Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the Pea Show,
continuing the Cold War series with Thomas seven seven seven.
Speaker 2: How are you doing, Thomas, I'm well, thank you man.
Today I wanted to get in the get them as
a somewhat difficult topic to address, I mean, not for
the usual reasons people bandy that, but because there's so
many misconceptions both on the left and the right and
the kind of the sensible center I'm talking about historians,
I mean, and there's still a lot of people still
have a lot of strong feelings about it. Be that.
Be that as it may. There's a basic lack of understanding,
even among a lot of revisionists of the kind of
broader political context of the war world in strategic terms
and in ideological ones. And what I think of is
apocal terms. I think people who watch our content, they've
they they've kind of become habituated to some of my
my vocabulary. When I talk about apocal events, you know,
I'm not just trying to draw up on high falutin
language or or trying to create my own kind of
you know, revisionist esperanto. I can't think of a better
way to describe what I'm talking about. And that's a
rough translation of a phenomenon that Ernst and Olti describes,
you know, and it basically the way to understand it
is kind of practical zeitgeist, you know. But that's I
just wanted to kind of can clarify that. And you know,
as I've talked about before, much as much as they
esteem guys like Meerscheimer, they're kind of locked. They're kind
of boxed in to the kind of like the clouds
of wits he in conceptual UH cube as it were.
You know, like a guy like meher Scheimer. If if
one wants to understand UH predicted in terms of predictive modeling,
I think there's nobody better than him. And like, for example,
like in the run of the ninety one Gulf War,
nobody UH modeled the outcome of that conflict with more
accuracy than he, and in fact, most people were totally
off base. He's a clouset Witzian thinker through and through
and ways both praiseworthy as well as uh not so praiseworthy.
But he's so fixated on on on conceptual modeling and
unidentifying like concrete variables that can be insinuated into that
sort of modeling that he he really misses apocal uh
like variables of apocal significance. Okay, nowhere is that more
clear than in his discussion of the Vietnam War. Mershamer
is one of these guys uh on the political right,
like at the time and subsequent you know, he was
constantly he was constantly making issuing the assertion that Indo
China was was was strategically without value. You know, He's
got this idea that the global north you know, uh,
Western Europe, uh, you know, the United States in Canada, Japan, uh,
Korea and some of the some of the Upper Pacific
rim that that's you know, in the in the Middle East,
that's basically that's basically geostrategic terms, that was the only
that's the location of the only stakes worth fighting for.
But that's not what people go to war anymore, okay.
And in fact, uh states going to war over over
commodities or over you know, to dominate trade routes and
sea lanes. That's really that that really reflects kind of
a narrow uh like like like a narrow kind of
kind of narrow piece of the modern era. You know,
we're in, uh that kind of power, political competition, you know,
translated very much to the concrete the need to capture
sort of concrete resources. You know. So, uh, it didn't
It didn't matter that Vietnam, the Vietnam War happened in Vietnam.
You know, if it had happened in Nicaragua, if it
had happened and you know, if it had happened in
in Greece, if it had happened uh in uh in
Borneo like it would, it would not have mattered. You know.
That's that that's where the communists pushed. That's where politics
kind of conspired and intrigued, you know, for for for
great powers to to to come together in hostile terms.
And that's where America staked U the line in the sand.
So it didn't matter, all right, this is where communism fought,
you know, the uh, the American led opposition. You know
what what what what that's self identified as the free world,
and that's what people like, that's what people in the right,
miss Okay. I think people on the left in contrast,
you know what they teach college kids, you know, bullshit
propagated by people like Chomsky or by people like Coward's
in where they claimed that like of Vietnam War, which
is you know, the Pentagon like murder machine profiting. That's
not really true. I mean the the there there was
a kind of the logic of the body count did
become kind of uh uh a instead of into itself.
And that's perverse in all kinds of ways, but that's
kind of the case and in modern war in the
twentieth century. And I I'm getting into that in the
manuscript and right right now about Nuremberg because about half
of it gets into the twentieth century generally. And yeah,
there was you know, there was all and anytime there's
anytimes a general war on it and and Vietnam was
a general war. Okay, you had a draft uh uh
you know, you had real casualties. You know, America was
mobilized anyway one to the situation in Europe and the
ongoing uh the ongoing strategic challenge presented by the Warsaw Pact.
But I mean anytime and anytime you're dealing with the
general war situation or conditions, uh you know, with with
on that spectrum, there's gonna be there's gonna be people
and and agents and uh and and and companies that
profit from that, okay, but that's not that's not that's
not the incentive, Okay, Like you know, uh, America didn't.
America didn't kill three million people and and and and
lose a sixty thousand of their own, you know, and
eventually like impose like a decade long recession on itself
just so that it could like sell helicopters to the Pentagon,
you know, or so that Cold could you know, manufacture
the armor lite and everybody makes money from you know,
outfitting the US Army with the ship that it needs.
Like that's that that's just a very basic view of
things and that's not that's not reality. And uh something
I have to other people too, And it's hard to
be able to put themselves in in this kind of
conceptual mindset because you know, the Cold Wars like receiving
like out of living memory. But there was real stakes
the warfare in the twentieth century. I mean, that's not
to say there weren't reckless decisions made. And that's not
to say that during the Cold War, you know, men
in the Pentagon and command roles and in the Department
of State didn't intriguing and inspire, you know, to go
to war when it wasn't absolutely the you know, essential
course of action, but this was taken very seriously because
there was real consequences. But also you had a real
cod reepublic intellectuals shaping defense policy, you know, and you
really did a lot of the best in the brightest
putting their minds to the waging of warfare. You know,
on the technical side, at Los Alamos would be the
zenith of that, you know, and people quite literally developing,
you know, more and more effective nuclear weapons. But you know,
you had you hat like I mean the point of
people a lot. If this was nineteen seventy or nineteen eighty,
a guy like Elon Musk could be working on SDI.
You know, you'd have guys who are going to work
on Wall Street now was quants. You know, they'd be
working for the Pentagon or the Department of State, where
they'd be working, uh for these n g O s
you know, to figure out how to uh how to
wage World War three. You know you didn't, you didn't
just have these idiots and these uh these lose these
like losers, uh like like like Pete Botagig, where the
fuck his name is? You know, these other these other
freaks that you know, you've had in uh Washington since
nineteen ninety three, you know, just kind of just kind
of deciding that, you know, we're gonna, we're gonna generally
deploy in some theater for no particular reason. I mean
that that did not happen in the Cold War because
it couldn't happen, and it just wouldn't have It would
have been like unthinkable, you know, the degree to which
there's a paradigm shift in uh, in the public mind,
it can't be over emphasized. But what I want to
get into today, I want to get into the the
political background of Vietnam and why it became such a
critical theater. And the next episode, like I said before
went live, you know, we'll we'll get into the battlefield
situation because that's an important topic. It's not just I mean,
I'm not a military guy, and I mean it's not
really my wheelhouse, but I do know something about military
science topics in a very like abstract sense. I mean,
obviously I don't I don't have experience like like grunt
stew or something, and I would not purport to, but
the but they kind of competing, Uh, I want to
get into West Morelands Creighton Abrams and they're kind of
tactical orientation. I want to know a guy named John
Paul Van and David Hackworth, you know, both of whom
had uh had a profound the ideas that they contributed
to an asymmetrical warfare. And uh, you know, I want
to get into why the US Army really really couldn't
adapt itself. It started, I think out the Army because
Franks and the Marine Corps as well as the Air Force,
like they did adapt free well. And the Air Force
is the case. It's pretty remarkable because the Air Force
was totally purposed to essentially like drop nuclear ordinance on
the warsaw pack that they time and the and the
you know, to to repurpose their aircraft, you know, for
essentially you know, uh like like like fire support, you know,
and a conventional bombing role. That remark. But today we're
gonna we're gonna talk about politics, which isn't as sexy
as ah as a battlefield kind of stuff, but uh,
it's essential to understanding it. And in the case of Vietnam,
I think I think it's I think it's uh, I
think it's paramount or the military side of things, the
seeds of the end of China wars uh, which uh,
I mean really we we could say that it goes
it's you know, things come as in nineteen thirty one,
I mean when when the Jamis Imperial Army assaulted China.
But for our purposes, what's conventiond what's conventionally viewed as
the Indo China Wars is you know the French UH,
the French war against the Vietnam that kicked off I forty.
You know, there was the storied defeat that dym been fu.
You know, the Forid legion got you know, surrounded and annihilated,
you know, and then the American War, which traditionally is
viewed as commencing in sixty five because that's when there
was the mass conventional build up, you know, he was
involvement ended in seventy three. Saigon fell in seventy five.
I'd include uh, I'd include the uh the Khmer Rouge
conquest of Cambodia within that same like conceptual paradigm too,
as well as the nineteen seventy nine war that Vietnam
foughtings the people's the public of China, which is fascinating,
and that the latter event informs a strategic landscape today
in profound ways. I find it fascinating but actually sensible,
and I attribute this to Robert Gates also, who was
a rare like sensible man and in UH in in
power and policy corridors, you know, post ninety three. But
he UH Obama, like in my opinion, owing to Gates's tutelage,
UH lifted remaining restrictions on arm sales to UH the
People's Republic of Vietnam very obviously, you know, employee Vietnam
is a military hedge against the People's Republic in China,
which is very smart. Honestly. That's that, that's it jumped
out of me because it was one of the few, uh,
one of the one of the few part of political
moves and not only made sense, like rational sense, but
actually was was was strategically sound and you'd never really
see you as government engage in anything sensible anymore. But
en though China, you know, uh, it really it really
was kind of the jewel of Southeast Asia. You know,
there's a reason why the French hung onto it. And
it wasn't just prestige and clout the way they did.
You know, Vietnam was not just this backwater. It's a
comparatively huge country, you know, very large population, and it
was it was a cosmopolitan place, okay, and in geostrategic terms,
like I said again, that wasn't paramount. But uh, the
French indo China, according to guys who spent a lot
of time, spent a lot of time with geopolitics, you know,
beginning in really in the nineteenth century, like on Crimean War. Actual, yeah,
probably around like eighteen twelve, they final Napoleonic era, as
is that kind of closed out, and Europeans started thinking
a lot about about the the you know, the then
contemporary battlefield. People generally associated into China with the kind
of the eastern third of the mainland of South East Asia, okay,
and they viewed it as essential in that regard. Like
I'm you know, not just as like a hedge against
the you know, powers emerging within the interior. But uh,
you know, there's it's it's you know, it's got it's
got cxs obviously, you know, on this extensive coast, you know,
things like that. So it's Americans tend to be kind
of geo strategically illiterate, and they Mosto got the time
to dismissed everywhere some backwater and that's that's particularly as
guiding as at Vietnam. Like, yeah, Vietnam was largely backwards
in ninety sixty five, but most of this planet was
backwards in ninety sixty five. And those places that weren't,
like a lot of them were still like in ruins
because twenty years before, like you know, the world the
gone to hell in a hand basket, and you know
in uh there were some places, including in Europe, mostly
behind the wall, but not exclusively that I mean, it
was still like until the eighties, like you know, there
was visible like battle damage from you know, combat at
forty years previously. So that's something to keep in mind. Uh,
the uh Ho Chi Minh himself was uh, well actually
the melu that Ho Chi Minh came out of. Uh.
The Vietnamese were looking for an identity in peculiar ways,
and Vietnam is a complex society. It wasn't like North Korean.
There's something I don't know if people know the history
particularly well, it's strange. But you know Kim Il Sung,
you know who, uh who who became Stellin's protege. He
was one of the Soviet Koreans. You know, part part
of Stalin's uh you know issue with the nationalities was
you know, not just you know, genocidal uh programs against
people that he considered to be you know, politically unreliable,
but also trying to assimulate populations that he considered to
be useful, like in the kind of the Soviet sphere
of influence in his Soviet life, well, the Koreans and
the Soviet Far East he considered to be one of
these populations. And Kim Il sung really had no interest
or under in or norns of communism. And if you
look in North Korea to day, like they you know,
it's it's this kind of like prestiche of like nineteen
fifty Stalinism and and and kind of cargo cult uh
uh in military dictatorship the type of the nineteen eighties
or something.
Speaker 1: It's also an hereditary it's a hereditary dictatorship, which yeah, exactly.
I think Stalin had told them you can't, you can't
do that, and they're like, screw you, You're just gonna.
Speaker 2: Do what we want. Yeah exactly. But it's but people
have this like people tend the sentence you like transposed
that that those kinds of tendencies to places like Vietnam,
which is very very misguided and like among other things.
I'm sure some people are gonna claim that this is
me being like a chauvinistic white man or whatever. I mean.
Obviously I don't care. But I I colonize peoples, they
tend to take on their characteristics of their colonizers, okay,
and the French are very sophisticated people. Okay. Now I'm
not saying that the Vietnamese, otherwise it'd be stupid or something.
I've I find the Vs actually be very interesting. That's
why this people, I mean included. Vietnam features heavily in
my fiction, as people will see when the second book drops.
But you know, so Vietnam, like any place, whether it's
Algeria or Vietnam or anywhere or Morocco, that was you know,
colonized by the French. It was it was not gonna
it was not gonna be some backwater like North Korea. Okay,
I mean regardless, even if what the German would called
the mentioned material was was not particularly I'm trying to
be delegate here, it was not particularly capable of human
stock okay, but the Vietnamese, you know, they're uh there,
there are relatively creative people. And Uh Ho Chiman himself,
he was the son of a Confucian scholar, and he
was a mysterious guy. His birth year is generally accepted
as eighteen ninety, but that's that's never been verified conclusively.
A lot of sources, both within Vietnam and without like
claim other years. His father, his family like lived in
Central Vietnam, which was kind of like a hub of
culture as well as political activity, and this endured through
like the American War in Vietnam. But it owing to
his dad, is going to his father's prestige, you know
that just asn't not just as an intellectual, but he
was this he was a kind of like he was
an imperial magistrate like the Uh after when Vietnam became
technically an empire, like after the Japanese deposed like the
French in nineteen forty five. This is before the war ended.
It was the VC regime and Uh and Uh the
thirteenth Emperor of Vietnam who who stepped out who advocated
ninety fifty five, but because it may there was an
imperial court and Ho Chiman's father. Uh, he was. He
was like this. He was like one half like top
one half judge kind of and he was demoted because
uh for for abuse of power after some influential local
hot show was uh what was availed to summary punishment
in in Hoe's father's core, and he was sentenced to
something crazy like one hundred lashes uh with with a cane,
you know.
Speaker 3: Uh?
Speaker 2: Any and the guy died, Okay, So that so o
Chimn's dad was. I mean this he was something. I mean,
he loomed larger to say the least, and he was
he was basically a judge and an intellectual and a
confusion and a judge, intellectual and a priest kind of.
I mean, Confucianism is kind of confusing of the Western mind,
including mine own. But you know, this was not Hochman
was not some guy peasant stock like quite the contrary.
Ho Chiman did kind of rewrite his biography as communists
all kind of did, and I mean, to be fair
partisans all do that to some degree. Even Cromwell did that.
He claimed. Ho Chiman claimed that he was radicalized in
nineteen oh eight when because he was, he was sent
to Hoais city to study, okay, and he said he
came across this demonstration of these poor peasants who were
bound in this kind of peculiar form of serfdom that
existed in South East Asia. I can't remember what the
French word is for it, but it was it was basically,
uh like like think of a think of a serf
who's bound in the land and who's not compensated for
his labor, but he's like, you know, paying rent on
his occupation of the land which he can't leave. This
was a big deal in Vietnam especially, and there was this,
there was this there was this demonstration that that the
Imperial Court cracked down on violently and uh, you know,
uh the social justice type of the day, including a
lot of Catholics because uh you know obviously you know,
Catholic missioners reactive in into China owing to the French regime,
but as well as well it's kind of the the
socialist International. This was like a big deal and whole
claimed like, well, this is when I realized, like I
was a communist, Okay, I mean, well that's true or not,
who knows. But he was mired in a revolutionary environment
owing to the fact, uh owing to his family's downura
mobility and no small measure because of the scandal of
his father and and this uh, this caning victim who died.
Ho realized that he wasn't going to be able to
he wasn't gonna be able to get a job, uh,
you know, with with with with this with the Imperial court.
And he said he refused to uh to try and
work uh you know as in the in the colonial administration,
because he refused to serve the French. And that's probably true.
So what he did do was he applied to work
on a French merchant ship when he got from when
he when he got to Saigon and UH in nineteen eleven,
UH he traveled first to France and then he ended
up in Dunkirk. He got back and forth between the
UK and Marseille UH for a few years, and then
from nineteen thirteen to nineteen nineteen he was in London.
It's disputed by some these days, but there's actually a
plaque in the New Zealand House in London, you know,
which is which houses literally you know, like the New
Zealander diplomatic mission that said that like ho Chi men
worked here is like some kind of pastry chef. Okay,
so I mean he was moving in pretty elite circles.
You know. I'llbeit in in a in a kind of
in a in a kind of meal role. But I
mean he was a young guy, so it wasn't something
that would have been seen as improper for a guy
his station, and he wouldn't just be viewed as like
a kolie, you know, because he was I mean he
was even he was very young, Okay, even though he
you know, he was a teenager in the early twenties.
I mean, even though we don't know his precise birthday,
I mean that much, it's clear. In nineteen nineteen he
returned to France in part because of a French socialist
named Marcel Kasheen. I'm sure we're during that pronunciation as
they often do. Excuse me. He was an activist and
the Socialist Party of France. What Kasheen essentially convinced Hoe
of was he said, look, you know the uh, the
Versailles uh, the Versailles Summit, this is our chance to
approach the light leaders, you know about freedom for for
Indo China, you know, because now they'll be receptive, you know,
not owing to any particular uh, you know, interest in
our cause, but because uh, you know, something is gonna
have to something, something's gonna have to you know, replace
the imperial regime, and like even they have to see that,
you know. And part of this, part of this was
kind of rigid Marxist uh, you know, thinking deterministic, rather
thinking like you know this this is you know, like
reading the proverbial signs, you know, like like an auger
Wood like obviously this is you know, a crucial moment
and in the advance of history, you know, we we've
got to get the attention to these men because capitalists,
though they are, you know, oppressors as they though they are,
you know, they're they're nonetheless you know that they're then
that they're none the less serving the cause of history
as a whole men are you know? I mean this
is already clear to people who kind of understand uh,
Marxist ontology such that it could be said to exist.
Ultimate subsequently claim that what drove Droom to Paris initially
was that he'd uh was that he he joined the
group of Vietnamese patriots. Uh. That's when it translated to
the I again, I can't I can't pronounce the French moniker.
But it was this group that coalesced in Paris, Uh.
You know, most clear uh uh with the university environs.
But they all they did have some power within the
syndic within within the cynicalist unions that had and there
was a number of Asian workers like who were present
on the ground. I mean obviously because you know, the
French Empire was always UH was always was always hungry
for menial labors, medial laborers from the outer dominions. But
this this particular faction, it included UH, basically the guys
who became kind of like the core of the Vietnamese
nationalist movement, okay, including UH Fanshoo trend Fan Van Trong.
These native probably don't mean anything to anybody today, but
they they were in the inter warriors and into UH
into the French Indo China War. Uh. These guys constituted
in early cadre of of a of the political leadership
cast resisting UH, resisting French UH control political and military.
So I mean these were like heavy, These were heavy people, okay,
And I mean undoubtedly Hoe was able to finangle that
like owing to his background. You know, I mean he
downplayed his privilege and everything like that, but he I
mean he was a guy who was I mean again
he his father was, Ah was Uh. It was a
very esteemed individual as well as owing to Hoe's Confusion education,
you know, he would have had to be he would
have had to have mastered a colloquial Vietnamese in a
way that most people just would not. You know, he
developed attitude in French. You know, he knew Chinese letters
because you had due to study confusion texts, you know.
I mean he was he was very very well situated
to take to you know, to to make contact with
revolutionary cadres, particularly in UH, particularly in uh In in
UH Interwar H France. But UH and Ho Uh and
his UH, his comrades, they actually they formally sent their
letter to UH to the Allied delegation, you know, Clement
sau Woodrow Wilson. They weren't able to obtain any consideration.
But what it did do was it I I attribute
this the fact that Hoe was very he was comfortable
with Westerners, He was familiar with them as well as
his his French was was was beyond competent. It was
probably not absolutely fluent, but it was far more so
than you know, your average your average Oriental at that
time that you know you'd run into in Europe. Ho
chiet Man became identified as the leader of the anti
colonial movement in Vietnam, for better or worse. And we've
discussed in the course of our you know, of our discussions,
and I made the point myself for Pate and my
pod in my lawn form a lot of what role
any man becomes insinuated into, regardless of his aptitude or ambition.
I'm talking politically, particularly a revolutionary. If people decide that
you know you are the leader, well then you are
in some real sense, okay, And this uh the Versailles
delegation identifying how even though they effectively snubbed him, the
fact that they identified him as the leader of the
Vietnamese resistance, I'd say that that's what launched his career
as a as a professional revolutionary.
Speaker 1: Is there is there any evidence of like who he
was re thing, who he was most inspired inspired by.
Speaker 2: That's a good question, I speculate. Despite the fact, and
this is gonna seem strange, particularly because most people you
know who are familiar with the French left uh, not
just younger people, I mean even people mind's a little
bit older. They be the French Left as kind of
the driving force behind the sixty eight ers, and uh,
the kind of break with the Warsaw Pact and uh,
you know, the kind of you know, the New Left
was literally founded by Foucot et least in In in
academ However, in uh, the Inner War yors, particularly at
the time of Versailles, the French, the French Communists were
very very orthodox Marxist Lentinis. They they very much believed
in the common turn. Uh and it's orthodoxy, probably even
more so than anybody, probably even more so than the Germans,
because there was uh, you know, one of the reasons
why the so you know, the seed not the KPD
begin the ruling party in East Germany was because the
Social Democrats and and the Marcus Leninist could never come
to the table. France did not really have that problem. Yes,
France was, Uh, I'm gonna say France was a house
divided quickly. I mean would be a gross center statement.
But the French Communist, for whatever reason, they I owe
it to I owe this phenomenon to very strong cadre building.
They were very very much united. And uh, I would speculate,
and again I would I'd have to deep dive into it,
and it would be very hard, I think. I mean,
it could be done, but it would take time to
kind of tease out real data on what the primary
sources were. But whether we're talking about Paul Pott or
Ho Chi minh or Japp who uh who o Chi
minh Uh had met at Huay when he was a
student there, all these guys either owing to the fact
that they were in France or you know, owing to
the French influence upon their cadre structure, like in Indo, China.
They they they'd be reading Marx and Lenin, you know,
and they and they they then and they'd be reading
you know, they they'd be reading Hegel and they you know,
they would have become familiar with the Aristotle and and
and and they would have become and and and and
Thomas Paine and Lock. But they but they, they like
Marx and Lenin would be there, you know, their Bible
as it were. But yeah, that's a great question, and
that's kind of a fascinating subject, especially like again, you know,
like we just mentioned uh, it's uh like like amaging
the French left is kind of like the standard bearer
of you know, rigid orthodoxy is is kind of hilarious.
But I mean that's that's that's that's the way it was.
Excuse me, they, uh, this is actually what gives ryans
to the myth. I don't know, I don't know how
much this is bandied about by court historians these days,
because frankly, don't read a lot of court history on uh,
on either World War One or on the Cold War,
I mean anymore. I mean I do for like, for
dedicated purposes, like in my writing and research, you know,
like if I say like, okay, well, you know, I
like refresh my recollection with what, you know, with what
kind of like the mainstream historians of the day, and
we're saying about let's say, like the French War in Algeria,
you know, and then you know, so not not just
for the sake like teeing off on the AD, but
just kind of you know, get a sense of what
people take for granted in terms of kind of the
not not just not just the key events that they
identify as as being essential understanding the conflict, but also
kind of like you know, what what sort of values
are insinuated into the narrative, you know, and and hind
and deliberatet hindsight. But when I was uh, like when
I'm when I was high school age, if you read
like a college textbook or like if you took like,
you know, uh an international relations class in your high school,
it's say that oh you see, you know, in nineteen nineteen,
there was this Wilsonian moment where you know, Ho Chi
minh he could have adopted a pro American stance if
only Wilson had paid attention to him. But you know,
because because you know, these like mean weight men were
just like being mean and racist, like this didn't happen.
Like I think that that's nonsense for all kinds of reasons.
I mean, first of all, it's it's like kind of
sending him fucking stupid, but also it really kind of
sells people like Ho tiam In short, Ho Hiaman wasn't
there to be a koolie and like gravel for you know,
token concessions. He uh he he he basically said, he
basically penned this document and owen to his uh and
on end to the influence of kind of his French
patrons who were experienced revolutionaries. They seem to think that
Wilson would recognize Wilson and Clements so would recognize they
didn't know China was going to be a significant potential
battle theater. Okay, there was nothing friendly about this communication,
you know. And then this idea that everybody if you
if if you give HOCHI meant a coke and a
Snickers bar or Hershey, aren't get him on the head,
he'll like, you know, give you a buck tooth grin
and say I love g I Joe Coca Cola. Like
that's way more quote unquote racist than anything in Wilson's mind.
This brings us to I realize I'm jumping around a lot,
but I as we get into this further, like I
think I shall be redeemed because people will understand. And
I want to get out of the way now to
reference a lot of these things as we get into
kind of the hard and fast, uh strategic analysis of
the conflict, and I don't want to have to keep
jumping back and saying, well, this is what this was.
People talk all the time about how Vietnam was like
this grave kind of failure of collective security and why
do they say that, Well, they said because of Cito Scato,
Like what was Cito to Ito is the Southeast Asian
Treaty organization. And if you think it sounds a lot
like NATO, you'd be right, because that's what that's what,
That's what his whole notion was was created by the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty also known as the Manila Pack,
that was signed in September nineteen fifty four. And you
guessed at Manila, the Philippines. Now who who's the driving
force behind CITO? It was a Vice President Nixon who,
upon returning from Asia ninety three said, look, we need
some kind of collective security arrangement in Asia that you know,
tantamount to NATO. There was far more confidential conflict diets
in Asia. The strategic landscape was a lot more fluid.
But and Nixon realized that. But at the same time
he said that, you know, one of the reason it's
impossible to h you know, develop a meaningful, uh kind
of strategic posture moving forward is because it's uncertain like
what any what if anything, you know, anyone's willing to
commit and what what they're willing to stand on as
you know, essential interests, and uh, this creates a credibility problem.
George Kennon also was very much behind this idea, if
not CITO itself, he said, there's got to be some
kind of collective security structure of a formal nature. Now,
I make this point a lot as people for a
few reasons. People act like NATO is this magical thing
that uh, I mean obviously like anybody who claims NATO
actually still exists as a fucking moron. But UH also
subsident does exist. It's profoundly destabilizing. But we don't know
if NATO was uh, what was effective or not. What
we do know is that there was basic credibility behind it,
and UH, the Soviet Union considered America, you know, represent
a credible threat, you know if uh if uh if
the primary conflict DIAD in Europe was triggered, you know,
which was obviously the inner German border. But at the
same time, UH, America periodically had to meet Soviet efforts
to decopple UH. European collective security from American strategic interests
was one reason why America maintained intermediate nuclear forces in Europe.
