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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's unpack this. You ever feel like you're just

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<v Speaker 1>waiting through endless cybersecurity warnings, Oh yeah, data breaches here,

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<v Speaker 1>some new kind of attack there, and you're left wondering

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<v Speaker 1>what it all really means.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, totally, it's overwhelming.

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<v Speaker 1>Maybe you're trying to wrap your head around for work,

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<v Speaker 1>or maybe you just want to feel a little less

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<v Speaker 1>in the dark about the digital world we live in. Huh, well,

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<v Speaker 1>that's exactly what we're diving into today.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely. Think of this as your shortcut to understanding the

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<v Speaker 2>core of how we tackle cyber incidents without getting lost

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<v Speaker 2>in all the technical weeds.

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<v Speaker 1>And today that core understanding comes from the world of

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<v Speaker 1>digital forensics and incident.

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<v Speaker 2>Response, right DFR.

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<v Speaker 1>Now, your first thought might be that sounds like something

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<v Speaker 1>for the tech giants, not me, but think of it

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<v Speaker 1>this way. Understanding these principles is like understanding basic first date.

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<v Speaker 2>That's great analogy.

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<v Speaker 1>It might not be a doctor, but knowing what to

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<v Speaker 1>do in an emergency can be crucial for anyone navigating

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<v Speaker 1>our digital lives.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a key point. I mean, while a major corporation

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<v Speaker 2>faces threats on a different scale than say, an individual,

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<v Speaker 2>the fundamental approach understanding what happened and how to respond.

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<v Speaker 2>It has common.

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<v Speaker 1>Threads, absolutely, and to help us navigate this fascinating but yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>sometimes complex area, we've got a real treasure trove of information,

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<v Speaker 1>most notably the book Digital Forensics and Incident Response, third.

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<v Speaker 2>Edition, Solid resource.

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<v Speaker 1>This isn't some surface level guide. It's a deep dive itself,

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<v Speaker 1>covering everything from the nitty gritty of computer memory analysis

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<v Speaker 1>to the strategic use of threat intelligence.

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<v Speaker 2>It's definitely comprehensive. Our goal here is to pull out

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<v Speaker 2>the most vital and frankly thought provoking aspects, giving you

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<v Speaker 2>a clear pathway to being well informed without feeling overloaded

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<v Speaker 2>by technical details.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, aiming for that practical aha moment where things really

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<v Speaker 1>click exactly. So, when something does go wrong in the

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<v Speaker 1>digital realm, where do the experts even begin to sort

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<v Speaker 1>it out?

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, let's start with the thirty thousand foot view. Digital

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<v Speaker 2>Forensics and Incident Response often shortened to DFIR. That's the

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<v Speaker 2>overarching process organizations used to manage and resolve cybertax.

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<v Speaker 1>DFIR the whole life cycle.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, the entire life cycle of dealing with a digital

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<v Speaker 2>security event.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, DFIR, the whole playbook for digital emergencies. What's like

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<v Speaker 1>one of the first pages in that playbook.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, a foundational element is the incident response or IR plan.

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<v Speaker 2>The IR plan this is basically a documented roadmap. It

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<v Speaker 2>outlines how an organization will prepare for, detect, contain, and

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<v Speaker 2>recover from security incidents. A robust IR plan has several

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<v Speaker 2>essential parts.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, lay them on us. What should a good IR

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<v Speaker 1>plan include?

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<v Speaker 2>Right? First and foremost preparation through training the team responsible

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<v Speaker 2>for handling incidents, the Computer Security Incident Response Team or CSRT.

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<v Speaker 2>They need to practice.

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<v Speaker 1>Practice makes perfect, even in cyber.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, think of it like a sports team running drills.

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<v Speaker 2>The book really highlights the value of tabletop exercises.

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<v Speaker 1>Tabletop exercise like playing a game sort of.

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<v Speaker 2>There's simulated incident scenarios that the entire CSART should walk

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<v Speaker 2>through regularly, ideally annually. These exercises often reveal unexpected communication

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<v Speaker 2>breakdowns or maybe unclear roles.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah, so it's not just technical stuff, it's the human

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<v Speaker 1>element too.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, definitely surprisingly effective. Communication under pressure is often a

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<v Speaker 2>major stumbling block. Then there's maintenance. The digital landscape is

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<v Speaker 2>constantly shifting, new technologies, evolving threats, personnel changes, you name it.

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<v Speaker 2>The IR plan.

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<v Speaker 1>Needs to keep up, so it can't just sit on

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<v Speaker 1>a shelf.

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<v Speaker 2>No way. The book recommends at least an annual review

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<v Speaker 2>to ensure the plan remains relevant and effective, and lessons

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<v Speaker 2>learned from exercises or you know, real incidents should be

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<v Speaker 2>incorporated to make it a stronger document.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, constantly updating based on experience makes sense exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And then we have playbooks. These are like specific step

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<v Speaker 2>by step guides for handling common types of incidents. Think

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<v Speaker 2>of it like having a checklist for different medical emergencies.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>The book mentions playbooks for things like phishing attacks, malware infections,

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<v Speaker 2>ransomware a big one, vulnerabilities and public systems and business

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<v Speaker 2>email compromise or be EC.

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<v Speaker 1>Ransomware gets its own playbook.

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<v Speaker 2>It emphasizes the critical nature of ransomware and suggests a

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<v Speaker 2>dedicated playbook for it. Yeah, just because of its potentially

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<v Speaker 2>devastating impact.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay. Playbooks the practical how to guides for when specific

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<v Speaker 1>digital alarms go.

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<v Speaker 2>Off precisely and within the IR plan. Clear escalation procedures

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<v Speaker 2>are vital.

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<v Speaker 1>Escalation, Who calls who? Basically?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, pretty much? These define who needs to be notified

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<v Speaker 2>and involved as an incident unfold from initial detection all

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<v Speaker 2>the way to full blown crisis management. This helps prevent

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<v Speaker 2>what the book calls see a shirt burnout burnout.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I can see that.

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<v Speaker 2>Being a risk definitely. It ensures that the specialized skills

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<v Speaker 2>of the team are deployed appropriately and important only when

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<v Speaker 2>truly needed. It's like a tiered alert system.

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<v Speaker 1>So when the ceesart does get engaged, what's the initial approach?

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<v Speaker 1>How do they jump in?

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<v Speaker 2>The book makes it pretty compelling comparison here, think of

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<v Speaker 2>engaging a se sert like calling the fire department. You

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<v Speaker 2>contact them, provide essential details, what's happening where, what's the

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<v Speaker 2>potential impact? That info allows them to dispatch the right resources. Similarly,

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<v Speaker 2>engaging a se sert follows a defined escalation path, making

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<v Speaker 2>sure the right expertise is brought to bear.

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<v Speaker 1>Like flagging a suspicious email that then gets escalated to

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<v Speaker 1>a specialist for like a deeper.

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<v Speaker 2>Look exactly, and once the seizert is on the scene,

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<v Speaker 2>a primary objective in those early stages is to understand

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<v Speaker 2>the scope of the incident.

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<v Speaker 1>How bad is it, how far is it spread?

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<v Speaker 2>Right Initially it might not be clear how far the

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<v Speaker 2>compromise is spread. The CS conducts a systematic investigation to

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<v Speaker 2>determine which systems data processes have been affected. They're essentially

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<v Speaker 2>trying to map the boundaries of the digital fire.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're like digital fire responders trying to contain the

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<v Speaker 1>damage and figure out how big the problem.

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<v Speaker 2>Actually is precisely, and for organizations with a more mature

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<v Speaker 2>security posture, often those with a dedicated security operations center

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<v Speaker 2>or SoC, or maybe a fusion center, there are technologies

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<v Speaker 2>like Security Orchestration, Automation and Response or SR.

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<v Speaker 1>SIR sounds like it takes a lot of the manual

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<v Speaker 1>work out of incident response.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the goal. Yeah. Gartner defines SOR as technologies that

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<v Speaker 2>integrate incident response platforms, orchestration and automation of security tasks,

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<v Speaker 2>and threat intelligence management into one unified.

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<v Speaker 1>System, integrating everything right.

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<v Speaker 2>It helps organizations streamline their response processes, manage incidents more efficiently,

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<v Speaker 2>and even leverage automation to handle routine tasks that frees

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<v Speaker 2>up human analysts for the more complex issues.

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<v Speaker 1>And you can't just automate everything right point.

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<v Speaker 2>A common pitfall is automating too much too soon. That

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<v Speaker 2>can lead to inflexible playbooks that don't handle novel attacks effectively.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's about smart automation.

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<v Speaker 1>Smart automation, not yeah yeah exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>So our platform typically includes an incident response platform for

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<v Speaker 2>managing workflows and tracking investigations, a security orchestration and automation

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<v Speaker 2>engine for automating tasks like isolating infected computers, and a

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<v Speaker 2>threat intelligence platform for gathering and enriching information about threats.

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<v Speaker 1>Automation insecurity. That makes a lot of sense for dealing

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<v Speaker 1>with the sheer volume of alerts these days. Now, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>once you know you have an incident, a critical next

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<v Speaker 1>step must be containing it, stopping the bleeding.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely. Containment is about limiting the spread and impact of

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<v Speaker 2>the attack. Think of it as building a firewall metaphorically speaking,

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<v Speaker 2>around the affected areas you.

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<v Speaker 1>Want to stop the digital infection from spreading further.

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<v Speaker 2>The book discusses both physical and logical containment. Physical containment

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<v Speaker 2>might involve actually physically disconnecting an infected machine from the network,

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<v Speaker 2>unplugging the network cable or turning off Wi Fi one

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<v Speaker 2>that plug. Yeah, but in large organizations, quickly locating and

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<v Speaker 2>isolating multiple affected systems can be a huge logistical challenge.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, imagine trying to find one compromised laptop in

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<v Speaker 1>a massive office.

