Speaker 1: Have you ever stopped to think that ransomware, this thing
Speaker 1: that feels like a modern digital plague, isn't actually news
Speaker 1: a threat that's been quietly evolving for decades. What's really surprising,
Speaker 1: I think, is how it went from pretty simple beginnings
Speaker 1: to being this incredibly stealthy, sophisticated weapon we see today.
Speaker 2: Exactly, It's got quite a history.
Speaker 1: So today we're taking a deep dive into the world
Speaker 1: of ransomware. We're drawing insights straight from Revendrodos's book Ransomware
Speaker 1: Penetration Testing and Contingency Planning. Think of this as your
Speaker 1: shortcut to getting really well informed on well a super
Speaker 1: critical cybersecurity topic.
Speaker 2: It really is critical.
Speaker 1: We'll explore the well surprising timeline of how ransomware evolved,
Speaker 1: will dissect how big global events like the COVID nineteen
Speaker 1: pandemic totally reshape the threat landscape, and we'll unpack some
Speaker 1: infamous real world attacks.
Speaker 2: And crucially the defenses too.
Speaker 1: Right Most importantly, will uncover the practical strategies you really
Speaker 1: need to know for preventing and just as vital, recovering
Speaker 1: from these increasingly sophisticated threats. Expect some aha moments you
Speaker 1: know or covering everything from that agonizing question of whether
Speaker 1: to pay the ransom all the way to the strategic
Speaker 1: importance of things like penetration testing and solid contingency plans.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's not just about understanding the problem exactly.
Speaker 1: It's about equipping you with the knowledge to mitigate the
Speaker 1: risks and actually fortify your digital world. Okay, so let's
Speaker 1: start by rewinding way back nineteen eighty nine. Can you
Speaker 1: believe the very first ransomware attack, the AIDS trojan, was launched.
Speaker 2: Then it seems like ancient history and tech terms, doesn't it.
Speaker 1: It really does. Joseph L. Pop, a biology professor, actually
Speaker 1: mailed out twenty thousand infected floppy discs floppy disks to
Speaker 1: attendees of a WHO conference.
Speaker 2: Wow physical media, right.
Speaker 1: The program encrypted their files and demanded a check, a
Speaker 1: physical check for one hundred and eighty nine dollars sent
Speaker 1: to an address in Panama. But interestingly, it was actually
Speaker 1: pretty easy to reverse engineer.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it wasn't exactly technically sophisticated, even for the time,
Speaker 2: but it established the concept.
Speaker 1: It did earned Pop the informal title father of ransomware.
Speaker 2: What's really fascinating, though, is what happened next, or rather
Speaker 2: what didn't happen after that Aid's trojan. Things went quiet
Speaker 2: for well almost fifteen years in the ransomware world.
Speaker 1: Fifteen years. That's a long gap, it is.
Speaker 2: But it wasn't total inactivity. It was more like the
Speaker 2: quiet before the storm, you know, as the whole dot
Speaker 2: com thing boomed, two new variants sort of crept onto
Speaker 2: the scene. There was GP codes spread through malicious links
Speaker 2: and phishing emails demanded like twenty.
Speaker 1: Bucks, twenty dollars, okay, yeah, and.
Speaker 2: Like the AIDS turgeon, it was pretty easily cracked. Then
Speaker 2: you had our achieves. Now this one actually tried using
Speaker 2: a much stronger encryption oneenty twenty four bit RSA. That
Speaker 2: was a big step up technically.
Speaker 1: Okay, so they were getting more ambitious definitely.
Speaker 2: But the attackers made a rookie mistake. They used weak passwords,
Speaker 2: so victims could still recover their data pretty easily. It
Speaker 2: shows this early kind of trial and error phase. Attackers
Speaker 2: were focused more on quantity getting it out there, not
Speaker 2: so much on sophistication.
Speaker 1: Yet setting the stage really.
Speaker 2: Exactly, it laid the groundwork for this relentless cat and
Speaker 2: mouse game we're still in today, every defense leads to
Speaker 2: a new attack method.
Speaker 1: Okay, Building on that, the twenty tens, this is where
Speaker 1: things got really serious, right. Ransomware strains became way more powerful,
Speaker 1: more in cities, a real turning point, absolutely.
Speaker 2: That's when we saw the locker variants pop up right.
Speaker 1: Rollmlock was the first one that actually locked users completely
Speaker 1: out of their devices.
Speaker 2: Yeah, total lockout. And then twenty twelve, Reveton arrived, and
Speaker 2: this was big because it introduced ransomware as a service race.
Speaker 1: So like cybercrime is a subscription model pretty.
Speaker 2: Much, allowing less skilled attackers to basically rent out attack
Speaker 2: capabilities on the dark web made it much more scalable.
Speaker 2: Reveton also did that thing where it accused victims of
Speaker 2: fake crimes.
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I remember that, like a fake FBI.
Speaker 2: Warning exactly, And it was a first to demand and bitcoin.
Speaker 2: That shift to virtual currency was huge untraceable payments.
Speaker 1: But the real game changer, the one everyone remembers from
Speaker 1: that era was Crypto Locker, wasn't it.
Speaker 2: Oh definitely. Crypto Locker up the anti massively. It combined
Speaker 2: the locker idea with serious encryption. Crypto used a two
Speaker 2: thy forty eight bit RSA.
Speaker 1: Key which is really strong.
Speaker 2: Incredibly strong, made recovery basically impossible without paying for the key.
Speaker 2: It mostly spread through phishing attachments, you know, infected email attachments,
Speaker 2: and it was insanely profitable, pulled in nearly twenty seven
Speaker 2: million dollars in just two months.
Speaker 1: Twenty seven million. Wow. That kind of money definitely.
Speaker 2: Gets attention, It absolutely does, and that success naturally led
Speaker 2: attackers to think bigger, you know, expand their target.
Speaker 1: Right because up until around twenty fifteen, it was mostly
Speaker 1: Windows machines getting hit, wasn't.
Speaker 2: It Almost exclusively Windows? But then simple Locker showed up
Speaker 2: in twenty fifteen and it specifically went after Android phones,
Speaker 2: encrypting files on sd cars, documents, photos, videos, Mobile became
Speaker 2: a target yep, and another one locker Pin also hit Android.
Speaker 2: It didn't just encrypt, it locked the device and changed
Speaker 2: the pin. And crucially, there was a version called Linux
Speaker 2: dot and coder dot one made just for Linux systems, so.
Speaker 1: Linux two nowhere was safe.
Speaker 2: Pretty much. It signaled that no os, no device type
Speaker 2: was off limits anymore. The attack surface just exploded and.
Speaker 1: The escalation just kept going. Twenty sixteen to twenty twenty,
Speaker 1: ransomware went truly global and got way deadlier, a huge
Speaker 1: leap in well destructive power, it really did.
Speaker 2: We saw ransom thirty two impacting JavaScript. But then these
Speaker 2: four new global variants emerged that just changed everything. Okay,
Speaker 2: like what, Well, First you had Petya. This was the
Speaker 2: first one to lock the master boot record.
Speaker 1: The NBR, so it stops the computer from even starting up.
Speaker 2: Exactly, renders the whole system unusable before Windows even loads.
Speaker 2: Then Zcryptor was the first to use worms self replicating malware.
Speaker 2: It could spread incredibly fast, turning into a ransom.
Speaker 1: Worm spreading on its own scary very.
Speaker 2: Then, of course want to Cry one of the deadliest evers,
Speaker 2: infected over one hundred thousand devices one hundred and fifty countries,
Speaker 2: spread like wildfire using that internal blue vulnerability.
Speaker 1: The leaked NSA exploit.
Speaker 2: Right, that's the one. Then GoldenEye came along, basically a
Speaker 2: mashup of Petia and WannaCry, but with even stronger encryption.
Speaker 1: Just getting worse and worse.
Speaker 2: And then not Petya. This one added a terrifying twist.
Speaker 2: It didn't just lock files, it could actually delete them
Speaker 2: if the ransom wasn't paid quickly enough, delete them.
Speaker 1: Yeah, Oh wow, that's a whole other level of pressure.
Speaker 2: Absolutely raising the stakes dramatically, which brings us closer to today.
Speaker 2: The twenty twenties marked another big shift, this time in
Speaker 2: attacker strategy.
Speaker 1: How So, we started.
Speaker 2: Seeing double extortion becoming really common. Attackers wouldn't just encrypt
Speaker 2: your files anymore. It also steal sensitive data like personally
Speaker 2: identifiable information PII.
Speaker 1: I'm threatened to leak it exactly.
