Speaker 1: You know, when we look back at history, especially at
the huge conflicts like World War One or World War Two,
it often feels like they just erupted out of nowhere,
sudden catastrophic events.
Speaker 2: Right like a storm appearing on a clear day. But
when you actually dig into the archives, when you look
at the context leading up to them, a different picture emerges.
Speaker 1: Exactly. It's less like a sudden storm and more like,
well like the final violent collapse of a building whose
foundations have been cracking for years, a long, slow motion process.
Speaker 2: It really is, these major conflicts, they seem to be
the culmination of stresses building up across society socially, economically, politically,
and often the warning signs those cracks in the foundation
they get missed.
Speaker 1: Why is that? Is it because people are too focused
on other things.
Speaker 2: Often, yes, especially during periods of rapid progress. Think about
new technologies, economic booms. Everyone's excited about the latest invention,
the rising stock market, dazzle of the new precisely, and
that can create blind spots. Societies get distracted by the
surface level shine and they don't notice the deeper structural shifts,
creating widespread insecurity or resentment bubbling underneath. It's a kind
of historical myopia.
Speaker 1: Okay, so that's our goal for this deep dive. Then
we're going to use history almost like a diagnostic tool.
We'll take the sources we have and compare three really
critical moments in time.
Speaker 2: That's right. We're looking at the period leading up to
nineteen fourteen, the years before nineteen thirty nine, and crucially
the world we find ourselves in right now.
Speaker 1: And the big question is are we seeing the same
kinds of patterns, the same precursors to instability across across
what we're calling the four key dimensions.
Speaker 2: Yes, the four lenses social, economic, political, and military. We
need a holistic view because cherry picking historical parallels is easy,
but it could be really misleading, ken it.
Speaker 1: Absolutely, you can find one similarity and use it to
push any agenda exactly.
Speaker 2: So the idea is to look for stress fractures across
all four of these pillars simultaneously. If we see widespread
systemic stress across the pl well, that's when history really
signals that we need to pay close attention.
Speaker 1: All right, Let's start with the first lens, the social dimension.
The sources seem to suggest this is often where the
earliest maybe deepest signs of trouble appear. How technology, even
the good stuff, can breed insecurity.
Speaker 2: It's a paradox, isn't it.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Think about the late nineteenth early twentieth century, the Bell
epoch on the surface of Golden.
Speaker 1: Age, right, the Second Industrial Revolution in full swing, electricity
lighting up cities, mass production, telephones becoming common, the first
cars rolling out. It must have felt like living in
the future.
Speaker 2: Absolutely miracles of engineering. But underneath that shiny surface, massive disruption.
Think about the impact on work.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it wasn't just losing a job, It was the
whole nature of work changing. Right. You go from being, say,
a skilled craftsman, master of your trade, or a farmer working.
Speaker 2: Your own land, to being a worker on an assembly
line governed by a clock, doing repetitive tasks, easily replaceable.
That's a huge psychological shift, not just an economic one.
It's a loss of autonomy, of identity almost.
Speaker 1: And the sources detail this displacement, don't they Machines replacing
workers and factories, but also new farming techniques pushing people
off the land.
Speaker 2: Yes, huge numbers of people moving from rural areas into
cities that often weren't prepared for them, overcrowding, poor conditions,
and this builds immediate resentment, resentment against the factory owners,
against the machines, against the whole system that seems to
have uprooted their lives.
Speaker 1: So you've got this growing massive people feeling insecure or
feeling like they've lost control. And then at the same time,
the traditional anchors are weakening exactly.
Speaker 2: The authority of old institutions, monarchies, established churches is being
questioned like never before. So the things that gave life
structure and meaning are shaking.
Speaker 1: And what fills that void When work feels precarious and
the old authorities.
Speaker 2: Are crumbling, ideology rushes in, often extreme ideology. The sources
highlight the rise of powerful mass movements. You see radical
labor unions on one side, demanding systemic change, and on
the other increasingly aggressive nationalist leagues, both feeding on fear,
fear that progress is actually destroying society's foundation's family, faith nation.
They offer simple, powerful answers, a sense of belonging and
certainty in a world that suddenly feels very uncertain and threatening.
Speaker 1: Okay, so that's pre WWI. Let's jump forward to the
interwar years the run up to World War Two. Does
that pattern of technological anxiety continue?
