, made and
executed the laws themselves, without the intervention of representatives or agents.
The more perfectly it does this, the more perfectly it
accomplishes its ends. But in doing so it only changes
the seat of authority without counteracting in the least the
tendency of the government to oppression and abuse of its power.
All Right, I would love for a John C. Calhoun
to be resurrected today and see if he still agrees
with us, because at the time that's what this it
looked like. Yeah, if he would have compared what happened
in France, you know with the French Revolution, would he yeah,
I mean, would he say that giving the people that
you could trust the people with a vote? I mean,
he hear. What he's saying is you can only trust
a certain amount of people with a vote. But we
know it's gotten to the point where that's never going
to happen again. It's never going to It's either going
to be everyone votes or no one votes. And I'm
pretty sure I'm not going to speak for mister Calhoun.
I will speak for myself as someone who grew up
in the civic religion and voting mattered, and voting was everything.
What I will say is that, yeah, I don't believe
I would rather have a CEO. I would rather have
somebody who the possibility that they could become tyrannical in themselves.
Then the tyranny of two point one million and that's
how many I think, that's how many members there are
of the executive, which is not even the executive anymore.
Let's just call it the menagerial. Yeah, this sounds great,
and it probably looked great when it probably worked out
pretty well early on when the country was homogeneous, when men,
when only men and landowners could vote, but now anyone
can vote, and people who just stepped over the border
can vote. I mean they give people say, oh that
doesn't that doesn't happen. You're forced, like to get a
driver's license in in California, you're I think you're forced
to register to vote, no matter if you're legal or not.
So I mean, I know it doesn't really mean anything
in California because I mean Democrats is gonna win California anyway.
It's California. If California goes red, and it'd be weird.
But yeah, I mean, at this point, we've seen what
voting does. Maybe if you had a a country that
was homogeneous, maybe El Salvador's elections look pretty good and
Russia seems to be pretty happy with Putin. Well, you know,
maybe in a homogeneous society it works. We don't have
that here. We need someone who we need somebody who
makes the decisions basically declares the exception. Right now, we
have a couple million people who do that, and look
at what we have onward. If the whole community had
the same interests, so that the interests of each and
every portion would be affected by the action of the government,
that the laws which oppressed or impoverished one portion would
necessarily oppress and impoverish all others, or the reverse. Then
the right of suffrage of itself would be all sufficient
to counteract the tendency of the government to oppression and
abuse of its powers, and of course would form of
itself a perfect constitutional government, the interest of all being
the same. By supposition, as far as the action of
the government was concerned, all would have like interests as
to what laws should be made and how they should
be executed. All strife and struggle would cease as to
who would be should be elected to make and execute them.
The only question would be who was most fit, who
the wisest and most capable of understanding, and then the
common interests of the whole this decided. The election would
pass off quietly and without party discord, as no one
portion could advance its own peculiar interests without regard to
the rest by electing a favorite candidate. But such is
not the case. But on the contrary, nothing is more
difficult than to equalize the action of the government in
reference to the various and diversified interests of the community,
and nothing more easy than to pervert its power into
instruments to aggrandize and enrich one or more interests by
oppressing and impoverishing the others. And this too under the
operation of laws couched in general terms, and which on
their face appear fair, and which on their face appear
fair and equal. Nor is this the case in some
particular communities only. It is so in all the small
and the great, the poor and the rich, irrespective of pursuits, puductions,
or degrees of civilization. With however, this difference that the
more extensive and populistic country, the more diversified the condition
and pursuits of its population, and the richer, more luxurious
and dissimilar to people, the more difficult it is to
equalize the action of the government, and the more easy
for one portion of the community to pervert its power
to oppress and plunder the other. That you didn't think
that I was going to be used in this to
make an argument for monoculture, to do you. Such being
the case, it necessarily results that the right of suffrage,
by placing the control of the government in the community, must,
from the same constitution of our nature which makes government
necessary to preserve society, lead to conflict among its different interests.
Each striving to obtain possession of its powers as the
means of protect itself against the other, or of advancing
its respective interests, regardless of the interests of others. For
this purpose, a struggle will take place between the various
interests to obtain a majority in order to control the government.
If one interested, if no one interested be strong enough
of itself to obtain it, a combination will be formed
between those whose interests are most alike, each conceding something
to the others, until a sufficient number is obtained to
make a majority. The process may be slow, and much
time may be required before a compact organized majority can
be thus formed. But formed it will be in time,
even without preconcert or design, by the sure workings of
that principle or its constitution of our nature in which
the government itself originates. When once formed, the community will
be divided into two great parties, a major and minor,
between which there were will be incessant struggles on the
one side to retain and on the other to on
the one side to retain and on the other to
obtain the majority and thereby the control of the government
and the advantages it confers. I guess the only thing
I have here is he said, the process can be
slow organized majority thus formed, but formed it will be
in time, even without preconcert or design. I would say
there's always preconcerted design, because I believe that there's always elites.
That you may get that majority, but it's only going
to be a very very small minority that's even running
that quote unquote majority. So deeply seated, indeed, is this
tendency to conflict between the different interests or portions of
the community, that it would result from the action of
the government itself. Even though it were possible to find
a community where the people were all of the same pursuits,
placed in the same condition of life, and in every
respect so situated as to be without inequality of condition
or diversity of interests. The advantages of possessing the control
of the powers of the government, and thereby of its
honors and emoluments, are of themselves, exclusive of all other considerations,
ample to divide even such a community into the two
great hostile parties, saying, even people with tons of things
in common with everything in common, can be split apart
in such a way in order to form a just
estimate of the full force of these advantages without reference
to any other consideration, It must be remembered that government
to fulfill it must be remember that government, to fulfill
the ends for which it is ordained, and more especially
that of protection against external dangers, must, in the present
condition of the world, be clothed with power or sufficient
to call forth the resources of the community, and be
prepared at all times to command them promptly in every
emergency which may possibly arise. For this purpose, large establishments
are necessary, both civil and military, including naval wear from
situation that description of force may be required, with all
the means necessary for prompt and effective action, such as fortifications, fleets, armories, arsenals, magazines,
arms of all descriptions, with well trained forces in sufficient
numbers to wield them with skill and energy whenever the
occasion requires it. The administration and management of a government
with such vast establishments must necessarily require a host of employees, agents,
and officers, of whom many must be vested with high
and responsible trusts, and occupy exalted stations, accompanied with much
influence and patronage. To meet the necessary expenses, law large
sums must be collected and dispersed, and for this purpose
heavy taxes must be imposed, requiring a multitude of officers
for their collection and disbursement. The whole United must necessarily
place under the control of government an amount of honors
and emoluments sufficient to excite profoundly the ambition of the
aspiring and the cupidity of the of our avaricious, and
to lead to the formation of hostile parties and violent
party conflicts and struggles to obtain the control of the government.
And what makes us evil remediless through the right of
suffrage of itself, however modified or carefully guarded, or however
enlightened the people the people is the fact that, as
far as the honors and emoluments of the government and
its fiscal actions are concerned, it is impossible to equalize it.
The reason is obvious. Its honors and emoluments, however great,
can fall to the lot of but a few, compared
to the entire number of the community and the multitude
who will seek to participate in them. But without this
there is a reason which renders it impossible to equalize
the action of the government so far as its fiscal
operation extends, which I shall next explain, few comparatively as
they are the agents and employees of the governments constitute
that portion of the community who are exclusive recipients of
the proceeds of the taxes. Whatever amount is taken from
the community in the form of taxes, if not lost,
goes to them in the shape of expenditures or disbursements.
The two disbursements, into disbursement and taxation, constitute the fiscal
action of the government. They are correlatives. What the one
takes from the community under the name of taxes is
transferred to the portion of the community by who are
the recipients under that of disbursements. But as the recipients
constitute only portion of the community, it follows, taking the
two parts of the fiscal process together, that its action
must be unequal between the payers of the taxes and
the recipients of their proceeds. Nor can it be otherwise
unless what is collected from each individual in the shape
of taxes shall be returned to him in that of disbursements,
which would make the process nugatory and absurd. Taxation may
indeed be made equal, regarded separately from disbursement. Even this
is no easy task, But the two united cannot possibly
meet made equal. Such being the case, it must necessarily
follow that some one portion of the community must pay
in taxes more than it receives back in dispersements, while
another receives in dispersements more than it pays in taxes.
It is then, I remember one time we used to
just try to trigger government employees by telling them that
they didn't pay taxes. Oh no, I pay taxes every
April fifteenth. No you don't, you know, they're just taking
they're taking back the taxes that were taken from someone else.
Oh no, but I do this, Okay, sure, sure, all right,
whatever you say. It is then manifest taking the whole
process together, the taxes must be, in effect bounties to
the portion of the community which receives more in dispersements
than it pays in taxes, while to the other which
pays in taxes more than it receives in disbursements, they
are taxes in reality burthens instead of bound burthens instead
of bounties. This consequence is unavoidable. It results from the
nature of the process. Be the taxes ever so equally
laid and the dispersements ever so fairly made in reference
to the public service. It is assumed, in coming to
this conclusion, that the disbursements are made within the community.
The reasons assigned would be applicable if the proceeds of
the taxes were paid in tribute or expended in foreign countries.
In either of these cases, the burthen would fall on
all in proportion to the amount of taxes they respectively paid.
Nor would it be less a bounty to the portion
of the community which receives back in disbursements more than
it paid in taxes, because receive the salaries for official services,
or payments to persons employed in executing the works required
by the government, or furnishing it with its various supplies,
or any other description of public employment, instead of being
bestowed gratuitously. It is the disbursements which give additional and
usually very profitable and honorable employments to the portion of
the community where they are made. But to create such
employments by disbursements is to bestow on the portion of
the community to whose the lot disbursements may fall a
far more durable and lasting benefit, one that would add
much more to its wealth and population than would be
the bestole of an equal sum gratuitously. And hence, to
the extent that the disbursements succeed the taxes, it may
be fairly regarded as a bounty. The very reverse is
the case in reference to the portion which pays in
taxes more than it receives in disbursements. With them, profitable
employments are diminished to the same extent, and population and
wealth correspondingly decreased. The necessary result, then, of the unequal
fiscal action of the government, is to divide the community
into two great classes, one consisting of those who in
reality pay the taxes and of course bear exclusively the
burden of supporting the government, and the other of those
who are recipients of their proceeds through disbursements and who
are in fact supported by the government, or in fewer words,
to divide it into taxpayers and tax consumers. But the
effect of this is to place them in antagonistic relations
in reference to the fiscal action of the the government
and the entire course of policy therewith connected connected. For
the greater the taxes and disbursements, the greater the gain
of the one and the loss of the other, and
vice versa. And consequently, the more the policy of the
government is calculated to increase taxes and disbursements, the more
it will be favored by the one and opposed by
the other. The effect, then, of every increase is to
enrich and strengthen the one, and impoverish and weaken the other. This, indeed,
may be carried to such an extent that one class
or portion of the community may be elevated to wealth
and power, and the other depressed to abject poverty and dependence,
simply by the fiscal action of the government, and this
too through disbursements only, even under a system of equal
taxes imposed for revenue only. If such may be the
effect of taxes and disbursements when confined to their legitimate objects,
that of raising revenues for the public service, some conception
may be formed how one portion of the community may
be crushed and another elevated on its ruins, by systematically
perverting the power of taxation and disbursement for the purpose
of aggrandizing and building up one portion of the community
at the expense of the other. That it will be
so used unless prevented, is from the constitution of man,
just as certain as that it can be so used,
and that, if not prevented, it must give rise to
two parties, and to violent conflicts and struggles between them.
To obtain. The control of the government is for the
same reason not less certain, nor is it less certain
from the operation of all these causes, that the dominant
majority for the time would have the same tendency to
oppression and abuse of power, which, without the right of suffrage,
irresponsible rulers would have no reason, indeed, can be assigned
why the latter would abuse their power, which would not
apply with equal force to the former. The dominant majority
for the time would, in reality, through the right of suffrage,
be the rulers the controlling, governing and irresponsible power, and
those who make and execute the laws would be for
the time be in reality but their representatives and agents.
Nor would the fact that the former would constitute a
majority of the community counteract a tendency originating in the
constitution of man, and which as such cannot depend on
the number by whom the powers of the government may
be wielded. Be it greater or smaller a majority or minority,
it must equally partake of an attribute inherent in each
individual composing it, and as in each of the individual
is stronger than the social feelings, the one would have
the same tendency as the other to oppression and abuse
of power. The reason applies to government in all its forms,
whether it be that of the one, the few, or
the many. In each there must of necessity be a
governing and governed a and a subject portion. The one
implies the other, and in all the two bear the
same relations to each other, and have, on the part
of the governing portion, the same tendency to oppression and
abuse of power. Where the majority is that portion, it
matters not how its powers may be exercised, whether directly
by themselves or indirectly through representatives or agents. Be it
which it may. The minority, for the time will be
as much the governed or subjected portion as are the
subject in an aristocracy or the subjects in a monarchy.
The only difference in this respect is that in the
government of a majority, the majority may become the majority.
In the government of a majority, the minority may become
a majority, and the majority the minority through the right
of suffrage, and thereby change their relative positions within the
interference without the interference of force or revolution. But the
duration or uncertainty of the tenure by which power is
held cannot of itself counteract to tendency inherence. The government
to oppression and abuse of power. On the contrary, the
very uncertainty of the tenure, combined with a violent party
warfare which must ever proceed a change of parties under
such governments, would rather tend to increase than diminish the
tendency to oppression. And I'm going to stop right there.
That's what's wild about this. That's what's wild about Calhoun
on this disquisition. He gives you the reason why government
needs to exist, and then it gives you all the
reasons why it doesn't work. It's truly amazing, and it
made me. This is one of those things that made
me come to a conclusion that yes, we need a government,
but do we need one like this. He's basically spelling
out why this can't work. And the question is what
comes to well, what kind of government do you want?
So if you want something where it's like this, it's
like this, this is what you're gonna get. If you
want something like monarchy where there's just one person in
charge CEO, yeah, basically the a king like type of administrator,
you're gonna have your your own problems too. But what
he's showing is that this is just it's a cluster necessity,
but what makes it a necessity is why it doesn't work.
And then you have people who say, well, then we
should just get rid of them altogether, not understanding that
what makes it, what makes a government necessary, would would
make insane chaos with that one. So that's it. Now.
I know that most people are going to listen to
this one or read the read along with this one,
watch a video, and you know that's when the drop
off happens. Episode two will have less people tuning in,
and then three and on down the line it goes
and everything. Try to tune in for episode two. Okay,
unless you just didn't get through to the end of this,
But if you got through to the end of this,
come for episode two, because we're gonna there's going to
be more of this and it's just gonna it's fascinating
the road he takes us down in this, and we
got through a lot of it today, So yeah, I
got through a lot. Actually, there are, as I mentioned
at the end of when I did zero to one,
there are going to be ads in here. If you
want to avoid the ads, you can go to Freeman
Beyond the Wall dot com, forward slash Support support me
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And I'm basically putting out like six episodes a week
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I put out one every day, and people may say
that's just too much. I can't keep up and everything,
but you know, some people are going to be more
attracted to one thing and some people can be attracted
to others. So I'm trying to hit a couple different
audiences with the things that I'm doing, especially with the
readings and the livestream kind of stuff heearing on other
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I have a guest. So yeah, think about supporting the
show and come back for episode two of John C.
Calhoun's Disposition on Government. Thank you. I want to welcome
everyone back to part two of John C. Calhoun's Disposition
on Government. We ended yesterday talking about how he saw
suffrage as the one thing that could push back tyranny
of government, and then, as he's explained, with everything that
he sees as a necessity for government, he starts talking
about the problems with suffrage, the problems with universal suffrage,
the problems with suffrage in general. And we're going to
continue talking a little bit about that. And I hope
you stick around for this one, because, like I said,
this whole thing is great, and people have a tendency
to drop out after the first episode. And I don't
know why that is once I listen to something. I mean,
I don't know, but yeah, so let's check this out here,
all right, picking up where we left off from yesterday.
As then, the right of suffrage without some other provision
cannot counteract this tendency of government. The next question for
consideration is what is that other provision? This demands the
most serious consideration for of all the questions embraced in
the science of government, it involves a principle, the most
important and the least understood, and when understood, the most
difficult of application and practice. It is indeed, emphatically that
principle which makes the Constitution in its strict and limited sense.
From what has been said, it is manifest that this
provision must be of a character calculated to prevent any
one interest or combination of interests, from using the powers
of government to aggrandize itself at the expense of the others.
Here lies to evil, and just in proportion as it
shall prevent or fail to prevent it, in the same
degree it will affect or fail to affect, the end
intended to be accomplished. There is but one certain mode
in which this result can be secured, and that is
by the adoption of some restriction or life limitation, which
shall be so effectually, which shall so effectually prevent any
one interest or combination of interests, from obtaining the exclusive
control of the government as to render hopeless all attempts
directed to that end. There is again but one mode
in which this can be affected, and that is by
taking the sense of each interest or portion of the community,
which may be unequally and injuriously affected by the action
of the government separately through its own majority, or in
some other way by which its voice may be fairly expressed,
and to require the consent of each interest, either to
put or to keep the government in action. This too,
can be applied only in one way, and that is
by such an organism of the government, and if necessary
for the purpose of the community, also as will, by
dividing and distributing the powers of government to each division
or interest through its appropriate organ either a concurrent voice
in making an executing laws, or a veto on their execution.
