Speaker 1: Okay, let's unpack this. You ever feel like you're just
Speaker 1: waiting through endless cybersecurity warnings, Oh yeah, data breaches here,
Speaker 1: some new kind of attack there, and you're left wondering
Speaker 1: what it all really means.
Speaker 2: Right, totally, it's overwhelming.
Speaker 1: Maybe you're trying to wrap your head around for work,
Speaker 1: or maybe you just want to feel a little less
Speaker 1: in the dark about the digital world we live in. Huh, well,
Speaker 1: that's exactly what we're diving into today.
Speaker 2: Precisely. Think of this as your shortcut to understanding the
Speaker 2: core of how we tackle cyber incidents without getting lost
Speaker 2: in all the technical weeds.
Speaker 1: And today that core understanding comes from the world of
Speaker 1: digital forensics and incident.
Speaker 2: Response, right DFR.
Speaker 1: Now, your first thought might be that sounds like something
Speaker 1: for the tech giants, not me, but think of it
Speaker 1: this way. Understanding these principles is like understanding basic first date.
Speaker 2: That's great analogy.
Speaker 1: It might not be a doctor, but knowing what to
Speaker 1: do in an emergency can be crucial for anyone navigating
Speaker 1: our digital lives.
Speaker 2: That's a key point. I mean, while a major corporation
Speaker 2: faces threats on a different scale than say, an individual,
Speaker 2: the fundamental approach understanding what happened and how to respond.
Speaker 2: It has common.
Speaker 1: Threads, absolutely, and to help us navigate this fascinating but yeah,
Speaker 1: sometimes complex area, we've got a real treasure trove of information,
Speaker 1: most notably the book Digital Forensics and Incident Response, third.
Speaker 2: Edition, Solid resource.
Speaker 1: This isn't some surface level guide. It's a deep dive itself,
Speaker 1: covering everything from the nitty gritty of computer memory analysis
Speaker 1: to the strategic use of threat intelligence.
Speaker 2: It's definitely comprehensive. Our goal here is to pull out
Speaker 2: the most vital and frankly thought provoking aspects, giving you
Speaker 2: a clear pathway to being well informed without feeling overloaded
Speaker 2: by technical details.
Speaker 1: Yeah, aiming for that practical aha moment where things really
Speaker 1: click exactly. So, when something does go wrong in the
Speaker 1: digital realm, where do the experts even begin to sort
Speaker 1: it out?
Speaker 2: Okay, let's start with the thirty thousand foot view. Digital
Speaker 2: Forensics and Incident Response often shortened to DFIR. That's the
Speaker 2: overarching process organizations used to manage and resolve cybertax.
Speaker 1: DFIR the whole life cycle.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the entire life cycle of dealing with a digital
Speaker 2: security event.
Speaker 1: Okay, DFIR, the whole playbook for digital emergencies. What's like
Speaker 1: one of the first pages in that playbook.
Speaker 2: Well, a foundational element is the incident response or IR plan.
Speaker 2: The IR plan this is basically a documented roadmap. It
Speaker 2: outlines how an organization will prepare for, detect, contain, and
Speaker 2: recover from security incidents. A robust IR plan has several
Speaker 2: essential parts.
Speaker 1: Okay, lay them on us. What should a good IR
Speaker 1: plan include?
Speaker 2: Right? First and foremost preparation through training the team responsible
Speaker 2: for handling incidents, the Computer Security Incident Response Team or CSRT.
Speaker 2: They need to practice.
Speaker 1: Practice makes perfect, even in cyber.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, think of it like a sports team running drills.
Speaker 2: The book really highlights the value of tabletop exercises.
Speaker 1: Tabletop exercise like playing a game sort of.
Speaker 2: There's simulated incident scenarios that the entire CSART should walk
Speaker 2: through regularly, ideally annually. These exercises often reveal unexpected communication
Speaker 2: breakdowns or maybe unclear roles.
Speaker 1: Ah, so it's not just technical stuff, it's the human
Speaker 1: element too.
Speaker 2: Oh, definitely surprisingly effective. Communication under pressure is often a
Speaker 2: major stumbling block. Then there's maintenance. The digital landscape is
Speaker 2: constantly shifting, new technologies, evolving threats, personnel changes, you name it.
Speaker 2: The IR plan.
Speaker 1: Needs to keep up, so it can't just sit on
Speaker 1: a shelf.
Speaker 2: No way. The book recommends at least an annual review
Speaker 2: to ensure the plan remains relevant and effective, and lessons
Speaker 2: learned from exercises or you know, real incidents should be
Speaker 2: incorporated to make it a stronger document.
Speaker 1: Right, constantly updating based on experience makes sense exactly.
Speaker 2: And then we have playbooks. These are like specific step
Speaker 2: by step guides for handling common types of incidents. Think
Speaker 2: of it like having a checklist for different medical emergencies.
Speaker 1: Okay. Yeah.
Speaker 2: The book mentions playbooks for things like phishing attacks, malware infections,
Speaker 2: ransomware a big one, vulnerabilities and public systems and business
Speaker 2: email compromise or be EC.
Speaker 1: Ransomware gets its own playbook.
Speaker 2: It emphasizes the critical nature of ransomware and suggests a
Speaker 2: dedicated playbook for it. Yeah, just because of its potentially
Speaker 2: devastating impact.
Speaker 1: Okay. Playbooks the practical how to guides for when specific
Speaker 1: digital alarms go.
Speaker 2: Off precisely and within the IR plan. Clear escalation procedures
Speaker 2: are vital.
Speaker 1: Escalation, Who calls who? Basically?
Speaker 2: Yeah, pretty much? These define who needs to be notified
Speaker 2: and involved as an incident unfold from initial detection all
Speaker 2: the way to full blown crisis management. This helps prevent
Speaker 2: what the book calls see a shirt burnout burnout.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I can see that.
Speaker 2: Being a risk definitely. It ensures that the specialized skills
Speaker 2: of the team are deployed appropriately and important only when
Speaker 2: truly needed. It's like a tiered alert system.
Speaker 1: So when the ceesart does get engaged, what's the initial approach?
Speaker 1: How do they jump in?
Speaker 2: The book makes it pretty compelling comparison here, think of
Speaker 2: engaging a se sert like calling the fire department. You
Speaker 2: contact them, provide essential details, what's happening where, what's the
Speaker 2: potential impact? That info allows them to dispatch the right resources. Similarly,
Speaker 2: engaging a se sert follows a defined escalation path, making
Speaker 2: sure the right expertise is brought to bear.
