WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.040 --> 00:00:01.399 I want you to picture something. 2 00:00:02.319 --> 00:00:06.240 Just place yourself in the pitch black, muddy waters of 3 00:00:06.240 --> 00:00:10.000 the Florida Everglades. Oh wow, okay, yeah, it's a moonless night, 4 00:00:10.080 --> 00:00:14.000 December nineteen seventy two. The air is just thick with 5 00:00:14.039 --> 00:00:17.239 this heavy, suffocating scent of jet fuel, right, and the 6 00:00:17.320 --> 00:00:18.440 metallic tang. 7 00:00:18.199 --> 00:00:20.239 Of swamp water sounds terrifying. 8 00:00:20.480 --> 00:00:20.879 It is. 9 00:00:21.280 --> 00:00:23.879 The eerie silence of the marsh is only broken by 10 00:00:24.000 --> 00:00:28.440 like the groans of twisted metal and the terrifying, unimaginable 11 00:00:28.480 --> 00:00:32.439 realization creeping over the survivors of Eastern Airlines Flight four 12 00:00:32.479 --> 00:00:35.119 oh one, that a perfectly good jumbo jet just fell 13 00:00:35.119 --> 00:00:35.719 out of the sky. 14 00:00:35.960 --> 00:00:37.359 And you know that was a state of the art 15 00:00:37.359 --> 00:00:41.399 aircraft too. It wasn't destroyed by a catastrophic engine failure 16 00:00:41.640 --> 00:00:44.479 or a bomb or anything like that. It was brought 17 00:00:44.479 --> 00:00:45.840 down by a twelvecent light bulb. 18 00:00:45.880 --> 00:00:47.119 A twelve cent light bulb. 19 00:00:47.359 --> 00:00:49.960 Unbelievable. Well, welcome to the deep dive today. We're stepping 20 00:00:50.000 --> 00:00:53.759 into the rolls of your expert aviation accident investigators. That's right, 21 00:00:53.799 --> 00:00:56.840 we're looking at the terrifying intersection of human psychology and 22 00:00:56.920 --> 00:00:59.759 aviation technology. We're going to bring you right into the cockpit, 23 00:01:00.159 --> 00:01:03.079 pack the true harrowing stories behind some of the most 24 00:01:03.079 --> 00:01:04.920 infamous plane crashes in history. 25 00:01:05.280 --> 00:01:10.000 Yeah, we're going to explore the incredibly fragile human element 26 00:01:10.120 --> 00:01:13.159 in a highly automated world. We'll look at the mechanisms 27 00:01:13.159 --> 00:01:16.599 behind how minor distractions can just cascade into absolute disaster 28 00:01:17.120 --> 00:01:21.680 and conversely, how unimaginable human bravery can lead to miracles. 29 00:01:22.000 --> 00:01:23.120 Okay, let's unpack this. 30 00:01:23.280 --> 00:01:26.359 Starting right back in that dark swamp with Eastern Airlines 31 00:01:26.400 --> 00:01:29.319 Flight four oh one. So we're descending into Miami and 32 00:01:29.359 --> 00:01:33.719 the crew is battling a stubborn issue. A single indicator 33 00:01:33.799 --> 00:01:36.040 light for the nose landing gear won't turn green on 34 00:01:36.079 --> 00:01:37.239 the dashboard. 35 00:01:37.120 --> 00:01:40.000 Right, And to put the technology of that era into perspective, 36 00:01:40.280 --> 00:01:42.760 this is a Lockheed L ten eleven try Star. 37 00:01:42.719 --> 00:01:43.719 A massive plane. 38 00:01:43.760 --> 00:01:45.920 Massive at the time, it was the most advanced passenger 39 00:01:45.959 --> 00:01:48.439 jet in the world, basically a flying supercomputer for nineteen 40 00:01:48.480 --> 00:01:52.359 seventy two. Yet Captain Loft, his copilot, and the flight 41 00:01:52.400 --> 00:01:56.640 engineer become completely utterly consumed by this one tiny problem, 42 00:01:56.680 --> 00:01:59.239 just a light bulb exactly. They're trying to figure out 43 00:01:59.239 --> 00:02:01.519 if the massive no landing gear is actually locked in 44 00:02:01.560 --> 00:02:04.280 the down position, or if the tiny indicator light bulb 45 00:02:04.359 --> 00:02:05.280 is just burned out. 46 00:02:05.400 --> 00:02:07.760 And they get so fixated on it that they actually 47 00:02:07.760 --> 00:02:10.479 pull the bulb out of the panel, right, they try 48 00:02:10.520 --> 00:02:12.240 to reinsert it and they end up jamming it. 49 00:02:12.319 --> 00:02:13.280 Yeah, they make it worse. 