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<v Speaker 2>Building precisely so, then you have logical containment. This involves

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<v Speaker 2>using software configurations to isolate systems or network segments, for example,

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<v Speaker 2>implementing new firewall rules or using network segmentation.

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<v Speaker 1>Using software barriers.

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<v Speaker 2>Right. This is often more scalable, but it does require

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<v Speaker 2>a well designed network architecture in the first place.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's often a combination of physically cutting off connections

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<v Speaker 1>and using software to create those digital barriers.

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<v Speaker 2>Correct and after the immediate crisis has been addressed, there's

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<v Speaker 2>a vital step for learning and improvement called the after

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<v Speaker 2>action review or AAR.

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<v Speaker 1>The AAR, what's that involved?

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<v Speaker 2>It's a structured process of looking back at the incident,

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<v Speaker 2>what went well, what could have been handled better, and crucially,

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<v Speaker 2>what changes need to be made to ce sart policies

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<v Speaker 2>and procedures. The goal is continuous.

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<v Speaker 1>Improvement, turning every incident into a learning.

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<v Speaker 2>Opportunity, exactly making your security stronger over time, like a

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<v Speaker 2>feedback loop.

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<v Speaker 1>Got it? Okay? Now shifting focus slightly to the digital

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<v Speaker 1>forensic side of dfire. You mentioned a principle.

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<v Speaker 2>Ah, yes, there's a fundamental principle that underpins a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of the work. Low cards exchange principle.

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<v Speaker 1>Low cards exchange principle. Okay, sounds like something from a

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<v Speaker 1>detective novel, It.

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<v Speaker 2>Kind of is. It's a cornerstone of forensic science, stating

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<v Speaker 2>that every contact leaves a trace.

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<v Speaker 1>Every contact leaves a trace.

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<v Speaker 2>In the digital world. This means that attackers, even if

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<v Speaker 2>they try to be stealthy and cover their tracks, will

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<v Speaker 2>inevitably leave digital footprints. The challenge and the skill of

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<v Speaker 2>digital forensics lies in having the right tools and expertise

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<v Speaker 2>to uncover these traces and connect them back to the

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<v Speaker 2>malicious activity.

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<v Speaker 1>So even deleting files or wiping a hard drive doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>necessarily mean all evidence is gone for good not always no.

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<v Speaker 2>Skilled forensic analysts can often rec covered deleted data or

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<v Speaker 2>find remnants of malicious activity that might not be immediately obvious.

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<v Speaker 2>It takes work, but it's often possible.

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<v Speaker 1>Interesting and speaking of things that might not be obvious,

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<v Speaker 1>you mentioned incident response has legal implications.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, absolutely significant one.

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<v Speaker 1>John, Just dealing with the technical side, definitely.

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<v Speaker 2>These can range from mandatory breach notification requirements, which depend

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<v Speaker 2>heavily on the type and volume of data compromised and

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<v Speaker 2>the jurisdiction right.

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<v Speaker 1>Those laws seem to change all the time.

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<v Speaker 2>They do, and then there are various privacy regulations, plus

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<v Speaker 2>the rules of evidence if legal action is pursued. The

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<v Speaker 2>book even mentions the Economic Espionage Act of nineteen ninety six,

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<v Speaker 2>which criminalizes the theft of trade secrets.

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<v Speaker 1>So how you handle a cyber incident and the evidence

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<v Speaker 1>you collect can have really serious legal consequences down the line.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely, evidence collection and preservation must adhere to establish legal

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<v Speaker 2>standards to be admissible in court. This involves maintaining a

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<v Speaker 2>queer chain of custody.

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<v Speaker 1>Chain of custody, proving who had the evidence.

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<v Speaker 2>When exactly, ensuring the integrity of the data through techniques

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<v Speaker 2>like hashing, and using forensically sound methods for acquisition. You

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<v Speaker 2>can't just copy paste files.

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<v Speaker 1>This is clearly a lot more involved than just, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>running an anti virus scan and calling it a day.

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<v Speaker 2>It certainly is. And just for a bit of historical context,

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<v Speaker 2>the field of digital forensics really began to take shape

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<v Speaker 2>within law enforcement back in the mid nineteen eighties as

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<v Speaker 2>computers became more integral to criminal activity. The eighties, Wow, yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>agencies like the FBI established specialized units such as the

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<v Speaker 2>Computer Analysis and Response Team or.

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<v Speaker 1>CART the FBI CART, so they were early pioneers in

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<v Speaker 1>this field.

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<v Speaker 2>Indeed, and the book highlights a really pivotal early case,

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<v Speaker 2>the intrusion into the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory by a

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<v Speaker 2>hacker named Marcus Hess. Okay, this activity might have gone

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<v Speaker 2>unnoticed were it not for the work of Clifford's Stole.

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<v Speaker 2>He devised this clever method to track the intruder his efforts,

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<v Speaker 2>which he read about in his book The Cuckoo's Egg.

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<v Speaker 1>The Cuckoo's Egg, I've heard of it, Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a classic. It not only led to the hacker's

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<v Speaker 2>prosecution for espionage, but also really underscored the critical importance

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<v Speaker 2>of digital forensics expertise in our connected world even back then.

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<v Speaker 1>That sounds like a fascinating story and still relevant today.

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<v Speaker 1>It's amazing to see how much the feel has evolved

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<v Speaker 1>since Stoles times.

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<v Speaker 2>And it has evolved dramatically. Today we have highly specialized

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<v Speaker 2>tools and methodologies for acquiring and analyzing digital evidence from

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<v Speaker 2>a huge multitude of sources. Speaking of which, let's maybe

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<v Speaker 2>delve into some of those key areas of evidence. A

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<v Speaker 2>fundamental concept in digital forensics is the distinction between volatile

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<v Speaker 2>and non volatile data.

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<v Speaker 1>Volatile versus non volatile. Break that down for.

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<v Speaker 2>Us, sure, volatile data is temporary information. It exists only

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<v Speaker 2>while a system is powered on, and it's lost when

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<v Speaker 2>the power is turned off. Think of the data held

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<v Speaker 2>in a computer's random access memory or RAM.

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff in RAM, got it.

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<v Speaker 2>Non Vogal data, on the other hand, is persistent. It

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<v Speaker 2>remains stored even when the system is powered down, So

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<v Speaker 2>like the data on a hard drive or a solid

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<v Speaker 2>state drive SSD.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay. So if you're responding to a live incident, capturing

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<v Speaker 1>that volatile memory the RAM quickly is crucial because it

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<v Speaker 1>might contain fleeting evidence that just disappears the moment the

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<v Speaker 1>machine is shut down or rebooted exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>That's often priority number one. Now, let's talk about specific

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<v Speaker 2>types of digital evidence, maybe starting with network evidence.

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<v Speaker 1>Network evidence, ok.

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<v Speaker 2>Our book emphasizes that network traffic can provide a wealth

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<v Speaker 2>of information for reconstructing a security incident.

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<v Speaker 1>Network traffic that sounds like an overwhelming amount of data.

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<v Speaker 1>Where do you even begin to look?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it can be. Key starting points usually include firewall and.

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<v Speaker 1>Proxy logs firewall and proxy logs.

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<v Speaker 2>These logs can provide valuable insights into the initial stages

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<v Speaker 2>of an attack, showing which internal systems communicated with external

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<v Speaker 2>potentially malicious websites or IP addresses. They can also help

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<v Speaker 2>identify command and control or C two traffic.

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<v Speaker 1>C two that's a communication back to the attacker, right.

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<v Speaker 2>The communication channel between an infected system and the attacker's infrastructure.

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<v Speaker 2>Think of firewall and proxy logs as kind of the

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<v Speaker 2>digital equivalent of border patrol logs.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so they give you a picture of what's coming

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<v Speaker 1>in and going out of your network perimeter precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>Then there's NetFlow NetFlow. While firewall and proxy logs primarily

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<v Speaker 2>focus on traffic crossing the network perimeter, NetFlow provides visibility

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<v Speaker 2>into internal network traffic what the book calls east west.

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<v Speaker 1>Traffic east west, so communication within the.

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<v Speaker 2>Network exactly, Yeah, showing how systems inside the network are

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<v Speaker 2>communicating with each other. This can be invaluable for detecting

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<v Speaker 2>lateral movement.

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<v Speaker 1>Lateral movement like an attacker who got in one place

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<v Speaker 1>and is now trying to spread sideways to other machines inside.

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<v Speaker 2>That's it exactly. NetFlow helps you track those internal maneuvers,

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<v Speaker 2>and for a much much deeper level of analysis, there's

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<v Speaker 2>packet capture.

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<v Speaker 1>Packet capture grabbing the actual data.

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<v Speaker 2>Tools like TCP dump on Linux and raw cap or

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<v Speaker 2>wind pee cap on Windows allow you to capture the

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<v Speaker 2>actual data packets being transmitted cross the network.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow.

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<v Speaker 2>You can even apply filters to these captures to focus

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<v Speaker 2>on specific types of traffic, like communication within known malicious

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<v Speaker 2>IP address or specific protocols, so you're not just drowning

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<v Speaker 2>in data.

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<v Speaker 1>Capturing the raw network data that's like recording every single

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<v Speaker 1>digital conversation happening on your network must be huge files.

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<v Speaker 2>They can be enormous, yes, and analyzing these massive amounts

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<v Speaker 2>of data requires specialized tools. Wire Shark is a very

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<v Speaker 2>widely used GUI based tool for both capturing and analyzing

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<v Speaker 2>network traffic in detail.

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<v Speaker 1>Wire Shark, Yeah, I heard of that one.

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<v Speaker 2>It allows you to inspect individual packets, follow the flow

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<v Speaker 2>of communication between systems, filter based on a huge range

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<v Speaker 2>of criteria. The book highlights its use for both live

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<v Speaker 2>capture and in depth post capture analysis, so you can.

