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<v Speaker 1>Have you ever stopped to think that ransomware, this thing

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<v Speaker 1>that feels like a modern digital plague, isn't actually news

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<v Speaker 1>a threat that's been quietly evolving for decades. What's really surprising,

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<v Speaker 1>I think, is how it went from pretty simple beginnings

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<v Speaker 1>to being this incredibly stealthy, sophisticated weapon we see today.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, It's got quite a history.

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<v Speaker 1>So today we're taking a deep dive into the world

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<v Speaker 1>of ransomware. We're drawing insights straight from Revendrodos's book Ransomware

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<v Speaker 1>Penetration Testing and Contingency Planning. Think of this as your

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<v Speaker 1>shortcut to getting really well informed on well a super

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<v Speaker 1>critical cybersecurity topic.

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<v Speaker 2>It really is critical.

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<v Speaker 1>We'll explore the well surprising timeline of how ransomware evolved,

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<v Speaker 1>will dissect how big global events like the COVID nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>pandemic totally reshape the threat landscape, and we'll unpack some

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<v Speaker 1>infamous real world attacks.

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<v Speaker 2>And crucially the defenses too.

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<v Speaker 1>Right Most importantly, will uncover the practical strategies you really

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<v Speaker 1>need to know for preventing and just as vital, recovering

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<v Speaker 1>from these increasingly sophisticated threats. Expect some aha moments you

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<v Speaker 1>know or covering everything from that agonizing question of whether

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<v Speaker 1>to pay the ransom all the way to the strategic

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<v Speaker 1>importance of things like penetration testing and solid contingency plans.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's not just about understanding the problem exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>It's about equipping you with the knowledge to mitigate the

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<v Speaker 1>risks and actually fortify your digital world. Okay, so let's

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<v Speaker 1>start by rewinding way back nineteen eighty nine. Can you

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<v Speaker 1>believe the very first ransomware attack, the AIDS trojan, was launched.

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<v Speaker 2>Then it seems like ancient history and tech terms, doesn't it.

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<v Speaker 1>It really does. Joseph L. Pop, a biology professor, actually

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<v Speaker 1>mailed out twenty thousand infected floppy discs floppy disks to

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<v Speaker 1>attendees of a WHO conference.

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<v Speaker 2>Wow physical media, right.

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<v Speaker 1>The program encrypted their files and demanded a check, a

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<v Speaker 1>physical check for one hundred and eighty nine dollars sent

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<v Speaker 1>to an address in Panama. But interestingly, it was actually

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<v Speaker 1>pretty easy to reverse engineer.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it wasn't exactly technically sophisticated, even for the time,

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<v Speaker 2>but it established the concept.

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<v Speaker 1>It did earned Pop the informal title father of ransomware.

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<v Speaker 2>What's really fascinating, though, is what happened next, or rather

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<v Speaker 2>what didn't happen after that Aid's trojan. Things went quiet

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<v Speaker 2>for well almost fifteen years in the ransomware world.

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<v Speaker 1>Fifteen years. That's a long gap, it is.

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<v Speaker 2>But it wasn't total inactivity. It was more like the

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<v Speaker 2>quiet before the storm, you know, as the whole dot

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<v Speaker 2>com thing boomed, two new variants sort of crept onto

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<v Speaker 2>the scene. There was GP codes spread through malicious links

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<v Speaker 2>and phishing emails demanded like twenty.

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<v Speaker 1>Bucks, twenty dollars, okay, yeah, and.

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<v Speaker 2>Like the AIDS turgeon, it was pretty easily cracked. Then

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<v Speaker 2>you had our achieves. Now this one actually tried using

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<v Speaker 2>a much stronger encryption oneenty twenty four bit RSA. That

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<v Speaker 2>was a big step up technically.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so they were getting more ambitious definitely.

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<v Speaker 2>But the attackers made a rookie mistake. They used weak passwords,

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<v Speaker 2>so victims could still recover their data pretty easily. It

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<v Speaker 2>shows this early kind of trial and error phase. Attackers

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<v Speaker 2>were focused more on quantity getting it out there, not

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<v Speaker 2>so much on sophistication.

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<v Speaker 1>Yet setting the stage really.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, it laid the groundwork for this relentless cat and

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<v Speaker 2>mouse game we're still in today, every defense leads to

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<v Speaker 2>a new attack method.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, Building on that, the twenty tens, this is where

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<v Speaker 1>things got really serious, right. Ransomware strains became way more powerful,

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<v Speaker 1>more in cities, a real turning point, absolutely.

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<v Speaker 2>That's when we saw the locker variants pop up right.

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<v Speaker 1>Rollmlock was the first one that actually locked users completely

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<v Speaker 1>out of their devices.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, total lockout. And then twenty twelve, Reveton arrived, and

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<v Speaker 2>this was big because it introduced ransomware as a service race.

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<v Speaker 1>So like cybercrime is a subscription model pretty.

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<v Speaker 2>Much, allowing less skilled attackers to basically rent out attack

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<v Speaker 2>capabilities on the dark web made it much more scalable.

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<v Speaker 2>Reveton also did that thing where it accused victims of

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<v Speaker 2>fake crimes.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, I remember that, like a fake FBI.

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<v Speaker 2>Warning exactly, And it was a first to demand and bitcoin.

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<v Speaker 2>That shift to virtual currency was huge untraceable payments.

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<v Speaker 1>But the real game changer, the one everyone remembers from

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<v Speaker 1>that era was Crypto Locker, wasn't it.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh definitely. Crypto Locker up the anti massively. It combined

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<v Speaker 2>the locker idea with serious encryption. Crypto used a two

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<v Speaker 2>thy forty eight bit RSA.

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<v Speaker 1>Key which is really strong.

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<v Speaker 2>Incredibly strong, made recovery basically impossible without paying for the key.

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<v Speaker 2>It mostly spread through phishing attachments, you know, infected email attachments,

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<v Speaker 2>and it was insanely profitable, pulled in nearly twenty seven

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<v Speaker 2>million dollars in just two months.

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<v Speaker 1>Twenty seven million. Wow. That kind of money definitely.

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<v Speaker 2>Gets attention, It absolutely does, and that success naturally led

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<v Speaker 2>attackers to think bigger, you know, expand their target.

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<v Speaker 1>Right because up until around twenty fifteen, it was mostly

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<v Speaker 1>Windows machines getting hit, wasn't.

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<v Speaker 2>It Almost exclusively Windows? But then simple Locker showed up

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<v Speaker 2>in twenty fifteen and it specifically went after Android phones,

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<v Speaker 2>encrypting files on sd cars, documents, photos, videos, Mobile became

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<v Speaker 2>a target yep, and another one locker Pin also hit Android.

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<v Speaker 2>It didn't just encrypt, it locked the device and changed

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<v Speaker 2>the pin. And crucially, there was a version called Linux

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<v Speaker 2>dot and coder dot one made just for Linux systems, so.

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<v Speaker 1>Linux two nowhere was safe.

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<v Speaker 2>Pretty much. It signaled that no os, no device type

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<v Speaker 2>was off limits anymore. The attack surface just exploded and.

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<v Speaker 1>The escalation just kept going. Twenty sixteen to twenty twenty,

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<v Speaker 1>ransomware went truly global and got way deadlier, a huge

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<v Speaker 1>leap in well destructive power, it really did.

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<v Speaker 2>We saw ransom thirty two impacting JavaScript. But then these

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<v Speaker 2>four new global variants emerged that just changed everything. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>like what, Well, First you had Petya. This was the

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<v Speaker 2>first one to lock the master boot record.

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<v Speaker 1>The NBR, so it stops the computer from even starting up.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, renders the whole system unusable before Windows even loads.

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<v Speaker 2>Then Zcryptor was the first to use worms self replicating malware.

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<v Speaker 2>It could spread incredibly fast, turning into a ransom.

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<v Speaker 1>Worm spreading on its own scary very.

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<v Speaker 2>Then, of course want to Cry one of the deadliest evers,

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<v Speaker 2>infected over one hundred thousand devices one hundred and fifty countries,

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<v Speaker 2>spread like wildfire using that internal blue vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 1>The leaked NSA exploit.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, that's the one. Then GoldenEye came along, basically a

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<v Speaker 2>mashup of Petia and WannaCry, but with even stronger encryption.

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<v Speaker 1>Just getting worse and worse.

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<v Speaker 2>And then not Petya. This one added a terrifying twist.

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<v Speaker 2>It didn't just lock files, it could actually delete them

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<v Speaker 2>if the ransom wasn't paid quickly enough, delete them.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, Oh wow, that's a whole other level of pressure.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely raising the stakes dramatically, which brings us closer to today.

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<v Speaker 2>The twenty twenties marked another big shift, this time in

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<v Speaker 2>attacker strategy.

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<v Speaker 1>How So, we started.

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<v Speaker 2>Seeing double extortion becoming really common. Attackers wouldn't just encrypt

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<v Speaker 2>your files anymore. It also steal sensitive data like personally

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<v Speaker 2>identifiable information PII.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm threatened to leak it exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Leak it publicly or sell it on the dark web.

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<v Speaker 2>Adds a whole new layer of pressure. You're not just

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<v Speaker 2>worried about getting your systems back, You're worried about the

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<v Speaker 2>massive data breach becoming public right.

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<v Speaker 1>The reputational damage too huge.

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<v Speaker 2>And alongside that we saw the rise of big game.

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<v Speaker 1>Hunting, targeting the big fish precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>Instead of spraying attacks widely, they started specifically targeting large

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<v Speaker 2>corporations organizations they knew could afford massive ransoms. These attackers

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<v Speaker 2>are patient, sophisticated. They might stock it systems for months

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<v Speaker 2>looking for weaknesses, often exploiting things like Remote Desktop Protocol

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<v Speaker 2>RDP or server flaws.

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<v Speaker 1>Like that Revial attack in twenty twenty one.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a prime example, affected over a million devices, through

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<v Speaker 2>a supply chain attack demanding a staggering seventy million dollars

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<v Speaker 2>shows just how targeted and potentially lucrative these operations became.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, before we move on, maybe we should quickly clarify something.

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<v Speaker 1>People often use malware and ransomware interchangeably, right, But there's

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<v Speaker 1>a difference.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a good point. They're related, but not the same.

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<v Speaker 2>Think of malware as the umbrella term for any malicious software, viruses, worms, spyware, adware, unise.

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<v Speaker 2>It goal is usually to cause damage, disrupt systems.

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<v Speaker 1>Or steal info, and ransomware is.

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<v Speaker 2>Ransomware is a specific type of malware. Its primary defining

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<v Speaker 2>purpose is extortion. It's designed specifically to lock you out

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<v Speaker 2>of your device or encrypt your data and hold it

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<v Speaker 2>hostage until you pay a ransom. It mainly spreads via phishing,

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<v Speaker 2>and it's notoriously hard to remove without paying, which, as

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<v Speaker 2>we'll discuss, is usually a bad idea.

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<v Speaker 1>Whereas other malware can often be cleaned up by antivirus software.

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<v Speaker 2>Often yes, standard antivirus or anti malware tools can frequently

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<v Speaker 2>detect and remove many types of malware, Ransomware, especially the

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<v Speaker 2>encrypting kind, is a much tougher beast once it's taken hold.

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<v Speaker 2>The key difference is that extortion.

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<v Speaker 1>Motive got it. Okay, so we've seen how the threats evolved.

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<v Speaker 1>Now let's talk about how external events can just completely

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<v Speaker 1>change the game. The COVID nineteen pandemic, I mean, it

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<v Speaker 1>turned everything upside down almost overnight, didn't it force this

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<v Speaker 1>massive rapid shift to remote work.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh completely Suddenly you had what ninety nine percent of

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<v Speaker 2>the workforce trying to connect remotely. That speed, that urgency

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<v Speaker 2>to just get at working created huge cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 1>Because security wasn't always the top priority in that scramble.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, exactly, getting people connected was priority one. Security often

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<v Speaker 2>came second, and that rapid shift created a whole new

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<v Speaker 2>set of threats. You had home networks suddenly connecting directly

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<v Speaker 2>to corporate networks, the lines totally creating backdoors that it

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<v Speaker 2>security teams had a nightmare trying to patch and monitor.

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<v Speaker 2>People were using personal devices, laptops, phones that often didn't

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<v Speaker 2>have the same security standards as corporate equipment, easy entry points.

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<v Speaker 1>And we saw things like zoom bombing too.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that became a real issue. Uninvited people crashing video calls,

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<v Speaker 2>sharing malicious or offensive content. Zoom patched it, sure, but

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<v Speaker 2>it highlighted the risks, and other platforms like Microsoft Teams

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<v Speaker 2>saw huge growth partly because of those concerns.

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<v Speaker 1>And the existing tech struggled, like VPNs oh massively.

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<v Speaker 2>Traditional virtual private new networks VPNs were mostly designed for

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<v Speaker 2>maybe twenty thirty percent of staff working remotely. Sometimes they

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<v Speaker 2>just weren't built to handle nearly everyone connecting all at once.

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<v Speaker 2>They buckled under the strain, became slow, unreliable, and left

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<v Speaker 2>big security holes attackers could exploit.

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<v Speaker 1>So with traditional defenses like VPNs clearly struggling, what stepped

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<v Speaker 1>up to fill the gap? How did companies adapt well?