Speaker 2: It does, but it sort of evolves. The insecurity is
still there, absolutely, but it starts getting expressed more symbolically too.
It's fascinating, isn't that The word robot literally enters the
language in nineteen twenty one from a.
Speaker 1: Play right, capturing that deep seated fear of being replaced,
of human obsolescence.
Speaker 2: And it wasn't just science fiction. You had major economists
validating these fears. We mentioned John Maynard Keynes. Yeah, in
nineteen thirty he talks about this new disease, as he
called it, technological unemployment.
Speaker 1: And he wasn't just talking about a temporary downt was he.
Speaker 2: No, he was warning about something structural, that automation, the
sheer speed and scale of it, could permanently outpace our
ability to create new kinds of work. Imagine hearing that
during the Great Depression. It tapped right into people's deepest
anxieties about their future.
Speaker 1: But maybe the biggest technological disruptor of the twenties and
thirties wasn't robots, but communications, radio, cinema, mass newspapers.
Speaker 2: Oh, absolutely transformative. These weren't just entertainment. They fundamentally changed
public discourse. They enabled propaganda on a scale that was
simply impossible.
Speaker 1: Before, creating echo chambers, amplifying fears.
Speaker 2: Precisely, echo chambers were anxieties about the economy, about immigrants,
about changing social norms, could be magnified and spread rapidly.
And the sources show a really strong cultural backlash during
this time too, from traditionalists. Yes, people deeply worried that
modern culture, think jazz music, flapper dresses, changing family roles
was literally eroding the moral fabric of society. Religious and tradition,
family values all felt under attack.
Speaker 1: And when people feel their culture is under siege from within, they.
Speaker 2: Become much more susceptible to politicians who promise to restore order, purity,
and national strength, often by identifying internal enemies and external threats.
It primes the pump for aggressive authoritarian politics.
Speaker 1: Which brings us inevitably to today, we're living through another
massive technological revolution AI, the Internet, social media, smartphones in
every pocket.
Speaker 2: It's reshaping everything how we work, how we communicate, how
we get information, maybe even how we think. And the
anxieties they echo the past, but maybe feel even more
intense because the pace is just relentless.
Speaker 1: You see it everywhere, Psychologists debating what constant screen time
is doing to kids' brains, huge debates about privacy surveillance, and.
Speaker 2: The forecast about AI causing large scale job losses aren't
just theory anymore. We're seeing it start to happen, affecting
not just manual labor, but white collar jobs, creative foreshions,
plus things like deep fakes, eroding trust in what we
see in here.
Speaker 1: So what's the key difference now compared to say, the
nineteen thirties. Is it just the speed?
Speaker 2: Speed is a huge part of it. Yes, Today's technologies
don't just spread ideas globally, they amplify everything. Frustrations, fears,
divisions almost instantaneously. A local incident can become a global
flashpoint online within.
Speaker 1: Hours, meaning resentment and polarization can build much much faster
than before, faster than institutions can possibly respond exactly.
Speaker 2: The feedback loops are incredibly tight now. So if we
step back and look at these three eras PREWWI, pre WWII,
and today, the historical lesson seems pretty clear and frankly
quite disturbing, which is rapid technological change even when it
brings benefits consistently, seems to generate deep psychological insecurity, resentment,
and uncertainty, and this creates a fundamental vulnerability within society
of vulnerability too to extreme ideologies. When people feel the
ground shifting beneath their feet, when they feel their identity
or security is threatened, they become much more open to simplistic,
often aggressive solutions. Historically, this disorientation has made society's fertile
ground for militarism, sometimes using external conflict as a tool
to forge unity at home.
Speaker 1: Okay, so that's the social pressure cooker, that internal stress.
Now let's look through the second lens, the economic dimension,
because there's this long held idea, isn't there that economic
ties interdependents actually prevent war.
Speaker 2: Ah? Yes, the Golden Arches theory updated sort of the
idea that countries that trade heavily with each other won't
fight because it would destroy their own prosperity. We really
need to.
Speaker 1: Challenge that, starting with WWI, because that seems like the
classic case against it.
Speaker 2: It absolutely is. You have to dismantle that absolute prosperity argument. First,
the dominant thinking in say nineteen ten was exactly that
war between the Great Powers was becoming economically irrational, therefore impossible, and.