Speaker 2: Leak it publicly or sell it on the dark web.
Speaker 2: Adds a whole new layer of pressure. You're not just
Speaker 2: worried about getting your systems back, You're worried about the
Speaker 2: massive data breach becoming public right.
Speaker 1: The reputational damage too huge.
Speaker 2: And alongside that we saw the rise of big game.
Speaker 1: Hunting, targeting the big fish precisely.
Speaker 2: Instead of spraying attacks widely, they started specifically targeting large
Speaker 2: corporations organizations they knew could afford massive ransoms. These attackers
Speaker 2: are patient, sophisticated. They might stock it systems for months
Speaker 2: looking for weaknesses, often exploiting things like Remote Desktop Protocol
Speaker 2: RDP or server flaws.
Speaker 1: Like that Revial attack in twenty twenty one.
Speaker 2: That's a prime example, affected over a million devices, through
Speaker 2: a supply chain attack demanding a staggering seventy million dollars
Speaker 2: shows just how targeted and potentially lucrative these operations became.
Speaker 1: Okay, before we move on, maybe we should quickly clarify something.
Speaker 1: People often use malware and ransomware interchangeably, right, But there's
Speaker 1: a difference.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a good point. They're related, but not the same.
Speaker 2: Think of malware as the umbrella term for any malicious software, viruses, worms, spyware, adware, unise.
Speaker 2: It goal is usually to cause damage, disrupt systems.
Speaker 1: Or steal info, and ransomware is.
Speaker 2: Ransomware is a specific type of malware. Its primary defining
Speaker 2: purpose is extortion. It's designed specifically to lock you out
Speaker 2: of your device or encrypt your data and hold it
Speaker 2: hostage until you pay a ransom. It mainly spreads via phishing,
Speaker 2: and it's notoriously hard to remove without paying, which, as
Speaker 2: we'll discuss, is usually a bad idea.
Speaker 1: Whereas other malware can often be cleaned up by antivirus software.
Speaker 2: Often yes, standard antivirus or anti malware tools can frequently
Speaker 2: detect and remove many types of malware, Ransomware, especially the
Speaker 2: encrypting kind, is a much tougher beast once it's taken hold.
Speaker 2: The key difference is that extortion.
Speaker 1: Motive got it. Okay, so we've seen how the threats evolved.
Speaker 1: Now let's talk about how external events can just completely
Speaker 1: change the game. The COVID nineteen pandemic, I mean, it
Speaker 1: turned everything upside down almost overnight, didn't it force this
Speaker 1: massive rapid shift to remote work.
Speaker 2: Oh completely Suddenly you had what ninety nine percent of
Speaker 2: the workforce trying to connect remotely. That speed, that urgency
Speaker 2: to just get at working created huge cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Speaker 1: Because security wasn't always the top priority in that scramble.
Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly, getting people connected was priority one. Security often
Speaker 2: came second, and that rapid shift created a whole new
Speaker 2: set of threats. You had home networks suddenly connecting directly
Speaker 2: to corporate networks, the lines totally creating backdoors that it
Speaker 2: security teams had a nightmare trying to patch and monitor.
Speaker 2: People were using personal devices, laptops, phones that often didn't
Speaker 2: have the same security standards as corporate equipment, easy entry points.
Speaker 1: And we saw things like zoom bombing too.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that became a real issue. Uninvited people crashing video calls,
Speaker 2: sharing malicious or offensive content. Zoom patched it, sure, but
Speaker 2: it highlighted the risks, and other platforms like Microsoft Teams
Speaker 2: saw huge growth partly because of those concerns.
Speaker 1: And the existing tech struggled, like VPNs oh massively.
Speaker 2: Traditional virtual private new networks VPNs were mostly designed for
Speaker 2: maybe twenty thirty percent of staff working remotely. Sometimes they
Speaker 2: just weren't built to handle nearly everyone connecting all at once.
Speaker 2: They buckled under the strain, became slow, unreliable, and left
Speaker 2: big security holes attackers could exploit.
Speaker 1: So with traditional defenses like VPNs clearly struggling, what stepped
Speaker 1: up to fill the gap? How did companies adapt well?
Speaker 2: In direct response to those VPN weaknesses and the much
Speaker 2: bigger attack surface, Something called the next generation firewall really
Speaker 2: came into its own. It emerged as a much more powerful,
Speaker 2: more comprehensive substitute.
Speaker 1: Next generation firewall. What makes it next generation several things.
Speaker 2: First, it offers full network traffic visibility. It inspects every
Speaker 2: data packet, whether it's at the gateway, moving internally, externally,
Speaker 2: or even across cloud platforms. Total visibility, seeing everything right. Second,
Speaker 2: it uses AI and machine learning to stop threats immediately.
Speaker 2: Not just known viruses, but brand new threat vectors, specialized malware.
Speaker 2: It's never seen.
Speaker 1: Before proactive defense exactly.
Speaker 2: Third, it gives you really tight control over software as
Speaker 2: a service SAUCE applications. It monitors who's accessing what cloud apps,
Speaker 2: preventing rogue applications from causing trouble.
Speaker 1: Like controlling access to things like salesforce or office through
Speaker 1: sixty five precisely.
Speaker 2: And Fourth, and this is crucial, It automatically implements a
Speaker 2: zero trust framework.
Speaker 1: Zero trust that sounds important, What is it?
Speaker 2: It's a fundamental security principle, Never trust, always verify. It
Speaker 2: means you don't automatically trust anyone or anything trying to connect,
Speaker 2: even if they're already inside your network. It requires multiple
Speaker 2: layers of authentication for all employees, all devices, constantly verifying
Speaker 2: identity and permissions.
Speaker 1: No inherent trust makes sense anything else.
Speaker 2: Yeah, One more thing. It helps create secure access for
Speaker 2: third parties like suppliers or partners. Using a clientless SSL
Speaker 2: protocol makes those external connections basically invisible from the outside,
Speaker 2: harder for attackers to find and exploit.
Speaker 1: So comparing it to old school firewalls to big leap,
Speaker 1: isn't it huge?
Speaker 2: Traditional firewalls were like you know, digital bouncers. At the
Speaker 2: main gate, they checked who was coming in from the outside,
Speaker 2: but once you're inside, they didn't do much and they
Speaker 2: weren't designed for cloud stuff or sauce apps at all.
Speaker 1: So next gen firewalls protect the cloud.
Speaker 2: Too, yes, and sauce applications. They help mitigate identity theft
Speaker 2: because of things like zero trust. They fortify the internal network,
Speaker 2: not just the perimeter, and they allow for really granular
Speaker 2: access rules. You can set rules based on the specific employee,
Speaker 2: the device they're using, even the type of content they're
Speaker 2: trying to access.
Speaker 1: Much more specific control, much more.
Speaker 2: Traditional firewalls couldn't do anything like that. It's really a
Speaker 2: fundamental shift in how you approach defense, moving from just
Speaker 2: guarding the walls to constantly verifying everything happening inside and outside.
Speaker 1: Okay, that makes sense. Now let's shift focus a bit.
Speaker 1: How does ransomware actually, you know, get onto your system
Speaker 1: in the first place. What are the main ways it's deployed.
Speaker 2: There are two primary methods attackers use. The first is
Speaker 2: what's called MOUSEPAM, basically malicious email phishing emails, yeah, exactly,
Speaker 2: emails with malicious attachments often disguised as invoices or important documents,
Speaker 2: maybe a dot ex file hid inside a ZIP or
Speaker 2: They have phony links that look legitimate but take you
Speaker 2: to a malicious site. They often use clever social engineering
Speaker 2: to trick you into clicking, making it look like it's
Speaker 2: from your bank or HR, creating a sense of.
Speaker 1: Urgency, preying on human psychology totally.
Speaker 2: The second main method is malvertizing malicious advertising. Right cyber
Speaker 2: attackers buy ad space on legitimate websites, but the ads
Speaker 2: themselves contain malicious code or link to malicious sites. You
Speaker 2: click on what looks like a normal ad, maybe even
Speaker 2: on a reputable news site, and you're infected. Well. Clicking
Speaker 2: the ad can trigger a couple of things. Sometimes it
Speaker 2: directly downloads malware. Other times it redirects you through a
Speaker 2: series of sites, often using hidden elements called iframes, which
Speaker 2: are like invisible web pages within the page you're seeing.
Speaker 2: These gather info about your computer location, browser type, vulnerabilities,
Speaker 2: and then deliver are the ransomware payload best suited to
Speaker 2: exploit your system. You might not even realize anything happen
Speaker 2: until the ransom note appears. Sneaky okay, so once it's deployed.