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<v Speaker 2>In direct response to those VPN weaknesses and the much

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<v Speaker 2>bigger attack surface, Something called the next generation firewall really

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<v Speaker 2>came into its own. It emerged as a much more powerful,

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<v Speaker 2>more comprehensive substitute.

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<v Speaker 1>Next generation firewall. What makes it next generation several things.

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<v Speaker 2>First, it offers full network traffic visibility. It inspects every

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<v Speaker 2>data packet, whether it's at the gateway, moving internally, externally,

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<v Speaker 2>or even across cloud platforms. Total visibility, seeing everything right. Second,

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<v Speaker 2>it uses AI and machine learning to stop threats immediately.

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<v Speaker 2>Not just known viruses, but brand new threat vectors, specialized malware.

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<v Speaker 2>It's never seen.

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<v Speaker 1>Before proactive defense exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Third, it gives you really tight control over software as

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<v Speaker 2>a service SAUCE applications. It monitors who's accessing what cloud apps,

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<v Speaker 2>preventing rogue applications from causing trouble.

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<v Speaker 1>Like controlling access to things like salesforce or office through

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<v Speaker 1>sixty five precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>And Fourth, and this is crucial, It automatically implements a

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<v Speaker 2>zero trust framework.

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<v Speaker 1>Zero trust that sounds important, What is it?

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<v Speaker 2>It's a fundamental security principle, Never trust, always verify. It

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<v Speaker 2>means you don't automatically trust anyone or anything trying to connect,

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<v Speaker 2>even if they're already inside your network. It requires multiple

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<v Speaker 2>layers of authentication for all employees, all devices, constantly verifying

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<v Speaker 2>identity and permissions.

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<v Speaker 1>No inherent trust makes sense anything else.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, One more thing. It helps create secure access for

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<v Speaker 2>third parties like suppliers or partners. Using a clientless SSL

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<v Speaker 2>protocol makes those external connections basically invisible from the outside,

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<v Speaker 2>harder for attackers to find and exploit.

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<v Speaker 1>So comparing it to old school firewalls to big leap,

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<v Speaker 1>isn't it huge?

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<v Speaker 2>Traditional firewalls were like you know, digital bouncers. At the

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<v Speaker 2>main gate, they checked who was coming in from the outside,

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<v Speaker 2>but once you're inside, they didn't do much and they

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<v Speaker 2>weren't designed for cloud stuff or sauce apps at all.

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<v Speaker 1>So next gen firewalls protect the cloud.

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<v Speaker 2>Too, yes, and sauce applications. They help mitigate identity theft

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<v Speaker 2>because of things like zero trust. They fortify the internal network,

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<v Speaker 2>not just the perimeter, and they allow for really granular

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<v Speaker 2>access rules. You can set rules based on the specific employee,

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<v Speaker 2>the device they're using, even the type of content they're

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<v Speaker 2>trying to access.

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<v Speaker 1>Much more specific control, much more.

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<v Speaker 2>Traditional firewalls couldn't do anything like that. It's really a

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<v Speaker 2>fundamental shift in how you approach defense, moving from just

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<v Speaker 2>guarding the walls to constantly verifying everything happening inside and outside.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that makes sense. Now let's shift focus a bit.

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<v Speaker 1>How does ransomware actually, you know, get onto your system

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<v Speaker 1>in the first place. What are the main ways it's deployed.

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<v Speaker 2>There are two primary methods attackers use. The first is

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<v Speaker 2>what's called MOUSEPAM, basically malicious email phishing emails, yeah, exactly,

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<v Speaker 2>emails with malicious attachments often disguised as invoices or important documents,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe a dot ex file hid inside a ZIP or

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<v Speaker 2>They have phony links that look legitimate but take you

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<v Speaker 2>to a malicious site. They often use clever social engineering

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<v Speaker 2>to trick you into clicking, making it look like it's

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<v Speaker 2>from your bank or HR, creating a sense of.

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<v Speaker 1>Urgency, preying on human psychology totally.

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<v Speaker 2>The second main method is malvertizing malicious advertising. Right cyber

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<v Speaker 2>attackers buy ad space on legitimate websites, but the ads

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<v Speaker 2>themselves contain malicious code or link to malicious sites. You

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<v Speaker 2>click on what looks like a normal ad, maybe even

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<v Speaker 2>on a reputable news site, and you're infected. Well. Clicking

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<v Speaker 2>the ad can trigger a couple of things. Sometimes it

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<v Speaker 2>directly downloads malware. Other times it redirects you through a

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<v Speaker 2>series of sites, often using hidden elements called iframes, which

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<v Speaker 2>are like invisible web pages within the page you're seeing.

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<v Speaker 2>These gather info about your computer location, browser type, vulnerabilities,

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<v Speaker 2>and then deliver are the ransomware payload best suited to

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<v Speaker 2>exploit your system. You might not even realize anything happen

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<v Speaker 2>until the ransom note appears. Sneaky okay, so once it's deployed.

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<v Speaker 2>Ransomware isn't just one thing, right, There are different types.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, they generally fall into a few categories, kind of

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<v Speaker 1>escalating in severity. First, you've got scareware.

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<v Speaker 2>Scareware sounds like what it does pretty much.

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<v Speaker 1>It's designed just to frighten you. You get annoying pop ups,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe claiming your computers infected with hundreds of viruses, often

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<v Speaker 1>mimicking real anti virus software warnings. They demand a small

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<v Speaker 1>payment to fix the non existent problem.

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<v Speaker 2>Annoying but maybe not devastating.

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<v Speaker 1>Usually not installing real anti molware software generally gets rid

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<v Speaker 1>of it. It's more of a nuisance designed to panning

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<v Speaker 1>people into paying a small fee.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, what's next?

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<v Speaker 1>Up the ladder screen lockers. These are more serious. They

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<v Speaker 1>completely lock your computer screen. You can't access anything. Instead,

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<v Speaker 1>you see a message, often claiming to be from law

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<v Speaker 1>enforcement like the FBI or Secret Service.

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<v Speaker 2>The fake FBI warning again.

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<v Speaker 1>Exactly accusing you of some illicit activity like downloading illegal

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<v Speaker 1>files or visiting prohibited websites, and demanding a hefty fine

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<v Speaker 1>to unlock your computer. And people should know, real law

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<v Speaker 1>enforcement doesn't operate.

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<v Speaker 2>Like that, right, absolutely not. Everment agencies will never demand

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<v Speaker 2>payment via pop up screen like that. With screen lockers,

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<v Speaker 2>recovery often needs professional help. Sometimes, depending on the variant,

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<v Speaker 2>the device might be effectively bricked.

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<v Speaker 1>Ouch. Okay, So what's the worst time that would be?

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<v Speaker 2>Encrypting ransomware This is the most common and damaging type today.

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<v Speaker 2>It doesn't just lock your screen. It gets into your files, documents, photos, databases,

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<v Speaker 2>everything and encrypts them using complex algorithms.

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<v Speaker 1>So you can see the files, which you can't open

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<v Speaker 1>them exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>They're scrambled useless without the unique decryption key. The attackers

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<v Speaker 2>then demand a large ransom, usually in bitcoin or another cryptocurrency,

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<v Speaker 2>in exchange for that key.

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<v Speaker 1>And do they actually give you the key if you pay?

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<v Speaker 2>That's the big gamble. Some times yes, but very often

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<v Speaker 2>attackers just disappear after getting paid, or the key they

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<v Speaker 2>provide doesn't work properly, and because they use virtual currency,

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<v Speaker 2>the payments are practically impossible to trace or recover. It's

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<v Speaker 2>devastating because your data is effectively gone forever if you

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<v Speaker 2>don't have backups.

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<v Speaker 1>Which leads to that awful dilemma if you get hit.

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<v Speaker 1>It's especially with encrypting ransomware. Do you pay? It must

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<v Speaker 1>be an agonizing decision.

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<v Speaker 2>It really is. For individuals. For huge companies, it's a

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<v Speaker 2>terrible choice. On the one hand, paying might be the

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<v Speaker 2>only way to get your data back if you don't

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<v Speaker 2>have good backups. It's a small mite, though.

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<v Speaker 1>But the downsides are huge.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, absolutely massive. First, there's zero guarantee you'll get a

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<v Speaker 2>working key. You're dealing with criminals. Second, paying marks you

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<v Speaker 2>or your organization as willing to pay. You become a

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<v Speaker 2>prime target for future attacks, often with even higher demands.

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<v Speaker 1>They know you're vulnerable and willing to cough up exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Third, the payments, usually bitcoin, are untraced. You won't get

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<v Speaker 2>that money back. And fourth, this is a really serious one.

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<v Speaker 2>Paying the ransom can actually be considered a crime in

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<v Speaker 2>some circumstances, especially by the US federal government if the

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<v Speaker 2>attackers are linked to sanctioned entities or state threat actors,

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<v Speaker 2>paying could even be viewed as treason.

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<v Speaker 1>Treason why yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>And on top of all that, many cyber insurance policies

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<v Speaker 2>may not cover losses if you choose to pay the ransom,

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<v Speaker 2>although there have been high profile exceptions, like the Colonial

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<v Speaker 2>pipeline case, where the impact on critical infrastructure complicated things

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<v Speaker 2>but generally panning is strongly advised against.

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<v Speaker 1>So the best approach is to avoid getting into that

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<v Speaker 1>situation in the first place. How do you avoid having

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<v Speaker 1>to make that choice?

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<v Speaker 2>Proactive measures are absolutely everything. The number one thing backups,

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<v Speaker 2>regular reliable backups. You should have daily backups, ideally following

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<v Speaker 2>the three to one rule, at least three copies on

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<v Speaker 2>two different types of media with one copy off site.

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<v Speaker 1>Off site is key for things like fire or flood

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<v Speaker 1>or even a really destructive attack.

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<v Speaker 2>And beyond just off site storage, leveraging cloud infrastructure is

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<v Speaker 2>a really smart move now platforms like Microsoft Azure or

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<v Speaker 2>Amazon Web Services AWS.

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<v Speaker 1>How does the cloud help specifically with ransomware?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, if you're using virtual machines or vms in the

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<v Speaker 2>cloud and one gets infected with ransomware, you can often

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<v Speaker 2>just delete the infected VM and spin up a brand new,

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<v Speaker 2>clean one from a backup image in minutes minutes.

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<v Speaker 1>That's incredibly fast recovery compared to trying to decrypt exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It dramatically reduces downtime and pretty much eliminates the incentive

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<v Speaker 2>to pay the ransom you just restore from your clean backup.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, backups are critical. What about protecting things inside the network,

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<v Speaker 1>preventing the ransomware from spreading or gaining access in the

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<v Speaker 1>first place.

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<v Speaker 2>That's where identity and Access management or IAM comes in.

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<v Speaker 2>IM solutions are crucial. They cover the three a's identification,

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<v Speaker 2>who are you, authentication, prove it and authorization? What do

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<v Speaker 2>you allowed to do?

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<v Speaker 1>Like the digital gatekeeper inside the system?

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely? Good IM involves things like automated logs tracking who

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<v Speaker 2>accessed what when, tools for managing employee permissions efficiently, comprehensive

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<v Speaker 2>databases of log in credentials securely stored.

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<v Speaker 1>And there are specific guidelines within IM.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes some key principles. First, role based access controls or RBAC.

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<v Speaker 2>This means assigning permissions based strictly on someone's job function,

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<v Speaker 2>give them only the minimum access they absolutely need to

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<v Speaker 2>do their job. The principle of least privilege, so if an.

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<v Speaker 1>Account gets compromised, the damage is limited.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly the attacker can only access what that specific user

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<v Speaker 2>could access. Second, multi factor authentication MFA. Don't rely on

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<v Speaker 2>just a password. Deploy at least three unique ways to

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<v Speaker 2>verify identity.

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<v Speaker 1>Like password plus a code from your phone plus maybe

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<v Speaker 1>a fingerprint.

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<v Speaker 2>Perfect example, password something you know a token or phone app,

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<v Speaker 2>something you have, biometrics, something you are makes it much

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<v Speaker 2>harder for attackers to gain access, even if they steal

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<v Speaker 2>a password. In the third one, work segmentation. This is

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<v Speaker 2>huge break down your IT infrastructure your network into smaller

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<v Speaker 2>isolated segments or subnets. Each subnet should have its own

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<v Speaker 2>security controls, maybe even its own MFA to move between segments.

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<v Speaker 1>So if attackers get into one part, they can't easily

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<v Speaker 1>move sideways to other parts of the network.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the goal. It contains the breach, limits the attackers

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<v Speaker 2>lateral movement and buys your security team time to respond.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so backups, IAM, MFA, segmentation. These are all vital defenses.

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<v Speaker 1>How do you pull this all together into a coherent

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<v Speaker 1>plan before an attack happens.

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<v Speaker 2>You need a comprehensive written ransomware plan and it needs

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<v Speaker 2>several key ingredients. First, you need a designated response team.

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<v Speaker 2>This has to be cross departmental IT security obviously, but

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<v Speaker 2>also legal, HR, maybe finance and accounting. Everyone needs clearly

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<v Speaker 2>assigned roles and responsibilities so.

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<v Speaker 1>Everyone knows what to do when crisis hits exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Second, you need a clear first response strategy. What do

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<v Speaker 2>you do in the first minutes the first hourly. It

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<v Speaker 2>involves immediately disconnecting affected devices, isolating the malware to stop

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<v Speaker 2>it spreading, and you must rehearse this regularly. Drills shorten

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<v Speaker 2>response time dramatically.