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<v Speaker 1>Watch traffic live or dig through recordings later.

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<v Speaker 2>Right. For example, you can filter to see only HTTP

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<v Speaker 2>traffic and then examine the specific web pages or urs

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<v Speaker 2>that were accessed.

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<v Speaker 1>Wire Shark sounds incredibly powerful, like a microscope for network data.

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<v Speaker 2>It really is, and for analyzing very large packet captures offline,

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<v Speaker 2>there are tools like arkhim arkim Yeah. The book shows

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<v Speaker 2>how you can load a captured file into arkham and

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<v Speaker 2>then efficiently examine things like HDVP sessions and the specific

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<v Speaker 2>web addresses that were visited. Wire Shark also has handy

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<v Speaker 2>features like display filters to zero in on relevant traffic

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<v Speaker 2>and coloring rules to visually highlight different types of packets,

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<v Speaker 2>which makes the analysis process a bit more manageable.

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<v Speaker 1>S galuring rules that sounds helpful for spotting patterns it

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<v Speaker 1>can be, and.

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<v Speaker 2>For detecting more subtle malicious activity, like an infected system

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<v Speaker 2>periodically beaconing back to a command and control server by

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<v Speaker 2>quiet check In beconing right, the book introduces Rata. Rita

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<v Speaker 2>uses behavioral analysis to identify these recurring patterns in network

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<v Speaker 2>traffic that might otherwise get lost in the noise. Beconing

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<v Speaker 2>like that regular quiet signal that an infected machine is

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<v Speaker 2>still under the attacker's control. ARIDA helps you pick up

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<v Speaker 2>on those faint signals.

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<v Speaker 1>Very cool that's right. Okay. So now let's shift our

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<v Speaker 1>focus from the network to individual computers and discuss host

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<v Speaker 1>based evidence.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, evidence on the actual machines.

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<v Speaker 1>As we touched on earlier, a critical first step in

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<v Speaker 1>many investigations is acquiring the volatile memory, grabbing.

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<v Speaker 2>That ram before the power goes off. What are the

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<v Speaker 2>go to tools for that? You mentioned volatile data earlier, right.

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<v Speaker 1>The book mentions win p mem as a tool specifically

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<v Speaker 1>designed for acquiring a memory image from Windows systems. It

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<v Speaker 1>creates a raw bit for big copy of the system's

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<v Speaker 1>physical memory.

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<v Speaker 2>The snapshot of the live memory.

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<v Speaker 1>Exactly, which can then be analyzed offline using specialized memory

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<v Speaker 1>forensics tools like volatility, which is another powerful tool.

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<v Speaker 2>So you take that memory snapshot and analyze it later

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<v Speaker 2>for clues that might not be present on the hard

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<v Speaker 2>drive at all.

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<v Speaker 1>Correct things like running processes, network connections, passwords potentially gotcha.

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<v Speaker 1>What about acquiring the persistent data, the stuff stored on

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<v Speaker 1>the computer's storage devices, the hard drives or SSDs.

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<v Speaker 2>For acquiring non volatile evidence, there are tools like silar

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<v Speaker 2>SLR is designed to efficiently collect log files and other

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<v Speaker 2>protected files from a system.

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<v Speaker 1>SILR for logs and protected stuff.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and another powerful tool is KPE. That's the Kinetic

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<v Speaker 2>Artifact Parser and Extractor. KP allows for highly targeted collection

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<v Speaker 2>of specific types of evidence based on predefined configurations or targets.

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<v Speaker 2>This is much more efficient than just grabbing absolutely everything.

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<v Speaker 1>Targeted collection focusing on the most likely sources of evidence.

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<v Speaker 1>That saves a lot of time and I guess storage

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<v Speaker 1>space too.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. Then there's the crucial concept of forensic imaging.

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<v Speaker 1>Imaging making a copy of the drive.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, creating a complete bit for bit copy of a

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<v Speaker 2>storage device. The book distinguishes between physical images, which capture

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<v Speaker 2>the entire drive, including unallocated space where deleted files might linger,

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<v Speaker 2>and logical images, which capture only specific partitions or files.

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<v Speaker 1>Physical versus logical, which is better.

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<v Speaker 2>Well for traditional hard disk drives HDDs, physical images are

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<v Speaker 2>generally preferred because they preserve everything, potentially allowing for the

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<v Speaker 2>recovery of deleted data. Okay, However, the book points out

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<v Speaker 2>that solid state drives SSDs present unique challenges. Why is

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<v Speaker 2>that because of a process called trim. Trim is designed

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<v Speaker 2>to improve SSD performance, but it can securely erase deleted

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<v Speaker 2>data pretty quickly, making recovery much more difficult, sometimes impossible.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah So SSDs can make the job of recovering deleted

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<v Speaker 1>files way more challenging for forensic investigators.

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<v Speaker 2>That's often the case. Yeah. For creating these forensic images,

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<v Speaker 2>tools like FTK emitter are widely used. FTK imager it

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<v Speaker 2>can create forensically sound images, meaning it calculates cryptographic hashes

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<v Speaker 2>like digital fingerprints of the original drive and the image

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<v Speaker 2>file to ensure the integrity of the copy, proof that

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<v Speaker 2>it hasn't been tampered with.

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<v Speaker 1>Hashes right verifying the copy is exact, and.

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<v Speaker 2>The book also emphasizes the critical importance of using right blockers.

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<v Speaker 1>Right blockers these.

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<v Speaker 2>Are hardware or sometimes software tools that prevent any accidental

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<v Speaker 2>modific case of the original evidence drive during the imaging process.

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<v Speaker 2>They ensure you don't accidentally change the evidence you're collecting.

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<v Speaker 1>Right blockers absolutely essential for preserving the integrity of the

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<v Speaker 1>evidence and making sure it's admissible in court. Makes sense.

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<v Speaker 1>What if you can't take a system offline to create

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<v Speaker 1>an image like a critical server?

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00:20:21.279 --> 00:20:25.559
<v Speaker 2>Good question. In some critical high availability environments, shutting down

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00:20:25.559 --> 00:20:28.839
<v Speaker 2>a system just isn't an option in those scenarios. For

404
00:20:28.920 --> 00:20:32.079
<v Speaker 2>virtual machines, you might create a VMware snapshot.

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<v Speaker 1>A snapshot, yeah, like freezing it in time exactly.

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00:20:35.599 --> 00:20:38.480
<v Speaker 2>This captures the exact state of the virtual machine at

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<v Speaker 2>a specific point in time, including its memory and disk.

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<v Speaker 2>This allows for analysis of the live system state without

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<v Speaker 2>directly altering the original underlying data.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>The book also briefly mentions using bootable USB devices containing

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<v Speaker 2>Linux based forensic distributions for imaging physical Linux systems, again

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<v Speaker 2>trying to minimize impact on the original system.

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<v Speaker 1>So different environments and can straints call for different evidence

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00:21:02.000 --> 00:21:07.720
<v Speaker 1>acquisition techniques. Very adaptable. Now, once you have that forensic image,

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<v Speaker 1>that big copy of the drive, how do you actually

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<v Speaker 1>go about analyzing all that store data?

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<v Speaker 2>Right? This is where forensic analysis platforms come into play.

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<v Speaker 2>The book introduces Autopsy, which is a very popular open

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<v Speaker 2>source forensic platform built on top of another tool set

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<v Speaker 2>called the sleuth kit.

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<v Speaker 1>Autopsy Oh open source, that's good.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. It provides a user friendly graphical interface for examining

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<v Speaker 2>disk images and offers a wide array of powerful.

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<v Speaker 1>Features like what cut of features.

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00:21:33.599 --> 00:21:39.519
<v Speaker 2>Things like timeline analysis, which displays events, file modifications, program executions,

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00:21:39.720 --> 00:21:43.799
<v Speaker 2>web visits in chronological order to help reconstruct the sequence

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00:21:43.799 --> 00:21:44.400
<v Speaker 2>of activity.

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<v Speaker 1>Timeline super useful for figuring out what happened when.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely also keyword searching to quickly find specific terms or freezes,

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00:21:52.480 --> 00:21:55.720
<v Speaker 2>and the ability to automatically parse and analyze web artifacts

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<v Speaker 2>like browser history, cookies, download history, all that juicy stuf

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<v Speaker 2>web artifacts.

434
00:22:01.319 --> 00:22:04.039
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that tells a story. The book even illustrates how

435
00:22:04.039 --> 00:22:06.279
<v Speaker 1>to start a new case in autopsy and add evidence

436
00:22:06.319 --> 00:22:07.000
<v Speaker 1>sources to it.

437
00:22:07.119 --> 00:22:09.240
<v Speaker 2>Exactly. It walks you through the basics. You can drill

438
00:22:09.319 --> 00:22:12.720
<v Speaker 2>down into the filesystem, examine metadata associated with files like

439
00:22:12.759 --> 00:22:17.400
<v Speaker 2>creation times, modification times, identify installed software, and see a

440
00:22:17.440 --> 00:22:20.759
<v Speaker 2>list of recently accessed documents which can provide valuable clues

441
00:22:20.759 --> 00:22:21.839
<v Speaker 2>about user activity.

442
00:22:22.319 --> 00:22:26.160
<v Speaker 1>Autopsy sounds like a central workbench for digital forensic investigations.

443
00:22:26.480 --> 00:22:29.599
<v Speaker 1>What about getting even deeper into the filesystem details For a.