Speaker 2: Ransomware isn't just one thing, right, There are different types.
Speaker 1: Yeah, they generally fall into a few categories, kind of
Speaker 1: escalating in severity. First, you've got scareware.
Speaker 2: Scareware sounds like what it does pretty much.
Speaker 1: It's designed just to frighten you. You get annoying pop ups,
Speaker 1: maybe claiming your computers infected with hundreds of viruses, often
Speaker 1: mimicking real anti virus software warnings. They demand a small
Speaker 1: payment to fix the non existent problem.
Speaker 2: Annoying but maybe not devastating.
Speaker 1: Usually not installing real anti molware software generally gets rid
Speaker 1: of it. It's more of a nuisance designed to panning
Speaker 1: people into paying a small fee.
Speaker 2: Okay, what's next?
Speaker 1: Up the ladder screen lockers. These are more serious. They
Speaker 1: completely lock your computer screen. You can't access anything. Instead,
Speaker 1: you see a message, often claiming to be from law
Speaker 1: enforcement like the FBI or Secret Service.
Speaker 2: The fake FBI warning again.
Speaker 1: Exactly accusing you of some illicit activity like downloading illegal
Speaker 1: files or visiting prohibited websites, and demanding a hefty fine
Speaker 1: to unlock your computer. And people should know, real law
Speaker 1: enforcement doesn't operate.
Speaker 2: Like that, right, absolutely not. Everment agencies will never demand
Speaker 2: payment via pop up screen like that. With screen lockers,
Speaker 2: recovery often needs professional help. Sometimes, depending on the variant,
Speaker 2: the device might be effectively bricked.
Speaker 1: Ouch. Okay, So what's the worst time that would be?
Speaker 2: Encrypting ransomware This is the most common and damaging type today.
Speaker 2: It doesn't just lock your screen. It gets into your files, documents, photos, databases,
Speaker 2: everything and encrypts them using complex algorithms.
Speaker 1: So you can see the files, which you can't open
Speaker 1: them exactly.
Speaker 2: They're scrambled useless without the unique decryption key. The attackers
Speaker 2: then demand a large ransom, usually in bitcoin or another cryptocurrency,
Speaker 2: in exchange for that key.
Speaker 1: And do they actually give you the key if you pay?
Speaker 2: That's the big gamble. Some times yes, but very often
Speaker 2: attackers just disappear after getting paid, or the key they
Speaker 2: provide doesn't work properly, and because they use virtual currency,
Speaker 2: the payments are practically impossible to trace or recover. It's
Speaker 2: devastating because your data is effectively gone forever if you
Speaker 2: don't have backups.
Speaker 1: Which leads to that awful dilemma if you get hit.
Speaker 1: It's especially with encrypting ransomware. Do you pay? It must
Speaker 1: be an agonizing decision.
Speaker 2: It really is. For individuals. For huge companies, it's a
Speaker 2: terrible choice. On the one hand, paying might be the
Speaker 2: only way to get your data back if you don't
Speaker 2: have good backups. It's a small mite, though.
Speaker 1: But the downsides are huge.
Speaker 2: Right, absolutely massive. First, there's zero guarantee you'll get a
Speaker 2: working key. You're dealing with criminals. Second, paying marks you
Speaker 2: or your organization as willing to pay. You become a
Speaker 2: prime target for future attacks, often with even higher demands.
Speaker 1: They know you're vulnerable and willing to cough up exactly.
Speaker 2: Third, the payments, usually bitcoin, are untraced. You won't get
Speaker 2: that money back. And fourth, this is a really serious one.
Speaker 2: Paying the ransom can actually be considered a crime in
Speaker 2: some circumstances, especially by the US federal government if the
Speaker 2: attackers are linked to sanctioned entities or state threat actors,
Speaker 2: paying could even be viewed as treason.
Speaker 1: Treason why yeah.
Speaker 2: And on top of all that, many cyber insurance policies
Speaker 2: may not cover losses if you choose to pay the ransom,
Speaker 2: although there have been high profile exceptions, like the Colonial
Speaker 2: pipeline case, where the impact on critical infrastructure complicated things
Speaker 2: but generally panning is strongly advised against.
Speaker 1: So the best approach is to avoid getting into that
Speaker 1: situation in the first place. How do you avoid having
Speaker 1: to make that choice?
Speaker 2: Proactive measures are absolutely everything. The number one thing backups,
Speaker 2: regular reliable backups. You should have daily backups, ideally following
Speaker 2: the three to one rule, at least three copies on
Speaker 2: two different types of media with one copy off site.
Speaker 1: Off site is key for things like fire or flood
Speaker 1: or even a really destructive attack.
Speaker 2: And beyond just off site storage, leveraging cloud infrastructure is
Speaker 2: a really smart move now platforms like Microsoft Azure or
Speaker 2: Amazon Web Services AWS.
Speaker 1: How does the cloud help specifically with ransomware?
Speaker 2: Well, if you're using virtual machines or vms in the
Speaker 2: cloud and one gets infected with ransomware, you can often
Speaker 2: just delete the infected VM and spin up a brand new,
Speaker 2: clean one from a backup image in minutes minutes.
Speaker 1: That's incredibly fast recovery compared to trying to decrypt exactly.
Speaker 2: It dramatically reduces downtime and pretty much eliminates the incentive
Speaker 2: to pay the ransom you just restore from your clean backup.
Speaker 1: Okay, backups are critical. What about protecting things inside the network,
Speaker 1: preventing the ransomware from spreading or gaining access in the
Speaker 1: first place.
Speaker 2: That's where identity and Access management or IAM comes in.
Speaker 2: IM solutions are crucial. They cover the three a's identification,
Speaker 2: who are you, authentication, prove it and authorization? What do
Speaker 2: you allowed to do?
Speaker 1: Like the digital gatekeeper inside the system?
Speaker 2: Precisely? Good IM involves things like automated logs tracking who
Speaker 2: accessed what when, tools for managing employee permissions efficiently, comprehensive
Speaker 2: databases of log in credentials securely stored.
Speaker 1: And there are specific guidelines within IM.
Speaker 2: Yes some key principles. First, role based access controls or RBAC.
Speaker 2: This means assigning permissions based strictly on someone's job function,
Speaker 2: give them only the minimum access they absolutely need to
Speaker 2: do their job. The principle of least privilege, so if an.
Speaker 1: Account gets compromised, the damage is limited.
Speaker 2: Exactly the attacker can only access what that specific user
Speaker 2: could access. Second, multi factor authentication MFA. Don't rely on
Speaker 2: just a password. Deploy at least three unique ways to
Speaker 2: verify identity.
Speaker 1: Like password plus a code from your phone plus maybe
Speaker 1: a fingerprint.
Speaker 2: Perfect example, password something you know a token or phone app,
Speaker 2: something you have, biometrics, something you are makes it much
Speaker 2: harder for attackers to gain access, even if they steal
Speaker 2: a password. In the third one, work segmentation. This is
Speaker 2: huge break down your IT infrastructure your network into smaller
Speaker 2: isolated segments or subnets. Each subnet should have its own
Speaker 2: security controls, maybe even its own MFA to move between segments.
Speaker 1: So if attackers get into one part, they can't easily
Speaker 1: move sideways to other parts of the network.
Speaker 2: That's the goal. It contains the breach, limits the attackers
Speaker 2: lateral movement and buys your security team time to respond.
Speaker 1: Okay, so backups, IAM, MFA, segmentation. These are all vital defenses.
Speaker 1: How do you pull this all together into a coherent
Speaker 1: plan before an attack happens.
Speaker 2: You need a comprehensive written ransomware plan and it needs
Speaker 2: several key ingredients. First, you need a designated response team.
Speaker 2: This has to be cross departmental IT security obviously, but
Speaker 2: also legal, HR, maybe finance and accounting. Everyone needs clearly
Speaker 2: assigned roles and responsibilities so.
Speaker 1: Everyone knows what to do when crisis hits exactly.
Speaker 2: Second, you need a clear first response strategy. What do
Speaker 2: you do in the first minutes the first hourly. It
Speaker 2: involves immediately disconnecting affected devices, isolating the malware to stop
Speaker 2: it spreading, and you must rehearse this regularly. Drills shorten
Speaker 2: response time dramatically.
Speaker 1: Practice makes perfect even in disaster.
Speaker 2: Absolutely. Third, a solid communication plan Who calls whom You
Speaker 2: need a detailed cal tree with landline numbers, cell numbers,
Speaker 2: work emails, personal emails updated monthly because people change roles.
Speaker 2: Use the company intranet for internal alerts, but definitely avoid
Speaker 2: social media during an active attack.