That's another question, and well that's a complicated issue. We'll
get into that. But my point is that it's not
treaties themselves that that that promotes stability. It's the it's
it's it's the willingness of the signatories, you know, in
order to UH. It's a willingness the signatories. I say
it was credibility. They're in Okay, and this should be obvious.
Where the signatories two seats though, it was Australia, France,
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the USA. Okay,
I might add this out of those signatories, Australia, New
Zealand cave show up to showed up the fight the
Vietnam War. Okay. France had just fought the vietnamn UH
for eight years and been defeated. Thailand was definitely a
combatant in the Vietnam War. If for no if I
mean they this was very much below board in terms
of special operations forces were very effective, but Thailand unconditionally
availed UH, their their bases and their airspace to do
anything that the Allies needed. The UK UH, the the
UK just UH. This caused great consternation. Anthony Eden profoundly offended.
H U S Department of State of the Era and
UH by essentially making it clear UH that that the
UK would not commit any kind of collective security arrangements
as regards the no China. Why they put pen to
paper on the middle of pact, that's another question that's
kind of complicated. It ordered the kind of the weasel
wards inherent to UH. To diplomats, I think I'm not.
I don't know if I'm gonna hatred of of of
I don't know if I'm gonna hatred of diplomats in
an of themselves. But there is a there's a kind
of a lawyer ball they play about, you know, qualifying
their willingness to hottern treaty obligations and UH. In the
case of the UK UH deciding on with Seito, it
had a lot to do with the claims of well,
this is this is a quote defensive alliance, I mean,
which is meaningless and more in peace. As Carl Smith taughtus,
there's another thing as an offensive or defensive war. All
wars both offensive and defensive. But that's a bit upside
the scope. Any event, it was cedy was headquartered in
uh In in Bangkok, Thailand. Incidentally, two and again Dulles, Uh,
John Foster Dallas was one hundred percent behind it. Two.
In fact, he could be viewed as kind of the
primary architect, like I said Nixon. Nixon was was convinced
a formal club of security arrangement was necessary, modeled roughly
on NATO. Dulles was the one who pushed for CIDO
as the answer to that. And it was Dulles who
who who uh who was profoundly offended by Eaden's anyone
to commit what is interesting? And it goes to U
two that like the quote special relationship between the United
States and the UK, I mean there were people in
the UK who had fake realize the UK lost World
War Two, and Eatan's a complicated figure. And a year
later in ninety fifty five, like Eden mcame Prime Minister.
But that's he's he's one of the more interesting post
war uh British executives I think. But yeah, as it
may like he he made it clear that the UK
was was was was gonna sit out anything that happened
in in in Southeast Asia. And it's an interesting question,
you know, I mean the obviously neither Eden nor anybody
else wasn't kind of augur. But you know, war literally
came to the UK's doorstep, uh in Northern Ireland and
uh there revisional IRA's efforts were very much perceived as
as as part of the anti colonial movement. Okay, I mean,
I don't want to I don't want to start some
big controversy with people. I'm not sitting here saying that
Canadians were a bunch of communists or something like that, Okay,
but it point being everything else aside, even if even if,
even if it's been some kind of hawkish uh like
proto Thatcher type at Downing Street, I don't the situation
that actually developed in the UK in the sixties. I
don't think they were in a position to be they'll
be fighting some general war against against you know, North
Vietnam and you know, halfway across the planet. But isn't
ans counterfactual? The uh, the background of what the what
immediately gave rise Desito From April twenty sixth until July twentieth,
nineteen fifty four. Uh, there's a Geneva conference in the
Status of Indo China, Like why was this convened? Well,
the French uh had you know, had just taken a
defeat by the VIETNMM at the end been Fu, uh,
which I would say was other than Singapore, you know
where the where the Jamons and Pupil army just just
like smashed the United Kingdom. That Singapore is the most
devastating defeat every levied to a white Westerner by a
uh a arising a rising non Western state them ben
Fu was the second, okay, Uh. The psychological impact on
this was devastating, and the Vietnam showed that they were
a marshall race. Okay. They man handled artillery up the
mountain side and and bombarded the French positions. You know.
The uh, the the Vietnamese of a genuine they've got
a genuine aptitude for war. We'll get into that as
in the next episode, as we get into the kind
of battlefield realities of the war. But that aside the
characteristics of the Vats themselves, aside. You know, France, Uh,
France was a real military power in those days. Okay too.
They weren't slouches, you know, and they weren't uh, they
weren't you know, the France nineteen fifty four wasn't the
France to today. You know, these this wasn't some half
assed army of a of mercenaries or something either. I mean,
it was the French Foreign Legion, you know, and these
were crack troops, you know, highly motivated, arguably uh arguably
the best equipped the army on the planet at that point.
You know, it kind of was confortable you know the
United States. Uh, it was coin of the year. They
it was connerable with the United States was fighting with Korea,
you know, after after a mobilization kicked off in earnest,
but uh, becase it may uh there's need of a conference.
Uh and the statisment of China. Half of it was
it was it was purpose. Half of it was purpose
to deal with issues resolving from the Korean War, you know,
and the UH and then the armistice, and and half
was the kind of resolve the French you know, China situation,
which is the recipe for as to begin with. Okay,
like you don't take that approach the you know, just
say yeah, we're gonna, we're gonna we're gonna knock out
two birds of one stone with this like great conference
and you know, we're just gonna figure out you know,
the based the whole status of Asia by you know,
putting the right you know, put it put putting, you know,
putting the right putting the right paperwork together. I mean,
all the things ridiculous. UH. The delegation, the delegations UH
represented on the status of Korea. It was the Soviet Union,
Peoples of Public in China, North and South Korea, and
the U s A and the Indo China side of UH.
The of the UH at the conference was France, UH.
The Vietnam although a non state actor, you know, they
had a formal representation UH, the U s s R,
the U s A, the People's Republic in China, the
UK and UH, the nascent, the UH, the maybe not
maybe the believer I should say, like UH success or
government in Vietnam to UH? What UH? What had been
the Beshy regime that was deposed by Japan, which says
I indicated at the start of this conversation at the
start of this talk only had a year to remain.
In nine to fifty five, there was the there's a
referendum in the emperor stepped down and Bao Dai was
the emperor to be replaced by DM. What was the
status of Vietnam? And I am a be four. Well,
there was two regimes of Vietnam. There's a Democratic Republic
of Vietnam led by the Communist Workers Party UH, and
the State of Vietnam, again by Emperor Bao Dai. The
Democratic Republic of Vietnam was strongest in the north and
in the center of the country, but had some followers
in the south as well. So basically what you're talking
about is you're talking about a country that's uh almost
it's a political map of it looks almost like leopard
spots at this point. It's okay, and UH the UH,
the seat of soerity that's claimed by the emperor is
is really a sovereign in name only, Okay. At the
time of the French defeat, sixty five thousand documented members
the Workers Party lived south of the seventeenth Parallel, which
is what became the divider between North and South Vietnam.
In the me calling Delta region alone, which is UH
in in in northern South Vietnam, so I mean a
key strategic piece of real estate, there was thirty thousand
party members concentrated. In addition, there was one hundred thousands
others in the south whore you know, sympathized with the
Vietnam or who were you know, just uh, you know,
card carrying communists of varying stripes. In short, the UH,
the the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which whose sole representative
was the Communists. They could claim membership throughout the entire country, okay,
the the formal state of Vietnam led by the emperor.
Part of the problem with this was UH was part
of the problem with characteristic of those resisting the communists
UH movement globally, you're looking at a house divided. You know,
the war had World War two, had had destroyed the
right for all time, there was no there was no
real political right anymore. Okay, there's reactionary elements, you know
who backs people like Emperor Bao Dai. You know, in
various monarchists. You know, there was people who didn't really
have a political consciousness, but they you know, they they
were hostile to Communists for self interested reasons. You know,
there wasn't there wasn't theresign really corralling these people. You know, like,
you can't build a movement, particularly when you're facing off
against dedicated cadres. You can't just build. You can't just
build a political You can't just you can't build a
political army based on opposition to something, you know what
I mean? That was that more Nowhere is that more
evident than Vietnam. And I think that I can't really
be overstated because the the Vietnamese who resisted the Communists
really do get kind of a bum rap. You know,
they're either they're rather casts as cowards or or just
you know, uh, you know, these kind of these kind
of third world uh kleptomaniacs or or just uh, you know,
pitiable kind of uh Lackey's and Koli's Like that's not
the case at all. I mean, they were a mixed bag,
but there were they they had disadvantages from Jump and
the people who should have been looking out for their
interests most aggressively we're not doing so I think on
on the military side, I think I think they were
the uh there was uh, there's plenty of American commanders
in South Korea. South Korea really came to fight in
the Vietnam War. They deployed there their forces around fifty
thousand men for countries as a Korea, it's a major deployment.
But on the military side, you had some very game,
uh commanders who very much wanted, you know, to give
the the South enemies what they needed to win and
uh and and led these guys into combat very briefly.
And these guys performed well with with honor. But uh,
on the political side, you know, it's like what what's what?
What what do you have in South? What do you
have and what became South Vietnam. It's like, okay, you
got you got a cadre of like kind of upper
league mobile or Kodrie kind of like upper lya mobile
Catholic types, which the French were still here. You know,
you got you you got, you got guys are basically
small business man who don't like the Communis to take
their stuff. You know. Uh, you got the Buddhists. We're
kind of like put upon by everybody. You know. You
got various minorities like a montag Yard Zone Sundry who
you know, realize their numbers up if the Communists win.
But I mean there's I know, it probably sounds like
I'm somebody who's like totally fixated. I'm owing to you
know kind of the the central emphasis of my research
being Nuremberg and and kind of the political theoretical trajectory
of things. Subsequent but imarious problems in the Cold War
really can be chalked up with the fact that, you know,
it's like, well, you know, if you're waging waging a
war of excrimination against the political right, like it's not
that that doesn't you're you're not living all hubble lot
when you're trying to draw up on your own cadres
to defeat the communists. And in Vietnam. Uh, that's a
topic that's not particularly emphasized, but I uh, I think
it's more important than in some theaters like legit.
Speaker 3: I I it uh.
Speaker 2: And as we'll get into like later in the series,
America learned this lesson in part by the final phase
of the Cold War, and that's one of the reasons
why the the that the conference are so effective in
places like Nicaragua, where honestly, the the Santin Eastern regime,
the story has probably invested more in that regime than
any other sense. Uh tens the Vietnam era. I mean,
it's as a client regime outside their media scare of influence.
I mean, but.
Speaker 3: In any event, uh, the the the uh.
Speaker 2: There's ne EVA conference basically all all it. All it
did was formed wise. It it formalized the division that
was already burgening. You know even in the even before
the French had been it had been defeated at them Benfu.
But what it did was it created this kind of
arbitrary dividing line to create kind of the fiction that
you know, there was there was two sovereign states here
that were at war and like that was never that
was never the case. I mean, the Vietnam War was
a civil war. I mean it's not me. There's not
me having sympathy for the devil or or or you know,
trying to simplify the political strategic situation. A civil wars.
One seems to be a civil war because great powers,
you know, converge, uh and and and and draw like
an imaginary line on the center of the country. That's
quite literally what happened. The fact, uh, the fact that
you had you know, we'll get into this too. You know,
North Vietnam was a crack army. It was an incredibly
game for US as well as like a truly conventional army.
This idea that Vietnam is just kind of like weird
guerrilla war, like that's bullshit. Yeah, there's aspects of asymmetrical war,
particularly in the Mekong Delta and particularly early on. Make
no mistake, the reason why Vietnam was so bloody and
so brutal is because it was a conventional war where
firepower carried the day. The North Vietnamese UH the only
way that uh, the only way that they could accomplish
their political objectives was through a conventional military victory. And
they knew that. This is one of the reasons why
America deployed so heavily. The way that they did was
that misguided uh not in and of itself. But we're
gonna get into why that didn't produce the results that
it had to. But this is a This is also
another example of how this you know, whether or not
we accept the kind of whether or not we accept
the quote democracy is utilized at present and even during
the Cold War when it actually had, you know, some
kind of identifiable meaning, even if it was only like
contra marcist Leninism. I returned to kind of the Schmidtian
notion that it doesn't do you any good at war
to have this kind of ongoing discussion in policy terms,
because even if people are doing some in good faith,
which they never are, because this becomes another means of
exploiting divisions within the electorate for some sort of competitive advantage.
But even if that were not the case, you know
that you don't you don't endlessly debate military questions as
if they're you know, ordinary policy matters. And the fact
that that's what a general war became led to some
really perverse outcomes, both on the battlefield and in terms
of what came to be considered a success in political terms.
And I think Vietnam was a rare situation where the
political and the military was questions were basically synonymous, and
Depentagon on some level recognize that, but the way they
preceded in actual policy terms, whereas if these were two
discreet things that had success metrics independent of one another,
if that makes any sense other than the more more
of what I mean in the next episode when some
concrete examples emerged as to how this phenomenon played out.
But ultimately, and I'm gonna wrap this up in a minute,
what need of a court led to was this fiction
of two Vietnams, okay, and it created a pathway, or
at least a roadmap to uh unification that was supposed
to obviate any potential crisis of authority, but it UH,
it was contingent upon it. It was, it was, it was,
It was contingent upon in plain language, you know, both
purported sovereign governments advocating any use of ourn force in
order to affect a political outcome and dominate UH the
future state by way of a single party regime. And obviously,
you know, the Hanoi government always claimed that the Vietcong
or the National Liberation Front was was was independent of
of of their authority. It was the spontaneous up art.
There was some shoot to that, but obviously Hanoi cadres
were operationally insinuated into the NLF. The Saygi regime always
maintained that, you know, the NLF was nothing but UH
a direct client of Hanoi, and that so long as
it existed, it constituted a terrorist threat to the UH,
to the universe, to the unification process, and so none
of the terms that Geneva agreement had to be honored.
So I mean that this this outcome was entirely predictable, okay,
I mean, there's there's basically no way that there's basically
no way that any other, any other outcome would have
been emerging. But that's that's why the kind of political
UH foundation was so murky and and kind of unworkable,
you know it. And I also got to show you that,
you know, make this point a lot there's I generally
don't engage people because it's it's just like bad fait
the bullshit. But people don't know what they're talking talking about,
like those who look, you know, they love the baby
about colonialism and how bid this was. It's like, okay,
so you really what I just described here, Like you
really think that's superior to having like the French administering
Vietnam like I I mean, like in what way, shape
or form? You know? And you could say that, well,
that was just another example of you know, white Westerns
imposing this paradigm like it really wasn't man. I mean,
the reason why it was so dysfunctional in Fubar is
because you did have that. You did have Beijing like
having their say, you did Moscow having their say, and
obviously you know, in having their say, they were deliberately
sabotaging their proceedings and creating conditions we're in, you know,
UH A cadre based movement, could you know, effectively sabotage
any government that immerged in the South. But you can't.
You can't. You can't just you can't just shut down
a conversation by saying, oh, that's just like something the
white man imposed, I didn't know China, you know. So
it's everybody's always people act like this kind of you know,
people act like the nineteenth century regime that endured really
till nineteen nineteen ninety twenty, you know, like you know, Britain, France, Germany,
you know, dividing up the world. Uh, in these in
these key theaters, Like was this like a bold situation?
It's like, well, what's your alternative? They're like they never
they never have one. You know. It's like this idea
like the world's kind of exists in sits you and
like it's it's like a place of plenty in peace,
but then people screwed up just but like imposing politics
upon it. It's like I think ontologically, like I think people,
it's like don't like a lot of people and people
are particularly dumb. They just like can't grasp like the
ontological reality of politics. I mean, I don't know, but
at any event, let's uh, let's let's wrap up for
now because uh uh I want to shift gears with
what we get to do next. And I realized this
might have been a little bit dry, But again, like
I said, I'm gonna reference all this stuff when we
get into the the uh you know, discussing the battlefield
situation and uh and and kind of the political uh
maneuverings of mister Kennedy and mister Jonas and mister Nixon,
so it becomes important. But yeah, I I hope, uh,
I hope this didn't bore people at death. I hope
they got something out of it relating to the topic.
Speaker 1: So just run through or anything you want to promote,
and we'll go.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, yeah, indeed, I mean, good things are happening.
We uh you know, like I said, within the next
week or so, we're launching the YouTube channel at one last,
steel Storm two is dropping this month. To be on
the lookout for that. I've got some big stuff happening
on the podcast. But I'm gonna announce that formally on
uh on the next pod episode, which you're gonna become
more frequent. But you'll you'll uh, I don't want to
I want to get into that like on the pod.
But yeah, that's all I got. You can find me
on Twitter at Triskelly and Jahad the he is A seven.
Find me at Substack Real Thomas seven seven seven dot
substack dot com.
Speaker 1: Thomas, I appreciate it. Until the next time.
Speaker 2: Yeah, likewise, thank you people.
Speaker 1: This is part seven of the Cold War series. Thomas
seven seven seven.
Speaker 2: How are you doing, everybody? I'm okay man today. The
issue with the Vietnam conflict, as we kind of got
into last episode, it's not just that the the sort
of controversy around it that endures to this day, you know,
in terms of ethics and in terms of policy critiques.
I mean, something has contrived. Some of it's not. But
even if we take people's sort of values and partisan
ideas are the equation entirely, the Vietnam conflict straddled, for
lack of a better way to characterize it or describe it,
in multiple epochs, in in in terms of political and
military affairs, you know, as Vietnam jumped off and earned
it says, we'll get into what which was very much
during the Kennedy administration. I know some people have this
sort of like, uh, you know, this this uh, this
revisionist notion that O. Kennedy was trying to disengage from Vietnam.
That's not true at all. But even if regardless of that,
the uh uh, a paradigm shift in military affairs was
underway from the post new look Eisenhower era, you know, uh,
which was kind of bookended by the Cuba crisis, which
you know put an end to that kind of thinking,
you know, and and from that kind of like the
first phase of the American War, you know, like sixty
two to sixty five, I guess you could say represented
you know, that is sort of a gray area between
you know, sort of policy orientations the uh, the kind
of revolutionary period in the Third World where like you know,
the Color Revolt, if you want to look at it,
like that was an underway, full swing. You know what
the what what remained of the Western Powers were still engaged,
you know, uh, Spain, Portugal, France who just you know
been issued to crushing defeat at the end ben Fu.
You know, they were trying to they were trying to
find a way to you know, utilize firepower and the
technological ads that they enjoyed, you know, in order to
in order to advantage them and in counterinsurgency warfare. Vietnam
ended in the nineteen seventies as the era of true
strategic parody. It was emerging from the United States and
the Soviet Union and major powers were disengaging from the
Third World in direct capacities like owing not just the
fact that you know, independence was causing more and more
conflict diets to emerge where escalation could have brought the
superpowers into direct collision, like in nineteen seventy three in
the Middle East, but also it's because you know, there's
a certain weariness for you know, this kind of constant
engagement and act in combat and in multiple in multiple featers.
So Vietnam is important for all those kinds of reasons,
but also just uh it there's because of all those
things that just describe and kind of the you know,
the historical situatedness of the conflict in like temporally, I mean,
there was there's a lot of data to be derived
from it about about warfare. You know, when the roamies
the road in terms of combat and things and technology
and how these things impact impact the modern battlefield. But
also you can extravlate things about the American system and
how particularly uh, particularly wartime administrations. Uh, the politics uh
is very much insinuated into the decision making process. I
don't mean high politics, although that is the case too.
I mean these kind of like domestic intrigues still over
into the decision making process as regards you know, war
and peace decisions. And that's very bad. And obviously this
this gained a lot of momentum, you know, during the
kind of meat you know, uh, the rise of of
of the you know, the modern or contemporary not modern
contemporary like news cycle, which really began in the sixties
and seventies, you know, like reacing its zenith, you know
in like nineteen ninety nineteen ninety one where he had
the true twenty var news cycle and the Gulf War
on TV. I mean, now obviously that's done. I mean
there's certain like like media is ubiquitous, like in a
way never it's never met before. But there's not as
bully pulpit of like the news media, you know, the
terrestrial news media that's what everybody watches and that controls
you know, narratives and the parameters of discourse. Like That's
what I was talking about. But to dive into the topic.
There there's nobody who's more associated with Vietnam than and
Robert Man, okay, and Errol Morris, who I'm a great
I've got great scheme for I mean, this was weird
nevish type, but he he makes great films. You know,
he did a documentary on Fred Later you know who
authored the report. He did a documentary on on Donald Rumsfeld,
you know, in his I mean not to go too
far afield from our topic, but Errol Morris really pioneered
the documentary style of filmmaking in a way that's become convention,
and him letting his subject and his you know, obviously
his primary uh, his primary efforts are biographical of historical
personages or of people are just interested in, like in
the case of Laketer, but putting the camera on the
subject and letting the subject just testify, and Morris asking
his questions off camera or the or the you know,
the filmmaker or the interviewer asking off camera like Morris
and vented that style. But he I highly recommend anybody
The Fog of War. I think it was released in
two thousand and three. That's a pretty good kind of
capsule summary of McNamara's career from you know, it's the
testimony of McNamara himself. But because it's only like a
two and a half hour film, obviously a lot of
things are left out. But I highly recommend that to
anybody who wants to learn more about macnamara. So let's
talk about the man himself, Robert S. McNamara the S
stance for strange. His middle name was Strange, Robert Strange McNamara.
He was the longest serving Secretary of Defense to this day,
from nineteen sixty one to sixty eight. Nowadays, even administrations
that have a comparatively strong mandate, you know, they played
musical chairs with their cabinet postings. But even even uh,
even in McNamara's epoch, it was unheard of for a
Secretary of Defense to serve that long. Okay, like, why
did he serve this long? Well? Mat the Mari team
from Humble oura Jins. He was born in San Francisco
in nineteen sixteen. His father was the sales manager of
some kind of wholesale firm that literally made shoes and
other things like this, okay, like shoes and boots for
you know, like nurses and factory workers, So I mean
like part of the upper kind of like the lower
middle class, upper working class. He proved himself to be
a prodigy of swords with mathematics what we consider to
be logistics and data management, well, I mean logitics. Is
this in those days we consided to be like data
management today. He graduated ninety thirty seven from Berkeley, went
out of the Harvard Business School in ninth and graduate
ninety thirty nine. Obviously, right around this time, you know,
the New Dealers War was was jumping off. It was
only about you know, two years away. And when Magnamar
found himself in uniform, he ended up in the Army
Air Corps. And guys of his kind of caliber and
intellect tended to be shuttled that way for obvious reasons.
And he uh he entered the army as a captain
in forty three. He served under Curtis Lamy, who then
was a colonel with macnamarin La May. And it's interesting
because macdernala May and and and McNamara gets into this
in the in the Fog of War documentary, Like mcnamver
is probably the closest thing Lea May had like a friend,
but like mac namers, you know, and he's like, I,
I I don't. I felt like I didn't really know
the man very well, you know, at all. And then
it's like when when Lamy died, apparently May's widow, kind
of mac namaran is like, yeah, Curtis said, you know,
he loved you. He said all these great things about you,
and mc namurrs like, really, like I idly heard the
guys say more than one word, but any of it.
Matthamas as a young officer kind of a defecto adjutant
to le May. He he kind of demonstrated his chops
for uh, for military logistics and just kind of you know,
applied applied analysis of of of of you know, the
mission at hand and in terms of like getting results
within the you know, rationale of what of of what
armyra coor was charged within the Pacific. Le May and
mag the mirror. They came up with a way to
assault the Japanese mainland from the Marianas Islands instead of
having to you know, jumped the Himalayas it has been
his had been done. And this o the things I
don't quite understand, like you know, fuel consumption versus load,
you know, versus you know, travel within or rebolvable, the
jet stream and all these kinds of things. You know,
the complex the complex calculus of the then nascent science
of uh military aviation. Okay, so the magna mirror. The
guy really was a polymath. Okay, I mean he and
he demonstrated that really by the time he was about
thirty years old. Well, my man, I got discharged. He
ended up at the Ford Motor Company in nineteen forty six.
And uh, the Ford Motor Company. It seems strange these
days it was like a college reason't really meaning thing.
But in those days when it was a rare credential
and when uh, unless you were one of these kind
of rich boys went to Yale or something, if you
went to college on merit, it's because you were a
guy who really really knew his stuff. There was very
view there's there's there's a dearth of of of managers
and an executive officers at Ford Motor Company were college educated.
So guys like mcnamurr was in demand. He got recruited
dinner in the as a manager of planning and financial analysis.
He he he advanced rapidly by nineteen sixty when he
was in his early when yeah, it was in his
late Yeah, it was nearly forties, been like forty three
forty four. Uh, he became the first president of Ford
Motor Company outside the Ford family, Okay, which was a
huge deal. And this was November ninth, which is a
date that I think we're all familiar with, and if
you were not before, I hope that after watching stuff
that Pete nos I do, you're familiar with it now.
November nineth nineties sixty was when he became first president
of Ford. This was one day after after JFK was elected.
And uh, during his uh, during his tenure at Ford,
both as what we now consider a quant and like
a corporate accountant, and during his brief tenure as president,
he's credited with basically like making Ford competitive in the
post war period, like after like the government pork like
went away obviously, and this in the nineteen fifties and
early sixties, like a huge amount of American automakers like
just cease towigs. It's okay, I mean the all these
kind of a kind of brand. Some of them endured
like ame c endured to like the seventies or eighties,
but like there's a huge number of of automotive brands
that went under during the nineteen fifties. It was I
mean that, uh, I means one part, one part market corrective,
one part that just you know, just the scaling back
of of the subsidies they'd enjoyed, you know, during the
kind of staladays of the new deal for big manufacturing firms.
But in any event, JFK. Whatever we can say about him,
and I don't want to. I don't want to get
into a discussion on the man's merit or character or
that of his politics. One thing I said disputable is
that uh, he he with the exception of of of
the kind of naked nepotism in the case of his brother.
But I consider that to be more of a matter
of self preservation, you know, with installing him and as
the Attorney general, with the exception to that. Kennedy or
and ors advisors, they had a remarkable eye for cabinet talent,
and Kennedy's uh Kennedy's first choice for Secretary of Defense
was Robert A. Love It, who'd been the secondary defense
under Truman. Interestingly from fifty one to fifty three, height
of the Korean War, so obviously Kennedy was looking at
it for a man who had served as a wartime
Secretary of Defense, Okay, which indicates the kind of hard
realism pre Cuba that Kennedy's not conventionally credited with. But
that I think it's clear if people know how to
read between the lines. But the reason why he broke
love at first is because he didn't. He nobody thought
that man Kimura would leave for a mortar company. So
it's like it wasn't even it wasn't even like consideration,
not on grounds his mirror or anything. It's just that,
you know, the guy with a freaking all star and
love it also have been appropiated. George Marshall and I.