Speaker 1: Like flagging a suspicious email that then gets escalated to
Speaker 1: a specialist for like a deeper.
Speaker 2: Look exactly, and once the seizert is on the scene,
Speaker 2: a primary objective in those early stages is to understand
Speaker 2: the scope of the incident.
Speaker 1: How bad is it, how far is it spread?
Speaker 2: Right Initially it might not be clear how far the
Speaker 2: compromise is spread. The CS conducts a systematic investigation to
Speaker 2: determine which systems data processes have been affected. They're essentially
Speaker 2: trying to map the boundaries of the digital fire.
Speaker 1: So they're like digital fire responders trying to contain the
Speaker 1: damage and figure out how big the problem.
Speaker 2: Actually is precisely, and for organizations with a more mature
Speaker 2: security posture, often those with a dedicated security operations center
Speaker 2: or SoC, or maybe a fusion center, there are technologies
Speaker 2: like Security Orchestration, Automation and Response or SR.
Speaker 1: SIR sounds like it takes a lot of the manual
Speaker 1: work out of incident response.
Speaker 2: That's the goal. Yeah. Gartner defines SOR as technologies that
Speaker 2: integrate incident response platforms, orchestration and automation of security tasks,
Speaker 2: and threat intelligence management into one unified.
Speaker 1: System, integrating everything right.
Speaker 2: It helps organizations streamline their response processes, manage incidents more efficiently,
Speaker 2: and even leverage automation to handle routine tasks that frees
Speaker 2: up human analysts for the more complex issues.
Speaker 1: And you can't just automate everything right point.
Speaker 2: A common pitfall is automating too much too soon. That
Speaker 2: can lead to inflexible playbooks that don't handle novel attacks effectively.
Speaker 2: So it's about smart automation.
Speaker 1: Smart automation, not yeah yeah exactly.
Speaker 2: So our platform typically includes an incident response platform for
Speaker 2: managing workflows and tracking investigations, a security orchestration and automation
Speaker 2: engine for automating tasks like isolating infected computers, and a
Speaker 2: threat intelligence platform for gathering and enriching information about threats.
Speaker 1: Automation insecurity. That makes a lot of sense for dealing
Speaker 1: with the sheer volume of alerts these days. Now, Okay,
Speaker 1: once you know you have an incident, a critical next
Speaker 1: step must be containing it, stopping the bleeding.
Speaker 2: Absolutely. Containment is about limiting the spread and impact of
Speaker 2: the attack. Think of it as building a firewall metaphorically speaking,
Speaker 2: around the affected areas you.
Speaker 1: Want to stop the digital infection from spreading further.
Speaker 2: The book discusses both physical and logical containment. Physical containment
Speaker 2: might involve actually physically disconnecting an infected machine from the network,
Speaker 2: unplugging the network cable or turning off Wi Fi one
Speaker 2: that plug. Yeah, but in large organizations, quickly locating and
Speaker 2: isolating multiple affected systems can be a huge logistical challenge.
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, imagine trying to find one compromised laptop in
Speaker 1: a massive office.
Speaker 2: Building precisely so, then you have logical containment. This involves
Speaker 2: using software configurations to isolate systems or network segments, for example,
Speaker 2: implementing new firewall rules or using network segmentation.
Speaker 1: Using software barriers.
Speaker 2: Right. This is often more scalable, but it does require
Speaker 2: a well designed network architecture in the first place.
Speaker 1: So it's often a combination of physically cutting off connections
Speaker 1: and using software to create those digital barriers.
Speaker 2: Correct and after the immediate crisis has been addressed, there's
Speaker 2: a vital step for learning and improvement called the after
Speaker 2: action review or AAR.
Speaker 1: The AAR, what's that involved?
Speaker 2: It's a structured process of looking back at the incident,
Speaker 2: what went well, what could have been handled better, and crucially,
Speaker 2: what changes need to be made to ce sart policies
Speaker 2: and procedures. The goal is continuous.
Speaker 1: Improvement, turning every incident into a learning.
Speaker 2: Opportunity, exactly making your security stronger over time, like a
Speaker 2: feedback loop.
Speaker 1: Got it? Okay? Now shifting focus slightly to the digital
Speaker 1: forensic side of dfire. You mentioned a principle.
Speaker 2: Ah, yes, there's a fundamental principle that underpins a lot
Speaker 2: of the work. Low cards exchange principle.
Speaker 1: Low cards exchange principle. Okay, sounds like something from a
Speaker 1: detective novel, It.
Speaker 2: Kind of is. It's a cornerstone of forensic science, stating
Speaker 2: that every contact leaves a trace.
Speaker 1: Every contact leaves a trace.
Speaker 2: In the digital world. This means that attackers, even if
Speaker 2: they try to be stealthy and cover their tracks, will
Speaker 2: inevitably leave digital footprints. The challenge and the skill of
Speaker 2: digital forensics lies in having the right tools and expertise
Speaker 2: to uncover these traces and connect them back to the
Speaker 2: malicious activity.
Speaker 1: So even deleting files or wiping a hard drive doesn't
Speaker 1: necessarily mean all evidence is gone for good not always no.
Speaker 2: Skilled forensic analysts can often rec covered deleted data or
Speaker 2: find remnants of malicious activity that might not be immediately obvious.
Speaker 2: It takes work, but it's often possible.
Speaker 1: Interesting and speaking of things that might not be obvious,
Speaker 1: you mentioned incident response has legal implications.
Speaker 2: Oh, absolutely significant one.
Speaker 1: John, Just dealing with the technical side, definitely.
Speaker 2: These can range from mandatory breach notification requirements, which depend
Speaker 2: heavily on the type and volume of data compromised and
Speaker 2: the jurisdiction right.
Speaker 1: Those laws seem to change all the time.
Speaker 2: They do, and then there are various privacy regulations, plus
Speaker 2: the rules of evidence if legal action is pursued. The
Speaker 2: book even mentions the Economic Espionage Act of nineteen ninety six,
Speaker 2: which criminalizes the theft of trade secrets.
Speaker 1: So how you handle a cyber incident and the evidence
Speaker 1: you collect can have really serious legal consequences down the line.
Speaker 2: Precisely, evidence collection and preservation must adhere to establish legal
Speaker 2: standards to be admissible in court. This involves maintaining a
Speaker 2: queer chain of custody.
Speaker 1: Chain of custody, proving who had the evidence.
Speaker 2: When exactly, ensuring the integrity of the data through techniques
Speaker 2: like hashing, and using forensically sound methods for acquisition. You
Speaker 2: can't just copy paste files.