50 00:02:13.400 --> 00:02:16.599 They even send the flight engineer down into the avionics bay, 51 00:02:16.879 --> 00:02:21.560 which is this cramped dark space beneath the cockpit literally 52 00:02:21.639 --> 00:02:25.080 nicknamed the hell hole, to physically look through a little 53 00:02:25.120 --> 00:02:27.039 people and check the landing gear. 54 00:02:27.520 --> 00:02:30.520 And while they're doing all this, air traffic control puts 55 00:02:30.560 --> 00:02:32.960 them in a holding pattern at two thousand feet out 56 00:02:33.000 --> 00:02:36.719 over the dark everglades. Okay, so the copilot engages the 57 00:02:36.719 --> 00:02:39.360 autopilot so they can focus all their attention on this bulb. 58 00:02:40.199 --> 00:02:43.919 But a fatal design flaw and a bit of clumsiness 59 00:02:44.360 --> 00:02:47.879 align perfectly here. Oh no, Yeah, As a captain turns 60 00:02:47.879 --> 00:02:49.800 around in his seat to talk to the engineer down 61 00:02:49.800 --> 00:02:52.680 in the hell hole, he accidentally nudges his control wheel 62 00:02:52.840 --> 00:02:55.599 just a bump, just a soft bump. But that simple 63 00:02:55.639 --> 00:02:59.719 action physically overrides the computer and it silently disengages the 64 00:02:59.719 --> 00:03:01.479 eltitude hold on the autopilot. 65 00:03:01.639 --> 00:03:04.159 Wow, so the plan just starts a slow and visible 66 00:03:04.159 --> 00:03:07.240 descent into the pitch black night outside, except the pilots 67 00:03:07.240 --> 00:03:10.960 are staring at a jammed light bulb, completely oblivious that 68 00:03:11.000 --> 00:03:14.520 they are dropping toward the swamp. Now, Miami tower controller 69 00:03:14.599 --> 00:03:18.719 Charlie Johnson actually notices this altitude drop on his brand 70 00:03:18.800 --> 00:03:21.960 new three D radar screen, right, but he assumes it's 71 00:03:22.000 --> 00:03:22.919 just a radar glitch. 72 00:03:23.000 --> 00:03:25.560 Well, you have to remember the regulations at the time 73 00:03:25.599 --> 00:03:29.159 didn't require controllers to report a slight altitude drop. It 74 00:03:29.199 --> 00:03:32.280 was a new radar system and false readings were like 75 00:03:32.879 --> 00:03:34.000 super common. 76 00:03:33.719 --> 00:03:34.759 So he just ignores it. 77 00:03:34.879 --> 00:03:36.879 He simply asks the crew if things are all right 78 00:03:36.919 --> 00:03:40.759 out there. They say yes, still completely oblivious to their descent. 79 00:03:40.919 --> 00:03:43.000 Well wait, I have to ask about the safety systems 80 00:03:43.000 --> 00:03:45.199 on the plane itself. Wouldn't a massive, state of the 81 00:03:45.319 --> 00:03:47.479 art jet have a warning system, like why didn't an 82 00:03:47.479 --> 00:03:49.759 alarm go off to snack them out of this fixation? 83 00:03:49.919 --> 00:03:53.319 What's fascinating here is an altitude warning chime actually did 84 00:03:53.319 --> 00:03:53.759 go off? 85 00:03:53.919 --> 00:03:54.199 Wait? 86 00:03:54.360 --> 00:03:58.759 Really, yes, at seven and fifty feet a clear chime 87 00:03:58.879 --> 00:04:01.960 sounded in the cockpit. It's perfectly audible on the cockpit 88 00:04:02.039 --> 00:04:04.280 voice recorder. But the crew didn't react. 89 00:04:04.439 --> 00:04:04.840 Why not? 90 00:04:05.120 --> 00:04:09.280 They were experiencing a psychological phenomenon known as auditory exclusion, 91 00:04:09.560 --> 00:04:11.919 which is brought on by extreme task saturation. 92 00:04:12.360 --> 00:04:15.159 Task saturation so their brains were just too full to 93 00:04:15.199 --> 00:04:17.639 process the sound. I mean, it's like looking down to 94 00:04:17.680 --> 00:04:20.199 text while driving on the highway, except you're flying at 95 00:04:20.199 --> 00:04:22.319 two thousand feet with one hundred and seventy six lives 96 00:04:22.319 --> 00:04:25.000 in your hands. Or like when you're so engrossed in 97 00:04:25.079 --> 00:04:27.560 reading a complex email that you literally don't hear your 98 00:04:27.560 --> 00:04:28.600 partner calling your name. 99 00:04:28.759 --> 00:04:32.319 That is a perfect analogy. The human brain only has 100 00:04:32.360 --> 00:04:36.560 so much cognitive bandwidth. When it's hyper fixated on solving 101 00:04:36.560 --> 00:04:40.519 a mechanical puzzle, it physically filters out unexpected audio cues. 102 00:04:40.639 --> 00:04:41.519 That's terrifying. 103 00:04:41.639 --> 00:04:44.040 It is the chime registered on the microphone but not 104 00:04:44.120 --> 00:04:45.480 in their conscious minds. 