I don't think the Marshall Plan was this great power coup.
I don't think it accomplished much of anything other than
other than putting some shine on the occupation regime, which
really which needed to be rehabilitated, UH in order to
get the Boomist Republic to play ball the way the
Truman and Hour and the Truman and later I administrations
needed it to. But that's another story. George Marshall heed
trumant his clout in those days, and UH A lot
aside in the fact again that he you know, he
uh he cut his teeth as a wartime defense secretary
public the fact that prior to that he serves Marshall's
Undersecretary of Defense, and he was very much a protegy
of the guy. But uh a lot of declined. He's like,
you know, out of raw fatigue, I think. But also
he said, you know, I you uh, you should, you
should you should poach magnam Era because he'll probably take it.
And uh, Kennedy went through started shreiver uh and offered
him the Secretary of Defense position or the Secretary of
the Treasury. Magnumer immediately accepted the appointment of Secretary of Defense.
Was Magma knowledgeable about defense matter as well? I mean,
I mean compared to compared to anybody since uh Cheney.
Let me qualify that. I mean, I hope people think
not not in proud of that Cheney's a total piece
of shit. When Chaney was Secretary of Defense under Bush
forty three, I think he very much had a sense
of what needed to be done in the transition era
from the UH from the from the as the Cold
Wars literally ending, Okay, And I only invoked him because
regardless of the guy's character, which I think we're gonna
agree is not something laudable, and whatever other issues he has,
he was a highly qualified Secretary of Defense. No, we
did not come up through the military, but he was
something of a polymath, and he understood military matters as
we are as policy or the roomies the road in
a really splendid way. Subsequently, I think the Secretary Defense
these days is something is is kind of uh, it's
almost like it's almost like kremlinology. You gotta look through
the kind of a pig. There's always like sinecures that
don't mean anything anymore, and people's titles don't actually indicate
what their roles in fact are, like I think I
think Robert Gates was the de facto like shadow foreign
policy president. I also think that Secretary Defense has become
Secretary of State in a real way, which is very strange.
But in the Kennedy era, these cabinet positions carried a
lot more weight and uh, there's a lot more transparency
in terms of the man who said who held the
office was very much the decision maker, with some mirrow exceptions.
You know, uh, there when you have an executive. It
was as much of a who was as much of
a hands on the sort of authoritarian his FDR. Yeah,
they're very much for some people are ciphers and key roles,
because he simply didn't want them to do anything. But
exempting that, you know, you, uh, if you've got a
pointed Secretary of Defense, you were a pretty heavy hitter.
And magnaver was one of the fourth Secretary of Defense
because until you know, the until Nuremberg was Secretary of
War was the cabinet posting. But that's that's uh, there's
a lot to unpack there, frankly, but that's that's outside
our scope. But in any event, mcmaarr was kind of
a perfect choice for this arrow, okay, because uh, the
technology and I mean this was this was the dawn
of the information age, Okay, like computing as we know
it was very much just kind of beginning then, and
it begun during the Second World War, but in an
applied capacity it was emergent. Uh, macnamara understood logistics better
than anybody. He understood highly scaled systems and management of
those systems and how do I identify variables and the
bouted rationality of the system in question and what it
was purposed for. You can identify like what was most
essential to production. And that's an odd skill set. That's
kind of like what management comes down to in the
burn up sense of managerialism. I mean when I say management,
I don't mean some dick who like manages a home depot,
and I don't mean like the way you eat like
fatty char ladies talking about management. I mean in terms
of you know, actual actually knowing how to knowing how
to optimize the performance of of a both the human
element and the autonomous element within some highly scaled structure,
you know, with all kinds of variables, some which are
more essential than others, you know, but the core ones
that facilitate productivity and the most concrete ways you know,
need be identified by most people can't do that, and
particularly in un member his day. Yeah, as it just indicated,
you know, this was like the dawn of the information age,
and you know technology there's there's gonna punctuated equal every
of the technology and then we can all agree on that.
You know. Uh, it's like once there's there'll be one
innovation and then you know that that that that leads
to others. You know, in a very kind of in
a very kind of in a very kind of rampid capacity.
This was under this what was underway, But you didn't
have at your disposal like all this kind of you know,
you didn't. You didn't have consumer tech that we take
for granted and big business in those days. You know,
like you didn't you you you're basically like using like
a pen and paper an antarchist like proverbially and sometimes literally,
you know, to handle like massive realms of data. So, uh,
the kind of like the right man in the role
and the aromastos men not for conspiratorial reasons but rand
their pological ones. You know that it was this was
this was more essential then than even today, although it's
still like remains essential. But Macnamer's philosophy, in his own words,
was uh. He said, the senator defense in the then
current era had to take an quote active role. He said, uh,
you know, he aimed to provide aggressive leadership, questioning, suggesting alternatives,
proposing objectives, and stimulating progress, just as he had done
at Ford Motor Company. That might sound corny on its
face or like corporate pr like magnamr Is the Concert
company man, but in his case, I think he really
believed that, and honestly, I think in a lot of
respects that's like what he accomplished. He rejected radical organizational changes. Look,
I just indicated there was there's a lot of people, uh,
both within the military establishment and also within the policy establishment.
And this was very incestuous in some case is too,
but on Capitol Hill there's all kinds of people who
are trying to force uh, you know, these kind of
top down changes to the military apparatus. You know the
command structure, you know the way forces it being were organized,
you know, uh at at that division level, and you know, uh,
and and what weapons systems we're gonna get privileged over others?
There even there was really is that there was a
there was there was debate about the draft and its future. Okay,
uh this Uh there was a committee I cannot remember
the name of it, and I'm sorry, headed by a senator,
uh Stewart Synington. He wanted to his committee with him
leading the charge. They wanted to abolish the discrete military departments.
They wanted to replace the joint chief the single chief
of staff and you know not and and and and
give him dominion over they wanted to like an inner
service command structure. Okay, you know, you abolish discrete ranks
between the services. You have like this unitary command structure
that went to this one man who in turned of
accountable only to the president and his national security cabin which,
in my opinion is a terrible idea, but like this
this was kind of thing among other stuff that was
being taken seriously then, you know, and mat the mirror
as soon as he took office, He's like, no, that
that ship's over with, you know, like, shut the fuck up.
That's not happening. You know, we're not well, we maybe
will be you know, we we maybe will be fighting
World War three at you know, in a few years,
we're probably gonna be at war, you know, in in
a secondary theater, you know, within months. We're not when
we're not gonna completely upset the We're not gonna cpletely
upset the wagon and uh for the apple cart, you know,
and and start playing games with you know, with with
force structure organization. And that was and that and that
actually that that was that that that was huge, okay,
because things would have I Simington's idea was particularly stupid,
I think, but there's all kinds there was all kinds
of stuff being bandied about that wouldn't really that wouldn't
really kind of upset the ability of h of the
entire defense establishment to react. And really from from after
the Cuba crisis, I mean in seventy three and then
an eighty three, I mean, yeah, there was there was
the punctity crisis of a strategic nature and that were
truly critical, but about every two years, like in between,
like you there were there was some kind of like
what you can think of as like brush fire uh uh,
crisis of a secondary in a secondary theater that that nonetheless,
you know, like required an active response. And this ultimately,
this is one of the things that led to like
the creation a special Operations Command, but that that stuff
had the scope too, you know, like a unitary command
or special operations forces. Unfortunately, a lot of disasters happened
for that to become uh implemented. But that's kind of
always the way it is, not just with the military.
But uh, what was Kennedy's polity policy envision If you
want to understand Vietnam's escalation, I don't just mean the
punctioning of escalation. That was yielded or exploited, depending on
your perspective, by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution Vietnam. True
engagement with Vietnam went began with Eisenhower, Okay, in a
real capacity. And when when when Kennedy took the oath
of office, there was there was special Operations forces types
on the ground who were directly engaged with the communists. Okay.
So I mean it's this this idea that you know,
this idea that you know, like I said before we
went live, Oh, Kennedy was trying to disengage from Sally Stasia.
But then you know, Johnson, this this this bad guy,
you know, just engage us, engage them. Is the country
at war? Said he could you know, make money by
you know, bell helicopters, selling selling stuff to the Pentagon
or whatever the fuck? Alverst Stone and Howard is in
claim that did not happen. Kennedy UH in his UH,
in his UH speech to Congress in March twenty eighth,
the UH, the core emphasis of the speech was defense.
It was Cold war, it was UH, it was war
in peace, it was power pilotic stuff. In part because
you know, Nickson was always not just kind of on
a campaign trail. I mean, Dixon was not just always
trying to portray Kennedy as some as some punk rich
kid who was went by in the years he was
He's basically he basically was always calling him a pussy,
you know, and saying like he's soft on communism. You know,
he's a rich kid. He he doesn't he does not
have the presence to command, nor does he have like
the knowledge, you know, which is not wrong, because Kennedy
was a lot of things, but he was like stay
in the Kennedy's he was a gangster's son, and he
was a war hero when he started in the brown Water.
Like the dude was kind of a bit you know,
like yeah, like yeah, he wasn't like a big pussy
or whatever. I mean, yeah, but the but I mean
politics is politics and being what it is. That's you know,
and I mean it wasn't just Nix and other people too.
They you know, Kennedy, he he had kind of like
a boyish charm like our phony might think that is
like he did not you know, he didn't come off
as uh this like a heavy personage and especially succeeding
Eisenhower like this, like the Soviets were genuinely afraid of Eisenhower,
and uh, I think for good reason. Like I'm not,
I don't think eys I was this rare genius like
some people do. And uh, I think in some ways
he was an ugly eye in terms of his character.
But he uh, he was a ruthless so ob, you know,
and he he definitely had a kind of command presence.
I mean that goes without saying. But okay, the out
line to to uh the March twenty eight, ninety sixty
one speech when he outlined, as he said, look, massive
retaliation is a doctrin and he's like, that's over. Okay.
It's like, so is the new look as it's been
you know, as it was uh euphemistically assigned. You know,
He's like, we're not we're not gonna rely on on
first un splendid first strike capability, nor are we just
gonna rely on the nuclear deterrent, you know in low
A conventional forces, like it's not realistic, it's totally flexible
and and frankly it's uh and frankly it's it's it's
totally it's it's it's it's it's morally bankrupt. You know,
you don't you don't you don't keep the peace by
threatening that several states of the world look like massive
like genocidal counter value with Saul, you know, like as
a standing policy, but it uh, I mean it being
someone for but there really was like there, like the
kind of MIDEU that Herman Khan came out of. And
I think Herman Khan was great, and I'm not putting
shit in him at all, but either the MIDEU of
Khan and Van Neuman, like there were guys like like
genuinely autistic guys, uh who'd uh you know, come up
through uh academia and and game theory and stuff. Who
who were suggesting things that you know, made sense in
terms of you know, the the raw variables of of
balance of forces and capabilities or were just like where
just like grossly moral offensive, morally offensive in terms of
like uh, in terms of policy orientation, but I mean
like doctor Strange Love Like yeah, it's like it seems
like over the top ridiculous, like something that piecedic movie,
but it was like ranging on like a real phenomon,
you know, like uh, which is which is kind of
funny but also kind of fucked up. But uh, the
he Kennedy also, to his credit, and this wasn't realized
until Carter and a presidential director of fifty eight and
fifty nine. And obviously the technology at that point it
made it far more critical for human decision makers to
assert control over nuclear arms and commanding control. But things
were already moving in that direction whereby not only were
we we're we're human decision makers being sidelined, but the
military and specifically Strategic Air Command was very much taking
control of these processes. And Kennedy, you know, said that
Scott to stop, you know, and and mag and Urra
was exactly the man to kind of see to that,
you know, in terms of structuring forces and protocol strategic forces,
I mean to uh, to obviate the threat of of
civilian control and the commander in chief role being appropriated
by by a military element. He manter I believed it
more to obviate that than anybody until Carter. And as
we get into the Carter era, we're gonna talk about
like all that cool stuff. I think it's cool fancied
by the late Cold War and the kind of strategic
nuclear paradigm and and artificial intelligence there in some people
will probably think that's boring as fuck, but I think
it's really cool. But in any event, what's key, uh
about Kennedy's policy speech on defense was uh, he said, quote,
we need to operate with an eye to to quote
prevent the steady erosion of the free world through limited wars. Now,
this is the crux of why America went to war
in Vietnam. Okay. The way you gotta look at the
Cold War is that obviously there's the ongoing strategic nuclear
threat of you know, a total war between WARSAW picked
and NATO, which would be catastrophic. I mean that goes
out saying, but the real issue on as a basic
stability ensued between the superpowers, it could be imagined and
the team b the you know, the the TV exercise
and the men who uh, the men who organized and
facilitated it and who were instrumentally getting regular elected. Frankly,
the scenario these guys painted was like, look, imagine in
America where essentially all of Asia save South Korea and Japan,
all of Latin America, say, Mexico, all of Africa save
like a handful of the Arab states who are nonetheless
like Soviet aligned, you know, goes Communists or becomes basically
sympathetic to the communist perspective and is either staked out,
you know, a position of absolute which in the Cold War,
or as a veil itself as a Soviet proxy. Like, yeah,
America would survive in those circumstances, but it basically be
as a garrison state that was kind of second rate
power within the Western hemisphere, you know, surrounded by a
hostile Like that's a very that that's a very dangerous
world to live in. And a lot of the things
we could even if even if some kind of perennial
piece could be achieved, a lot of the things we
take for granted, we just would not exist, you know.
Uh that would it kind of frozen American tech and
American wealth at a certain point because just by virtual
of dominating the rest of the planet, you know, like
the Soviet Union could have kind of like remade the
world in its own image, kind of like how America
like remade the world in its own image after nineteen
eighty nine, which is not a good thing. But my
point being, like people act like the Cold War was
this kind of like ridiculous paranoid fantasy, or that it
was like this excuse to like so munitions and helllicopters
you know, by defense contractors, like it was in fact
the real thing, and this was this was the potential outcome.
Really until until Gorbachev and until the Stowe's folded their flag.
It wasn't this binary thing like either you know, total
war or peace or you know, ah, this communism doesn't work. Yeah,
it doesn't work, but it doesn't matter all because of
the ship doesn't work that you know. Nevertheless, like indoors
or shuffles on like like some like like some fucking
Frankenstein's monster or something like that. That was a very
real possibility. And Kennedy's uh, what he was saying here
is look, if we ignore, if if we ignore theaters
like you know, China, if we ignore theaters it's up
there in Africa. If we ignore especially you know, uh,
developments in their own backyard. I mean, that's two folds
on the road doctrine. But that aside a minute. You know,
it's like we're gonna die like at death by a
thousand cuts. That's regards our ability to you know, influence
the course of politics and the rest of his planet.
You know, and you do you really want to be
like a garrison state, albeit a continent side garrison states
as large as all deficient, self sufficient, But you do
you really want to be like like the American island
in like the Red World. I mean that that was
that was not only poignant, but he was very realistic.
And I give Kennedy aught of props for that for
that speech. Like I said, I'm reading wind the lions
as he intended, Gogress read wind the lines. But that's
that's I'm not a Kennedy fan or apologist at all.
But not only does that go ahead, I'm.
Speaker 1: Sorry, let me ask, Okay, he said that the Cold
War was a very real thing. Is that because of
was it?
Speaker 2: Was?
Speaker 1: It a continuing ideological war between the the neo conservatives
and who started them and the Soviet Union that whole time.
Speaker 2: Well, there's wars within that, there's wars within that camp.
I mean, do you want to know what I think?
I agree with the Yaki's perspective that the Doctor's plots
like that epoch, not that incident itself, but that incident
was demonstrative like a break within the communist camp, like
if the leadership cast Okay, and that's also one of
the reasons why, like Israel up and just became like
massively anti communists, like all of a sudden. Okay, so
yeah there was that. The Soviet Union became this kind
of strange thing, like, yeah, it was. It was. It
clung to revolutionary socialism till the end of its life.
But like was it a Marxist Leninist state, Like as
much as such things existed, it was. But uh, you
know what the Soviet Union really had going for it
was the kind of Soviet DDR model that was really
appealing in the people in the Third World. You know,
like uh, Olive from North when he was under cover
like doing verty shady things. When he landed the Monagua airport,
he relaid back under like like State Department cover roof.
He liked their teleux or whatever. He's like, a Managua
airport it's a mirror. It's He's like it's a mirror
image of a checkpoint Charlie in the inner German border.
You know, He's like these a bunch of nicarag was
running around acting like they're the Stazi. You know. He's
like this is and I mean that spoke for itself.
So even when even when Stalinism, even when the even
when the even when the war's up pack kind of
like even after sixty eight, and I mean even before
like putting six days on the formal breach, you know,
with the new Left, even when like nobody in France,
nobody in the Netherlands, like even comedies, I mean like
looked like the Soviet Union for inspiration, like you better
believe that, like hundreds of millions of people in Africa
and Latin America, you know, in Indonesia, like they did,
you know, like that's they looked at that as like wow,
this this is a great model of progress. And you
know where we we don't need to suffer, you know,
the we don't need to suffer the pain of exploitation
to reach you know, uh, the bounty of of of
technive technology and and plenty and modern productive, productive techniques.
You know, all we have to do is sign on
with the Soviet block and we'll get all those things.
And plus like you know, they're gonna they're gonna lead us,
They're gonna lead us to this tilleric utopia because eventually
we're gonna fight America. I mean like that, and yeah,
within that, like the godfathers and neo conservitism, like they
became like on that target list ironically, Like that's why
I like communists like a Frankenstein monster. Like a lot
of people who are like called which is the meaning
was term, but a lot of people are called like
anti Semitic people are like, oh, how can you say that?
You know, Communism was you know, emerged from the Jewish
world of social existence. The Soviet Union hated Jews. It's like, well,
there's such a thing as like, you know, there's such
a thing as you know, a bale of prague. Okay,
like you create something and it gets out of control
or it turns on you. But it's also too like
ideologies aren't any like one thing. It's like you can't
say like communism was Jewish or just not Jewish or that.
You know, the coalition that created it in Russia, you know,
consisted of like X Y Z kind of people and
nobody else. The Soviet it was a weird coalition of
like indigenous Slavs, uh, you know who who hated the
European overcast, you know, Uh, they were aligned with a
slightly more cosmopolitan element, you know of of Ashkenazi Jews
who hated that same overcast for different reasons. And these
people don't really like each other, but they had common
enemies and common interests. And when that fell apart in
in large measure because uh, the situation of the Jewish
people are internationally totally changed after Nuremberg again for the
Delphin Declaration. Yeah, they stop keeping up appearances at all.
And yeah, I agree with YACKI basically that if you
were on the right after a after about ninety fifty
three fifty four forty five, they were running around like
a John Bircher like calling for the death of Ivan,
you were, you were a fucking idiot, I mean basically
because it Russian's definitely like the Soviet Union definitely wasn't it.
Then Russian honestly is not really your friend if you're
a white western man. But they're not really your enemy either,
I mean, and it's they as a hedge against people
who really are your enemy. Is better that they existently
not exist. But that's probably a subject for whatever episode.
But yeah, the but the Cold War, the way to
understand it in very raw terms, especially in the Kennedy
era before things got a little bit more complicated through
the taunt and then like when the Colder jumped off
again into Earnest in ninety it's not it's not reductions
to say that there really was a quote colored revolt underway.
This was the question of the day in power, political
and military terms. It was very much led from Moscow.
It was facilitated by warsaw pacts, arms, logistics, equipment, foodstuffs, technology, manpower, everything,
and that's what was on the table. Yeah, there was
no deeper nuances to like the ideology that had created it.
But in uh and as the world that stood when
Kennedy took the oath of office, like the Cold War
was what I just described, and that was a very
real thing, you know, Like I said, there were yeah,
guys like Yaki, guys I got a Reamer Yaqui was
dead by then. But what he'd been saying before, and
what Reamer was saying until the d die was you know, uh,
you get if you're a European, you know who's under
occupation and which all which they all were. I mean
it's still this day, but in those days, you know,
the Red Army was also in Berlin. But uh, you know,
I said, you need to be very careful about what
you wished for and in and and and then advocating that,
you know, the Soviet Union should be destroyed because it's
really the only hedge against the traditional enemy of Europe.
And I agree with that, but uh, for our purposes,
I have besides the world situation as it was in
ken of the other of office, because like people this
idea like oh, you know, what a bunch of horse ship,
we got to go fight the communists and now or
or they'll be over here, like that was not what
was on the table. And that's not what anybody thought.
And the potredominant theory. Wasn't this like crazy thing that
John Bircher's thought or that crazy general's thought, like this
was actually happening like huge swaths of the planet or
going red. Okay, Stalinism had real cachet and you know,
a huge in in in in one huge global popular
and the entire like Raizon Detras. Opposedly, neurim Berg was
we're gonna create this world society. I know, we even
have the United Nations and so okay, well if like
you know, at that at that time, and then there's
about like and I think there's about like five billion
people in the world. It's like, well, if like four
billion of those five million people like think that communism
is great, you've got a problem. Okay. I mean that's
what the Cold War was about. It wasn't about you know,
when I walk outside Terry Hood, Indiana, you know there's
gonna be some there's gonna be some chinaman with a
red star in his head and being it. You know,
it's gonna like fucking you know, charge me and and
like you know, turn me into fucking sashimi and like
enslave my wife and you know, make everybody's go to
the drive in and watch like shitty communist movies. Nobody likes.
Like that's not what people thought. Maybe some people thought that,
but that's not you know, like that, that's not what
underlay the Cold War, and like people like, man.
Speaker 1: Well, let me let me ask you another question. It
almost makes it almost makes it sound like you could,
like somebody would say that they're reactionaries and how you
know how people on the right are always just we're
all reactionaries. It makes it sound like if the if
the third world is turning red and these dominoes are falling,
there's a reason why they're doing it, and they're reacting
to what they're seeing happening to Europe. Basically, yeah, and.
Speaker 2: It seems like that's the case too. And that's why
I mean today there's something that is I spend a
lot of time. I spent a lot of time reading
about and kind of studying as much as they can
what uh what what what what some of these like
Middle Eastern Nazi the actors are doing. And a bunch
of these guys like a popular Front deliberies at Palestine
General Command, like who who are big time a lie
with Worsaw act like they flipped his lomic like very
profoundly okay, and like very immediately after the wall came
now and like some people be like, oh, you know,
those guys just being mercenary and doing what they have
to do to keep you know, money and weapons flowing.
I don't think it's that simple, man. I think to
your point, a lot of these guys they were basically
they basically had contempt for like the features of capitalist
modernity that they considered to be like most offensive. You know,
whether it's like sexual essentiousness or you know, like the
erosion of uh of of meaningful roles for men and
women or you know, like mixing between races or you know, pornography,
and I there there is a certain puritanical aspect of
communism as it manifested in the Third World, but even otherwise,
you know, like that was one of the things the
uh that was that was a cause of refrain. There's
like I'll get the fuck device and stuff in the DDR,
you know, like I mean there was like not like narcotics,
but like prostitution and sex stuff and all kinds of
really crummy social ills. But at least the official line
was that this stuff nasty, it's it's it's it's it's deplorable. Uh,
this is the kind of thing characteristic in the Capital
is West, Like we don't have any truck with that,
and and this kind of thing should should be identified
and stopped out wherever we find it. So yeah, I
think there's an aspect of that and uh and yeah,
that's but that was that was the jockey's old point
and some of the people he inspired subsequent, like Thompson
and like and like James Maddle who a lot of
people think it was a crank. I actually hold him
in a lot of steam. Uh. They that that was
the point is the op points that Washington and New
Yorker are in Los Angeles are or help a lot
more quote unquote red and Moscow in East Berlin ever
were ever will be. So yeah, there's an aspect of
that that's a kind of a good question, and it's
like a it's like a question, is it quite It's
like a theoretical philosophical aspect to it, like we just raised,
but there's also like a practical aspect and in concrete terms,
the way people we are like leading their lives, you know,
like you raised two that's what That's why I raised
the use of these Middle Eastern peoples and stuff, because
I was I think they're kind of like a bell
weather for sort of radical tendencies. But I mean, that's
that's my I've got my own thoughts on that, and
that's that is like way too far outside of scope.
But yeah, i'll uh i'll uh i'll uh I'll try.
I'll try and get to the point and I wrap
this up to realize, been a rambling for a minute,
but the.
Speaker 1: Uh, I can ask questions to get people doing that.
Speaker 2: But no, no, I I I appreciate you asking questions, man,
Like I I appreciate that, like the give and take.
I mean you, I mean you always you always in
situ way like meaningful stuff that i't a lot of
time I haven't thought about. But also it's just, uh
it helps me because I I have wore sometimes that
like I go out too many tangents because my brain
just sort of works that way. But yeah, I way
interject whenever you want and don't. I'm not gonna feel
explated or something. But the uh, the the uh yeah,
Kennedy's basically I mean would basically underlay all this too
in uh again kind of like raw strategic terms too,
like without I mean, aside from the politics. Kennedy realized
that you need a lot of you for lack of
I forgive me if this sounds like flippant or silly,
but you need like a number of mini options in
military affairs in terms of your response. Okay, it can't
just be either like massive assault, massive counter value assault,
or some kind of like inglorious retreat or doing nothing,
you know. I mean that's uh, it's like Highlight said
the Starship Troopers like this, which is like a thinly
veiled metaphor. I think the critique of a of a
like Eisenhower, Truman and Eisenhower era military thinking. Like some
young officer Cannedy says it like this grizzled like invagery captain, Like,
what the hell, what the hell do we need conventional
invagery for? And the captain it's like, let me ask
you something like if a child's misbehaving, you cut his
head off or you stink him, you know, like you
you know, you know, you'll just like maintain a hatchets
like in the misbehaving child. You know. That's uh which
seems like the Coby kind of silly, but it's actually poignant.
And uh yeah, that's something we take for granted as
the way things develop, particularly through the Reagan era and
in terms of military affairs. I mean, but in the
nineteen and in the nineteen fifties, really through like fifteen
ninety sixty, people were literally talking that way, like hey,
we've got nuclear arms we can threaten anybody with, you know,
basically like counter value genocide, Like why why do we
need why do we need invest around with conventional forces?