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<v Speaker 1>Practice makes perfect even in disaster.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely. Third, a solid communication plan Who calls whom You

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<v Speaker 2>need a detailed cal tree with landline numbers, cell numbers,

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<v Speaker 2>work emails, personal emails updated monthly because people change roles.

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<v Speaker 2>Use the company intranet for internal alerts, but definitely avoid

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<v Speaker 2>social media during an active attack.

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<v Speaker 1>Why avoid social media?

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<v Speaker 2>Attackers monitor it. It can spread misinformation or panic, and

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<v Speaker 2>you can inadvertently reveal information they can use. Stick to

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<v Speaker 2>controlled channels. Fourth, Obviously, your data backup plan needs to

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<v Speaker 2>be a part of this, clearly defining who's responsible for

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<v Speaker 2>executing backups and restorations right what else. Stakeholder notification. You

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<v Speaker 2>need a plan for quickly notifying shareholders, key vendors, law

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<v Speaker 2>enforcement and regulatory bodies. Failing to report a significant breach

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<v Speaker 2>is often a serious offense, even af fect in some cases.

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<v Speaker 2>And Finally, include your insurance policy information, key contacts, policy details,

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<v Speaker 2>claim procedures. Your cyber insurance can be a crucial financial buffer,

424
00:22:10.799 --> 00:22:12.119
<v Speaker 2>so know how to use it quickly.

425
00:22:12.279 --> 00:22:14.960
<v Speaker 1>That's a lot to coordinate. Seems like planning is everything.

426
00:22:15.160 --> 00:22:17.759
<v Speaker 2>It really is. Having that plan and practicing it is

427
00:22:17.799 --> 00:22:21.160
<v Speaker 2>the difference between a manageable incident and a complete catastrophe.

428
00:22:21.240 --> 00:22:23.720
<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's shift gears now and talk about one of

429
00:22:23.799 --> 00:22:28.079
<v Speaker 1>the most well insidious ways these attacks happen supply chain attacks.

430
00:22:28.200 --> 00:22:30.880
<v Speaker 1>We mentioned REvil using one. Can you unpack what that means?

431
00:22:31.119 --> 00:22:34.039
<v Speaker 2>Yeah? A supply chain attack is particularly nasty because it

432
00:22:34.079 --> 00:22:37.200
<v Speaker 2>doesn't target you directly. It targets one of your trusted

433
00:22:37.359 --> 00:22:41.759
<v Speaker 2>third party vendors, maybe a software provider, a service supplier,

434
00:22:42.160 --> 00:22:44.559
<v Speaker 2>someone whose products or services you rely on.

435
00:22:44.680 --> 00:22:47.079
<v Speaker 1>So they attack the vendor to get to the vendor's customers.

436
00:22:47.279 --> 00:22:51.440
<v Speaker 2>Exactly. By compromising the vendor, they can push malicious code

437
00:22:51.519 --> 00:22:54.319
<v Speaker 2>or gain access to all the organizations that use that

438
00:22:54.440 --> 00:22:58.319
<v Speaker 2>vendors software services. The solar Winds attack is probably the

439
00:22:58.359 --> 00:23:01.279
<v Speaker 2>most famous and frankly terrifying example of this.

440
00:23:01.519 --> 00:23:04.160
<v Speaker 1>Solar Winds, right, that was huge news. Remind us what

441
00:23:04.200 --> 00:23:04.720
<v Speaker 1>happened there.

442
00:23:04.759 --> 00:23:06.920
<v Speaker 2>Okay, So solar Winds is a big software company. They

443
00:23:06.920 --> 00:23:09.400
<v Speaker 2>make it management and monitoring tools, and one of their

444
00:23:09.440 --> 00:23:13.480
<v Speaker 2>main products is called Orion. It's used by thousands of organizations,

445
00:23:13.519 --> 00:23:17.799
<v Speaker 2>including government agencies and major corporations to monitor their networks.

446
00:23:17.640 --> 00:23:19.960
<v Speaker 1>So a really widely used, trusted.

447
00:23:19.559 --> 00:23:23.960
<v Speaker 2>Tool, extremely trusted. The attackers, believed to be a sophisticated

448
00:23:24.039 --> 00:23:28.359
<v Speaker 2>nation state group, didn't breach solar Wind's main network initially. Instead,

449
00:23:28.400 --> 00:23:31.400
<v Speaker 2>they managed to inject malicious code into the software update

450
00:23:31.440 --> 00:23:32.839
<v Speaker 2>process for Orion.

451
00:23:32.720 --> 00:23:33.720
<v Speaker 1>Into the updates.

452
00:23:33.920 --> 00:23:38.160
<v Speaker 2>Wow. Yeah, so when solar Win's customers downloaded and installed

453
00:23:38.160 --> 00:23:41.480
<v Speaker 2>what they thought was a legitimate routine software patch for Orion,

454
00:23:42.000 --> 00:23:47.200
<v Speaker 2>they were unknowingly installing malware. It was disguised brilliantly affected

455
00:23:47.240 --> 00:23:49.200
<v Speaker 2>over thirty thousand entities worldwide.

456
00:23:49.200 --> 00:23:52.000
<v Speaker 1>Eventually, how do they even get into the update process?

457
00:23:52.640 --> 00:23:56.400
<v Speaker 2>It seems they first gained access to solar Winds internal systems,

458
00:23:56.440 --> 00:24:00.839
<v Speaker 2>possibly their software development environment, as early as October twenty nineteen,

459
00:24:01.640 --> 00:24:05.279
<v Speaker 2>likely exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office three sixty five that

460
00:24:05.359 --> 00:24:06.759
<v Speaker 2>solar Winds was using, so they.

461
00:24:06.640 --> 00:24:10.039
<v Speaker 1>Were inside for months before deploying the malicious update.

462
00:24:09.839 --> 00:24:13.839
<v Speaker 2>Potentially even longer. They inserted the main trojan horse malware

463
00:24:14.039 --> 00:24:17.799
<v Speaker 2>dubbed Sunburst, into the build process around March twenty twenty.

464
00:24:18.279 --> 00:24:21.680
<v Speaker 2>This created back doors in the infected customer systems. These

465
00:24:21.720 --> 00:24:24.680
<v Speaker 2>back doors would then communicate very stealthily with command and

466
00:24:24.680 --> 00:24:27.680
<v Speaker 2>control servers run by the attackers, allowing them to steal data,

467
00:24:27.799 --> 00:24:30.920
<v Speaker 2>escalate privileges, and move laterally within the victim networks, and

468
00:24:30.960 --> 00:24:34.920
<v Speaker 2>it looked legitimate completely. The malicious code was digitally signed

469
00:24:35.039 --> 00:24:39.000
<v Speaker 2>using compromised or manipulated solar Wind certificates. It even had

470
00:24:39.000 --> 00:24:41.960
<v Speaker 2>a built in delay. It would lie dormant for about

471
00:24:41.960 --> 00:24:45.519
<v Speaker 2>fourteen days after installation before trying to call home to

472
00:24:45.519 --> 00:24:49.440
<v Speaker 2>the attacker servers. This dormancy period helped to evade detection

473
00:24:49.559 --> 00:24:53.880
<v Speaker 2>by security tools looking for immediate suspicious activity. It was

474
00:24:54.000 --> 00:24:56.519
<v Speaker 2>incredibly patient, incredibly stealthy.

475
00:24:56.839 --> 00:24:59.480
<v Speaker 1>That timeline is just staggering. You said they might have

476
00:24:59.480 --> 00:25:01.519
<v Speaker 1>been in the zero is late twenty nineteen.

477
00:25:01.880 --> 00:25:06.400
<v Speaker 2>Evidence suggests initial foothold possibly September twenty nineteen. They did

478
00:25:06.440 --> 00:25:09.160
<v Speaker 2>a test run of the malicious code insertion in February

479
00:25:09.160 --> 00:25:12.359
<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty. The somber erst malware went into the updates

480
00:25:12.400 --> 00:25:15.240
<v Speaker 2>around March twenty twenty, but the world didn't know anything

481
00:25:15.319 --> 00:25:17.160
<v Speaker 2>was wrong until December twenty twenty.

482
00:25:17.279 --> 00:25:19.200
<v Speaker 1>December, so it was active for maybe eight or nine

483
00:25:19.200 --> 00:25:20.000
<v Speaker 1>months undetected.

484
00:25:20.079 --> 00:25:22.519
<v Speaker 2>At least. The first public sign was on December eighth,

485
00:25:22.519 --> 00:25:25.759
<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty, when the cybersecurity firm FireEye announced they had

486
00:25:25.799 --> 00:25:27.920
<v Speaker 2>been breached and their own red team tools were storn.

487
00:25:27.960 --> 00:25:31.240
<v Speaker 2>Fire Eye got hit, yes, and while investigating their own breach,

488
00:25:31.480 --> 00:25:34.440
<v Speaker 2>FireEye discovered the Solar Winds connection. Just a few days later,

489
00:25:34.559 --> 00:25:37.720
<v Speaker 2>on December eleventh, they realized it was a massive supply

490
00:25:37.839 --> 00:25:40.160
<v Speaker 2>chain attack involving the Orion platform.

491
00:25:40.279 --> 00:25:43.400
<v Speaker 1>So FireEye finding their own breach actually uncovered the whole

492
00:25:43.400 --> 00:25:45.079
<v Speaker 1>Solar Winds campaign largely.

493
00:25:45.160 --> 00:25:47.759
<v Speaker 2>Yes. They notified Solar Winds on December twelfth, and the

494
00:25:47.839 --> 00:25:52.839
<v Speaker 2>US National Security Council got involved immediately. Then things moved fast.

495
00:25:53.160 --> 00:25:57.519
<v Speaker 2>December thirteenth, SISO ordered all US federal agencies to stop

496
00:25:57.599 --> 00:26:01.759
<v Speaker 2>using Orion. Solar Winds rushed out temporary fifth FireEye publicly

497
00:26:01.759 --> 00:26:04.720
<v Speaker 2>declared it a supply chain hack, hitting Fortune five hundreds.

498
00:26:04.759 --> 00:26:08.279
<v Speaker 2>Microsoft detailed the customer impact, but December fifteenth, Solar Winds

499
00:26:08.319 --> 00:26:11.599
<v Speaker 2>released proper software fixes. The first wave of high profile

500
00:26:11.680 --> 00:26:15.680
<v Speaker 2>victims was identified, and SISA and the FBI launched formal investigations.

501
00:26:16.000 --> 00:26:19.079
<v Speaker 2>The sheer length of the compromise before discovery is what's

502
00:26:19.119 --> 00:26:19.759
<v Speaker 2>so chilling?

503
00:26:19.880 --> 00:26:22.799
<v Speaker 1>Who are the victims you mentioned government agencies fortune five hundreds.

504
00:26:22.960 --> 00:26:25.640
<v Speaker 2>The list is huge and likely still not fully known.

505
00:26:26.119 --> 00:26:30.279
<v Speaker 2>Estimates are around eighteen thousand organizations downloaded the malicious update.

506
00:26:30.480 --> 00:26:34.880
<v Speaker 2>Over forty major business entities were confirmed victims, about forty

507
00:26:34.920 --> 00:26:38.359
<v Speaker 2>four percent of them tech companies, but it also included

508
00:26:38.440 --> 00:26:43.920
<v Speaker 2>multiple US government departments Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland, Security, State, Treasury,

509
00:26:44.000 --> 00:26:49.759
<v Speaker 2>even health. Plus big names like Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, Deloitte,

510
00:26:50.000 --> 00:26:54.519
<v Speaker 2>FireEye itself, even Mount Sinai Hospital. It was incredibly widespread.

511
00:26:54.759 --> 00:26:56.880
<v Speaker 1>What are the big lessons here for CIOs? For IT

512
00:26:57.119 --> 00:27:00.000
<v Speaker 1>security teams? What should they take away from solar winds?

513
00:27:00.400 --> 00:27:03.920
<v Speaker 2>Several critical lessons. First, vet your source code, especially third

514
00:27:03.920 --> 00:27:06.759
<v Speaker 2>party code or components. You need processes to scan and

515
00:27:06.799 --> 00:27:09.319
<v Speaker 2>test all code for malware before it gets deployed into

516
00:27:09.319 --> 00:27:10.559
<v Speaker 2>your environment or products.

517
00:27:10.680 --> 00:27:12.880
<v Speaker 1>Don't blindly trust updates you can't afford to.

518
00:27:13.240 --> 00:27:17.039
<v Speaker 2>Second, rigorous third party vetting. Scrutinize the security procedures of

519
00:27:17.039 --> 00:27:19.319
<v Speaker 2>your suppliers, not just before you sign a contract, but

520
00:27:19.400 --> 00:27:23.000
<v Speaker 2>continually during the relationship, because legally and financially, you are

521
00:27:23.000 --> 00:27:26.240
<v Speaker 2>often held responsible if their breach affects your customers or data.

522
00:27:26.319 --> 00:27:28.839
<v Speaker 1>Your security is only as strong as your weakest supplier

523
00:27:29.119 --> 00:27:29.799
<v Speaker 1>pretty much.