105 00:04:45.279 --> 00:04:48.079 Which led to one hundred and sixty ton aircraft flying 106 00:04:48.120 --> 00:04:50.439 gently into the swamp at two hundred and twenty seven 107 00:04:50.519 --> 00:04:53.879 miles per hour. Ninety nine people died, and for the 108 00:04:53.879 --> 00:04:57.160 seventy seven survivors, I mean, the nightmare was just beginning. 109 00:04:57.199 --> 00:05:00.360 In that much the swamp water was thick with aviation fuel. 110 00:05:00.680 --> 00:05:03.439 Survivors faced the threat of alligators grounding in the dark, 111 00:05:03.680 --> 00:05:06.279 and a deadly infection from the anaerobic bacteria in the 112 00:05:06.279 --> 00:05:07.879 swamp mud called gas gangreen. 113 00:05:08.160 --> 00:05:11.120 It's just horrifying. It was only thanks to the heroics 114 00:05:11.160 --> 00:05:14.000 of a local frog hunter named Bob Marcus, who rushed 115 00:05:14.000 --> 00:05:16.040 out on his airboat in the pitch black to pull 116 00:05:16.079 --> 00:05:18.560 people from the wreckage that more didn't drown. I mean 117 00:05:18.600 --> 00:05:21.120 a twelve cent distraction brought down a jumbo jet. 118 00:05:21.240 --> 00:05:25.439 It did, But this tragedy fundamentally altered the course of 119 00:05:25.439 --> 00:05:30.160 commercial aviation. It birthed the concept called crew resource management 120 00:05:30.399 --> 00:05:35.079 or CRM. Right CRM, the industry realized that a hierarchical 121 00:05:35.160 --> 00:05:40.079 cockpit where the captain's attention dictates everything is deadly. CRM 122 00:05:40.120 --> 00:05:44.560 dictates that a captain must delegate tasks, maintain situational awareness, 123 00:05:44.920 --> 00:05:48.120 and crucially ensure someone is always actually flying the plane. 124 00:05:48.160 --> 00:05:50.160 Someone has to look out the window, so the lesson. 125 00:05:50.160 --> 00:05:53.519 There is the danger of task saturation and failing to delegate. 126 00:05:53.600 --> 00:05:55.680 But what happens when pilots swing too far in the 127 00:05:55.720 --> 00:05:58.639 opposite direction, Like what happens when an experienced crew relies 128 00:05:58.759 --> 00:06:01.240 entirely on the automation they're supposed to be monitoring. 129 00:06:01.480 --> 00:06:05.279 Ah The concept of automation complacency that brings us to 130 00:06:05.360 --> 00:06:08.839 China Airlines flight zero zero six in February nineteen eighty five. 131 00:06:09.079 --> 00:06:11.319 Let's set the scene for that one. We are forty 132 00:06:11.360 --> 00:06:13.800 one thousand feet above the Pacific Ocean. It's the middle 133 00:06:13.839 --> 00:06:16.720 of the night. Passengers are asleep or you know, drinking 134 00:06:16.839 --> 00:06:18.160 champagne in first class. 135 00:06:18.240 --> 00:06:18.800 Nice. 136 00:06:18.959 --> 00:06:21.600 But in the cockpit we have a very tired crew 137 00:06:21.800 --> 00:06:26.279 flying through their deepest circadian sleep cycle. They are battling 138 00:06:26.360 --> 00:06:29.600 severe jet lag across eighteen time zones. 139 00:06:29.519 --> 00:06:32.519 And in the middle of this exhaustion, a mechanical issue 140 00:06:32.519 --> 00:06:35.560 crops up. Engine number four, out on the right wing 141 00:06:36.279 --> 00:06:40.000 loses thrust due to a worn out valve. It's known 142 00:06:40.040 --> 00:06:41.079 as a hung engine. 143 00:06:41.240 --> 00:06:42.680 Okay, so they lose an engine. 144 00:06:42.800 --> 00:06:45.240 Yeah, but in a Boeing seven forty seven, losing one 145 00:06:45.279 --> 00:06:49.079 of four engines is considered a relatively minor event. The 146 00:06:49.120 --> 00:06:51.839 plane is aerodynamically designed to fly easily. 