You know? And that's that seems crazy, but that but
it wasn't just I'm not talking about like I'm not
just talking about like goofballs like in the media or
something like you equivalent of like internet guys of the day,
Like I mean like like actual guys would out and
policymaking circles, you know, and guys who had uh, who
had a chest full of ribbons and and and a
half full of brass like you know, fucking talking this
white man. But it's Macnamara. And then that's why we'll
get into this I g as we as we proceed
in our series. But the roots of the revolution and
military affairs are here with Macnamara, and Macnamara one of
the things he diligently worked towards, I mean, the Vietnam
War ended up taking off like a huge amount of
his time and labors, but obviously but uh, developing a
conventional capability not just for the purpose of flexible response,
but to really make like a devastating conventional capability the
kind of sphere point of American power that very much
came from Magnamara. And he realized the way the world
was going, and uh, part of it was he realized,
you know what we just talked about that you know,
nuclear arms are purpose for a very very specific exigency
that almost never ever ever occurs. But also just you know, uh,
the dawn of the information age, the uh, you know,
the kind of rapid, uh punctuated development of all these
applied technologies. You know, like things were becoming possible in
the battlefield that were unthinkable even you know, twenty years ago,
you know, and and in the in the then present,
it's the uh and Macnamer Macnair's fortune is really during
the Kennedy administration. I mean, if you need any more
evidence that Kennedy really did kind of marry the US
and the Republic of Vietnam in terms of in terms
of you know, uh, global security policy. Uh, it was
uh it was mac damara who who put together really
the first military advisory group that landed in Vietnam, like
in real depth. I mean, yeah, going back to Eisenhower,
there's been you know, advisor on the ground what became
Military Assistants Command of Vietnam, you know mc V. It was, uh,
it was during was when Kennedy was still alive. It
was during the last you know, like year and a
half of his life or whatever. The mac namara raised
force levels to about for a few hundred about to
about seventeen thousand, okay, and I mean this was well
before the Golf of Tonkin incident, Okay, in August nineteen
sixty four, after mister Kennedy was dead, of course. But
the uh, the and the Golf of Tonkin is a
tricky issue too, Like I I don't know how to
approach that because it warns more attention than I'm giving
it right now. But people talk about it like I
know that I'm gonna get it, like hate messages for this,
because I do. Anyway, from the libertarians, a libertarians have
this idea about the uh about about Article one an
Article two, like expressly delegated powers they do these things
like they do the gold standard, like something like they're
Sacroe stack and never ever change or something. But formal
declarations of war between powers that enjoy equalities of status
and a multipolar world where if have planet's like divided up,
you know, between these information powers and where like a
change in the status of relations comes from like a
formal declaration of war. And this is a recognized policy
instrument that doesn't happen anymore. Maybe that's bad, maybe it's not,
but it doesn't happen anymore. And since Nuremberg. It's not
thinkable for that to happen anymore so for guys to
come out and be like, well, actually it requires a
declaration of war. Like, no, that's not how things work, okay,
And I'm not gonna like worry aboudy the next position
for the next hour, and like why it doesn't work
that way? But it doesn't. And you've got to take
my word for that, okay. And and Article two and
expressing delegated power that is not negotiable and does not
change with the times. Is the president being the commander
in chief okay? And the president ability to command forces
is not contingent upon a nineteenth century style declaration of war. Okay. However,
considering Congress controls the purse strings, it's a good idea
to make your case for why you should get, you know,
endless money in cargo to wage the war. That's what
the Gulf of Talking was about, Okay. Was it a ruse?
Maybe it was, Maybe it wasn't. It doesn't matter. Josh
was gonna get his war somehow, or his mandate somehow.
With Johnson's war, Congress had to find a way to
give him the uh, give him the uh, the the
the Tabula rossa to do so and to and also
signal of the Pentagon that they were willing to they
were willing to foot the bill. And this is the
way it came together, you know, basically to protect the record,
you know, because America, I mean, he's the fiction of oh,
we're always fighting defensive wars. Hey, we were attacked. And finally,
like we talked about in the last episode, there was
a lot of fictions that went into the drawing of
the map and into China after nineteen fifty five, and
whether North and South Vietnam or truly sovereign states that
was even really clear because the only the seventieth parallel
was supposed to be a stop gap measure pending you
know name pending country wide elections were by the to
be a single seat of government and that didn't happen.
And the UH and and the DM government claimed initially
that that was because the NLF, you know, the viet Cong,
you know, had resorted to violence in order to in
order to sway in order to sway you know, opinion
in their favor to terror. So these elections are definitely postponed. So,
I mean, it's not as simple as well you know,
the Republic of Vietnam's a sovereign country and it's under
assaults and we have an obligation to them moral as
well as duristic. Like the beginning it is that it's
not as it's not so simple the sailor the Golf
of Tonkin incident, for the alleged incident, and the resolution
was like some ruse by evil mister LBJ to you know,
get a war man date or so mucho a lie
and oh, by the way, that's illegitimate anyway, because there's
no declaration of war like it's eighteen forty like not.
That's not the way he approached it. And like I said,
I know people are gonna send me like fucking messages.
I don't care if I'm right and you're wrong, but
that's important and I'm I'm the last person who's gonna
defend LBJ in the record. But whether it been Kennedy,
whether it been Ike, whether it had been mister Nixon, uh,
they probably would have finastic goal better than LBJ did.
But they would have gotten their warman day in some
similar way. Okay, they just would have Okay, that's that's
not arguable. Obviously, after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was
m was rushed through. Uh that's uh basically the escalation
over Vietnam like but it literally began like with the
air war, and inially it was massive intiliatory air strikes
against naval targets and and and targets within a North
Vietnam proper that were said to, you know, be facilitating
it's it's it's it's blue water navy capability, which you
know supposedly is what had brought you know, American vessels
under assault. But from there, I mean the uh, the
kind of fix was in and people can I mean
the fixes in run characterizecuse. Like I said, I believe
within the bound rationality of the Cold War, the Vietnam
War had to be fought, okay, and I I stand
by that position. But mag Namara, even it had that
not been the case, you know, man if in this
area defense, uh, you know, like a he can an officer,
I mean, you're you're accountable the commander in chief. Okay,
I mean it's not it's not like Magnamara. Ahead. You know,
first of all, you can't you can't need some conscientest
objector and fulfill your obligations in the offense of secondary defense.
But whatever McNamara did or didn't do, I mean, he
was executing the owners of the commander in chief, and
policy does not originated with the Secretary Defense's Office or
at the Department of the Army or Depentagon. Frankly, However,
as we get into McNamara's success or as true successor,
Melvin Laird, I think I think, I think, I think
that the career of Lair and the kind of the
trajectory of his tenure and his machinations against Nixon and Kissinger,
I think that was kind of the origin of the
true like modern deep state as we think of it.
There's always been shadow government, shadow governments, not the deep state.
That's something that was emergent, in my opinion, really interested
around the nineteen seventies. But in uh, in any event,
uh Magma anyway, he he uh, you know, Magna visited
Vietnam repeatedly, like in person, you know, I mean he
and and not just not a diplomatic meeting greets, you
know where he revisited, you know, DM or two and
go to go to some embassy party and then you know,
take some like handshake shots of some general I mean
he he visited mcavee. He he spent time at Long
Been asking junior officers, like, what's going on here? Is actly?
You know? Uh? He spent time pouring over uh, you
know body count statistics that were coming from the title
uh headquarters you know in the field that you know,
like DOCTA or whatever, and saying like you know this,
this isn't right, this is not possible, this idea, it
was just like this kind of ghoulish warmonger just like
signing off and everything or you know, somehow enriching himself.
I mean, Magnemara, we don't need to sit here and
like feel sad for magnemer He ended his He ended
up at the World Bank. Subsequently, he had a very
good life, you know. But but the fact is in
public life he was ruined. You know. It's like, what
what great stuff did Macnera get from you know, this
kind of seventy years of managing the Vietnam War. Like
it's not it's not like he got like some great
benefits from this. He knows how he pulled us a
lens Ski and like was pocketing a billion dollars and
what he would have been a nobody before, like This
is like a huge step down, you know, like Magnaver
didn't get anything by by waging the Vietnam War on
behalf of Johnson, Like he really didn't. But we're coming
up in the hour here. Let's I'm gonna get into
Melvin Laird and the rest of Magnamara next episode, and
we can do that whatever you want, like even this week.
And I'll uh, I realized the gind of got it
cut to the chase. It's just somebody is a personage
just kind of towering his magnumbry. It warrants a lot
of attention, like more so than some than some people
and even some presidents. But yeah, so I hope I didn't.
I hope I hope I didn't drag it out too
long for you're okay, great, Yeah, yeah, I figured you
would have like kind of reined me in if I
was like point two far on tangents. But yeah, no,
thank you, Pete. This was really great. Yeah.
Speaker 1: I mean the only reason I interrupted was I had questions.
Speaker 2: So I want to take up that question proper too.
I'll get a dedicated episode. Maybe it was like the
bookend when he finished the Cold War. That's like a
hugely important question and to me especially like I spend
a lot of time with it, you know, just going
to my own kind of interest in things. So yeah, no,
I interject whatever you want, man like please do like
it helps me organize my thoughts.
Speaker 1: All right, quick plugs so we'll get out.
Speaker 2: Yeah man. Uh as people might have noticed because I
tweeted it out as well as I announced that on
my subject hit like steel Storm two. Uh. You know,
my second science fiction novel. It's been printed, it's it's
in it send the hands of Imperium Press. I gotta
touch base on my dear friends there anyway, but they
physically have it, so I'm gonna get word from them
when it's gonna go up for sale on imperium press
dot org, and I'll drop a word of that. In
the meantime. You can find me, uh you find my
podcast and so on my long form at substick. It's
real Thomas seven seven seven dots substack dot com. You
can find me on Twitter at Triskellian Jahad. The T
is a number seven. But if you seek me on
Twitter you should you probably shall. We'll find or just
like start Thomas seven seven seven. That's basically where I'm
at where I'm active right now. I am launching the
YouTube channel by the end of the month, I promise.
I know it's been delayed and delayed, but by the
last day in January, and I mean before then, but
by the end of January, like the channel will launch.
So please look for that two it's uh Thomas TV
on YouTube.
Speaker 1: I appreciate it till the next time.
Speaker 2: Like, man, thank you very much.
Speaker 1: Thanks. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pea
Show for a Part seven is eight eight of the
Cold War series. Thomas seven seven seven.
Speaker 2: How you're doing, sir, I'm very well man, thanks for
posting me as always. Don't feel bad. I only I
only know that it's part ocho because that was indicated
when I joined the meeting that is Cold War with
Thomas Part eight. You know, like uh, like Jason takes
me in hand. But it's just like Thomas fuks on zoom.
But uh, because it may We're going to continue to
flesh out, you know, the career of Robert McNamara and
the Vietnam conflict, not just because mcnamarror is a key personage,
you know in understanding the Cold War, I mean represented
a certain type truly. You know, people derisively would refer
to people like McNamara and Thomas Schelling. We'll talk about
probably the episode after naxt he was another brilliant Shelling.
I mean he was not a brilliant polymath. He was
instrumental in Cold War strategic planning and uh, you know
gaming scenarios that uh that were where in you know,
a strategy could meaning meaningfully be incorporated into exta technology
and weapons platforms. And the degree to which the shape
policy at every level like cannot be overstated. I mean,
I guess on the one hand, that's obvious because we're
talking about you know, I mean, I mean the essence
of the political is war and peace. You know, kind
of the zenith of war fighting technology is a general
nuclear war, even if you know, we stipulate that a
lot of the kind of hysteria around nuclear weapons is
just that hysteria. But you know, the Shelling was far
less of a public figure than magnam Era. I mean
for a few reasons, not uh that that I think
are obvious. You know, Shelling uh didn't preside over uh
an active war. We're in you know, American Uh, Americans
were dying in theater. But Mcnamerica kind of became that
a figure that the left kind of loved to burn
an effig, you know, proverbially speaking, And uh, I think he,
I think he kind of like embodies that era, like
the era of the technocrat. And I don't I don't
mean that in punitive terms. I mean certainly that there's
a lot of men who that that kind of that
that kind of sociological structure produced, that we're not attractive people,
and that we're re lacking in in a grounded morality,
and and we're not, you know, we're not the kind
of men who one would want sort of guiding policy
in concrete ways. But you know, McNamara himself was a
complex person. And to make the point again and again,
like McNamara was not this guy who was fired to
be Secretary of Defense. It wasn't like one of these
kinds of He wasn't one of these guys who really
had no way of kind of like capturing cloud other
than going to Washington and and capitalizing on connections. You know,
they asked him, he didn't ask for them. And like
we talked about, it's not like mcnamur resigned in disgrace
or something, you know, I mean, he he went on, uh,
he went on to be the chairman of the World Bank.
But at the same time, you know, his name became
synonymous with the with the kind of grewsome uh calculus
of the body count, you know with uh you know,
the kind of the kind of head nerd view of
that that came to surround the papers. You know. So
it's not like it's not like market no matter somehow
like profited immensely from his tenure as Secretary of Defense,
and you know, his he even when eve when public
opinion precipitously turned against the war post tet Uh. You
know it's uh McNamara didn't simply exit stage laugh when
things went bad. And I I can't, I can't emphasize
enough to you know, the fact that he served for
seven years. That's an eternity for a cabinet post, particularly
for Secretary of Defense, and particularly during uh A wartime administration.
You know. So, like I said, I I'm sure a
lot of people are gonna just claim it, I'm some
kind of Macnamara apologists owing to you know, owing to
him you know, either like emotional uh factors or you know,
I'm gonna hero worship. Like neither of those things are true.
But I at all anyone who hasn't seen uh it,
I like I said, I I I highly recommend he
watched the Aeron Morris biopic on On macnamara, where I
mean you he he interviews the man himself, you know,
because that's what man what I'm what Morris does. I've
reserved judgment until one views that Magnamara quoted himself incredibly well.
And and compare that to one of Morris's subsequent biopics
about Donald Rumsfeld. He just came who came off just
as really kind of I mean just really just a
really really just nasty person, you know, I mean in
every sense of the word. You know. Uh, I think uh,
I think compared to I think compared to those who
followed who are either clowns or just you know, kind
of you know, cynical uh creeps like Rumsfeld, and I
think I think mc namara wims very large and uh
in mostly positive terms. But we left off last episode,
I believe, talking a bit about the Gulf of Talk
and resolution and the incident itself. I don't wanna, uh,
I don't, I don't wanna. I don't want to rehash
the entire debate as it were, that still surrounds the
incident that gave rise the Congressional revolution that you know,
gave Johnson the Tabiola rossa to escalate. Essentially, I I
just made the point then, as I'll reiterate now that
for better or worse, and I understand the libertarian argument
against this UH precedent, and I very much understand the
kind of constitutionalist objection to it, But for better or worse,
this is how the business of war and peace is conducted,
and this is how it's finessed. And policy terms, Okay,
it's some kind of incidents that identified as a clear
and present danger or constituting a necessity, you know, UH,
demanding intervention. You know, Congress affords the executive the UH,
the ways and means in budgetary terms and in command
terms to accomplish you know, the mission in general terms,
and UH and and and and then you know it's
it's uh. The legislature bows out of the decision making
process in large in in large part you know there
in in in a formal capacity, you know, until uh
and until until something happens or a series of occurrences
ensue that, you know, brings it back within their direct purview,
you know, either willing to you know, revolt of the
the body politics at war, or you know, some kind
of perceived malfeasance on on the on on the part
of the executive in terms of the conduct of the war.
But we're not here to have a discussion on abstract
constitutional theory, you know, or on you know, war power
and and when, what it what and what its significance
is in the in the post number era. I just
wanted to make the point that the Westphalian practice of
literally declaring war as a change of status and relations
between equals like that, that's totally obsolete. And it doesn't
matter if we think that good or bad. That's the
way it is. So the golf of talk and resolution
doesn't stand out as this uniquely you know, kind of
corrupt uh way of uh of a rather morally uh
you know, uh compromise executive Verkira Warman date. I'm not
gonna sit here and say Josson was was had any
redeeming characteristics. But even like like if Kennedy had been
in the White House, he would have pursued he would
he would have proceeded in much the same way as
would Nixon, Okay, as would you know, Reagan had he
been I mean, this is something important to keep in mind,
but I won't believe that point anymore. But what the
resolution represented was that, and I'm gonna, I'm go, I'm
gonna jump backwards a little bit, doesn't. We proceed to
talk about Colonel John Paul Van who I think is
very important. He was his analysis of the Vietnam War
like as it was underway, I think is essential to
understanding the battlefield situation and you know, kind of the
tactical shortcomings of a particularly of McVie. But I don't
want to get into that yet. But what's important to
keep in mind in discussing the escalation that was facilitated
by the Tonkin Resolution is that Military Assistants Command Vietnam.
It arrived in country in nineteen sixty two, and from
sixty two to sixty five there was a proper counterinsurgency
campaign underway against the viet Cong. And this really you know,
Army Special Forces was very much purpose for that, you know,
and that we talked earlier about, you know, Kennedy's you know,
Kennedy's a strategic orientation towards sec NERD theaters, you know,
and the need to you know, not surrender these contested
territories to the communists, you know, for not not just
for you know, on grounds of military necessity, but you know,
owing owing the profound political implications of communist victory, you know,
in these uh in these developing countries. You know, the
and the fact that he is the Kennedy was such
a champion of special operations forces is inextrictly bound up
with that policy vision. But Vietnam pre Tonkin Gulf.
Speaker 1: So Kennedy in sixty two and sixty three was commander
in chief guiding these missions.
Speaker 2: Yeah, essentially, Yeah, I mean he had it was it
was mac Namara and it was you know, he Kennedy
had a lot of talent around him, you know, who
are who are helping him identify kind of the concrete variables.
Now this translated actual war fighting. But so, I mean,
I wasn't just emergent from the mind of Kennedy. But
Kennedy did understand military matters reasonably well, you know, I
mean he had been in pretty heavy action in the Navy.
You know, he wasn't he he wasn't just some like
civilian neo fight who had no idea of you know
what what of what this constitute and what the difference
was between the heavy army you know, organized around uh,
organized around armor, you know, and that that uh that
had a very very clouset wood see in view of
war fighting. It was the advance of fire. I mean,
this really did like rule the day, you know, and
and I mean for good reason, frankly, because the the
the army's uh most probable military mission was to fight
the Red Army. I mean, but the uh, the kind
of tactical flexibility that early special operations forces represented, this
really was like a revolutionary idea. You know, like people
under like forty five or so, when they think of
the army, they or they when they think of the
military establishment, they think of special operations forces. That's completely
the opposite of the way things were during the Cold War, Okay,
and it uh and there there's a lot of there's
a lot of institutional resentment of the army towards special
operations and I mean that's a whole other issue that's fascinating.
But point being, there's kind of this mischaracterization I'm on
court historians that Okay, in Vietnam, there's this guerrilla war underway,
and you know Johnson, you know, being the you know,
being the kind of fool that he was, and you
know the Army being you know, trigger happy as they are,
they just like looked over the situation and said, you
know what, We're gonna deploy in massive, in massive depth,
and we're gonna throw like as much firepower as we
can at the viet Cong. Like that's not what happened.
You know. There's a years long counterinsurgency, low intensity war
against the National Liberation Front by the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam, you know, by uh by the Arvin
Ranger element, which was kind of their quasi special forces elements,
and like we talked about, the South of Enemy's Army
does get a bad rap because there were elements among
them that fought hard and we're and we're very game fighters.
But yeah, there's actually a fastening old movie called Go
Tell the Spartans, which is about exactly this topic. It's
about you know, the like the Kennedy era of Vietnam
War and these green berets of this kind of forlorn outpost,
you know, uh as they realized the kind of tactical
situations changing, and obviously in the back of their mind
they're terrified. Although they'd never like let on this is
the case that of of of like the North Veennamese
Army one day showing up and just like sweeping through,
you know, out of nowhere. I mean, things like that
did happen, you know, later on like against the against
the purported you know, in address to what Army intelligence
was claiming with the capabilities extent of you know, Hannoid
to deploy in the south. But uh he as it
may as uh as the as as things that are
going bad in the south, and as as d M
made it clear that he was willing to negotiate. You know,
we talked about the kind of murky political status of Vietnam,
you know, and it there was there was a lot
of there's there's great concern that d M was just
gonna sit you know, quote unlet sell out the West
and kind of you know, kind of terms with with
Ho Chi Minh and with Hanoid, you know, to incorporate
you know, not just the NLF, but you know, the
Communist Party of Vietnam UH into you know, into UH
into the ruling apparatus, and I mean obviously that was
unacceptable because that you know that that the precedent that
that would set would be completely would be completely at
odds with what you know, America is trying to accomplish
in the developing world. And you know, we talked about
how again like you know, the UH the it was
it was at base. We're talking about a political conflict.
It doesn't matter that you know they're they're there, that
that's into China's not you know, a bounty of natural resources.
It doesn't matter that you know, there's not there's not
some absolutely essential you know, maritime portocoll that you know
has UH has profound military significance there. You know, the
line in the sand was UH was Vietnam, and that's
that's where the Communists challenged and that's you know, the
challenge of everyone. That challenge was going to be met
or it was not. And the Communists had great momentum
in the Third World even really up until up until
the late nineteen eighties, you know, like long after, you know,
long after like Stalinists type rule, you know, Marxist Leninist
revolutionary ambition and and the kind of the kind of
the armed UH insurgency culture or political culture around it.
Long after that like lost its luster, you know for anybody,
but you know, total diehards, you know, like the kind
of people who joined like the Bottom Minehoff gang, you know,
in in the Western world. This kind of thing had
an incredible power to animate people in the Third world,
you know, and Hochi Minh was himself as a testament
to that. You know, like we talked about, Hoe was
not some It wasn't some bumpkin or some or some
ignorant you know, farmer or something. He you know, he
was uh, he was. He was highly educated. You know,
his family was uh was was was wealthy and well
situated and very insinuated into the uh indigenous political structure,
you know, and uh in Vietnam, so you know, and
he was not He was not an outlier, nor was
he an achronism. But because it may it uh, the
the mass escalation, I mean yeah, part of that was
owing to the fact that the post the new look army,
you know, once what once conventional forces, you know, kind
of became uh what once again in vogue for lack
of a better way to describe it, the army, uh,
the army remained obsessed with with firepower, you know, and
the idea that you know, combined arms and a lot
of these nascent technologies you know, and and the precursor
the smart weapons you know, and uh as well as
like the technologies immediately preceding the revolution and military affairs
that allowed command and control, the truly direct fire they like,
the the destructive capabilities of these things was just awesome.
So there was, in fact the sense and the Pentagon
that like, look, you know, asymmetric warfare. Yeah, there's you know,
there's considerations emergent you know, within that paradigm, and that's
got to be accounted for within the battle space itself
and within you know, uh and and and and and
it's got to inform decision making of how forces are
structured and deployed in country. But at the same time,
you know, if you can blast the hell out of everything,
you're gonna get a lot done, you know. And and
how can you know, how can the National Liberation Front,
you know, no matter it doesn't matter how hard they are,
It doesn't matter you know what kind of uh what
what kind of civilian support they have? You know, it
doesn't matter, you know, kind of how uh, it doesn't
matter that they've got this kind of mass, youthful male
population to draw upon. You know, if you if, if you,
if you apply this kind of pressure in the form
of you know, just relentless and massive firepower against the adversary,
he's gonna just crumble. I mean, there was there was
more than you know, like a modicum of of that
sort of thinking. I mean, obviously, however, it was clear,
you know, in nineteen fifty nine, and I mean sixty
nine all the way to you know, nineteen seventy four,
seventy five, when the People's Army Vietnam launched its final offensive,
it was clear that Hanoi was not going to prevail
without a massive conventional assault on the South Vietnam. It's
a comparatively huge country. The National Liberation Front had the
capability to dominate the countryside very effectively. Thus, this is
what was responsible for the kind of you know, hearts
and minds campaign, all of that, and and the idea
of free fire zones and strategic hamlets, and we'll get
into some of that later. But the uh, but but
the but key urban centers the viet Cong could not,
not only could not capture, but they couldn't, you know,
and there there was a dearth of of necessary civilian support,
you know, which was the true kind of like infrastructure
of the Vietcong, you know, like any gorilla movement, that's
what they have to draw up on. But even like
their big coup was when they their big battlefield coup
was when the NLF captured Howayi City, you know, and
that's you know, and and uh, there's just there's those
dramatic shots of the US Marines, you know, like raising
the American flag like over the citadel and in uh
in Hway, you know, because it was it was this
horrible like pitched battle. But I mean just really really raw.
That's why I think it's cool that full Metal Jacket
like focuses on Howay you know. And and uh, Gustav
Hasford made Wway the focus of uh the battlefield segment
of his novel for for a reason. But the point is, like,
you know, they couldn't hold it. You know, it's not
like it's not like it's not like the NLF took
away and said into this massive push on TET sixty eight,
you know, and then uh, and and then the civilian
population he came out and drove, you know, allow them
to consolidate that that their presence there, you know, quite
the contrary. So it was clear that South Vietnam either
was going to have to develop a competent conventional capability
buttressed by or facilitated by rather you know, modern combined
arms and hardware, as well as the training of their people,
you know, to operate these these weapons systems and weapons platforms,
or there was gonna have to be direct intervention you know,
by Sito ideally, and we got into STO the other
day or some constellation of you know, American allies in
order to in order to stave off uh this uh
this uh this imminent assault until until the South could
stand on its own. And that's what I just said.
That's what became Grand strategy in Vietnam. You know. And
as any military man will tell you, you know, you
don't you don't you don't you don't wait until, uh,
the exigency is afoot and then respond to it, you know,
just like just as you anticipate capabilities, you know, not
you know, you don't just consider you know, probable action
in terms of uh, in terms of judging and you know,
a potential opposing UH force. You were you pre empt
UH the ambitions of that opposing force, you know, you
don't you don't you don't wait until the People's Army
of Vietnam is assaulting across the seventeenth parallel, you know,
in in in in in depth, you know, with with
combined arms, you know, to decide, like how are you
going to react to that? Okay? So this was the
this was this was the logic behind the massive escalation
and UH there had been at its peak pre talking golf,
I think it was between seventeen thousand and eighteen thousand,
five hundred approximddally UH American forces on the ground in Vietnam.
This is by the end of nineteen sixty seven, this
had swelled the four hundred and eighty five thousand UH
troops and UH by the peak, which was the summer
in nineteen sixty eight, it was it was over half
a million. It was something like five hundred and thirty thousand. Okay,
the UH and obviously you know, as as as the
casualties mounted and as UH and as some the plus
situation you know kind of like restricted the UH the
tactical environment and and what was and what was permissible
according to the rules of engagement. You know, commanders on
the ground, uh down to the company level, you know,
their their constant refrain was like, basically, we need more manpower.
You know, we need we we you know, we need
to be able to apply more apply more pressure now
And why why why was it kind of boiled down
to that metric? Okay, well, you know we talked, uh
we we talked when we first kind of scratched the
service of of the atomic age, I mean, like it's
advent and what the implications were in policy terms as
well as military ones. And obviously I can speak a
lot more about the former than the latter, because I
am not a military man, and I you know, that's
not really my wheelhouse. But I do know something about
policy as it interfaces with military decision making and the
needs of you know, the needs of the military establishment
to accomplish stated policy goals as directed by the civilian executive.