Speaker 1: On paper it made sense. Britain was the world's banker,
the center global trade. Germany was this booming industrial powerhouse,
It's exports surging.
Speaker 2: They were deeply intertwined economically. British finance fueled German industry.
German goods traveled on British ships. They needed each other,
both the laits the leader. They knew a war would
be economically catastrophic for everyone, and yet they stumbled into
the abyss. The WWI paradox is the crucial lesson here,
and the sources really hammer this home. Economics might tell
you what's possible, what could be gained through cooperation, but.
Speaker 1: It doesn't dictate what will happen exactly.
Speaker 2: Politics, ambition, nationalism, fear, miscalculation. These forces ultimately drove the decisions.
Economics took a backseat. War is not just about the
bottom line. It showed that even strong economic interdependence isn't
a fool proof guarantee against conflict.
Speaker 1: Okay, So if absolute prosperity isn't the key, what about
the next layer, the idea of relative power?
Speaker 2: Right? This shifts the focus for nations especially ambitious ones.
It's often not enough just to be prosperous. The goal
becomes being richer, stronger, more powerful than your rivals.
Speaker 1: It's about the league table, not just your own score.
Speaker 2: Precisely, it's about relative standing, and this is critical to
understanding the lead up to WWII. Why did Germany and
Japan become so aggressive. They didn't see the existing global
economic system dominated by Britain, France and the US as
fair or beneficial enough to them.
Speaker 1: Even if they were getting richer in absolute terms.
Speaker 2: Yes, because they perceived themselves as falling further behind structurally
or being deliberately held back by the established powers who
controlled key resources, trade routes, colonial empires.
Speaker 1: Japan felt dependent on America for oil and steel. Germany
felt hemmed in, lacking resources and living space.
Speaker 2: Exactly, they felt vulnerable because their economic well being seemed
dependent on the goodwill of rivals. The perception was that
the existing system wasn't allowing them to close the power gap.
Speaker 1: Fast enough, So their response wasn't to trade more but
the opposite.
Speaker 2: The response was purely strategic shift away from interdependence toward
self sufficiency. Tarchi and how do you achieve a Tarchi.
Speaker 1: If you lack resources, military conquest to seize the oil fields,
the iron mines, the agricultural land you need.
Speaker 2: Economic nationalism became the direct path to war. Secure your
own resources, build your own exclusive economic block, dominate your region.
That was the logic.
Speaker 1: Okay, now connect that suit today. For decades, the prevailing wisdom,
especially regarding the US and China was basically the nineteen
fourteen argument rehashed. We're two interconnected economically to ever fight
a major war, Chimerica.
Speaker 2: That assumption has been fundamentally shattered, hasn't it. We've had
two massive wake up calls.
Speaker 1: Recently and pandemic.
Speaker 2: First, yes, COVID nineteen starkly revealed just how fragile global
supply chains were and the immense danger of relying on
potential adversaries for critical goods masks, medical equivment, pharmaceuticals, you
name it.
Speaker 1: And then Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Speaker 2: Which demonstrated the raw geopolitical leverage a country gains when
others on it for essential resources like energy. Europe's reliance
on Russian gas became a weapon.
Speaker 1: So the lesson learned by governments around the world was.
Speaker 2: That deep economic dependence on arrival isn't just inefficient, it's
a massive national security vulnerability. It's simply too risky.
Speaker 1: And the result is this trend we're seeing everywhere now, decoupling,
de risking, basically prioritizing security over pure economic efficiency.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, it's a global shift towards trying to achieve greater
self sufficiency or at least diversified sourcing in critical sectors.
Think about the push for domestic semiconductor production, securing rare
earth mineral supplies, bringing manufacturing back home or to allied countries.
Speaker 1: This isn't just about economics then, its strategy.
Speaker 2: It's fundamentally strategic. It mirrors that drive towards AUTARKI we
saw before WWII. Nations are consciously choosing to pay a
higher price for goods or accept lower efficiency in order
to reduce their vulnerability to geopolitical rivals.
Speaker 1: So the big picture here, economically speaking, is a move
away from the interdependence that was supposed to guarantee peace
towards a more fragmented, nationalistic and potentially adversarial economic landscape.