147 00:06:51.480 --> 00:06:54.959 On three, but a tired brain makes mistakes. The flight 148 00:06:55.000 --> 00:06:58.040 engineer attempts to restart the engine, but he misses a 149 00:06:58.079 --> 00:07:01.160 crucial step right he leaves something called a bleed air 150 00:07:01.240 --> 00:07:01.920 valve open. 151 00:07:02.000 --> 00:07:03.240 Walk me through the mechanics of that. 152 00:07:03.399 --> 00:07:06.439 Sure, So a jet engine requires highly compressed air to 153 00:07:06.519 --> 00:07:09.240 mix with fuel and ignite. A bleed air valve is 154 00:07:09.240 --> 00:07:10.959 exactly what it sounds like. It bleeds some of that 155 00:07:11.040 --> 00:07:13.879 high pressure air away from the engine to power cabin 156 00:07:13.920 --> 00:07:16.519 systems like the air conditions. Oh so, by leaving that 157 00:07:16.639 --> 00:07:20.480 valve open during a restart attempt, the engineer robbed the 158 00:07:20.560 --> 00:07:23.959 engine of the internal pressure it desperately needed to ignite 159 00:07:23.959 --> 00:07:24.399 the fuel. 160 00:07:24.680 --> 00:07:28.000 So the engine refuses to start, and they're now flying 161 00:07:28.000 --> 00:07:30.680 with dead weight on the right wing, which means the 162 00:07:30.720 --> 00:07:33.519 plane naturally wants to bank to the right due to 163 00:07:33.639 --> 00:07:39.120 asymmetrical thrust. Exactly now, Captain Hoe leaves the autopilot engaged, 164 00:07:39.600 --> 00:07:41.240 but the autopilot seems. 165 00:07:40.920 --> 00:07:43.439 To be struggling right, it's trying its hardest to keep 166 00:07:43.480 --> 00:07:46.560 the winds level. But we have to understand how autopilots 167 00:07:46.560 --> 00:07:49.279 of that era worked. The computer was only linked to 168 00:07:49.319 --> 00:07:52.480 the ailerons. Those are the hinged flaps on the trailing 169 00:07:52.560 --> 00:07:55.079 edge of the main wings that control the plane's roll. Okay, 170 00:07:55.600 --> 00:07:58.480 but to counter a dead engine pulling you to one side, 171 00:07:58.560 --> 00:08:00.920 you need to use the rudder, the vertical flap on 172 00:08:00.959 --> 00:08:03.399 the tail that controls left to right movement, And the 173 00:08:03.439 --> 00:08:05.959 autopilot wasn't programmed to use the rudder. 174 00:08:06.040 --> 00:08:09.480 Here's where it gets really interesting. Wait, if the autopilot 175 00:08:09.519 --> 00:08:11.879 can't use the rudder and the plane is pulling hard 176 00:08:11.920 --> 00:08:14.399 to the right, why didn't the captain just step on 177 00:08:14.439 --> 00:08:16.959 the rudder pedal with his left foot. It seems like 178 00:08:17.000 --> 00:08:20.040 such a simple physical correction to make just override the computer. 179 00:08:20.519 --> 00:08:26.240 Under normal alert circumstances, he absolutely would have, But fatigue 180 00:08:26.800 --> 00:08:31.399 heavily degrades human problem solving. This is where automation complacency 181 00:08:31.439 --> 00:08:32.120 becomes lethal. 182 00:08:32.159 --> 00:08:33.480 He just trusted it too much. 183 00:08:33.639 --> 00:08:38.039 Exactly, by trusting the autopilot blindly to maintain straight flight, 184 00:08:38.519 --> 00:08:41.000 Captain Hoe kept his hands and feet off the controls. 185 00:08:41.919 --> 00:08:45.360 Because he wasn't manually flying, he lost his pactile feel 186 00:08:45.440 --> 00:08:47.720 for what the massive jet was actually doing. 187 00:08:47.799 --> 00:08:48.279 Wow. 188 00:08:48.480 --> 00:08:50.639 If we connect this to the bigger picture, automation is 189 00:08:50.679 --> 00:08:53.480 designed to help right, but it can't solve real time 190 00:08:53.519 --> 00:08:55.399 physics problems it wasn't programmed for. 191 00:08:55.840 --> 00:08:58.720 Because he didn't manually correct with the rudder, the plane's 192 00:08:58.759 --> 00:09:02.320 nose pitches up its stalls and then slowly rolls completely 193 00:09:02.360 --> 00:09:05.399 over onto its back upside down. Upside down, and because 194 00:09:05.399 --> 00:09:08.240 they're flying through a thick cloud bank with no visual 195 00:09:08.279 --> 00:09:11.240 reference to the stars or the ocean. They suffer complete 196 00:09:11.240 --> 00:09:12.399 spatial disorientation. 197 00:09:12.679 --> 00:09:15.480 They look at their artificial horizon instruments on the dashboard, 198 00:09:15.879 --> 00:09:19.440 see the plane as completely inverted, and their exhausted brains 199 00:09:19.840 --> 00:09:21.440 literally reject the information. 200 00:09:21.679 --> 00:09:23.000 Just don't believe it right. 