524
00:27:30.039 --> 00:27:33.680
<v Speaker 2>Third, simplicity and your security stack. Don't just keep adding

525
00:27:33.720 --> 00:27:37.480
<v Speaker 2>more and more tools. Invest in fewer, strategically deployed tools

526
00:27:37.480 --> 00:27:41.240
<v Speaker 2>that integrate well. A complex, sprawling set of tools actually

527
00:27:41.240 --> 00:27:44.240
<v Speaker 2>increases your attack surface and makes it harder to pinpoint

528
00:27:44.279 --> 00:27:48.480
<v Speaker 2>real threats. Amidst all the noise, use AI and machine

529
00:27:48.519 --> 00:27:52.160
<v Speaker 2>learning to help filter alerts. Okay, segmentation, we talked about

530
00:27:52.160 --> 00:27:55.160
<v Speaker 2>it before, but solar winds drove it home. Implement zero

531
00:27:55.319 --> 00:27:59.720
<v Speaker 2>trust by breaking your network into subnets with independent defenses.

532
00:28:00.319 --> 00:28:03.000
<v Speaker 2>If the attackers had only been able to compromise one segment,

533
00:28:03.079 --> 00:28:05.920
<v Speaker 2>the damage would have been far less. And finally, keep

534
00:28:05.920 --> 00:28:10.240
<v Speaker 2>your technology updated. Get rid of outdated systems like traditional VPNs,

535
00:28:10.559 --> 00:28:13.799
<v Speaker 2>move to things like next generation firewalls that offer better

536
00:28:13.880 --> 00:28:17.200
<v Speaker 2>visibility and control, especially for cloud and hybrid environments.

537
00:28:17.240 --> 00:28:20.079
<v Speaker 1>And the financial impact of solo winds must have been enormous.

538
00:28:20.400 --> 00:28:23.519
<v Speaker 2>Estimates vary, but solar Winds itself reported costs around ninety

539
00:28:23.559 --> 00:28:27.839
<v Speaker 2>million dollars initially. The total economic damage across all victims

540
00:28:28.039 --> 00:28:31.359
<v Speaker 2>could potentially reach one hundred billion dollars. When you factor

541
00:28:31.440 --> 00:28:36.799
<v Speaker 2>in investigation, remediation, loss, productivity, reputational damage, it's staggering.

542
00:28:36.960 --> 00:28:40.160
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so solar winds showed the danger of attacks on

543
00:28:40.400 --> 00:28:44.640
<v Speaker 1>our digital infrastructure, our software supply chains. You mentioned earlier

544
00:28:44.640 --> 00:28:48.680
<v Speaker 1>there's been a shift towards targeting critical infrastructure. What does

545
00:28:48.720 --> 00:28:49.799
<v Speaker 1>that mean exactly?

546
00:28:50.079 --> 00:28:53.559
<v Speaker 2>It means attackers are increasingly targeting the physical systems that

547
00:28:53.680 --> 00:28:57.880
<v Speaker 2>underpin modern society, not just data centers and software companies,

548
00:28:57.920 --> 00:29:00.799
<v Speaker 2>but things like the electrical grid, water, tree treatment plants,

549
00:29:01.119 --> 00:29:06.200
<v Speaker 2>transportation systems, oil and gas pipelines, manufacturing, even food distribution.

550
00:29:06.400 --> 00:29:07.880
<v Speaker 1>The actual physical world.

551
00:29:07.759 --> 00:29:11.319
<v Speaker 2>Exactly, systems where a cyber attack can have immediate, tangible,

552
00:29:11.400 --> 00:29:16.000
<v Speaker 2>and potentially devastating real world consequences. Think about the impact

553
00:29:16.039 --> 00:29:18.920
<v Speaker 2>of shutting down power to a city, or contaminating a

554
00:29:18.960 --> 00:29:22.359
<v Speaker 2>water supply, or disrupting fuel distribution, like we saw with

555
00:29:22.400 --> 00:29:23.359
<v Speaker 2>the Colonial pipeline.

556
00:29:23.359 --> 00:29:25.880
<v Speaker 1>Plobial pipeline paid a ransom, didn't they four point four

557
00:29:25.920 --> 00:29:26.599
<v Speaker 1>million dollars?

558
00:29:26.720 --> 00:29:29.759
<v Speaker 2>They did. It caused massive fuel shortages along the US

559
00:29:29.759 --> 00:29:33.640
<v Speaker 2>East Coast. Other high impact targets include nuclear facilities incredibly

560
00:29:33.720 --> 00:29:37.039
<v Speaker 2>sensitive and disrupting the food supply chain. The potential for

561
00:29:37.119 --> 00:29:40.480
<v Speaker 2>causing widespread panic or harm is enormous.

562
00:29:40.839 --> 00:29:43.759
<v Speaker 1>Can you give some other examples of attacks on critical infrastructure.

563
00:29:43.920 --> 00:29:48.200
<v Speaker 2>Sure Back in December twenty fifteen, Ukraine's power grades were hit.

564
00:29:48.640 --> 00:29:52.839
<v Speaker 2>Attackers exploited outdated control systems known as SCATUS systems, using

565
00:29:52.920 --> 00:29:56.240
<v Speaker 2>spear phishing emails to gain access. They cut power to

566
00:29:56.359 --> 00:29:58.799
<v Speaker 2>about two hundred and thirty thousand residents.

567
00:29:58.839 --> 00:29:59.799
<v Speaker 1>Wow. What else?

568
00:30:00.000 --> 00:30:02.440
<v Speaker 2>There was an attack on a water dam in Ryebrook,

569
00:30:02.480 --> 00:30:04.559
<v Speaker 2>New York. It actually happened back in twenty thirteen, but

570
00:30:04.640 --> 00:30:09.359
<v Speaker 2>wasn't reported until twenty sixteen. A nation state actor, allegedly Iran,

571
00:30:09.599 --> 00:30:12.559
<v Speaker 2>got into the dam's command center through Believe or Not

572
00:30:13.079 --> 00:30:14.079
<v Speaker 2>a dial up motive.

573
00:30:14.160 --> 00:30:16.400
<v Speaker 1>A dial up modem in twenty thirteen, YEP.

574
00:30:16.240 --> 00:30:19.160
<v Speaker 2>Shows how outdated some of this infrastructure can be. Then

575
00:30:19.200 --> 00:30:23.000
<v Speaker 2>there's the global financial messaging system Swift. The North Korean

576
00:30:23.079 --> 00:30:26.559
<v Speaker 2>Lazarus Group gained access using stolen Swift loggins, trying to

577
00:30:26.559 --> 00:30:29.359
<v Speaker 2>steal massive amounts of money and disrupting international.

578
00:30:28.960 --> 00:30:31.440
<v Speaker 1>Banking financial infrastructure too definitely critical.

579
00:30:31.640 --> 00:30:34.759
<v Speaker 2>We also saw spearfishing attempts targeting personnel at the Wolf

580
00:30:34.759 --> 00:30:39.160
<v Speaker 2>Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation in Kansas, which exposed vulnerabilities potentially

581
00:30:39.160 --> 00:30:42.960
<v Speaker 2>affecting nuclear facilities across the US, and more recently, the

582
00:30:43.000 --> 00:30:44.799
<v Speaker 2>water supply in old smart Florida.

583
00:30:44.880 --> 00:30:46.240
<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, I remember that one.

584
00:30:46.319 --> 00:30:49.319
<v Speaker 2>That was scary very An attacker got in using a

585
00:30:49.359 --> 00:30:53.839
<v Speaker 2>remote access tool, exploiting an outdated operating system and weak passwords.

586
00:30:54.079 --> 00:30:56.599
<v Speaker 2>They tried to increase the levels of sodium hydroxide LIE

587
00:30:56.640 --> 00:31:00.000
<v Speaker 2>in the water to poisonous levels. Luckily, an employee noticed

588
00:31:00.200 --> 00:31:02.599
<v Speaker 2>the changes on screen in real time and reversed it.

589
00:31:03.279 --> 00:31:05.319
<v Speaker 2>But it was a terrifyingly close call.

590
00:31:05.759 --> 00:31:10.640
<v Speaker 1>It really highlights the vulnerability. So why are these industrial

591
00:31:10.680 --> 00:31:14.400
<v Speaker 1>control systems, these ICs that run everything so vulnerable?

592
00:31:14.640 --> 00:31:17.720
<v Speaker 2>Several reasons rooted in their history. First, the idea of

593
00:31:17.839 --> 00:31:21.160
<v Speaker 2>air gapping, keeping these systems totally isolated from the Internet

594
00:31:21.200 --> 00:31:25.960
<v Speaker 2>is becoming almost impossible. Why the industrial Internet of Things.

595
00:31:25.720 --> 00:31:29.480
<v Speaker 1>Or IoT connecting industrial machines to the Internet.

596
00:31:29.200 --> 00:31:32.599
<v Speaker 2>Right for remote monitoring, predictive maintenance, efficiency gains, but it

597
00:31:32.599 --> 00:31:37.200
<v Speaker 2>connects previously isolated systems vastly expanding the attack surface. And

598
00:31:37.240 --> 00:31:40.079
<v Speaker 2>these legacy systems, they're often really hard to upgrade or

599
00:31:40.079 --> 00:31:42.519
<v Speaker 2>patch without disrupting critical operations.

600
00:31:42.799 --> 00:31:45.839
<v Speaker 1>They weren't built with Internet connectivity in mind, not at all.

601
00:31:46.119 --> 00:31:49.039
<v Speaker 2>Second, much of the hardware and software is ancient. We're

602
00:31:49.079 --> 00:31:54.799
<v Speaker 2>talking about PLCs, programmable logic controllers RTUs Remote terminal units

603
00:31:55.160 --> 00:31:58.480
<v Speaker 2>DCS's distributed control systems that might date back to the

604
00:31:58.519 --> 00:32:02.480
<v Speaker 2>seventies or eighties. They often lack basic authentication or encryption.

605
00:32:02.920 --> 00:32:05.839
<v Speaker 2>Attackers can potentially just connect and send commands to shut

606
00:32:05.920 --> 00:32:08.799
<v Speaker 2>things down, and they might be running on ancient operating

607
00:32:08.839 --> 00:32:11.440
<v Speaker 2>systems like Windows and T or Windows XP, which are

608
00:32:11.440 --> 00:32:15.599
<v Speaker 2>full of known unpatched vulnerabilities win tos XP still in

609
00:32:15.640 --> 00:32:20.319
<v Speaker 2>some critical infrastructure settings Unfortunately. Yes, Third, there's often a

610
00:32:20.440 --> 00:32:24.160
<v Speaker 2>lack of visibility. Unlike modern IT networks or cloud environments,

611
00:32:24.200 --> 00:32:26.920
<v Speaker 2>where you have lots of monitoring tools, it's much harder

612
00:32:26.920 --> 00:32:31.039
<v Speaker 2>to see suspicious activity. Within these older ICs environments, Attackers

613
00:32:31.079 --> 00:32:33.920
<v Speaker 2>can lurk undetected for longer, harder to spot the intrusion

614
00:32:34.160 --> 00:32:40.200
<v Speaker 2>much harder. And Fourth, outdated communication protocols. Many ICs systems

615
00:32:40.319 --> 00:32:44.359
<v Speaker 2>use proprietary protocols developed decades ago. These weren't designed with

616
00:32:44.400 --> 00:32:47.000
<v Speaker 2>security in mind and can have built in back doors

617
00:32:47.079 --> 00:32:50.119
<v Speaker 2>or weaknesses that allow attackers to intercept or even change

618
00:32:50.160 --> 00:32:54.079
<v Speaker 2>the commands being sent, altering the physical process the system controls.

619
00:32:54.799 --> 00:32:58.440
<v Speaker 2>They could subtly change chemical mixtures or pressure levels or timing,

620
00:32:58.519 --> 00:33:00.160
<v Speaker 2>causing failures or dangerous cans.

621
00:33:00.880 --> 00:33:05.720
<v Speaker 1>So specifically focusing on SCATA systems supervisory control and data acquisition,

622
00:33:05.799 --> 00:33:08.319
<v Speaker 1>which are key for managing things like power grids and

623
00:33:08.400 --> 00:33:10.799
<v Speaker 1>water plants. What are their main security issues?

624
00:33:11.000 --> 00:33:14.119
<v Speaker 2>SCATA systems really embody these challenges. They suffer from outdated

625
00:33:14.119 --> 00:33:18.960
<v Speaker 2>technologies because historically the focus was entirely on physical security fences, guards,

626
00:33:19.000 --> 00:33:23.400
<v Speaker 2>locked rooms, not cybersecurity. Adding modern security tools can actually

627
00:33:23.400 --> 00:33:26.680
<v Speaker 2>cause problems breaking compatibility with the older SCATIC components.

628
00:33:26.680 --> 00:33:29.400
<v Speaker 1>Trying to bolt modern security onto old systems.

629
00:33:29.119 --> 00:33:31.680
<v Speaker 2>It often doesn't work well. They also have this issue

630
00:33:31.680 --> 00:33:35.480
<v Speaker 2>of open visibility. Sometimes the physical layouts might be widely known,

631
00:33:35.839 --> 00:33:39.640
<v Speaker 2>making them vulnerable to insider attacks or targeted physical sabotage.