Speaker 1: This is clearly a lot more involved than just, you know,
Speaker 1: running an anti virus scan and calling it a day.
Speaker 2: It certainly is. And just for a bit of historical context,
Speaker 2: the field of digital forensics really began to take shape
Speaker 2: within law enforcement back in the mid nineteen eighties as
Speaker 2: computers became more integral to criminal activity. The eighties, Wow, yeah,
Speaker 2: agencies like the FBI established specialized units such as the
Speaker 2: Computer Analysis and Response Team or.
Speaker 1: CART the FBI CART, so they were early pioneers in
Speaker 1: this field.
Speaker 2: Indeed, and the book highlights a really pivotal early case,
Speaker 2: the intrusion into the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory by a
Speaker 2: hacker named Marcus Hess. Okay, this activity might have gone
Speaker 2: unnoticed were it not for the work of Clifford's Stole.
Speaker 2: He devised this clever method to track the intruder his efforts,
Speaker 2: which he read about in his book The Cuckoo's Egg.
Speaker 1: The Cuckoo's Egg, I've heard of it, Yeah.
Speaker 2: It's a classic. It not only led to the hacker's
Speaker 2: prosecution for espionage, but also really underscored the critical importance
Speaker 2: of digital forensics expertise in our connected world even back then.
Speaker 1: That sounds like a fascinating story and still relevant today.
Speaker 1: It's amazing to see how much the feel has evolved
Speaker 1: since Stoles times.
Speaker 2: And it has evolved dramatically. Today we have highly specialized
Speaker 2: tools and methodologies for acquiring and analyzing digital evidence from
Speaker 2: a huge multitude of sources. Speaking of which, let's maybe
Speaker 2: delve into some of those key areas of evidence. A
Speaker 2: fundamental concept in digital forensics is the distinction between volatile
Speaker 2: and non volatile data.
Speaker 1: Volatile versus non volatile. Break that down for.
Speaker 2: Us, sure, volatile data is temporary information. It exists only
Speaker 2: while a system is powered on, and it's lost when
Speaker 2: the power is turned off. Think of the data held
Speaker 2: in a computer's random access memory or RAM.
Speaker 1: Stuff in RAM, got it.
Speaker 2: Non Vogal data, on the other hand, is persistent. It
Speaker 2: remains stored even when the system is powered down, So
Speaker 2: like the data on a hard drive or a solid
Speaker 2: state drive SSD.
Speaker 1: Okay. So if you're responding to a live incident, capturing
Speaker 1: that volatile memory the RAM quickly is crucial because it
Speaker 1: might contain fleeting evidence that just disappears the moment the
Speaker 1: machine is shut down or rebooted exactly.
Speaker 2: That's often priority number one. Now, let's talk about specific
Speaker 2: types of digital evidence, maybe starting with network evidence.
Speaker 1: Network evidence, ok.
Speaker 2: Our book emphasizes that network traffic can provide a wealth
Speaker 2: of information for reconstructing a security incident.
Speaker 1: Network traffic that sounds like an overwhelming amount of data.
Speaker 1: Where do you even begin to look?
Speaker 2: Yeah, it can be. Key starting points usually include firewall and.
Speaker 1: Proxy logs firewall and proxy logs.
Speaker 2: These logs can provide valuable insights into the initial stages
Speaker 2: of an attack, showing which internal systems communicated with external
Speaker 2: potentially malicious websites or IP addresses. They can also help
Speaker 2: identify command and control or C two traffic.
Speaker 1: C two that's a communication back to the attacker, right.
Speaker 2: The communication channel between an infected system and the attacker's infrastructure.
Speaker 2: Think of firewall and proxy logs as kind of the
Speaker 2: digital equivalent of border patrol logs.
Speaker 1: Okay, so they give you a picture of what's coming
Speaker 1: in and going out of your network perimeter precisely.
Speaker 2: Then there's NetFlow NetFlow. While firewall and proxy logs primarily
Speaker 2: focus on traffic crossing the network perimeter, NetFlow provides visibility
Speaker 2: into internal network traffic what the book calls east west.
Speaker 1: Traffic east west, so communication within the.
Speaker 2: Network exactly, Yeah, showing how systems inside the network are
Speaker 2: communicating with each other. This can be invaluable for detecting
Speaker 2: lateral movement.
Speaker 1: Lateral movement like an attacker who got in one place
Speaker 1: and is now trying to spread sideways to other machines inside.
Speaker 2: That's it exactly. NetFlow helps you track those internal maneuvers,
Speaker 2: and for a much much deeper level of analysis, there's
Speaker 2: packet capture.
Speaker 1: Packet capture grabbing the actual data.
Speaker 2: Tools like TCP dump on Linux and raw cap or
Speaker 2: wind pee cap on Windows allow you to capture the
Speaker 2: actual data packets being transmitted cross the network.
Speaker 1: Wow.
Speaker 2: You can even apply filters to these captures to focus
Speaker 2: on specific types of traffic, like communication within known malicious
Speaker 2: IP address or specific protocols, so you're not just drowning
Speaker 2: in data.
Speaker 1: Capturing the raw network data that's like recording every single
Speaker 1: digital conversation happening on your network must be huge files.
Speaker 2: They can be enormous, yes, and analyzing these massive amounts
Speaker 2: of data requires specialized tools. Wire Shark is a very
Speaker 2: widely used GUI based tool for both capturing and analyzing
Speaker 2: network traffic in detail.
Speaker 1: Wire Shark, Yeah, I heard of that one.
Speaker 2: It allows you to inspect individual packets, follow the flow
Speaker 2: of communication between systems, filter based on a huge range
Speaker 2: of criteria. The book highlights its use for both live
Speaker 2: capture and in depth post capture analysis, so you can.
Speaker 1: Watch traffic live or dig through recordings later.
Speaker 2: Right. For example, you can filter to see only HTTP
Speaker 2: traffic and then examine the specific web pages or urs
Speaker 2: that were accessed.
Speaker 1: Wire Shark sounds incredibly powerful, like a microscope for network data.
Speaker 2: It really is, and for analyzing very large packet captures offline,
Speaker 2: there are tools like arkhim arkim Yeah. The book shows
Speaker 2: how you can load a captured file into arkham and
Speaker 2: then efficiently examine things like HDVP sessions and the specific
Speaker 2: web addresses that were visited. Wire Shark also has handy
Speaker 2: features like display filters to zero in on relevant traffic
Speaker 2: and coloring rules to visually highlight different types of packets,
Speaker 2: which makes the analysis process a bit more manageable.