Speaker 1: Why avoid social media?
Speaker 2: Attackers monitor it. It can spread misinformation or panic, and
Speaker 2: you can inadvertently reveal information they can use. Stick to
Speaker 2: controlled channels. Fourth, Obviously, your data backup plan needs to
Speaker 2: be a part of this, clearly defining who's responsible for
Speaker 2: executing backups and restorations right what else. Stakeholder notification. You
Speaker 2: need a plan for quickly notifying shareholders, key vendors, law
Speaker 2: enforcement and regulatory bodies. Failing to report a significant breach
Speaker 2: is often a serious offense, even af fect in some cases.
Speaker 2: And Finally, include your insurance policy information, key contacts, policy details,
Speaker 2: claim procedures. Your cyber insurance can be a crucial financial buffer,
Speaker 2: so know how to use it quickly.
Speaker 1: That's a lot to coordinate. Seems like planning is everything.
Speaker 2: It really is. Having that plan and practicing it is
Speaker 2: the difference between a manageable incident and a complete catastrophe.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's shift gears now and talk about one of
Speaker 1: the most well insidious ways these attacks happen supply chain attacks.
Speaker 1: We mentioned REvil using one. Can you unpack what that means?
Speaker 2: Yeah? A supply chain attack is particularly nasty because it
Speaker 2: doesn't target you directly. It targets one of your trusted
Speaker 2: third party vendors, maybe a software provider, a service supplier,
Speaker 2: someone whose products or services you rely on.
Speaker 1: So they attack the vendor to get to the vendor's customers.
Speaker 2: Exactly. By compromising the vendor, they can push malicious code
Speaker 2: or gain access to all the organizations that use that
Speaker 2: vendors software services. The solar Winds attack is probably the
Speaker 2: most famous and frankly terrifying example of this.
Speaker 1: Solar Winds, right, that was huge news. Remind us what
Speaker 1: happened there.
Speaker 2: Okay, So solar Winds is a big software company. They
Speaker 2: make it management and monitoring tools, and one of their
Speaker 2: main products is called Orion. It's used by thousands of organizations,
Speaker 2: including government agencies and major corporations to monitor their networks.
Speaker 1: So a really widely used, trusted.
Speaker 2: Tool, extremely trusted. The attackers, believed to be a sophisticated
Speaker 2: nation state group, didn't breach solar Wind's main network initially. Instead,
Speaker 2: they managed to inject malicious code into the software update
Speaker 2: process for Orion.
Speaker 1: Into the updates.
Speaker 2: Wow. Yeah, so when solar Win's customers downloaded and installed
Speaker 2: what they thought was a legitimate routine software patch for Orion,
Speaker 2: they were unknowingly installing malware. It was disguised brilliantly affected
Speaker 2: over thirty thousand entities worldwide.
Speaker 1: Eventually, how do they even get into the update process?
Speaker 2: It seems they first gained access to solar Winds internal systems,
Speaker 2: possibly their software development environment, as early as October twenty nineteen,
Speaker 2: likely exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office three sixty five that
Speaker 2: solar Winds was using, so they.
Speaker 1: Were inside for months before deploying the malicious update.
Speaker 2: Potentially even longer. They inserted the main trojan horse malware
Speaker 2: dubbed Sunburst, into the build process around March twenty twenty.
Speaker 2: This created back doors in the infected customer systems. These
Speaker 2: back doors would then communicate very stealthily with command and
Speaker 2: control servers run by the attackers, allowing them to steal data,
Speaker 2: escalate privileges, and move laterally within the victim networks, and
Speaker 2: it looked legitimate completely. The malicious code was digitally signed
Speaker 2: using compromised or manipulated solar Wind certificates. It even had
Speaker 2: a built in delay. It would lie dormant for about
Speaker 2: fourteen days after installation before trying to call home to
Speaker 2: the attacker servers. This dormancy period helped to evade detection
Speaker 2: by security tools looking for immediate suspicious activity. It was
Speaker 2: incredibly patient, incredibly stealthy.
Speaker 1: That timeline is just staggering. You said they might have
Speaker 1: been in the zero is late twenty nineteen.
Speaker 2: Evidence suggests initial foothold possibly September twenty nineteen. They did
Speaker 2: a test run of the malicious code insertion in February
Speaker 2: twenty twenty. The somber erst malware went into the updates
Speaker 2: around March twenty twenty, but the world didn't know anything
Speaker 2: was wrong until December twenty twenty.
Speaker 1: December, so it was active for maybe eight or nine
Speaker 1: months undetected.
Speaker 2: At least. The first public sign was on December eighth,
Speaker 2: twenty twenty, when the cybersecurity firm FireEye announced they had
Speaker 2: been breached and their own red team tools were storn.
Speaker 2: Fire Eye got hit, yes, and while investigating their own breach,
Speaker 2: FireEye discovered the Solar Winds connection. Just a few days later,
Speaker 2: on December eleventh, they realized it was a massive supply
Speaker 2: chain attack involving the Orion platform.
Speaker 1: So FireEye finding their own breach actually uncovered the whole
Speaker 1: Solar Winds campaign largely.
Speaker 2: Yes. They notified Solar Winds on December twelfth, and the
Speaker 2: US National Security Council got involved immediately. Then things moved fast.
Speaker 2: December thirteenth, SISO ordered all US federal agencies to stop
Speaker 2: using Orion. Solar Winds rushed out temporary fifth FireEye publicly
Speaker 2: declared it a supply chain hack, hitting Fortune five hundreds.
Speaker 2: Microsoft detailed the customer impact, but December fifteenth, Solar Winds
Speaker 2: released proper software fixes. The first wave of high profile
Speaker 2: victims was identified, and SISA and the FBI launched formal investigations.
Speaker 2: The sheer length of the compromise before discovery is what's
Speaker 2: so chilling?
Speaker 1: Who are the victims you mentioned government agencies fortune five hundreds.
Speaker 2: The list is huge and likely still not fully known.
Speaker 2: Estimates are around eighteen thousand organizations downloaded the malicious update.
Speaker 2: Over forty major business entities were confirmed victims, about forty
Speaker 2: four percent of them tech companies, but it also included
Speaker 2: multiple US government departments Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland, Security, State, Treasury,
Speaker 2: even health. Plus big names like Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, Deloitte,
Speaker 2: FireEye itself, even Mount Sinai Hospital. It was incredibly widespread.
Speaker 1: What are the big lessons here for CIOs? For IT
Speaker 1: security teams? What should they take away from solar winds?
Speaker 2: Several critical lessons. First, vet your source code, especially third
Speaker 2: party code or components. You need processes to scan and
Speaker 2: test all code for malware before it gets deployed into
Speaker 2: your environment or products.
Speaker 1: Don't blindly trust updates you can't afford to.
Speaker 2: Second, rigorous third party vetting. Scrutinize the security procedures of
Speaker 2: your suppliers, not just before you sign a contract, but
Speaker 2: continually during the relationship, because legally and financially, you are
Speaker 2: often held responsible if their breach affects your customers or data.
Speaker 1: Your security is only as strong as your weakest supplier
Speaker 1: pretty much.
Speaker 2: Third, simplicity and your security stack. Don't just keep adding
Speaker 2: more and more tools. Invest in fewer, strategically deployed tools
Speaker 2: that integrate well. A complex, sprawling set of tools actually
Speaker 2: increases your attack surface and makes it harder to pinpoint
Speaker 2: real threats. Amidst all the noise, use AI and machine
Speaker 2: learning to help filter alerts. Okay, segmentation, we talked about
Speaker 2: it before, but solar winds drove it home. Implement zero
Speaker 2: trust by breaking your network into subnets with independent defenses.
Speaker 2: If the attackers had only been able to compromise one segment,
Speaker 2: the damage would have been far less. And finally, keep
Speaker 2: your technology updated. Get rid of outdated systems like traditional VPNs,
Speaker 2: move to things like next generation firewalls that offer better
Speaker 2: visibility and control, especially for cloud and hybrid environments.
Speaker 1: And the financial impact of solo winds must have been enormous.
Speaker 2: Estimates vary, but solar Winds itself reported costs around ninety
Speaker 2: million dollars initially. The total economic damage across all victims
Speaker 2: could potentially reach one hundred billion dollars. When you factor
Speaker 2: in investigation, remediation, loss, productivity, reputational damage, it's staggering.
Speaker 1: Okay, so solar winds showed the danger of attacks on
Speaker 1: our digital infrastructure, our software supply chains. You mentioned earlier
Speaker 1: there's been a shift towards targeting critical infrastructure. What does
Speaker 1: that mean exactly?