It is only by such an organism that the ascent
of each can be made necessary to put the government
in motion, or the power made effectual to arrest its
action when put in motion. And it is only by
the one or the other that the different interests, orders, classes,
or portions into which the community may be divided can
be protected, and all conflict and struggle between them prevented
by rendering it impossible to put or to keep it
in action without the concurrent consent of all. Such an
organism as this, combined with the right of suffrage, constitutes,
in fact the elements of constitutional government. The one, by
rendering those who make and execute the laws responsible to
those on whom they operate, prevents the rulers from oppressing
the rule, and the other, by making it impossible for
any one interest or combination of interests, or class or
order or portion of the community to obtain exclusive control,
prevents any one of them from oppressing the other. It
is it is clear that oppression and abuse of power
must come if at all from the one or the
other quarter from no other can they come. It follows
that the two suffrage and proper organism combined are sufficient
to counteract the tendency of government to oppression and abusive power,
and to restrict to it the fulfillment of the great
ends for which it is ordained. I'm gonna keep going.
In coming to this conclusion, I have assumed the organism
to be perfect, and the different interests, portions, or classes
of the community to be sufficiently enlightened to understand its
character an object, and to exercise with due diligence the
right of suffrage to the extent that either may be defective.
To the same extent, the government would fall short of
fulfilling its ends. But this does not impeach the truth
of the principles on which it rests. Very theory cell
here in reducing them to proper form in applying them
to practically uses. All elementary principles are liable to difficulties,
but they are not on this account the less true
or valuable. Where the organism is perfect, every interest will
be truly and fully represented, and of course the whole
community must be so. It may be difficult or even
impossible to make a perfect organism. But although this be true,
yet even when instead of the sense of each and
of all, it takes that of a few great and
prominent interests only, it would still in a great measure,
if not altogether, fulfill the end intended by a constitution.
For in such case, it would require so large a
portion of the community compared with the whole, to concur
or acquiesce in the act of the government, that the
number to be plundered would be too few, and the
number to be aggrandized too many to afford adequate motives
to oppression and the abuse of its powers. Indeed, however
imperfect the organism, it must have more or less effect
in diminishing such tendency. And what's the problem with that conspiracy?
People coming together, people of like interest coming together, and
as he has talked about previously, getting their way taking over,
becoming the majority, And how do they keep their power.
They have to keep being the majority, and they have
to squash the minority. And his point is, well, the
minority can become the majority. But when you really look
at this, we're not talking about like groups of people
from the community, you know, just every people like you
and me. What we're talking about is elites that do this.
It's the elites who make constitutional government impossible. Because once
you have elites, and once you have their money, and
once you have people who are self interested, who are
in power and are taking that money, well, very quickly,
this check on powers starts to melts away. So take
a sip. It may be readily inferred from what has
been stated that the effect of organism is neither to
supersede nor diminish the importance of the right of suffrage,
but to aid and perfect it. The object of the
latter is to collect the sense of the community. The
more fully and perfectly it accomplishes this, the more fully
and perfectly it fulfills its ends. But the most it
can do of itself is to collect the sense of
the greater number, that is, of the stronger interests or
combination of interests, and to assume this to be the
sense of the community. It is only when aided by
a proper organism, that it can collect the sense of
the entire community, of each and all its interests, of
each through its appropriate organ and of the whole, through
all of them united. This would truly be the sense
of the entire community. For whatever diversity each interest might
have within itself, as all would have the same interest
in reference to the action of the government, the individuals
composing each would be fully and truly represented by its
own majority or appropriate organ regarded in the reference to
the other interests. In brief, every individual of every interest
might trust with confidence its majority or appropriate organ against
that of every other interests. It results from what has
been said that there are two different modes in which
the sense of the community may be taken, one simply
by the right of suffrage unaided, the other by the
right through a proper organism. Each collects the sense of
the majority, but one regards numbers only, and considers the
community as a unit, having but one common interest throughout,
and collects the sense of the greater number of the
whole as that of the community. The other, on the contrary,
regards interests as well as numbers, considering the community as
made up of different and conflicting interests as far as
the action of the government is concerned, and takes the
sense of each through its majority or appropriate organ and
the united sense of all as the sense of the
entire community. The former of these I shall call them
a numerical an absolute majority, and the latter the concurrent
or constitutional majority. I call it the constitutional majority because
it is an essential element in every constitutional government, be
its form. What it may so great is the difference
politically speaking between the two majorities that they cannot be
co founded without leading to great and fatal errors. And
yet the distinction between them has been so entirely overlooked
that when the term majority is used in political discussions,
it is applied exclusively to designate the numeracle, as if
there were no other. Until this distinction is recognized and
better understood, there will continue to be great liability to
error in properly constructing constitutional governments, especially the popular form,
and of preserving them when properly constructed. Until then, the
latter will have a strong tendency to slide first into
government of the numerical majority, and finally into absolute government
of some other form. To show that such must be
the case, and at the same time to mark more
strongly the difference between the two, in order to guard
against the danger of overlooking it, I propose to consider
the subject more at length. This is getting good. The
first and leading era, which naturally arises from overlooking the
distinction referred to is to confound the numerical majority with
the people, and this is so completely as to regard
them as identical. This is a consequence that necessarily results
from considering the numerical as the only majority. All admit
that a popular government or democracy is the government of
the people. For the terms imply this. A perfect government
of the kind would be one which would embrace the
consent of every citizen or member of the community. But
as this is impracticable impracticable in the opinion of those
who regard the nu miracle as the only majority, and
who can perceive no other way by which the sense
of the people can be taken, they are compelled to
adopt this as the only true basis of popular government,
in contradistinction to governments of the aristocratical or monarchical form.
Being thus constrained, they are in the next place, forced
to regard the numerical majority as as in effect the
entire people, that is, the greater part of the whole,
and the government of the greater part as the government
of the whole. It is thus the two come to
be confounded, and a part made identical with the whole,
and It is thus also that all the rights, powers,
and immunities of the whole people come to be attributed
to the numerical majority, and, among others, the supreme sovereign
authority of establishing and abolishing governments at pleasure. This radical error,
the consequence of confounding the two and of regarding the
numerical as the only majority, has contributed more than any
other cause, to prevent the formation of popular constitutional governments,
and to destroy them even when they have been formed.
It leads to the conclusion that in their formation and establishment,
nothing more is necessary than the right of suffrage and
the allotment to each division of the community a representation
in the government in proportion to no If the numerical
majority were really the people, and if to take its
sense truly, or to take the sense of the people truly,
a government so constituted would be a true and perfect
model of a popular constitutional government, and every departure from
it would detract from its excellence. But as such is
not the case, as the numerical majority, instead of being
the people, is only a portion of them. Such a government,
instead of being a true and perfect model of the
people's government, that is, a people self governed is but
the government of over a part, the major over the
minor portion. But this misconception of the true elements of
constitutional government does not stop here. It leads to other
equally false and fatal in reference to the best means
of preserving and perpetuating them, when for some fortunate combination
of circumstances they are correctly formed. For they who fall
into these errors regards are the restrictions which organisms impose
on the will of the numerical majority as restrictions on
the will of the people, and therefore as not only useless,
but wrongful and mischievous, And hence they endeavor to destroy
organism under the delusive hope of making government more democratic.
Such are some of the consequences of confounding the two
and of regarding the numerical as the only majority. And
in this may find, and in this may be found
the reason why so few popular governments have been properly constructed,
and why of these view so small a number have
proved durable. Such must continue to be the result so
long as these errors continue to be prevalent. There is
another error of a kindred character, whose influence contributes much
to the same results. I prefer to the prevalent opinion
that a written constitution containing suitable restrictions on the powers
of government is to efficient of itself without the aid
of any organism, except such as is necessary to separate
at several departments and render them independent of each other
to counteract the tendency of the numerical majority to oppression
and the abuse of power. You can see that Calhoun
is not a fan of democracy at all. He is
not a fan of fifty point one rule over the other.
So I assumed that everyone who's been listening to this
knows basically what he thought what this organism is. A
written constitution has many and considerable advantages. But it is
a great mistake to suppose that the mere insertion of
provisions to restrict and limit the powers of the government,
without investing those whose protection they are inserted, with the
means of enforcing their observance, will be sufficient to prevent
the major and dominant party from abusing its powers. Being
the party in possession of the government, they will, from
the same constitution of man, which makes government necessary to
protect society, be in favor of the powers granted by
the constitution, and opposed to the restrictions intended to limit them.
As the major and dominant party, they will have no
need of these restrictions for their protection. The ballot box
of itself would be ample protection to them, needing no other.
They would come in time to regard these limitations as
unnecessary in improper restraints, and endeavor to elude them, with
a view of increasing their power and influence you getting it.
The minor or weaker party, on the contrary, would take
the opposite direction and regard them as essential to their
protection against the dominant party. They'd be waiving constitution pocket
sized constitutions everywhere, be saying what about my rights? Look
at haven't you read the constitution? What does a party
in power think? Well, if it's a Republicans, they're like, yeah,
we care about your rights. Go ahead, start chopping body
parts off of your kids. Sure, that's your right. They're
four years old, it's your child. Do what you want.
But what about And hence they would endeavor to defend
and enlarge the restrictions and to limit and contract the powers.
But where there are no means by which they could
compel the major party to observe the restrictions, the only
resort left would be a strict construction of the constitution,
that is, a construction which would confine these powers to
the narrowest limits which the meaning of the words used
in the grant would admit. To This, the major party
would oppose a liberal construction. One would oppose a liberal construction,
one which would give to the words of the grant
the broadest meaning of which they were susceptible. It would
then be construction against construction, the one to contract and
the other to enlarge the parties of the governments of
the utmost. But of what possible avail could the strict
construction of the minor party be against the liberal interpretation
of the major When the one would have all the
powers of the government to carry its construction into effect,
and the other be deprived of all means of enforcing
its construction. In a contest so unequal, the result would
be would not be doubtful. The party in favor of
the restrictions would be overpowered. At first. They might command
some respect and do something to stay the march of encroachment,
but they would in the progress of the contest be
regarded as mere abstractionists, and indeed deservedly if they should
indulge the folly of supposing that the party in possession
of the ballot box and the physical force of the
country could be successfully resisted by an appeal to reason, truth, justice,
or the obligations imposed by the Constitution. For when these
of themselves shall exert sufficient influences stay the hand of power,
then government will no longer be will be no longer
necessary to protect society, nor constitutions needed to prevent government
from abusing its powers. Ah, that sounds familiar, right, Like
if you have a society that already doesn't steal stuff,
it doesn't hurt people and doesn't take their stuff, do
you really need a constitution? Now? You want a society
where as soon as you start writing stuff down, you're
pretty much screwed, because, as I say, lawyer can step
in and make it mean anything, especially if you're not
the party in power anymore. The end of the contests
would be the subversion of the Constitution, either by the
undermining process of construction where its meaning would admit of
possible doubt, or by substituting in practice what is called
party usage in place of its provisions, or finally, when
no other contrivance would subserve the purpose by openly and
boldly setting them aside. By the one or the other,
the restrictions would ultimately be annulled, and the government be
converted into one of unlimited powers. Have we seen that?
Nor would the division of government into separate or and
as in regards as it regards each other, independent departments,
prevent this result. Such a division may do much to
facilitate its operations and to secure its administration greater caution
and deliberation. But as each in all the departments, and
of course the entire government would be under the control
the numerical majority, it is too clear to require explanation
that a mere distribution of its powers again among its
agents or representatives, could do little or nothing to counteract
its tendency to oppression and abuse of power. To effect this,
it would be necessary to go one step further and
make the several departments the organs of the distinct interests
of portions of the community, and to clothe each with
a negative on the others. But the effect of this
would be to change the government from numerical into the
concurrent majority. Having now explained the reasons why it is
so difficult to form and preserve popular constitutional government, so
long as the distinction between the two majorities is overlooked,
and the opinion prevails that a written constitution with suitable
restrictions and a proper division of its powers is sufficient
to counteract the tendency of the numerical majority to the
abuse of its power. I shall next proceed to explain
more full while the concurrent majority is an indispensable element
in forming constitutional governments, and why the numerical majority of
itself must in all cases make governments absolute. You think
he's going to talk himself out of concurrent majority. The
necessary consequence of taking the sense of the community by
the concurrent majority is, as has been explained, to give
to each interest or portion of the community a negative
on the others. It is this mutual negative among its
various conflicting interests, which invests each with the power of
protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each
where only they can be securely placed under its own guardianship.
Without this, there can be no system, no systematic, peaceful
or effective resistance to the natural tendency of each to
come into conflict with the others, And without this there
can be no constitution. It is this negative power, the
power of preventing or arresting the actions of the action
of the government. Be it called by that, by what
term it may veto, interposition, nullification, check, or balance of power?
What in fact forms the constitution? They are all but
different names for the negative power, in all its forms
and under all its names, it results from the concurrent majority.
Without this, there can be no negative, and without a negative,
no constitution. The assertion is true in reference to all
constitutional governments, be their forms what they may. It is,
indeed the negative power which makes the constitution and the
positive which makes the government. The one is the power
of acting, the other is the power of preventing or
arresting acts. The two combined make constitutional governments. Now, where's
the problem with this? Basically what he's talking about, he's
talking about federalism, and he's talking about what we saw
some governors do during COVID, you know, just basically saying
this isn't constitutional, We're not going to do it. Well,
what's the problem with that? In the modern age, in
the way things are set up now. I think the
main problem is the fact that so many states and
so many localities take federal money that they become reliant
upon it, and now they can't stand up and say no.
There's so much graft, there's so much there's so many contracts,
there's so all of these things. If the states just
concentrated on creating their own economies, their own to the
point where they could seceed and they could survive, then
you can have something like that. But people are people
in special interests, which is why you need somebody to
step up and say no. And it's got to be
one person. I know. I keep saying that. But as
he argues for this and then argues against it, and
you see that this is the government that was started
in this country, and you see how in this document
how we got to where we are. There has to
be something. There has to be a better alternative. What
is the alternative? Maybe I'll read that next. What I
think the alternative should be, I don't know. But as
there can be no constitution without the negative power, and
no negative power without the concurrent majority, it follows necessarily
that where the numerical majority has the sole control of
the government, there can be no constitution. As constitution implies
limitation or restriction, and of course is inconsistent with the
idea of sole or exclusive power, and hence the numerical
unmixed with the concurrent majority necessarily forms in all cases
absolute government. It is indeed the single or one power
which excludes the negative and constitutes absolute government, and not
the number in whom the power is vested. The numerical
majority is as truly a single power and excludes the
negative as completely as the absolute government of one or
of the few. The former is as much the absolute
government of the democratic or popular form as the latter
of the monarchical or aristocratical form. It has, accordingly in
common with them, the same tendency to oppression and abuse
of power. Like I said, I think I said last time,
he's basically crapping all over monarchy and aristocracy here. And
I'd like to see if he could come forward to
where we are now. And I mean, he's a man
of his time. He wasn't alive during the Constitution, during
the Revolution, but he was born shortly after. He was
brought up in the early eighteen hundreds. It's still fresh
in everyone's mind. You have the War of eighteen twelve,
which I mean shows exactly. You know, they burned the
White the Brits came and burned the White House down.
So he has this aversion to monarchy and aristocracy. One
person being in charge. Don't have to call him king,
you can call him ceo, you can call him whatever.
But you'd have to wonder what he would think. Now.
Constitutional governments of whatever form are indeed much more similar
to each other in their structure and character than they
are respectively to the absolute governments, even of their own class.
All constitutional governments, or whatever class they may be, take
the sense of the community by its parts, each through
its appropriate organ and regard the sense of all its
parts as the sense of the whole. They all rest
on the right of this on the right of suffrage,
and the responsibility of rulers, directly or indirectly. On the contrary,
all absolute governments of whatever form, concentrate power in one
uncontrolled and irresponsible individual or body, whose will is regarded
as the sense of the community. So you could see
in his language right there that he by calling it
uncontrolled and irresponsible, in an uncontrolled, irresponsible uh or and
irresponsible individual or body, you can see what his presupposition is. So,
and hence the great and broad distinction between governments is
not that of the one the few or the many,
but of the constitutional and the absolute. So there's no other.
There's nothing else really, Okay. From this there results another
distinction which, although secondary and its character, very strongly marks
the difference between these forms of government. I refer to
their respective conservative principle, that is the principle by which
they are upheld and preserved. This principle in constitutional governments
is compromised, and an absolute governments is force. As will
be next explained, is that Thomas soul said, is only compromised.