201 00:09:23.440 --> 00:09:26.480 They assume the instruments have failed, rather than believing their 202 00:09:26.519 --> 00:09:28.960 massive seven four seven is flying upside down. 203 00:09:29.080 --> 00:09:32.480 Which leads to a terrifying thirty thousand foot free fall. 204 00:09:32.679 --> 00:09:36.519 In just two minutes, the aircraft approaches mock point nine 205 00:09:36.559 --> 00:09:38.679 to nine. I mean, that's nearly the speed of sound. 206 00:09:38.759 --> 00:09:39.480 It's insane. 207 00:09:39.559 --> 00:09:43.360 The g forces inside the cabin were unimaginable. Passengers were 208 00:09:43.399 --> 00:09:47.000 pinned to the floor feeling five times their normal body weight, and. 209 00:09:46.960 --> 00:09:50.200 The aerodynamic stress on the airframe was so severe that 210 00:09:50.240 --> 00:09:53.480 the landing gear doors were physically ripped off the bottom 211 00:09:53.519 --> 00:09:56.879 of the plane. The horizontal stabilizers on the tail were 212 00:09:56.960 --> 00:09:58.720 bent and severely damaged. 213 00:09:58.799 --> 00:10:02.840 It's honestly miraculous. The wings din just snap off like twigs. Finally, 214 00:10:02.879 --> 00:10:05.320 plummeting through ten thousand feet, the plane breaks out of 215 00:10:05.360 --> 00:10:08.120 the bottom of the clouds. Captain Hose sees the actual 216 00:10:08.159 --> 00:10:11.120 horizon line of the ocean snaps out of his disorientation, 217 00:10:11.320 --> 00:10:15.120 grabs the oak, and hauls the plane out of the dive. Incredible, 218 00:10:15.240 --> 00:10:18.200 they survived, but it proved that blind trust and a 219 00:10:18.240 --> 00:10:20.639 computer nearly doomed hundreds of people. 220 00:10:20.879 --> 00:10:23.559 Yeah, China Airlines survived because they had forty thousand feet 221 00:10:23.559 --> 00:10:25.399 of altitude to play with. They had time to fall. 222 00:10:25.879 --> 00:10:30.279 But that systemic reliance on technology raises an even darker scenario. 223 00:10:30.679 --> 00:10:31.039 What's that? 224 00:10:31.399 --> 00:10:34.720 What happens when exhaustion strikes just miles from the runway 225 00:10:34.919 --> 00:10:37.919 and the electronic safety systems meant to protect you are 226 00:10:38.000 --> 00:10:40.960 intentionally turned off by the very people running the airport? 227 00:10:41.120 --> 00:10:41.720 Oh Man. 228 00:10:42.240 --> 00:10:46.120 That brings us to August nineteen ninety seven, a pitch black, 229 00:10:46.360 --> 00:10:50.200 rainy night over the Pacific island of Kuam. We are 230 00:10:50.240 --> 00:10:54.240 on Korean air flight eight oh one. Unpredictable violent top 231 00:10:54.279 --> 00:10:58.279 hat thunderstorms are completely blocking any visual site of the runway. 232 00:10:58.399 --> 00:11:01.879 This crash is a master cloud in the normalization of devians, 233 00:11:02.240 --> 00:11:06.159 where cutting corners just becomes the standard operating procedure. First, 234 00:11:06.240 --> 00:11:09.159 the airport's glide slope beacon is out of service for maintenance. 235 00:11:09.279 --> 00:11:10.200 What does that do again? 236 00:11:10.240 --> 00:11:13.279 That's the electronic radio beam that creates a virtual safe 237 00:11:13.360 --> 00:11:16.039 pathway down to the tarmac for the pilots to follow 238 00:11:16.080 --> 00:11:16.840 on their instruments. 239 00:11:16.919 --> 00:11:19.440 Right, So Captain Park is incredibly sleep deprived, and he's 240 00:11:19.480 --> 00:11:23.600 getting confused by spurious ghostly flickers on his broken glide 241 00:11:23.600 --> 00:11:25.720 slope indicator in the cockpit. 242 00:11:25.759 --> 00:11:28.320 Because it's picking up random radio noise. 243 00:11:28.440 --> 00:11:32.360 Exactly, it's tricking him into thinking the system is actually working. 244 00:11:32.919 --> 00:11:36.679 He follows this ghost signal, descending way too fast in 245 00:11:36.679 --> 00:11:39.559 the blinding rain. But I don't understand how air traffic 246 00:11:39.600 --> 00:11:42.759 control didn't intervene. Shouldn't the tower have warned him he 247 00:11:42.840 --> 00:11:44.000 was flying into a mountain? 248 00:11:44.480 --> 00:11:48.720 This raises an important question about the infrastructure we blindly trust. See, 249 00:11:48.759 --> 00:11:52.600 the FAA had installed a system called MSL Minimum Safe 250 00:11:52.639 --> 00:11:57.679 Altitude Warning. It uses radar to constantly monitor planes on approach. 