444
00:22:29.599 --> 00:22:33.200
<v Speaker 2>Deeper understanding of filesystem activity. On Windows systems, there's the

445
00:22:33.359 --> 00:22:38.119
<v Speaker 2>Master Filetable or MFT MFT Master Filetable. It's essentially the

446
00:22:38.160 --> 00:22:43.839
<v Speaker 2>index of the entire NTFS filesystem. Tools like MFTSCMD can

447
00:22:43.920 --> 00:22:48.119
<v Speaker 2>parse the MFT, allowing investigators to track file creation, modification,

448
00:22:48.319 --> 00:22:51.480
<v Speaker 2>access and deletion times, providing a really detailed history of

449
00:22:51.480 --> 00:22:52.720
<v Speaker 2>filesystem interactions.

450
00:22:52.799 --> 00:22:55.519
<v Speaker 1>The MFT, like a detailed ledger of all file related

451
00:22:55.559 --> 00:22:59.200
<v Speaker 1>actions on a Windows system, even deleted one sometimes precisely.

452
00:22:59.440 --> 00:23:03.279
<v Speaker 2>Remnants often remain, And even if an executable file itself

453
00:23:03.279 --> 00:23:05.759
<v Speaker 2>has been deleted, you might still find traces of its

454
00:23:05.799 --> 00:23:09.720
<v Speaker 2>execution through prefetch files. In Windows prefisch files, what are those?

455
00:23:09.880 --> 00:23:13.319
<v Speaker 2>Windows creates them to speed up application loading. Tools like

456
00:23:13.400 --> 00:23:16.920
<v Speaker 2>pecmd can analyze these prefetch files to determine if a

457
00:23:16.920 --> 00:23:19.599
<v Speaker 2>program has been run, when it was last run, and

458
00:23:19.680 --> 00:23:22.000
<v Speaker 2>how many times, even if the program's gone.

459
00:23:22.039 --> 00:23:25.680
<v Speaker 1>Wow, prefetch files a historical record of executed programs, even

460
00:23:25.680 --> 00:23:27.160
<v Speaker 1>if they've been subsequently deleted.

461
00:23:27.680 --> 00:23:31.359
<v Speaker 2>That's sneaky evidence. What at the Windows registry, It seems

462
00:23:31.359 --> 00:23:34.640
<v Speaker 2>like that holds a vast amount of system configuration information.

463
00:23:34.799 --> 00:23:37.599
<v Speaker 1>Oh, it absolutely does. It's a gold mine. Autopsy can

464
00:23:37.640 --> 00:23:40.680
<v Speaker 1>parse the registry, allowing you to examine various registry keys

465
00:23:40.680 --> 00:23:41.119
<v Speaker 1>and values.

466
00:23:41.160 --> 00:23:42.880
<v Speaker 2>What can you find in the registry.

467
00:23:42.519 --> 00:23:46.160
<v Speaker 1>Crucial information such as connected USB devices including their vendor

468
00:23:46.240 --> 00:23:48.880
<v Speaker 1>and product IDs vidps AH.

469
00:23:48.559 --> 00:23:50.519
<v Speaker 2>So you can see if a specific USB drive was

470
00:23:50.519 --> 00:23:51.559
<v Speaker 2>plugged in exactly.

471
00:23:51.799 --> 00:23:55.880
<v Speaker 1>Very helpful in tracking potential data expiltration or maybe the

472
00:23:55.920 --> 00:23:59.720
<v Speaker 1>introduction of malware via external media. You can also find network,

473
00:23:59.759 --> 00:24:04.240
<v Speaker 1>hit street, user account information, recently run programs, tons of stuff,

474
00:24:04.720 --> 00:24:05.680
<v Speaker 1>so much information.

475
00:24:05.960 --> 00:24:08.759
<v Speaker 2>The book notes that registry analysis is a deep and

476
00:24:08.839 --> 00:24:12.920
<v Speaker 2>specialized area, but even a basic analysis can often uncover

477
00:24:13.079 --> 00:24:14.720
<v Speaker 2>valuable investigative leads.

478
00:24:15.480 --> 00:24:18.720
<v Speaker 1>Okay, So from the network, to volatile memory to persistent

479
00:24:18.759 --> 00:24:22.240
<v Speaker 1>storage like hard drives and the registry, there are numerous

480
00:24:22.279 --> 00:24:25.960
<v Speaker 1>layers of potential evidence to examine. And then we have

481
00:24:26.279 --> 00:24:30.119
<v Speaker 1>the often overlooked but critical area of log files. Ah.

482
00:24:30.279 --> 00:24:33.519
<v Speaker 2>Yes, log files often the first place investigators turn to

483
00:24:33.559 --> 00:24:36.119
<v Speaker 2>understand what happened on a system or network.

484
00:24:36.200 --> 00:24:38.960
<v Speaker 1>But there are so many logs there are.

485
00:24:38.960 --> 00:24:41.440
<v Speaker 2>Which is why the book emphasizes the importance of a

486
00:24:41.480 --> 00:24:45.880
<v Speaker 2>well defined log management policy within an organization. The c

487
00:24:46.079 --> 00:24:49.279
<v Speaker 2>search should play a crucial role in specifying what types

488
00:24:49.319 --> 00:24:52.160
<v Speaker 2>of events should be logged and importantly, for how long

489
00:24:52.160 --> 00:24:53.119
<v Speaker 2>the log should be retained.

490
00:24:53.160 --> 00:24:55.079
<v Speaker 1>You need a plan for your logs, definitely.

491
00:24:55.480 --> 00:24:59.480
<v Speaker 2>NIST provides excellent guidance on establishing effective log management practices.

492
00:25:00.200 --> 00:25:02.000
<v Speaker 2>We can't investigate what you don't have a record of.

493
00:25:02.279 --> 00:25:05.000
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, So what are some key considerations when it comes

494
00:25:05.000 --> 00:25:07.519
<v Speaker 1>to log files and incident response? How do you manage them?

495
00:25:07.680 --> 00:25:11.480
<v Speaker 2>Well? A security information in event management or SEAM system

496
00:25:11.839 --> 00:25:15.799
<v Speaker 2>is an invaluable tool for log aggregation and retention, particularly

497
00:25:15.799 --> 00:25:19.240
<v Speaker 2>in larger organizations that generate massive amounts of log data.

498
00:25:19.359 --> 00:25:21.839
<v Speaker 1>A SEAM collects all logs in one place.

499
00:25:21.680 --> 00:25:25.000
<v Speaker 2>Exactly, a SEAM collects logs from various sources across the

500
00:25:25.039 --> 00:25:30.720
<v Speaker 2>infrastructure servers, firewalls, workstations into a central platform. This makes

501
00:25:30.720 --> 00:25:34.640
<v Speaker 2>it much easier to search, correlate events from different systems,

502
00:25:34.880 --> 00:25:36.599
<v Speaker 2>and identify suspicious.

503
00:25:36.079 --> 00:25:39.480
<v Speaker 1>Patterns correlation seeing how an event on one system relates

504
00:25:39.480 --> 00:25:40.359
<v Speaker 1>to another right.

505
00:25:40.680 --> 00:25:44.000
<v Speaker 2>The elastic stack, with tools like elastic Search, log Stash,

506
00:25:44.079 --> 00:25:48.240
<v Speaker 2>and Kibana, is another powerful option for centralized log analysis,

507
00:25:48.599 --> 00:25:51.680
<v Speaker 2>offering near real time search capabilities and visualization.

508
00:25:52.200 --> 00:25:55.119
<v Speaker 1>SEM and elastic stack essential for making sense of that

509
00:25:55.200 --> 00:25:58.920
<v Speaker 1>overwhelming volume of log data. What about analyzing Windows event

510
00:25:58.960 --> 00:26:01.119
<v Speaker 1>logs specifically on a single machine.

511
00:26:01.160 --> 00:26:04.079
<v Speaker 2>Sure, the built in event viewer in Windows allows you

512
00:26:04.119 --> 00:26:06.640
<v Speaker 2>to view these logs. Of course, the raw log files

513
00:26:06.680 --> 00:26:09.319
<v Speaker 2>themselves are typically stored in the c Windows System thirty

514
00:26:09.359 --> 00:26:12.440
<v Speaker 2>two WINEVAD logs directory, and there are several key event

515
00:26:12.519 --> 00:26:15.799
<v Speaker 2>IDs that investiators often look for, specific numbers that mean

516
00:26:15.839 --> 00:26:19.440
<v Speaker 2>specific things like what, For example, event ID four six

517
00:26:19.480 --> 00:26:23.160
<v Speaker 2>twenty four indicates a successful account log on four six

518
00:26:23.200 --> 00:26:26.440
<v Speaker 2>three four signifies an account log off. A high volume

519
00:26:26.480 --> 00:26:29.359
<v Speaker 2>of event ID four six twenty five, which indicates failed

520
00:26:29.400 --> 00:26:32.160
<v Speaker 2>log on attempts might suggest a brute force attack.

521
00:26:32.279 --> 00:26:36.400
<v Speaker 1>Four six twenty five lots of failed logins red flag.

522
00:26:36.200 --> 00:26:38.759
<v Speaker 2>Big red Flag and event ID forty one O four

523
00:26:38.880 --> 00:26:42.160
<v Speaker 2>records the execution of PowerShell scripts, which are very often

524
00:26:42.279 --> 00:26:45.640
<v Speaker 2>used in malicious activities these days. These specific evn IDs

525
00:26:45.640 --> 00:26:47.119
<v Speaker 2>can act like digital breadcrumbs.

526
00:26:47.200 --> 00:26:50.039
<v Speaker 1>Those specific event IDs sound like crucial indicators to look

527
00:26:50.079 --> 00:26:52.839
<v Speaker 1>for when sifting through Windows logs, really useful.