Speaker 2: That seems to be the clear trend, and history suggests
that when nations start prioritizing relative power and self sufficiency
over mutual economic benefit. It signals a preparation for a
much less cooperative world order. Political and strategic calculations are
overriding purely economic ones.
Speaker 1: Okay, so social pressures building, economic vulnerabilities widening. That brings
us to the third pillar, the political dimension. This is
where we see the actual breakdown of order, right, polarization
turning into violence.
Speaker 2: Yes, this is about the failure of institutions. Polarization itself
isn't necessarily the final step. You can have divided media,
fierce political debates, even legislative gridlock. We see that a lot.
Speaker 1: There's a line that gets crossed.
Speaker 2: There is the most dangerous form. The real historical warning
sign is when political division spills over in to sustained
organized violence. Specifically when you see armed groups emerging. Because
people no longer trust the official system, the courts, the police,
the government to resolve disputes fairly or protect their interests.
Speaker 1: They decide to take matters into their own hands.
Speaker 2: Essentially exactly, force becomes the perceived alternative to politics. Look
back at WWI again. The spark was the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo nineteen fourteen by.
Speaker 1: The Blackhand, a Serbian nationalist group. Easy to dismiss as
just terrorism.
Speaker 2: But the sources emphasize it wasn't random. That assassination was
the culmination of years, decades, even of simmering ethnic tensions
and political violence in the Balkans. The Austro Hungarian Empire
was already failing to manage these deep fractures peacefully.
Speaker 1: And the Black Hand wasn't just some fringe group.
Speaker 2: No, it had documented links deep within Serbian military intelligence.
So the assassination wasn't just terrorism. It was politically motivated
violence with at least tacit state backing. It showed that
the normal rules, the institutional constraints had already broken down.
It was a symptom of complete political failure in the region,
which then tragically pulled the whole continent into war.
Speaker 1: Now fast forward to the Weimar Republic in Germany. Before WWII,
polarization was.
Speaker 2: Extreme, extreme and violence was common on the streets. But again,
look at the nature of the violence. It wasn't just
street brawls. You had targeted assassinations of key government figures.
Speaker 1: Like the finance minister Ersberger in twenty one and Foreign
Minister Rathanow in twenty two.
Speaker 2: Exactly, these weren't crimes of passion. They were calculated political
acts designed to destabilize the republic, to eliminate leaders associated
with the Versailles Treaty or with democratic governance. They were
sending a message, we will use force to remove those
we oppose.
Speaker 1: And what made Weimar particularly unstable, according to the sources,
was the militia problem.
Speaker 2: That was critical. It wasn't just one side that was armed.
All the major political factions the Communists read for Viders,
the social Democrats and Centrists, reichs Banner, the Nazis, Essay
or stormtroopers, they all had their own paramilitary.
Speaker 1: Wings, private armies.
Speaker 2: Basically, essentially, yes, when every political group feels it needs
its own armed force for protection or intimidation, the state
has lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
That's the textbook definition of a feeling state. Compromise becomes
impossible when disputes are settled by street fights and assassinations.
This created the chaos that allowed the Nazis to eventually
seize total power.
Speaker 1: Okay, the parallels to today are uncomfortable to say.
Speaker 2: The least they are concerning. Look at the US. The
January sixth attack on the Capitol was a direct assault
on the peaceful transfer of power, driven by contested election results.
It was political polarization manifesting as direct anti institutional violence.
Speaker 1: And it's not isolated. Is that the sources mention arise
in threats and even assassination attempts against political figures across
the spectrum.
Speaker 2: That's a crucial point. The political violence isn't just coming
from one fringe. It's becoming more widespread and reciprocal. The
idea that violence is a legitimate tool to achieve political
ends seems to be gaining traction, crossing ideological lines.
Speaker 1: And this isn't just a US phenomenon. What about Germany today?
Speaker 2: The statistics from Germany are quite stark. Sources point to
something like over ten thousand politically motivated attacks targeting politicians, journalists,
activists over just last five years.
Speaker 1: It's a huge search and again it's reciprocal.
Speaker 2: Yes, that pattern is clear. For example, you see attacks
committed by supporters of the far right AfD party, but
AfD politicians themselves are also very frequent targets of attacks.
