Speaker 1: What do you think epistemic justification is?
Speaker 2: I mean it would be justifying epistemologically somehow.
Speaker 1: I don't know, so justification is justifying it? Good job?
Any any other circular statements? What is episomic? You can't
even tell me what you even have as in epistemology?
Want one class?
Speaker 2: No, I've not been to an epistology one on one class.
Speaker 1: No.
Speaker 3: Okay, on this topic, liquid Zulu is going to open.
You have seven minutes on the clock. I'm gonna set
the clock right now, and you can you can go
ahead and begin.
Speaker 1: Cool.
Speaker 2: So, libertarian property theory can be split up into two
basic parts, both of which are derived from the non
aggression principle. So first there's self ownership, and second there's
ownership in external means that basically covers everything.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: If one does not grant self ownership, there are two alternatives.
Either one some group A owns group B, or two
everyone co owns every other person. Issue with the first
alternative is that it does not make for a human ethic.
It's that sets up a group of humans owning a
group of subhumans. The problem with this is that it
is therefore a particular rather a universal ethic, but particular
ethics are per se arbitrary, as if you were to
drive an ethic for man qua man, it would have
to apply to all men, as all men have the
same nature. Therefore, selectively revoking this ethic from a certain
subclass of men would be to contradary reasoning that was
used to prove it for all of mankind. The issue
with the second alternative is that would imply the death
of humanity, as if every man were co owned by
every other man, he would require everyone else's permission before
engaging in any course of action, but asking their permission
would also be an action. Thus you could not do anything,
and you would die. Moreover, it would not be possible
to even begin to combine with this ethic in the
first place, because you cannot purposely not act. Even staying
completely motionless, if done for a purpose, would be a
form of human action. This leaves us with the choice
between a universal death ethic or a particular and thus
irrational ethic which does not per se kill off humanity.
So much for self ownership, then ourselves to ownership in
external means. The libertarianism of libertarianism is clear on this, in
that they first possess or aka the homesteader is of
a good is its owner. This can be demonstrated from
the simple observation that ownership and possession are distinct, and
this preestpose is true by anybody who engages in any
conflict whatsoever. Consider a home says homestead's a stick, and
B initiates a conflict over the use of that stick.
Both A and B are asserting that they own the
stick and the other does not. And moreover that even
if the other comes out of the conflict victorious, they
would still not own it. Therefore, ownership in possession are
indeed distinct. What this means is that a latecomer cannot come.
Latecomer to a good cannot come to be the owner,
as if he was, then a later comer c could
come along and take it from him, thereby becoming the owner.
But what this means is that we have a rovert
to a mere possessor ethic which implies that ownership and
possession are not distinct, thus contradicting in the presumption that
they are distinct. So we therefore have it that all
men own themselves and whatever external goods they come into
first possession of, thereby completing our libertarian property theory.
Speaker 4: Okay, is that the end of your opening Zulu?
Speaker 3: Yeah, okay, Jay, you have seven minutes on the clock
for your opening.
Speaker 4: Go ahead.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So today's topic is the debate of God and
the state, and I appreciate him for being willing to
discuss both of those topics, because for me, the issue
of authority is what is kind of assumed. He your,
I listened to this opening statement. I got a lot
of notes, so I'll wait until maybe we have more
of a back and forth before I go through the
claims and the views that he put forth in his
opening statement. But I would say that the first problem
with the notion of the libertarian theory of property ownership
or rights or anything that he's really putting forward is
that libertarianism comes out of an ethos that doesn't come
to us in a vacuum. It comes to us, particularly
from the Enlightenment, and the Enlightenment philosophical ethos is pretty
much dominated by an anti metaphysical stance. If you look
at Dick Cartes wanted to retain some of the Enlightenment
metaphysical ideas. He's severely critiqued and contrasted by Hume and
Kant to take enlightenment philosophy to its next logical step,
which is to, as David Hume says, toss out all
the metaphysical books and universities throughout Europe. So what happens
when we do this is that we're severely limited in
the types of claims that we can make. And the
rest of the history of empirical philosophy after Hume, all
the way up until Bbo Kwined in the twentieth century
with his two Dogmas of Empiricism, really leaves us in
a kind of a box where we're severely limited in
what things we can say. And ultimately, with qwins Essay,
we're again reduced to the subjectivism and skepticism of logical posism.