632
00:33:39.720 --> 00:33:41.720
<v Speaker 2>And like we said, they were designed to be isolated,

633
00:33:41.720 --> 00:33:45.640
<v Speaker 2>but now they're increasingly networked via IoT, dramatically expanding that

634
00:33:45.680 --> 00:33:48.960
<v Speaker 2>attack surface without fundamentally upgrading the core security.

635
00:33:49.359 --> 00:33:52.160
<v Speaker 1>Have there been specific SCATA system exploits.

636
00:33:52.359 --> 00:33:56.440
<v Speaker 2>Yes, Schneider Electric, a major SCAT of vendor, had vulnerabilities

637
00:33:56.480 --> 00:33:58.960
<v Speaker 2>discovered in their firmware that could allow attackers to gain

638
00:33:59.000 --> 00:34:03.359
<v Speaker 2>control over immergency shut down systems. Incredibly dangerous. There were

639
00:34:03.440 --> 00:34:06.519
<v Speaker 2>attax targeting power line SCATA systems in the US in

640
00:34:06.559 --> 00:34:10.400
<v Speaker 2>twenty eighteen, and a major European energy company's SCATA network

641
00:34:10.480 --> 00:34:14.199
<v Speaker 2>was breached in twenty sixteen. These systems are definitely being targeted.

642
00:34:14.280 --> 00:34:16.719
<v Speaker 1>So how do you even begin to secure these vital

643
00:34:16.840 --> 00:34:18.920
<v Speaker 1>but often old SCATA systems.

644
00:34:19.280 --> 00:34:22.760
<v Speaker 2>It's a huge challenge requires a multi layered approach. First,

645
00:34:22.760 --> 00:34:26.599
<v Speaker 2>you have to map out all connections, ascertain what's connected, why,

646
00:34:26.840 --> 00:34:30.920
<v Speaker 2>and disconnect anything that's unnecessary. Then art in the connections

647
00:34:30.920 --> 00:34:35.920
<v Speaker 2>that must remain strong encryption, authentication, firewalls, avoid implementing new

648
00:34:35.960 --> 00:34:39.199
<v Speaker 2>proprietary protocols, stick to modern secure standards.

649
00:34:39.199 --> 00:34:42.480
<v Speaker 1>Where possible, testing is important too, presumably.

650
00:34:42.000 --> 00:34:46.840
<v Speaker 2>Crucial, conduct regular penetration testing specifically targeting the SCATA environment.

651
00:34:47.280 --> 00:34:52.000
<v Speaker 2>Do threat hunting exercises, deploy specialized firewalls and intrusion detection

652
00:34:52.119 --> 00:34:55.920
<v Speaker 2>systems designed for ICs environments around the SCATA network segments.

653
00:34:56.440 --> 00:34:59.639
<v Speaker 2>Regular risk assessments are vital, as our Red Team exercises

654
00:34:59.679 --> 00:35:01.280
<v Speaker 2>similar lating realistic.

655
00:35:00.800 --> 00:35:03.920
<v Speaker 1>Attack scenarios and the human element absolutely key to.

656
00:35:03.920 --> 00:35:07.519
<v Speaker 2>Find clear roles and responsibilities for who manages SCAT of security,

657
00:35:08.039 --> 00:35:11.480
<v Speaker 2>and just like in corporate it implement and religiously practice

658
00:35:11.599 --> 00:35:16.199
<v Speaker 2>robust data backup, incident response and disaster recovery plans specifically

659
00:35:16.199 --> 00:35:19.719
<v Speaker 2>tailored to the SCATA environment and the critical processes it controls.

660
00:35:19.960 --> 00:35:23.320
<v Speaker 1>Looking ahead, then, what's the future hold for ransomware targeting

661
00:35:23.320 --> 00:35:25.480
<v Speaker 1>critical infrastructure? What should we expect?

662
00:35:25.599 --> 00:35:28.679
<v Speaker 2>Well, Segmentation will continue to be a major challenge because

663
00:35:28.679 --> 00:35:30.840
<v Speaker 2>of all that legacy tech. It's hard to carve up

664
00:35:30.840 --> 00:35:34.239
<v Speaker 2>systems that were never designed for it. The risks associated

665
00:35:34.280 --> 00:35:37.760
<v Speaker 2>with the industrial Internet of Things might actually slow down

666
00:35:37.920 --> 00:35:41.280
<v Speaker 2>IoT adoption in some critical sectors if they can't get

667
00:35:41.320 --> 00:35:42.280
<v Speaker 2>the security right.

668
00:35:42.159 --> 00:35:44.639
<v Speaker 1>A backlash against connectivity.

669
00:35:44.039 --> 00:35:47.079
<v Speaker 2>Potentially, or at least a much more cautious approach. We'll

670
00:35:47.159 --> 00:35:51.239
<v Speaker 2>almost certainly see escalating financial damage from attacks, higher ransom demands,

671
00:35:51.320 --> 00:35:56.159
<v Speaker 2>multimillion dollar recovery costs, longer outages. This will likely force

672
00:35:56.199 --> 00:36:00.800
<v Speaker 2>closer collaboration between critical infrastructure operators and the cybersecrecurity industry,

673
00:36:01.119 --> 00:36:03.199
<v Speaker 2>a real push towards shared.

674
00:36:02.880 --> 00:36:04.719
<v Speaker 1>Responsibility more partnerships.

675
00:36:04.760 --> 00:36:09.239
<v Speaker 2>Definitely, we'll also see increased demand for cybersecurity insurance policies

676
00:36:09.519 --> 00:36:14.119
<v Speaker 2>specifically covering critical infrastructure incidents as organizations try to buffer

677
00:36:14.159 --> 00:36:17.880
<v Speaker 2>the financial blow. And while some partial migration to cloud

678
00:36:17.960 --> 00:36:22.000
<v Speaker 2>technologies for non core functions might happen, a full cloud

679
00:36:22.039 --> 00:36:25.159
<v Speaker 2>migration for the core control systems seems unlikely in the

680
00:36:25.199 --> 00:36:28.719
<v Speaker 2>near term, just because those legacy technologies are so deeply embedded.

681
00:36:28.920 --> 00:36:31.679
<v Speaker 1>It sounds like a really complex, high stakes problem for

682
00:36:31.719 --> 00:36:32.239
<v Speaker 1>the future.

683
00:36:32.320 --> 00:36:36.239
<v Speaker 2>It absolutely is, which underscores why proactive defense and testing

684
00:36:36.280 --> 00:36:38.400
<v Speaker 2>are so incredibly important.

685
00:36:38.000 --> 00:36:41.159
<v Speaker 1>Which brings us nicely to penetration testing. You've mentioned it

686
00:36:41.159 --> 00:36:43.800
<v Speaker 1>a few times, let's really dive into that. What exactly

687
00:36:43.960 --> 00:36:45.119
<v Speaker 1>is penetration testing?

688
00:36:45.199 --> 00:36:47.519
<v Speaker 2>Okay, So if you want to know how strong your

689
00:36:47.559 --> 00:36:51.639
<v Speaker 2>defenses really are, penetration testing or pen testing is arguably

690
00:36:51.719 --> 00:36:54.559
<v Speaker 2>the best way to find out before a real attacker does.

691
00:36:55.000 --> 00:36:56.920
<v Speaker 2>It's essentially ethical hacking.

692
00:36:57.079 --> 00:36:58.320
<v Speaker 1>Ethical hacking, right.

693
00:36:58.920 --> 00:37:03.840
<v Speaker 2>You hire certify security professionals, individuals or teams to legally

694
00:37:03.920 --> 00:37:06.800
<v Speaker 2>and ethically try to break into your systems, your network,

695
00:37:06.840 --> 00:37:10.400
<v Speaker 2>your applications. Their goals to find vulnerabilities, both the ones

696
00:37:10.440 --> 00:37:14.039
<v Speaker 2>you might already know about and crucially the unknown ones,

697
00:37:14.079 --> 00:37:15.360
<v Speaker 2>the hidden back doors or.

698
00:37:15.320 --> 00:37:17.519
<v Speaker 1>Weaknesses, so they think like an attacker.

699
00:37:17.880 --> 00:37:21.119
<v Speaker 2>Exactly like an attacker, they use the same tools and techniques.

700
00:37:21.559 --> 00:37:24.800
<v Speaker 2>After the test, they compile a detailed report outlining everything

701
00:37:24.800 --> 00:37:28.039
<v Speaker 2>they found, how they got in, how severe the vulnerabilities are,

702
00:37:28.039 --> 00:37:31.760
<v Speaker 2>and specific recommendations on how to fix them. It's a proactive,

703
00:37:32.280 --> 00:37:35.599
<v Speaker 2>deep assessment of your actual security posture, not just a

704
00:37:35.599 --> 00:37:36.639
<v Speaker 2>theoretical check.

705
00:37:36.760 --> 00:37:39.599
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so it's legal, it's planned. What are some other

706
00:37:39.679 --> 00:37:40.639
<v Speaker 1>key characteristics.

707
00:37:40.719 --> 00:37:43.679
<v Speaker 2>Well, it's always bound by a strict legal contract outlining

708
00:37:43.719 --> 00:37:46.199
<v Speaker 2>the scope what they can and can't do. They must

709
00:37:46.239 --> 00:37:49.519
<v Speaker 2>follow the law. Client notification and approval are required for

710
00:37:49.639 --> 00:37:53.239
<v Speaker 2>risky actions. The detailed reports are a key deliverable that

711
00:37:53.400 --> 00:37:56.800
<v Speaker 2>roadmap for improvement. It takes time, could be days, weeks,

712
00:37:56.920 --> 00:37:58.760
<v Speaker 2>even months. For a complex environment.

713
00:37:58.800 --> 00:38:00.039
<v Speaker 1>It's not a quick scan then.

714
00:38:00.079 --> 00:38:03.360
<v Speaker 2>Definitely not. It usually involves specialized teams we can talk

715
00:38:03.400 --> 00:38:06.000
<v Speaker 2>about Red, Blue and Pupple teams can be done remotely

716
00:38:06.280 --> 00:38:08.760
<v Speaker 2>trying to breach from the outside or on site testing

717
00:38:08.800 --> 00:38:13.199
<v Speaker 2>internal defenses. And while automation AI machine learning can assist

718
00:38:13.320 --> 00:38:16.599
<v Speaker 2>the human element, the creativity and ingenuity of the ethical

719
00:38:16.599 --> 00:38:20.400
<v Speaker 2>hacker is absolutely crucial for finding those non obvious flaws

720
00:38:21.079 --> 00:38:21.559
<v Speaker 2>you mentioned.

721
00:38:21.599 --> 00:38:24.360
<v Speaker 1>It's not just a quick scan. How does pen testing

722
00:38:24.440 --> 00:38:29.000
<v Speaker 1>differ from say, vulnerability scanning. People sometimes confuse those.

723
00:38:29.280 --> 00:38:32.599
<v Speaker 2>That's a really important distinction. They both aim to find weaknesses,

724
00:38:32.639 --> 00:38:34.239
<v Speaker 2>but they're very different processes.

725
00:38:34.360 --> 00:38:36.119
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so what's vulnerability scanning.

726
00:38:36.400 --> 00:38:40.440
<v Speaker 2>Vulnerability scanning is typically automated. You run software tools that

727
00:38:40.480 --> 00:38:44.239
<v Speaker 2>scan your systems and networks looking for non vulnerabilities, checking

728
00:38:44.320 --> 00:38:49.920
<v Speaker 2>against databases of published cvees, common vulnerabilities and exposures.

729
00:38:49.360 --> 00:38:51.719
<v Speaker 1>So looking for publicly known flaws exactly.

730
00:38:51.800 --> 00:38:55.199
<v Speaker 2>It's usually quick, minutes or hours. The report you get

731
00:38:55.280 --> 00:38:59.519
<v Speaker 2>is often quite general, listing potential vulnerabilities found, but usually

732
00:38:59.559 --> 00:39:04.559
<v Speaker 2>without confirming if they're actually exploitable. We're giving detailed remediation steps.

733
00:39:05.000 --> 00:39:08.400
<v Speaker 2>It's affordable, so you can run scans frequently, even continuously.

734
00:39:08.880 --> 00:39:11.079
<v Speaker 2>Think of it as a passive test, like getting an

735
00:39:11.119 --> 00:39:13.760
<v Speaker 2>EKG for your network. It shows surface level issues.

736
00:39:13.840 --> 00:39:18.320
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so vulnerability scanning is automated, quick finds non issues, passive.

737
00:39:18.719 --> 00:39:20.079
<v Speaker 1>How does pen testing compare?

738
00:39:20.440 --> 00:39:23.920
<v Speaker 2>Pen testing is a much deeper dive. It's primarily manual

739
00:39:24.000 --> 00:39:27.840
<v Speaker 2>conducted by skilled ethical hackers, although they use automated tools

740
00:39:27.880 --> 00:39:30.840
<v Speaker 2>as part of their toolkit. It takes much longer days

741
00:39:30.920 --> 00:39:35.280
<v Speaker 2>or weeks. Crucially, it looks for both known and unknown vulnerabilities.

742
00:39:35.639 --> 00:39:39.400
<v Speaker 2>They're actively trying to exploit weaknesses, chain them together, find

743
00:39:39.400 --> 00:39:42.400
<v Speaker 2>those covert back doors that a simple scan would miss.

744
00:39:42.559 --> 00:39:45.079
<v Speaker 1>So it's an active test very much so more.

745
00:39:44.960 --> 00:39:48.440
<v Speaker 2>Like an angiogram, actively probing and testing the system's resilience.