This tit for tat cycle of violence shows a deep
breakdown in basic political norms and dialogue.
Speaker 1: So the historical pattern seems pretty clear here. Once political
violence becomes normalized, once factions arm themselves or resort to
force against.
Speaker 2: Opponents, compromise becomes virtually impossible. The institutions that are supposed
to mediate conflict lose all credibility. The political order is
essentially eating itself from within, making the entire system incredibly
fragile and vulnerable to shocks, both internal.
Speaker 1: And external, which leads us directly to the final dimension,
the military. This is where the internal weaknesses potentially meet
external threats. Right, And it's all about alliances.
Speaker 2: Exactly because world wars rarely start as world wars. They
almost always begin as regional conflicts that then escalate dragging
in other powers because of existing alliances and security commitments.
Speaker 1: WWI is the classic example again, Austria versus Serbia.
Speaker 2: Poles in Russia, then Germany, then France, then Britain. A
Balkan dispute becomes a European war, then a global war,
all through that chain reaction of alliances.
Speaker 1: WWII started differently, though, didn't it, not one spark but several?
Speaker 2: Right? It began as three distinct regional wars really launched
by three different aggressor states with different ambitions. Germany aiming
for dominance in Europe, Italy wanting an empire in the Mediterranean, Africa,
Japan seeking control over China and the Asia Pacific.
Speaker 1: So they weren't initially fighting one unified war.
Speaker 2: Not at first. They had overlapping interests and ideological similarities,
but they were pursuing separate expansionist goals. The conflict only
truly became World War Two when these separate theaters fused,
primarily after the US entered the war following Pearl Harbor,
connecting the Europeana Patific conflicts.
Speaker 1: Okay, so applying that framework to today, the parallel is quite striking.
Speaker 2: It is we already have two major ongoing regional conflicts
with global implications, Russia's war in Ukraine clearly and the
complex web of proxy wars and instability fueled by Iran
across the Middle East.
Speaker 1: Two theaters already active, and the potential third.
Speaker 2: The third potential theater, is actively forming around China's increasing
pressure on Taiwan and its broader ambitions in the Indo Pacific.
The danger mirroring the pre WWI scenario isn't just one
of these conflicts, but the possibility that they could merge
or occur simultaneously, stretching resources and potentially drawing in major
powers on multiple fronts.
Speaker 1: If say, a conflict breaks out over Taiwan and you
have the US, maybe Japan, Australia involved there, while still
supporting Ukraine and managing Middle East tensions, the system gets
overloaded very quickly.
Speaker 2: Extremely quickly. Now, this is where the sources highlight a
really critical point of comparison, maybe the most critical, the
difference in the integration of the main adversarial alliances then
versus Now.
Speaker 1: You mean how unified the bad guys were.
Speaker 2: Basically essentially Yes, we often talk about the Axis powers
of the nineteen thirties Germany, Italy, Japan as if they
were this monolithic block. Yeah, but the reality their alliance
was surprisingly weak and uncoordinated.
Speaker 1: Really, they weren't working closely together.
Speaker 2: Often they were working at cross purposes. The sources give
concrete examples. In nineteen thirty four, Hitler tried to orchestrate
a Nazi coup in Austria. Mussolini, fearing German expansion on
his border, actually mobilized Italian troops to stop him. These
supposed allies were literally facing off against each other.
Speaker 1: That's incredible. In the Germany Japan relationship.
Speaker 2: Even more awkward. Initially, Germany was actively selling weapons and
providing military advisors to Chiang Kaishek's China helping them fight
against Japan. Right up until late nineteen thirty eight. It
was an alliance of convenience, not deep strategic alignment. They
didn't trust each other much and they didn't coordinate effectively.
Speaker 1: Okay, Contrast that low level of integration in the nineteen
thirties axis with the groups sometimes called the Axis of
authoritarians today, China, Russia and North Korea Iran.
Speaker 2: The difference is stark. The level of cooperation and integration
we're seeing now between these dates is significantly higher, much
more functional, both economically and militarily.
Speaker 1: What's the evidence for that, concrete and material?