251 00:11:57.879 --> 00:11:59.240 Okay, so it watches their height. 252 00:11:59.440 --> 00:12:02.240 Right. If an aircraft drops below a safe altitude for 253 00:12:02.240 --> 00:12:05.200 that specific terrain, a loud alarm goes off in the 254 00:12:05.200 --> 00:12:09.039 controlled tower, alerting the controller to immediately radio the pilot 255 00:12:09.159 --> 00:12:10.159 and tell them to pull up. 256 00:12:10.360 --> 00:12:12.720 So why didn't the alarm go off for flight. 257 00:12:12.519 --> 00:12:15.399 Eight oh one because the FAA had intentionally disabled it 258 00:12:15.480 --> 00:12:16.159 near the airport? 259 00:12:16.279 --> 00:12:19.080 Wait How does a federal safety agency just turn off 260 00:12:19.120 --> 00:12:20.519 a life saving radar system. 261 00:12:20.600 --> 00:12:23.840 It comes down to a psychological concept called alarm fatigue. 262 00:12:24.320 --> 00:12:27.960 The original software parameters were just too sensitive. Whenever a 263 00:12:28.000 --> 00:12:30.960 plane made a totally normal safe landing, the system would 264 00:12:30.960 --> 00:12:32.879 still trigger a blaring alarm in the tower. 265 00:12:32.960 --> 00:12:33.679 Oh I see, Yeah. 266 00:12:33.679 --> 00:12:37.200 The controllers were getting incredibly annoyed by these constant nuisance alarms, 267 00:12:37.759 --> 00:12:41.879 So instead of fixing the software's parameters, the FAA redesigned 268 00:12:41.879 --> 00:12:45.039 the system to push the warning zone miles away over 269 00:12:45.080 --> 00:12:49.200 the ocean. You're kidding, Nope, They effectively blinded the radar 270 00:12:49.720 --> 00:12:51.679 over the actual hills near the airport. 271 00:12:52.120 --> 00:12:54.799 That is the definition of alarm fatigue. I mean this 272 00:12:54.919 --> 00:12:58.759 is like driving blindly through a blizzard, trusting a GPS 273 00:12:58.799 --> 00:13:01.159 that you know is broken while the guardrails on the 274 00:13:01.159 --> 00:13:03.399 side of the cliff have been removed, Or like taking 275 00:13:03.440 --> 00:13:05.759 the batteries out of your smoke detector because it chirps 276 00:13:05.759 --> 00:13:08.399 when you make toast, completely forgetting that it's there to 277 00:13:08.440 --> 00:13:10.159 save you when the house actually catches fire. 278 00:13:10.399 --> 00:13:13.679 Exactly. They stripped away the ultimate safety net, and as 279 00:13:13.679 --> 00:13:16.919 a result, Captain Park who's confused by a glitching instrument 280 00:13:16.960 --> 00:13:20.240 blinded by a tropical storm and completely unprotected by air 281 00:13:20.320 --> 00:13:23.919 traffic control, flies a perfectly good Boeing seven forty seven 282 00:13:23.960 --> 00:13:27.639 directly into Nimitzs Hill, a rocky outcrop just three miles 283 00:13:27.639 --> 00:13:28.480 short of the runway. 284 00:13:28.639 --> 00:13:29.000 God. 285 00:13:29.279 --> 00:13:31.440 Out of two hundred and fifty four people on board, 286 00:13:31.559 --> 00:13:34.799 only twenty six survived the impact and the flames, and 287 00:13:34.879 --> 00:13:38.240 one of those survivors was a helicopter pilot named Verry Small. 288 00:13:38.759 --> 00:13:41.879 His survival story is unreal but also incredibly revealing. 289 00:13:42.000 --> 00:13:42.600 It really is. 290 00:13:42.840 --> 00:13:45.879 When the plane crashed, he braced himself. His legs were 291 00:13:45.879 --> 00:13:48.600 saved from being crushed by the metal seat crossbars in 292 00:13:48.600 --> 00:13:51.759 front of him because his tightly packed carryon bag acted 293 00:13:51.759 --> 00:13:52.799 as a physical cushion. 294 00:13:52.960 --> 00:13:55.200 Wow, that's incredibly lucky, right. 295 00:13:55.120 --> 00:13:57.360 But with a broken leg, he had to drag himself 296 00:13:57.399 --> 00:14:01.120 through a burning, shattered fuselage. 297 00:14:00.159 --> 00:14:04.440 And his expert observation during that terrifying escape highlights another 298 00:14:04.519 --> 00:14:08.320 massive blind spot in aviation safety. The ensuing fire was 299 00:14:08.399 --> 00:14:11.399 devastatingly intense, and it wasn't just jet fuel buding. No, 300 00:14:11.759 --> 00:14:15.039 the inferno was significantly fueled by over four hundred liters 301 00:14:15.080 --> 00:14:18.159 of high proof duty free alcohol stored in the passenger 302 00:14:18.200 --> 00:14:18.840 overhead bins. 303 00:14:18.840 --> 00:14:20.799 Wait, the alcohol mixed with something else, didn't it? 304 00:14:20.960 --> 00:14:24.919 Yeah? Did? The severe impact caused the plane's emergency oxygen 305 00:14:24.960 --> 00:14:28.840 masks to deploy. Now, these masks don't use oxygen tanks. 