746
00:39:48.920 --> 00:39:52.679
<v Speaker 2>Pen testing can also assess things vulnerability scanning can't touch,

747
00:39:52.880 --> 00:39:56.280
<v Speaker 2>like physical security weaknesses. Can they tailgate into the building,

748
00:39:56.880 --> 00:40:00.960
<v Speaker 2>clone an ID badge and it heavily tests human vulnerability

749
00:40:01.039 --> 00:40:03.760
<v Speaker 2>through social engineering? Can they trick an employee into giving

750
00:40:03.800 --> 00:40:06.880
<v Speaker 2>up credentials or clicking a malicious link. It can be

751
00:40:06.960 --> 00:40:11.079
<v Speaker 2>internal testing defenses from within the network or external attacking

752
00:40:11.159 --> 00:40:13.159
<v Speaker 2>from the outside like a real adversary.

753
00:40:13.280 --> 00:40:15.719
<v Speaker 1>It sounds much more comprehensive. You mentioned different teams of

754
00:40:15.760 --> 00:40:17.760
<v Speaker 1>all red, blue, purple right.

755
00:40:17.880 --> 00:40:21.239
<v Speaker 2>These terms describe different roles within a pen testing engagement,

756
00:40:21.559 --> 00:40:26.000
<v Speaker 2>or sometimes within an organization's ongoing security operations. The red

757
00:40:26.039 --> 00:40:27.679
<v Speaker 2>team are the attackers, the.

758
00:40:27.639 --> 00:40:29.239
<v Speaker 1>Ethical hackers trying to break in.

759
00:40:29.480 --> 00:40:35.159
<v Speaker 2>Exactly, they simulate real adversaries using their techniques to breach defenses.

760
00:40:35.519 --> 00:40:39.480
<v Speaker 2>They focus on finding access methods, thinking creatively about how

761
00:40:39.519 --> 00:40:42.719
<v Speaker 2>to get in, not just hitting known targets. They often

762
00:40:42.840 --> 00:40:47.880
<v Speaker 2>use a layered approach, trying multiple attack vectors simultaneously. Their

763
00:40:47.920 --> 00:40:51.000
<v Speaker 2>goal is to breach the defenses by any means necessary

764
00:40:51.039 --> 00:40:54.960
<v Speaker 2>within the agreed scope, providing an unbiased, holistic view of

765
00:40:55.000 --> 00:40:56.800
<v Speaker 2>where the weaknesses truly lie?

766
00:40:56.920 --> 00:40:59.519
<v Speaker 1>Okay, So if the Red team is attacking, who's defending?

767
00:40:59.639 --> 00:41:02.320
<v Speaker 2>That's the Blue Team. The Blue Team are the defenders

768
00:41:02.719 --> 00:41:05.079
<v Speaker 2>during a test. They're the ones trying to detect and

769
00:41:05.119 --> 00:41:08.159
<v Speaker 2>respond to the Red team's attacks, often working closely with

770
00:41:08.199 --> 00:41:12.679
<v Speaker 2>the client's internal IT security team. Their responsibilities include preparedness,

771
00:41:12.719 --> 00:41:16.360
<v Speaker 2>are the defenses configured correctly? Thread identification? Can they see

772
00:41:16.400 --> 00:41:20.199
<v Speaker 2>the attack happening? Containment, using the incident response plan to

773
00:41:20.199 --> 00:41:23.760
<v Speaker 2>stop the bleeding, recovery using the disaster recovery plan, and

774
00:41:23.800 --> 00:41:27.400
<v Speaker 2>then analyzing what happened forensics lessons learned. They also focus

775
00:41:27.400 --> 00:41:30.519
<v Speaker 2>on hardening systems and managing perimeter defenses day to day.

776
00:41:30.639 --> 00:41:33.159
<v Speaker 1>So Red attacks Blue defense, What does the Purple Team do?

777
00:41:33.440 --> 00:41:35.559
<v Speaker 2>The Purple Team acts as a kind of bridge or

778
00:41:35.679 --> 00:41:39.320
<v Speaker 2>mediator between Red and Blue. They're a neutral party focused

779
00:41:39.400 --> 00:41:42.960
<v Speaker 2>on maximizing the effectiveness and learning from the entire exercise.

780
00:41:43.320 --> 00:41:45.880
<v Speaker 2>They might evaluate the security controls the Blue team has

781
00:41:45.920 --> 00:41:49.360
<v Speaker 2>in place, brainstorm new attack scenarios for the Red team

782
00:41:49.400 --> 00:41:52.679
<v Speaker 2>based on emerging threats, and audit how well the Blue

783
00:41:52.679 --> 00:41:57.639
<v Speaker 2>team detected and responded. They facilitate communication and information sharing

784
00:41:57.679 --> 00:42:01.000
<v Speaker 2>between the two teams, ensuring the client gets the maximum

785
00:42:01.119 --> 00:42:03.239
<v Speaker 2>value and improvement out of the engagement.

786
00:42:03.639 --> 00:42:07.440
<v Speaker 1>Interesting, so maximizing the learning. Now. Within PEN testing itself,

787
00:42:07.679 --> 00:42:11.199
<v Speaker 1>are there different approaches depending on how much information the testers.

788
00:42:10.840 --> 00:42:14.360
<v Speaker 2>Have yes generally three main types. White box testing is

789
00:42:14.400 --> 00:42:16.679
<v Speaker 2>when the PEN testers have full knowledge of the target

790
00:42:16.679 --> 00:42:21.960
<v Speaker 2>system beforehand, network diagrams, source code, administrator credentials, everything. This

791
00:42:22.119 --> 00:42:25.599
<v Speaker 2>is often used for testing internal IT infrastructure thoroughly, where

792
00:42:25.599 --> 00:42:27.840
<v Speaker 2>you won't find every possible flaw, so they have the

793
00:42:27.840 --> 00:42:32.639
<v Speaker 2>blueprints exactly. Then there's black box testing. Here the testers

794
00:42:32.639 --> 00:42:36.119
<v Speaker 2>have zero prior knowledge of the target system, just maybe

795
00:42:36.159 --> 00:42:39.239
<v Speaker 2>a company name or an IP address range. They have

796
00:42:39.280 --> 00:42:42.119
<v Speaker 2>to discover everything from the outside, just like a real

797
00:42:42.400 --> 00:42:46.000
<v Speaker 2>external attacker would. This is often favored because it provides

798
00:42:46.079 --> 00:42:49.760
<v Speaker 2>the most realistic simulation of an external.

799
00:42:49.280 --> 00:42:50.639
<v Speaker 1>Threat starting from scratch.

800
00:42:50.920 --> 00:42:55.360
<v Speaker 2>And the third gray box testing. This is a hybrid approach.

801
00:42:55.559 --> 00:42:58.920
<v Speaker 2>The testers have some limited knowledge, maybe user level credentials

802
00:42:59.000 --> 00:43:02.320
<v Speaker 2>or some understanding of the system architecture, but not full

803
00:43:02.400 --> 00:43:06.199
<v Speaker 2>administrator access or complete blueprints. This is often used for

804
00:43:06.239 --> 00:43:09.719
<v Speaker 2>things like testing web application source code efficiently, providing a

805
00:43:09.760 --> 00:43:12.400
<v Speaker 2>balance between the depth of white box and the realism

806
00:43:12.480 --> 00:43:13.159
<v Speaker 2>of black box.

807
00:43:13.239 --> 00:43:16.280
<v Speaker 1>Okay, that makes sense. You mentioned testing web apps. How

808
00:43:16.280 --> 00:43:19.719
<v Speaker 1>important is PEN testing during the actual software development process?

809
00:43:19.800 --> 00:43:20.960
<v Speaker 1>Should you wait until the end?

810
00:43:21.119 --> 00:43:23.599
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely not wait until the end, But that's a critical point.

811
00:43:23.719 --> 00:43:26.079
<v Speaker 2>Pen testing shouldn't be an afterthought you tack on just

812
00:43:26.079 --> 00:43:29.079
<v Speaker 2>before release. It needs to be integrated throughout the software

813
00:43:29.119 --> 00:43:32.280
<v Speaker 2>development life cycle. The SDLC why test early and often

814
00:43:32.480 --> 00:43:35.519
<v Speaker 2>several reasons. First, it helps you stay ahead of the curve.

815
00:43:36.239 --> 00:43:40.559
<v Speaker 2>Automated hacking tools are constantly evolving. Testing during development helps

816
00:43:40.599 --> 00:43:44.679
<v Speaker 2>find flaws before those tools can exploit them in production. Second,

817
00:43:44.960 --> 00:43:49.039
<v Speaker 2>finding and fixing vulnerabilities early is vastly cheaper and less

818
00:43:49.039 --> 00:43:52.119
<v Speaker 2>disruptive than finding them late in the cycle or after release.

819
00:43:52.559 --> 00:43:57.079
<v Speaker 2>It ensures smoother transitions between development stages and helps meet delivery.

820
00:43:56.639 --> 00:43:59.000
<v Speaker 1>Deadlines less costly, rework much less.

821
00:43:59.480 --> 00:44:02.880
<v Speaker 2>Third, it helps detect vulnerabilities you might inherit, especially if

822
00:44:02.920 --> 00:44:06.039
<v Speaker 2>you're using third party libraries or code components. You need

823
00:44:06.079 --> 00:44:09.199
<v Speaker 2>to test those two. Fourth, it prepares your development and

824
00:44:09.280 --> 00:44:13.760
<v Speaker 2>operations teams for worst case scenarios. Practicing response during development

825
00:44:13.800 --> 00:44:17.440
<v Speaker 2>builds muscle memory, enabling quicker reaction and reduce downtime if

826
00:44:17.440 --> 00:44:20.920
<v Speaker 2>a real attack occurs later. And Finally, it's often required

827
00:44:20.960 --> 00:44:25.679
<v Speaker 2>for compliance regulations like hip hop gepr ISO twenty seventh

828
00:44:25.719 --> 00:44:31.159
<v Speaker 2>zero one, pcidss NIS standards many mandate regular penetration testing.

829
00:44:31.400 --> 00:44:34.039
<v Speaker 2>Integrating it into the SDLC helps ensure you meet those

830
00:44:34.039 --> 00:44:36.519
<v Speaker 2>requirements continuously shift.

831
00:44:36.199 --> 00:44:38.400
<v Speaker 1>Left security, build it in from the start.

832
00:44:38.239 --> 00:44:41.679
<v Speaker 2>Exactly, don't just test for bugs, test for security flaws throughout.

833
00:44:41.960 --> 00:44:44.800
<v Speaker 1>Okay, So what does the actual process of a penetration

834
00:44:44.920 --> 00:44:48.000
<v Speaker 1>test look like? What are the steps the ethical hackers take?

835
00:44:48.519 --> 00:44:52.159
<v Speaker 2>It follows a pretty methodical approach, mimicking how real attackers

836
00:44:52.199 --> 00:44:57.119
<v Speaker 2>often operate. Step one is reconnaissance, gathering information right studying

837
00:44:57.159 --> 00:45:01.159
<v Speaker 2>the target. This involves passive techniques like internet searches, looking

838
00:45:01.239 --> 00:45:05.599
<v Speaker 2>up domain registration info, checking social media, even physical techniques

839
00:45:05.639 --> 00:45:10.000
<v Speaker 2>like dumpster diving sometimes and active techniques like network stanning

840
00:45:10.039 --> 00:45:14.119
<v Speaker 2>to identify live hosts, open ports, and running services. Social

841
00:45:14.119 --> 00:45:17.119
<v Speaker 2>engineering is often heavily used in this phase, too, trying

842
00:45:17.119 --> 00:45:19.400
<v Speaker 2>to gather intelligence from employees.

843
00:45:19.000 --> 00:45:21.800
<v Speaker 1>Learning as much as possible before attacking. What's next.

844
00:45:22.079 --> 00:45:25.039
<v Speaker 2>Step two is scanning. Building on the reconnaissance, they use

845
00:45:25.079 --> 00:45:29.079
<v Speaker 2>various tools to actively probe the identified targets for vulnerabilities,

846
00:45:29.400 --> 00:45:34.320
<v Speaker 2>scanning digital assets like cloud instances, servers, email systems, websites

847
00:45:34.440 --> 00:45:38.320
<v Speaker 2>source code. They're looking for specific weaknesses they can potentially exploit.

848
00:45:38.800 --> 00:45:42.039
<v Speaker 2>This phase can also include scanning physical security controls if

849
00:45:42.039 --> 00:45:42.679
<v Speaker 2>that's in scope.

850
00:45:42.920 --> 00:45:44.239
<v Speaker 1>Finding the weak points, yeah.

851
00:45:44.440 --> 00:45:48.119
<v Speaker 2>Step three is gaining access. This is where they attempt

852
00:45:48.199 --> 00:45:51.679
<v Speaker 2>to exploit the vulnerabilities found during scanning to actually infiltrate

853
00:45:51.679 --> 00:45:54.639
<v Speaker 2>the system or network. They might use an exploit kit,

854
00:45:55.079 --> 00:46:00.280
<v Speaker 2>crack passwords, bypass security controls find those unknown backdoors. The

855
00:46:00.360 --> 00:46:03.239
<v Speaker 2>goal is to get that initial foothold. Often they'll try

856
00:46:03.239 --> 00:46:05.280
<v Speaker 2>to establish multiple points of entry if.