There came the ability to the the ability to corral
data and the ability to interpret data, the ability to
apply data to all kinds of problems at scale. You know,
whether you're talking about you know, whether you're talking about
the best of offset liability if you're you know, if
if you're manufacturing automobiles, you know, and thus that that
was the you know, unsafe at any speed. That was
like the Ralph Nader book about uh, you know, the
auto industry and it's it's macat calculus of you know,
how many how many deaths owing to the products liability
issues were acceptable? You know, vis a vis what would
be the cost of remedying these design defects. I mean,
everybody's familiar with that, Okay, that this this was something
that was emergent, just like across the board, you know,
in uh in the private sector and government, you know,
in in in social planning, the military, uh, in the
Cold War, it what you know, what the what the
victory metric was in these secondary theaters, you know, where
the primary challenge was a political one, you know, not
a military one. You know, a comparable situation would be
with the British we're facing in Northern Ireland. Okay, I
mean that that that conflict developed ory differently, but uh,
identifying you know, not just what uh what the tactical
orientation should be in order to neutralize the opposing force,
but what the performance metric is, you know, of those
forces in theater. Well, what this came boiled down to was,
you know, the the the ability to manufacture enemy dead.
Quite literally, the logic of the body count became the
performance metric. So there'd be demands from a battalion level,
you know, originating with the originating you know, at M
at long been uh, you know, and and trickling down
to company and then platoon level, you know, like you
need to produce bodies, you need to produce enemy dead.
And UH, as a standalone metric, that's problematic. I mean,
aside from the fact that it's macabre and all of that,
and I realized it's it's kind of a gross thing
to talk about that makes people uncomfortable. But this is
very much like I mean, this, this is this, this
is the stuff of modern warfare. Okay, but it took
on a significance into itself and Vietnam owing again to
the kind of to to the kind of the culture
of strategic planning. But it wasn't just spillover from you know,
the uh, the kind of a the data revolution spearheaded
by I. D. M. And it's got the proto computers
you know that were utilized uh in the Second World War,
and and and and you know thereafter obviously, you know,
the victory metric of in nuclear war is very much
distilled down to you know, the ability to the like
the ability to yield you know, enemy dead at the
beyond like a certain tipping point. You know, that's that's
literally what the term you know, like mega death indicates
and assured destruction. Mega death was not just you know,
the name of like kind of a got you know,
a like a like a fucking heavy metal man, you know,
like it Actually it actually was a term of art,
if not the nuclear war studies and game theory, but
because it may there is something too, uh there, there
is something to this logic on the body count. I mean,
if you're if the burn rate that uh that you're
that you're imposing a upon the opposing force you know,
far exceeds the population and military age males you know,
who can be trained, equipped and fielded, you know, to
replace those losses. At some point, you know, the insurgency
is gonna fall apart where it's at least not gonna
be able to mount operations you know beyond you know,
like platoon level or something. And uh, this did work
in a sense I'm one of the few defenders you'll
find the Phoenix program. We'll get into that at another date.
And people who don't really understand it, like even people
are otherwise sensible, Like it's become this kind of it's
become this kind of horror story that they like to
bandy about. You know that, you know, it's kind of
synonymous in their mind, or you know, it's taken on
kind of the characteristic of a it's become kind of
like the exemplar of of a of executive overreach and
and and and violence they're in you know, but it
something like that identifying enemy cadres, I mean, if you
have a reliable system of of of identifying these people
and targeting them for annihilation with a minimum of collateral
damage where possible. That's basically how you fight uh counterinsurgency
warfare or how you wage counter in curtaincy warfare. And uh,
that's what the British Army started doing by the late
nineties in Northern Ireland. Uh. The way they did it
obviously was or by by the late eighties, I mean sorry,
by not the late nineties, but the this uh that
this this this was underway in Vietnam. At the same
time that, you know, there was this kind of uh
there's this kind of like body count driven effort in
uh and you know, being waged by you know, conventional forces,
you know, just to rack up the body count. And
I mean obviously this led to all kinds of problems.
You know, wherein these these numbers were confabulated. You know,
civilians were counted as a as a as enemy combatants.
You know, like really very very corrupt things happened, you know,
of a moral and material nature. But that happens in
every war, right, yeah, exactly. And it's also this didn't
like somehow emerge in the Macnamara Magris and this gooulish
guy who was like, oh, well, I have an idea.
You know, let's let's transform let's transform the military apparatus
into this kind of corpse manufacturing uh enterprise, you know,
because that's just a great thing to do. I mean,
this was this was the thinking at the time. And
frankly too, I mean it there's a again, the Cold
War was strange. I mean, in some ways there's commonality
to all uh, you know, to to to all conflicts
where there's uh uh at you know, where where there's
where there's certain variables present. You know that that uh
that caused you know, combat to resolve in similar ways,
you know, adjusting for technology and things, you know, like
with it within disparate theaters and across you know, across
you know, the temporal divide and stuff. But uh, there
were strange things about the Cold War that limited what
was possible, not just because the threat of escalation, you know,
even in even in a very secondary theater, excuse me,
it was always present, but also again if you're fighting
a primarily political war. You know, we're not just talking
about we're not talking about the enemy's ability to field
military age males, you know, who are gonna be trained
as infantry or sapers or whatever. Not every man is
gonna make it as a Viet Cong. That requires a
certain radicalism, uh within uh you know, like with with
with with within you know the quote heart and mind
of that individual, you know, I mean it's not if
you're if you're looking to build an insurgent army, particularly
in a situation like when the vietnames called the American War,
where you know, basically there's like an eighty percent chance
you're gonna die, like you're not. It's not like being
drafted into the US Army and you know, to go
fight the Korean War. It's like a very different thing,
you know, like you you every man pretty much needs
to be a partisan. And yeah, you know, there were
there there were a there were NLF fighters you know,
who are basically like press ganged and you know, like
joining the viet Cong and stuff. But that that was
the minority, because you don't get results out of people
like that, you know. I mean, so it the the
idea that we've got to kill as many of these
people as possible, and it targeted capacity, and you know,
killing them is a is an end in itself because
that's a victory metric in order to kind of alter
you know, the political conditions on the ground and how
these conditions translate to military power, you know, albeit in
an asymmetrical way like that. That is a real thing.
And that's that's that's a legit analysis. I'm not saying
legit and you know, moral terms whatever, I mean, I'm
not rendering decision on that one or the other. But
in terms of there there is a tactical logic to that.
That's not you know, insane or something or totally off
base or the nor is it the kind of nineteen sixties,
you know, technocrat version of Chatto generalship. And I think
that that's important. It's uh. But moving on that, THEMERA
became very very skeptical of administration policy, not because Johnson,
as we as we talked about, you know, Johnson viewed
escalation and the threat of escalation as a kind of
political bargaining ship, which is not how you wage a war. Okay,
I mean it's not and I mean you're first of all,
you're playing with the lives of the men you know
who uh who are charged with fighting that war. But
also it just doesn't uh, you know, it doesn't. It
doesn't work. You know, that's not a thing that yields concessions.
And you know it doesn't. It doesn't it doesn't instill
fear in the opposing force. You know, it basically tells
him that, you know, eventually, you're gonna be willing to compromise,
because otherwise, at the end of the day, you know,
if you if that was not the case, you know,
you'd be fighting this war. There'd be no like no
restraint on the rules of engagement. Like don't get me wrong,
you know. Uh the uh despite despite the kind of
the kind of canaris like, oh, America was like fighting
the Vietnam War with one hand tied around his balls
or something. I mean, we killed a huge amount of
people in Vietnam, Okay, like some real cowboy ship was
going on. I'm not I'm not trashing the war effort
at all. Okay, like uh unlike World War Two, I
think within within the boundary rationality of the Cold War,
I like I said, Vietnam had to be fought, Okay,
but there was a lot of uh there there there
there was there's a lot of wholesale killing of human beings, okay,
according to pretty loose uh criteria, you know, the tactical restraints.
There was you know, the the literally the parameters that
were imposed on the operational environment. Like yeah, that had
a that that rendered victory problematic. Okay, like no doubt
about it, but it but the uh but but this,
but this, but this idea that you know, uh America
was like hesitating to drop bodies in Vietnam wing to
crazy r O R O E. Like that's that that's
that's completely fastile. But the uh but what mcnamer realized
was that, uh, you know, the dropping more and more,
deploying more and more men to Vietnam was not going
to solve the problem, you know, Nor was uh? Nor
was uh? Nor was the problem that you know, they're
the bombing campaign wasn't intense enough or something, you know,
Like he he basically reached the conclusions you know that
that we're gonna talk about now, and like a lot
of like like a lot of what I'm drawing upon
to describe his mindset and describe some of the extant
challenges of of of the Secretary Defense in his epoch,
I'm drawing upon his own direct testimony, you know, I mean,
among other things, obviously, but the Mactimer and in winter
nineteen sixty seven, MC and everyone as far as to
suggests freezing troop levels and uh, basically to prepare Magnara
said like, well, then you know, we we don't we
don't have infant we don't have any indefinite timetable you know,
to make South Vietnam like combat ready in terms of
their force isn't being you know, to stand on their
own against the North, you know it. Uh, He like
basically said that the situation is not going to improve
on the ground. Either either you know, either the ear
of the Republic of Vietnam can fight now or it's
or or or or it can't fight. You know, two
years from now, the situation is not gonna it is
not going to be radically different. This was rejected outright
by Johnson. And that's you know, it was November twenty
ninth of sixty seven that Magnevara announced his Penning resignation.
He didn't retire until February sixty eight, or resign rather,
But that, I mean, that was that that thing was
a story that brought the camel's back. Okay, I think
Magna gave it his all and Vietnam for years. He
risked his reputation, he probably risked like a lot of
his a lot of his moral uh, he probably compromised
a lot of his a lot of his a lot
of his moral commitments too. Frankly, I'm not gonna sit
here and make a martyr out of him. He took
the job. And I mean, if you're Secretary of Defense,
I mean you're you're dealing with the deaths of human beings.
You gotta be okay with it. But the you know,
he for for for this is what he did for
for seven years almost and uh when when he when
he approached his commander in chief and said, like, this
is a situation as it stands, I mean Johnson Bass
like waved him off, like dismissed him, you know. I
mean I and I'm not saying that magnum are quit
because you know, on ground is like massculine ego or
something at all. But I can't even imagine being in
that role particularly and considered like what what was underway
in the country, you know, and uh and your secretary
Defense like literally the man who uh you know, who
you rely upon more than any singular figure, I mean
in that administration, you know, to give you the straight
story on the strategic situation, like he tells you exactly
that you know exactly what what what you know what
what what the what your options are is as commander
in chief, you know, and you simply dismiss him because
like that that that doesn't comport with like your own
conceptual prejudices. I mean, it's incredible, But LBJ was just
a terrible person and a terrible chief executive. You know.
It's but that that doesn't need to be rehashed. But
who succeeded. Who succeeded McNamara was Clark Clifford very briefly,
that's not like a yalely like uh you're like old
uh old America like name, I don't know what is,
but he you kind of a placeholder. The true succession
to mc namara was a guy named Melvin Laird. He's
kind of forgotten the history, but Melvin Laird loomed really
large over the late Cold War. His deputy, uh what
what was not worry about Clifford was one of his
one of like one of his chief uh like assistants
was Paul Nitza, you know, and Paul Nitza was you know,
he was the co founder of Team B and uh
you know until he was like quite elderly like he
he uh like Nitsa was even like he was he
was he was drafting, uh he was, he was. He
was he was drafting policy statements on behalf of the
project for a New American Century, you know, like as
late as the early two thousands. You know, like he
he's he's he's one of these. He's one of these
kinds of I mean not to sound no dramatic, he's
one of these Nize was one of these shadowy figures
of the defense establishment, you know who who really was
uh you know who really was kind of like a
hidden eminence. But uh, that's really all that's remarkab about
Clifford Laird. Uh, Laird was interesting, and there was a
how long, how how long we've been going here? I
don't know if I should I don't know if I
should dive into I don't know I should dive into. Yeah,
we'll get started on Melvin Laird and and and then
what begin the Nixon doctor in and then like well
we'll we'll like deep dive properly into like Nixon's war
next episode at that school because it requires I'm not
intentionally dragging this out, but it there's just like a
lot here. But Melvin Laird, Uh, some people, some of
you'll talk on him like it was a hands off
secretary Defense either wanting to you know, Nixon being an
imperial executive who bullied his cabinet, Like that's that's complete nonsense.
Other people cast Laired as this guy who uh you know,
in in and then and delivered. Ever to strike a
contrast to mc namara, you know, uh was was was
a verse to you know, setting a policy course in uh,
like you know, in its own right emergent from the
Secretary Defensive Office. It's not now those things are correct.
Laird actually was, uh, it was very much uh engaged
in the course of policy and uh he very much
became an enemy of Nixon Kissinger. And this had implications
for Watergate, which in my opinion, was, you know, just
the coup against Nixon. By what we do today is
the deep you know, I uh certainly was government in
those days.
Speaker 1: You broke up there, you broke up there for a
second out were you referring to it as you said
that the people who would have carried out Watergate would
have been comparable to today what we call the deep state?
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, definitely, definitely. It's just that the it's like
the like government was different than the Cold War and
certain key ways. But I mean some like I'm not.
I mean, yeah, okay, we get. I mean, if you
want to talk about in linear terms like yeah, I get,
we can, we can look at it as is kind
of you know, the phenomena in common. But the but Laird, yeah, uh,
I think Laird's hostility to Nixon and Kissinger, it took
on a very personal tenor, which is strange. I mean,
I think it, uh, But in pure policy terms Lared's vision,
I think he was wrong, but it's he wasn't totally
of base. If you if you, if you'd Vietnam as
essentially weakening the United States, not just some material terms,
but uh, he said that, you know, essentially, he's like,
you got a war weary country now, you know then
like that they're now being nineteen sixty nine. You know,
he's like a general war broke up, you know, broke
out with warsaw pack tomorrow you know uh uh, you know,
with with the country really have the political will, uh,
you know, to fight worse, to fight the Soviet Union,
warsaw packed in Central Europe. You know, it sacrificed. It's
like a million and a half young people, you know,
on the on on on the heels of what we've
already endured in Southeast Asia. Secondly, he's like, you know,
the uh, the the Soviet Union was advantaged, as we
talked about before, in terms of the fact that you
know it it basically had pre existing cadres on the
ground throughout the Third World, owing in a large part
you know, the kind of the anti colonial movement and
other things on like a basic hostility you know to
the West and and and profound turves not just superficial
ones and uh, but also like a lot of these
a lot of these movements, like including the National Liberation
Front itself. You know, they've been engaged, uh in combat
either against the Axis or you know, against UH or
against the Portuguese, the French or the English or you know,
any of these uh, any of these fading you know,
colonial powers. The Soviet Union was able to really kind
of spare its its own blood and treasure. Meanwhile, it
really kind of had the United States's number in terms
of it's war fighting doctor and in terms of strengths
and weaknesses, you know, and uh, while America was you know,
while America was taking heavy casualties in Vietnam, you know,
and UH and and uh and and and and people
were losing confidence in the dollar and things. You know,
the Soviet Union was really was was uh was was
under had undertaken It's owning a revolution in military affairs,
you know, but it had done so without you know,
like paying any costs and blood. And uh. Lard had
a good point there, and UH, this became very evident
post I think, and that's one of the reasons why
when Reagan took the oath of office, you know, a
decade later, there really was a sense that warsaw pat
constituted a clear and present danger that wasn't that wasn't
just propaganda or you know, a precursor to war fever
or something, or or ear an iteration of war fever,
what have you. What Lard did do was he said, uh,
you know, his big thing where where where he and
Nixon converged. He said that, you know, uh, we've uh,
we've got to be we've got to be more assertive
in in foreign affairs. We gotta be we gotta strengthen
you know, us influence you know over the over what
was then the European Community, you know, because the EU
didn't exist yet. You know, He's like, we've got to consolidate.
We we we've got to consolidate, you know, the whold
we have on Japan and Korea, you know, to make
sure that's permanent, you know. When uh and uh, he
said that, you know, absolutely incredible nuclear determs is essential
to essential sound foreign policy. But he said that strong
conventional defense is is is just as important, you know.
And the uh he came back to this point again
and again. Like I said, he's like, you know, you're
you're you're gonna be basically turn people against the military
established man that we're constantly engaged in these brush fire wars.
And I understand, I understand that point, but I don't
accept it. But it uh, you know, my point is,
like I said, like, it wasn't It wasn't some crazy idea.
It's uh the Viyitnamization, uh regime. You know, Nixon's policy
a disengagement with the South, you know well well, butcherssing
its forces and being you know, in material terms as
well as as well as in terms of morale and
you know, transform transform the army of the Republic of Vietnam.
It is something comic capable that very much that policy
course very much came from Nixon, but Melvin Lair with
the rubber met the road, you know, kind of uh
saw to it being implemented. So it's profs for that.
The uh. One of the early riffs between Layered and
and and and Nixon and Kissinger. I mean basically the
entire like executive basically the entire executive National Security staff
of the White House, like you know, other than himself.
In sixty nine, that's when the secret bombing is Cambodia began.
You know, Cambodia was officially neutral. I mean, they were
engaged in their own like bloody civil war. There's all
kinds of intrigues there. And what's fascinating is that as
the sin of Soviet split kind of set in, there's
very much a proxy war between the Soviet Union and
and Red China in Cambodia, you know, between the between
the Soviet client North Vietnamese like later just you know,
the Vietnamese army and the Khmer rouge. But that next
an increasingly sidelined Laird and these key decisions, and that's
there's an interesting parallel I with with Iran contract there,
which which Warrants mentioned. I want I want deep dive
into that now because obviously it would be here all afternoon.
But it's Laird. Laird understood. Laird said, basically looked like
this wasn't a matter of priety, is you know, it's
not a matter of me being affronted that you know,
despite the vegu of Secretary Defense, I being left out
of these decisions but he said, there's an inevident there's
an evidence there's going to be an inevitable disclosed public
disclosure of uh of these bombings, and UH public outrage
UH authentic or not cultivated or not by by hostile
elements is gonna is gonna harm the harm wrought by
that is gonna neutralize any tactical advantage by hitting these North.
These North made me sanctuaries in Cambodia. And Larry was
actually right about that. And again, I mean, may what
what what was the anti war movement? And was it
was its focused on these discrete policy decisions, you know,
like the secret bonding of Cambodia. Was that like authentic
uh outrage? I don't know, Okay, not at all. It
was it was it was the It was the nineteen
sixty eight equivalent sorrows inc you know, color revolutioning, uh,
the American street against mister Nixon and the Vietnam War
with of course the help of warsaw paged intelligence agencies.
But that didn't matter. The point is that's what it
would be a catalyst for. And of course I mean
the you gonn almost hear the Nixon rebuttal of that
of you know, we're not we're not gonna let these
like we're not gonna let some like commy cocksuckers in
Berkeley like dictate like the course of policy, particularly not
you know, the course of war and peace decisions, because
you know, bombing nominally neutral states that are actually communist
sanctuaries is bad PR. But Laird was absolutely right. Okay,
And you know, you if you're the president of the
United States, you know you're presiding over the political culture
that you're presiding over, and misguidance it may be, you know,
like comically improper as it may be. You know, you
are dealing with the hostile media. If you're a mister Nixon,
her mister Trump, that's going to do early in his
power to remove you from office. And these things must
be considered. Now, that does not mean that you're refrained
from assaulting Cambodia if it's a if it's if it's
a tactical necessity. What it does mean is that you
finesse it the right way, and you know, you don't
do it in secret and cut the Secretary of Defense
out of the equation. But that that really kind of, uh,
that really uh, that really was kind of the nail
in the cop and the relationship between Laird and and
and Nixon and Kissinger, and later when when it was disclosed,
when the bombing of Cambodia was disclosed, and these mass
protests broke out, which with a precursor to the to
the Kent State uh tragedy, which I don't know, people,
I didn't know that until fairly recently. I mean I
knew like when that. I knew when the camp I
knew when the Cambodia bombies occurred, I knew when Kent
State happened. I didn't realize that like that, at least
the nominal pretext for the big protest was was the
bombing of Cambodia. But uh, when this was disclosed, the media, uh,
Nixon through Kissinger very publicly accused Laird of of leaking it,
you know, just uh, which was a pretty was a
pretty pretty serious allegation. I haven't deep dived into the issue.
I can't really comment in that. I would have been
surprised if that was the case. Somebody Lard was a
serious guy, however you or I feel about his politics.
He wouldn't have compromised. A guy like Lard wouldn't have
compromised the you know, an active war effort, you know,
to stick it to mister Nixon or to score points
with the with the with with with with with with
Woodward and Bernstein types. I. I just can't see that happening.
But uh, be as it may, this was another I
mean this, this was in another dysfunction of the Nixon
White House. And I mean, don't get me wrong, I
think Nixon was actually fighting the Vietnam War to win it.
And uh next episode will also get into the man
of Creighton Abrams, General Creighton Abrams, who succeeded Westmoreland, And
uh I I think of Westmoreland almost, uh almost, uh
almost like a McLellan of his era, you know, like
very much, very much, very much a being counter or
like a lesser or like a middle level executive and
in particularly innovative company, you know, in in in in
in in an army uniform. How Westmoreland advanced the way
he did remains a mystery. But again I I don't
there there's obviously not a help of a lot I
can add. There's not obviously not a help a lot
of insight I have into into the US military culture.
And uh, I mean having not seen it from within.
But the uh laird, Uh we'll wrap up here in
a minute. So that because uh, the next kind of
sub top I'm gonna get into is is huge. But
the there's a legacy the laired I think he was
very much the last kind of like Secretary Defense that
had any real independence in policy matters now because he
was such an incredible, dynamic guy, but because subsequent presidents
did not make mistake that Nixon did your secretary defense
during the Cold War, in my opinion, was was arguably
as important as as ah as one as a selection
for Attorney general. But uh, that's that's a that could be. Uh.
I guess they could be arguing a number of different ways,
but I think this might be a kind of a
natural stopping point. I.
Speaker 1: Uh, you can do your you can do your plugs.
You can also announce that Twitter is being Twitter again.
Speaker 2: You know, yeah, yeah, yeah, I think.
Speaker 1: Account you know yeah yeah. I was suspended from Twitter
the week Elon took over.
Speaker 2: It's just bizarre and like as they suspended him and
he's is a legit guy, and like he's afraid to
speak his mind, Like what what what would what? He
doesn't he doesn't he like blogs about I mean, he's
he's he's like kind of a mega guy. But what
what the hell is he dropping that's offensive to Twitter?
You know, like it's just totally random.
Speaker 1: Accept his love for docking back for the attack. That's
the only thing that really.
Speaker 2: But it makes no sense, like even like like the
things that even usually throw like their triggers like he
or whatever, like he like why bing him? But it's
but the uh but yeah, I mean and it's I
I but who people not every time does this has
happened literally a dozen times. It happens like every several weeks.
Everyone it happens. People act like I die or something.
It's like I do a lot of just like goofy
shit posting on Twitter. I drop some serious stuff there too,
but that's like it's kind of a big nothing man
like I use it to promote what we're doing so
that our people can find us, you know, and and
tune in for like the stuff we're doing here. This
idea that it's like this awesome platform that we need.
We don't fucking need that shit. Like I built my
brand when I was on no social media at all. Okay,
I do have an account there that is active, But
I I'm gonna be low key about it because like I,
I don't know who the hell knows like what they're
you know what what the kind of one can never tell,
like what what the lay of the land is in
terms of you know the I mean, who can who
can predict arbitrary and caprecious action, which is by definition
is arbitrary caprecious. But I'm transitioning to YouTube, that's like
my primary platform. I'm gonna back it up on Odyssey
and stuff. Yes, I realized YouTube is censorious as well,
but I mean I've been we're we're kind of we're
kind of leaving Twitter behind anyway. But yeah, so I
don't want people acting like this is like the end
of the fucking world. Like it just it bothers me
when people act that way. But the but the yeah,
I mean find me on substack real Thomas seven seven
seven dot substick dot com. I'm on Instagram just at
like number seven h m A S seven seven seven.
The YouTube channels launching at the end of the month.
Like I said, I'm very excited about it, Like I
really am it. I there's a lot of potential there
and I think people will be very happy with it,
and I've got I'm very blessed to have some really
great people helping me produce it, because I certainly would
be pissing into the wind on on the production side
or not for them. But yeah, and Steel Storm two
is available at Imperium Press. That's the second installment in
my science fiction series. So yeah, please check it out
if you're a fan of my work product and or
science fiction. And that's that's all I got.
Speaker 1: Well, once again, thank you, and it's all the next time.
I want to welcome everyone back to the Kenyona Show,
part nine of the Cold War series. How you doing, Thomas,
I very well.
Speaker 2: Thanks. Today I wanted to talk about something that's sort
of a forgotten that themned them to the Vietnam War,
And like I raised before we went live, there's some
there's some pretty haunting things about Vietnam. I don't want
to sound allo dramatic, and I don't mean in the
way that it's presented in most court history narratives, but
there are there's a lot of dishonesty about the conflict,
particularly among you know, in the accounts of men who
served in the executive branch Now, if you go to
the Vietnam War Memorial, you know the wall in Washington, DC.
And I didn't notice this until two thousand and five.
You know, these the black marble or granted whatever it is.
I'm not a big fan of the memorial, honestly, like
the way it's designed. I think it's kind of morbid.
But because it may, each section is designated by conflict gear,
you know, so it's like all the men who died
in nineteen sixty seven in hostile action, you know, they'll
they'll be like their names the final panels nineteen seventy five.
So I figured, okay, that's probably I didn't think there
are any casualties of the embassy marines or whatever during
occupation or operation. I think it was enduring wind the
evacuation of Saigon. But I noticed there's like thirty eight
or some names on it, and I'm like, that's not right.
And uh lo, and behold the men who died on
Ko Tang, the Battle of Ko Tang Island against the
Khmer Rouge, where it just kind of as an afterthought
tacked down to the Vietnam War Wall, which doesn't make
any sense. The Battle of Kotang was not the final
battle of the Vietnam War. It was against an entirely
it was against it, you know, it was waved against
an entirely different regime in an entirely different country for
totally unrelated reasons. And I found that to be kind
of grotesque. But some years later Rumsfeld wrote a couple
of books. Okay, he wrote his autobiography and then he
wrote his memoirs. And Rumsfeld really cut his teeth in
government as the White Awshiva staff from the Ford administration,
and he talked about the Battle of Ko Tang like
it was this great operation and you know, there was
only I think he said there was only three casualties,
which is perverse. And we'll get into why. It was
just like an out and out lie. And this disturbed me.
I mean, I suppose the rebuttal would be, well, you know,
Rumsfeld is recalling things then that were, you know, thirty
five years in the past. Rumsfeld had a photographic memory.
He used to brag about that. And Uh, my dad
made the point. When my dad got out of the army, Uh,
he went to work for McGeorge Bundy and they developed
kind of a rapport, you know. Uh, and my dad
used to drive him around and stuff like that. And uh,
my dad met Rumsfeld during his tenure with Bundy. You know,
my dad was just like a nobody, you know, so
there was no way for Rumsfeld to remember him. And
then decades later, my dad and a Rumsfeld at some
like CFR thing, and Rumsfeld addressed him by his first
name because he just that's the way the guy is.