306 00:14:29.000 --> 00:14:32.399 They use chemical oxygen generators hidden in the ceiling, which 307 00:14:32.440 --> 00:14:35.759 burn incredibly hot to produce oxygen gas. So you had 308 00:14:36.000 --> 00:14:40.320 hundreds of liters of highly flammable alcohol dripping down onto 309 00:14:40.440 --> 00:14:43.360 superheated chemical oxygen generators. 310 00:14:43.000 --> 00:14:46.519 Pumping pure oxygen right into the fire. Exactly, alcohol and 311 00:14:46.519 --> 00:14:49.320 pure oxygen in the ceiling of a crashing plane, a 312 00:14:49.360 --> 00:14:52.919 total preventable inferno that forced a massive overhaul in how 313 00:14:53.000 --> 00:14:56.480 airlines manage hazardous materials and emergency systems. 314 00:14:56.080 --> 00:14:56.679 In the cabin. 315 00:14:56.879 --> 00:14:57.360 Definitely. 316 00:14:58.039 --> 00:15:01.039 The Korean aircraft showed us how vulnerable pilots are when 317 00:15:01.080 --> 00:15:04.120 systemic safety nets are stripped away. But there is a 318 00:15:04.159 --> 00:15:07.440 scenario that is even more terrifying when the aircraft's own 319 00:15:07.559 --> 00:15:11.200 systems actively lie to the crew, completely masking a fatal 320 00:15:11.320 --> 00:15:12.519 error until it's too late. 321 00:15:12.679 --> 00:15:16.080 Yeah. This is the haunting story of Helios Airways flight 322 00:15:16.159 --> 00:15:19.399 five twenty two in August two thousand and five. It's 323 00:15:19.399 --> 00:15:21.639 known in aviation history as the ghost plane. 324 00:15:21.919 --> 00:15:25.279 Let's picture this high above the Mediterranean, Greek F sixteen 325 00:15:25.320 --> 00:15:28.279 fighter jets are scrambled to intercept a silent Boeing seven 326 00:15:28.360 --> 00:15:31.919 thirty seven circling over Athens. The fighter pilots fly right 327 00:15:32.000 --> 00:15:34.440 up to the window of the commercial jet, look into 328 00:15:34.480 --> 00:15:37.679 the cockpit and see the copilots slumped over the controls. 329 00:15:38.320 --> 00:15:42.279 The captain's chair is completely empty, oxygen masks are dangling 330 00:15:42.279 --> 00:15:46.200 in the passenger cabin, but everyone is motionless, and then 331 00:15:46.480 --> 00:15:49.480 they see one loan figure moving around in the flight deck. 332 00:15:49.879 --> 00:15:52.519 It's one of the most chilling images in modern aviation, 333 00:15:53.320 --> 00:15:56.279 and the root cause traces back to a routine maintenance 334 00:15:56.360 --> 00:15:59.440 check earlier that morning. On the ground, an engineer had 335 00:15:59.480 --> 00:16:03.039 switched the P five pressurization panel to manual to test 336 00:16:03.120 --> 00:16:04.360 the door seals for leaks. 337 00:16:04.480 --> 00:16:06.600 Okay, standard test, standard. 338 00:16:06.120 --> 00:16:08.639 Test, but when he finished, he simply forgot to flip 339 00:16:08.679 --> 00:16:09.639 the switch back to oddo. 340 00:16:09.759 --> 00:16:13.279 A single switch left in the wrong position, so as 341 00:16:13.279 --> 00:16:15.840 the plane takes off and climbs into the thin atmosphere, 342 00:16:16.120 --> 00:16:19.440 the cabin fails to pressurize. But surely there is a 343 00:16:19.480 --> 00:16:20.399 warning system for that. 344 00:16:20.840 --> 00:16:23.720 There is, but it's a terrible piece of user interface design. 345 00:16:24.080 --> 00:16:26.960 As the plane climbs past ten thousand feet, a loud 346 00:16:27.000 --> 00:16:30.480 warning horn sounds in the cockpit. However, Boeing engineers use 347 00:16:30.519 --> 00:16:33.120 the exact same audio horn for the cabin altitude warning 348 00:16:33.279 --> 00:16:35.360 as they did for the takeoff configuration warning. 349 00:16:35.519 --> 00:16:38.919 Wait, the takeoff configuration warning. That's an alarm that tells 350 00:16:38.919 --> 00:16:43.120 pilots the planes flaps and trims aren't set properly for takeoff. Right, yes, 351 00:16:43.279 --> 00:16:45.559 which means it normally only happens when the plane is 352 00:16:45.559 --> 00:16:46.080 on the ground. 