857
00:46:05.159 --> 00:46:07.880
<v Speaker 1>Possible, getting inside, and once they're in.

858
00:46:08.000 --> 00:46:12.280
<v Speaker 2>Step four is maintaining access exploitation. Once inside, they try

859
00:46:12.280 --> 00:46:15.840
<v Speaker 2>to maintain their presence, often installing persistent back doors and

860
00:46:16.079 --> 00:46:19.960
<v Speaker 2>escalate their privileges to gain deeper control. Then comes the

861
00:46:20.000 --> 00:46:23.719
<v Speaker 2>exploitation part, but in a controlled way. They might deploy

862
00:46:23.760 --> 00:46:28.400
<v Speaker 2>simulated malicious payloads, demonstrating things like sequel injection, planting inert

863
00:46:28.480 --> 00:46:32.800
<v Speaker 2>trojans or worms, using key loggers without causing actual damage.

864
00:46:33.000 --> 00:46:36.159
<v Speaker 2>The goal is to demonstrate impact. They might also try

865
00:46:36.159 --> 00:46:39.760
<v Speaker 2>to expltrate small amounts of nonsensitive data slowly to show

866
00:46:39.800 --> 00:46:43.199
<v Speaker 2>they can bypass data loss prevention systems without triggering alarms

867
00:46:43.480 --> 00:46:46.559
<v Speaker 2>It's all about proving the vulnerability and its potential impact

868
00:46:46.599 --> 00:46:48.000
<v Speaker 2>in a safe, controlled manner.

869
00:46:48.079 --> 00:46:51.119
<v Speaker 1>A controlled demonstration of harm makes sense. Yeah, what kinds

870
00:46:51.119 --> 00:46:53.079
<v Speaker 1>of things typically get targeted in a PEN test?

871
00:46:53.360 --> 00:46:56.440
<v Speaker 2>It covers a wide range, reflecting the modern IT landscape.

872
00:46:56.679 --> 00:46:59.559
<v Speaker 2>Web applications are a huge target looking for flaws like

873
00:46:59.559 --> 00:47:05.599
<v Speaker 2>Cross's scripting exss SQL injection, insecure authentication mobile applications to

874
00:47:05.880 --> 00:47:08.119
<v Speaker 2>both the app itself on the device client side and

875
00:47:08.119 --> 00:47:11.639
<v Speaker 2>the server site APIs it communicates with, plus authentication and

876
00:47:11.800 --> 00:47:18.400
<v Speaker 2>MFA controls networks definitely. Network infrastructure is core testing firewalls, routers, switches,

877
00:47:18.559 --> 00:47:24.280
<v Speaker 2>wireless networks, network protocols, ssltls, certificate security. Cloud environments are

878
00:47:24.320 --> 00:47:28.440
<v Speaker 2>increasingly critical targets. Testing the security of virtual machines, cloud databases,

879
00:47:28.519 --> 00:47:32.000
<v Speaker 2>storage configurations, identity management in the cloud.

880
00:47:32.199 --> 00:47:34.320
<v Speaker 1>Cloud containers too like Docker.

881
00:47:34.079 --> 00:47:39.119
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely testing container configurations, image security orchestration platforms like Kubernetes,

882
00:47:39.400 --> 00:47:42.280
<v Speaker 2>and don't forget wireless devices and networks. Testing Wi Fi

883
00:47:42.320 --> 00:47:46.760
<v Speaker 2>security protocols, authentication methods, potential rogue access points, and any

884
00:47:46.760 --> 00:47:50.239
<v Speaker 2>server site issues related to wireless access. Basically anyway an

885
00:47:50.239 --> 00:47:51.320
<v Speaker 2>attacker might try to get in.

886
00:47:51.440 --> 00:47:53.519
<v Speaker 1>It covers a lot of ground. Are there specific tools

887
00:47:53.559 --> 00:47:54.639
<v Speaker 1>these pen testers use?

888
00:47:54.960 --> 00:47:57.320
<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, a whole arsenal of tools, many of them

889
00:47:57.360 --> 00:48:00.840
<v Speaker 2>open source. They fall into different categories. For network scanning

890
00:48:00.840 --> 00:48:04.960
<v Speaker 2>and analysis, tools like endmap and wireshark are standards for exploitation.

891
00:48:05.079 --> 00:48:09.480
<v Speaker 2>The metasploit framework is incredibly powerful for password cracking, John

892
00:48:09.480 --> 00:48:13.679
<v Speaker 2>the ripper or hashcat. For web application testing, burp suite

893
00:48:13.679 --> 00:48:17.239
<v Speaker 2>and skull map are very common. Kali Linux is a

894
00:48:17.239 --> 00:48:21.440
<v Speaker 2>popular operating system distribution that comes preloaded with hundreds of

895
00:48:21.480 --> 00:48:22.920
<v Speaker 2>security testing tools.

896
00:48:22.599 --> 00:48:25.280
<v Speaker 1>So a lot of specialized software. You also mentioned as

897
00:48:25.320 --> 00:48:27.079
<v Speaker 1>a service model emerging.

898
00:48:27.159 --> 00:48:30.599
<v Speaker 2>Paid ass yes penetration Testing as a service or TAS.

899
00:48:30.599 --> 00:48:34.239
<v Speaker 2>It's a newer delivery model. Instead of commissioning a single large,

900
00:48:34.280 --> 00:48:38.599
<v Speaker 2>time bound pen test project, paid as platforms offer more flexibility.

901
00:48:38.840 --> 00:48:41.480
<v Speaker 2>You might get a combination of automated scanning and access

902
00:48:41.519 --> 00:48:44.199
<v Speaker 2>to human testers on demand or via subscription.

903
00:48:44.760 --> 00:48:46.480
<v Speaker 1>What are the pros and cons.

904
00:48:46.239 --> 00:48:49.519
<v Speaker 2>Well, Advantages can include potentially faster hiring of testing teams

905
00:48:49.559 --> 00:48:52.639
<v Speaker 2>maybe two hundred and forty seven monitoring capabilities, often more

906
00:48:52.679 --> 00:48:56.239
<v Speaker 2>affordable pricing structures compared to massive one off tests, quicker

907
00:48:56.280 --> 00:48:59.360
<v Speaker 2>reporting through the platform, and better integration with modern development

908
00:48:59.400 --> 00:49:03.559
<v Speaker 2>workflows like devox or DevSecOps sounds good. Any downsides, pricing

909
00:49:03.559 --> 00:49:06.719
<v Speaker 2>can be variable and sometimes complex to predict, and it

910
00:49:06.800 --> 00:49:10.400
<v Speaker 2>might not be ideal for really deep, complex bespoke testing

911
00:49:10.440 --> 00:49:14.440
<v Speaker 2>scenarios where you need a dedicated team spending weeks understanding

912
00:49:14.480 --> 00:49:17.880
<v Speaker 2>a unique environment. The key takeaway, though, whether it's traditional

913
00:49:17.920 --> 00:49:21.400
<v Speaker 2>pen testing or PIS, is that the best results almost

914
00:49:21.440 --> 00:49:25.480
<v Speaker 2>always come from a combination of technology and skilled human intervention.

915
00:49:26.079 --> 00:49:29.360
<v Speaker 2>You can't rely solely on automation, nor can you ignore

916
00:49:29.400 --> 00:49:33.639
<v Speaker 2>the efficiency tools provide. The human expertise and creativity remain.

917
00:49:33.519 --> 00:49:38.480
<v Speaker 1>Vital technology plus human intelligence. Okay, so pen testing helps

918
00:49:38.480 --> 00:49:41.800
<v Speaker 1>you find weaknesses before an attack. But what happens if

919
00:49:41.920 --> 00:49:45.000
<v Speaker 1>despite your best efforts, an attack does succeed. Let's talk

920
00:49:45.000 --> 00:49:45.960
<v Speaker 1>about recovery, right.

921
00:49:46.000 --> 00:49:49.079
<v Speaker 2>If the worst happens, containing the damage and recovering quickly

922
00:49:49.199 --> 00:49:53.000
<v Speaker 2>requires having solid plans in place beforehand. We're talking primarily

923
00:49:53.000 --> 00:49:55.800
<v Speaker 2>about two key plans here, an incident response plan and

924
00:49:55.800 --> 00:49:59.159
<v Speaker 2>a disaster recovery plan. They sound similar, but they focus

925
00:49:59.159 --> 00:49:59.880
<v Speaker 2>on different things.

926
00:50:00.000 --> 00:50:02.199
<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's break them down. What's an incident response plan

927
00:50:02.280 --> 00:50:03.000
<v Speaker 1>or IR plan?

928
00:50:03.159 --> 00:50:06.679
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, an IR plan is your detailed, written, pre approved

929
00:50:06.719 --> 00:50:10.480
<v Speaker 2>playbook for handling a security incident like a ransomware attack,

930
00:50:10.559 --> 00:50:13.880
<v Speaker 2>a data breach, anything while it's happening and immediately after.

931
00:50:14.679 --> 00:50:17.719
<v Speaker 2>It guides your organization through the entire life cycle of

932
00:50:17.760 --> 00:50:18.280
<v Speaker 2>an incident.

933
00:50:18.400 --> 00:50:19.559
<v Speaker 1>What's that life cycle look like?

934
00:50:19.800 --> 00:50:24.000
<v Speaker 2>Generally it follows a flow preparation, having the plan, then

935
00:50:24.280 --> 00:50:26.639
<v Speaker 2>detection and analysis. How do you spot an incident and

936
00:50:26.639 --> 00:50:30.840
<v Speaker 2>figure out what's going on? Then containment, stop the bleeding, eradication,

937
00:50:31.119 --> 00:50:34.519
<v Speaker 2>get rid of the threat, recovery, get systems back online,

938
00:50:34.599 --> 00:50:38.960
<v Speaker 2>and finally post incident activity lessons learned, forensics reporting, It's

939
00:50:38.960 --> 00:50:39.719
<v Speaker 2>a cycle.

940
00:50:39.480 --> 00:50:41.039
<v Speaker 1>And what goes into the plan itself.

941
00:50:41.320 --> 00:50:44.920
<v Speaker 2>Key components include identifying your core IR communications team who

942
00:50:44.960 --> 00:50:48.679
<v Speaker 2>needs to be in the loop usually CEO, CFO, CIO

943
00:50:48.800 --> 00:50:52.920
<v Speaker 2>or CISO, PR, investor relations HR, maybe key sales or

944
00:50:52.960 --> 00:50:57.119
<v Speaker 2>marketing leads. Establishing clear mechanisms for employees to report potential

945
00:50:57.119 --> 00:51:00.519
<v Speaker 2>threats they see, having pre drafted risk messaging to templates for

946
00:51:00.639 --> 00:51:04.639
<v Speaker 2>internal and external comms, Creating those internal contact rosters the

947
00:51:04.679 --> 00:51:08.920
<v Speaker 2>call trees we mentioned, updated monthly and trucially. Identifying and

948
00:51:09.000 --> 00:51:12.760
<v Speaker 2>establishing relationships with key external stakeholders before you need them

949
00:51:12.960 --> 00:51:18.519
<v Speaker 2>major investors, key customers, critical vendors, law enforcement, contacts regulatory bodies.

950
00:51:19.000 --> 00:51:21.440
<v Speaker 1>Why is having that quick response so important? What are

951
00:51:21.480 --> 00:51:22.000
<v Speaker 1>the benefits?

952
00:51:22.159 --> 00:51:26.760
<v Speaker 2>Huge benefits. A fast, well executed response minimizes downtime and

953
00:51:26.800 --> 00:51:30.000
<v Speaker 2>financial impact. It reduces the chance for attackers to exploit

954
00:51:30.039 --> 00:51:33.119
<v Speaker 2>more vulnerabilities or steal more data. It helps prevent the

955
00:51:33.159 --> 00:51:36.280
<v Speaker 2>same attack from happening again, done well with timely and

956
00:51:36.280 --> 00:51:40.039
<v Speaker 2>transparent communication, it can actually help build customer trust showing

957
00:51:40.039 --> 00:51:43.880
<v Speaker 2>your handling the situation responsibly, and it preserves evidence vital

958
00:51:43.920 --> 00:51:46.679
<v Speaker 2>for forensic investigation and potential legal action later.

959
00:51:46.960 --> 00:51:51.119
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so the IR plan handles the immediate crisis. What

960
00:51:51.239 --> 00:51:53.440
<v Speaker 1>about the disaster Recovery plan the DRP.

961
00:51:53.800 --> 00:51:56.800
<v Speaker 2>The DRP is more focused on the aftermath of a

962
00:51:56.840 --> 00:52:00.679
<v Speaker 2>major incident, specifically on getting the IT infrastructure and business

963
00:52:00.760 --> 00:52:03.960
<v Speaker 2>operations back up and running as quickly as possible, even

964
00:52:04.000 --> 00:52:07.199
<v Speaker 2>if it's initially at a minimal level. It's primarily concerned

965
00:52:07.199 --> 00:52:11.119
<v Speaker 2>with recovering from data loss and restoring system functionality. Think

966
00:52:11.159 --> 00:52:13.679
<v Speaker 2>of it as the short term technical recovery plan.

967
00:52:14.119 --> 00:52:15.760
<v Speaker 1>What are the key parts of a DRP.