So Rumsfeld, what I'm getting his rumhold not forget what
the casualties were at Ko Tang, and he didn't just
get confused about, you know, what actually happened there. Nor
do I believe somebody ghost wrote the book and Rumsfeld
didn't fact check it. So I mean that's I guess
what what kind of jumped out of me is that
this this was still being kind of swept under the
rug like decades later. So what was the Mayagas incident
and why is it important? Well? On May twelfth, ninety
seventy five, uh a uh an American cargo ship s S.
Mayag Is the A crew at thirty nine. It was
off the territorial coast of Cambodia, you know, which was
then which was then ruled by the commuter route. You know,
two weeks before and UH they had conquered the capitol,
they got captured. The Kremier Rugs claimed that they were
in territorial waters. UH. The captain of the Mayagas subsequently
claimed like they were fired upon by teeth by peat
by pt boats and you know, corralled into Cambodian territory. Regardless,
this whole crew was seized. UH. This UH had echoes
of UH when the North Koreans had UH seized the Pueblo,
which is the navy intelligence vessel in nineteen sixty eight,
and UH, the North Koreans grabbed the Pueblo at the
height of the tet offensive and being there it was
an intelligent ship, the North Koreans were able to seize
encryption equipment. And it's believed that, UH, it's believed that
John Walker, not John Walker Land, a different John Wallcker
who became associated with infamy and freezing. He was this
naval officer who, UH, as it turned out, was spying
for the Soviet Union for decades. And it's believed that
you know, the North Koreans conveyed UH this naval encryption
equipment to Moscow. Walker then provided Moscow with like the
with the ciphers so that they could you know, that
the Soviets could could decode you know, the encrypted language.
So I mean this was a this was a big deal,
you know, and it it and it you know, there,
even if Johnson had a stronger mandate, and even if
the Vietnam War was going better, Uh, the United States
wasn't really a position you know, opened up another front
in Asia and you know, wage war with North Korea.
But there's evidence that in part the North Koreans via
the Chinese, were very much trying to facilitate that. But
that's a little bit outside this go. But in any event,
Ford was not going to allow a repeat of the
Pueblo incident. So immediately, obviously, you know, the uh, the
the National Security Council convened secondary defense, UH, which at
the time was Schlessinger, who uh, I've got nothing nice
to say about. People who remember him at all generally
remember him for some incredibly slanderous things that he said
about President Nixon. But he uh, you know, Nixon played
musical chairs with his cabinet kind of like mister Trump did.
Although there was obviously there was more kind of rhyme
and reason to to uh Nixon's staff decisions. But uh,
Schlessinger had succeeded Elliott Richardson. Elliot Richardson had succeeded Melvin
Laird Like none of these men like Stir for more
than several months. Okay, but he was a holdover from
the Nickson ministry for better or worse. So is Kissinger,
who was Secretary of State at the time. But uh,
And what's important, what's important to keep in mind during
this time is that there was no Special Operations Command.
The US military was kind of a mess. You know,
this was only this was less This was less than
a year and a half after the draft had had ended,
the all Volunteer Force was being implemented. There's a there's
a there's a draw down in uh in the number
of h division sized combat capable formations. So basically, uh,
the the Cold War flash points in Europe and in
Asia were really being manned by a skeleton crew, as
it were, and there was not this like rapid deployment capability,
and there was no Special Operations Command. So you know,
the kind of instinctive response people have in reading about
the Mayagas was like, well, why didn't you know? What
didn't so commerce predecessor, just like deploy Navy seals or
something like that. Infrastructure didn't exist. And also and uh
as the crow flies. I think the closest UH combat
capable force to UH to Cambodia would have been located
in Okanawa. Nineteen seventy five. Okay, like this was, this
was this is heigh of the Cold War. You know,
this was not America did not have you know, four
deployments all over this planet, you know that, And it
didn't have the commanding control nor the forces in't being
you know, to respond to something like this instantaneously. Yeah,
but I mean I've seen it seems short sighted, I
guess that people today, But it's history in the rearview mirror,
Like this was not this kind of thing was not
really within the contemplation of of of the Department of
Defense either. It was it was not the kind of
exigencies that were emerging in nineteen seventy five in any
any kind of regular or predictable capacity. But because it
may like we talked about, like we talked about last
couple of episodes, Cambodia and the Kremie Rouge was absolutely
a client regime of the people's Republic in China. This
created some strange intrigues. As you know, Pet King was
decoupled from Moscow in a real way. And this was
you know, solidified by the efforts of a Nixon and Kissinger.
America had to tread somewhat lightly too in order to
preserve that just a uh an immediate kind of brought
spectrum assault on Khmer Rouge Cambodia, which they had they
were calling Democratic Campuccia. That would have caused real problems
and uh that could have uh that wouldn't have this
the Sino Soviet split by that point, was that the
chasm was too great. Proverbially, that wouldn't have driven the
Chinese back into the arms of Warsaw Pact, but it
definitely would have generated momentum in that direction. Okay, So
that's kind of the subtext of this, and that's one
of the reasons why I think it's an important It's
not just you know, like a footnote of history. It's
something that deserves to be talked about, not just because
the men that were lost there and and the three
of them in particular stuff for an utterly horrible fate
that we'll get into, but it's imperative to understand, uh,
you know, how complicated and how strange the late Cold
War became. And obviously later you know, uh, in nineteen
seventy nine, the Hanoi government quite literally went to war
with China, and uh, concomitantly, you know, the the Vietnamese
assaulted into Cambodia, deposed the Khmer Rouge and and this
you know, decades long conflict ensued, you know, between the
Vietnamese occupiers and the Khmer Rouge have been driven off
into the bush, which was very much a proxy war
between the people's public as China and the Soviet Union,
which I mean not to be flippant about it, because
I mean, you know this, the cost in human suffering
was immense, but uh, creating generating that conflict was kind
of a master stroke of the Nixon White House and
subsequent administrations who continued to cultivate that divide and conquer strategy.
But there's some uh, there's some evidence, uh, if one
knows what to look for, the Chinese had absolutely no
interest in sabotaging the kind of strategic alliance for the
America which was then still pretty fresh. But at the
same time, you know, China was not America's friend, and
they were just as prone to intrigues as uh. As ever,
I believe that the Chinese probably directed uh the Kmier
rouge to seize them uh, to seize the uh mayagas
or at least once it happened, you know, they they
they they they endorsed that move. And I think the
I think the long game for Pet King was that
then they could intervene as like negotiator. It would be
a way to kind of bloody Uncle Sam's nose in
terms of global credibility, you know, cast China as uh
you know kind of uh the arbiter of a of
of warrant piece affairs in the Orient and uh. Plus
it would generate good will, at least in pay King's
mind with uh you know, whatever government replaced the Ford administration.
And that sounds totally backwards, it's strange, but that's the
way that the Chinese think and thought it is. It's
an arguable examples are myriad. If people think I'm just
you know, kind of mouthing off they don't like the
Chinese or whatever, But this was a delicate situation, is
uh what I'm getting at, you know, beyond the obvious
fact that that any kind of hostage rescue operation is
is is kind of the worst possible in operational terms,
UH circumstance to emerge. You know, one doesn't need to
be H one doesn't need to be some high speed
military type to recognize that. But the way it played
out in UH operational terms was for for it was
informed the seizure of the make of the Mayagas at
his UH morning briefing on UH the sixteenth, like I said,
the National Security Council was convened Brent Scowcroft, who, as
I'm sure people will recognize, you know, later went on
to play a major role in the Reagan administration, particularly
Reagan's first term. You know, he he basically early on
in the crisis was UH what was the one who
uh you know convened UH what ultimately became you know,
the parties who determined what what the what the operational
response would be for better or worse? The UH, the
the big concern I mean obviously aside from the you know,
the issues are just indicated relating to a relating the
UH US Chinese relations and everything else. America had a
major credibility problem, and like we talked, you know, owing
to the falls Saigon. And as we talked about I
think last episode, I'm not just overstating that because it's
kind of my peculiar emphasis as a revisionist. This was
in the Cold War, particularly as UH strategic parody set
in which UH in the later region of era was
I mean, it was was kind of the you know
what was was the height of that kind of paradigm shift.
The United States enjoying credibility and its ability to project
power successfully, you know, when a third world That's basically
what the entire Truman doctrine hinged upon, and the entire
American Cold War strategy in in military terms, hinged on
the Truman doctrine. Okay, so coming off of UH, coming
off of defeat and Saigon, despite you know, however much
that had been mitigated by the sound of Soviet split.
In pure military and strategic terms, if America had proven
unable or lacking in the will to respond UH to
the seizure, that mayegg isn't its crew Well, in you know,
military operational terms, that would have UH, that would have
had real world consequences and UH, and and that that's
that's really what was on the minds of you know,
Ford himself and everybody in his National Security cabinet. Ford
immediately issued a statement declaring at the seizure of the
vessel was an act of piracy, which is interesting language,
which wasn't really precedented. And the context understand that statement
within it wasn't just him, It wasn't just the president
relying upon you know, kind of cringe polemic. What he
was saying was, I mean, this this was the era
when people were banding that you know, the president had
to have you know, approval from Congress before he, uh,
you know, acted in the Article two commander in chief
role and like nonsense like the War Powers Act was
being floated. Okay, I don't want to start a constitutional debate,
but that kind of stuff was emergent from the hangover
over over the Vietnam conflict that that does not have
a leg to stand on according to the letter of
the Constitution. But because that was the tenor of discourse,
forded to send some kind of message that you know,
he was not gonna he was not gonna he was
not gonna await some kind of congressional debate. And whether
or not, you know, he was off the rise, he
was forc against the Premier Rouge. You know, he's saying, like,
you know, this is outside of the bounds of of
of ordinary international relations, and you know I'm gonna respond
to OVERI fit that's reading between the lines. I find
that very interesting. I can't think of a more unenviable
position to be in than, you know, the American president
in the aftermath of Watergate, being faced with a you know,
a kind of asymmetrical national security crisis like this that
calls for you know, immediate decisive action that I mean,
that's never a particularly desirable situation to find oneself in,
but in that era, and then specifically in that moment,
you know, weeks after the fullest I gone like I
can't even imagine. But secret to state Schlessinger, what he
did immediately was he directed the Joint Chiefs to order
their people in theater to locate the mayaga Is and
at all costs prevent the vessel's movement to mainland Cambodia,
employing all the des ury munitions required to do that,
but obviously taking care not to harm you know, the
hostage crew. Kissinger, and this was fascinating, immediately went into action.
But he didn't contact the Khmer Rouge or attempt to.
What he did was he conducted the Chinese liaison office
in Washington and he immediately demanded to release the mayag
is and to convey that message to the Khmer Rouge
on the ground. The whoever the formal diplomatic representative of
Pey King was, refused to accept the note, saying basically,
I can't take responsibility for this gets injured. Then tapped
George Herber Walker Busch, who at that time was leading
the counterpart lie as an office in Pey King. He
delivered the note personally to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and he,
according to Bush himself, and uh, I don't see why
you would lie about this. He conveyed orally that if
there was not you know, if the immediate release of
of the Mayaga's crew was not you know, was not realized,
that uh, the Khmer rou should be held responsible collectively
and there'd be a massive shock and awe assault on
Panolan Penn And again the this wasn't just diplomatic protocol
that both Kissinger and then Bush approached China. I mean
it goes to show you what was underway behind the scenes,
and that this obviously the most charitable view to take
of it is that, well, you know, the Khmer Rouge,
they were paranoid psychos and it was this kind of
backwards revolutionary regime. They grabbed the Mayagas just because they
were paranoid. Then when they realized, you know, that it
was a US flag vessel, they freaked out and didn't
know what to do. The most kind of punitive view
of it is that, you know what I the possibility
I raised a moment ago, was that the Chinese orchestrated this,
as you know, part of a Machiavilian kind of intrigue drama,
which they've done in the past, frankly, and continue to
do so today, albeit and less punctuated in violent terms.
But regardless, Washington obviously was aware that, you know, China
was either responsible for this and in approximate causal terms
or had the power to force a resolution. And that
tells you everything you need to know about the relationship
between the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese, the Soviet Union, China
in the United States. H Subsequently, the Khmuho's tried to
do exactly that, release the Mayaga's crew unharmed, which we'll see,
and I think that further substantiates, you know, my kind
of uh spitball analysis. But I, like I said, I'm
not I'm not just speculating or conspiracy theorizing. I think
anyone who spends time with the factual record and you know,
kind of read between the lines of American diplomacy speak,
I think this becomes clear. Okay, back to the uh
kind of practical operational side of it, though the uh
it was on the the following day, it was confirmed
that the Mayagas was off the coast of Ko Tang,
which is an island in Cambodian territorial waters which the
Khmuter Rouge had fortified after the after Prono and Pen fell,
which it later became clear that they'd done so in
anticipation of a Vietnamese naval assault, because their big fear
was that it would be used as a staging ground,
you know, to assault in mainland presumably as you know,
a secondary theater to a divert kremue Ruse forces and
being from you know whatever across border Loca I had
had been the you know, the the spair plannks as
were of of the Vietnamese of potential Vietnamese assault I
can't speak how problem that would have been, because I mean,
who knows, but it wasn't. It was entirely reasonable to
you know, anticipate that at the time and with what
was underway. And I mean ultimately the Vietnamese did. I
mean that's what the posed the com rouge was a
Vietnamese attack. So I mean this was not just this
is not just an alibi of a of the regime,
whatever else we can say about it and its credibility.
The absence of combat cable American forces in theater again
was the big problem. The closest, uh truly comic cable
element was the second Battalion, ninth Marines, when a training
who were then engaged in a trainingcise on Okinawa and
on the night of the thirteenth of May, which was
the day after the that the seizure of the the
vessel itself, they were ordered to return a camp and
prepare for departure by air on May fourteenth. It Uh,
the problem was this was a heavy I mean, this
is this, this was not this is this is the
proverbial operation. Every one needs to go into light. I mean,
like again, these days we would think of it as
like a Sealed Team six or like a Delta Forest
kind of operation, and uh, this is not really what
people were training for at that time, and there was
an by nineteen seventy five, there was there was a
handful of officers with second Italian ninth Marines who died,
you know, been under fire in Vietnam, but virtually none
of the enlisted matter Renco's head. You know, the idea taken.
I mean, however tough these guys were, and I'm sure
that they were like a hard dudes taking you know,
taking a marine element that had not been in combat before,
and you know, kind of breaking their proverbial sherry, you know,
by having them assault a ship that had been taken hostage.
And this in a kind of anti counter terrorist operation
like that seems like a recipe for disaster. Would ultimately
put the gobache on that planned operation. Was uh a
guy named General Burns, Yeah, Burns, he was commander with
the seventh Air Force. He uh wade in and said, look,
you know, it's very possible that you know, the crew
has already been you know, taking landside either on Ko
Tang itself or is being shuttled to the mainland. Regardless,
He's like you're gonna need more firepower than just you know,
then then you know, can be uh gonna be brought
to bear you know by dropping uh, but by dropping
uh by dropping the Marines, you know, by chopper onto
uh onto the vessel itself, you know, with you know
kind of like light covering fire from whatever. These I assume,
like I assume like Hue. I don't know if Hue
Cobras were fielded then yet, but yeah, yeah they would
have been. But I mean point being you know with uh,
Burns to his credit, was thinking ahead and uh his
idea was, uh bring to bear air Force gunships and
shoppers to be able to you know, saturate the island
of firepower if need be. And the uh you know,
the the hostage rescue element, he suggested, uh, the fifty
sixth Security Police Squadron. He is like the Air Force
guys who like guard like air bases at that at
that time, that's what they were. Like. These days, the
Air Force has like a high speed like like spec
war like element, but in those days they basically had
these guys were somewhat like more high speed like MPs,
you know, and again like that's not really that's not
really you know, the element you want for something like this.
But uh, his view at least was more kind of
in line with what was to develop than then than
that than that which was floated uh previously and in
this operation was actually implemented it and the Utapo Airbase
and Thailand, which I believe is still in use. Like
the idea was that these gunships and these UH and
these UH air Force MPs you know who are the
hostage rescue element, They're gonna be shuttled from the Philippines
to uh Utapo in Thailand to be yah different thing,
and then from there they were gonna assault Ko Tang
on the way to Thailand. Uh there was there was
a chopper crash and like eighteen of their number were killed.
So as you can see this, uh it was eighteen
eighteen the security police and five crewmen. So I mean,
as you can see, there's just getting like more and
more food barb by the moment. In operational terms.
Speaker 1: It sounds it sounds like trying to go into a
ram and get the hostages.
Speaker 2: Yeah exactly, And uh, yeah, no that's that You're exactly right.
And this coupled with desert one and you know, with
which the aborded Iranian rescue mission and uh, the lack
of integrated command and control of Grenada. That's really what
created so COOM, you know, because the need for it
became recognized.
Speaker 1: Well, there was only one lost in Grenader, right, was
there one? I think there was only one casualty in
Grenader right?
Speaker 2: No, there was a number. And what happened was these
Navy seals who were there was a bunch, there's a few.
There was like a you know, there's an Army command element,
a Marine command element, and then there was these seals
who ended up somehow dropped in the wrong place and
then they ended up drownings. They weren't retrieved. Yeah, it
was a whole mess, and like it had to do.
It was literally totally avoidable when it was like a
command and control.
Speaker 1: Nineteen dead, nineteen dead, one hundred and fifty wounded.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean Grenada is all. We'll get
into Grenada in one of the later episodes because it's
in political terms, Uh it it bored directly on uh
uh the Sandinist Revolution, and there was there was North
Koreans on the ground there. I mean, obviously it was
the Cuban element there's a couple of East Germans like
it's fascinating and it very much, uh, it very much
was what the I mean, however, anybody feels about the
Reagan administration, and you know, some of it's alleged overreach.
Grenada actually was it was it was being purposed to
rapidly reinforce Nicaragua and and friendly proxies like the theater.
You know, that was you know, the the only thing
to building Grenada was an airstrip for that purpose, and
that's exactly what they were building. But as it may,
after this atter, this, after this UH, after this disaster
with you know in uh at uh the TAPO for
it can be another National Security Council meeting on UH
on May fourteenth, the uh A communication like been established
with the seventh Air Force elements UH that had departed
from Hawaii and where the circling Ko Tang and in
these day, in those days, that was a closer you
get to like real time communications. I mean, that's another
thing we take for branded today. But obviously then like
you were, there was quite literally like blindness in theater
if you were the command element in in the White House,
you know, trying to direct military operations to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and then they in turn, you know,
any any any data they were getting from the battlespace
was you know, minutes at least minutes and probably hours
out of date. The UH these fighters, UH they were
trying to What they didn't realize was that the crew
by this time of the Mayagas had been shuttled to
this fishing boat which was then UH attempting to transport
them to UH the mainland, this coastal city called Kampong Sum.
These guys their credit, these pilots who were circling in theater,
they recognized that that's probably was going on. They requisitive
permission to UH trying to shoot the rudders off of
this ship that was conveying them and like assault the
pet boats that were escorting it. Ford intervened had said that,
you know, the use of those kinds of munitions would
be would present too great risks of the crew. So
they put the gabash on that the UH at at
the same time, UH the National and Security Council, they
got word, UH they got word back that the Chinese
For and Ministry and BREAT Beijing had refused to UH
pass any kind of formal communication on the Khmer Rouge.
But Busch said that in his belie but Busch said
that he could all but guarantee that the Chinese are
putting pressure on the Khmer Rouge to comply with whatever
American demands were because like, obviously even if I mean,
like I said, I've got my own theory on this,
that this was very much orchestrated by Pey King. But
whether it was or not, obviously the situation was rapidly,
you know, spiraling out of control. And uh Busch, uh whatever, Uh,
whether a view of him charitable or or whether it's
you know, not particularly so. So Bush was a serious
guy and he very much understood the Chinese and had
a rapport with them. And I mean he was a
career intelligence And if you're relayed that in my belief, uh,
you know, this has been conveyed and this is what's happening.
I think, you know, that was I think I think
I think that was as good as gold. But uh,
the the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
was a guy named uh, it was a guy named
David Jones. What he presented and this was ultimately followed
through in operational terms. He presented the arrange in military
opposite of the National Security Council and he said, you know,
look like we're not even sure where the Mayagus crew
is at this point, you know, whether there's shipboard, whether
they're landside, and if they're landside, where they're actually located.
And he's like, obviously like they are, you know, rescuing
them on a harmony to be our priority. But he's like,
we've basically got to like waste the commuter rouge because
like we can't just like let the slide. You know,
He's like, we gotta this is a credibility issue at
bubb all else, you know, aside. You know, obviously you
know we're not going to disregard the lives of our people,
but you know, we've got it. We've got to lay
as much hurt on the premier ruge as we can.
And from that point forward that was basically accepted by
the White House. It came down to three possibilities. Some
intelligence suggested that they were still on the mayagas. Some
suggested they were on Kotang Island. Others suggested that they
were on the fishing boat itself route uh I, bound
for the mainland and the you know, the coastal city
of Campung Som, which is what these Air Force pilots
were laid, which turned out to be true, incidentally, But
what was ultimately decided was an ancial security council decided
to do. They decided to deploy the Marines to take
the Mayagas itself, assault Kotang Island and together the ass
of Assault and Cambodi itself, particularly it's shipping and uh
it's uh it's shipping infrastructure, you know, and you know
all like you know, naval military targets and uh escalating
the Panolan pen itself, you know, and like any other
kind of like counter value uh targets of opportunity that
presented themselves. You know, if if uh if if within
you know, twenty four or thirty six hours or whatever,
you know, there wasn't resolution to the crisis. The fishing
boat on which uh the magus crew actually was and
it did arrive at Kampung Sam. The Khmun rouse commander
at Kampung Sam either either he had either been either
the Chinese had gotten to him, or he just understood
what was underway. He issued in order to his men,
like you know, I don't know you know, do not
harm these hostages, you know, under any circumstances. You know,
he asked these hostages. You know, he's like, you know,
I mean, I mean by that point, but established obviously
it was an American flag ship, you know, and he uh,
he asked him if the radio equipment was was operable,
you know, said they get it's He's like, look releasing
you you know, like, can you call off this assault?
And uh it was it turned out the radio equipment
was not operable, but the uh as it uh and
as it turned out later like one of the one
of the one of the guys later just closed. He's like,
he's like, I didn't know if we'll be able to
reach like any of the aircraft in the air. But
he's like, by that point, like I wanted He's he's like,
I wanted to commuter ruders to get their ass kicks.
So he's like, I, you know, he's like I wouldn't
have transmitted it anyway, which Franklin was the right call,
I think, but that but by that point, uh, the
die was cast. The uh the it was that uh
the U it was that around just past dawn on
May sixteenth, Kotang itself was assaulted. But as it as
it turned out, Intel suggested that there was only about
twenty or thirty Camire Rouge fighters on the island. It
turned out that there's over one hundred. And again they
they they they had a lot of heavy machine guns
among them and like uh and cruiser like squad weapons.
Is because you know, like we talked about a moment ago,
they fortified the island and as a patient of a
Vietnamese assault which never came. But you know, these uh,
the Khmer Rouge, whatever you can say about these guys,
were were incredibly game fighters. This pitched battle ensued between
the Marines and the camer Rouge. The UH, the the uh.
The crew of the Mayagas was safely conveyed uh back
from this fishing boat like back to the Mayagas itself
and uh and and they were they were they were
safely conveyed away from the battle space. But uh, when
it became clear that the crew had been released and
was safe it uh the Marines were ordered to withdraw
and they began uh affecting a tacticle withdraw like a
fighting or tree as it were. But the Marine commander
on the ground there was two beachheads at the eastern.
The commander of the easternmost UH operational area, he conveyed, like, look,
unless we're like wrapped, unless we're rapidly reinforced, like we're
gonna be overrun. So UH they reinforcem or some instead
have been called off. Were then directed back to Ko
Tang to reinforce the Marines on the ground. You know
this uh in this kind of chaotic withdraw that ensued,
there was a machine gun team of UH three marines
that uh in this kind of craggy they in this
kind of craggy area, like on the beach itself, like
just outside of the ever kind of shrinking perimeter. You know,
they'd uh they'd set up a UH an ad hoc
machine gun nest and they'd been left behind in the
wake of the withdrawal. And UH one of the one
of these guys platoon mates had said on board the shopper, like,
you know, there's there's at least three men on the
ground there. For some reason, this wasn't this wasn't a
biden And I realized, like in the middle of a
hot alz, like in the midst of a firefight. I mean,
I'm sure, things are confused, but this, uh, as it happened,
these guys were left behind, managed to radio a passing
US naval vessel and apparently, uh, some intelligence officers said
it's probably like a Kremiere Rouge trick, and there like,
I mean, it seems ridiculous. It seems like something like
a cordial old movie, like some Premier Ruge saying like Yo,
g I Joe, you'll send them all. I mean, that's
I'm not even light of a horrible situation with that.
It seems to me by that point probably everybody's looking
to cover their own ass as it became clear that,
you know, they're like there head probably been men left behind.
These three guys are left behind. This became this like
a enduring kind of myth on most And I remember
before I knew anything about the mayag As, before I'd like,
I mean, I was always fancy by Vietnam, and I
mean ever since I could read, I was reading about,
you know, about the cold warn things. But I knew
this guy in the early nineties. Uh, he was kind
of a sad guy. You know, he's kind of like
the troubled Vietnam veda myth and lore you know, like
he had a drug problem and stuff, but he he
never became pretty tights like we worked together, like we
delivered pizzas together, you know. And he he'd he I
talked about Vietnam and he was really into the Pow
Mia movement, you know, and I kind of just looked
at him, was like a sad guy who was troubled
by the war and other things. But he kept coming
back to Ko Tang and saying, you know, they left
guys behind, you know in Cambodia. You know that means
they left other guys behind, and like, uh, like, I'm
not saying he was right about all these things he claimed,
but he wasn't just like talking shit, you know, like
and he that's this. As it turns out, the uh,
these guys were a bannon on Ko Tang. That that
fed a lot of the speculation that the that the
kind of Pow movement you know, derived uh their claims from.
But it came out years later. These three guys and
there were his kids, I think, like and they were
like I think they were like eighteen nineteen and twenty one, respectively.
They were on the island for a week, and uh,
the Khmer Rous realized that like some of their rights
stores had gone missing, and that you know, bootprints uh
that obviously weren't uh you know, camier rous sandals were
found and the cammree was tracked these guys and they
found them. They were uh shuttled to the mainland. Uh
you know, I mean, god knows what they were subjected
to do by commie us tortures. But after several days,
uh they were looking to the jailers. Uh they were
beaten to death with the butt end of a B
forty rocket launcher. I mean, I can't even imagine that
man like being being uh being being abandoned uh by
uh by your own forces and then falling into the
hands of the caremure rouge like literally on this like
god forsaken island. I mean, that's that's beyond that. A
lot of stuff frightens me, like at my age and
frankly had some kind of awful experiences, but that that,
I mean, I find that there's like horrifying even even
to think about, you know, and their kids.