Speaker 2: It means attackers are increasingly targeting the physical systems that
Speaker 2: underpin modern society, not just data centers and software companies,
Speaker 2: but things like the electrical grid, water, tree treatment plants,
Speaker 2: transportation systems, oil and gas pipelines, manufacturing, even food distribution.
Speaker 1: The actual physical world.
Speaker 2: Exactly, systems where a cyber attack can have immediate, tangible,
Speaker 2: and potentially devastating real world consequences. Think about the impact
Speaker 2: of shutting down power to a city, or contaminating a
Speaker 2: water supply, or disrupting fuel distribution, like we saw with
Speaker 2: the Colonial pipeline.
Speaker 1: Plobial pipeline paid a ransom, didn't they four point four
Speaker 1: million dollars?
Speaker 2: They did. It caused massive fuel shortages along the US
Speaker 2: East Coast. Other high impact targets include nuclear facilities incredibly
Speaker 2: sensitive and disrupting the food supply chain. The potential for
Speaker 2: causing widespread panic or harm is enormous.
Speaker 1: Can you give some other examples of attacks on critical infrastructure.
Speaker 2: Sure Back in December twenty fifteen, Ukraine's power grades were hit.
Speaker 2: Attackers exploited outdated control systems known as SCATUS systems, using
Speaker 2: spear phishing emails to gain access. They cut power to
Speaker 2: about two hundred and thirty thousand residents.
Speaker 1: Wow. What else?
Speaker 2: There was an attack on a water dam in Ryebrook,
Speaker 2: New York. It actually happened back in twenty thirteen, but
Speaker 2: wasn't reported until twenty sixteen. A nation state actor, allegedly Iran,
Speaker 2: got into the dam's command center through Believe or Not
Speaker 2: a dial up motive.
Speaker 1: A dial up modem in twenty thirteen, YEP.
Speaker 2: Shows how outdated some of this infrastructure can be. Then
Speaker 2: there's the global financial messaging system Swift. The North Korean
Speaker 2: Lazarus Group gained access using stolen Swift loggins, trying to
Speaker 2: steal massive amounts of money and disrupting international.
Speaker 1: Banking financial infrastructure too definitely critical.
Speaker 2: We also saw spearfishing attempts targeting personnel at the Wolf
Speaker 2: Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation in Kansas, which exposed vulnerabilities potentially
Speaker 2: affecting nuclear facilities across the US, and more recently, the
Speaker 2: water supply in old smart Florida.
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I remember that one.
Speaker 2: That was scary very An attacker got in using a
Speaker 2: remote access tool, exploiting an outdated operating system and weak passwords.
Speaker 2: They tried to increase the levels of sodium hydroxide LIE
Speaker 2: in the water to poisonous levels. Luckily, an employee noticed
Speaker 2: the changes on screen in real time and reversed it.
Speaker 2: But it was a terrifyingly close call.
Speaker 1: It really highlights the vulnerability. So why are these industrial
Speaker 1: control systems, these ICs that run everything so vulnerable?
Speaker 2: Several reasons rooted in their history. First, the idea of
Speaker 2: air gapping, keeping these systems totally isolated from the Internet
Speaker 2: is becoming almost impossible. Why the industrial Internet of Things.
Speaker 1: Or IoT connecting industrial machines to the Internet.
Speaker 2: Right for remote monitoring, predictive maintenance, efficiency gains, but it
Speaker 2: connects previously isolated systems vastly expanding the attack surface. And
Speaker 2: these legacy systems, they're often really hard to upgrade or
Speaker 2: patch without disrupting critical operations.
Speaker 1: They weren't built with Internet connectivity in mind, not at all.
Speaker 2: Second, much of the hardware and software is ancient. We're
Speaker 2: talking about PLCs, programmable logic controllers RTUs Remote terminal units
Speaker 2: DCS's distributed control systems that might date back to the
Speaker 2: seventies or eighties. They often lack basic authentication or encryption.
Speaker 2: Attackers can potentially just connect and send commands to shut
Speaker 2: things down, and they might be running on ancient operating
Speaker 2: systems like Windows and T or Windows XP, which are
Speaker 2: full of known unpatched vulnerabilities win tos XP still in
Speaker 2: some critical infrastructure settings Unfortunately. Yes, Third, there's often a
Speaker 2: lack of visibility. Unlike modern IT networks or cloud environments,
Speaker 2: where you have lots of monitoring tools, it's much harder
Speaker 2: to see suspicious activity. Within these older ICs environments, Attackers
Speaker 2: can lurk undetected for longer, harder to spot the intrusion
Speaker 2: much harder. And Fourth, outdated communication protocols. Many ICs systems
Speaker 2: use proprietary protocols developed decades ago. These weren't designed with
Speaker 2: security in mind and can have built in back doors
Speaker 2: or weaknesses that allow attackers to intercept or even change
Speaker 2: the commands being sent, altering the physical process the system controls.
Speaker 2: They could subtly change chemical mixtures or pressure levels or timing,
Speaker 2: causing failures or dangerous cans.
Speaker 1: So specifically focusing on SCATA systems supervisory control and data acquisition,
Speaker 1: which are key for managing things like power grids and
Speaker 1: water plants. What are their main security issues?
Speaker 2: SCATA systems really embody these challenges. They suffer from outdated
Speaker 2: technologies because historically the focus was entirely on physical security fences, guards,
Speaker 2: locked rooms, not cybersecurity. Adding modern security tools can actually
Speaker 2: cause problems breaking compatibility with the older SCATIC components.
Speaker 1: Trying to bolt modern security onto old systems.
Speaker 2: It often doesn't work well. They also have this issue
Speaker 2: of open visibility. Sometimes the physical layouts might be widely known,
Speaker 2: making them vulnerable to insider attacks or targeted physical sabotage.
Speaker 2: And like we said, they were designed to be isolated,
Speaker 2: but now they're increasingly networked via IoT, dramatically expanding that
Speaker 2: attack surface without fundamentally upgrading the core security.
Speaker 1: Have there been specific SCATA system exploits.
Speaker 2: Yes, Schneider Electric, a major SCAT of vendor, had vulnerabilities
Speaker 2: discovered in their firmware that could allow attackers to gain
Speaker 2: control over immergency shut down systems. Incredibly dangerous. There were
Speaker 2: attax targeting power line SCATA systems in the US in
Speaker 2: twenty eighteen, and a major European energy company's SCATA network
Speaker 2: was breached in twenty sixteen. These systems are definitely being targeted.
Speaker 1: So how do you even begin to secure these vital
Speaker 1: but often old SCATA systems.
Speaker 2: It's a huge challenge requires a multi layered approach. First,
Speaker 2: you have to map out all connections, ascertain what's connected, why,
Speaker 2: and disconnect anything that's unnecessary. Then art in the connections
Speaker 2: that must remain strong encryption, authentication, firewalls, avoid implementing new
Speaker 2: proprietary protocols, stick to modern secure standards.
Speaker 1: Where possible, testing is important too, presumably.
Speaker 2: Crucial, conduct regular penetration testing specifically targeting the SCATA environment.
Speaker 2: Do threat hunting exercises, deploy specialized firewalls and intrusion detection
Speaker 2: systems designed for ICs environments around the SCATA network segments.
Speaker 2: Regular risk assessments are vital, as our Red Team exercises
Speaker 2: similar lating realistic.
Speaker 1: Attack scenarios and the human element absolutely key to.
Speaker 2: Find clear roles and responsibilities for who manages SCAT of security,
Speaker 2: and just like in corporate it implement and religiously practice
Speaker 2: robust data backup, incident response and disaster recovery plans specifically
Speaker 2: tailored to the SCATA environment and the critical processes it controls.
Speaker 1: Looking ahead, then, what's the future hold for ransomware targeting
Speaker 1: critical infrastructure? What should we expect?
Speaker 2: Well, Segmentation will continue to be a major challenge because
Speaker 2: of all that legacy tech. It's hard to carve up
Speaker 2: systems that were never designed for it. The risks associated
Speaker 2: with the industrial Internet of Things might actually slow down
Speaker 2: IoT adoption in some critical sectors if they can't get
Speaker 2: the security right.
Speaker 1: A backlash against connectivity.
Speaker 2: Potentially, or at least a much more cautious approach. We'll
Speaker 2: almost certainly see escalating financial damage from attacks, higher ransom demands,
Speaker 2: multimillion dollar recovery costs, longer outages. This will likely force
Speaker 2: closer collaboration between critical infrastructure operators and the cybersecrecurity industry,
Speaker 2: a real push towards shared.