968
00:52:16.119 --> 00:52:19.280
<v Speaker 2>You need a dedicated disaster recovery team again with clear

969
00:52:19.360 --> 00:52:22.440
<v Speaker 2>roles and contact info. You need a plan for potentially

970
00:52:22.559 --> 00:52:26.519
<v Speaker 2>moving employee equipment if a physical site is unusable. Implementing

971
00:52:26.599 --> 00:52:29.840
<v Speaker 2>and verifying those daily data backup checks is core to

972
00:52:29.880 --> 00:52:34.039
<v Speaker 2>the DRP. Ensuring backups are actually usable. You need processes

973
00:52:34.039 --> 00:52:36.880
<v Speaker 2>for restoring operations with your vendors if their services are

974
00:52:36.880 --> 00:52:40.079
<v Speaker 2>critical at clear process for document recovery. How do you

975
00:52:40.079 --> 00:52:41.239
<v Speaker 2>get essential files back?

976
00:52:41.519 --> 00:52:44.760
<v Speaker 1>So IR is managing the fire, DR is rebuilding afterwards.

977
00:52:45.199 --> 00:52:47.039
<v Speaker 1>Is there another piece? I think I've heard of? Business

978
00:52:47.079 --> 00:52:48.000
<v Speaker 1>continuity plans?

979
00:52:48.400 --> 00:52:51.599
<v Speaker 2>Yes, the business continuity plan or BCP is the third

980
00:52:51.679 --> 00:52:54.760
<v Speaker 2>leg of the stool. It's broader than dr The BCP

981
00:52:54.960 --> 00:52:58.440
<v Speaker 2>is a detailed, overarching strategy to ensure the entire organization

982
00:52:58.519 --> 00:53:02.519
<v Speaker 2>can prevent or rapidly recover from any significant operational disruption

983
00:53:02.719 --> 00:53:06.920
<v Speaker 2>and maintain essential business functions long term. It's about overall

984
00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:08.119
<v Speaker 2>business resilience, so.

985
00:53:08.239 --> 00:53:10.880
<v Speaker 1>More strategic longer term survival exactly.

986
00:53:10.920 --> 00:53:15.199
<v Speaker 2>Components include regular risk assessments identifying all potential disruptions not

987
00:53:15.239 --> 00:53:20.280
<v Speaker 2>just cybertax, fire, flood, pandemic, supply chain failure, planning for

988
00:53:20.320 --> 00:53:24.559
<v Speaker 2>technology needs remote versus physical work locations on premise versus

989
00:53:24.599 --> 00:53:30.639
<v Speaker 2>cloud infrastructure dependencies, ensuring power supply, restoration generators, alternative power plans,

990
00:53:31.079 --> 00:53:35.880
<v Speaker 2>establishing resilient communication infrastructure, maybe using Ukere's Unified Communications as

991
00:53:35.920 --> 00:53:38.960
<v Speaker 2>a service, Planning for vendor relations, especially if they suffer

992
00:53:39.000 --> 00:53:42.039
<v Speaker 2>a breach that impacts your supply chain, and critically analyzing

993
00:53:42.039 --> 00:53:46.000
<v Speaker 2>recovery time objectives rtos and recovery point objectives RPOs and

994
00:53:46.039 --> 00:53:49.239
<v Speaker 2>the associated budget needed so you can continuously improve resilience

995
00:53:49.280 --> 00:53:51.920
<v Speaker 2>over time. The BCP keeps the business running, not just

996
00:53:51.960 --> 00:53:52.920
<v Speaker 2>the IT systems.

997
00:53:53.280 --> 00:53:56.679
<v Speaker 1>IRDR BCP seems like a lot of planning. What's the

998
00:53:56.760 --> 00:53:58.639
<v Speaker 1>absolute key to making them effective?

999
00:53:58.800 --> 00:54:03.039
<v Speaker 2>The single most important thing practice? These plans ir DR

1000
00:54:03.239 --> 00:54:07.199
<v Speaker 2>BCP cannot be static documents sitting on a shelf collecting dust.

1001
00:54:07.480 --> 00:54:10.360
<v Speaker 2>They must be tested and practiced regularly, at least quarterly.

1002
00:54:10.559 --> 00:54:11.719
<v Speaker 1>How do you practice them.

1003
00:54:11.599 --> 00:54:15.320
<v Speaker 2>Through things like tabletop exercises where you walk through scenarios

1004
00:54:15.360 --> 00:54:19.159
<v Speaker 2>on paper, or even full simulations mimicking a real event.

1005
00:54:19.480 --> 00:54:21.920
<v Speaker 2>You have to update the plans with lessons learned from

1006
00:54:21.920 --> 00:54:25.079
<v Speaker 2>each test and keeping that contact information for all team

1007
00:54:25.119 --> 00:54:29.239
<v Speaker 2>members absolutely current is vital. Without regular practice and updates,

1008
00:54:29.440 --> 00:54:32.000
<v Speaker 2>even the most detailed plan will likely fail under the

1009
00:54:32.000 --> 00:54:33.599
<v Speaker 2>pressure of a real crisis.

1010
00:54:33.639 --> 00:54:36.320
<v Speaker 1>A practice, practice practice got it. So if we boil

1011
00:54:36.519 --> 00:54:40.119
<v Speaker 1>everything down, all the defenses, all the plans. What's one

1012
00:54:40.159 --> 00:54:43.760
<v Speaker 1>of those critical things for actually recovering from a ransomware attack?

1013
00:54:43.880 --> 00:54:45.800
<v Speaker 2>If I had to pick one thing, it comes back

1014
00:54:45.840 --> 00:54:49.719
<v Speaker 2>to backups. Having a robust, well tested data backup plan

1015
00:54:49.840 --> 00:54:52.320
<v Speaker 2>and diligently enforcing it is still one of the single

1016
00:54:52.320 --> 00:54:55.159
<v Speaker 2>best ways to ensure you can recover without paying the ransom.

1017
00:54:55.360 --> 00:54:57.039
<v Speaker 2>It's your ultimate safety net.

1018
00:54:57.159 --> 00:55:00.960
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, and making that safety net really strong requires a

1019
00:55:00.960 --> 00:55:03.679
<v Speaker 1>smart strategy, right, not just one backup.

1020
00:55:03.599 --> 00:55:07.360
<v Speaker 2>Definitely multifaceted. Keep backups in different locations on site for

1021
00:55:07.440 --> 00:55:10.679
<v Speaker 2>quick restores of small things off site, physically separate for

1022
00:55:10.920 --> 00:55:15.639
<v Speaker 2>major disasters, and leverage cloud platforms like AWS or Azure.

1023
00:55:16.119 --> 00:55:19.800
<v Speaker 2>They offer incredible resilience and affordability, plus that rapid VM

1024
00:55:19.840 --> 00:55:21.000
<v Speaker 2>recovery we talked about.

1025
00:55:21.039 --> 00:55:22.559
<v Speaker 1>What about overriding backups?

1026
00:55:22.920 --> 00:55:27.039
<v Speaker 2>Don't do it. Keep separate versioned backups, even if it

1027
00:55:27.079 --> 00:55:29.559
<v Speaker 2>costs a bit more in storage. If your latest backup

1028
00:55:29.599 --> 00:55:32.840
<v Speaker 2>gets corrupted or includes the ransomware itself, you need older,

1029
00:55:33.079 --> 00:55:36.559
<v Speaker 2>clean versions to fall back on. Use diverse strategies too,

1030
00:55:36.599 --> 00:55:41.159
<v Speaker 2>maybe full backups, weekly, incremental or differential backups daily, balance

1031
00:55:41.199 --> 00:55:43.119
<v Speaker 2>recovery speed needs with storage space.

1032
00:55:43.519 --> 00:55:45.199
<v Speaker 1>And you mentioned backing up the catalogs.

1033
00:55:45.320 --> 00:55:48.199
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's a detail people often miss. The backup software

1034
00:55:48.280 --> 00:55:50.119
<v Speaker 2>uses a catalog file to keep track of where all

1035
00:55:50.119 --> 00:55:52.880
<v Speaker 2>your backup data is stored across different tapes or discs.

1036
00:55:53.280 --> 00:55:55.519
<v Speaker 2>If you lose the catalog, restoring can be a nightmare,

1037
00:55:55.599 --> 00:55:57.599
<v Speaker 2>even if you have the data tapes. Back up the

1038
00:55:57.599 --> 00:55:58.440
<v Speaker 2>catalog itself.

1039
00:55:58.599 --> 00:56:00.239
<v Speaker 1>Good tip anything else in backup.

1040
00:56:00.519 --> 00:56:04.679
<v Speaker 2>Back up your critical processes and configurations, not just raw data.

1041
00:56:05.360 --> 00:56:09.199
<v Speaker 2>How do you rebuild that essential server? What are the steps?

1042
00:56:09.440 --> 00:56:13.360
<v Speaker 2>Document it and back up that documentation? Test your backup

1043
00:56:13.400 --> 00:56:16.880
<v Speaker 2>restoration plan regularly, at least every couple of months. A

1044
00:56:16.920 --> 00:56:19.639
<v Speaker 2>backup is useless if you can't actually restore from it.

1045
00:56:20.000 --> 00:56:24.679
<v Speaker 2>Verification is key, absolutely, and really embrace the cloud's potential here.

1046
00:56:24.760 --> 00:56:27.760
<v Speaker 2>If a VM gets infected, delete it, spin up a

1047
00:56:27.800 --> 00:56:30.519
<v Speaker 2>clean one from a cloud backup in minutes. You can

1048
00:56:30.559 --> 00:56:34.000
<v Speaker 2>even back up entire cloud data centers to different geographic regions.

1049
00:56:34.519 --> 00:56:37.480
<v Speaker 2>That level of resilience was unthinkable just a few years

1050
00:56:37.519 --> 00:56:38.880
<v Speaker 2>ago for most organizations.

1051
00:56:39.000 --> 00:56:41.360
<v Speaker 1>Okay, we've covered so much ground the history that defense

1052
00:56:41.440 --> 00:56:43.760
<v Speaker 1>is the recovery. As we wrap up, I want to

1053
00:56:43.840 --> 00:56:46.519
<v Speaker 1>leave our listeners with a final thought. Something really critical

1054
00:56:46.519 --> 00:56:49.880
<v Speaker 1>from Revendra DOS's book and echoed by most experts.

1055
00:56:50.000 --> 00:56:51.079
<v Speaker 2>I think I know where you're going.

1056
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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, never ever pay the cyber attacker.

1057
00:56:54.199 --> 00:56:57.800
<v Speaker 2>It seems counterintuitive sometimes, especially when you're desperate, but it's

1058
00:56:57.800 --> 00:56:59.199
<v Speaker 2>almost always the right advice.

1059
00:56:59.559 --> 00:57:02.320
<v Speaker 1>Why is it's so important not to pay. Let's recap that.

1060
00:57:02.480 --> 00:57:05.119
<v Speaker 2>Well, as we said, there's absolutely no guarantee you'll get

1061
00:57:05.119 --> 00:57:08.039
<v Speaker 2>your data back or get a working key. Paying just

1062
00:57:08.119 --> 00:57:11.360
<v Speaker 2>confirms to them and other attackers that ransomware works, fueling

1063
00:57:11.400 --> 00:57:15.400
<v Speaker 2>more attacks and potentially higher demands next time. It directly

1064
00:57:15.440 --> 00:57:19.039
<v Speaker 2>funds criminal enterprises. It can in some cases be deemed

1065
00:57:19.039 --> 00:57:23.119
<v Speaker 2>a crime itself, even treason, and your insurance carrier is

1066
00:57:23.440 --> 00:57:26.199
<v Speaker 2>very unlikely to cover a ransom payment you make voluntarily.

1067
00:57:26.760 --> 00:57:29.840
<v Speaker 2>You risk everything, gain nothing certain, and make the overall

1068
00:57:29.880 --> 00:57:30.559
<v Speaker 2>problem worse.

1069
00:57:31.239 --> 00:57:33.880
<v Speaker 1>So the focus has to be on resilience, on backups,

1070
00:57:33.920 --> 00:57:37.679
<v Speaker 1>on those IRDR and BCP plans we talked about exactly.

1071
00:57:37.840 --> 00:57:41.920
<v Speaker 2>Prevention is ideal, but robust recovery capability is your ultimate

1072
00:57:41.960 --> 00:57:43.199
<v Speaker 2>defense against extortion.

1073
00:57:44.119 --> 00:57:47.079
<v Speaker 1>You know, understanding all this, taking this deem dive, it

1074
00:57:47.159 --> 00:57:50.159
<v Speaker 1>isn't just about accumulating knowledge. It's really about empowerment, isn't

1075
00:57:50.239 --> 00:57:53.719
<v Speaker 1>It absolutely is so being proactive, being resilient in a

1076
00:57:53.760 --> 00:57:56.599
<v Speaker 1>world where the cyber threats are just well, there are

1077
00:57:56.840 --> 00:58:00.800
<v Speaker 1>persistent reality. Now hopefully you are listeners. Now feel better

1078
00:58:00.800 --> 00:58:03.400
<v Speaker 1>equipped to ask the right questions whether it's your workplace

1079
00:58:03.480 --> 00:58:05.920
<v Speaker 1>or for your own personal security, and to start building

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00:58:05.960 --> 00:58:08.079
<v Speaker 1>stronger defenses in your own digital world