Is no such thing, no such thing as a perfect
It is only compromised. I can't remember the exact term,
but yeah, I mean you're not going if you're going
to have a government like this, it's going to be
founded uncompromised, unless you have an autarchy or what he
calls an absolute government, which he calls force. I mean,
as a constitutional government. Do you think we have a
constitutional government that prides itself on compromise. It has been
already shown that the same constitution of man, which leads
those who govern to press the governed, if not prevented,
will with equal force and certainty, lead the latter to
resist oppression when possessed of the means of doing so
peaceably and successfully. But absolute governments of all forms exclude
all other means of resistance to their authority than that
of force, and of course leave no alternative to the
governed but to acquiesce an oppression, however great it may be,
or to resort to force to put down the government.
I mean, I can immediately think of three kings, I
mean talking about big kingdoms where he's just he's basically
going to the worst possible And I think if you
read Hoppo's Democracy of the God that Failed, you could
see that it was not in most king's interest to
be this heavy handed, or to even come close to
the kind of thing he's talking about. It's yeah, he's
a man of his time, That's all I can say.
But the dread of such a resort must necessarily lead
the government to prepare to meet force in order to
protect itself, and hence, of necessity, force becomes the conservative
principle of all such governments. On the contrary, the government
of the concurrent majority, where the organism is perfect, excludes
the possibility of oppression by giving to each interest or
portion or order. Where there are established classes the means
of protecting itself by its negative, by its negative against
all measures calculated to advance the peculiar interests of others
at its expense. Its effect, then is to cause the
different interests, portions, or orders, as the case may be,
to desist from attempting to adopt any measure calculated to
promote the prosperity of one or more by sacrificing that
of others, and thus to force them to unite in
such measures only as would promote the prosperity of all,
as the only means to prevent the suspension of the
action of the government, and thereby to avoid anarchy, the
greatest of all evils. It is by means of such
authorized and effectual resistance that oppression is prevented and the
necessity of resorting to force superseded. In governments of the
concurrent majority, and hence compromise instead of force becomes their
conservative principle. It would perhaps be more strictly correct to
trace the conservative principle of constitutional governments to the necessity
which compels the different interests or portions or orders to
compromise as the only way to promote their respective prosperity
and to avoid anarchy. Rather than to compromise itself. No
necessity can be more urgent and imperious than that of
avoiding anarchy. It is the same as that which makes
government indispensable to preserve society, and is not less imperative
than that which compels obedience to superior force. Trace to
this source, the voice of a people uttered under the
necessity of avoiding the greatest of calamities, through the organs
of a government so constructed as to suppress the expression
of all partial and selfish interests, and to give a
full and faithful utterance to the sense of the whole
community in reference to its common welfare, may without impiety,
be called the voice of God. To call any other
so would be impious in stating that forces the conservative
prince siple of absolute and compromise of constitutional governments. I
have assumed both to be perfect in their kind, but
not without bearing in mind that few or none, in fact,
have ever been so absolute as not to be under
some restraint, and none so perfectly organized as to represent
fully and perfectly the voice of the whole community. Not
even close, I would assume, in most cases of polities
above a very small size, where pretty much everyone might
be related, and then you still might have some problems there.
Such being the case, all case, all must in practice
depart more or less from the principles by which they
are respectively upheld and preserved, and depend more or less
for support on force or compromise as the absolute or
the constitutional form predominates in their respective organizations. Nor in
stating that absolute governments exclude all other means of resistance
to its authority than that, have I overlooked the case
of governments of the numerical majority, which form apparently an exception.
It is true that in such governments, the minor and
subject party for the time have the right to oppose
and resist the major indominant party for the time through
the ballot box, and may turn them out and take
their place if they can obtain a majority of votes. Well,
let's see what happened Trump twenty sixteen presidency. They had
the Supreme Court, they had Congress, he had everything. Oh
what happened? Oh that's right, he could have the get
all the votes he wanted, but everything had already been
co opted. All of these that all of these checks
and balances, they were gone. Might be something I don't know,
may just be something may have something to do with
human nature, But it is no less true that this
would be a mere change in the relations of the
two parties. The minor and subject party would become the
major and dominant party, with the same absolute authority and
tendency to abuse power, and the major and dominant party
would become the minor and subject party, with the same
right to resist through the ballot box, and if successful again,
to change relations with like effect. But such a state
of things must necessarily be temporary. The conflict between the
two parties must be transferred sooner or later from an
appeal to the ballot box. Who would appeal to force.
So I shall next proceed to explain. This is where
I've had people, people I respect, tell me to my
face that, well, any power that you create to fight
back against your enemies will just be used against you. Well, yeah,
that's what happens in what we have now, which is
basically which is a democracy, which is really an oligarchy,
but it is a democracy. You've got to get rid
of the democracy, and a narco capitalism isn't the answer.
A narco capitalism doesn't have an answer for I mean,
unless you're going to you know, exclude and get rid
of people. And you know, there are a lot of
people out there who understand human nature, and they're called
social engineers, and they basically the reason that you most
people believe something is because of them. Even there's stuff probably,
I mean, I'm not immune to this either. Social engineers
that put things into your mind and until you get
rid of them, or you figure out a way to
bypass their influence, I don't know, taking CNN's license to
do business away and freezing their bank accounts. Same with
MSNBC at this point, same with Fox. Until you do that,
I mean, do you think you're going to control the narrative?
You think there's a reason why maybe Elon Musk and
whatever people were behind him buying Twitter did it. The
conflict between the two parties and the government of the
numerical majority tends necessarily to settle down into a struggle
for the honors and emollience of the government and each
in order to obtain an object so ardently desired, will,
in the process of the struggle resort to whatever measure
may seem best calculated to affect this purpose. The adoption
by the one of any measure, however, objectionable, which might
give it an advantage, would compel the other to follow
its example. In such case, it would be indispensable to
success to avoid division and keep united, and hence from
a necessity inherent to the nature of such governments, each
party must be alternately forced, in order to ensure victory,
to resort to measures to concentrate the control of its
movements in fewer and fewer hands. As the struggle became
more and more violent. This in process of time must
lead to party organization and party caucuses in discipline, and
these to the conversion of the honors and emolians of
the government into means of rewarding partisan services in order
to secure the fidelity and increase the zeal of the
members of the party. The effect that the whole combined,
even in the earlier stages, as a process, when they
exert the least pernicious influence, would be a place to
control of the two parties in the hands of their
respective majorities, and the government itself virtually under the control
of the majority of the dominant party for the time
instead of the majority of the whole community. Where the
theory is where the theory of this form of government
vests it. Thus, in the very first stage of the process,
the government becomes the government of a minority instead of
a majority. A minority usually, and under the most favorable
circumstances of not much more than one fourth of the
whole community. But the processes regards the concentration of power
would not stop at this stage. The government would gradually
pass from hands of the majority of the party into
those of its leaders. As to struggle becomes more intense
than the honors and emollience of the government of the government,
the all absorb all absorbing objects. At this stage, principles
and policy would lose all influence in the elections, and
cunning falsehood, deceptions, slander, fraud, and gross appeals to the
appetite of the lowest and most worthless portions of the
community would take the place of sound reason and wise debate.
Does any of this sound familiar? After these have thoroughly
debased and corrupted the community, and all the arts and
devices of party have been exhausted, the government would vibrate
between the two factions. For such will parties have become
at each successive election, neither would be able to retain
power beyond some fixed term. For those seeking office and
patronage would become too numerous to be rewarded by the
governments and the patronage. At the disposal of the government,
and these being the sole objects of pursuit, the disappointed would,
at the next succeeding election throw their weight into the
opposite scale and the hope of better success at the
next turn of the wheel. These vibrations would continue until confusion, corruption, disorder,
and anarchy would lead to an appeal to force, to
be followed by a revolution in the form of the government.
Such must be the end of the government of the
numerical majority, and such in brief the process through which
it must pass in the regular course of events before
it can reach out. Before it can reach it, this
transition would be more or less rapid according to circumstances.
The more numerous to population, the more extensive the country,
the more diversified the climate, productions, pursuits and character the people,
the more wealthy, refined and artificial their condition, and the
greater the amount of revenues and disbursements. The more unsuited
woul the community be to such a government, and the
more rapid would be the passage. On the other hand,
it might be slow in its progress amongst small communities
during the early stages of their existence, with inconsiderable revenues
and disbursements in a population of simple habits, provided the
people are sufficiently intelligence to exercised properly the right of suffrage,
and sufficiently conversant with the rules necessary to govern the
deliberations of legislative bodies. I hope everyone else is listening
to this and reading the salog and smiling with me,
because this is just so, It's so great and reveals
so much. It is perhaps the only form of popular
governments suited to a people while they remain in such
a condition. Any other would be not only too complex
and cumbersome, but unnecessary to guard against oppression, where the
motive to use power for that purpose would be so feeble.
And hence colonies from countries having constitutional governments, if left
to themselves, usually adopt governments based on the numerical majority.
But as population increases, wealth accumulates, and above all, the
revenues and expenditures become large, governments of this form must
become less and less suited to the condition of society, until,
if not in the meantime, changed into governments of the
concurrent majority, they must and in an appeal to force,
to be followed by a radical change in its structure
and character, and most probable into monarchy in its absolute form,
as will be next explained, He saw this so long ago.
The country is barely fifty years old, and he saw this.
How amazing is this? You can find this anywhere. I mean,
it's free on the Internet. There's good copies of it
in the it's in the it's open domain now, so
people publish it for real, inexpensive on Amazon. I have
a hard a little hardcover version that has his discourse
on the Constitution as well. I'm not going to read
that those constitution bores me such indeed as to repugnance
between popular governments and force, or, to be more specific,
military power, that the almost necessary consequence of a resources
to force by such governments in order to maintain their
authority is not only a change of their form, but
a change into the most opposite that of absolute monarchy.
The two are the opposites of each other, from the
nature of popular governments the kind of absolute monarchy. The
change he's talking about is he's talking about that basically
what this country started as becomes a monarchy. And you
could see that under FDR, I mean FDR was basically
became a monarch. The problem is, you know, he didn't
pass it along. If Truman, if he would have given
Truman all that power, if he would have taught Truman
how to do all that, if he would have liked
Truman at all, it wouldn't all that power wouldn't have
spread out and dispersed itself to the whole rest of
the government. So we're at the point now where we
have a blob that basically no one knows where begins
and no one knows where it starts. The two are
the opposites of each other. From the nature of popular governments,
the control of its power is vested in the many.
While military power to be efficient must be vested in
a single individual, All of government to be efficient must
be vested in a single individual, a single competent individual.
When then the two parties in governments of the numerical
majority resort to force in their struggle for supremacy, he
who commands the successful party will have the control of
the government itself, and hence, in such contrasts in contests,
the party which may prevail will usually find in the
commander of its forces, a master under whom the great
body of the community will be glad to find protection
against the incessant agitation and violent struggles to the two
corrupt factions, looking only to power as the means of
securing to themselves the honors and emolliance of the government.
From the same cause, there is a like tendency and
aristocratical to terminate in absolute governments of the monarchical form,
but by no means as strong, because there is less
repugnance between military power and aristocratical that between it and
democratic that between it and democratical governments. A broader position
may indeed be taken that there is a tendency in
constitutional governments of every form to degenerate into their respective
absolute forms, and in all absolute governments into that of
the monarchical form. But the tendency is much stronger in
constitutional governments of the democratic forms to degenerate into their
respective absolute forms than in either of the others, because,
among other reasons, the distinction between the constitutional and absolute
forms of aristocratical and monarchical governments is far more strongly
marked than in democratic governments. The effect of this is
to make the different orders or classes in an error
aristocracy or monarchy, far more jealous and watchful of encroachment
on their respective rights, and more resolute and preserving and
resisting attempts to concentrate power in any one class or order.
On the contrary, the line between the two forms and
popular governments is so imperfectly understood that honest and sincere
friends of the constitutional form not infrequently, instead of jealously
watching and arresting their tendencies to degenerate into their absolute forms,
not only regard it with approbation, but employ all their
powers to add to its strength and increase its impetus
in the vain hope of making the government more perfect
and popular. The numerical majority perhaps should usually be one
of the elements of the constitutional democracy, but to make
it the sole element in order to perfect the constitution
and make the government more popular is one of the
greatest and most fatal political errors. Among the other advantages
which governments of the conc current have over those of
the numerical majority, and which strongly illustrates their more and
which strongly illustrates a more popular character, is that they
admit with safety a much greater extension of the right
of suffrage. It may be safely extended in such governments
to universal suffrage, that is, to every male citizen of
mature age, with few extraordinary exceptions. But it cannot be
so far extended in those of the numerical majority without
placing them ultimately under the control of the most ignorant
and dependent portions of the community. For as the community
becomes populous, wealthy, refined, and highly civilized, the difference between
the rich and the poor will become more strongly marked,
and the number of the ignorant independent greater in proportion
to the rest of the community. With the increase of
this difference the tendency to conflict between them, the tendencies
a conflict between them will become stronger, and as the
poor independents that become more numerous in proportion, there will
be in governments of the numerical majority no want of
leaders among the wealthy and ambitious to excite and direct
them in their efforts to obtain control. The case is
difference in governments of the concurrent majority. There mere numbers
have not the absolute control, and the wealthy and intelligent
become identified in interest with the poor and ignorant of
their respective portions or interests of their community become their
leaders and protectors, and hence as the latter would have
neither hope nor inducement to rally the former in order
to obtain the control the right of suffrage under such
a government may be safely enlarged to the extent stated
without incurring the hazard to which such enlargement would expose.
Governments of the numerical majority. In another particular, governments of
the concurrent majority have greatly the advantage I allude to
the difference in their respective tendency in reference to dividing
or uniting the community. That of the concurrent has been
shown has been shown is to unite the community, let
its interests be ever so diversified or opposed, while that
of the numeracle is to divide it into two conflicting portions,
let its interests be naturally ever so united and identified.
I think I'm going to stop right there. So I
think the great thing about this is it does show
that when you have a more republican form of government,
you can last a lot longer than if you just
have a democracy. It's one of the reasons why the
progressive are always talking about getting rid of the electoral college.
The electoral college has saved us to some extent up
until now. It's a lot of people would you say,
how can it be much worse than it is right now?
And you know, I would say that it can be.
It could be much worse than it is right now.
And maybe that little bit, maybe that the federalism that
is left is is saving us from something, is saving
us from full on catastrophe. But yeah, I mean what
this shows is it shows at once, once you take
the reins of power out of the hands of one
person or a very very small group of people. Usually
it's gonna be one person. You have your CEO, and
you're going to have the board. And once you take
take the reins away from him and you start giving it,
you give it to the board, and then the board
passes it down to HR, and then HR passes it
down into the you know, the secretarial pool. You're screwed.
You're screwed. The more people who the more people who
have a say in quote unquote order, the more disorder
you're going to have, the more self interest, the more
headbutting over self interest is going to be, and the
easier it is for special interests to come in and
take over. All right, So we're gonna stop right there.
We'll pick this up in part three. I want to
remind everybody this is gonna you've already heard. If you
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for part three, and I'll be back with part three
in a couple of days if I know, if I
can remember how to talk. And until then, thanks for
tuning in take care. I want to welcome everyone back
to the third read of John C. Calhoun's Disquisition on Government.
Looks like I'll be able to knock this out in
five so this will be shorter than the last one.
Still trying to figure out what I want to do
for the next one. But yesterday we were pretty much
finished up talking about He's still talking about elections, the
numerical majority, things like that, So I'm just going to
jump right back in. So here we go that the
numerical majority will divide the community, let it be ever
so homogeneous, into two great parties, which will be engaged
in perpetual struggles to obtain the control of the government.
Has already been established, the great importance of the subject
at sake must necessarily form strong party attachments and party antipathies.
Attachments on the part of the members of each to
their respective parties through whose efforts they hope to accomplish
an object dear to all, and antipathies to the opposite
party as presenting the only obstacle to success. This reminds
me a thinking of Karl Schmidt right here. In order
to have a just conception of their force it must
be taken into consideration that the object to be won
or lost appeals to the strongest passions of the human heart, avarice, ambition,
and rivalry. It is that it is not then wonderful
that a form of government, which periodically stakes all its
honors and emoluments as prizes to be contended for, should
divide the community into two great hostile parties, Or that
party attachments, in the progress of the strife, should become
so strong among the members of each, respectively, as to
absorb almost every feeling of our nature, both social and individual,
Or that their mutual antipathies should be carried to such
an excess as to destroy almost entirely all sympathy between them,
and to substitute in its place the strongest aversion. Nor
is it surprising that under their joint influence, the community
should cease to be the common center of attachment, or
that each party should find that center only in itself.
It is thus that in such governments, devotion to party
becomes stronger than devotions to country, the promotion of the
interests of party more important than the promotion of the
common good of the whole, and its triumph and ascendency
objects objects of far greater solicitude than the safety and
prosperity of the community. It is thus also that the
numerical majority, by regarding the community as a unit and
having as such the same interest throughout all its parts,
must necessary operation divided into two hostile parts waging under
the forms of law incestant hostilities against each other. What's
the way to solve this hostility? To break apart? And
then somebody will say, well, eventually it's going to happen
in the new break apart again. Yeah, unless you want
Unless this is the way you want to live. This
is the way you want to live in constant hostility politically,
and you want your kids, you want your grandkids, you
want your progeny to live this way forever. You continually
break apart or get away from get away from each other.