Speaker 1: S galuring rules that sounds helpful for spotting patterns it
Speaker 1: can be, and.
Speaker 2: For detecting more subtle malicious activity, like an infected system
Speaker 2: periodically beaconing back to a command and control server by
Speaker 2: quiet check In beconing right, the book introduces Rata. Rita
Speaker 2: uses behavioral analysis to identify these recurring patterns in network
Speaker 2: traffic that might otherwise get lost in the noise. Beconing
Speaker 2: like that regular quiet signal that an infected machine is
Speaker 2: still under the attacker's control. ARIDA helps you pick up
Speaker 2: on those faint signals.
Speaker 1: Very cool that's right. Okay. So now let's shift our
Speaker 1: focus from the network to individual computers and discuss host
Speaker 1: based evidence.
Speaker 2: Okay, evidence on the actual machines.
Speaker 1: As we touched on earlier, a critical first step in
Speaker 1: many investigations is acquiring the volatile memory, grabbing.
Speaker 2: That ram before the power goes off. What are the
Speaker 2: go to tools for that? You mentioned volatile data earlier, right.
Speaker 1: The book mentions win p mem as a tool specifically
Speaker 1: designed for acquiring a memory image from Windows systems. It
Speaker 1: creates a raw bit for big copy of the system's
Speaker 1: physical memory.
Speaker 2: The snapshot of the live memory.
Speaker 1: Exactly, which can then be analyzed offline using specialized memory
Speaker 1: forensics tools like volatility, which is another powerful tool.
Speaker 2: So you take that memory snapshot and analyze it later
Speaker 2: for clues that might not be present on the hard
Speaker 2: drive at all.
Speaker 1: Correct things like running processes, network connections, passwords potentially gotcha.
Speaker 1: What about acquiring the persistent data, the stuff stored on
Speaker 1: the computer's storage devices, the hard drives or SSDs.
Speaker 2: For acquiring non volatile evidence, there are tools like silar
Speaker 2: SLR is designed to efficiently collect log files and other
Speaker 2: protected files from a system.
Speaker 1: SILR for logs and protected stuff.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and another powerful tool is KPE. That's the Kinetic
Speaker 2: Artifact Parser and Extractor. KP allows for highly targeted collection
Speaker 2: of specific types of evidence based on predefined configurations or targets.
Speaker 2: This is much more efficient than just grabbing absolutely everything.
Speaker 1: Targeted collection focusing on the most likely sources of evidence.
Speaker 1: That saves a lot of time and I guess storage
Speaker 1: space too.
Speaker 2: Exactly. Then there's the crucial concept of forensic imaging.
Speaker 1: Imaging making a copy of the drive.
Speaker 2: Right, creating a complete bit for bit copy of a
Speaker 2: storage device. The book distinguishes between physical images, which capture
Speaker 2: the entire drive, including unallocated space where deleted files might linger,
Speaker 2: and logical images, which capture only specific partitions or files.
Speaker 1: Physical versus logical, which is better.
Speaker 2: Well for traditional hard disk drives HDDs, physical images are
Speaker 2: generally preferred because they preserve everything, potentially allowing for the
Speaker 2: recovery of deleted data. Okay, However, the book points out
Speaker 2: that solid state drives SSDs present unique challenges. Why is
Speaker 2: that because of a process called trim. Trim is designed
Speaker 2: to improve SSD performance, but it can securely erase deleted
Speaker 2: data pretty quickly, making recovery much more difficult, sometimes impossible.
Speaker 1: Ah So SSDs can make the job of recovering deleted
Speaker 1: files way more challenging for forensic investigators.
Speaker 2: That's often the case. Yeah. For creating these forensic images,
Speaker 2: tools like FTK emitter are widely used. FTK imager it
Speaker 2: can create forensically sound images, meaning it calculates cryptographic hashes
Speaker 2: like digital fingerprints of the original drive and the image
Speaker 2: file to ensure the integrity of the copy, proof that
Speaker 2: it hasn't been tampered with.
Speaker 1: Hashes right verifying the copy is exact, and.
Speaker 2: The book also emphasizes the critical importance of using right blockers.
Speaker 1: Right blockers these.
Speaker 2: Are hardware or sometimes software tools that prevent any accidental
Speaker 2: modific case of the original evidence drive during the imaging process.
Speaker 2: They ensure you don't accidentally change the evidence you're collecting.
Speaker 1: Right blockers absolutely essential for preserving the integrity of the
Speaker 1: evidence and making sure it's admissible in court. Makes sense.
Speaker 1: What if you can't take a system offline to create
Speaker 1: an image like a critical server?
Speaker 2: Good question. In some critical high availability environments, shutting down
Speaker 2: a system just isn't an option in those scenarios. For
Speaker 2: virtual machines, you might create a VMware snapshot.
Speaker 1: A snapshot, yeah, like freezing it in time exactly.
Speaker 2: This captures the exact state of the virtual machine at
Speaker 2: a specific point in time, including its memory and disk.
Speaker 2: This allows for analysis of the live system state without
Speaker 2: directly altering the original underlying data.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: The book also briefly mentions using bootable USB devices containing
Speaker 2: Linux based forensic distributions for imaging physical Linux systems, again
Speaker 2: trying to minimize impact on the original system.
Speaker 1: So different environments and can straints call for different evidence
Speaker 1: acquisition techniques. Very adaptable. Now, once you have that forensic image,
Speaker 1: that big copy of the drive, how do you actually
Speaker 1: go about analyzing all that store data?
Speaker 2: Right? This is where forensic analysis platforms come into play.
Speaker 2: The book introduces Autopsy, which is a very popular open
Speaker 2: source forensic platform built on top of another tool set
Speaker 2: called the sleuth kit.
Speaker 1: Autopsy Oh open source, that's good.
Speaker 2: Yeah. It provides a user friendly graphical interface for examining
Speaker 2: disk images and offers a wide array of powerful.
Speaker 1: Features like what cut of features.
Speaker 2: Things like timeline analysis, which displays events, file modifications, program executions,
Speaker 2: web visits in chronological order to help reconstruct the sequence
Speaker 2: of activity.
Speaker 1: Timeline super useful for figuring out what happened when.
Speaker 2: Absolutely also keyword searching to quickly find specific terms or freezes,
Speaker 2: and the ability to automatically parse and analyze web artifacts
Speaker 2: like browser history, cookies, download history, all that juicy stuf
Speaker 2: web artifacts.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that tells a story. The book even illustrates how
Speaker 1: to start a new case in autopsy and add evidence
Speaker 1: sources to it.