Speaker 1: Responsibility more partnerships.
Speaker 2: Definitely, we'll also see increased demand for cybersecurity insurance policies
Speaker 2: specifically covering critical infrastructure incidents as organizations try to buffer
Speaker 2: the financial blow. And while some partial migration to cloud
Speaker 2: technologies for non core functions might happen, a full cloud
Speaker 2: migration for the core control systems seems unlikely in the
Speaker 2: near term, just because those legacy technologies are so deeply embedded.
Speaker 1: It sounds like a really complex, high stakes problem for
Speaker 1: the future.
Speaker 2: It absolutely is, which underscores why proactive defense and testing
Speaker 2: are so incredibly important.
Speaker 1: Which brings us nicely to penetration testing. You've mentioned it
Speaker 1: a few times, let's really dive into that. What exactly
Speaker 1: is penetration testing?
Speaker 2: Okay, So if you want to know how strong your
Speaker 2: defenses really are, penetration testing or pen testing is arguably
Speaker 2: the best way to find out before a real attacker does.
Speaker 2: It's essentially ethical hacking.
Speaker 1: Ethical hacking, right.
Speaker 2: You hire certify security professionals, individuals or teams to legally
Speaker 2: and ethically try to break into your systems, your network,
Speaker 2: your applications. Their goals to find vulnerabilities, both the ones
Speaker 2: you might already know about and crucially the unknown ones,
Speaker 2: the hidden back doors or.
Speaker 1: Weaknesses, so they think like an attacker.
Speaker 2: Exactly like an attacker, they use the same tools and techniques.
Speaker 2: After the test, they compile a detailed report outlining everything
Speaker 2: they found, how they got in, how severe the vulnerabilities are,
Speaker 2: and specific recommendations on how to fix them. It's a proactive,
Speaker 2: deep assessment of your actual security posture, not just a
Speaker 2: theoretical check.
Speaker 1: Okay, so it's legal, it's planned. What are some other
Speaker 1: key characteristics.
Speaker 2: Well, it's always bound by a strict legal contract outlining
Speaker 2: the scope what they can and can't do. They must
Speaker 2: follow the law. Client notification and approval are required for
Speaker 2: risky actions. The detailed reports are a key deliverable that
Speaker 2: roadmap for improvement. It takes time, could be days, weeks,
Speaker 2: even months. For a complex environment.
Speaker 1: It's not a quick scan then.
Speaker 2: Definitely not. It usually involves specialized teams we can talk
Speaker 2: about Red, Blue and Pupple teams can be done remotely
Speaker 2: trying to breach from the outside or on site testing
Speaker 2: internal defenses. And while automation AI machine learning can assist
Speaker 2: the human element, the creativity and ingenuity of the ethical
Speaker 2: hacker is absolutely crucial for finding those non obvious flaws
Speaker 2: you mentioned.
Speaker 1: It's not just a quick scan. How does pen testing
Speaker 1: differ from say, vulnerability scanning. People sometimes confuse those.
Speaker 2: That's a really important distinction. They both aim to find weaknesses,
Speaker 2: but they're very different processes.
Speaker 1: Okay, so what's vulnerability scanning.
Speaker 2: Vulnerability scanning is typically automated. You run software tools that
Speaker 2: scan your systems and networks looking for non vulnerabilities, checking
Speaker 2: against databases of published cvees, common vulnerabilities and exposures.
Speaker 1: So looking for publicly known flaws exactly.
Speaker 2: It's usually quick, minutes or hours. The report you get
Speaker 2: is often quite general, listing potential vulnerabilities found, but usually
Speaker 2: without confirming if they're actually exploitable. We're giving detailed remediation steps.
Speaker 2: It's affordable, so you can run scans frequently, even continuously.
Speaker 2: Think of it as a passive test, like getting an
Speaker 2: EKG for your network. It shows surface level issues.
Speaker 1: Okay, so vulnerability scanning is automated, quick finds non issues, passive.
Speaker 1: How does pen testing compare?
Speaker 2: Pen testing is a much deeper dive. It's primarily manual
Speaker 2: conducted by skilled ethical hackers, although they use automated tools
Speaker 2: as part of their toolkit. It takes much longer days
Speaker 2: or weeks. Crucially, it looks for both known and unknown vulnerabilities.
Speaker 2: They're actively trying to exploit weaknesses, chain them together, find
Speaker 2: those covert back doors that a simple scan would miss.
Speaker 1: So it's an active test very much so more.
Speaker 2: Like an angiogram, actively probing and testing the system's resilience.
Speaker 2: Pen testing can also assess things vulnerability scanning can't touch,
Speaker 2: like physical security weaknesses. Can they tailgate into the building,
Speaker 2: clone an ID badge and it heavily tests human vulnerability
Speaker 2: through social engineering? Can they trick an employee into giving
Speaker 2: up credentials or clicking a malicious link. It can be
Speaker 2: internal testing defenses from within the network or external attacking
Speaker 2: from the outside like a real adversary.
Speaker 1: It sounds much more comprehensive. You mentioned different teams of
Speaker 1: all red, blue, purple right.
Speaker 2: These terms describe different roles within a pen testing engagement,
Speaker 2: or sometimes within an organization's ongoing security operations. The red
Speaker 2: team are the attackers, the.
Speaker 1: Ethical hackers trying to break in.
Speaker 2: Exactly, they simulate real adversaries using their techniques to breach defenses.
Speaker 2: They focus on finding access methods, thinking creatively about how
Speaker 2: to get in, not just hitting known targets. They often
Speaker 2: use a layered approach, trying multiple attack vectors simultaneously. Their
Speaker 2: goal is to breach the defenses by any means necessary
Speaker 2: within the agreed scope, providing an unbiased, holistic view of
Speaker 2: where the weaknesses truly lie?
Speaker 1: Okay, So if the Red team is attacking, who's defending?
Speaker 2: That's the Blue Team. The Blue Team are the defenders
Speaker 2: during a test. They're the ones trying to detect and
Speaker 2: respond to the Red team's attacks, often working closely with
Speaker 2: the client's internal IT security team. Their responsibilities include preparedness,
Speaker 2: are the defenses configured correctly? Thread identification? Can they see
Speaker 2: the attack happening? Containment, using the incident response plan to
Speaker 2: stop the bleeding, recovery using the disaster recovery plan, and
Speaker 2: then analyzing what happened forensics lessons learned. They also focus
Speaker 2: on hardening systems and managing perimeter defenses day to day.
Speaker 1: So Red attacks Blue defense, What does the Purple Team do?
Speaker 2: The Purple Team acts as a kind of bridge or
Speaker 2: mediator between Red and Blue. They're a neutral party focused
Speaker 2: on maximizing the effectiveness and learning from the entire exercise.
Speaker 2: They might evaluate the security controls the Blue team has
Speaker 2: in place, brainstorm new attack scenarios for the Red team
Speaker 2: based on emerging threats, and audit how well the Blue
Speaker 2: team detected and responded. They facilitate communication and information sharing
Speaker 2: between the two teams, ensuring the client gets the maximum
Speaker 2: value and improvement out of the engagement.
Speaker 1: Interesting, so maximizing the learning. Now. Within PEN testing itself,
Speaker 1: are there different approaches depending on how much information the testers.
Speaker 2: Have yes generally three main types. White box testing is
Speaker 2: when the PEN testers have full knowledge of the target
Speaker 2: system beforehand, network diagrams, source code, administrator credentials, everything. This
Speaker 2: is often used for testing internal IT infrastructure thoroughly, where
Speaker 2: you won't find every possible flaw, so they have the
Speaker 2: blueprints exactly. Then there's black box testing. Here the testers
Speaker 2: have zero prior knowledge of the target system, just maybe
Speaker 2: a company name or an IP address range. They have
Speaker 2: to discover everything from the outside, just like a real
Speaker 2: external attacker would. This is often favored because it provides
Speaker 2: the most realistic simulation of an external.
Speaker 1: Threat starting from scratch.
Speaker 2: And the third gray box testing. This is a hybrid approach.
Speaker 2: The testers have some limited knowledge, maybe user level credentials
Speaker 2: or some understanding of the system architecture, but not full
Speaker 2: administrator access or complete blueprints. This is often used for
Speaker 2: things like testing web application source code efficiently, providing a
Speaker 2: balance between the depth of white box and the realism
Speaker 2: of black box.
Speaker 1: Okay, that makes sense. You mentioned testing web apps. How
Speaker 1: important is PEN testing during the actual software development process?
Speaker 1: Should you wait until the end?
Speaker 2: Absolutely not wait until the end, But that's a critical point.