Speaker 1: But they should their kids, they should be home in
the driveway working on a car they just bought.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, man. And it's like, of all people of
being captured by the Communer Ruge and one most horrifying
thing I can think of, because like it's not just
like the Commune Rouge really were animals, Like it's not.
I mean like it's that's like, yeah, it's not, it's
not something just like bullshit propaganda or something like it.
I mean, there's a lot of cases where you know,
if if you're if you surrender, if you're captured at war,
I mean you're you're dealing with that ponent, you're dealing
with an opt for that are just guys like you,
like in the case of the Communit Rouge, like these
these guys were fucking barbarians.
Speaker 1: But the uh yeah, they they seem like the the
descendants of the the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War.
Speaker 2: Yeah they yeah. And there's just there's like horrible stuff
like the there actually were like documents and says like
cannibalism just like terrorized people and stuff, and like they
you know, they it's it's one of the few wintances
again we're kind of the truth is the truth is
worse than a lot of the propaganda that came out,
but it but it's also too like I think I
think a lot of this was suppressed, uh for the
reasons I said. It was like this, it was this bizarre,
like messy political and diplomatic situation relating to the you know,
uh the intrigues incident of the son of Soviets split. Uh.
You know, a lot of the uh, the ongoing hangover
as it were, from the Vietnam conflict. And you know,
like I said, just even the way it's treated as bizarre,
that gets in the fact like this was just uh,
this was just uh, you know, it's just kind of
like as an afterthought, like slapped on to the Vietnam
War Memorial as all. And this was you know that
this happened sort of in theater and sort of you know,
within the same decades, So you know, why not just uh,
you know, why why not just treat it as part
of like the same uh, part of the same kind
of like nucleus of uh of of conflict events. But
it's yeah, I that's the uh, that's the that's that's
the story of Ko tank Man and that's the uh
and that's the time. That's the uh. I believe, and
I've written about this in my fiction, Like I believe
that uh, I believe the US engage. I believe US
forces engaged the Commune Rouge like fairly regularly. I don't
see how they could not have. Like they were you know,
they were running around Cambodia for years prior to nineteen
seventy and then in the aftermath, you know, even uh,
even when even when the US and China like came
to terms and uh, the US began cultivating the camer
Rouge against uh, you know, the pro Vietnamese element. There's
no way that there's no way that American soldiers did
not engage the Khmer Rouge in a hostile action in theater.
But this is the only time it happened above board.
I mean, this was like a real firefight, you know.
And that's you know, like I said it, uh I.
I I try and raise the people because I think
as a historical writer, I think it's important, you know,
out of the memory of people like these guys who
were there. But it's also it shows you how it
shows you how strange the Cold War got really after
sixty nine to seventies seventy one, when it became really
like a three way kind of contest with the United States,
kind of like nominally allied with China in strategic terms,
you know, in pursuing the kind of interdependence the results
of which you know, we we kind of see today
in the global structure. But it's it was far from, uh,
it was far from some kind of like clean alliance
and uh, you know, the the way what the Chinese
view is kind of sound policy in terms of how
to intrigue against others is incredibly weird. You know, like
and I'm telling you, like creating this incident for the
sake of trying to exploit uh, you know, the the
ensuing chaos for some kind of political and diplomatic cachet
that might seem crazy like the Western mind, that's exactly
the way the Chinese think. If you read about the
the pointless border war that Mau provoked with with Moscow
mal basically uh risked and nuclear war with the Soviet Union,
said he could go around uh humiligating version ev you know,
for a few weeks and acting like, uh, he'd scored
some kind of victory so that domestically, like you know,
he could shore up his kind of fledging personality called credibility,
and like, no, like even a totally unhanged Western uh,
you know, tyrant like wouldn't think that way or wouldn't
do that. But that's that's the kind of stuff characteristic
of the regime and from I mean in the lifetime
of people like me and yourself. I mean, yeah, the
the kinds of chaos of of mau when in the
aftermath is something we didn't experience firsthand. But even uh,
even even Dang was kind of credited as like this
great reformer or and this kind of moderating influence. I mean,
the stuff that he uh would orchestrate in order to
in order to UH advantage himself or advantage you know,
pet King in his eyes uh visa VII the West.
It doesn't it doesn't make any sense. So that was
kinna last tragic chapter in the history of UH. What
wasn't oil China? There's a I mean, there was, there
was the Chinese, there was the there was the Sino
Vietnamese border War in seventy nine, and there was again too,
there was the there's the occupation of Cambodia. You know,
from seventy nine until until the wall came down.
Speaker 1: China, Chinese and Vietnamese forces fired on each other like
four years ago.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, no, and that's why one of the really
inzing things, you know, Obama was one of the last
things he did in office was a he he lifted
any remaining restrictions on a military tech transfers to Vietnam.
Like the the people in the Pentagon aren't conceptually illiterate,
and there's very few of them who aren't. Uh they're
they're like literally fucking morons. But the they they realized
that Vietnam's like an essential hedge against the People's Republic,
and it is, and Vietnam has got a real comic capability.
I mean, there are hard people, they've got a real military,
and Vietnam's comparatively huge country. It's got like sixty million people,
you know, like people think it's now that people think
it's like like Americans, they think all these countries like
the size of Albania or something like a Vietnam's and
a as a as a geotragic hedge. Yeah, Vietnam is
incredibly important and uh an alliance that would make sense.
And now that leave some of the pressure of America
having to you know, kind of play between Tokyo and Seoul,
you know, which is increasingly you know, causing consternation the
in in in relationship with both countries as well as
their relationship to China. Like what would be intelligent would
be to do the cultivate UH countries like Vietnam and
some kind of like American version of of of what
the Russians are trying to college with the Shanghai Qui
Operation Organization. Like like, not only is NATO like destabilizing
and pointless, but it also says not how you structure
military alliances in the twenty fourth century, it's like structurally
obsolescent as well as as well as politically anachronistic. That's
gonna subject another show, but I hope I didn't. I
didn't like bore people with just kind of like relaying
the Battle of Ko Tang, like I said, I yeah, yeah,
and I next time what I want to get into,
I want to get in to the President Carter's modernization
of the command and control aspect of america strategic nuclear
forces and how you know, the advent of AI as
well as UH. You know, the the onset of strategic parody.
We're in the window of decision making, you know, was
reduced in some cases, you know, to five to eight
minutes or something, and it had just been accepted for
a time that the president would die immediately and have
been a nuclear war. It's a strategic air command and
would be acting as the Article two executive. I mean
that's parently and constitutional number one number two. It's just like, ethically,
that's not right. You don't like the United States Air
Force and you know, uh, strategic air commands that then existed,
they don't. They don't get to decide you know, uh,
like who lives and who dies. They don't. They don't
get to decide, you know, when and how we wage war.
But also it raised a fascinating issue. I'm what I
was telling people too, Like guys like Harlan Ellison, you know,
when they were you know, Harlan Ellison actually came over
with the idea for sky in It and like James
Cameron like ripped him off, like Cameron rips off everything.
But this wasn't just like some kind of horror movie trope.
There the removal of human decision makers from strategic nuclear
war fighting. That was a real thing, and by the
nineteen eighties it was becoming and uh, when there's when
with a lot launching even on warning when when when
the window of decision making temporarily speaking, becomes so narrow
that even launching on warning is too late, Like what
do you do? It's like, well, you know, you defend
yourself by finding ways to code variables that indicate, you know,
that that indicate imminent assault like before though you know,
before there's even like conventional like launch indicators and mobilization indicators.
But then it's like okay, but then like when do
you attack when there's like a ten percent probability of assault,
when there's like a fifty anything over fifty percent, then
when there's ninety percent, when there's anything over one percent,
you know, and it's some not you know that that's
a kind of like machine thinking that becomes inevitable, you know,
when technology it becomes totally just positive as outcomes, but
also uh, the amount of data that has to be
managed in a strategic landscape like that, like humans can't
do it, you know. So we were looking at a
situation where the Cold War endured, like machines would have
been the decision maker, you know, and uh, you'd have
to hope that you know, the the coded uh indicators
you know, were correct or at least I couldn't be spoofed,
you know, by by man or by fate. But that yeah,
that's I I'll save it for the when we get
into that. But that's that's that's kind of the that's
kind of the key feature of the Carter presidency, I think,
and I mean I I'm a lot friendly to Carter
and uh, you know the way I I view the
his epoch and most people. So well, we'll get into
some of these strategic nuclear command and control issues, some
of these wartech issues, and and and we'll deal with
like Carter the man himself in the next episode. And
like again, I really really appreciate people supporting the series,
and I wanted to give Ko Tang it's due and
the you know, the men were there. It's due because,
like I said, it's it's something nobody really talks about.
And that's part of the reason for these series, so
that we can deep dive into stuff that people don't
really talk about in more mainstream sources. So that's all
I got. And thank you, Pet.
Speaker 1: Yeah, of course I'm too quick plugs.
Speaker 2: Yeah, you can find me on Twitter that probably that
will probably change in the next few weeks.
Speaker 3: But.
Speaker 2: I'm on there. Again. You can find me at Real
Underscore Thomas seven seven seven. I'm recording from my YouTube
channel on Friday with my dear friend Carrie, and I'm
gonna upload that next week sometime, so I'll make sure.
I'll hype that everybody knows my YouTube channel. There's nothing
near yet, but there will be is Thomas TV. You
can find me on substack, which is kind of my
permanent home. It's a real Thomas seven seven seven dot
subseac dot com. I'm gonna relaunch a Telegram channel because
everybody who supports us, they really like Telegram. I mean,
Telegram really treats me badly, so I wasn't real keen
to doing business with them again. But i will launch
a channel for the sake of the subscribers and our friends.
But I'm going to do that sometime this weekend and
i'll plug that when we're back on there. But right
now I just have like a private channel, but I'm
going to relaunch a public one. That's all I got.
Speaker 1: Awesome, man, So the next time, thank you, Thomas. Today
happens to be the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of
the Paris Piece Accords, which ended the Vietnam War, and
we couldn't think of anyone better to have on to
talk about that than somebody that is gracing me with
his presence on my podcast and going through a Cold
War series right now.
Speaker 2: So how do I'm doing? Well? Thank you? Well? I
I appreciate you inviting me.
Speaker 1: Here's the first question I want to ask, because I
was I was writing questions on the last episode we
did and I realized the episodes were for the end.
So did public opinion help in ending the war?
Speaker 2: I mean yeah, because the internal situation in any state,
any modern state, I mean, whether you're talking about a
nominal you know, multi party democracy, I mean in the
terms that that signifiers utilizing the Cold War, or whether
you're talking about you know, the Communi states of the
Eastern Bloc, in a in a state in the general
mobilization especially, but in any in any any policy, ongoing policy, initiative,
or structure that directly affects the population, like public opinion
is impactful on that policy, you know. Not despite the
kind of mythology of democratic peace theory or whatever, there
are not states that exist that are just totally in
odds to the body politic, Not any government in existence,
nor has there been in the modern era that just
has absolutely no mandate. You know, it's it's completely immune
to public opinion. That's not nothing to work. But what
I was saying a moment ago, and I'm going somehow
with this is not just like a old guy tangent.
I'm listening to Michael Savage and he's got Colonel McGregor on.
I know that people don't. I know some people are
just like doing McGregor either. That's not the point. Savage
kept on talking about the Russians kind of foibles in
Ukraine and saying this is like Vietnam when you know
the Pegon just wouldn't really fight the war, and McGregor
was credit corrected Savage. McGregor's like, look, man, like Vietnam
is a fucking scalpunt. We killed the amount of people
in Vietnam. It was not just like pussy footing around
like hey, we want to be you know, we gotta
gotta playtate world opinion. We we don't want to like
killing Vietnammese. It was I mean, part of my language.
It was a fucking gook scalp punt. Okay, but you
don't win wars just by going out and killing as
many people as possible. You don't win wars by you know,
manufacturing dead people. If you did, I think throughout ninety
forty two that Wehrmacht hit something like a fifteen to
one burn rate in like major engagement with the Red Army. Okay,
I mean is did does the Greater German Reich it
exist today? Didn't win the wars? It killed a whole
lot of people in Russia. No, But the issue with
public opinion was that it wasn't so much like the
court history is two things. It's what Michael Samadge said.
It's that, oh, America wasn't really fighting the Vietnam War,
you know, or was doing brutal things. But you know
these things were you know, not the war was there
wasn't a general mobilization in place, and you know, America
wasn't really applying force the way it should. That's part
of the narrative. The other part is, well, the Vietnam
War was wrong, so all these people rose up and
just forced you know, evil mister Nixon to stop what
he was doing. Like nothing like that happened. And you know,
seventy percent of combat infantrymen and non were guys who enlisted,
you know, and the remaining thirty percent and probably you know, uh,
there there was some truth of the fact that there
was like a poverty draft, you know, when when the
standards are kind of lessened on on uh you know,
who who would be you know, considered. I can't remember
the classification scheme was, but I mean there was some
truth to that. But this idea that there was either
this draft revolt or America just became like a country
of peace micks and and that ended the war. But
what it did do I mean Johnson was in fact
lying to the American people and what he was saying
was not making any sense, and he was getting on
TV directly concert thing mc namara on top of that,
unlike uh, you know, the New Dealers War, where Roosevelt
would literally have you arrested if you were a media
guy who criticized him his policy or you engage in fetism,
which constantly was everything from saying maybe the war is
not a great idea to reporting on you know, America
actually like losing in the field. I mean that this
I'm not meaning this up like this is it compared
during the comparing the the view of UH or the
orientation of the executive branch. You know, in ninety one
to forty five and from ninety six about to seventy three,
it's like night and day. You know, like if you
think Roosevelt when it's tolerated, you know, Amby Hoffman, UH
or some or or some counterparty like w Pelly, you know,
holding one hundred thousand PAN protests waving National Socialist flags
in Washington, Like you're dead fucking wrong, Like why this
was allowed? And like why this kind of nonsense? You know,
why why why cronkite was allowed to be embedded at
I Corps and UH at long been when UH, you
know NLF like sappers were assaulting it. I mean that's
a whole other issue. But people didn't realize something was wrong.
There was major attrition in Vietnam, like young Americans were
dying in large numbers, and it was it was clear
that it was clear that John's was lying. Okay, Nixon,
who swept the country as we've talked about and Creighton
Abrams to replace Westmorland. Nixon was in fact winning the war,
I believe in military terms, I mean the political side
of it was totally different well in country as well
as domestically, and as regards the internal situation in the
United States. Nixon did do some foolish things. However, like
we talked about in our last episode, you know how
Kissinger and Nixon they they kind of weighed his personal
war in Melvin Laired, the Secretary of Defense, and that's
not what you do if you're the president. And then
they went it was publicly layered of like leaking the
secret bombing of Cambodia looked like, first of ball, why
are you admitting to that? Because that's terrible. Pr Secondly,
like why you like having this knockdown, drag up flight
in public with Melvin Laired, Like how does that look? Okay?
So even people were enthusiastic about, you know, kind of
the policy shift of Nixon create Abrams and all of that,
They're like, okay, why why are all these conspiratorial intrigues happening?
What exactly is going on? You know? And then the
media really you know, the I'm sorry to feel like
if I'm if this seems scatter shop, but I'm trying
to present a linear narrative the best I can. You know,
the Kent State maybe a lot of people know this.
I don't think they do though. You know, the Kent
State shooting of the students the National Guard, that pro
that was a protest of the assault on Cambodia. Okay,
you know late in the war in nineteen seventy there
is my people freaked out about the assault in Cambodia.
Is because to them it indicated a wider war. In
a sense, it was, but Nixon was not lying. Vietnamization
was well underway. There was an active disengagement. The Army
of the Republic of Vietnam was taking on the brunt
of combat duties, and Cambodia was key. And we'll get
into that if you know you're willing to. When we
got the time, Nixon really kind of neutralized the strategic
uh game of Warsaw Pact in Vietnam by affecting the
Sun that Soviets split wherein China and their proxy, the
Khmer Rouge, came to be totally at odds with the
Soviet Union and Hanoi, and an active proxy war between
communist superpowers developed. Uh, you know, between the Vietnamese and
the Khmer Rouge. I mean, whether the Commuter Rouge were
evil or not. I mean that that's another issue. But
point being, there was complexities to widen the war in
Cambodia that couldn't really be finessed in pr terms. And
the fact Nixon what have been going on with him
because during Layered it seemed rotten. These things kind of
conspired to really turn public opinion against what was underway.
So yeah, I mean I realized I was a long winded,
in some of a scattershoff, but yes, there was a
huge impact. It was one part the anti war movement,
which was in part I mean it was a fifth
column regardless, but in part of actually was funded and
organized by UH agents of Warsaw Pact intelligence services. There
was a hostile media apparatus, even those that weren't even
those aspects of national media at warn't hostile Johnson who
did a lot of incredibly stupid and kind of incomprehensible
things allowing media to truly be embedded in the field
with combat elements in a war like Vietnam I with
free fire zones. I mean that that's literally insane. You know,
it was inevitable even if something like mel I hadn't
broken at some point, some newsmen would would have had
raw footage of gis like wasting like women and kids.
I'm not saying as American troops are evil or something
at all. I'm saying like that's what happens in a
free fire zone, okay, and in in good wars like
Over one and two that happened also, but in Vietnam. Uh,
going to the peculiar nuances of the strategic environment, that
kind of thing happened in alarming earnest, if that makes
any sense. But point being, Yeah, so some of this
was some of this was self sabotaged. Some of this
was kind of like the peculiar some of those people
not really understanding like I mean, TV was still new
then basically. I mean part of it was, uh, you know,
especially Johnson, you know, who was a guy who was
like born in nearly twentieth century and not really understanding things.
Party was Johnson wasn't was fucking insane. Uh. Part of
it was you know, the uh you had a you know,
you had a you had a domestic situation that had
been actually subverted, which was literally the opposite of you know,
the situation the New Dealer was confronted, you know, when
they mobilized for war. I mean it was uh on
the top of that too. I mean there was there
was incredibly dangerous things. But you know, sixty two was
the Cuba crisis. Seventy three was the next major crisis
in the Middle East, which I think in some ways
was more dangerous nable Arch eighty three, Okay, But in
the interim, you know you had, uh, there was five
thousand Soviet military uh personnel on the ground in North Vietnam.
You know, intelligence types. You know, some of these guys
are training the northe the knees on SAM missiles and things.
But uh, there's a there's you know, there was the
constant fear, you know during these operations like Linebacker, are
we gonna kill a bunch of Russians? And then you
know what we're gonna is, what the what the fuck's
that Crimlin gonna do? Then maybe nothing, or maybe they're
gonna treat as an act of war. This was like
incredibly dangerous stuff. And uh there's the ongoing you know
issue in Europe where you know you had you know,
you had uh you know, you literally had three hundred
thousand US troops, uh those and those with the Red Army,
the full the Gap and then the Rederman plane I mean,
and and say nothing of you know, occupied the Lynn
like it this. People don't realize, uh, I mean if
you don't realize how, I mean you remember because you're
old enough, and I do. I mean I didn't live
through Vietnam, but you know, I do remember vividly the
early eighties and being afraid of of uh of nuclear war.
I mean, people don't realize like how how tense things
were and in data capacity that was strewing with people's lives.
And even even people who basically were patriotic according to
the terms of you know, the era, and even people
who weren't particularly anti government, there was a certainly like
weirdness of the Cold War thinking. And it's like okay,
like you know, even people who didn't have you know,
teenage kids, at least some kid on their block gotten
blown away, you nom or some relative of theirs. You know,
they got this constant fear of like nuclear attack, you
know it. Uh, the economy was going to shit, like
despite people like Olivers don't tell you, like Vietnam didn't
like make everybody rich, Like yeah, there's always war profiteers
and Zelenski types, like there were five hundred years ago,
and there were five thousand years ago. There weren't in
the sixty eight or to day. Yeah, there were guys
were profiting from the Vietnam War. But the Vietnam War
was killing the American economy, you know, I mean like
it was. These were not like good times. Okay, it's uh,
that's one of the uh in America didn't really right
itself until Reagan's second term. Honestly. I mean there's other
contributing factors, you know, like the energy crisis and the
need to like restructure uh, like certain aspects of America's
uh of America's consumption energy consumption in order to would
count from new realities. But it literally took like a
decade and a half, like America like on fuck itself
from Vietnam, like in terms of you know, the national
economic profile. But seven it was all of those things.
The big uh, the big issue with the Paris Peace
agreements is people, Yeah go ahead.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you're you're talking about the economy. And they were
almost literally doing two wars because not only are they
paying for Vietnam, but now they have this war on
poverty that they're having to print money over and so
you of course you're going things are going to go
to two ship because when you're also millions of social
program come in, you're.
Speaker 2: Also throwing millions upon millions on millions of dollars to
develop you know, ICBM systems that you know can be
super hardened to withstand like first strike. You know, like
you know, keep keeping be fifty two's constantly in the air,
like with nuclear payloads, keeping three hundred thousand men in
West Germany, you know, keeping uh, you know, developing and
maintaining like a fleet of Minutemen missiles as uh, you know,
as the primary deterrent you know, keeping uh keeping nuclear
cable submarines in the war. Like this is unbelievable defensive.
You know, like one of the reasons why like Reagan
went all in to win the Cold War wasn't just
because you know, he you know, he had like balls
or something, or because he you know, he you know,
he wasn't like a pushy like Carder or whatever, like
dumb things people think today, And uh, look like America,
America could waive the colder longer than Ivan, but America's
running out of money to fucking do it too. You know,
you can't you cannot sustain that, and definitely you're either
gonna go to war or you're gonna face some kind
of structural crisis like the Soviets did, and then the
odds of war happening becomes exponentially more likely. I mean,
you know that this idea somehow like America could have
like it definitely you know, maintains like a six hundred
ship navy. Uh, you know, could have could have continuously
like fielded like you know Nora Dora weapons. Uh, you know,
like the B two platform and uh, and you know,
and and and and pursue you know, SDI which would
have become necessary. I know, people just like like to
talk about it. It's like I'm gonna pipe dream, you know,
people like you know, mister Ted Kennedy and the Epoch.
But it wasn't like Jerry Parnell said, like orbital space
had the Cold War indor in the ninety nineties, like
orbital space is going to become what naval warfare platforms
were the strategic nuclear planning in the eighties. I mean,
at some point the money would have run out, you know.
You like again, it's they can't.
Speaker 1: That's also that's also why President Nixon ended Breton Woods.
I mean it makes it easier if you get off
the gold standard, then you can uh, you know, accelerate
the money supply to.
Speaker 2: Yeah, very much so. But it's also too he was
genuinely worried. He was genuinely worried about about UH about
about like a run on the gold resers I, which
was like a real that was that was a real prospect,
especially because it's like outside the scope and against with
this in another episode. And I'm not an economist, but
I do know I am something of an economic historian,
and that I I like a basic conceptual picture of UH,
of the about the structure of UH American economic policy changed,
and just like how globalism kind of gradually became a reality,
you know, and how the kind of information age you know,
changed the way financial markets function wheever meets the road.
And aside of all these things, you and I just
raised the nineteen seventies. That was the dawn. That was
what you're done of the information age. Okay, I mean
you could say that like the kind of machines that
like Turing machines were, I don't mean like that, I
mean like the digital age. I guess I should say
that the dawna that was the ninety seventies and things
from from the nineteen seventies to now, things changed just rapidly,
you know, and that that was altering the way business
is done in the way like money is conceptualized, in
my opinion, for better and for worse. I mean, it was,
it was not. It was not all negative, although there
aren't any negatives, but you know, the these kinds of punctuated,
these kinds of punctuated changes are they they're their stresses,
you know, like I they they they uh, they cause
they make they make crises more probable of all sorts.
So yeah, it uh, you know, but the the main
uh what I kind of wanted to emphasize on, you know,
I mean, like all things related to Vietnam even today,
even though kind of the like the tamboo is no
longer around the Vietnam War obviously as it was for
you know when I was a kid and like when
you were a teenager. I'm sure, but people there's still
like ill understood's there's this idea of the Paaris peace talks.
Like guys are kind of the mainstream, right, even some
guys like on the dissident right, they do it. It's like, oh, well,
Congress screwed Nixon over and just you know, cut off
the money supply and you know, the tangible military aid
to the Republic of Vietnam. You know, so the South
can't defend itself, and you know, Hanoi was just rubbing
its hands together and never meant to like abide the
rules of the or the material express conditions of the
peace agreement. It's not really true, you know. And then
there's like other people who uh uh, you know, people
on the left and kind of like Majama Storians. They
just claim that like, well Nixon was just making you know,
make a fool the American people and like pretending to
accomplish peace, and that that's not true either. This was
kind of a if you the view from Nixon and
Kissinger and uh and across the aisle, you know, jop
and and and the Hanoi leadership, like the Central Committee,
the communist part of Vietnam, there's like a lack of
shared premises written large and if you read the statements, uh,
what Hanoi was saying to Cosvin Cosvin cos VN that's
an acronym. It' says for Central offices South Vietnam. There
was the anglicized acronym for the what amountse the Central
Committee of the Viet Cong OKAY based in South Vietnam,
and what they communicated to them was that in their view,
what the ceasefire meant, or what the peace agreement meant,
was that America would disengage that communists in South Vietnam,
like former party members, Viet Cong suspects, you know, sympathizers
all in Sundry, would no longer be treated as enemy combatants.
A roadmap would be implemented as it were for what
was supposed to be implemented in nineteen fifty four, you know,
which was eventually you know, like countrywide elections, which never
actually happened, in part because of the constantly you know,
the Kazi changing regime in Saigon never allowed to happen.
Like that is true, and they wouldn't allow to happen
because it would have Vietnam would have gone. So I
understand that completely. But Uh, the two regime in Saigon
immediately after, uh, like the ink was dry. Uh. Basically
like a major push happened in key areas, especially border
territories like with with Cambodia, as well as the Quang
Tray province. You know, key uh key key operational areas
of communist uh control that were like strategically essential for
them to be able to bargain from a position of
strength and an advent of hostilities access logistically uh what
they needed to in Cambodia. And when it became clear
that the South was gonna was going to continue to
you know, trying to annihilate when remained of the Viet
Kong Uh, the Doris responded with conventional means, and their
reasoning was always South Vietnam is not a sovereign country either,
are not to Vietnams. Then North never accepted that. So
their notion was well, kind of like the provisional Ira
and you can say this is in bad faith. Their
view was always, you know, we're, uh, we're gonna lay
down our arms. But you've basically got to like allow like,
you know, full representation the communist party, and you know
you've got to you've got to give our people, you know,
the quality of status at the polls, and uh you
know added to that too. Obviously there's epistemological problem with
communism because they claim that they're practicing a kind of science.