Speaker 2: Exactly. It walks you through the basics. You can drill
Speaker 2: down into the filesystem, examine metadata associated with files like
Speaker 2: creation times, modification times, identify installed software, and see a
Speaker 2: list of recently accessed documents which can provide valuable clues
Speaker 2: about user activity.
Speaker 1: Autopsy sounds like a central workbench for digital forensic investigations.
Speaker 1: What about getting even deeper into the filesystem details For a.
Speaker 2: Deeper understanding of filesystem activity. On Windows systems, there's the
Speaker 2: Master Filetable or MFT MFT Master Filetable. It's essentially the
Speaker 2: index of the entire NTFS filesystem. Tools like MFTSCMD can
Speaker 2: parse the MFT, allowing investigators to track file creation, modification,
Speaker 2: access and deletion times, providing a really detailed history of
Speaker 2: filesystem interactions.
Speaker 1: The MFT, like a detailed ledger of all file related
Speaker 1: actions on a Windows system, even deleted one sometimes precisely.
Speaker 2: Remnants often remain, And even if an executable file itself
Speaker 2: has been deleted, you might still find traces of its
Speaker 2: execution through prefetch files. In Windows prefisch files, what are those?
Speaker 2: Windows creates them to speed up application loading. Tools like
Speaker 2: pecmd can analyze these prefetch files to determine if a
Speaker 2: program has been run, when it was last run, and
Speaker 2: how many times, even if the program's gone.
Speaker 1: Wow, prefetch files a historical record of executed programs, even
Speaker 1: if they've been subsequently deleted.
Speaker 2: That's sneaky evidence. What at the Windows registry, It seems
Speaker 2: like that holds a vast amount of system configuration information.
Speaker 1: Oh, it absolutely does. It's a gold mine. Autopsy can
Speaker 1: parse the registry, allowing you to examine various registry keys
Speaker 1: and values.
Speaker 2: What can you find in the registry.
Speaker 1: Crucial information such as connected USB devices including their vendor
Speaker 1: and product IDs vidps AH.
Speaker 2: So you can see if a specific USB drive was
Speaker 2: plugged in exactly.
Speaker 1: Very helpful in tracking potential data expiltration or maybe the
Speaker 1: introduction of malware via external media. You can also find network,
Speaker 1: hit street, user account information, recently run programs, tons of stuff,
Speaker 1: so much information.
Speaker 2: The book notes that registry analysis is a deep and
Speaker 2: specialized area, but even a basic analysis can often uncover
Speaker 2: valuable investigative leads.
Speaker 1: Okay, So from the network, to volatile memory to persistent
Speaker 1: storage like hard drives and the registry, there are numerous
Speaker 1: layers of potential evidence to examine. And then we have
Speaker 1: the often overlooked but critical area of log files. Ah.
Speaker 2: Yes, log files often the first place investigators turn to
Speaker 2: understand what happened on a system or network.
Speaker 1: But there are so many logs there are.
Speaker 2: Which is why the book emphasizes the importance of a
Speaker 2: well defined log management policy within an organization. The c
Speaker 2: search should play a crucial role in specifying what types
Speaker 2: of events should be logged and importantly, for how long
Speaker 2: the log should be retained.
Speaker 1: You need a plan for your logs, definitely.
Speaker 2: NIST provides excellent guidance on establishing effective log management practices.
Speaker 2: We can't investigate what you don't have a record of.
Speaker 1: Absolutely, So what are some key considerations when it comes
Speaker 1: to log files and incident response? How do you manage them?
Speaker 2: Well? A security information in event management or SEAM system
Speaker 2: is an invaluable tool for log aggregation and retention, particularly
Speaker 2: in larger organizations that generate massive amounts of log data.
Speaker 1: A SEAM collects all logs in one place.
Speaker 2: Exactly, a SEAM collects logs from various sources across the
Speaker 2: infrastructure servers, firewalls, workstations into a central platform. This makes
Speaker 2: it much easier to search, correlate events from different systems,
Speaker 2: and identify suspicious.
Speaker 1: Patterns correlation seeing how an event on one system relates
Speaker 1: to another right.
Speaker 2: The elastic stack, with tools like elastic Search, log Stash,
Speaker 2: and Kibana, is another powerful option for centralized log analysis,
Speaker 2: offering near real time search capabilities and visualization.
Speaker 1: SEM and elastic stack essential for making sense of that
Speaker 1: overwhelming volume of log data. What about analyzing Windows event
Speaker 1: logs specifically on a single machine.
Speaker 2: Sure, the built in event viewer in Windows allows you
Speaker 2: to view these logs. Of course, the raw log files
Speaker 2: themselves are typically stored in the c Windows System thirty
Speaker 2: two WINEVAD logs directory, and there are several key event
Speaker 2: IDs that investiators often look for, specific numbers that mean
Speaker 2: specific things like what, For example, event ID four six
Speaker 2: twenty four indicates a successful account log on four six
Speaker 2: three four signifies an account log off. A high volume
Speaker 2: of event ID four six twenty five, which indicates failed
Speaker 2: log on attempts might suggest a brute force attack.
Speaker 1: Four six twenty five lots of failed logins red flag.
Speaker 2: Big red Flag and event ID forty one O four
Speaker 2: records the execution of PowerShell scripts, which are very often
Speaker 2: used in malicious activities these days. These specific evn IDs
Speaker 2: can act like digital breadcrumbs.
Speaker 1: Those specific event IDs sound like crucial indicators to look
Speaker 1: for when sifting through Windows logs, really useful.
Speaker 2: Nuggets precisely, and there are tools to help. Deep Blue Cli,
Speaker 2: which is a PowerShell script itself, can help automate the
Speaker 2: analysis of Windows of events by identifying known suspicious events
Speaker 2: and patterns based on those ideas and other heuristics automating
Speaker 2: the log search Yeah Event log Explorer offers more events filtering, searching,
Speaker 2: and reporting capabilities than the built in event viewer, and
Speaker 2: for situations where you need to collect logs remotely and
Speaker 2: correlate them with other data sources, tools like Scotti can
Speaker 2: be very useful.
Speaker 1: So a combination of built in Windows tools and specialized
Speaker 1: utilities can help you extract meaningful insights from those often
Speaker 1: verbose event logs. Okay, let's move on to a topic
Speaker 1: that I think many find particularly concerning malware.
Speaker 2: Indeed, malware malware analysis is a critical component of incident response,
Speaker 2: no question.
Speaker 1: What are the main goals when analyzing malware?