Speaker 2: Pen testing shouldn't be an afterthought you tack on just
Speaker 2: before release. It needs to be integrated throughout the software
Speaker 2: development life cycle. The SDLC why test early and often
Speaker 2: several reasons. First, it helps you stay ahead of the curve.
Speaker 2: Automated hacking tools are constantly evolving. Testing during development helps
Speaker 2: find flaws before those tools can exploit them in production. Second,
Speaker 2: finding and fixing vulnerabilities early is vastly cheaper and less
Speaker 2: disruptive than finding them late in the cycle or after release.
Speaker 2: It ensures smoother transitions between development stages and helps meet delivery.
Speaker 1: Deadlines less costly, rework much less.
Speaker 2: Third, it helps detect vulnerabilities you might inherit, especially if
Speaker 2: you're using third party libraries or code components. You need
Speaker 2: to test those two. Fourth, it prepares your development and
Speaker 2: operations teams for worst case scenarios. Practicing response during development
Speaker 2: builds muscle memory, enabling quicker reaction and reduce downtime if
Speaker 2: a real attack occurs later. And Finally, it's often required
Speaker 2: for compliance regulations like hip hop gepr ISO twenty seventh
Speaker 2: zero one, pcidss NIS standards many mandate regular penetration testing.
Speaker 2: Integrating it into the SDLC helps ensure you meet those
Speaker 2: requirements continuously shift.
Speaker 1: Left security, build it in from the start.
Speaker 2: Exactly, don't just test for bugs, test for security flaws throughout.
Speaker 1: Okay, So what does the actual process of a penetration
Speaker 1: test look like? What are the steps the ethical hackers take?
Speaker 2: It follows a pretty methodical approach, mimicking how real attackers
Speaker 2: often operate. Step one is reconnaissance, gathering information right studying
Speaker 2: the target. This involves passive techniques like internet searches, looking
Speaker 2: up domain registration info, checking social media, even physical techniques
Speaker 2: like dumpster diving sometimes and active techniques like network stanning
Speaker 2: to identify live hosts, open ports, and running services. Social
Speaker 2: engineering is often heavily used in this phase, too, trying
Speaker 2: to gather intelligence from employees.
Speaker 1: Learning as much as possible before attacking. What's next.
Speaker 2: Step two is scanning. Building on the reconnaissance, they use
Speaker 2: various tools to actively probe the identified targets for vulnerabilities,
Speaker 2: scanning digital assets like cloud instances, servers, email systems, websites
Speaker 2: source code. They're looking for specific weaknesses they can potentially exploit.
Speaker 2: This phase can also include scanning physical security controls if
Speaker 2: that's in scope.
Speaker 1: Finding the weak points, yeah.
Speaker 2: Step three is gaining access. This is where they attempt
Speaker 2: to exploit the vulnerabilities found during scanning to actually infiltrate
Speaker 2: the system or network. They might use an exploit kit,
Speaker 2: crack passwords, bypass security controls find those unknown backdoors. The
Speaker 2: goal is to get that initial foothold. Often they'll try
Speaker 2: to establish multiple points of entry if.
Speaker 1: Possible, getting inside, and once they're in.
Speaker 2: Step four is maintaining access exploitation. Once inside, they try
Speaker 2: to maintain their presence, often installing persistent back doors and
Speaker 2: escalate their privileges to gain deeper control. Then comes the
Speaker 2: exploitation part, but in a controlled way. They might deploy
Speaker 2: simulated malicious payloads, demonstrating things like sequel injection, planting inert
Speaker 2: trojans or worms, using key loggers without causing actual damage.
Speaker 2: The goal is to demonstrate impact. They might also try
Speaker 2: to expltrate small amounts of nonsensitive data slowly to show
Speaker 2: they can bypass data loss prevention systems without triggering alarms
Speaker 2: It's all about proving the vulnerability and its potential impact
Speaker 2: in a safe, controlled manner.
Speaker 1: A controlled demonstration of harm makes sense. Yeah, what kinds
Speaker 1: of things typically get targeted in a PEN test?
Speaker 2: It covers a wide range, reflecting the modern IT landscape.
Speaker 2: Web applications are a huge target looking for flaws like
Speaker 2: Cross's scripting exss SQL injection, insecure authentication mobile applications to
Speaker 2: both the app itself on the device client side and
Speaker 2: the server site APIs it communicates with, plus authentication and
Speaker 2: MFA controls networks definitely. Network infrastructure is core testing firewalls, routers, switches,
Speaker 2: wireless networks, network protocols, ssltls, certificate security. Cloud environments are
Speaker 2: increasingly critical targets. Testing the security of virtual machines, cloud databases,
Speaker 2: storage configurations, identity management in the cloud.
Speaker 1: Cloud containers too like Docker.
Speaker 2: Absolutely testing container configurations, image security orchestration platforms like Kubernetes,
Speaker 2: and don't forget wireless devices and networks. Testing Wi Fi
Speaker 2: security protocols, authentication methods, potential rogue access points, and any
Speaker 2: server site issues related to wireless access. Basically anyway an
Speaker 2: attacker might try to get in.
Speaker 1: It covers a lot of ground. Are there specific tools
Speaker 1: these pen testers use?
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, a whole arsenal of tools, many of them
Speaker 2: open source. They fall into different categories. For network scanning
Speaker 2: and analysis, tools like endmap and wireshark are standards for exploitation.
Speaker 2: The metasploit framework is incredibly powerful for password cracking, John
Speaker 2: the ripper or hashcat. For web application testing, burp suite
Speaker 2: and skull map are very common. Kali Linux is a
Speaker 2: popular operating system distribution that comes preloaded with hundreds of
Speaker 2: security testing tools.
Speaker 1: So a lot of specialized software. You also mentioned as
Speaker 1: a service model emerging.
Speaker 2: Paid ass yes penetration Testing as a service or TAS.
Speaker 2: It's a newer delivery model. Instead of commissioning a single large,
Speaker 2: time bound pen test project, paid as platforms offer more flexibility.
Speaker 2: You might get a combination of automated scanning and access
Speaker 2: to human testers on demand or via subscription.
Speaker 1: What are the pros and cons.
Speaker 2: Well, Advantages can include potentially faster hiring of testing teams
Speaker 2: maybe two hundred and forty seven monitoring capabilities, often more
Speaker 2: affordable pricing structures compared to massive one off tests, quicker
Speaker 2: reporting through the platform, and better integration with modern development
Speaker 2: workflows like devox or DevSecOps sounds good. Any downsides, pricing
Speaker 2: can be variable and sometimes complex to predict, and it
Speaker 2: might not be ideal for really deep, complex bespoke testing
Speaker 2: scenarios where you need a dedicated team spending weeks understanding
Speaker 2: a unique environment. The key takeaway, though, whether it's traditional
Speaker 2: pen testing or PIS, is that the best results almost
Speaker 2: always come from a combination of technology and skilled human intervention.
Speaker 2: You can't rely solely on automation, nor can you ignore
Speaker 2: the efficiency tools provide. The human expertise and creativity remain.
Speaker 1: Vital technology plus human intelligence. Okay, so pen testing helps
Speaker 1: you find weaknesses before an attack. But what happens if
Speaker 1: despite your best efforts, an attack does succeed. Let's talk
Speaker 1: about recovery, right.
Speaker 2: If the worst happens, containing the damage and recovering quickly
Speaker 2: requires having solid plans in place beforehand. We're talking primarily
Speaker 2: about two key plans here, an incident response plan and
Speaker 2: a disaster recovery plan. They sound similar, but they focus
Speaker 2: on different things.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's break them down. What's an incident response plan
Speaker 1: or IR plan?
Speaker 2: Yeah, an IR plan is your detailed, written, pre approved
Speaker 2: playbook for handling a security incident like a ransomware attack,
Speaker 2: a data breach, anything while it's happening and immediately after.
Speaker 2: It guides your organization through the entire life cycle of
Speaker 2: an incident.
Speaker 1: What's that life cycle look like?
Speaker 2: Generally it follows a flow preparation, having the plan, then
Speaker 2: detection and analysis. How do you spot an incident and
Speaker 2: figure out what's going on? Then containment, stop the bleeding, eradication,
Speaker 2: get rid of the threat, recovery, get systems back online,
Speaker 2: and finally post incident activity lessons learned, forensics reporting, It's
Speaker 2: a cycle.
Speaker 1: And what goes into the plan itself.