Speaker 2: Look at North Korea sending massive amounts of ammunition, weapons,
possibly even personnel to help Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
That's direct operational military support and China's role. China's playing
multiple roles. It's providing an economic lifeline to North Korea,
food energy, which frees up Pyongyang's resources to produce weapons
for Russia. At the same time, China is propping up
both Russia and Iran economically by buying their sanctioned oil
and gas, undermining international.
Speaker 1: Pressure, and militarily beyond the economic support.
Speaker 2: Critically, China is supplying Russia with huge amounts of non
lethal but essential military related technology electronics, machine tools, drone components,
stuff that directly fuels Russia's war machine and helps rebuild
its defense industrial base. This isn't just rhetoric. It's a functioning,
integrated network supporting mutual geopolitical goals.
Speaker 1: So a much more cohesive adversarial block than in the
nineteen thirties. Now, what about the other side, the democracies NATO, Well,
this is.
Speaker 2: Where the tarallel becomes worrying again. The sources suggest that
in contrast to the growing cohesion of the authoritarian block,
the democratic alliances, NATO alliances in the Pacific are showing
signs of division and strain obvious things like persistent debates
and shortfalls and defense spending. Many NATO allies still don't
meet the grade two percentage GDP target, putting a disproportionate
burden on the US and a few others. There are
also clear strategic disagreements. How much focus on Russia versus China,
how to handle trade issues, how much support for Ukraine.
This lack of unity and perceived lack of resolve weakens
to terrence.
Speaker 1: So if you put those two pieces together, a more united,
integrated aggressor alliance and a more divided, perhaps hesitant, defensive alliance,
what does history suggest?
Speaker 2: History offers a pretty chilling conclusion. When the powers seeking
to overturn the existing order are growing stronger, more coordinated,
and perceive the defenders of that order is weak, divided,
or distracted.
Speaker 1: The incentive to act aggressively increases dramatically.
Speaker 2: Precisely, they see a window of opportunity. They calculate that
the risk of aggression are lower because the response is
likely to be slow, fragmented, and ineffective. It makes bold
moves seem much more feasible.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's try to pull all four threads together them.
We've gone through a lot.
Speaker 2: We have. We've looked at the social dimension, how technological
change breeds insecurity and opens the door to extremism. The
economic dimension, the shift from interdependence towards nationalism and relative
power concerns.
Speaker 1: The political dimension, how polarization escalates into organized violence signaling
institutional collapse. And finally, the military dimension the dynamic where
regional wars escalate via alliances, particularly when aggressor alliances are
unifying while defensive ones seem fractured.
Speaker 2: And across all four we see these historical patterns, these
echoes from the periods before WWI and WWII resonating quite
loudly today.
Speaker 1: The point of seeing these patterns, these rhymes and history
isn't to say conflict is inevitable, right. It's not about
predicting the future with certainty.
Speaker 2: Absolutely not. It's about recognition. It's about understanding the dynamics
at play so we can potentially avoid the catastrophic mistakes
of the past, mistakes often borne from failing to see
the warning signs until it was too late. The sources
urge us to be clear eyed about the structural stresses
where abs.
Speaker 1: It really drives home that famous saying.
Speaker 2: History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes. And we're
definitely hearing some powerful rhymes right now, aren't we.
Speaker 1: I certainly are okay. As we wrap up this deep dive,
let's leave our listeners with something to think about. A
final thought. We spend a lot of time talking about
the internal factors social anxiety driven by technology, deep political polarization.
These seem to be the fundamental weaknesses that external aggressors
then exploit.
Speaker 2: They create the fertile ground.
Speaker 1: Yes, so the provocative thought is this, if that internal fracturing,
the tech anxiety, the societal division is a key historical
precursor to major conflict, what can actually be done about it?
Not by governments necessarily, not militarily, but by ordinary people,
by communities, by citizens, non state actors.
Speaker 2: Hmm interesting? What concrete steps can be taken now at
a grassroots level to actively push back against those dangerous
feedback loops to rebuild social trust and cohesion before things
reach a breaking point?
Speaker 1: Exactly? It shifts the focus from waiting for top down
solutions to thinking about bottom up braziliance. What can you,
the listener do to counter the very real historical patterns
we've discussed today? Something powerful time all.
Speaker 2: Over, A very important question. Thank you for joining us
on this pretty intense deep dive. We hope it provided
some valuable context.
Speaker 1: Indeed, we'll be back next time with more insights from
the sources,