That's just basically what has to happen over and over again.
You want to be what like minded people, or you
have one person who makes the decisions. The concurrent majority,
on the other hand, tends to unite the most opposite
and conflicting interests and to blend the whole in one
common attachment to the country by giving to each interest
or portion the power of self protection, all strife and
struggle become between them, for ascendency is prevented, and thereby
not only every feeling calculated to weaken the attachments of
the whole is suppressed, but the individual and the social
feelings are made to unite in one common devotion to country.
Each season feels that it can be best, that it
can best promote its own prosperity by conciliating the good
will and promoting the prosperity of the others, and hence
there will be diffused throughout the whole community kind feelings
between its different portions, and instead of antipathy, a rivalry
amongst them to promote the interests of each other, as
far as this can be done consistently with the interests
of all. Under the combined influence of these causes, the
interests of each would be merged in the common interests
of the whole, and thus the community would become a
unit by becoming the common center of attachment of all
its parts, and hence, instead of faction, strife, and struggle
for party ascendency, there would be patriotism, nationality, harmony, and
a struggle only for supremacy in promoting the common good
of the whole. It seems like at some point someone
or someone's figured out that the best way to do
this would be to find a common enemy outside of
the polity. If anyone who remembers nine to eleven remembers
that New York was attacked, Washington was attacked, but people
from all over the country volunteered to go get the bastards, Well,
that wouldn't happen normally. If somebody commits a crime, If
there's a crime committed in Baltimore or where somebody gets killed,
the whole country doesn't come together unless it's turned into
something by the narrative makers. But the narrative of an
outside influence attacking all of us that has a habit
of bringing people together. But is that the way you
want to live again? Where that's the only thing that
can bring people together? An outside enemy? But the difference
in their operation is that in this respect would not
end here. Its effects would be as great in a
moral as I have attempted to show they would be
in a political point of view. Indeed, public and private
morals are so nearly allied that it would be difficult
for it to be otherwise, that which corrupts and debases
the community politically must also corrupt and debase it morally.
The same cause which in governments of the numerical majority
gives to parties, attachments and antipathies such force as to
place party triumph and ascendency above the safety and prosperity
of the community, will justice certainly give them sufficient force
to overpower all regard for truth, justice, sincerity, and moral
obligations of every description. It is accordingly found that in
the violence strikes between parties for the high and glittering
prize of government honors and emoluments and emoluments, falsehood injustice, fraud, artifice, slander,
and breach of faith are freely resorted to as legitimate weapons,
followed by all their corrupting and debasing influences in the
government of the concurrent majority. On the contrary, the same
cause which prevents such strife, as the means of obtaining power,
and which makes it the interest of each portion to
conciliate and promote the interests of the others, would exert
a powerful influence towards purifying and elevation the character of
the government and the people morally as well as politically,
the means of acquiring power, or more correctly, influence, in
such governments would be the reverse instead of the vices
by which it is by which it is acquired, In
that the numerical majority, the opposite virtues truth, justice, integrity, fidelity,
and all others by which respect and confidence are inspired,
would be the most certain and effectual means of acquiring it.
Nor would the good effects resulting, thence be confined to
those who take an active part in political affairs. They
would extend to the whole community. For of all the
causes which contribute to form the character of a people,
those by which power, influence, and standing in the government
are most certainly and readily obtained are by far the
most powerful. These are the objects most eagerly sought of
all others by the talented and aspiring, and the possession
of which commands for the greatest respect and admiration. But
just in proportion to this respect and admiration will be
their appreciation by those whose energy, intellect, and position in
society are calculated to exert the greatest influence in forming
the character of a people. If knowledge, wisdom, patriotism, and
virtue be the most certain means of acquiring them, they
will be the most highly appreciated and assiduously cultivated, and
this would cause them to become prominent traits in the
character of the people. But if, on the contrary, cunning, fraud, treachery,
and party devotion be the most certain, they will be
the most highly prized and become marked features in their character.
I think we know which one one. So powerful, indeed,
is the operation of the concurrent majority in this respect,
that if it were possible for a corrupt and degenerate
community to establish and maintain a well organized government of
the kind it would be of itself, it would of
itself purify and regenerate them. While on the other the
other hand, a government based wholly on the numerical majority
would justice certainly corrupt and debase the most patriotic and
virtuous people. So great is our difference in this respect,
that justice, the one or the other element predominates in
the construction of any government, in the same proportion, will
the character of the government and the people rise or
sink in the scale of patriotism and virtue. Neither religion
or education can counteract a strong tendency of the numerical
majority to corrupt and debase the people. Where do you
think we ended up? I think it's pretty clear. If
the two be compared in reference to the ends for
which government is ordained, the superiority of the government of
the concurrent majority will not be less striking. These, as
has been stated, are twofold to protect and to perfect society.
But to preserve society, it is necessary to guard the
community against injustice, violence, and anarchy within and against attacks
from without. If it fail in either, it would fail
in the primary end of government, and would not deserve
the name. When I see this what he's writing right here,
When he talks about morality, when he talks about virtue,
when he talks about honor, and when he talks about
protecting the society, I think he's talking about gatekeeping. It's
something that I talk about all the time. How did
we get here? We started out a certain This government
started out a certain way. Clearly, it was designed for
certain people, of a certain temperament, of a certain color,
of a certain religion including religion, and of a certain background.
And it kind of it kind of screwed the pooch
by importing millions from the Dark Continent to labor here
and then, well, what happens in the eighteen hundreds you
have people who are well, I mean it starts earlier
than that, but Marx's theories start making it over here
and influxes from all all over the world. What was
going to happen? What he's talking about here is he's
talking about a very tight knit, homogeneous, culturally culturally homogeneous society. Well,
didn't do everything they could to guard the community against that.
To perfect society, it is necessary to develop the faculties intextual, intellectual,
and moral with which men is endowed. But the main
spring to their development and through this to progress, improvement,
and civilization with all their blessings. The desire of individuals
to better their condition. Do we have that when you
have all of these entitlements out there? When you have
all of this, is there any There's whole classes of
people now who don't seek to better themselves because they
know they'll be taken care of. And now it's become intergenerational.
For this purpose, liberty and security are indispensable. Liberty leaves
each free to pursue the course he may deem best
to promote his interest and happiness, as far as it
may be compatible with the primary end for which government
is ordained, while security gives assurance to each that he
shall not be deprived of the fruits of his exertion,
of his exertions to better his condition. These combined give
to this desire the strongest impulse of which it is susceptible.
For to extend liberty beyond the limits assigned would be
to weaken the government and to render it incompetent to
fill its primary end, protection of society against dangers internal
and external. I immediately think of the borders being wide
open and a decision being made this week that people
who have not been screened to be here. We have
no idea who they are, that they can carry weapons.
And libertarians are like, no, I'm fine with that. I'm
fine with that. Perfect. Perfect. Liberals are like, I'm fine
with that. Yeah, the Second Amendment, the rights in the
Constitution are for everyone in the whole world. I'm a
libertarian universalist. If I get those rights, everyone gets those rights.
That's bullshit. Not everybody is equipped to know how to
deal with those rights. Not everybody is equipped to know
how to deal with a modern society. And you know,
oh well, you know, if if they pass these laws,
then they'll just come for your guns too, because they
can come for their guns too. Well, I mean, okay,
they could try. I brought up the I brought up
the example of in France you can buy a suppressor
in a hardware store, but an American can't who's traveling,
can't go in there and do that, and if they
get found with one, they get in trouble. Why how
come France can enforce that law and we can't. And
someone's like, oh, well, you're just using France. They have
they have harsh gun laws. That's not the point. Now,
you're just dodging. No enforce the law. Okay, Well the
government there, the government that's in charge, isn't enforcing the law,
so we have to abandon the ideas of legal order. Well,
isn't that the same thing? Is? It makes no sense
to say that we can't because we're not enforcing laws,
that we can't enforce laws, or to say because laws
are being enforced poorly that we shouldn't still enforce laws
just gives you a narco tyranny. They see that, they
see your arguments, and they run with them and they
exploit them. Every argument you make, like that canon will
be used against you by people who are smarter and
have power and desire power which a lot of people don't.
The effect of this would be insecurity, and of insecurity
to weaken the impulsive individuals to better their condition, and
thereby retard progress and improvement. On the other hand, to
extend the powers of the government so as to contract
the sphere assigned to liberty would have the same effect
by disabling individuals in their efforts to better their condition.
Herein is to be found the principle which assigns to
power and liberty their proper spheres and reckon cells, each
to the other under all circumstances. Four. If power be
necessary to secure the liberty the fruits of its exertions,
liberty in turn repays power with interest by increased population, wealth,
and other advantages which progress and improvement bestow on the community.
By thus assigning to each its appropriate sphere, all conflicts
between them cease, and each is made to cooperate with
and assist the other in fulfilling the great ends for
which government is ordained. But the principle applied to different
communities will assign to them different limits. It will assign
a larger sphere to power and a more contracted one
to liberty, or the reverse, according to circumstances. To the former,
there must, ever be allotted. Under all circumstances, a seer
sufficiently large to protect the community against danger from without
and violence and anarchy from within. The residuum belongs to
liberty cannot be safe more cannot be safely or rightly
allotted to it. But some communities require a far greater
amount of power than others to protect them against anarchy
and external dangers, and of course the sphere of liberty
and such must be proportionally contracted. The causes calculated to
enlarge the one and contract the other are numerous and various.
Some are physical, such as open and exposed frontiers surrounded
by powerful and hostile neighbors. Others are moral, such as
the different degrees of intelligence, patriotism, and virtue among the
mass of the community, and their experience and pro efficiency
in the art of self government. Of these, the moral
are by far the most influential. A community may possess
all the necessary moral qualifications in so high a degree
as to be capable of self government under the most
adverse circumstances, while on the other hand, another may be
so sunk in ignorance and vice as to be incapable
of forming a conception of liberty or of living, even
when most favored by circumstances, under any other than an
absolute and despotic government. The principle in all communities, according
to these numerous and various causes, assigns to power and
liberty their proper spheres to allow to liberty. In any case,
a sphere of action more extended than this than this assigns,
would lead to anarchy, and this probably in the end
to a contraction instead of an enlargement of its sphere. Liberty, then,
when forced on a people unfit for it, would instead
of a blessing, be a curse, as it would, in
its reaction, lead directly to anarchy, the greatest of all curses.
No people, indeed, can long enjoy more liberty than that
to which their situation in advanced intelligence and morals fairly
entitle them. If more than this be allowed, they must
soon fall into confusion and disorder, to be followed, if
not by anarchy and despotism, by a change to a
form of government more simple and absolute, and therefore better
suited to their condition. And hence, although it may be
true that a people may not have as much liberty
as they are fairly entitled to and are capable of joining,
yet the reverse is unquestionably true, that no people can
long possess more than they are fairly incitled to. And
here I will make a statement that always pisses people off.
Maybe the government is the way it is because of
the way the people is. Maybe the people are out
of control. Maybe the people can't show self control. Maybe
the people are violent. Maybe the people want anarchy so
that they can do whatever they want, and maybe the
government grew out of that. I forget who said it,
but someone said, you get the government you deserve. Maybe
the government is so violent because the people are so violent.
Maybe the people are so violent because the government is
so violent. Maybe it's chicken and egg. But for a
long time I've thought that maybe the government is a
reflection of the people, and of the people are liberal.
Live and let live, YadA YadA. I don't care. Let
them all in. I don't care who they are. Maybe
the government is going to give you what you want.
Maybe they'll force it upon you, and then when you
try and reverse it, they'll be like, no, screw you, now,
you're the enemy. Government is for the kind of government
that was designed for the United States was a small government,
and it presupposed people who self control high morals. Yeah,
does that look like does that look like the population
at the United States? You sure, where I live people
are cool, and where you live, people are cool. But
look at the places that aren't. Are they just going
to concentrate on those You know, they're not even concentrating
on those places to stop them. Maybe in some odd
way they're waiting for us to do it. But then
you see the das. Then you look and you're like, well,
how does this get solved? Well, think I'm trying to
answer that question over and over again. Liberty, indeed, though
among the greatest of blessings, is not so great as
that of protection, inasmuch as the end of the former
is to progress and improvement of the race, while that
of the latter is its preservation and perpetrate. Prepare, and hence,
when the two come into conflict, liberty must and ever
ought to yield to protection, as the existence of the
race is of greater moment than its improvement. Think about
that last sentence, and hence when the two come into conflict.
Liberty must, ever ought to yield to protection, as the
existence of the race is of is of greater moment
than its improvement. It follows from what has been stated
that it is a great and dangerous error to suppose
that all people are equally entitled to liberty. Thank you
very much, mister Calhoun. It is a reward to be earned,
not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike,
a reward reserved for the intelligent, the patriotic, the virtuous,
and deserving, and not a boon to bestowed on a
people too ignorant to great ambitious to be capable either
of appreciating or of enjoying it. Nor is it any
disparagement to liberty that such is and ought to be
the case. Liberty is not hurt because there are people
who can't, people who would treat it in a way
that would hurt it, would treat it as a freedom
to hurt other people. That's not liberty's fault. On the contrary,
Its greatest praise, it's proudest distinction, is that an all
wise providence has reserved it as the noblest and highest
reward for the development of our faculties moral and intellectual.
A reward more appropriate than liberty could not be conferred
on the deserving, nor a punishment inflicted on the undeserving
more just than to be subject to lawless and despotic rule.
This dispensation seems to be the results of some fixed law,
and every effort to defeat, to disturb, or defeat it,
by attempting to elevate a people in the scale of
liberty above the point to which they are entitled to rise,
must ever prove abortive and in disappointment. The progress of
a people rising from a lower to a higher point
and the scale of liberty is necessarily slow, and by
attempting to precipitate we either retard or permanently defeat it.
If you are in a place that values liberty and
you see somebody who is and what does value and
liberty look like, it means a moral people. It means
an intelligent people. It means a people of a high culture.
If somebody is in that polity and they are doing
and their actions are destroying it, you get them the
hell out of there. You deal with it, because it
will permanently destroy you. It will permanently destroy what has
been built. It will permanently destroy liberty. Look at this
fucking country. We let people in who don't know how
to act. We allow people to act out and act
any way they want, and we no longer have liberty.
And people can say, oh, well, the government did that.
The government allowed them to do that. It was you know,
why did no one step up to stop it? There
is another error, not less great and dangerous, usually associated
with the one which has just been considered. I refer
to the opinion that liberty and equality are so intimately
united that liberty cannot be perfected without perfect equality, that
they are united to a certain extent, and that equality
of citizens in the eyes of the law is essential
to liberty, and a popular government is conceded. But to
go further and make equality of condition essential to liberty
would be to destroy both liberty and progress. The reason
is that inequality of condition, while it is a necessary
consequence of liberty, is at the same time indispensable to progress.
In order to understand why this is so, it is
necessary to bear in mind that the mainspring to progress
is the desire of individuals to better their condition, and
that the strongest impulse which can be given to it
is to leave individuals free to exert themselves in the
manner they may deem best for that purpose, as far
at least as it can be done, to be consistently
with the ends for which government is ordained, and to
secure to all the fruits of their exertions. Now, as
individuals differ greatly from each other in intelligence, sagacity, wisdom, energy, perseverance, skill,
habits of industry and economy, physical power, position, and opportunity,
the necessary effect of leaving all free to exert themselves
to better their condition must be corresponding inequality between those
who may possess these qualities and advantages in a high
degree and those who may be deficient in them. The
only means by which this result can be prevented are
either to impose such restrictions on the exertions of those
who may possess them in a high degree as will
place them on a level with those who do not,
or to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions.
But to impose such restrictions on them would be destructive
of liberty, while to deprive them of the fruits of
their exertions would be to destroy the desire of bettering
their condition. Does this sound familiar at all? It is indeed,
this inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks
in the march of progress which gives so strong an
impulse to the former to maintain their position and to
the latter to press forward into their files. This gives
to progress its greatest impulse. To force the front rank
back to the rear, or attempt to push forward the
rear into a line with the front by the interposition
of the government, would put an end to that impulse
and effectually arrest the march of progress. Can anyone can?
Let's talk about the progress that has been made since
nineteen sixty four. In nineteen sixty five and go back
to nineteen fifty four, go back to World War two?
What's the progress technological? Great? Wonderful? Just look at wages
since the seventies. These great and dangerous errors have their
origin and the prevalent opinion that all men are born
free and equal than which nothing can be more unfounded
and false. It rests upon the assumption of a fact
which is contrary to universe observation. In whatever light it
may be regarded, it is indeed difficult to explain how
an opinion so destitute of all sound reason ever could
have been so extensively entertained unless we regard it as
being confounded with another which has some semblance of truth,
but which, when properly understood, is not less false and dangerous.
This reminds me of me talking about during the Roundtable
with a Dark Enlightenment, Charles Bidel and Jose Ninho, how
this is just widely accepted now, and it wasn't like it.