Speaker 2: The primary goals are first to understand how the malware
Speaker 2: works its behavior, Second, what are its capabilities? What can
Speaker 2: it do? And third to identify indicators IOCs that can
Speaker 2: be used to detect and eradicate it from infected systems.
Speaker 1: Understand it, find it, kill it.
Speaker 2: Pretty much. The book introduces the concept of a malware sandbox.
Speaker 1: Sandbox like a safe play.
Speaker 2: Area, exactly, a safe isolated environment. This can be either
Speaker 2: a local virtual machine you set up yourself or a
Speaker 2: cloud based service. It's where you can execute and analyze
Speaker 2: malware samples without risking your actual production network or data.
Speaker 1: A controlled laboratory for studying dangerous software makes sense precisely.
Speaker 2: There are two main types of analysis, static and dynamic.
Speaker 2: Static analysis involves examining the malware's code and structure without
Speaker 2: actually running.
Speaker 1: It, looking at the blueprint right.
Speaker 2: Tools like pay studio can help you analyze the files metadata,
Speaker 2: identify imported functions, what Windows features it uses, and look
Speaker 2: for suspicious strings or patterns that might indicate malicious behavior,
Speaker 2: things like references to known malicious URLs or command and
Speaker 2: control servers.
Speaker 1: Okay, static analysis examining it while it's inert, what's dynamic.
Speaker 2: Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, involves observing the malwur's
Speaker 2: behavior while it's running in that safe sandbox.
Speaker 1: Environment, watching it in action.
Speaker 2: YEP. Tools like Process Explorer or process monitor can be
Speaker 2: used to monitor its activity, like the processes it creates,
Speaker 2: the files it modifies, the registry keys changes, and crucially,
Speaker 2: the network connections it attempts to establish.
Speaker 1: So static analysis is like examining the blueprint, while dynamic
Speaker 1: analysis is like watching how it actually behaves in that
Speaker 1: controlled environment.
Speaker 2: That's a good way to put it. And there are
Speaker 2: online sand boxing services like in teaser analyze an you
Speaker 2: run Joe.
Speaker 1: Sandbox online sandbox.
Speaker 2: Yeah, these can automate much of this dynamic analysis process.
Speaker 2: You upload the suspicious file and they run it and
Speaker 2: give you back detailed reports on its actions. They can
Speaker 2: even identify similarities to known malware families based on code
Speaker 2: reused analysis.
Speaker 1: Very useful automation, again handling the heavy lifting exactly.
Speaker 2: The book also introduces yarra rules ya air rules. They're
Speaker 2: essentially pattern matching rules. They allow you to identify malware
Speaker 2: based on specific textual or binary characteristics like unique strings
Speaker 2: or sequences.
Speaker 1: Of like a custom search pattern for malware precisely.
Speaker 2: Tools like Loki can scan systems for files that match
Speaker 2: a given set of yar rules, and yargen can help
Speaker 2: you generate your own yar or rules based on a
Speaker 2: sample of malware you've found. These rules act like digital
Speaker 2: fingerprints for known threats or even new variants.
Speaker 1: YARR rules sound like a powerful way to proactively hunt
Speaker 1: for known malware on your systems or even variations of it.
Speaker 2: They are very powerful, yes, and that naturally leads us
Speaker 2: to the crucial area of threat intelligence.
Speaker 1: Right connecting the dots, What is threat intelligence exactly?
Speaker 2: Correct? Threat intelligence is essentially information about existing and emerging threats.
Speaker 2: It helps organizations better understand their adversaries, who they are,
Speaker 2: their motivations, and their tactics, techniques and procedures, their TTPs,
Speaker 2: understanding the enemy exactly. That understanding allows for a more
Speaker 2: proactive and informed security posture rather than just reacting. The
Speaker 2: book outlines different types of threat intelligence, strategic high level risks,
Speaker 2: tactical attacker methodologies, operational details of specific attacks, and technical
Speaker 2: specific indicators like ips or hashes.
Speaker 1: Different levels of intel for different needs.
Speaker 2: Right. It also introduces the pyramid of pain.
Speaker 1: Pyramid of pain sounds painful.
Speaker 2: Well, it's a really useful model. It illustrates the value
Speaker 2: and the difficulty for an attacker to change different types
Speaker 2: of indicators. At the bottom, you have things like HASH
Speaker 2: values and IP addresses, easy for attackers to change. At
Speaker 2: the top, you have TTPs, much harder for them to change.
Speaker 2: So focusing your defenses there causes them more pain.
Speaker 1: Ah okay, so focus on detecting their behavior TTPs, not
Speaker 1: just the specific tools hashes they use today makes sense.
Speaker 1: So how does an organization actually go about using threat
Speaker 1: intelligence effectively?
Speaker 2: It's a cycle, really, a continuous process that involves several stages.
Speaker 2: Planning what intel do we need? Collection, where do we
Speaker 2: get it? Processing, making sense of raw data, analysis, extracting insights, dissemination,
Speaker 2: getting it to the right people, and feedback.
Speaker 1: Did it help the thread intelligence life cycle? Where do
Speaker 1: you get this intel?
Speaker 2: Various sources. It can include internally generated data from your
Speaker 2: own incidence, commercial threat intelligence feeds you subscribe to, and
Speaker 2: open source intelligence or.
Speaker 1: Ocinth ocynth publicly available.
Speaker 2: Stuff exactly, information from reputable sources like sands, Internet Storm Center,
Speaker 2: user advisories, security blogs, vendor reports, and platforms like Alien
Speaker 2: volved OTX. There's a huge man out there if you
Speaker 2: know where to look.
Speaker 1: Okay, ocent sounds like a valuable resource. But how do
Speaker 1: you make sense of all that diverse information, especially the
Speaker 1: attack or TTPs you mentioned.
Speaker 2: That's where the miter att and CK framework comes in.
Speaker 2: It's become indispensable.
Speaker 1: Miter att ANDCK here they mentioned a lot.
Speaker 2: It's a structured and incredibly comprehensive knowledge base of adversary tactics,
Speaker 2: techniques and procedures TTPs observed in real world cyber attacks.
Speaker 2: It's all mapped.
Speaker 1: Out a catalog of attack methods pretty much.
Speaker 2: You can use the ATT and CK Navigator, which is
Speaker 2: a web based tool to visually explore are these TTPs
Speaker 2: and understand how different thread actors operate at various stages
Speaker 2: of an attack life cycle, from initial access to data xfiltration,
Speaker 2: visualizing the attack chain exactly. The book stress is the
Speaker 2: importance of working with indicators of compromise or IOCs.
Speaker 1: Biocs like file hash is, malicious ips right.