So that's a more consistent approach to Enlightenment philosophy, which
is the school, which is the ethos from which the
opponent here comes. And so I'm just I'm going to
be curious to hear when he's asked all these essentially,
what are metaphysical concepts that he's made reference to, such
as universal ethics particulars in universals, which comes out of
the universal nominalist debate. The realist nominalist debates of the
Middle Ages, which are all of Enlightenment philosophy after Hume
is predicated on denying the real existence of universals. I'm
going to be curious to hear what a self is
because he talks about self ownership. I'm curious again about
there's so many claims, so many phrases that were used
which do not make any sense in an Enlightenment atheist
materialistic paradigm and cannot be ground that are justified. Now
beyond these claims that are very common in sort of
libertarian and artical circles, like the non aggression principle, I'm
curious to hear why anybody is bound to the aggression principle, because,
of course, after Hume, we have to answer the question
of how is their normativity? How can we have what
we ought to do? From an is and the atheist
materialists presubpositions of most of the Enlightenment after day Heart
really leave with no possibility of any is ought without
justifying an hot claim from the fact that things are
the case. We can see this all the way up
into modern philosophers. Alexander Harris, who is still besieged by
this question of being unable to answer the is aart
dilemma from David Hume. And again, any atheist is going
to have to deal with this dilemma because there's not
a justification for the illogical move from the fact that
things are this way, so they ought to be this way.
But again, the entire non aggression principle presupposes this kind
of universal ethic, this kind of universal claim, which I
don't understand how he's going to have justification again for
any of his universal claims. He also made an odd phraseology,
such as having the same nature. Nature is a metaphysical concept.
It's a metaphysical claim. And I'm curious again to know
how he's going to justify that such a thing as
a human nature given the fact that most of his enlightenment,
for Father, denied ultimately that there is such a thing
is a human nature, even though they might have wanted
to retain this for their universalized ethic. I don't think
it's justified claim. And beyond that, I'll say that the
history of anarcho libertarianism also I think presents us the problems.
The history argument isn't necessarily a defeat, but I think
it's relevant for how this actually plays out, since it's
been positive, and what we see is the same types
of manipulations. We see the libertarian ethos pretty much being
dominated by monetarism, monopoly capital You know, most of the
important figures that come out of this ethos, David Rockefeller,
Von hyak Alan, Greenspan, they're all proponents for a form
of world governance. And so I'm curious now again, maybe
he'll say that those are just inconsistent principles and nobody's
really put into play authentic libertarianism. We're just many many
times from a lot of the proponents, which is ironic
because it's exact same argument that Marxis say, they're flip
side cousins that no one's ever actually really tried. We're
just waiting for that to actually happen. And so the
irony is that whether it's Marxism socialism, or whether it's monetarism,
monopoly capitalism, usery based economic systems, they all are children
of the Enlightenment, and they're all part of a dialectical
revolutionary philosophy that's ultimately in a way coming out of
her Meticism and later on free Masonic lodges. And we
can see this in the two schools of thought coming
out of the French Revolution. The jacob Is in the
Grondin's the two false left and the false right dialectic
of revolutionary thought. And so I don't think that Jacobinism
or Grondinism, either one has a sufficient answer. And so
this leads us back to questions of authority, and authority
questions are ultimately going to be determined by the ultimate
presubpositions in our worldview, and so I think that the
Christian parent That's why it comes back to the question
of God in metaphysics. The Christian paradigm gives an account
for God metaphysics. I'm assuming that God gives an account
board metaphysics and pistemology, ethics, and the possibility of grounding
those things in a coherent worldview and thus attaining too
justification in an epistemic sense. So we're talking about epistemic
justification for things like human rights, or why we shouldn't
engage in the non aggression, why we should adhered to
the nonaggresion personal I should say, why there are universal ethics,
why there are universal claims at all, why there are
universal principles, or universals at all or particulars. How there
is induction and deduction, How there's identity over time, How
there is the principle of causation. How there's the principle
of telos. All of those things make sense in a
world that is created, sustained, governed, body, mine, providence, and
has a purpose or a telos or an end. In
a position where the world is just matter in flux, which,
as I understand, my friend is an atheist here, so
I assume that he just thinks that everything is a
sort of matter in motion, not a grounding or justification
or an explanation for anything in immaterial invariant like the
laws of logic, like ethical standards like universals, and universal
claims like human rights and dignity, like the notion of ownership,
like the notion of the self or quote human nature.