528
00:26:52.640 --> 00:26:55.960
<v Speaker 2>Nuggets precisely, and there are tools to help. Deep Blue Cli,

529
00:26:56.079 --> 00:26:58.799
<v Speaker 2>which is a PowerShell script itself, can help automate the

530
00:26:58.799 --> 00:27:02.400
<v Speaker 2>analysis of Windows of events by identifying known suspicious events

531
00:27:02.400 --> 00:27:05.680
<v Speaker 2>and patterns based on those ideas and other heuristics automating

532
00:27:05.720 --> 00:27:10.480
<v Speaker 2>the log search Yeah Event log Explorer offers more events filtering, searching,

533
00:27:10.519 --> 00:27:13.920
<v Speaker 2>and reporting capabilities than the built in event viewer, and

534
00:27:14.079 --> 00:27:16.680
<v Speaker 2>for situations where you need to collect logs remotely and

535
00:27:16.720 --> 00:27:19.720
<v Speaker 2>correlate them with other data sources, tools like Scotti can

536
00:27:19.759 --> 00:27:20.559
<v Speaker 2>be very useful.

537
00:27:20.880 --> 00:27:24.200
<v Speaker 1>So a combination of built in Windows tools and specialized

538
00:27:24.279 --> 00:27:27.960
<v Speaker 1>utilities can help you extract meaningful insights from those often

539
00:27:28.039 --> 00:27:31.160
<v Speaker 1>verbose event logs. Okay, let's move on to a topic

540
00:27:31.160 --> 00:27:34.079
<v Speaker 1>that I think many find particularly concerning malware.

541
00:27:34.279 --> 00:27:40.000
<v Speaker 2>Indeed, malware malware analysis is a critical component of incident response,

542
00:27:40.039 --> 00:27:40.559
<v Speaker 2>no question.

543
00:27:40.720 --> 00:27:43.279
<v Speaker 1>What are the main goals when analyzing malware?

544
00:27:43.400 --> 00:27:46.680
<v Speaker 2>The primary goals are first to understand how the malware

545
00:27:46.680 --> 00:27:50.000
<v Speaker 2>works its behavior, Second, what are its capabilities? What can

546
00:27:50.039 --> 00:27:53.400
<v Speaker 2>it do? And third to identify indicators IOCs that can

547
00:27:53.400 --> 00:27:56.319
<v Speaker 2>be used to detect and eradicate it from infected systems.

548
00:27:56.480 --> 00:27:57.720
<v Speaker 1>Understand it, find it, kill it.

549
00:27:57.839 --> 00:28:01.720
<v Speaker 2>Pretty much. The book introduces the concept of a malware sandbox.

550
00:28:01.880 --> 00:28:03.680
<v Speaker 1>Sandbox like a safe play.

551
00:28:03.440 --> 00:28:07.400
<v Speaker 2>Area, exactly, a safe isolated environment. This can be either

552
00:28:07.519 --> 00:28:10.160
<v Speaker 2>a local virtual machine you set up yourself or a

553
00:28:10.160 --> 00:28:13.680
<v Speaker 2>cloud based service. It's where you can execute and analyze

554
00:28:13.720 --> 00:28:17.519
<v Speaker 2>malware samples without risking your actual production network or data.

555
00:28:17.640 --> 00:28:22.559
<v Speaker 1>A controlled laboratory for studying dangerous software makes sense precisely.

556
00:28:22.920 --> 00:28:26.279
<v Speaker 2>There are two main types of analysis, static and dynamic.

557
00:28:26.599 --> 00:28:30.559
<v Speaker 2>Static analysis involves examining the malware's code and structure without

558
00:28:30.599 --> 00:28:31.559
<v Speaker 2>actually running.

559
00:28:31.279 --> 00:28:33.000
<v Speaker 1>It, looking at the blueprint right.

560
00:28:33.279 --> 00:28:36.799
<v Speaker 2>Tools like pay studio can help you analyze the files metadata,

561
00:28:37.279 --> 00:28:40.960
<v Speaker 2>identify imported functions, what Windows features it uses, and look

562
00:28:41.000 --> 00:28:44.200
<v Speaker 2>for suspicious strings or patterns that might indicate malicious behavior,

563
00:28:44.359 --> 00:28:47.640
<v Speaker 2>things like references to known malicious URLs or command and

564
00:28:47.640 --> 00:28:48.400
<v Speaker 2>control servers.

565
00:28:48.440 --> 00:28:52.240
<v Speaker 1>Okay, static analysis examining it while it's inert, what's dynamic.

566
00:28:52.440 --> 00:28:55.440
<v Speaker 2>Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, involves observing the malwur's

567
00:28:55.440 --> 00:28:58.000
<v Speaker 2>behavior while it's running in that safe sandbox.

568
00:28:57.599 --> 00:28:59.200
<v Speaker 1>Environment, watching it in action.

569
00:28:59.519 --> 00:29:03.440
<v Speaker 2>YEP. Tools like Process Explorer or process monitor can be

570
00:29:03.519 --> 00:29:06.599
<v Speaker 2>used to monitor its activity, like the processes it creates,

571
00:29:06.640 --> 00:29:10.759
<v Speaker 2>the files it modifies, the registry keys changes, and crucially,

572
00:29:10.880 --> 00:29:13.359
<v Speaker 2>the network connections it attempts to establish.

573
00:29:13.480 --> 00:29:17.559
<v Speaker 1>So static analysis is like examining the blueprint, while dynamic

574
00:29:17.640 --> 00:29:20.519
<v Speaker 1>analysis is like watching how it actually behaves in that

575
00:29:20.559 --> 00:29:21.559
<v Speaker 1>controlled environment.

576
00:29:21.759 --> 00:29:23.880
<v Speaker 2>That's a good way to put it. And there are

577
00:29:23.920 --> 00:29:28.039
<v Speaker 2>online sand boxing services like in teaser analyze an you

578
00:29:28.160 --> 00:29:28.720
<v Speaker 2>run Joe.

579
00:29:28.680 --> 00:29:30.240
<v Speaker 1>Sandbox online sandbox.

580
00:29:30.400 --> 00:29:33.319
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, these can automate much of this dynamic analysis process.

581
00:29:33.599 --> 00:29:36.200
<v Speaker 2>You upload the suspicious file and they run it and

582
00:29:36.240 --> 00:29:39.039
<v Speaker 2>give you back detailed reports on its actions. They can

583
00:29:39.079 --> 00:29:43.160
<v Speaker 2>even identify similarities to known malware families based on code

584
00:29:43.160 --> 00:29:44.240
<v Speaker 2>reused analysis.

585
00:29:44.359 --> 00:29:47.599
<v Speaker 1>Very useful automation, again handling the heavy lifting exactly.

586
00:29:48.000 --> 00:29:51.640
<v Speaker 2>The book also introduces yarra rules ya air rules. They're

587
00:29:51.720 --> 00:29:55.000
<v Speaker 2>essentially pattern matching rules. They allow you to identify malware

588
00:29:55.039 --> 00:29:59.240
<v Speaker 2>based on specific textual or binary characteristics like unique strings

589
00:29:59.279 --> 00:30:00.240
<v Speaker 2>or sequences.

590
00:29:59.799 --> 00:30:02.920
<v Speaker 1>Of like a custom search pattern for malware precisely.

591
00:30:03.400 --> 00:30:06.480
<v Speaker 2>Tools like Loki can scan systems for files that match

592
00:30:06.559 --> 00:30:09.119
<v Speaker 2>a given set of yar rules, and yargen can help

593
00:30:09.160 --> 00:30:11.240
<v Speaker 2>you generate your own yar or rules based on a

594
00:30:11.279 --> 00:30:14.440
<v Speaker 2>sample of malware you've found. These rules act like digital

595
00:30:14.440 --> 00:30:16.960
<v Speaker 2>fingerprints for known threats or even new variants.

596
00:30:17.680 --> 00:30:21.079
<v Speaker 1>YARR rules sound like a powerful way to proactively hunt

597
00:30:21.079 --> 00:30:24.240
<v Speaker 1>for known malware on your systems or even variations of it.

598
00:30:24.319 --> 00:30:27.119
<v Speaker 2>They are very powerful, yes, and that naturally leads us

599
00:30:27.160 --> 00:30:29.200
<v Speaker 2>to the crucial area of threat intelligence.

600
00:30:29.279 --> 00:30:32.000
<v Speaker 1>Right connecting the dots, What is threat intelligence exactly?

601
00:30:32.119 --> 00:30:36.799
<v Speaker 2>Correct? Threat intelligence is essentially information about existing and emerging threats.

602
00:30:37.200 --> 00:30:40.200
<v Speaker 2>It helps organizations better understand their adversaries, who they are,

603
00:30:40.359 --> 00:30:44.160
<v Speaker 2>their motivations, and their tactics, techniques and procedures, their TTPs,

604
00:30:44.400 --> 00:30:47.839
<v Speaker 2>understanding the enemy exactly. That understanding allows for a more

605
00:30:47.880 --> 00:30:52.400
<v Speaker 2>proactive and informed security posture rather than just reacting. The

606
00:30:52.440 --> 00:30:56.640
<v Speaker 2>book outlines different types of threat intelligence, strategic high level risks,

607
00:30:57.160 --> 00:31:03.440
<v Speaker 2>tactical attacker methodologies, operational details of specific attacks, and technical

608
00:31:03.680 --> 00:31:06.759
<v Speaker 2>specific indicators like ips or hashes.

609
00:31:06.599 --> 00:31:08.440
<v Speaker 1>Different levels of intel for different needs.

610
00:31:08.640 --> 00:31:11.400
<v Speaker 2>Right. It also introduces the pyramid of pain.

611
00:31:11.640 --> 00:31:14.000
<v Speaker 1>Pyramid of pain sounds painful.

612
00:31:14.240 --> 00:31:16.759
<v Speaker 2>Well, it's a really useful model. It illustrates the value

613
00:31:16.759 --> 00:31:19.039
<v Speaker 2>and the difficulty for an attacker to change different types

614
00:31:19.039 --> 00:31:21.960
<v Speaker 2>of indicators. At the bottom, you have things like HASH

615
00:31:22.079 --> 00:31:25.759
<v Speaker 2>values and IP addresses, easy for attackers to change. At

616
00:31:25.759 --> 00:31:28.680
<v Speaker 2>the top, you have TTPs, much harder for them to change.