Speaker 2: Pieces of forensic evidence that suggests the system has been compromised,
Speaker 2: and also indicators of attack or ioas ioas.
Speaker 1: How are they different?
Speaker 2: Ioas focus more on the actions than attacker is taking
Speaker 2: the behaviors regardless of the specific tools or IOCs involved.
Speaker 2: Think detecting credential dumping activity versus detecting a specific known
Speaker 2: credential dumping tools. Hash ioas are often more.
Speaker 1: Robust detecting what not just the how exactly.
Speaker 2: The key though, is to focus on the data, whether
Speaker 2: IOCs or ioas, that is most relevant and actionable for
Speaker 2: your specific organization and environment. Don't just collect everything right.
Speaker 1: Focus is key. Themar E ATT and CK framework like
Speaker 1: a comprehensive cat log of attacker behaviors, helping you understand
Speaker 1: your adversaries. So, how do you actually integrate this threat
Speaker 1: intelligence into your incident response efforts? How does it help
Speaker 1: the CSR? Good question.
Speaker 2: Many forensic analysis tools like autopsy, which we mentioned, have
Speaker 2: the capability to ingest threat intelligence feeds, for instance, lists
Speaker 2: of known malicious file hashes or IP addresses autopsy can
Speaker 2: then automatically flag files or network artifacts on a compromise
Speaker 2: system that match those known bad indicators during an investigation.
Speaker 1: So the tool does the matching for you.
Speaker 2: Saves a lot of time. Maltago is another powerful tool,
Speaker 2: more for visualization. It can be used for graphically analyzing
Speaker 2: the relationships between different pieces of threat intelligence like IP addresses,
Speaker 2: domain names, malware samples, email addresses, helping to build a
Speaker 2: clearer picture of an attack campaign and infrastructure.
Speaker 1: Altago for seeing the connections exactly.
Speaker 2: The book even provides a practical example using IOCs associated
Speaker 2: with the hffn IM threat.
Speaker 1: Group khifn i AM Change Attackers.
Speaker 2: That's the one active in twenty twenty one. It shows
Speaker 2: sourcing IOCs from alien Vault OTX and then using a
Speaker 2: tool called CTI encoder to convert these iics into queries
Speaker 2: that can be used directly with various security tools like
Speaker 2: signs or eder platform.
Speaker 1: Inverting intel into actual search queries very practical.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and you can also leverage Jura and low key,
Speaker 2: which we discussed earlier.
Speaker 1: With malware right the pattern matching to.
Speaker 2: Scan your systems for files matching known malware signatures or
Speaker 2: behaviors identified through your threat intelligence feeds.
Speaker 1: So you're taking what you know about known attackers and
Speaker 1: their methods and actively looking for evidence of those activities
Speaker 1: within your own environment. That's a proactive use of intelligence.
Speaker 1: That's exactly it, and that leads us directly into the
Speaker 1: concept of thread hunting right using intel to hunt exactly.
Speaker 2: Thread hunting is a proactive security activity. It's where security
Speaker 2: analysts actively search for threats that might have evaded existing
Speaker 2: automated security controls.
Speaker 1: Going looking for trouble before it finds you.
Speaker 2: That's a good way to put it. It's about going
Speaker 2: beyond just reacting to alerts and actively seeking out potential
Speaker 2: indicators of compromise or malicious activity that might be lurking
Speaker 2: undetected in your environment.
Speaker 1: Assuming compromise, sometimes threat hunting actively going on the offensive
Speaker 1: to find threats before they trigger an alert. How do
Speaker 1: you even begin a threat hunt? It sounds like looking
Speaker 1: for a needle in a haystack.
Speaker 2: It can be. The book emphasizes the crucial role of
Speaker 2: forming a hypothesis.
Speaker 1: First hypothesis like a specific guess about what might be.
Speaker 2: Wrong exactly based on initiating events, maybe unusual network traffic patterns,
Speaker 2: suspicious log entries you notice, and also leveraging threat intelligence
Speaker 2: about known adversary PTPs relevant to your industry or technology stack.
Speaker 2: You don't just randomly start searching.
Speaker 1: Okay, start with a theory.
Speaker 2: You need a specific idea of what you're looking for,
Speaker 2: informed by potential threats and observed anomalies. Then you plan
Speaker 2: your hunt, decide which systems, logs, network traffic you'll examine.
Speaker 2: You'll often use digital forensic techniques and tools, plus maybe
Speaker 2: endpoint detection and response or EDR tools for broader.
Speaker 1: Searching, using forensic skills proactively right.
Speaker 2: The outcome of a thread hunt can range from confirming
Speaker 2: a previously unknown compromise, which means the HUT was successful
Speaker 2: even if it's bad news finding something bad, to validating
Speaker 2: the effectiveness of your existing security controls finding nothing which
Speaker 2: is good, or maybe identifying blind spots in your detection
Speaker 2: capabilities where you should have seen something that didn't.
Speaker 1: So it's a continuous cycle of learning, hypothesizing, searching, and
Speaker 1: refining your security posture based on what you find or
Speaker 1: don't find.
Speaker 2: Precisely, it's an ongoing effort.
Speaker 1: Now, let's try to tie a lot of this together
Speaker 1: with a real world example that unfortunately we hear about
Speaker 1: all too often. Ransomware.
Speaker 2: Uh, ransomware, Yes, it has become such a pervasive and
Speaker 2: costly threat. The book uses the Kanti ransomware group as
Speaker 2: a detailed case study.
Speaker 1: Kanti they were huge for a while, weren't they. There'
Speaker 1: stuff leaks on line too?
Speaker 2: They were, and yes, those leaks provided a lot of insight. Kanti,
Speaker 2: often associated with the Wizard Spider and trick Bot thread
Speaker 2: actors operated on a ransomware as a service or RIOS.
Speaker 1: Model rios, meaning they rented out their.
Speaker 2: Ransomware essentially, yes, making it accessible to a wider range
Speaker 2: of cyber criminals, not just the core developers. The book
Speaker 2: outlines their common tactics.
Speaker 1: What kind of tactics did Kanti use?
Speaker 2: Things like using tools like proc dump to bump credentials
Speaker 2: like passwords from compromise system's memory, leveraging standard Windows protocols
Speaker 2: like SMB and RDP for lateral movement across the network.
Speaker 1: Moving sideways using normal.
Speaker 2: Tools exactly, utilizing frameworks like Cobalt strike for command and control,
Speaker 2: and crucially exfiltrating sensitive data via SFTP or HTTPS before
Speaker 2: encrypting local files. The double extortion.