All of those things have to be grounded, and I
think Christianity does that. And this is also where the
state comes in, because the state is an entity that
does have authority in history. And we can get into
that lay.
Speaker 3: All right pretty much, hit it right at that marker,
that seven minute marker before we jump into it. Guys,
a couple things. We are going to be taking call
ins today. The mods will be putting in the discord
so that you guys can call in when we get
to the call in section, of course, sending your super
chats if you have those, if you have questions for
the debaters, and we'll be getting to all of those.
Two one final thing, liquid Zulu, The audience is requesting
that you don't have an accent because it's really hard
to understand you.
Speaker 4: You think you can do something about that, or.
Speaker 2: Well, I mean, I suggest the audience that she's just
become smarter, and then.
Speaker 3: All right, full fine, I guess I guess we'll live
with your handicap. Gentlemen, the floor is open and go ahead.
Speaker 2: Sure. So, I mean, I'm somewhat familiar with Jay's position
that you know, any stands you're gonna hold is gonna
have all sorts of presuppositions about metaphysics, pistmology, YadA, YadA, YadA.
So I would suppose you know, just on that note,
is libertarian property theory personally incompatible with the orthodox Christian worldview?
Speaker 1: Well, owning proper ship, owning property is certainly a right
that we have, So I guess it depends on how
how we scale that down and how minimal the claims
are as opposed to whether or not your atheistic paradigm
can justify these kinds of claims and these kinds of ideas.
Speaker 2: I mean, then you're gonna have some sort of property
theory in your entire worldview, right, So is that incompatible
with the libertarian property theory? Like, well, it's your property.
Speaker 1: Theory, not necessarily if we just mean that, you know,
individuals have human u ownership, they have the right to
own property. You know, they have. The notion of rights
is something that I think is a you know, this
is tied to the notion of the good. It's tied
to value judgments, and so we need more than just
the notion of property ownership. We have that that rests
on other ideas, and so how do we give an
account for those ideas that that rests on?
Speaker 3: Sure to hang out ang on Zulu before before you
respond when when Jay's talking or when when you're talking.
I appreciate it if you didn't type on the keyboards,
very distracting. People can't hear what he's saying.
Speaker 2: All right, So I'll mute when he's talking.
Speaker 4: Then, Okay, go ahead, with your response.
Speaker 2: Yeah, so I agree that you know, your understanding of
rights is going to be tied to other areas. I
for you philosophy, I completely agree with that. Like, you know,
if you don't think that humans exist at all, then
there's no going to not going to be any notion
of what rights humans have. But like, and you know,
just setting out a sight, you know, what is your
property theory? Like, I know you don't have just a
property theory, but is the property theory and is it
incompatible with the one I've.
Speaker 1: Presented necessarily if we scale it down to the right
to own these things? Right? So you know, if you're
asking what is property in our paradigm or what, I
don't know that we have any really precise, you know,
minutia definition of property. But if you're saying that, well, okay,
it might rest on these other things, but you're not
concerned with that. But I am concerned with that. So
I mean, I'm happy to answer your question not necessarily
incompatible now.
Speaker 2: Right, So if it's not necessarily incompatible, do you have
any contention with my property theory of non aggression, where
you know, everyone owns themselves and whatever goods they come
to first possess no again.
Speaker 1: And as I said in my opening statement, I would
agree that we should not engage in overt aggression, you know,
unprovoked or anything like that. I think that it's correct
in its basic idea, but we got to have a
reason as to why we should believe that and not
just not just arbitrary positing of it.
Speaker 2: Do you think that would apply always? Like, do you
think there's going to be some you know, some side constraints,
like some situations where you should in need engage in
aggression or is it like always you're not you shouldn't
be ingreate engaging an aggression.
Speaker 1: Well, I mean if you mean like self defense, which
is an aggression. But I mean I understand the non
aggression principles that I don't engage in aggression without any
reason or without any cause.
Speaker 2: Right to be clear, I would say that, you know,
defending your property or whatever, that would not be aggression.