617
00:31:28.680 --> 00:31:31.240
<v Speaker 2>So focusing your defenses there causes them more pain.

618
00:31:31.480 --> 00:31:36.279
<v Speaker 1>Ah okay, so focus on detecting their behavior TTPs, not

619
00:31:36.359 --> 00:31:40.359
<v Speaker 1>just the specific tools hashes they use today makes sense.

620
00:31:40.640 --> 00:31:43.480
<v Speaker 1>So how does an organization actually go about using threat

621
00:31:43.519 --> 00:31:44.759
<v Speaker 1>intelligence effectively?

622
00:31:45.000 --> 00:31:48.799
<v Speaker 2>It's a cycle, really, a continuous process that involves several stages.

623
00:31:49.079 --> 00:31:51.920
<v Speaker 2>Planning what intel do we need? Collection, where do we

624
00:31:51.960 --> 00:31:58.079
<v Speaker 2>get it? Processing, making sense of raw data, analysis, extracting insights, dissemination,

625
00:31:58.319 --> 00:32:00.000
<v Speaker 2>getting it to the right people, and feedback.

626
00:32:00.160 --> 00:32:02.680
<v Speaker 1>Did it help the thread intelligence life cycle? Where do

627
00:32:02.759 --> 00:32:03.519
<v Speaker 1>you get this intel?

628
00:32:03.759 --> 00:32:06.720
<v Speaker 2>Various sources. It can include internally generated data from your

629
00:32:06.759 --> 00:32:10.079
<v Speaker 2>own incidence, commercial threat intelligence feeds you subscribe to, and

630
00:32:10.319 --> 00:32:11.880
<v Speaker 2>open source intelligence or.

631
00:32:11.759 --> 00:32:14.680
<v Speaker 1>Ocinth ocynth publicly available.

632
00:32:14.200 --> 00:32:19.039
<v Speaker 2>Stuff exactly, information from reputable sources like sands, Internet Storm Center,

633
00:32:19.400 --> 00:32:24.000
<v Speaker 2>user advisories, security blogs, vendor reports, and platforms like Alien

634
00:32:24.079 --> 00:32:27.000
<v Speaker 2>volved OTX. There's a huge man out there if you

635
00:32:27.039 --> 00:32:27.680
<v Speaker 2>know where to look.

636
00:32:27.799 --> 00:32:30.839
<v Speaker 1>Okay, ocent sounds like a valuable resource. But how do

637
00:32:30.880 --> 00:32:34.240
<v Speaker 1>you make sense of all that diverse information, especially the

638
00:32:34.279 --> 00:32:35.880
<v Speaker 1>attack or TTPs you mentioned.

639
00:32:35.920 --> 00:32:38.799
<v Speaker 2>That's where the miter att and CK framework comes in.

640
00:32:38.839 --> 00:32:40.160
<v Speaker 2>It's become indispensable.

641
00:32:40.400 --> 00:32:42.799
<v Speaker 1>Miter att ANDCK here they mentioned a lot.

642
00:32:42.960 --> 00:32:48.119
<v Speaker 2>It's a structured and incredibly comprehensive knowledge base of adversary tactics,

643
00:32:48.200 --> 00:32:52.480
<v Speaker 2>techniques and procedures TTPs observed in real world cyber attacks.

644
00:32:52.519 --> 00:32:53.480
<v Speaker 2>It's all mapped.

645
00:32:53.200 --> 00:32:55.599
<v Speaker 1>Out a catalog of attack methods pretty much.

646
00:32:55.640 --> 00:32:57.880
<v Speaker 2>You can use the ATT and CK Navigator, which is

647
00:32:57.880 --> 00:33:00.920
<v Speaker 2>a web based tool to visually explore are these TTPs

648
00:33:00.920 --> 00:33:04.200
<v Speaker 2>and understand how different thread actors operate at various stages

649
00:33:04.240 --> 00:33:07.599
<v Speaker 2>of an attack life cycle, from initial access to data xfiltration,

650
00:33:07.880 --> 00:33:11.240
<v Speaker 2>visualizing the attack chain exactly. The book stress is the

651
00:33:11.240 --> 00:33:14.680
<v Speaker 2>importance of working with indicators of compromise or IOCs.

652
00:33:14.920 --> 00:33:18.240
<v Speaker 1>Biocs like file hash is, malicious ips right.

653
00:33:18.200 --> 00:33:21.519
<v Speaker 2>Pieces of forensic evidence that suggests the system has been compromised,

654
00:33:21.839 --> 00:33:25.799
<v Speaker 2>and also indicators of attack or ioas ioas.

655
00:33:25.960 --> 00:33:26.720
<v Speaker 1>How are they different?

656
00:33:26.839 --> 00:33:29.720
<v Speaker 2>Ioas focus more on the actions than attacker is taking

657
00:33:29.759 --> 00:33:33.920
<v Speaker 2>the behaviors regardless of the specific tools or IOCs involved.

658
00:33:34.240 --> 00:33:38.400
<v Speaker 2>Think detecting credential dumping activity versus detecting a specific known

659
00:33:38.480 --> 00:33:41.559
<v Speaker 2>credential dumping tools. Hash ioas are often more.

660
00:33:41.480 --> 00:33:44.000
<v Speaker 1>Robust detecting what not just the how exactly.

661
00:33:44.480 --> 00:33:46.640
<v Speaker 2>The key though, is to focus on the data, whether

662
00:33:46.720 --> 00:33:50.480
<v Speaker 2>IOCs or ioas, that is most relevant and actionable for

663
00:33:50.599 --> 00:33:54.839
<v Speaker 2>your specific organization and environment. Don't just collect everything right.

664
00:33:55.000 --> 00:33:58.920
<v Speaker 1>Focus is key. Themar E ATT and CK framework like

665
00:33:58.960 --> 00:34:02.240
<v Speaker 1>a comprehensive cat log of attacker behaviors, helping you understand

666
00:34:02.240 --> 00:34:05.559
<v Speaker 1>your adversaries. So, how do you actually integrate this threat

667
00:34:05.599 --> 00:34:08.159
<v Speaker 1>intelligence into your incident response efforts? How does it help

668
00:34:08.159 --> 00:34:09.480
<v Speaker 1>the CSR? Good question.

669
00:34:09.960 --> 00:34:13.360
<v Speaker 2>Many forensic analysis tools like autopsy, which we mentioned, have

670
00:34:13.480 --> 00:34:18.199
<v Speaker 2>the capability to ingest threat intelligence feeds, for instance, lists

671
00:34:18.239 --> 00:34:22.239
<v Speaker 2>of known malicious file hashes or IP addresses autopsy can

672
00:34:22.280 --> 00:34:25.800
<v Speaker 2>then automatically flag files or network artifacts on a compromise

673
00:34:25.880 --> 00:34:30.440
<v Speaker 2>system that match those known bad indicators during an investigation.

674
00:34:29.960 --> 00:34:31.559
<v Speaker 1>So the tool does the matching for you.

675
00:34:31.719 --> 00:34:34.559
<v Speaker 2>Saves a lot of time. Maltago is another powerful tool,

676
00:34:34.719 --> 00:34:38.440
<v Speaker 2>more for visualization. It can be used for graphically analyzing

677
00:34:38.440 --> 00:34:42.639
<v Speaker 2>the relationships between different pieces of threat intelligence like IP addresses,

678
00:34:43.000 --> 00:34:46.880
<v Speaker 2>domain names, malware samples, email addresses, helping to build a

679
00:34:46.880 --> 00:34:49.719
<v Speaker 2>clearer picture of an attack campaign and infrastructure.

680
00:34:49.800 --> 00:34:52.239
<v Speaker 1>Altago for seeing the connections exactly.

681
00:34:52.639 --> 00:34:56.159
<v Speaker 2>The book even provides a practical example using IOCs associated

682
00:34:56.199 --> 00:34:58.280
<v Speaker 2>with the hffn IM threat.

683
00:34:58.039 --> 00:35:01.199
<v Speaker 1>Group khifn i AM Change Attackers.

684
00:35:00.719 --> 00:35:03.079
<v Speaker 2>That's the one active in twenty twenty one. It shows

685
00:35:03.119 --> 00:35:06.360
<v Speaker 2>sourcing IOCs from alien Vault OTX and then using a

686
00:35:06.400 --> 00:35:10.079
<v Speaker 2>tool called CTI encoder to convert these iics into queries

687
00:35:10.119 --> 00:35:12.639
<v Speaker 2>that can be used directly with various security tools like

688
00:35:12.719 --> 00:35:14.039
<v Speaker 2>signs or eder platform.

689
00:35:14.119 --> 00:35:17.000
<v Speaker 1>Inverting intel into actual search queries very practical.

690
00:35:17.119 --> 00:35:19.159
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and you can also leverage Jura and low key,

691
00:35:19.199 --> 00:35:20.559
<v Speaker 2>which we discussed earlier.

692
00:35:20.239 --> 00:35:22.679
<v Speaker 1>With malware right the pattern matching to.

693
00:35:22.679 --> 00:35:27.559
<v Speaker 2>Scan your systems for files matching known malware signatures or

694
00:35:27.599 --> 00:35:30.599
<v Speaker 2>behaviors identified through your threat intelligence feeds.

695
00:35:30.960 --> 00:35:34.440
<v Speaker 1>So you're taking what you know about known attackers and

696
00:35:34.480 --> 00:35:38.480
<v Speaker 1>their methods and actively looking for evidence of those activities

697
00:35:38.480 --> 00:35:41.519
<v Speaker 1>within your own environment. That's a proactive use of intelligence.