It was planned, it was it was thrown into the culture,
it was put a switch was flipped, and we have
this attitude. All we have to do is flip the
switch in the other direction. All people have to do
is go no, no, no, I'm not no doing that. No.
I refer to the assertion that all men are equal
state are equal in the state of nature, meaning by
a state of nature, a state of individuality supposed to
have existed prior to the social and political state, and
in which men lived apart and independent of each other.
If such a state ever did exist, all men would
have been indeed free and equal in it, that is,
free to do as they pleased and exempt from the
authority of control of others, as by supposition it existed
anterior to society and government. But such a state is
purely hypothetical, not anymore. John, It never did, nor can exist,
as it is inconsistent with the preservation and perpetuation of
the race. It is therefore a great misnomer to call
it the state of nature, instead of being the natural
state of man. It is, of all conceivable states, the
most pose to his nature, most repugnant to his feelings,
and the most incompatible with his wants. His natural state
is the social and political, the one for which his
creator made him, and the only one in which he
can preserve and perfect his race. As then, there never
was such a state as the so called as the
so called state of nature, and never can be. It
follows that men, instead of being born in it, are
born in the social and political state, and of course,
instead of being born free and equal, are born subject
not only to parental authority, but to the laws and
institutions of the country where born, and under whose protection
they draw their first blood. With these remarks, I returned
from this digression to resume the thread of the discourse.
Give another drink. It follows from all that has been
said that the more perfectly a government combines power and liberty,
that is, the greater its power, and the more enlarged
and secure the liberty of individuals, the more perfectly it
fulfills the ends for which government is ordained to show, then,
that the government of the concurrent majority is better calculated
to fulfill them them than that of the Nu Miracle.
It is only necessary to explain why the former is
better suited to combine a higher degree of power and
a wider scope of liberty than the latter. I shall
begin with the former. The concurrent majority, then, is better
suited to enlarge and secure the bounds of liberty, because
it is better suited to present and prevent government from
passing beyond its proper limits, and to restrict it to
its primary end, the protection of the community. But in
doing this it leaves necessarily all beyond it open and
free to individual exertions, and thus enlarges and secures the
sphere of liberty to the greatest extent which the condition
of the community will admit. As has been explained, the
tendency of governments to pass beyond its proper limits is
what exposes liberty to danger and renders it insecure. And
it is the strong counteraction of governments and the concurrent
majority to this tendency which makes them so favorable to liberty.
On the contrary, those of the numerical instead of opposing
and counteracting this tendency, add to it increased strength in
consequence of the violent party struggles incident to them, as
has been fully explained, and hence their recroachments on liberty
and the danger to which it is exposed under such governments.
So great, indeed is the difference between the two in
this respect, that liberty is little more than a name
under all governments of the absolute form, including that of
the numerical majority, and can only have a secure, endurable
existence under those of the concurrent or constitutional form. The latter,
by giving to each portion of the community which may
be unequally affected by its action a negative on the others,
prevents all partial or local legislation, and restricts its action
to such measures as are designed for the protection and
the good of the whole. In doing this, it secures
at the same time the rights and liberties of the
people regarded individually, as each portion consists of those who,
whatever may be the diversity of interests among themselves have
the same interest in reference to the action of the government.
Such being the case, the interest of each individual may
be safely confided to the majority or voice of his portion,
against that of all others, and of course the government itself.
It is only through an organism which vests each with
a negative in in some one form or another, that
those who have like interest in preventing the government from
passing beyond its proper sphere and encroaching on the rights
and liberties of individuals can operate peacefully and effectually in
resisting the encroachments of power, and therefore reserve their rights
and liberty. Individual resistance is too feeble, and the difficulty
of concert and cooperation too great unaided by such an
organism to oppose successfully the organized power of government, with
all the means of the community at its disposable at
its disposal, especially in populist county countries of great extent,
where concert and cooperation are almost impossible. Even when the
oppression of the government comes to be too great to
be born, and forces resorted to in order to overthrow it,
the result is rarely ever followed by the establishment of liberty.
The force sufficient to overthrow an oppressive government is usually
sufficient to establish one equally more oppressively in its place,
or more oppressively in its place. Sorry, and hence, in
no governments except those that wrest on the principle of
the concurrent or constitutional majority, can the people guard their
liberty against power, and hence, also, when lost, the great
difficulty and uncertainty of regaining it by force. This is
where we are. This is where we've been for a
long time. So it may be further affirmed that being
more favorable to the enlargement and security of liberty, governments
of the concurrent must necessarily be more favorable to progress, development, improvement,
and civilization, and of course to the increase of power
which results from and depends on these, than those of
the numerical majority. That it is liberty which gives to
them their greatest impulse has already been shown, and it
now remains to show that these in turn contribute greatly
to the increase of power. In the earlier stages of society,
numbers and individual prowess constituted the principal elements of power.
In a more advanced stage, when communities had passed from
the barbarous to the civilized state, discipline, strategy, weapons of
increased power, and money as a means of meeting increased
expense became additional and important elements. In this stage, the
effects of progress and improvement on the increase of power
began to be disclosed. But still numbers and personal prowess
were sufficient for a long period to enable barbarous nations
to contend successfully with the civilized, and in the end
to overpower them, as the pages of history abundantly testify.
But a more advanced progress, with its numerous inventions and improvements,
has furnished new and far more powerful and destructive implements
of offense and defense, and greatly increased the intelligence and
wealth necessary to engage the skill and meet the increased
expense required for their construction and application to purposes of war.
The discovery of gunpowder and the use of steam as
an impelling force, and their applications to military purposes, have
forever settled the question of acendency between civilized and barbarous
communities in favor of the former. Indeed, these, with other
improvements belonging to the present state of progress, have given
to communities to most advanced a superiority over the least
so almost as great as that of the latter. Over
the brute creation, and among the civilized, the same causes
have decided the question of superiority, where other circumstances are
nearly equal in favor of those whose governments have given
the greatest impulse to develop progress and improvement, that is,
to those whose liberty is the largest and best secured.
Among these, England and the United States affords striking examples
not only of the effects of liberty and increasing power,
but of the more perfect adaptation of government is founded
on the principle of the concurrent or constitutional majority to
enlarge and secure liberty. They are both governments of this description,
as will be shown hereafter. But in estimating the power
of a community, moral as well as physical causes must
be taken into the calculation, and in estimating the effects
of liberty on power, it must not be overlooked that
in it that it is in itself an important agent
in augmenting the force of a moral as well as
of physical power. It bestows on a people elevation, self reliance, energy,
and enthusiasm. And these combinents give to the physical power
of vastly augmented and almost irresistible impetus. These, however, are
not the only elements of moral power. There are others,
and among them harmony, unanimity, devotion to country, and a
disposition to elevate to places of trust and power. Those
who are distinguished for wisdom and experience these, when the
occasion requires it, will, without compulsion, and from their very nature,
unite and put forth the entire force of the community
in the most efficient manner, without hazard to its institutions
or its liberty. We could only wish all these causes
combined give to a community its maximum power. Either of
them without the other will leave it comparatively feeble. But
it cannot be necessary. But it cannot be necessary, after
what has been stated, to enter into any further explanation
or argument. In order to establish the superiority of governments
of the concurrent majority over the numerical in developing the
great elements of moral power, so vast is the superiority
that the one, by its operation, necessarily leads to their development,
while the other as necessarily prevents it. As has been
fully shown, such are the many and striking advantages of
the concurrent over the numerical majority against the former. But
two objections can be made. The one is that it
is difficult of construction, which has already been sufficiently noticed,
and the other that it would be impracticable to obtain
the concurrence of conflicting interests where there were numerous and diversified,
or if not, that the process for this purpose would
be too tardy to meet with sufficient promptness the many
and dangerous emergencies to which all communities are exposed. This
objection is plausible and deserves a further notice than it
has yet received. The diversity of opinion is usually so
great on almost all questions of policy that it is
not surprising on a slight view of the subject it
should be thought impracticable to bring the various conflicting interests
of a community to unite on any one line of policy,
or that a government founded on such a principle would
be too slow in its movements and too weak in
its foundation to succeed in practice. But plausible as it
may seem at the first glance, a more deliberate view
will show that this opinion is erroneous. It is true
that when there is no urgent necessity, it is difficult
to bring those who differ to agree on any one
line of action, Each will naturally insist on taking the
course he thinks best, and from pride of opinion, will
be unwilling to yield to others. But the case is
different when there is an urgent necessity to unite on
a common cause of action. As reason and experience both
prove when something must be done and when it can
be done only by the united consent of all, the
necessity of the case will force to a compromise. Be
the cause of that necessity. What it may on all
questions of acting, necessity on all questions of acting necessity
where it exists, is the overruling motive, and where in
such cases compromise among the parties is an indispensable condition
to acting, it exerts an overruling influence in predisposing them
to acquiescence in some one for opinion or court course
of action. Experience furnishes many examples in confirmation of this
important truth. Among these, to trial by jury is the
most familiar, and on that account will be selected for illustration.
This just goes back to when you get attacked nine
to eleven, everybody comes together. But really the best course
of action here is what Rome did put one person
in charge until the condition was met dealt with, in
my opinion, in these twelve individuals selected without discrimination. That's
not true, must unanimously concur in opinion, under the obligations
of an oath to find a true verdict according to
law and evidence. And this too, not unfrequently, under such
great difficulty and doubt that the ablest and most experienced
judge and advocates differ in opinion after careful examination. And
yet as impracticable as this mode of trial would seem
to a superficial observer, it is found in practice not
only to succeed, but to be the safest, the wisest,
and the best that human enguity has ever devised. When
closely investigated, the cause will be found in the necessity
under which the jury is placed to agree unanimously in
order to find a verdict. The necessity access to as
the predisposing cause of concurrence in some common opinion, and
with such efficacy that a jury rarely fails to find
a verdict. The problem you have with that now is
is that you say, oh, I'm going to get a
jury of my peers. Really, am I going to get
a jury at twelve podcasters, twelve podcasters that I've had
on the show before, Or am I going to get
to people who emigrate to Hear from India, to people
who emigrate to Hear from Asia, a couple who may
have walked over the border a year ago. Is that
what happens? And then if you want to have a
jury trial, they say, okay, well here's the thing. You're
looking at twenty years for this act, whatever it is,
but we'll give you three years if you take this plea.
If you don't take the plea, you're getting the whole
twenty if it goes to trial, and they scare the
shit out of people. If everybody, I remember Monica Perez
said a few years ago, if everybody just decided, screw it,
we're going to do a jury trial, it would the
system would I wouldn't know what to do. I wouldn't
know what to do. That would be a I guess
I was gonna say, that'd be a whole lot easier
than oh, we just get everybody to stop paying taxes
and or everything like that. But it wouldn't be easy
because people, the masses can't the masses can't coordinate, the
masses can't plan together, the masses can't organize, so stuck
with this. But I guess at this time it was
it was good to be on in jury. It was
good to have a jury trial. I guess under its
potent influence, the jurors take their seats with a disposition
to give a fair and impartial hearing to the arguments
on both sides meet together in the jury room, not
as dispute, not as disputants, but calmly to hear the
opinions of each other, and to compare in way the
arguments on which they are founded, and finally to adopt
that which, on the whole is thought to be true. Yeah,
in a monocultural society and a homogeneous society, sure that
could happen under the influence of this disposition to harmonize
one after another falls into the same opinion until unanimity
is obtained. Hence its practice practicability, and hence also its
peculiar excellence. Nothing, indeed, can be more favorable to the
success of truth and justice than this predisposing influence caused
by the necessity of being unanimous. It is so much
so as to compensate for the defect of legal knowledge
and a high degree of intelligence on the part of
those who usually composed juries. Composed juries. But I mean
even if the person on a jury at this time
weren't weren't book learned, they would know how to milk
a cow, build a fence, do things like that. These
aren't unintelligent people. They just may not be able to quote.
They may not be able to quote Adam Smith or
some other jackass from back then. If the necessity of
unanimity were dispensed with, and the finding of a jury
made to depend on a bare majority jury, trial, instead
of being one of the greatest improvements in the judicial
development of government, would be one of the greatest evils
that could be inflicted on the community. It would be
in such case the conduit through which all the factious
feelings of the day would enter and contaminate justice at
its source. But the same cause would act would still
great or force in predisposing the various interests of the
community to agree in a well organized government founded on
the concurrent majority. The necessity for unanimity in order to
keep the government in motion would be far more urgent.
Would act, would act under circumstances so more favorable to
secure it, it would be superfluous after what has been stated,
to add any other reasons in order to show that
no necessity, physical or moral, can be more imperial, more
imperious than that of government. It is so much so
that to suspend its action altogether, even for an inconsiderable period,
would subject the government with the community to convulsions and anarchy.
But in governments of the concurrent majority, such fatal consequences
can only be avoided by the unanimous concurrence or acquiescence
of the various portions of the community, such as the
imperious character of the necessity which impels to compromise under
governments of this description. But to have a just conception
of the overpowering influence it would exert, the circumstances under
which it would act must be taken into consideration. These
will be found, on comparison, much more favorable than those
under which juries act. In the latter case, there is
nothing besides the necessity of unanimity in finding a verdict
and the inconvenience to which they might be subjected in
the events of a division, to induce juries to agree,
except the love of truth and justice, which was not
counteracted by some improper motive or bias, more or less
influences all not expecting the most depraved. In the case
of governments of the concurrent majority, there is besides these
the love of country than which it was if not
counteracted by the unequal and oppressive active government or other causes.
Few motives exert a greater sway. It comprehends, indeed, within itself,
a large portion both of our individual and social feelings,
and hence it almost its almost boundless control when left
free to act. But the government of the concurrent majority
leaves it free by preventing abuse and oppression, and with
them the whole train of feelings and passions which leads
to discord and conflict between different portions of the community.
Impelled by the imperious necessity of preventing the suspension of
the action of government with the fatal consequences to which
it would lead, and by strong additional impulse derived from
an ardent love of country, each portion would regard the
sacrifice it might have to make by yielding its particular
peculiar interest to secure the common interest and safety of all,
including its own, as nothing compared to the evils that
would be inflicted on all, including its own, by by
pretend pertainness, pretentishly adhering to a different line of action.
So powerful, indeed would be the motives for concurring, and
under such circumstances, so weak would be those who oppose it.
The wonder would be not that there should be but
that there should not be a compromise. I think I'm
gonna stop right there. I mean, he goes back and forth.
He makes these incredible points, shows you what government can become,
shows you, know, you see what jury can become. He's
talking about these juries, and then he talks about how, well,
if it's just done this way, everything's fine. Well I
think we tried that, so all right, I'll be back
for part four. Like I've been saying at the end
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be back for episode four in a couple of days.
Thank you very much. Take care. I want to welcome
everyone back to part four of my reading of John C.
Calhoun's A Disquisition on Government. Should be able to knock
this out in two more, this one and one more.
And there was a question from the last episode on
what exactly does Calhoun mean by a concurrent government? And
you will see when I wrote, I made some notes
on it to give a basically a brief analysis of
what he sees at as would be able to prevent
the majority quote unquote democratic from subjugating the minority. So
you know what basically does he mean by concurrent So
he's he's looking at it consists of voices of conflicting
interests which are given veto powers against each other in
a way that basically qualitative and quantitative features exist. So
any government action can only be taken with widespread consents
across basically all the structor sectors and strata of government.
So he basically said that the an organism can more
fully collect the sense of the community and therefore aid
and perfect the right of suffrage. So you can see
how really this would almost have to be brought down
to the local level unless you are well, well a,
you're gonna have lobbies things like that. One of the
reasons I think I've said this before I wanted to
read this is because you know, it talks about our government.
It talks about the system of government that we probably
recognize the most. But it also he does a great
job in sections of showing why it doesn't work. So yeah,
and the concurrent majority is one of those things that
once you understand that, you're like, yeah, well, how would
you even how would that even work? Now you don't
even have there's not even a foundation of subjective truth
or I mean of objective truth or morality. I mean
we're basically at war because of that. So yeah, no,
it's not going to work. But I still think finishing
this and reading it in the first place helps because
in my opinion, he was the greatest political thinker, probably
when it comes to political theory, the greatest American political thinker.
So yeah, right, I'm going to continue reading the great
page sixty nine and I'm going to pick up where
I left off, but to form adjuster that should be
why do I want to scream more? Just? But to
form a justter estimate of the full force of the
impulse to compromise, there must be added that in that
in governments of the concurrent majority, each portion in advance
to in order to advance its own peculiar interests, would
have to conciliate all others by showing a disposition to
advance theirs. And for this purpose each would select those
to represent it whose wisdom, patriotism, and weight of character
would command the confidence of the others. Leaders that everybody
can agree upon natural elites maybe Hans Herman Hoppa might
call them, but you're talking about elites here. Under its influence,
and with representatives so well qualified to accomplish the object
for which they were collected, the prevailing desire would be
to promote the common interest of the whole, and hence
the competition would be not which should yield the least
to promote the common good, but which should yield the most.