So the way I define aggression is the initiation of conflict,
where a conflict is defined as contradict reactions. So let's
say Crusoe and Friday on an island. Crusoe owns a stick,
and then Friday comes along and he tries to wrestle
that stick off of Crusoe. So there's a conflict over
the use of the stick. They can't both use the
stick for their incompatible ends at the same time. So
and Friday has initiated the conflict because he's come in
and he's trying to take the stick off Cruso.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I agree that we shouldn't engage in that kind
of activity. But I'm asking, like, let's say that there
is no God. Let's say that we live in an
atheistic worldview. Why is it wrong to engage in conflict
in that way, or or to contradict, or to engage
in subversive practices of business or you know, let's say
that I have a Let's say I have a business
that a competitor is starting up a business in my village,
and I don't physically aggress them, but I engage in
let's say, subversive activities where I spread rumors about his
business or something that destroys his business. I mean, those
are not ethical activities, but they're not aggression if we
restrict aggression to physical activities. And so the first question
is do you restrict it only to physical aggression or
is it also ideological and subversive activities, and then on
what basis ought we not do those things.
Speaker 2: Well, I would say aggression is you know, I gave
my definition of aggression, it's the initiation of conflict. So
that's going to be over physical things, like you can't
have conflicts over like ideaological No, you can't have ideological
conflict too, not possible under my definition of conflict. You know,
you can say colloquially that you could have a conflict
over ideas, but not really. You both two people can
have incompaible ideas at the same time, right. In fact,
one person can have a contradiction in their head like
ideas can't have conflicts.
Speaker 1: I'm saying that if I start a rumor that's trying
to put a competitor out of business, does that fit
under your notion of aggression or not?
Speaker 2: It would not know.
Speaker 1: Okay, so aggression is only physical.
Speaker 2: I can't think of any like non physical way to
aggress unless you mean, like, you know, maybe if you
think light isn't physical or something, and you could like
shine a laser a someone.
Speaker 1: You know, the version I mean if I engage in
ideological subversion against a competitor, that's not aggression, corporate corporate espionage.
Speaker 2: If you if you right now like started you know,
you pulled a document and you'd been like compiling a
massive list of lies about me to make everyone hate me, right,
and you start going through this on the stream, that
would not be aggressive.
Speaker 1: So again I'm just asking in terms of the practicality
of this. You said that we shouldn't engage in certain
activities based around the NAP, and I'm just trying to
figure out, like, how do you restricted only to physical
aggression on what basis is that if I can achieve,
let's achieve more of a of an effect against you
in an unethical way through non physical means. I mean,
don't you think governments, for example, or corporations engage in
corporate espionage?
Speaker 2: Surely do. But like the reason why I restricted to
physical things is because I think that's the only type
of thing which can be an aggression. I think it's
the only when you're engaging in some sort of physical activity,
and that's the only time when you can initiate could someone.
Speaker 1: So I'm not so if I completely destroy your life,
I haven't violated any ethics as long as I don't
do it physically, you.
Speaker 2: Might have done something wrong.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: It may be the case that you know, we say
that that's a bad thing to do, like you shouldn't
do it. But the question is whether or not it's
aggressive to do it, like whether I could resist you
doing that.
Speaker 1: And that answer is you know, okay, and on what
basis ought or not?
Speaker 2: Because you aren't initiating any conflicts.
Speaker 1: On what basis? Is that the standard of what is
right and wrong.
Speaker 2: I didn't say it was the standard of writing wrong.
I said that's the definition of aggression.
Speaker 1: When I'm asking, you said ought you ought not? And
I'm saying, okay, so let's.
Speaker 2: Just yeah, I didn't. I don't property theory, like law
doesn't encompass all of ethics. There are questions outside of.
Speaker 1: Boiling it down to the main point, which is on
what basis ought we not do this or that in
your view?
Speaker 2: Well, on the main point is an anarchism versus statism, Right,
that's the main point. And if you agree with me
that people should never aggress, then we have anarchism, right
because the state is a necessarily aggressive organization.
Speaker 1: Well, I have a basis to say that we shouldn't
do that. I'm asking what your basis is other than
just saying.
Speaker 2: That we shouldn't right. And if you have a basis
that we shouldn't engage in aggression, then you still agree
with me. Right, You might, you might, You might say
that you have agreement.
Speaker 1: Does the agreement doesn't mean that we have the same
reasons for believing that. I'm asking your reasons for believing
that we might have.
Speaker 2: We might have different reasons for being anarchists. But if
you are an anarchist, and that matters to a position.