698
00:35:41.599 --> 00:35:43.800
<v Speaker 1>That's exactly it, and that leads us directly into the

699
00:35:43.800 --> 00:35:47.760
<v Speaker 1>concept of thread hunting right using intel to hunt exactly.

700
00:35:48.159 --> 00:35:51.920
<v Speaker 2>Thread hunting is a proactive security activity. It's where security

701
00:35:51.920 --> 00:35:55.320
<v Speaker 2>analysts actively search for threats that might have evaded existing

702
00:35:55.360 --> 00:35:57.360
<v Speaker 2>automated security controls.

703
00:35:57.119 --> 00:35:59.519
<v Speaker 1>Going looking for trouble before it finds you.

704
00:35:59.800 --> 00:36:01.920
<v Speaker 2>That's a good way to put it. It's about going

705
00:36:01.920 --> 00:36:05.880
<v Speaker 2>beyond just reacting to alerts and actively seeking out potential

706
00:36:05.920 --> 00:36:09.599
<v Speaker 2>indicators of compromise or malicious activity that might be lurking

707
00:36:09.960 --> 00:36:11.440
<v Speaker 2>undetected in your environment.

708
00:36:11.719 --> 00:36:15.519
<v Speaker 1>Assuming compromise, sometimes threat hunting actively going on the offensive

709
00:36:15.599 --> 00:36:18.440
<v Speaker 1>to find threats before they trigger an alert. How do

710
00:36:18.480 --> 00:36:21.000
<v Speaker 1>you even begin a threat hunt? It sounds like looking

711
00:36:21.039 --> 00:36:22.239
<v Speaker 1>for a needle in a haystack.

712
00:36:22.400 --> 00:36:25.719
<v Speaker 2>It can be. The book emphasizes the crucial role of

713
00:36:25.760 --> 00:36:27.079
<v Speaker 2>forming a hypothesis.

714
00:36:27.159 --> 00:36:31.320
<v Speaker 1>First hypothesis like a specific guess about what might be.

715
00:36:31.280 --> 00:36:36.800
<v Speaker 2>Wrong exactly based on initiating events, maybe unusual network traffic patterns,

716
00:36:37.239 --> 00:36:41.280
<v Speaker 2>suspicious log entries you notice, and also leveraging threat intelligence

717
00:36:41.320 --> 00:36:46.079
<v Speaker 2>about known adversary PTPs relevant to your industry or technology stack.

718
00:36:46.360 --> 00:36:48.360
<v Speaker 2>You don't just randomly start searching.

719
00:36:48.079 --> 00:36:49.320
<v Speaker 1>Okay, start with a theory.

720
00:36:49.480 --> 00:36:51.519
<v Speaker 2>You need a specific idea of what you're looking for,

721
00:36:51.719 --> 00:36:55.880
<v Speaker 2>informed by potential threats and observed anomalies. Then you plan

722
00:36:55.960 --> 00:37:00.119
<v Speaker 2>your hunt, decide which systems, logs, network traffic you'll examine.

723
00:37:00.559 --> 00:37:04.159
<v Speaker 2>You'll often use digital forensic techniques and tools, plus maybe

724
00:37:04.280 --> 00:37:08.440
<v Speaker 2>endpoint detection and response or EDR tools for broader.

725
00:37:08.079 --> 00:37:10.599
<v Speaker 1>Searching, using forensic skills proactively right.

726
00:37:10.840 --> 00:37:13.360
<v Speaker 2>The outcome of a thread hunt can range from confirming

727
00:37:13.440 --> 00:37:17.039
<v Speaker 2>a previously unknown compromise, which means the HUT was successful

728
00:37:17.079 --> 00:37:20.280
<v Speaker 2>even if it's bad news finding something bad, to validating

729
00:37:20.280 --> 00:37:24.079
<v Speaker 2>the effectiveness of your existing security controls finding nothing which

730
00:37:24.079 --> 00:37:27.400
<v Speaker 2>is good, or maybe identifying blind spots in your detection

731
00:37:27.480 --> 00:37:29.760
<v Speaker 2>capabilities where you should have seen something that didn't.

732
00:37:30.079 --> 00:37:34.639
<v Speaker 1>So it's a continuous cycle of learning, hypothesizing, searching, and

733
00:37:34.719 --> 00:37:38.119
<v Speaker 1>refining your security posture based on what you find or

734
00:37:38.159 --> 00:37:38.760
<v Speaker 1>don't find.

735
00:37:38.880 --> 00:37:40.480
<v Speaker 2>Precisely, it's an ongoing effort.

736
00:37:40.599 --> 00:37:42.639
<v Speaker 1>Now, let's try to tie a lot of this together

737
00:37:42.960 --> 00:37:46.079
<v Speaker 1>with a real world example that unfortunately we hear about

738
00:37:46.119 --> 00:37:48.000
<v Speaker 1>all too often. Ransomware.

739
00:37:48.320 --> 00:37:51.639
<v Speaker 2>Uh, ransomware, Yes, it has become such a pervasive and

740
00:37:51.679 --> 00:37:55.280
<v Speaker 2>costly threat. The book uses the Kanti ransomware group as

741
00:37:55.320 --> 00:37:56.599
<v Speaker 2>a detailed case study.

742
00:37:56.840 --> 00:37:59.360
<v Speaker 1>Kanti they were huge for a while, weren't they. There'

743
00:37:59.360 --> 00:38:00.480
<v Speaker 1>stuff leaks on line too?

744
00:38:00.599 --> 00:38:04.840
<v Speaker 2>They were, and yes, those leaks provided a lot of insight. Kanti,

745
00:38:05.199 --> 00:38:08.039
<v Speaker 2>often associated with the Wizard Spider and trick Bot thread

746
00:38:08.079 --> 00:38:12.119
<v Speaker 2>actors operated on a ransomware as a service or RIOS.

747
00:38:11.760 --> 00:38:13.880
<v Speaker 1>Model rios, meaning they rented out their.

748
00:38:13.840 --> 00:38:17.159
<v Speaker 2>Ransomware essentially, yes, making it accessible to a wider range

749
00:38:17.199 --> 00:38:20.000
<v Speaker 2>of cyber criminals, not just the core developers. The book

750
00:38:20.000 --> 00:38:21.519
<v Speaker 2>outlines their common tactics.

751
00:38:21.559 --> 00:38:23.199
<v Speaker 1>What kind of tactics did Kanti use?

752
00:38:23.360 --> 00:38:26.519
<v Speaker 2>Things like using tools like proc dump to bump credentials

753
00:38:26.559 --> 00:38:31.000
<v Speaker 2>like passwords from compromise system's memory, leveraging standard Windows protocols

754
00:38:31.039 --> 00:38:34.400
<v Speaker 2>like SMB and RDP for lateral movement across the network.

755
00:38:34.199 --> 00:38:35.920
<v Speaker 1>Moving sideways using normal.

756
00:38:35.639 --> 00:38:40.400
<v Speaker 2>Tools exactly, utilizing frameworks like Cobalt strike for command and control,

757
00:38:41.039 --> 00:38:47.079
<v Speaker 2>and crucially exfiltrating sensitive data via SFTP or HTTPS before

758
00:38:47.199 --> 00:38:49.800
<v Speaker 2>encrypting local files. The double extortion.

759
00:38:49.480 --> 00:38:53.000
<v Speaker 1>Tactic steal the data, then encrypt it nasty gary.

760
00:38:53.280 --> 00:38:57.400
<v Speaker 2>Understanding these specific tactics is crucial for both prevention and response.

761
00:38:57.840 --> 00:39:01.559
<v Speaker 1>Kanty's a stark reminder of the sophistication and potential damage

762
00:39:01.559 --> 00:39:05.559
<v Speaker 1>of modern ransomware operations. What are some key steps organizations

763
00:39:05.599 --> 00:39:08.519
<v Speaker 1>can take to prepare for and respond to such an attack?

764
00:39:08.719 --> 00:39:10.280
<v Speaker 1>Based on this kind of intel.

765
00:39:10.280 --> 00:39:13.039
<v Speaker 2>The book highlights the importance of a layered security approach,

766
00:39:13.119 --> 00:39:17.199
<v Speaker 2>focusing on both network and endpoint resilience defence in depth right.

767
00:39:17.400 --> 00:39:21.320
<v Speaker 2>This includes deploying robust eder solutions for endpoint monitoring and

768
00:39:21.360 --> 00:39:26.000
<v Speaker 2>threat detection. Disabling unnecessary administrative shares on network systems, common

769
00:39:26.079 --> 00:39:30.079
<v Speaker 2>lateral movement paths, Implementing network segmentation using vlands to limit

770
00:39:30.079 --> 00:39:32.559
<v Speaker 2>the blast radius if one part gets hit, segmenting the

771
00:39:32.599 --> 00:39:38.039
<v Speaker 2>network oh containing the fire exactly. Utilizing Microsoft's Local Administrator

772
00:39:38.079 --> 00:39:42.639
<v Speaker 2>Password Solution or LAPS to manage local admin passwords securely

773
00:39:42.760 --> 00:39:46.360
<v Speaker 2>so they're not all the same. Disabling credential caching where

774
00:39:46.440 --> 00:39:50.039
<v Speaker 2>possible to prevent attackers from easily stealing credentials left in memory.

775
00:39:50.239 --> 00:39:52.440
<v Speaker 1>Lots of practical hardening steps.

776
00:39:52.159 --> 00:39:57.039
<v Speaker 2>Yes, and CSRT preparedness is also paramount Having well defined

777
00:39:57.079 --> 00:40:01.440
<v Speaker 2>procedures for rapidly isolating infected systems to prevent further spread.

778
00:40:01.360 --> 00:40:02.719
<v Speaker 1>Is key quick isolation.