Speaker 2: Key components include identifying your core IR communications team who
Speaker 2: needs to be in the loop usually CEO, CFO, CIO
Speaker 2: or CISO, PR, investor relations HR, maybe key sales or
Speaker 2: marketing leads. Establishing clear mechanisms for employees to report potential
Speaker 2: threats they see, having pre drafted risk messaging to templates for
Speaker 2: internal and external comms, Creating those internal contact rosters the
Speaker 2: call trees we mentioned, updated monthly and trucially. Identifying and
Speaker 2: establishing relationships with key external stakeholders before you need them
Speaker 2: major investors, key customers, critical vendors, law enforcement, contacts regulatory bodies.
Speaker 1: Why is having that quick response so important? What are
Speaker 1: the benefits?
Speaker 2: Huge benefits. A fast, well executed response minimizes downtime and
Speaker 2: financial impact. It reduces the chance for attackers to exploit
Speaker 2: more vulnerabilities or steal more data. It helps prevent the
Speaker 2: same attack from happening again, done well with timely and
Speaker 2: transparent communication, it can actually help build customer trust showing
Speaker 2: your handling the situation responsibly, and it preserves evidence vital
Speaker 2: for forensic investigation and potential legal action later.
Speaker 1: Okay, so the IR plan handles the immediate crisis. What
Speaker 1: about the disaster Recovery plan the DRP.
Speaker 2: The DRP is more focused on the aftermath of a
Speaker 2: major incident, specifically on getting the IT infrastructure and business
Speaker 2: operations back up and running as quickly as possible, even
Speaker 2: if it's initially at a minimal level. It's primarily concerned
Speaker 2: with recovering from data loss and restoring system functionality. Think
Speaker 2: of it as the short term technical recovery plan.
Speaker 1: What are the key parts of a DRP.
Speaker 2: You need a dedicated disaster recovery team again with clear
Speaker 2: roles and contact info. You need a plan for potentially
Speaker 2: moving employee equipment if a physical site is unusable. Implementing
Speaker 2: and verifying those daily data backup checks is core to
Speaker 2: the DRP. Ensuring backups are actually usable. You need processes
Speaker 2: for restoring operations with your vendors if their services are
Speaker 2: critical at clear process for document recovery. How do you
Speaker 2: get essential files back?
Speaker 1: So IR is managing the fire, DR is rebuilding afterwards.
Speaker 1: Is there another piece? I think I've heard of? Business
Speaker 1: continuity plans?
Speaker 2: Yes, the business continuity plan or BCP is the third
Speaker 2: leg of the stool. It's broader than dr The BCP
Speaker 2: is a detailed, overarching strategy to ensure the entire organization
Speaker 2: can prevent or rapidly recover from any significant operational disruption
Speaker 2: and maintain essential business functions long term. It's about overall
Speaker 2: business resilience, so.
Speaker 1: More strategic longer term survival exactly.
Speaker 2: Components include regular risk assessments identifying all potential disruptions not
Speaker 2: just cybertax, fire, flood, pandemic, supply chain failure, planning for
Speaker 2: technology needs remote versus physical work locations on premise versus
Speaker 2: cloud infrastructure dependencies, ensuring power supply, restoration generators, alternative power plans,
Speaker 2: establishing resilient communication infrastructure, maybe using Ukere's Unified Communications as
Speaker 2: a service, Planning for vendor relations, especially if they suffer
Speaker 2: a breach that impacts your supply chain, and critically analyzing
Speaker 2: recovery time objectives rtos and recovery point objectives RPOs and
Speaker 2: the associated budget needed so you can continuously improve resilience
Speaker 2: over time. The BCP keeps the business running, not just
Speaker 2: the IT systems.
Speaker 1: IRDR BCP seems like a lot of planning. What's the
Speaker 1: absolute key to making them effective?
Speaker 2: The single most important thing practice? These plans ir DR
Speaker 2: BCP cannot be static documents sitting on a shelf collecting dust.
Speaker 2: They must be tested and practiced regularly, at least quarterly.
Speaker 1: How do you practice them.
Speaker 2: Through things like tabletop exercises where you walk through scenarios
Speaker 2: on paper, or even full simulations mimicking a real event.
Speaker 2: You have to update the plans with lessons learned from
Speaker 2: each test and keeping that contact information for all team
Speaker 2: members absolutely current is vital. Without regular practice and updates,
Speaker 2: even the most detailed plan will likely fail under the
Speaker 2: pressure of a real crisis.
Speaker 1: A practice, practice practice got it. So if we boil
Speaker 1: everything down, all the defenses, all the plans. What's one
Speaker 1: of those critical things for actually recovering from a ransomware attack?
Speaker 2: If I had to pick one thing, it comes back
Speaker 2: to backups. Having a robust, well tested data backup plan
Speaker 2: and diligently enforcing it is still one of the single
Speaker 2: best ways to ensure you can recover without paying the ransom.
Speaker 2: It's your ultimate safety net.
Speaker 1: Absolutely, and making that safety net really strong requires a
Speaker 1: smart strategy, right, not just one backup.
Speaker 2: Definitely multifaceted. Keep backups in different locations on site for
Speaker 2: quick restores of small things off site, physically separate for
Speaker 2: major disasters, and leverage cloud platforms like AWS or Azure.
Speaker 2: They offer incredible resilience and affordability, plus that rapid VM
Speaker 2: recovery we talked about.
Speaker 1: What about overriding backups?
Speaker 2: Don't do it. Keep separate versioned backups, even if it
Speaker 2: costs a bit more in storage. If your latest backup
Speaker 2: gets corrupted or includes the ransomware itself, you need older,
Speaker 2: clean versions to fall back on. Use diverse strategies too,
Speaker 2: maybe full backups, weekly, incremental or differential backups daily, balance
Speaker 2: recovery speed needs with storage space.
Speaker 1: And you mentioned backing up the catalogs.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's a detail people often miss. The backup software
Speaker 2: uses a catalog file to keep track of where all
Speaker 2: your backup data is stored across different tapes or discs.
Speaker 2: If you lose the catalog, restoring can be a nightmare,
Speaker 2: even if you have the data tapes. Back up the
Speaker 2: catalog itself.
Speaker 1: Good tip anything else in backup.
Speaker 2: Back up your critical processes and configurations, not just raw data.
Speaker 2: How do you rebuild that essential server? What are the steps?
Speaker 2: Document it and back up that documentation? Test your backup
Speaker 2: restoration plan regularly, at least every couple of months. A
Speaker 2: backup is useless if you can't actually restore from it.
Speaker 2: Verification is key, absolutely, and really embrace the cloud's potential here.
Speaker 2: If a VM gets infected, delete it, spin up a
Speaker 2: clean one from a cloud backup in minutes. You can
Speaker 2: even back up entire cloud data centers to different geographic regions.
Speaker 2: That level of resilience was unthinkable just a few years
Speaker 2: ago for most organizations.
Speaker 1: Okay, we've covered so much ground the history that defense
Speaker 1: is the recovery. As we wrap up, I want to
Speaker 1: leave our listeners with a final thought. Something really critical
Speaker 1: from Revendra DOS's book and echoed by most experts.
Speaker 2: I think I know where you're going.
Speaker 1: Yeah, never ever pay the cyber attacker.
Speaker 2: It seems counterintuitive sometimes, especially when you're desperate, but it's
Speaker 2: almost always the right advice.
Speaker 1: Why is it's so important not to pay. Let's recap that.
Speaker 2: Well, as we said, there's absolutely no guarantee you'll get
Speaker 2: your data back or get a working key. Paying just
Speaker 2: confirms to them and other attackers that ransomware works, fueling
Speaker 2: more attacks and potentially higher demands next time. It directly
Speaker 2: funds criminal enterprises. It can in some cases be deemed
Speaker 2: a crime itself, even treason, and your insurance carrier is
Speaker 2: very unlikely to cover a ransom payment you make voluntarily.
Speaker 2: You risk everything, gain nothing certain, and make the overall
Speaker 2: problem worse.
Speaker 1: So the focus has to be on resilience, on backups,
Speaker 1: on those IRDR and BCP plans we talked about exactly.
Speaker 2: Prevention is ideal, but robust recovery capability is your ultimate
Speaker 2: defense against extortion.
Speaker 1: You know, understanding all this, taking this deem dive, it
Speaker 1: isn't just about accumulating knowledge. It's really about empowerment, isn't
Speaker 1: It absolutely is so being proactive, being resilient in a
Speaker 1: world where the cyber threats are just well, there are
Speaker 1: persistent reality. Now hopefully you are listeners. Now feel better
Speaker 1: equipped to ask the right questions whether it's your workplace
Speaker 1: or for your own personal security, and to start building
Speaker 1: stronger defenses in your own digital world