353 00:16:46.200 --> 00:16:49.039 Precisely the problem. The crew is climbing through ten thousand 354 00:16:49.080 --> 00:16:52.399 feet and they hear an alarm that their brains strictly 355 00:16:52.440 --> 00:16:57.120 associate with being on the runway. It causes massive cognitive. 356 00:16:56.559 --> 00:16:59.039 Dissonance because it makes no sense exactly. 357 00:16:59.360 --> 00:17:02.120 They start try shooting the wrong problem, trying to figure 358 00:17:02.159 --> 00:17:05.680 out why a ground based alarm is sounding in the air, 359 00:17:06.200 --> 00:17:08.880 completely ignoring the fact that the air around them is 360 00:17:08.920 --> 00:17:10.079 getting dangerously thin. 361 00:17:10.519 --> 00:17:14.000 The passenger oxygen masks automatically drop from the ceiling. But 362 00:17:14.359 --> 00:17:17.759 and here is a purifying fact for you, those masks 363 00:17:17.920 --> 00:17:20.359 only provide about twelve minutes of chemical oxygen. 364 00:17:20.440 --> 00:17:21.400 Right. It's very limited. 365 00:17:21.559 --> 00:17:24.880 It's not designed to sustain a flight. It's just enough 366 00:17:24.880 --> 00:17:28.279 time for a conscious pilot to execute a rapid descent 367 00:17:28.359 --> 00:17:33.079 to a breathable altitude, but the pilots didn't descend. I 368 00:17:33.119 --> 00:17:35.920 have to push back hard here because it defies common sense. 369 00:17:36.559 --> 00:17:39.319 How do highly trained pilots just ignore the fact that 370 00:17:39.359 --> 00:17:43.680 they're running out of oxygen? Shouldn't they literally feel themselves suffocating, 371 00:17:43.759 --> 00:17:45.359 like gasping for breath. 372 00:17:45.440 --> 00:17:49.799 That is the most insidious, dangerous part of this entire event. Hypoxia, 373 00:17:49.799 --> 00:17:53.519 which is oxygen starvation at high altitude, doesn't feel like suffocating. 374 00:17:53.599 --> 00:17:53.880 Really. 375 00:17:54.039 --> 00:17:55.960 It isn't like holding your breath underwater where your lungs 376 00:17:55.960 --> 00:17:58.880 burn and panic sets in. Because you are still breathing 377 00:17:58.920 --> 00:18:02.640 in air, just air with very low oxygen molecules. Your 378 00:18:02.680 --> 00:18:04.519 body doesn't trigger the panic response. 379 00:18:04.599 --> 00:18:05.599 So what does it feel like. 380 00:18:05.759 --> 00:18:07.720 It feels like having three or four strong drinks on 381 00:18:07.720 --> 00:18:11.720 an empty stomach. Wow, it's a subtle giddy euphoria. Your 382 00:18:11.720 --> 00:18:15.200 peripheral vision slowly fades, You lose the ability to think 383 00:18:15.240 --> 00:18:18.880 coherently or perform basic tasks, but you feel completely fine 384 00:18:18.880 --> 00:18:21.000 and relaxed right up until you simply fall asleep and 385 00:18:21.000 --> 00:18:22.839 slip into an irreversible coma. 386 00:18:22.599 --> 00:18:23.720 That is terrifying. 387 00:18:24.039 --> 00:18:27.359 The pilot's lost consciousness while trying to fix a phantom problem, 388 00:18:27.480 --> 00:18:29.000 feeling no pain at all. 389 00:18:28.839 --> 00:18:32.200 So the pilots pass out and the plane's computer dutifully 390 00:18:32.200 --> 00:18:36.640 flies itself on autopilot towards appens full of unconscious passengers 391 00:18:37.119 --> 00:18:39.960 except for that one lone figure the F sixteen pilot 392 00:18:39.960 --> 00:18:40.839 saw moving around. 393 00:18:41.119 --> 00:18:43.160 Yeah, that was a twenty five year old flight attendant 394 00:18:43.240 --> 00:18:46.599 named Andreas Prodromo. He wasn't just a flight attendant. He 395 00:18:46.680 --> 00:18:50.559 was a former scuba diver and a Cypriot Special Forces. 396 00:18:50.200 --> 00:18:53.240 Soldier, and because of his intense physical conditioning and die 397 00:18:53.279 --> 00:18:56.920 of training, he managed to recognize the symptoms of hypoxia 398 00:18:57.240 --> 00:18:59.880 and stay conscious just a bit longer than everyone. 399 00:19:00.359 --> 00:19:03.839 Yes, he grabbed the portable heavy duty oxygen bottles meant 400 00:19:03.880 --> 00:19:04.680 for the cabin crew. 401 00:19:05.000 --> 00:19:08.960