And if you refuse to abide what they claim is
the inevitable science of history, you know, which is like
advancing socialism. You know, you're basically engaged in some kind
of oppression of humanity in general. Like quite literally, this
is like what they'd say, you know, whether you're talking
about East Berlin while you're talking on Moscow, where you're
talking about Prague, where you're talking about Vietnam. So there's
like added just kind of like just added like inability
to come to terms that like framed like uh, Hanoi's
conceptual horizon. However, Nixon basically puts Saigon in as good
as stead as it could have been in terms of
political legitimacy and in terms of bolstering their case in
the court of world opinion, which actually mattered then in
a way it didn't it doesn't now. And uh, the
nineteen seventy two offensive, colloquially called the Easter of by
like you know, military geeks and uh, like historians on Sundry,
that was stopped in its tracks. I mean, American air
power were devastated North Vietnamese armed columns, but the other
public of Vietnam actually stood and fought, and like, I
think I made the point some we back that they
get a bad rap, you know, because they're always kind
of panned as like this cowardly forest like crooks and
like anyway, full mill jag at the only time you
see the Arvin on screen, it's some Arvin captain and
he's wearing like some faggety like fucking silk scarf and
he's literally pimping some girl to the Marines, like hey,
you want you want to boom boom and like and that,
Like you literally never see a portrayal of them as
like anything but like the scum to eggs or like pussies,
and like that's not fair. I mean, I'm not a
Vietnam veterans, so like, I'm sure those guys had their
own extra grind with them people, But I'm talking the
historical record, just like as a dude who like writes
about his ortal topics. There's nothing else like the seventy
two offensive and the fact that it was stopping its
tracks like a quits the army the Republic of Vietnam. Okay,
that's not all airpower. Okay, so yeah there's that, but
that's that's kind of the way to understand the Paris
Piece agreement. It wasn't just kissing, dripping duplicatus or Nixon,
you know, being a snake or I mean, what would
Nixon game from that anyway? Like because all if any
and who knows that about Nixon knows like Nixon's a
guy who like he's a rare American who lived historically
in absolute terms, like all Nicks never thought about was
his like contribution to history. Like Nixon never ever ever
would just like it, just like you know, pull him
on her ruse and said, like the hell with Tangan,
I don't care, you know this, I'm just gonna you know,
this is how I'm gonna like try and shore up
by Craig, like and I missed the Watergate like that
this nonsense, but it but it's also you know, the
Sino Soviet split Nixon. If you read what Nixon wrote
after the war and post Watergate, Nixon disappeared for about
five years, but then he made it come back as
a best selling author. And as the Cold War heated
up again, you know, people became very thirsty for serious
analysis on on geo's strategic things. And Nixon really had
the Soviet Union's number in a way remarkable, and he
wrote a lot about why he went to China, and
he said, like, look, you know, I basically realized in
nineteen fifty three, you know, as the steelmate in Korea
set in, like we had to decople pig King from
Moscow at all costs. I mean, yeah, we have to
make compromises there. Like yeah, you know a lot of
people would suffer in places like Cambodia because of that.
You know, you can say it's callous, but Nixon was
totally open about that. But had that not happened, the
Communists would have won the Cold War absolutely. You know,
you'd have a communist world in America, this kind of
garrison of state that existed, you know, and had an
ability to protect power kind of like in nineteenth century terms,
like you know, throughout like the western hemisphere, probably as
far as Greenland or something. But it would, you know,
it would it would be this kind of like island
to miss, like a hostel like red World. Okay, and
that was a very real possibility had things that developed
what they did. But in the more immediate capacity, uh,
Nixon realized he had the court now when he did,
because that neutralized that, they neutralized that the strategic advantage
of of Soviet victory by proxy and Vietnam because uh,
he literally had a communist super state on the border
of like you know, their client in Vietnam, and uh,
the Khmer Rouge would stand with China no matter what.
You know, it didn't matter that, you know, they they'd uh,
it didn't matter that they'd clicked up with the Soviets
and the Chinese and the National Liberation Front and Hanoi
to fight the Americans when uh, when things the Commie
never liked the Vietnamese anyway, and when things went bad
between Hanoi and or between them Moscow and pet King, Uh,
the Kremer Rugs would always be all in with with
China and it's will okay, So you had Nixon managed
uh you know what what what what did the Soviets
are like gained in Vietnam. It's like okay, Yeah, like
we talked about Vietnam was uh that was where that
was that that was that was where the line in
the sand was drawn. You know, when when the Free
World as it was called, you know, like fought you know,
the Communists in open combat, it didn't matter. It could
have been anywhere, but that's just where it was. There
was a political fight, it wasn't a struggle for resources
and territory. And yeah, they Congress won that. But it's
like okay, so uh, now, you know the Soviets that
basically like this kind of they've got they've got this,
they've they've got this appendage beliaguered by you know, hostile
kremie ruge Cambodia and like hostile you know, communists China
do it's north And that is really interesting too because
obviously this at that time the trifect uh that truly
ruled the Soviet Union in my opinion was Usenov and
drop off in grom Eco. And you know, uh, the
Soviets hedge against China was India. You know, that's something
like the true military interdepensula between Moscow and in India.
And uh, that's when Kissinger went all in with uh
with Pakistan, you know, in the India, the Indo Pakistan
or it was very much a Cold War proxy resultant
directly from the writing on the wall. The Soviets detected
from what's happening with Nixon and China. And then when
that I mean that result incredibly brutally, and then the
Soviets pushed uh in Angola like immediately after. That's that's
why the Povias shifted to Africa. That Africa we can win,
you know, like what's the West have you know, They've
got Rogez Rogez is going down, you know, they got
South Africa South as a paraya, you know, and plut
like they wanted to fight the South Africans, you know,
and then fifty thousand Cubans showed up to fight the
s A d F, you know, and it was, hey,
we're you know, look at look at look at this,
look at this racist depressor state, you know, like we're
we're uh, you know, the the Warsaw Pack, you know,
believes in in liberating people, you know, in in the
global South or the colored world, take your pick. But that,
I mean, all these these things are just these things
are as incidental. It was approximately caused by Vietnam. I mean,
it's proximately caused by the fact that Nixon and Kissinger
were able to decouple Paking from Moscow, like in absolute terms,
you know, I mean, I you know, and it that
the point that that riff could never be repaired I
mean that that's remarkable. There would have been I mean
oing to the vagaries of Mao, and I think just
things in trip to the Chinese national and cultural character,
as well as just kind of racial differences and in
geostrategic issues. I think, I think the sin of Soviet
allions have been problematic going forward, but it definitely would
have held together until at least, you know, America splash.
NATO was like vanquished within for you know, the Oriasian
land mass and the Soviets and the shotgown is going
to handle. Ran says later, it always entirely to Nixon
and Kissinger that the Santa Soviets split was that freshness
and that permanent. I firmly believe that if that was
like to kind of like why widely off topic and
he wanted to focus more specifically and concretely in the
piece of Sorry, but I thought it was important to.
Speaker 1: Well, here's one thing I wanted to bring up about
the accords. Yeah, most I would say a lot of
mainstream historians would say that southeas Vietnam was basically pressured
into accepting an agreement that basically ensured that it was
going to collapse.
Speaker 2: I mean, I think there's a political problem here. Like
we're used to I mean, we're we're not been so
wrong would characterize it. We're accustomed to the Department of
State just kind of issuing these ridiculous statements that nobody
could possibly derive anything from. But like gross offense. I
mean in terms of like you know, the foreign regimes
that directed that, Like in the case of Vietnam, there
was a very it was a very delicate minuet. I mean,
first of all, I mean, like I said at the
Assets discussion, you know, we killed a huge amount of
people in North Vietnam, I mean in the south, but
particularly I mean we these were not people who had
warm feelings towards America, you know. I mean, this was
a brutal war with race overtone was frankly okay. Secondly,
like I said, this wasn't clear cut. I mean, arguably,
it's always ambiguous if you're talking about national frontiers, and
you know, like I know, people talk like, you know,
the borders of Ukraine are like absolutely sacred, you know,
and like more holy than you know, like some some
prom queen's virginity or something or that, Like you know,
the state of Poland is a sacred thing. I mean.
But aside from like the garbage of that, the the
status of Vietnam actually was genuinely ambiguous, you know, and
the succession of governments America really kind of mishandled that.
You know. It's like, okay, I mean, you know, you
had a guy like DM who straight up you know,
who straight up whacked because it was pretty clear he
was just gonna go all in and say like, hey,
look ala lala, like a national election, you know, basically,
and I think him, being in the kind of hustler
that he was, was looking to carve out some kind
of it's I king of space, uh, in the regime,
you know, for for him and those like himself, you know.
But he obviously, you know, America wasn't going to tolerate that.
But you know, their successors, you know, he had a
guy like too who was completely a hard line on
the Communists, but that that wasn't reasonable either, you know,
and they had to come to terms somehow. And I
believe Nixon's reasoning was you know, just strictly like in
theater in terms of the military situation and how it
impacted the delicate politics. As I said, if uh, if
there'd been a normal uh political situation in America, and
if you'd had you know, if if they're hadn't been
like quite literally a coup against Nixon, if you hadn't
had in Congress that you know, full of people who
are essentially campaigning on, you know, building a career on
you know, condemning the promoted evil of Vietnam war, had
the true doctrine being a bite it as intended, I
think South Vietnam could have basically held off a northern
assaultant definitely, and as perverse logic. The body count was
particularly as realized. You know, North Vietnam had been at
war for decades, and this thing of the burn rate,
they were losing a huge amount of military age males.
I mean, at some point the enormans would not have
been able to sustain that, you know, at some point
unless you're talking about some unless you're talking about some
crazy situation like the farc in Cambodia where you're literally
talking about dudes like living in the jungle, not metaphorically
literally you know who are like running running cocaine and
dope and uh, you know, carrying on some alleged insurgency
for fifty years, which probably more than anything. That's kind
of like a cover for their little like narco trade
and their bizarre kind of you know, anarchical primitives existence.
Like you can't you can't just a you know, a
revolutionary campaign for decades on decades, and we're not talking
about a low intensity campaign like the p I RA
and in Belfast. I mean even that is difficult. But
you know, we're talking about you know, the North India's
army was actually a crack army, and we're talking about
combined arms assaults. You know, where mass numbers of men
are dying. You know, uh where you know you're you're
assaulting with uh, you're restulting with columns a T fifty
four tanks. They have to be fueled, you know. Uh,
they're being uh they're they're getting close air support from
MiG seven teens that you know, with pilots, they have
to be trained extensively, and when they die, they're hard.
It's hard to replace them. You know, you're periodically, you know,
your capital city is periodically getting like bombed into the
fucking stone Age, you know what I mean, Like it
does take its toll over time, you know what I
mean and that, uh, I don't the vietnames initially thought
it would probably take them to the nineteen seventy nine,
nineteen eighty to win the war, like hannoy, I mean,
And there is interesting talk because obviously anyone who spoke
on the Central Committee like picked their language carefully, you know,
as people doing government, but particularly governments at war and
especially you know, the communist regimes the Cold War, you
could tell these guys were nervous, like military and civilian alike,
like look, basically, beyond nineteen eighty, all bets are off
like translated and really win the lines like we can't
sustain this indefinitely, you know. So there is that. But well,
I think I did want to raise I made the
point that in my opinion, and I'm not prilinologists, I
don't speak Russian, but I do know something about the
Soviet Union, and I believe firmly that the Soviet Union
was that zenith when the shadow Executive was this direfect
of u usnov Gramiko and and drop off and drop
off really really had the United States's number, okay, and
he under in a way that most Russians don't, in
the way frankly most like Eastern bloc types didn't. And
that's one of the reasons why he was so effective.
And he very much understood that if you can really
really fuck with, you know, the the internal situation of
America and and carve out a genuine like single issue
opposition on a matter of war and peace, you can
really really use food bar their system. You know. That's
kind of like America's weak point, just like Solidarity was
like the weak point of these Iron Curtain regimes, and
like its similar you know, uh, similarly structured things. You know.
Solidarity of course was it was like it basically a
Catholic social teaching movement that was at base, you know,
like a labor union, you know, that was demanding what
the party was was always promising but never delivering on.
And that was like kryptonite to the you know, Marcus
Lennon is Cadres that ruled you know it. Uh So, yeah,
there was. It's kind of a perfect storm of things
that made, you know, made the situation untenable visa the
South Vietnam. But I also I mean, and again I
want to well in the discussion just a bit, I
got to come to the point again again because people
like like Vietnam's is weird anominally you're this like unique
and remarkable evil. You know, we talked about the reason
I raised this with Cito, you know Scato, so all
these days a treaty, the organization, the nineteen fifty four
Dual Accords of Korea and into China, and the Truman doctrine,
like this was entirely congruous with US policy after after
the Second World War, like the cost of waiting a
Second World War, among other things, was when these primitive
as hell third world nations, which of those the true
were primitive, like people living in huts, when they come
unto assault by ivan, you go defend them, and your
kids go defend them, and your tax dollars go defend them,
and you lose those things. I mean that this was
very well understood. You know. That was the Cold War
that came to an end, in part because Watchington realized
it wasn't tenable. Part was the revolution and military affairs,
but part of it was just it took. It took
thirty years for the damage brought by World War Two
to be repaired and for these states like Korea to
be built into like functional client states with a comic
capability of their own. I mean, that's you know, I
don't want to see what America could have done within
the I'm not I don't think World War two gymen fought, obviously,
but within the power of rationality if I'm if I'm Kennedy,
or if I'm macnamara, or if I'm Nixon in sixteen,
in February sixty nineteen to the office, like one of
my doing sell these days to say, Okay, the Truman
doctrine's off, the Cold War's off. We're not gonna defend Vietnam.
We're not not pre commitments. You know, we may not
even defend West Berlin. I don't know. Because war is
bad and just people don't like it and it's messy
and people die. I mean, like what is the other
people that should have been done? You know, I mean
that's arguably that's why it was incredibly it's side of
the fact, don't genocide your own civilization. And it was
incredibly stupid to wage World War two because this was
the result, you know. I mean, Okay, well now you
get no not now you get to fight ivan for
the rest of the planet. I mean, you know, and
that's what happened. So this was like nobody really explained
to me. It's like it was good to wouldcinerate, you know,
it was good to would cinerate you know, one hundred
and many thousand people at Dresden. But the most evil
thing ever was other than you know, the quote unte
Holocaust was like blowing away like Vietnamese villagers at MELI.
I'm not trying to be flipping because that's that's fucking horrible, Okay,
Like both those things are horrible, but nobody can tell me,
like why the ladder is like, you know, the Day
of Miracle lost its innocence, but the form was just
like something that like had to be done, you know,
like it doesn't There's a lot of dishonesty about Vietnam.
You know. It's kind of like it's kind of like
the dishonesty of World War two and reverse, you know,
like and this is faded because it's fad of misterical memory,
but I mean you remember because you're a little, just
a little than me. Like Vietnam is presented as like
the worst war ever waged for like reasons no one
can particulate, you know, like why like yeah, and the
whole thing was very was very very cynical and ideologically German.
Speaker 1: But yeah, well, is that because everything after Nuremberg has
to have a moral component to it. Yeah, if you have,
if you apply to a moral component to anything, then
if you start with the morality it's a good war,
it's a bad war, then you can I mean, you're
basically pulling at the heartstrings of Middle America, of Protestant America,
church going America and around like the dog of course.
Speaker 2: But at my point is it was arbitrary, you know,
and it's like the like it was, I realized why
people were doing this, and I realized why this Fifth
Column developed the way it did and why they focused
on Vietnam. But in absolute terms, like this doesn't make
any sense, you know, and like I said, Vietnam is
exceptionalized like people, you know, the narrative presented by you know,
people that are on COVID, people like Oliver Stone, you know,
people in the era like Abbie Hoffman was that this
is like kind of conspiratorial design. It's like, look, man,
like the human doctrine is very clear, like America deployed
and pretty much exactly the same way in in Korea
and the Dominican Republic in sixty five in Bolivia, a
rundown Shagwavara decades later in Nicaragua, and I'll sell it
to or although obviously those weren't you know, those weren't
deep employments. Like it's not like America abiding the Truman
doctrine and you know, realizing I had to fight it
still be a client regime to maintain credibility. I missed
uh as as as the error strategic parody was imminent
like that it's not something weird thing like hard to
like difficult to decipher, like I you know, and again
like nobody explained to me why like why why Like
annihilating Europe uh and sarificing your son is like I'm
on Guadalcanal is like awesome, but you know, like losing
your son and I had drank or q son is
like this great evil like when America lost its innocence.
Like it's just it's just it's just stupid, and you
know it's and it's beyond stupid.
Speaker 1: It's you know, well they just said that it it
just really became a a trope that it this wasn't
the war to fight, that there was nothing good about
this War sixty eight. You know, even Cronkite is saying
that the war can't be won.
Speaker 2: Well yeah, and again too, like imagine, I mean there
were but think about this, like imagine in nineteen forty three.
Imagine after you know what, the United the USR didn't
meet the Wehrmachten combat until forty three, and they got
their asses kicked the casserine pass. Like imagine if Walter
Winschall had gone on the radio and said, mister Roosevelt's
a liar, World War two can't be one. You know,
victory of the access is imminent. Like dude would have
been arrested, have not disappeared, you know what I mean.
Like it's it's it's it's a joke. But you can't
make this up, you know, like the my actics was
just some like normal occurrence or just like sound journalism.
And again, I mean Americans did this weird idea. Like
I said, the two kind of most puzzling myss to
me because it's otherwise like intelligent people you know, who
present this these things I'm about to raise. You know,
it's not just like dumb people who were creating worldships.
They've heard It's like the guys who say with Michael
Savage did I mean Savage isn't smart, but the arts
marketing to say it is like, oh, America was like
just pusty footing around in Vietnam and we killed them
like three million people and it was literally like a
fucking scalpont. Yeah. Yeah, I'm not like saying that butt
shade on on on the Vietnam Army. I've got a
lot of respect for them guys and I but the
but I mean, look, man, it's real, like we we
killed a fucking huge amount of those people and we
were being like we were we were being like we're
doing like cowboys shit around. It's you know, like so
it's like, don't pretend that, like, you know, don't pretend
like killing millions of these fucking people with like firepower
with that was purpose to fight the Soviet Union, like
it was like something like low key thing that was
like not not real war. But also the like when
people claim like Vietnam it was just like a stupid war,
it's like, look, I mean, like I said, part ways
the mirror stand on this. You know, like you don't
you know, you don't fight you didn't fight wars in
nineteen sixty eight, you know, to like access to like
more like grain reserves, you know, or like you know,
control the ability to like you know, ship like silk
out of out of out of out of the fucking
you know, out of China, back to back to Europe
or something. You know, Like it didn't matter where Vietnam was.
You know, that's where the line is, say, was drawn.
That's where the Reds pushed, you know, and if you're
gonna if you're gonna win the Cold War, like wherever
the Reds push. It might be Bolivia, it might be Iran,
it might be Vietnam, it might be Angola, like it
might be it might be West Berlin. Like that's where
you fight them. You know, Like the issue is like
who's gonna you know, the color was fought in every
in every aspect of conceptual political life, you know, like economically,
like culturally, like technologically and militarily you know, you know,
you can like pick and choose like where you fight,
you know, and that's and plus like wars like a
like we talked about war rihves like the seasons. I mean,
that's that's the problem with clouds, of which is victims
like taking the kind of this sort of like like
like logical extreme it becomes a g irrational like you
not like you don't just like go to war like
affect like policy ambitions by other means, you know, like
war rives like the seasons, and there's about irrationality to
warfare absolutely and warf is a rational process the way
it's fought. But like you don't just go to war
because it's like I you know, I can't. I don't
like I don't like the trade arraignments that of country.
Why I know I'm gonna launch a massive assault on
them like that. That's that's not how things work. And
that I said, like I want to sell you my house.
Maybe if I go to your house and like beat
the ship out of you, like that'll help me like
get a better deal. I mean it's like not, that's
not how people think, you know, Like that's that's not
like things are done, you know, like and it's not
I realized that's like sounds but you know, the uh,
you know, this is a very important point. And that's
one of the things that's why as that race sorel
It's not just because I mean, like ideas an aesthetics
and things in the way like people view like labor
and the way identitarian things in political life. I mean,
he deals with those things in intelligent ways, that is
to people like us. But it's like ontological view of
like conflict, Like this is something that happens, like it's
not this rational thing. It arrives like it's like why
you find like a girl attractive. It's like why. It's
like why, it's like why certain symbols like take root,
like during cultural epox It's like it's it's like why
winter comes. Where at war? Now, you know, war arrives.
I mean that I realize that was a bit far afield. Yeah,
I think that's important. I mean, in none doesn't regards
to Vietnam, but in the case of Vietnam, it's particularly
kind of like neglected that you know, Yeah, we'll go ahead.
Speaker 1: I'm sorry, Oh, no problem. Well we're coming up on
the hour, so let me end with this, because I
know you could probably go on a little bit about this.
The common trope even till today, is that the United
States lost the Vietnam War. What what is your opinion
when you hear somebody say that, what thoughts come into
your mind?
Speaker 2: I mean, I agree with John Paul Van. For those
who don't know, Van was a really interesting guy and
a very troubled guy. He he had kind of like
a horrible upbringing, like mom was literally like an alcoholic prostitute,
like didn't know his father. Joins the Army Air Corps,
gets train as a pilot. World War Two ends before
he sees action. When the Air Force man an independent service,
he wanted to stay in the Army, so he became
an infantry officer. Long story short. He commanded a company
and then a ranger battalion in Korea, and David Hackworth,
the young David hacker was under his command, and Van
became as like whole badass. Okay, he had problems with alcohol,
He got into shit with an underage girl. I mean,
typical like warrior type. It was his own worst enemy,
but like a really brilliant soldier. And when he left
the service he was one of the before his last
kind of role in the uniform, he's one of the
first guys deployed the mcavee Okay militarysisans comand Vietnam in
nineteen sixty two. And the reasoning there that we talked about,
there's more much a Special Forces war, you know, counterinsurgency
direct action, identifying cadres and eliminating them. Okay, sixty four.
After two years at MCVEE, Colonel Van retires. He becomes
this independent like defense consultant. Now lo and behold. A
year later, this like massive build up happens and Van
is like, what the hell are you doing? And Van
so lit of these friends in the Pentagon. So he
was able to get back to Vietnam as a civilian,
and he ultimately died in nineteen seventy two and in
a shopper crash. But he Van wrote a book with
a bright shining why, and this kind of put the
Vietnam War in perspective for me in terms, and I
was a kid, and I highly recommend it to anybody.
Van said, basically what I what I what I say.
At the outside of this discussion, I was basically borrowing
from a Van, like, look, you don't like win wars
wars on a cond of to see like how many
people you can kill? You know, you don't like win
a war by like racking up the biggest body counts
or by winning all the battles. You know, you win
wars by by annihilating the man's ability to fight, you know,
but it's strung as infrastructure and his you know, and
his ability to reconstitute and continted to wage war and
by breaking his political will to wage war in any
number of ways, and some constellations those things like wins
the war. So no, America lost the Vietnam War. But
Americans look at this like a football game or something like, hey,
we killed more of those people, like okay, great man,
like the the like again the Merrimont killed something like
they're they're there. Burn ratio is in like fifteen to one.
I'm not exaggerating, Okay, I mean does does that mean
like does I mean that the German right won World
War two because they killed twenty million Russians? I mean
at uh, you know, And it's not it's not a
football game like saying like hey at Aya drying, like
we kicked more Vietnams. It's like they didn't really win
or like whatever Westmoreland's cope was it? You know, the
uh and and Van was absolutely right. The problem with
America is that it set the firepower. That's something that
America borrowed from the German General Staff of old. But
with kind of without the kind of uh tactical flexibility
and intelligence of the German General staff. It's like the
American notion is that fire power solves all problems. It
doesn't matter what it is. If you're throw in a
firepower at it's gonna be defeated. Nothing can stand up
to American combined arms. That's not true. I mean, yeah,
I guess there's no if you if you throw it
a firepower at Vietnam, you would continue to kill two
numbers of people. They could probably turn it into like
a non functional country. I mean, especially had one resorted
to nuclear and biological weapons. But that's not You don't
wage war to just annihilate countries, you know. That's why
the Carthaginian peace has become like this mythological thing. I mean,
I assume I'm not in general, but I do know something.
So no, I mean America, America lost the Vietnam War
because it it was I mean again too, it's like,
what's your victory metric? I mean, like the minute, the minute,
the minute those guys, those little yellow guys with with
red stars on their pith helmets were running into Saigon
with their with They're clashing the costs. They look too
big for him. And these guys are running. They were
they were double timing. These guys have been more at
war for thirty years. Think about that. I mean that
that's when that's when the hand only won that war. Okay,
I mean so the uh the you know, I I
look at that, and then if you look at them
when I say that, because again, they got it's like
some pride thing or something like like I'm making fun
of their favorite football team or something, you know, And
like I said, I've got I've got all. I've got
huge respects for the Vietnam Army. Not just that's like
my dad's generation, but they're like fascinating guys and like
that's when the US Army was, Yeah, it's best. And
plus it was was like cool you had like that
was the only time like you had like weird in
the army too. You had like weird like long hair
eyes and like and like weird rednecky guys like like
like crazy ass like like dude like huge afros, like
fucking I'm like being silly, but like not you know,
I'm like I really play about a trope. But I
I'm the last person who's going to say anything nasty
about the Vietnam Army, like those guys are like the best.
They were like legit, like what was cool about America?
Like legit, you know, but going around saying and it
wasn't and it wasn't their fault, like they those guys
that those guys fucked splindily like they performed very very well.
But uh no, Marya, absolutely not when the Vietnam War.
Speaker 1: No, all right, well let's end it there. Thomas, please
give your plugs and uh yep.
Speaker 2: Yeah, man. You can find me on substack, which is
kind of like my permanent home. It's real Thomas seven
seven seven dot substack dot com. I beag on Twitter again,
but I get, I get. I get fucking nude from
there like all the time. But I mean, if you
look for me, like, you'll find me there, but it's
don't be like sad. If like you look for me
and I'm gone and I literally get banned from there
like every like several weeks. I'm at uh real Capital
r e A L underscore Thomas seven seven seven on Twitter.
I am launching my YouTube channel man like, and I
talked to my long suffering editor and like production guy
and he's ready to go. So this weekend, I gotta
record more with mister Pete here, and I've got to
record my own pod and I got to record uh
with a couple of dear friends of mine for the
channel content that's gonna go to my editor and then
that's gonna launch. So you can find my channel at
Thomas TV on YouTube. I'll uh, I link it on
my on my substack and I link it on my
Twitter if you can't find it, but there's nothing there yet,
but there will be in like a week. Yeah, like
like literally in a week, like right around the first
of right on the first week and during the first
week in February. That's what I got. Oh and my
my second book in my steel Storm series just drop.
You should get that at Imperium Press. It's imperium press
dot org. The book is steel Storm two. It's the
second one of five. It's it's uh it's Frank Herbert
style science fiction. And I think, uh, I've gotten over
wrongly positive feedback on it. I wouldn't keep writing them.
So yeah, and thank you for that, everybody, and really,
really really I'm honored by that. But yeah, that's all
I got, man,