Speaker 1: Tactic steal the data, then encrypt it nasty gary.
Speaker 2: Understanding these specific tactics is crucial for both prevention and response.
Speaker 1: Kanty's a stark reminder of the sophistication and potential damage
Speaker 1: of modern ransomware operations. What are some key steps organizations
Speaker 1: can take to prepare for and respond to such an attack?
Speaker 1: Based on this kind of intel.
Speaker 2: The book highlights the importance of a layered security approach,
Speaker 2: focusing on both network and endpoint resilience defence in depth right.
Speaker 2: This includes deploying robust eder solutions for endpoint monitoring and
Speaker 2: threat detection. Disabling unnecessary administrative shares on network systems, common
Speaker 2: lateral movement paths, Implementing network segmentation using vlands to limit
Speaker 2: the blast radius if one part gets hit, segmenting the
Speaker 2: network oh containing the fire exactly. Utilizing Microsoft's Local Administrator
Speaker 2: Password Solution or LAPS to manage local admin passwords securely
Speaker 2: so they're not all the same. Disabling credential caching where
Speaker 2: possible to prevent attackers from easily stealing credentials left in memory.
Speaker 1: Lots of practical hardening steps.
Speaker 2: Yes, and CSRT preparedness is also paramount Having well defined
Speaker 2: procedures for rapidly isolating infected systems to prevent further spread.
Speaker 1: Is key quick isolation.
Speaker 2: The book also touches on analyzing initial access methods like
Speaker 2: malicious macros and documents, using tools like ola dump, dot
Speaker 2: PIY and cyber chef to deconstruct them, and investigating lateral
Speaker 2: movement by examining Windows security event logs for specific indicators
Speaker 2: like that event ID four six x two four type
Speaker 2: three log on we mentioned, which can indicate network based
Speaker 2: logins between machines.
Speaker 1: So a combination of proactive security measures, good hygiene, and
Speaker 1: a well drilled incident response team are essential for minimizing
Speaker 1: the impact of ransomware.
Speaker 2: Attach Absolutely, preparation is key.
Speaker 1: Finally, after an incident has been contained and eradicated, oh lovely,
Speaker 1: how do you properly document everything that happened? Reporting seems crucial?
Speaker 2: It is thorough. Incident reporting is a critical final step
Speaker 2: in the incident response life cycle. You're not done until
Speaker 2: the report is done. The book emphasizes the importance of
Speaker 2: creating documentation tailored to different audiences within the organization.
Speaker 1: Different reports for different people.
Speaker 2: Yes, an executive summary provides a high level overview for leadership,
Speaker 2: c suite board members. It covers the root cause, the impact,
Speaker 2: and key recommendations for preventing future occurrences, all in business terms.
Speaker 1: The quick version for the bosses pretty much.
Speaker 2: Then, the investigation details section provides a more comprehensive narrative
Speaker 2: of the incident, timeline, the detailed findings identified indicators of compromise.
Speaker 2: This is for both leadership and technical personnel. More detail,
Speaker 2: and finally, a detailed forensic report provides the real technical
Speaker 2: specifics of the evidence analysis tools used, step by step
Speaker 2: findings data analysis. This is for the technical teams, maybe
Speaker 2: legal counsel.
Speaker 1: Different reports for different levels of understanding and different needs.
Speaker 1: What are some key elements that should be included across
Speaker 1: these reports?
Speaker 2: The book stresses the importance of a clear and accurate
Speaker 2: timeline of events. Detailing when different activities occurred during the
Speaker 2: incident is fundamental to understanding the narrative.
Speaker 1: The timeline is critical.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, detailed note taking throughout the investmentation is also crucial.
Speaker 2: You can't rely on memory weeks later. The book even
Speaker 2: suggests tools like monolith notes for effective note taking and
Speaker 2: organization during a chaotic response.
Speaker 1: Kee good notes, Yes.
Speaker 2: And the language use in the reports should be appropriate
Speaker 2: for the intended audience. Executive summaries need that business oriented narrative,
Speaker 2: while forensic reports will be highly technical and detail oriented.
Speaker 1: Tailor the language makes sense. Comprehensive documentation is vital not
Speaker 1: only for internal learning and improvement, but also for any
Speaker 1: potential legal or regulatory requirements.
Speaker 2: Right absolutely, it serves as the official record of what transpired,
Speaker 2: how it was handled, and the lessons learned. It can
Speaker 2: be invaluable for demonstrating due diligence and for strengthening future
Speaker 2: security efforts.
Speaker 1: Wow, okay, we've covered an incredible amount of ground in
Speaker 1: this deep dive, huh, from the fundamental principles of DFIR
Speaker 1: to the intricate details of evidence acquisition analysis, the strategic
Speaker 1: use of threat intelligence, all in formed by the comprehensive
Speaker 1: insights of digital forensics and incident response.
Speaker 2: Indeed, it's a huge field. We hope that you, our listener,
Speaker 2: now have a much clearer understanding of the processes, the tools,
Speaker 2: and frankly, the thinking involved in responding to and investigating
Speaker 2: cyber incidents.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you should now be able to approach discussions about cybersecurity,
Speaker 1: or even just the news headlines with a more informed perspective,
Speaker 1: recognizing the underlying methodologies and technologies that security professionals rely
Speaker 1: on every single day.
Speaker 2: So maybe a question for you to ponder considering the
Speaker 2: sophisticated techniques employed in ransomware attacks like CONTI, what are
Speaker 2: some specific immediate steps that come to mind for enhancing
Speaker 2: your own digital security practices, whether that's at home or
Speaker 2: in your workplace.
Speaker 1: That's a good one. Or thinking about the other side,
Speaker 1: given the ever increasing complexity and sophistication of the threat landscape,
Speaker 1: how critical do you now perceive proactive threat hunting to
Speaker 1: be for organizations striving to stay ahead of potential attacks?
Speaker 1: Is reacting enough anymore?
Speaker 2: Yeah? Great questions. We really encourage you to delve deeper
Speaker 2: into any of the specific topics that particularly sparked your
Speaker 2: interest today. Perhaps explore some of the powerful tools we mentioned,
Speaker 2: like volatility for advanced memory analysis, or maybe delve further
Speaker 2: into the wealth of knowledge contained within the ITTNCK framework.
Speaker 1: Online, because in the dynamic and ever evolving field of cybersecurity,
Speaker 1: continuous learning and just plain curiosity are probably your most
Speaker 1: valuable assets.
Speaker 2: Well said, until our next deep dive, stay curious, stay informed,
Speaker 2: and stay secure.