It is thus that concession would cease to be considered
a sacrifice, would become a free will offering on the
altar of the country, and lose the name of compromise.
And herein is to be found the feature which distinguishes
governments of the concurrent majority so strikingly from those of
the numerical In the latter, each faction, in the struggles
to obtain the control of the government elevates the power
to designating the artful and unscrupulous, who, in their devotion
to party, instead of aiming at the good of the whole,
aim exclusively at securing the ascendency of the party. When
traced to its source, this difference will be found to
originate in the fact that in governments of the concurrent majority,
individual feelings are from its organism necessarily enlisted on the
side of the social and made to unite with them
in promoting the interests of the whole as the best
way of promoting the separate interests of each, while in
those of the numerical majority, the social are necessarily enlisted
on the side of the individual and made to contribute
to interest the interest of parties regardless of that of
the whole, to affect the former. To enlist the individual
on the side of the social feelings to promote the
good of the whole is the greatest possible achievement of
the science of government, while to enlist the social on
the side of the individual. To promote the interest of
parties at the expense of the good of the whole
is the greatest blunder which ignorance can possibly commit. And
yet that's where we are to This also may be
referred the greatest solidity of foundation on which governments or
the concurrent majority repose. Both ultimately rest on necessity for
force by which those the numerical majority are upheld, and
is only acquiesced in from necessity, a necessity not more imperious, however,
than that which compels the different portions in governments of
the concurrent majority to acquiesce and compromise. There is, however,
a great difference in the motive, the feeling, the aim
which characterized the act in the two cases. In the one,
it is done with the reluctance and hostility, ever incident
to enforce submission to what is regarded an injustice and oppression,
accompanied by the desire and purpose to seize on the
first favorable opportunity for resistance, But in the other willingly
and cheerfully under the impulse of an exalted patriotism, impelling
all to act yes in whatever the common good requires
do you think does anyone think there's any possibility that
you will ever see that again with the system of
government that we have today. If that's impossible, then the
system needs to be changed. I'm not talking about here.
It is if your car breaks down. If your car
is broken, you have two choices, repair it or replace it.
Can this system be repaired? I think anyone who understands
the slightest political theory dread Burnham, which I've read on
the show before, knows that the only way it needs
to be replaced, something new has to be done. It's
not going to You're not going to repair this. It
needs to be replaced. It is then a great error
to suppose that the government of the concurrent majority is impracticable,
or that it rests on a feeble foundation. History furnishes
many examples of such governments, and among them one in
which the principle was carried to an extreme that would
be thought impracticable had it never existed. I refer to
that of Poland. In this it was carried to such
an extreme that in the election of her kings, the
concurrence or acquiescence of every individual of the nobles and
gentry present in an assembly numbering usually from one hundred
and fifty and fifty to two hundred thousand was required
to make a choice, thus giving to each individual a
vote on his election. So likewise, each member of the Diet,
the supreme legislative body consisting of the King, the Senate, bishops,
and deputies of the nobility and gentry of Palatinates, possessed
a veto on all its proceedings, thus making a unanimous
vote necessary to enact a law or to a dict
any measure whatever. And as if to carry the principle
to the utmost extent, the vito of a single member
not only defeated the particular bill or measuring question, but
prevented all others passed during the session from taking effect. Further,
the principle could not be carried, could not be carried.
It in fact, made every individual of the nobility and
gentry a distinct element of the organism, or, to vary
the expression, made him in a state of the kingdom.
And yet this government lasted in this form more than
two centuries, embracing the periods of Poland's greatest power and renown.
Twice during its existence, she protected Christendom when in danger
by defeating the Turks under the walls of Vienna and
permanently arresting thereby the tide of their Conquestsard, what's the
difference between Poland then and the United States now? If
you thought I was going to say multicultural, multicultural society,
verse is a homogeneous society, you'd be right. Also, he's
writing here at the beginning and going basically, the industrial
revolution is on. Okay, I personally think that the industrial
revolution when people are out there working, when people when
people have to really put in the work to make money,
even the elites, that there's a tendency to there's no
easy there's no real easy money to be made. Sure
there can be easy money monopoly. Sure there can be
easy money in cronyism, but it's not the easiest money.
Once you get out of the industrial once you get
into the age of banking, where you can just make
money by sitting at home if you have enough of
it and you have access to the pawer or you
have like our government right now, government officials can trade,
can inside trade legally. Okay, there's no there's no cohesiveness.
It's every it's every man for himself and I really
think that's what banking and that's what used toe and
the stock market all this, that's what that's what brought
us here that you can you know, there's no skin
in the game, there's no skin in the game. You
just want what you can get. And that's what bringing
in central banking, and that's what brings in the stock market.
Things like that. If you want riches, if you want
a government that's based off of you want a society
that's based off that you think is a healthy society,
because line go up, Well that's our society. Congratulations. It
is true. Her government was finally subverted and the people
subjugated in consequence of the extreme to which the principle
was carried, not however, because of its tendency to dissolution
from weakness, but from the facility it afforded to powerful
and unscrupulous neighbors to control by their intrigues the election
of her kings. But the fact that a government in
which the principle was carried to the utmost extreme not
only existed, but existed for so long a period in
great power and splendor is proof conclusive. Is proof conclusive
both of its practicability and its compatibility with the power
and permanency of government. Another example, not so striking indeed,
but yet deserving notice, is furnished by the government of
a portion of the Aborigines in our country. I refer
to the Confederacy of the Six Nations who inhabited what
now is called the Western portion of the State of
New York. One chief delegate chosen by each nation, associated
with six others of his own selection and making in
all forty two members constituted their federal or general government.
When met, they formed the Council of the Union and
discussed and decided all questions relating to the common welfare.
As in the Polish diet, each member possessed a veto
on its decisions, so that nothing could be done without
the united consents of all. But this, instead of making
the confederacy weaker impracticable, had the opposite effect. It secured
harmony in council and action, and with them a great
increase of power. The Six Nations, in consequence, became the
most powerful of all the Indian tribes within the limits
of our country. They carried their conquest and authority far
beyond the country they originally occupied. I passed for the present.
The most distinguished of all these examples the Roman Republic,
where the veto or negative power was carried not indeed
to the same extreme as in the Polish government, but
very far and with great increase of power and stability,
as I shall show more at large hereafter. It may
be thought, and doubtless many have supposed that the defects
inherent in the government of the numeric whole majority may
be remedied by a free press as the organ of
public opinion, especially in the more advanced stage of society,
so as to supersede the necessity of the concurrent majorities
to counteract this tendency to oppression and abuse of power. Yeah,
we're gonna trust. We're going to trust in the press.
It is not my aim to detract from the importance
of the press in order to underestimate the great power
and influence which it has been given, which it has
given to public opinion. On the contrary, I admit that
these are so great as to entitle it to be
considered a new and important political element. Its influence is
at this press at the present day, on the increase,
and it is highly probable that it may, in combination
with the causes which have contributed to raise it to
its present importance effect in time great changes social and political.
But however important its present influence may be or may
hereafter become, or however great and beneficial the changes to
which it may ultimately lead, it can never counteract the
tendency of the numerical majority to the abuse of power,
nor supersede the necessity of the concurrent as an essential
element in the formation of constitutional governments. These it cannot
affect for two reasons, either of which is conclusive. The
one is that it cannot change the principle of our nature,
which makes constitutions necessary to prevent government from abusing its powers,
and government necessary to protect and perfect society. Constituting as
this principle does an essential part of our nature. No
increase of knowledge and intelligence, no enlargement of our sympathetic feelings,
no influence of education, or modification of the condition of
society can change it. But so long as it shall
continue to be an essential part of our nature, so
long will government be necessary. And so long as this
continues to be necessary, so long will constitutions also be
necessary to counteract its tendency to the abuse of power
and so long must the concurrent majority remain an essential
element in the formation of constitutions. The press may do
much but giving impulse to the progress of knowledge and intelligence,
to aid the cause of education, and to bring about
salutary changes in the condition of society. These, in turn
may do much to explode political errors, to teach how
governments should be constructed in order to fulfill their ends,
and by what means they can be best preserved. When
so constructed. They may also do much to enlarge the
social and to restrain the individual feelings, and thereby to
bring about a state of things. When far less power
will be required by governments to guard against internal disorder
and violence and external danger, and when, of course, the
sphere of power may be greatly contracted, and that of
the liberty proportionally enlarged. Good luck. But all this would
not change the nature of man, nor supersede the necessity
of government. For so long as government exists, the possession
of its control as the means of directing its action
and dispensing its honors and emoluments, will be an object
of desire. While this continues to be the case, it
must in governments of the numerical majority lead to party struggles,
and as has been shown to all the consequences which
necessarily flow in their train, and against which the only
remedy is the concurrent majority. The other reason is to
be found in the nature of the influence which the
press politically exercises. It is similar in most respects to
that of suffrage. They are indeed both organs of public opinion.
The principal difference is that the one has much more
agency in forming public opinion, while the other gives a
more authentic and authoritative expression to it. Regarded in either light,
the press cannot of itself guard any more against the
abuse of power than suffrage. And for the same reason,
if what is called public opinion were always the opinion
of the whole community, the press would, as its organ
be an effective guard against the abuse of power and
supersede the necessity of the concurrent majority, just as the
right of suffrage would do where the community, in reference
to the action of government, had but one interest. But
such is not the case. On the contrary, what is
called public opinion, instead of being the united opinion of
the whole community, is usually nothing more than the opinion
or voice of the strongest interest or combination of interests,
and not unfrequently of a small but energetic and active
portion of the whole that we call an elite m
It'll always be here. This is a pipe dream. Public
opinion in relations to government and its policy is as
much divided and diversified as are the interests of the
community and the press. Instead of being the organ of
the whole, is usually but the organ of these various
and diversified interests, respectively, or rather of the parties growing
out of them. It is used by them as the
means of controlling public opinion and of so molding it
as to promote their peculiar interests and to aid in
caring on the welfare of party. But as the organ
and instrument of parties in governments of the numerical majority,
it is as incompetent as suffrage itself to counteract the
tendency to oppression and abusive power, and can no more
than that supersede the necessity of the concurrent majority. On
the contrary, as the instrument of party warfare, it contributes
greatly to increase party excitement and the violence and virulence
of party struggles, and in the same degree the tendency
to oppression and abuse of power. Instead, then, of superseding
the necessity of the concurrent majority, it increases it by
increasing the violence and force of party feelings in like
manner as party caucuses and party machinery, of the latter
of which indeed it forms an important part. You can
just see how this can't work anymore. Right, In one respect,
and only one, the government of the numerical majority has
the advantage over that of the concurrent if indeed it
can be called an advantage, I refer to its simplicity
and facility of construction. It is simple, indeed, wielded as
it is by a single power, the will of the
greater number, and very easy of construction. For this purpose,
nothing more is necessary than universal suffrage and the regulation
of the manner of voting, so as to give the
greater number to supreme control over every department of government.
When he says universal suffrage, he's not taught universal within
the scope of a certain group. But whatever advantage is,
simplicity and facility of construction may give it. The other
forms of absolute government possessed them in a still higher degree.
The construction of the government of the numerical majority, simple
as it is requires some preliminary measures and arrangements, while
the other, especially the monarchical, will, in its absence or
where it proves incompetent, forced themselves on the community. And
hence I hate when he does that because you can
pull numerous, numerous examples. This isn't one of those things
where these are exceptions. I think Hapa did a really
good job at proving that it's pretty much the rule.
It was the rule. If anything, they were indifferent to
your existence half the time. And even under feudalism, the
feudal lord and the serfs would drink at the same
bar and yeah, yeah, yeah, And hence, among other reasons,
the tendency of all governments is from the more complex
and difficulty of construction to the more simple and easily constructed,
and finally to absolute monarchy as the simple as the
most simple of all complexity and different ficulty of construction
as far as they form. Objections apply not only to
governments to the concurrent majority of the popular form, but
to constitutional but the constitutional governments of every form, the
least complex and the most easily constructed of them are
much more complex and difficult of construction than any of
the absolute forms. Indeed, so great has has this difficulty,
has been this difficulty that their construction has been the
result not so much of wisdom and patriotism as of
favorable combinations of circumstances. They have, for the most part,
grown out of the struggles between conflicting interests, which, for
some fortunate turn have ended in a compromise by which
both parties have been admitted, in some way or another,
to have a separate and distinct voice in the government.
Where this has not been the case, they have been
the product of fortunate circumstances, acting in conjunction with some
pressing danger, which forced the adoption as the only means
by which it could be avoided. It would seem that
it has exceeded human sagacity deliberately to plan and construct
constitutional governments with a full knowledge of the principles on
which they were formed, or to reduce them to practice
without the pressure of some immediate and urgent necessity. Nor
is it surprising that such should be the case, for
it would seem almost impossible for any man or body
of men to be so profoundly and thoroughly acquainted with
the people of any community, which has made any considerable
progress in civilization and wealth, with all the diversified interests
ever accompanying them, as to be able to organize constitutional
governments suited to their condition. But even were this possible,
it would be difficult to find any community sufficiently enlightened
and patriotic to adopt such a government without the compulsion
of some pressing necessity. A constitution to succeed must spring
from the bosom of the community and be adapted to
the intelligence and character of the people, and all the
multifarious relations in turn and external which distinguish one people
from another. If it did not, it will prove in
practice to be not a constitution but a cumbrous and
useless machine, which must be speedily superseded and laid aside
for some other, more simple and better suited to their condition.
There it is, I mean, it's a constitution to succeed
must spring from the bosom of the community. I think
Aaron McIntyre has talked about this. He's like, once you
have to write it down, once you have to write
the laws down. If you have to write the laws
down because you think that's what's going to control the community,
you've lost. I love this. It should spring from the
bosom of the community and be adapted to the intelligence
and character of the people. I don't know how I mean.
This goes to so many arguments. It goes to not
only the I mean obviously the immigration are I mean,
you don't want people coming in here who don't who
can't grasp it, who don't care, who will do anything
to supersede it, to get around it, you know, but
you also have to teach your children. You have to
teach your children. You have to teach each other, you
have to remind each other because you know, one of
the biggest problems with hoppy In, like the hoppy In
Covenant community that I used to always talk about, is
the fact that you know, in a generation, you're going
to have new You're gonna have new members, and you
can teach them and bring them up all you want
in the ways that you of the community, but they
could rebel and then what are you going to do.
Are you going to kick them out and keep them
ritying and kick your kids out because they don't believe
in you know, everything that's on the Covenant constitution. Well
maybe you will. I don't know how you're going how
that will last past one generation? Or two. But hey,
at least you had something there for a while, right,
It's not like you want would want to build anything lasting.
It would thus seem almost necessary that governments should commence
in some one of the simple and absolute forms, which,
however well suited to the community in its earlier stages,
must in its progress, lead to oppression and abuse of power,
and finally to an appeal to force, to be succeeded
by a military despotism, unless the conflicts to which it
leads should be fortunately adjusted by a compromise, which will
give to the respective parties a participation in the control
of the government, and thereby lay the foundation of a
constitutional government, to be afterwards matured and perfected. Such governments
have been emphatically the product of circumstances, and hence the
difficulty of one people imitating the government of another, and
hence also the importance of terminating all civil conflicts by
a compromise which shall prevent either party from obtaining complete
control and thus subjecting the other. Of the different forms
of constitutional governments, the popular is the popular is the
most complex and difficult of construction. It is indeed so
difficult that ours, it is believed, may with truth be
said to be the only one of a purely popular
character of any considerable importance that ever existed of any
considerably importance. Let's see what he says about practicality. The
cause is to be found in the fact that in
the other two forms, society is arranged in artificial orders
or classes. Artificial orders or classes, where these exist, the
line of distinction between them is so strongly marked as
to throw into shade, or otherwise to absorb all interests
which are foreign to them, respectively. Hence, in an aristocracy
all interests are politically reduced to the nobles and the people,
and in a monarchy with a nobility into three, the monarch,
the nobles, and the people. In either case that they
are so few that the sense of each may be
taken separately though its appropriate organ, so as to give
to each a concurrent voice and a negative on the
other through the usual departments of the government, without making
it too complex or too tardy in its movements to
perform with promptness and energy all the necessary functions of government.
The case is different in constitutional governments of the popular form.
In consequence of the absence of these artificial distinctions, the
various natural interests resulting from diversity of pursuits, condition, situation,
and character of different portions of the people, and from
the action of the government itself, rise into prominence and
struggle to obtain the ascendency they will. It is true,
in governments of the numerical majority ultimately coalesce and form
two great parties, but not so closely as to lose
entirely their separate character and existence. These they will, ever,
be ready to reassume when the objects for which they
coalesced are accomplished. To overcome the difficulties occasion by so
great a diversity of interest, or an organism far more complex,
is necessary. Another obstacle difference overcome opposes the formation of
popular constitutional governments. It is much more difficult to terminate
the struggles between conflicting interests by compromise in absolute popular
governments than an aristocracy or monarchy. And an aristocracy. The
object of the people in the ordinary struggle between them
and the nobles, is not, at least in its early stages,
to overthrow the nobility and revolutionize the government, but to
participate in its powers, notwithstanding the oppression to which they
may be subjected. Under this form of government. The people
commonly feel no small degree of respect for the descendants
of the long line of distinguished ancestors, and do not
usually aspire to more in opposing the authority of the
nobles than to pain such a participation in the powers
of the government as will enable them to correct its
abuses enlighten their burdens among the nobility. On the other hand,
it sometimes happens that there are individuals of great influence
with both sides, who have the good sense and patriotism
to interpose in order to affect a compromise by yielding
to the reasonable demands of the people, and thereby to
avoid the hazard of a final and decisive appeal to force.