779
00:40:02.960 --> 00:40:06.280
<v Speaker 2>The book also touches on analyzing initial access methods like

780
00:40:06.400 --> 00:40:10.119
<v Speaker 2>malicious macros and documents, using tools like ola dump, dot

781
00:40:10.159 --> 00:40:14.119
<v Speaker 2>PIY and cyber chef to deconstruct them, and investigating lateral

782
00:40:14.159 --> 00:40:17.719
<v Speaker 2>movement by examining Windows security event logs for specific indicators

783
00:40:18.079 --> 00:40:20.280
<v Speaker 2>like that event ID four six x two four type

784
00:40:20.320 --> 00:40:23.000
<v Speaker 2>three log on we mentioned, which can indicate network based

785
00:40:23.079 --> 00:40:24.400
<v Speaker 2>logins between machines.

786
00:40:24.519 --> 00:40:27.559
<v Speaker 1>So a combination of proactive security measures, good hygiene, and

787
00:40:27.599 --> 00:40:30.800
<v Speaker 1>a well drilled incident response team are essential for minimizing

788
00:40:30.880 --> 00:40:32.400
<v Speaker 1>the impact of ransomware.

789
00:40:31.920 --> 00:40:33.760
<v Speaker 2>Attach Absolutely, preparation is key.

790
00:40:33.920 --> 00:40:37.239
<v Speaker 1>Finally, after an incident has been contained and eradicated, oh lovely,

791
00:40:37.639 --> 00:40:41.039
<v Speaker 1>how do you properly document everything that happened? Reporting seems crucial?

792
00:40:41.280 --> 00:40:45.119
<v Speaker 2>It is thorough. Incident reporting is a critical final step

793
00:40:45.199 --> 00:40:48.440
<v Speaker 2>in the incident response life cycle. You're not done until

794
00:40:48.440 --> 00:40:51.840
<v Speaker 2>the report is done. The book emphasizes the importance of

795
00:40:51.920 --> 00:40:56.320
<v Speaker 2>creating documentation tailored to different audiences within the organization.

796
00:40:56.159 --> 00:40:57.599
<v Speaker 1>Different reports for different people.

797
00:40:57.679 --> 00:41:01.800
<v Speaker 2>Yes, an executive summary provides a high level overview for leadership,

798
00:41:01.880 --> 00:41:05.599
<v Speaker 2>c suite board members. It covers the root cause, the impact,

799
00:41:05.760 --> 00:41:09.840
<v Speaker 2>and key recommendations for preventing future occurrences, all in business terms.

800
00:41:09.960 --> 00:41:12.039
<v Speaker 1>The quick version for the bosses pretty much.

801
00:41:12.559 --> 00:41:16.719
<v Speaker 2>Then, the investigation details section provides a more comprehensive narrative

802
00:41:16.840 --> 00:41:22.400
<v Speaker 2>of the incident, timeline, the detailed findings identified indicators of compromise.

803
00:41:23.039 --> 00:41:26.480
<v Speaker 2>This is for both leadership and technical personnel. More detail,

804
00:41:26.639 --> 00:41:30.320
<v Speaker 2>and finally, a detailed forensic report provides the real technical

805
00:41:30.360 --> 00:41:33.880
<v Speaker 2>specifics of the evidence analysis tools used, step by step

806
00:41:33.920 --> 00:41:37.840
<v Speaker 2>findings data analysis. This is for the technical teams, maybe

807
00:41:37.920 --> 00:41:38.599
<v Speaker 2>legal counsel.

808
00:41:38.800 --> 00:41:41.760
<v Speaker 1>Different reports for different levels of understanding and different needs.

809
00:41:42.199 --> 00:41:44.679
<v Speaker 1>What are some key elements that should be included across

810
00:41:44.719 --> 00:41:45.360
<v Speaker 1>these reports?

811
00:41:45.599 --> 00:41:48.639
<v Speaker 2>The book stresses the importance of a clear and accurate

812
00:41:48.679 --> 00:41:53.039
<v Speaker 2>timeline of events. Detailing when different activities occurred during the

813
00:41:53.079 --> 00:41:55.679
<v Speaker 2>incident is fundamental to understanding the narrative.

814
00:41:55.840 --> 00:41:57.039
<v Speaker 1>The timeline is critical.

815
00:41:57.159 --> 00:42:01.360
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, detailed note taking throughout the investmentation is also crucial.

816
00:42:01.400 --> 00:42:04.280
<v Speaker 2>You can't rely on memory weeks later. The book even

817
00:42:04.320 --> 00:42:07.559
<v Speaker 2>suggests tools like monolith notes for effective note taking and

818
00:42:07.760 --> 00:42:09.719
<v Speaker 2>organization during a chaotic response.

819
00:42:10.199 --> 00:42:11.599
<v Speaker 1>Kee good notes, Yes.

820
00:42:11.639 --> 00:42:14.400
<v Speaker 2>And the language use in the reports should be appropriate

821
00:42:14.440 --> 00:42:19.480
<v Speaker 2>for the intended audience. Executive summaries need that business oriented narrative,

822
00:42:19.840 --> 00:42:23.559
<v Speaker 2>while forensic reports will be highly technical and detail oriented.

823
00:42:23.599 --> 00:42:27.880
<v Speaker 1>Tailor the language makes sense. Comprehensive documentation is vital not

824
00:42:27.920 --> 00:42:30.920
<v Speaker 1>only for internal learning and improvement, but also for any

825
00:42:31.159 --> 00:42:33.440
<v Speaker 1>potential legal or regulatory requirements.

826
00:42:33.519 --> 00:42:37.239
<v Speaker 2>Right absolutely, it serves as the official record of what transpired,

827
00:42:37.559 --> 00:42:40.320
<v Speaker 2>how it was handled, and the lessons learned. It can

828
00:42:40.360 --> 00:42:44.079
<v Speaker 2>be invaluable for demonstrating due diligence and for strengthening future

829
00:42:44.119 --> 00:42:45.039
<v Speaker 2>security efforts.

830
00:42:45.280 --> 00:42:48.719
<v Speaker 1>Wow, okay, we've covered an incredible amount of ground in

831
00:42:48.719 --> 00:42:52.159
<v Speaker 1>this deep dive, huh, from the fundamental principles of DFIR

832
00:42:52.599 --> 00:42:57.519
<v Speaker 1>to the intricate details of evidence acquisition analysis, the strategic

833
00:42:57.719 --> 00:43:01.239
<v Speaker 1>use of threat intelligence, all in formed by the comprehensive

834
00:43:01.239 --> 00:43:04.639
<v Speaker 1>insights of digital forensics and incident response.

835
00:43:04.960 --> 00:43:08.239
<v Speaker 2>Indeed, it's a huge field. We hope that you, our listener,

836
00:43:08.599 --> 00:43:12.599
<v Speaker 2>now have a much clearer understanding of the processes, the tools,

837
00:43:12.639 --> 00:43:17.119
<v Speaker 2>and frankly, the thinking involved in responding to and investigating

838
00:43:17.239 --> 00:43:18.159
<v Speaker 2>cyber incidents.

839
00:43:18.519 --> 00:43:21.559
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you should now be able to approach discussions about cybersecurity,

840
00:43:21.880 --> 00:43:25.199
<v Speaker 1>or even just the news headlines with a more informed perspective,

841
00:43:25.519 --> 00:43:29.639
<v Speaker 1>recognizing the underlying methodologies and technologies that security professionals rely

842
00:43:29.719 --> 00:43:30.719
<v Speaker 1>on every single day.

843
00:43:31.079 --> 00:43:33.559
<v Speaker 2>So maybe a question for you to ponder considering the

844
00:43:33.599 --> 00:43:37.400
<v Speaker 2>sophisticated techniques employed in ransomware attacks like CONTI, what are

845
00:43:37.440 --> 00:43:40.199
<v Speaker 2>some specific immediate steps that come to mind for enhancing

846
00:43:40.239 --> 00:43:42.960
<v Speaker 2>your own digital security practices, whether that's at home or

847
00:43:43.000 --> 00:43:44.280
<v Speaker 2>in your workplace.

848
00:43:44.079 --> 00:43:46.840
<v Speaker 1>That's a good one. Or thinking about the other side,

849
00:43:47.119 --> 00:43:51.039
<v Speaker 1>given the ever increasing complexity and sophistication of the threat landscape,

850
00:43:51.480 --> 00:43:54.960
<v Speaker 1>how critical do you now perceive proactive threat hunting to

851
00:43:55.000 --> 00:43:58.639
<v Speaker 1>be for organizations striving to stay ahead of potential attacks?

852
00:43:59.320 --> 00:44:00.719
<v Speaker 1>Is reacting enough anymore?

853
00:44:01.039 --> 00:44:04.000
<v Speaker 2>Yeah? Great questions. We really encourage you to delve deeper

854
00:44:04.039 --> 00:44:07.039
<v Speaker 2>into any of the specific topics that particularly sparked your

855
00:44:07.079 --> 00:44:10.599
<v Speaker 2>interest today. Perhaps explore some of the powerful tools we mentioned,

856
00:44:10.840 --> 00:44:14.480
<v Speaker 2>like volatility for advanced memory analysis, or maybe delve further

857
00:44:14.559 --> 00:44:19.000
<v Speaker 2>into the wealth of knowledge contained within the ITTNCK framework.

858
00:44:18.519 --> 00:44:22.320
<v Speaker 1>Online, because in the dynamic and ever evolving field of cybersecurity,

859
00:44:22.760 --> 00:44:26.199
<v Speaker 1>continuous learning and just plain curiosity are probably your most

860
00:44:26.280 --> 00:44:27.199
<v Speaker 1>valuable assets.

861
00:44:27.360 --> 00:44:31.480
<v Speaker 2>Well said, until our next deep dive, stay curious, stay informed,

862
00:44:31.599 --> 00:44:32.440
<v Speaker 2>and stay secure.