It is thus, by a judicious and timely compromise the
people in such governments may be raised to a participation
in the administrative sufficient for their protection, without the loss
of authority and the part on the part of the nobles.
In the case of a monarchy, the process is somewhat different.
Where it is a military despotism, that people rarely have
the spirit or intelligence to attempt resistance, or if otherwise,
their resistance must almost necessarily terminate in defeat or in
a mere change of dynasty by the elevation of their
leaders to the throne. It is different where the monarch
is surrounded by a hereditary nobility in a struggle between
him and them. Both, but especially the monarch, are usually
disposed to court the people in order to enlist them
on their respective sides, a state of things highly favorable
to their elevation. In this case, the struggle, if it
should not be continued without decisive results, would almost necessarily
raise them to political importance and to a participation in
the powers of the government. The case is different in
absolute democracy. Party conflicts between the majority and minority, and
such governments can hardly ever terminate and compromise. The object
of the opposing minority is to expel the majority from power,
and of the majority to maintain their hold upon it.
It is on both sides a struggle for the whole,
a struggle that must determine which shall be the governing
and which the subject party, and in character and in character,
object and result, not unlike that be between competitors for
the scepter. In absolute monarchies, its regular course, as has
been shown, is excessive violence and appeal to force, followed
by revolution and terminating at last in the elevations to
supreme power of the general of the successful party, and hence,
among other reasons, aristocracies and monarchies more readily assume the
constitutional form than absolute power governments. Of the three different forms,
the monarchical has the heretofore been much the most prevalent
and generally the most powerful and durable. This result is
doubtless to its attributed principle to be attributed principally to
the fact that in its absolute form it is the
most simple and easily constructed, and hence, as government is indispensable,
communities having too little intelligence to form or preserve the
others naturally fall into this It may also in part
be attributed to another case already alluded to, that its origin,
in its organism and character it is much more more
closely assimilated than either of the other two, to military power,
on which all absolute governments depend for support, and hence
also the tendency of the others of constitutional governments which
have been so badly constructed or become so disorganized as
to require force to support them, to pass into military despotism,
that is, into monarchy in its most absolute and simple form.
And hence again the fact that revelate revolutions and absolute
monarchies end almost invariably in a change of dynasty and
not of the forms of the government, as is almost
universally the case in the other systems. But there are
besides these other causes of the higher character which contribute
much to make monarchies the most prevalent and usually the
most durable governments. Among them, the leading one is they
are the most susceptible to improvement. That is, they can
be more easily and readily modified so as to prevent,
to a limited extent oppression and abuse of power without
assuming the institutional form. In a strict sense. It slides
almost naturally into one of the most important modifications I
refer to hereditary descent. When this becomes well defined and
firmly established, a community or kingdom comes to be regarded
by the sovereign as the hereditary possession of his family,
a circumstance which tends strongly to identify his interests with
those of his subjects, and thereby to mitigate the rigor
of the government. It gives besides great additional security to
his person and prevents in the same degree not only
the suspicion and hostile feelings incidents in security, but invites
all those kindly feelings which naturally spring up on both
sides between those whose interests are identified when there is
nothing to prevent it, and hence the strong feelings of
paternity on the side of the sovereign and of loyalty
on that of his subjects, which are often exhibited in
such governments. There is another improvement of which it is
readily susceptible, nearly allied to the preceding. The hereditary principle,
not unfrequently extends to other families, especially to those of
the distinguished chieftains by whose aid the monarchy was established
when it originates in conquest. When this is the case
and a powerful body of hereditary nobles surround the sovereign,
they opposed a strong resistance to his authority and heat
of theirs, tending to the advantage and security of the people.
Even when they do not succeed in obtaining a participation
in the powers of the government, they usually acquire sufficient
ways to be felt and respected. From this state of things.
Such governments usually, in time settle down on some fixed
rules of action which the sovereign is compelled to respect,
and by which increased protection and security are required by all.
It was thus the enlightened monarchies of Europe. It was
thus that the enlightened monarchies of Europe were formed, under
which the people of that portion of the globe have
made such great advances in power, intelligence, and in civilization. Well,
it's nice of them to say that to these may
be added the greater capacity which governments of the monarchical
form have exhibited to hold under subjugation a large extent
of territory and a numerous population, and which has made
them more powerful than others of a different form, to
the extent that these constitute an element of power. All
these causes combined have given such great and decisive advantages
as to enable them heretofore to absorb in the progress
of events the few governments which have from time to
time assumed different forms, not accepting even the mighty Roman Republic, which,
after attaining the highest point of power, passed seemingly under
the operation of irresistible causes, into a military despotism. I
say heretofore, for it remains to be seen whether they
will continue to retain their advantages in these respects over
the others. Under the great and growing influence of public
opinion and the new and imposing which popular government has
assumed with us, these have already affected great changes, and
will probably affect still greater adverse to the monarchical form.
But as yet these changes have tended rather to the
absolute than to the constitutional form of popular governments, for
reasons which have been explained. If this tendency should continue
permanently in the same direction, the monarchical form must still
retain its advantages and continue to be the most prevalent.
Should this be the case, the alternative will be between
monarchy and popular government in the form of the numerical
majority or absolute democracy, which, as has been shown, is
not the is not only the most fugitive of all
the forms, but has the strongest tendency of all others
to the monarchical if on the other, If on the contrary,
this tendency or the changes referred to, should incline to
the constitutional form of government of popular power, and a
proper organism comes to be regarded as not less indispensable
than the right of suffrage to the establishment of such governments.
In such case that it is not improbable that in
the progress of events, the monarchical will cease to be
the prevalent form of government. Whether they take this direction,
at least for a long time, will depend on the
success of our government and a correct understanding of the
principles of which it is constructed. Or technology can create
great weapons in which you can go to war, and
you can wipe out monarchies through banking too. Through let's
face it, to comprehend more fully the force and bearing
of public opinion, and to form a just estimate of
the changes to which, aided by the press, it will
probably lead politically and socially, it will be necessary to
consider it in connection with the causes that have given
it an influence so rate as to entitle it to
be regarded as a new political element. They will, upon investigation,
be found in the many discoveries and inventions made in
the last few centuries. Among the most prominent of those
are an earlier date. Of those of an earlier date
stand the practical application of the magnetic powers to the
purposes of navigation by the invention of the mariner's compass,
the discovery of the mode of making gunpowder and its
applications to the art of war, and the inventions of
the art of printing. Among the most recent are the
numerous chemical and mechanical discoveries and inventions, and their applications
to the various arts of production. The application of steam
to machinery of almost every description, especially to such as
is as is designed to facilitate transportation and travel by
land and water, And finally, the invention of the magnetic telegraph.
All these have led to important results, though the invention
of the mariner's compass, the globe. Through the invention of
the mariners compass, the globe has been circumnavigated and explored,
and all who inhabit it, with but few exceptions, brought
within the sphere of an all pervading commerce which is
daily diffusing over its surface. The light and blessings of civilization,
though that of the art of printing, Through that of
the art of printing, the fruits of observation and reflection
of discoveries and inventions, with all the accumulated stores of
previously acquired knowledge are preserved and widely diffused. The application
of gunpowder to the art of war has forever settled
the long conflict for ascendency between civilization and barbarism in
favor of the former, and thereby guaranteed that whatever knowledge
is now accumulated, or may hereafter be added, shall never
again be lost. The numerous discoveries and inventions chemical and mechanical,
and the application of steam to machinery, have increased manyfold
the production powers of labor and capital, and have thereby
greatly increased the number who may devote themselves to study
and improvement, and the amount of means necessary for commercial exchanges,
especially between the more and the less advanced in civilized
portions of the globe. To the great advantage of both,
but particularly of the latter, the application of steams to
the purposes of travel and transportation by land and water
have vastly increased the facility, cheapness, and rapidity of both,
diffusing with them information and intelligence almost as quickly and
as freely as it is borne by the winds, while
the electrical wires outstrip them in velocity, rivaling in rapidity.
Though even thought itself, the joint effect of all this
has been a great increase and diffusion of knowledge, and
with this an impulse to progress and civilization heretofore unexampled
in the history of the world, accompanied by a mental
energy and activity unprecedented to all these causes. Public opinion
and its organ the press, oh their origin and great influence.
Already they have attained a force in the more civilized
portions of the globe sufficient to be felt by all governments,
even the most absolute and despotic. But as great as
they now are, they have is yet attained nothing like
their maximum force. It is probable that not one of
these causes, that not one of the causes which have
contributed to the formation and influence, has yet produced its
full effect. While several of the most powerful have just
begun to operate, and many others, probably of equal or
even greater force, yet remain to be brought to light.
It's good looking ahead by him when the causes now
in operation have produced their full effect, and inventions and
discoveries shall have been exhausted. If that may ever be,
they will give a force to public opinion and cause
changes political and social difficult to be anticipated. What will
be their final bearing. Time can only decide with any
certain andy that they will, however, greatly improve the condition
of man. Ultimately, it would be impious to doubt. It
would be to suppose that the all wise and beneficent, beneficent,
beneficent creator, being the creator of all, had so constituted
man as that the employment of the high intellectual faculties
with which he has been pleased to endow him, in
order that he may develop the laws that control the
great agents of the material world and make them subservience
to his use, would prove to him the cause of
permanent evil, and not of permanent good. If then such
a supposition be admissible, they must, in their orderly and
full development, end in his permanent good. But this cannot
be unless the ultimate effect of their action politically shall
be to give acendency to that form of government best
calculated to fulfill the ends for which government is ordained. For.
So completely does the well being of our race depend
on good government that it is hardly possible any chance.
It is hardly possible any change the ultimate effect of
which should be otherwise could prove to be a permanent good.
It is, however, not improbable that many and great but
temporary evils will follow the changes that have affected and
are destined to effect. It seems to be a law,
in the political as well as in the material world,
that great changes cannot be made except very gradually, without
convulsions and revolutions, to be followed by calamities in the beginning,
however beneficial they may prove to be in the end,
the first effect of such changes on long established governments
will be to unsettle the opinions and principles in which
they originated and which have guided their policy before those
which the changes are calculated to form and established are
fairly developed and understood. The interval between the decay of
the old and the formation of the establishment of the
new constitutes a period of transition which must always necessarily
be one of uncertainty, confusion, error, and wild and fierce fanaticism.
I'm gonna leave it right there. I can't think of
a more perfect place to stop and finish the next time,
Page ninety governments. All right, I hope you're getting a
lot out of this. I think that Calhoun is indispensable
to understand where a political mind was at at the
time and what he saw the future. And it's really
easy to see that he knew that all this was
going to fall apart, that it would It wasn't going
to work the way he wanted it to work, as
much as he would want it to. It wasn't gonna
it wasn't going to turn out the way he wanted.
So that's it. I'm not going to tack an add
on to the front of this. So if you go
to freemamby on the Wall dot com forward slash support,
you can support the show. This episode had ads in it.
You can avoid the ads by and get the show
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they take care of our people and they make sure
that we don't experience any censorship. And yeah, we'll be
back for the finish, the final episode, which would be
part five of Calhoun's disposition on Government, and then I've
already decided what the next one is going to be,
and it's going to be long. There's gonna be as
long as it could be. You know some books that
I would love to read but would take twenty to
thirty episodes, but this one could take possibly a couple
more than Race Warre in High School did. So that's it.
See on the next We'll see it for the final
episode of John C. Calhoun's Disquisition on Government. I want
to welcome everyone back to the finale of John C.
Calhouns A Disquisition on Government. Let's get this done with
so I can move on to my next project, my
next reading, which I'm sure a lot of you will
be interested in. So I'm going to pick up where
we left off, and I'm going to go to the end.
All right. The governments are the more advanced and civilized
portions of the world are now in the midst of
this period. It has proved and will continue to prove
a severe trial to existing political institutions of every form.
Those governments which have not the sagacity to perceive what
is truly pub opinion, to distinguish between it and the
mere clamor of faction or shouts of fanaticism, and the
good sense and firmness to yield timely and cautiously to
the claims of the one, and to resist promptly and
decidedly the demands of the other, are doomed to fall.
Few will be able successfully to pass through this period
of transition, and these not without shocks and modifications more
or less considerable. It will endure until the governing and
the governed shall better understand the ends for which government
is ordained, and the form best adapted to accomplish them,
under all the circumstances in which communities may be respectively placed.
I shall, in conclusion, proceed to exemplify the elementary principles
which have been established by giving a brief account of
the origin and character of the governments of Rome and
Great Britain, the two most remarkable and perfect of their
perspective forms of constitutional government. The object is to show
how these these principles were applied in the more simple
forms of such governments, preparatory to the preparatory to an
exposition of the mode in which they have been applied
in our own more complex system. It will appear that
in each the principles are the same, and that the
difference in their application resulted from the different situation and
social condition of the respective communities. They were modified in
each so as to conform to these and hence their
remarkable success. They were applied to communities in which hereditary
rank had long prevailed. Their respective constitutions originated in concession
to the people, and through them they acquired a participation
in the powers of government. But with us they were
applied to communities which all political rank and distinction between
citizens were excluded, and where government had its orige origin
in the will of the people. His idea of the concurrent,
you get the idea that in his idea, the concurrent
majority would be a perfect kind of polity, for a
perfect kind of system, for a people who know each other,
who respect each other, who have foundations in the same things,
who built upon, who come from the same place, who
share the same culture, share the same background, share the
same religion. But when it comes down to multiculturalism, it's
just not going to happen. Factions are going to fight
against each other or in. McIntyre had a great, great
tweet today in which he said that I will find
it because I don't want to mess it up. He said,
once men and women become political interest groups, your civilization
is over. The total state is the politicization of every
aspect of society, and nothing demolish is social coordination. Faster
than introducing this into the sexual dynamic and family formation.
If politics has come down to men's rights and women's rights,
you're lost. You're done so a concurrent majority. You can
never have a concurrent majority in that you can't have
one in this system. But however different their origin and character,
it will be found that the object in each was
the same to blend and harmonize the conflicting interests of
the community, and the means the same. Taking the sense
of each class or portion through its appropriate organ and
considering the concurrent sense of all as the sense of
the whole community. Such being the fact, an accurate and
clear conception how this was affected in their more simple
forms will enable us better to understand how it was
accomplished in our far more refined, artificial and complex form.
It is well known to all the least conversant with
their history that the Roman people consisted of two distinct
orders or classes, the patricians and the plebeians, and that
the line of distinction was so strongly drawn that for
a long time the right of intermarriage between them was prohibited.
After the overthrow of the monarchy and the expulsion of
the Tarkans, the governments fell exclusively under the control of
the patricians, who, with their client and dependence, formed at
the time a very numerous and powerful body. At first,
while there was danger of the return of the exiled family,
they treated the Plebeian the Plebeians with kindness. I'm not
going to say Plebeians. I'm going to say Plebeians with kindness,
because that's the way I learned it in school. But
after it had passed away with oppression and cruelty. It
is not necessary, with the object in view, to enter
into a minute account of the various acts of oppression
and cruelty to which they were subjected. It is sufficient
to state that, according to the usage of war at
the time, the territory of a conquered people became the
property of the conquerors, and that the Plebeians were harassed
and oppressed by incessant wars, in which the danger and
toil were theirs, while all the fruits of victory, the
lands of the vanquished, and the spoils of war accrued
to the benefit of their oppressors. The result was such
as might be expected. They were impoverished and forced from
necessity to borrow from the patricians. At Eusyrius and exorbitant interests,
funds with which they had been enriched through their blood
and toil, and to pledge their all for repayment at
stipulated periods. In case of default, the pledge became forfeited,
and under the provisions of law, in such cases, the
debtors were liable to be seized and sold or imprisoned
by their creditors in private jails prepared and kept for
the purpose. These savage provisions were enforced with the utmost
rigor against the indebted and impoverished pablion they constituted, indeed
an essential part of the system through which they were
plundered and oppressed by the patricians. A system so oppressive
could not be endured. The natural consequences followed. Deep hatred
was engendered between the orders, accompanied by factions, violence, and corruption,
which distracted and weakened the government. At length, an incident
occurred which roused the indignation of the Plebeians to the
utmost pitch, and which ended in an open rupture between
the two orders. An old soldier who had long served
the country and had fought with bravery in twenty eight battles,
made his escape from the prison of his creditor, squalid,
pale and famished. He implored the protection of the Plebeians.
A crowd surrounded him, and his tale of service to
the country and the cruelty to which he had been
treated by his creditor, kindled the flame, which continued to
rage until it extended to the army. It refused to
continue any longer in service crosty Onio and took possession
of the sacred mount. The patricians divided an opinion as
to the course which should be pursued. The more violent
insisted on an appeal to arms, but fortunately the Council
of the Moderate, which recommended concession and compromise, prevailed. Commissioners
were appointed to treat with the arm with the army,
and a formal compact was entered into between the orders
and ratified by the oaths of each, which conceded to
the Plebeians the right to elect two tribunes as to
protectors of their order, and made their persons sacred. The
number was afterwards increased to ten, and their election by
centuries changed to elections by tribe, a mode by which
the Plebeians secured a decided preponderance. Such was the origin
of the tribunit, which in process of time opened all
the honors of the government to the plebeians. They acquired
the right not only a veto in the passage of
all laws, but also their execution, and thus obtained, through
their tribunes, a negative on the entire higher action of
the government, without divesting the patricians of their control over
the Senate, but this arrangement the government. By this arrangement,
the government was placed under the concurrent and joint voice
of the two orders, expressed through separate and appropriate organs,
the one possessing the positive and the other the negative
powers of the government. This simple change converted it from
an absolute into a constitutional government, from a government of
the patricians only to that of the whole Roman people,
and from an aristocracy into a republic. In doing this,
it laid a solid foundation of Roman liberty and greatness.
A superficial observer would pronounce the government so organized as
that one should have the power of making and executing
the laws in another, or the representatives of another, the
unlimited authority of preventing their enactment and execution, if not
wholly impracticable, at least too feeble to stand the shocks
to which all governments are subject are subject, and would
therefore predict this speedy dissolution after a distracted and glorious career.
How different from the result. Instead of distraction, it proved
to be proved to be the bond of concord and harmony,
instead of weakness and unequal strength, And instead of a
shortening glorious career, one of great length and immortal glory.
It moderated the conflicts between the orders, harmonized their interests,
and blended them into one. Substituted devotion to country in
the place of devotion to particular orders, called forth the
united strength and energy of the whole, and the hour
of danger raised to power the wives of the patriotic
elevated the Roman name above all others, extended her authority
and dominion over the greater part of the then known world,
and transmitted the influence of her laws and institutions to
the present day. Had the opposite council prevailed that this
crucial juncture, had an appeal had been made to arms
instead of the concession and compromise, Rome, instead of being
what she afterwards became, would in all probability have been
an inglooryious and as little known to posterity as the
insignificant states which surrounded her, whose names and existence would
have been long consigned to oblivion had they not been
preserved in the history of her conquests of them. But
for the wise course then adopted, it is not improbable,
whichever order might have prevailed, that she would have fallen
under some cruel and petty tyrant and finally been conquered
by some of the neighboring states, or or by the
Carthaginians or the Gauls. To the fortunate turn which events
then took, she owed her unbounded sway and imperishable renown.
It is true that the tribuneit, after raising her to
a height of power and prosperity never before equaled, finally
became one of the instruments by which her liberty was overthrown.
But it was not until she became exposed to new
dangers growing out of the increase of wealth and the
great extent of her dominions against which the tribunit furnished
no guards. What's he saying Its original object was the
protection of the Plebeians against depression and abusive power on
the part of the Patricians. This is thoroughly accomplished. That
this it thoroughly accomplished. But it had no power to
protect the people of the numerous and wealthy conquered countries
from being plundered by consuls and proconsuls. Nor could it
prevent the plunderers from using the enormous wealth which they
extorted from the impoverished and ruined and ruined provinces to
corrupt and debase to people, nor arrest the formations of
part formation of parties, irrespective of the old division of
patricians and plebeians, having no other object than to obtain
the control of the government for the purpose of plunder.
Against these formidable evils, her constitution furnished no adequate security.
Under their baneful influence, the possession of the government became
the object of the most violent conflicts, not between patricians
and probelions, but between profligate and corrupt factions. They continued
with increasing violence until finally Rome sunk, as must every
community under similar circumstances beneath the strong grasp the despotic
rule of the chieftain of the successful party. The sad
but only alternative which remained to prevent universal violence, confusion,
and anarchy. The republic had in reality ceased to exist
long before the establishment of the empire. The interval was
filled by the rule of ferocious, corrupt, and bloody factions.
There was, indeed, a small but patriotic body of eminent
individuals who struggled in vain to correct abuses and to
restore the government to its primitive character and purity, and
who sacrificed their lives and their endeavors to accomplish an
objects so virtuous and noble. But it can be, but
it can be no disparagement to the tribunet that the
great powers conferred on it for wise purposes, and which
it had so fully accomplished, should be seized upon during
this violence and corrupt interval to overthrow the liberty it
had established and so long nourished and supported. It's very
interesting that the when you look at civilizations through history,
that as long as they stayed tight knit, as long
as they stayed homogeneous, things were fine. As soon as
they started to try to branch out or got overrun.
Obviously overrun, but branch out bring people in from the outside,
get rich. It's when things start to fall apart. In
assigning such consequence to the tribunit. I must not overlook
other important provisions of the constitution of the Roman government.
The Senate, as far as we are in form seems
to have been admirably constituted to secure consistency and steadiness
in action. The power, when the Republic was exposed to
eminent danger to appoint a dictator vested for a limited
period with almost boundless authority the two councils in the
manner of electing them. The auguries, the Cibilian books, the priesthood,
and the censorship, all of which ip pertained to the patricians,
were perhaps indispensable to withstand the vast and apparently irregular
powers power of the tribunit, while the possession of such
great powers by the patricians made it necessary to give
proportionate strength to the only organ which the Pablians could
act on the government with effect. The government was indeed
powerfully constituted and apparently well proportioned, both in its positive
and negative organs. It was truly an iron government. Without
the tribunit, it proved to be one of the most
oppressive and cruel that ever existed, but with it one
of the strongest and the best. The origin and character
of the British government are so well known that a
very brief sketch with object in view will suffice the
causes which ultimately into its present form commenced with the
Norman conquest. This introduced a feudal system with its necessary appendages,
a hereditary monarchy and nobility, the former in the line
of the chief who led the invading army, and the
latter and that of his distinguished followers. They became his
feud feudatories. The country, both land and people, the latter
its serfs, was divided between them. Conflicts soon followed between
the monarch and the nobles, as must ever be the
case under such systems. They were followed in the progress
of events by efforts on both parts of monarchs and
nobles to conciliate the favor of the people. They, in consequence,
gradually rose to power. At every step of their assent,
they became more important, and were more and more courted,
until at length their influence was so sensibly felt that
they were summoned to attend the meeting of Parliament by delegates, not, however,
as in a state of the realm or constituent member
of the body politic the first summons came from the nobles,
and was designed to conciliate their good feelings and secure
their cooperation in the war against the king. This was
followed by one from him, but his object was simply
to have them present at the meeting of his parliament
in order to be consulted by the crown on questions
relating to taxes and supplies, not indeed to discuss the
right to lay the one and to raise the other,
for the King claimed the arbitrary authority to do both,
but with a view to facilitate their collection and to
reconcile them to their imposition. From this humble beginning, they,
after a long struggle accompanied by many vicissitudes, raised themselves
to be considered one of the estates of the realm, and, finally,
in their effort to enlarge and secure what they had gained,
overpowered for a time the other two estates, and thus
concentrated all power in a single estate or body. Give
me a second here, a decent real quick all right?
This in effect made the government absolute and led to
consequences which, as by a fixed law, must ever result
in popular governments of this form, namely to organize parties
or rather factions contending violently to obtain or retain the
control of the government, and this again by laws almost
as uniform to the concentration of all the powers of
government in the hands of the military commander of the
successful party. His heir was too feeble to hold the
scepter he had grasped, and the general discontent with the
results of the revolution led to the restoration of the
old dynasty without defining the limits between the powers of
the respective estates. After a short interval, another revolution followed
in which the lords and commons united against the king.
This terminated in his overthrow and the transfer of the
crown to a collateral branch of the family, accompanied by
a declaration of rights which defined the power of the
several estates of the realm and finally perfected and established
the Constitution. Thus, a feudal monarchy was converted, through a
slow but steady process of many centuries, into a highly
refined constitutional monarchy without changing the basis of the original government.
As it now stands, the realm consists of three estates,
the King, the Lord's temporal and spiritual, and the commons.
The Parliament is to grand council. It possesses the supreme power.
It enacts laws by the concurring assent of the Lords
and Commons, subject to the approval of the King. The
executive power is vested in the monarch, who is regarded
as constituting the first estate. Although irresponsible himself, he can
only act through responsible ministers and agents. They are responsible
to the other estates, to the Lords as constituting the
High Court, before whom all the servants of the Crown
may be tried from malpractices and crimes against the realm
or official delinquencies, And to the Commons as possessing the
impeaching power and constituting the granding in quest of the kingdom.
These provisions, with their legislative powers, especially that of withholding supplies,
give them a controlling influence on the executive department, virtually
and virtually a participation in its powers, so that the
acts of the government throughout its entire range may be
fairly considered as the results of the concurrent and joint
action of the three estates, and as these embrace all
the orders of the concurrent and joint action of the
Estates of the realm. He would take he would take
an imperfect He would take an imperfect and false view
of the subject. Who would consider the King in his
mere individual character, or even as the head of the
royal family, as constituting an estate regarded in either light,
so far from deserving to be considered as the first
estate and the head of the realm as he is,
he would represent an interest too inconsiderable to be an
object of special protection. Instead of this, he represents what
in reality is habitually and naturally the most powerful interests
all things considered under every form of government in all
civilized communities. The tax consuming interest, or more broadly, the
great interests, which necessarily grows out of the action of
the government, be its form that it may the interest
that lives by the government. It is composed of recipients
of its honors and emoluments, and may be properly called
the government interest or party. In contradistinction to the rest
of the community, or as they may be properly called,
the people or commons. The one comprehends all who are
supported by the government, and the other and the other
all who support the government. And it is only because
the former are strongest all things being considered, that they
are enabled to retain for any considerable time, advantages so
great and commanding, this great and predominant interest is naturally
represented by a single head, for it is impossible, without
being so represented, to distribute the honors and emoluments of
the government among government among those who compose it, without
producing discord and conflict. And it is only by preventing
these that advantages so tempting can be long retained. And
hence the strong tendency of this great interest to the
monarchical form, that is to be represented by a single individual.
On the contrary, the antagonistic interests, that which supports the
government has the opposite tendency, a tendency to be represented
by many, because a large assembly can better judge than
one individual or a few, what burdens the community can bear,
and how it can be most equally distributed and easily collected.
Good luck. In the British government, the King constitutes an
estate because he is the head and representative of of
this great interest. He is the conduit through which all
the honors and emoluments of the government flows, while the
House of Commons, according to the theory of the government,
is the head and representative of the opposite, the great
tax paying interest by which the government is supported. Between
these great interests, there is necessarily a constant and strong
tendency to conflict, which, if not counteracted, must end in
violence and an appeal to force, to be followed by revolution.
As has been explained. To prevent this, the House of Lords,
as one of the estates of the realm, is interposed
and constitutes the conservative power of the government. It consists,
in fact, of that portion of the government who are
the principal recipients of the honors, emoluments, and other advantages
derived from the government, and whose condition cannot be improved
but must be made worse by the triumph of either
of the conflicting estates over the other. And hence it
is opposed to the ascendency of either, and in favor
of preserving the equilibrium between them. This sketch, brief as
it is, is sufficient to show that these two constitutional governments,
by far the most illustrious of their respective kinds, conformed
to the principles that have been established alike in their
origin and in their construction. The constitutions of both originated
in a pressure occasioned by conflicts interest between hostile classes
or orders, and were intended to meet the pressing exigencies
of the occasion, neither party, it would seem, having any
conception of the principles involved or the consequences to follow
beyond the immediate objects in contemplation. It would indeed seem
almost impossible for constitutional governments founded on orders or classes
to originate in any other manner. It is difficult to
conceive that any people among whom they did not exist
would or could voluntarily institute them in order to establish
such governments. While it is not at all wonderful that
they would grow out of the conflicts between orders or
classes when aided by a favorable combination of circumstances. The
constitutions of both rest on the same principle, an organism
by which the voice of each order or class is
taken through its appropriate organ and which requires the concurring
voice of all to constitute that of the whole community.
The effects, too, were the same, in both to unite
and harmonize conflicting interests, to strengthen attachments to the whole community,
and to moderate that to the respective orders or classes.
To rally all in the hour of danger around the
standard of their country, to elevate the feeling of nationality,
and to develop power moral and physical to an extraordinary extent.
Yet each has the distinguishing figures resulting from the difference
of their organisms and the circumstances of which they respectively originated.
In the government of Great Britain, the three orders are
blended in the legislative department, so that the separate and
concurring act of each is necessary to make laws. While,
on the contrary, in the Roman, one order had the
power of making laws and another of annulling them or
arresting their execution. Each had its peculiar advantages. The Roman
developed more fully the love of country and the feelings
of nationality. I am a Roman citizen was pronounced with
a pride and elevation of sentiment never perhaps felt before
or since by any citizen or subject of any community
in announcing the country to which he belonged. It also
developed more fully the power of community, taking into consideration
their respective population and the state of the art of arts.
At the different periods. Rome developed more power comparatively than
Great Britain ever has vast as that is and has been,
or perhaps than any other community ever did. Hence the
mighty control she acquired from a beginning so humble. But
the British government is far superior to that of Rome,
and its adaptation and capacity to embrace under its control
extensive dominions without subverting its constitution. In other words, they
can be an empire without the constitution falling apart. Well
in this respect, the Roman constitution was effective, and in
consequence soon began to exhibit marks of decay after Rome
had extended her dominions beyond Italy. While the British holds
under its way without apparently impairing either an empire equal
to that under the weight of which the constitution and
liberty of Rome were crushed. The great advantage it derives
from its different structure, especially that of the Executive Department
of the Executive Department, and the character of its conservative principle.
The former is so constructed as to prevent, in consequence
of its unity and hereditary character, the violent and factious
struggles to obtain the control of the government and with
it the vast patronage, which distracted, corrupted, and finally subverted
the Roman Republic. Against this fatal disease, the latter had
no security whatever, While the British government, besides the advantages
it possesses in this respect from the structure of its
executive department, has, in the character of its conservative principle,
another and powerful security against it. Its such that patronage,
instead of weakening, strengthens it. For the greater the patronage
of the government, the greater will it be the share
which falls the estate constituting the conservative department of the government.
And the more eligible its condition, the greater its opposition
to any radical change in its form. The two causes
combined give to the government a greater capacity of holding
under subjection extensive dominions without subverting the Constitution or destroying liberty,
than has ever been possessed by any other. It is difficult, indeed,
to assign any limit to its capacity in this respect.
The most probable which can be assigned is its ability
to bear increased burdens the taxation necessary to meet the
expenses incidents of the acquisition and government of such vast
dominions may prove in the end so heavy as to
crush under its weight the laboring and productive portions of
the population. I have now finished this brief sketch I
proposed of the ore and character of these two renowned
governments and shall proceed to consider the character, origin, and
structure of the government of the United States. It differs
from the Roman and British more than they differ from
each other. And although an existing government of recent origin,
its character and structure are perhaps less understood than these others.
And if you want to read about that, it's called
a Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States.
You can read that on your own, all right. It
reminds me of when he was talking about Rome, was
saying Rome. People didn't love Rome because it was great.
Rome was great because people loved Rome. And it seems
like when the people like something, when they love something,
when they're investing in something, it sticks around, it will
keep its form. But unfortunately, we've just gotten to the
point where even through this, reading five readings of this,
you see that what he was proposing and would have
been proposed since the beginning, just couldn't be held onto
And you can make you can look at him talking
about Britain becoming an empire but still being able to
hold their constitutions together, and a lot of people point
to the beginning of our empire building which they say
turn of the century. In nineteen to twentieth and see
how things fell apart there. But two World wars didn't help,
Cold War didn't help, and basically getting involved in other
people's businesses where we could have been concentrated on. I
think even at a Point and Run nineteen ninety one
where the Soviet Union fell and Pat Buchannan said, great,
no more enemies, let's concentrate on the homeland. If they
hadn't decided to switch over to concentrating on Islam, things
would be a lot different now. But yeah, it's hard
to say mistakes were made. Long before the nineteen ninety
one we still lived under a basically Nuremberg New New Deal,
anti fascist regime. Nineteen ninety one you already started seeing
political correctness coming through, and yeah, so can it be?
Would it have? It? Probably would have kicked the can
down the road a little bit. But people would have
got tired, They would have got tired of peace, and
they would have won a war. They would have wanted enemies.
And that's the way. It's the way elites look look
at things. They see war, see an enemy, see it
as something that can bring people together, common enemy. People
in Hawaii volunteering for the military after nine to eleven,
even though there were no attacks anywhere near it. We're
all Americans, right, but I think falling more and more
away from that. So it's like I said, through this
whole thing, I don't think any of this is gonna
is going to help us. I just think it shows
where we went wrong and shows what doesn't work, and
then we need something new. And that's about it. Look
forward to my next reading. There were ads on this,
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onto the next reading. Take care bye,