If you're an anarchist, vacation for the claims that you're making, okay,
and based the justification for your standard. Sure, I justify
the libertarian property theory in my opening statement, other any
alternatives are incoherent. Sorry, n.
Speaker 4: No, You're good now go ahead.
Speaker 1: So, in your worldview as an atheist, I'm asking for
the justification for things like human rights, human ethics, universals, natures,
et cetera.
Speaker 2: What are these I mean? In my opening statement, I
gave the justification for a libertary and prompty theory, which
apparently you agree with, and in which case then there
is no state in your.
Speaker 1: Work specifically about you. No, I asked for your justification
and your worldview of those metaphysical things.
Speaker 2: I gave the justification for the property theory, which is
what this debate is.
Speaker 1: Here, was the justification for the things, not things I'm
asking for, not property theory.
Speaker 2: This isn't a debate about anything other than property theory, though.
Speaker 1: It's a debate about God and state. That's what you
agreed to. Do you think that relates to metaphysical ideas
and categories?
Speaker 2: Sure, but I agree to debate you on your justification
for the state, which apparently you don't have.
Speaker 1: And it's going to rest on metaphysical concepts. And you're
a child of the Enlightenment with your atheism, and I'm
asking for a justification for the metaphysics that your forbearers denied.
Do you believe in metaphysics?
Speaker 4: No?
Speaker 2: No, Do you have a justification for the state or not?
Because you're switching between anarchism and statism when a dying here.
Speaker 1: I'm asking you about the assumptions of your worldview, and yes,
I do have it.
Speaker 2: Okay, so you do. You are in favor of aggression
sometimes then you said you weren't before.
Speaker 1: Now I'm saying that as individuals, we don't have a
right to engage in aggressive activities per se. But there
are authorities in the earth and they do have the
right to engage in warfare and aggression.
Speaker 2: Yes, are those authorities made up of individuals?
Speaker 1: Uh, their collective and their individuals?
Speaker 2: Sure, but surely any aggression they've engaged in would have
to be done on an individual level, right.
Speaker 1: I mean armies fight as groups, they're not only individuals.
Speaker 2: Surely as groups, but like you know, it's not the
group acting, it's the individuals in that group, like is
having a group behind.
Speaker 1: In groups? Okay, so but you use phrases like same
nature and universals? Did you not use these phrases?
Speaker 2: Yeah?
Speaker 1: Okay, what are those?
Speaker 2: I mean is irrelevant?
Speaker 1: Yeah, you're using claims about metaphysical things that I don't
think you know whether they are nor can you justify.
Then then that's very elevant for a debate.
Speaker 2: Yeah, well no, no, no, because the debate is over whether
or not the state has the right to engage an aggression. Yeah,
you're saying they do collectively.
Speaker 1: Individual metaphysical concepts. You understand that rests on metaphysical CONTs.
Speaker 2: Okay, but how can they collectively engage in aggression and
not individually do it?
Speaker 1: Well, Individuals also make up groups, and I think groups
have a real existence and a real reality like groups
like human nature that you mentioned. So you yourself believe in
real universal categories, don't you? Sure?
Speaker 2: Whatever? But like the question is kind.
Speaker 1: Of you're not whatever.
Speaker 2: The individual the individuals are having to engage in the aggression, right,
which is a contradiction because you said they're they're you
said individuals, not individuals said, you said that individuals do
not have the.
Speaker 1: Right claim of universe.
Speaker 2: I'm asking about your claim about the you know, anarchism
verse statism.
Speaker 1: You're not going to answer whether or not metaphysical things
have a real exist since they're not. Are these things relevant?
Speaker 2: What was your opinion on the Heisenberg principle?
Speaker 1: You're arguing on presupposition that you won't justify.
Speaker 3: Yeah, let's let's back up here for a second and
see if we can we can get this back on track.
So liquid Zulu, Uh, if you're asking for the justification
that Jay has for state, Jay is saying that he
has a justification for the state, right, let's question that
that hang on, let me finish and then we'll we'll
we'll get it right back but you're saying his justification
for the state relies on metaphysics. That's what he's saying.
That's his positive claim. I don't see a problem with
that claim. Uh, with allowing that claim for the concept
of this debate. Can you can you tell me why
that would be incorrect?
Speaker 2: Like, I'm not I'm not specifically making the claim you
said there, I'm I'm not asking for his justification of
the state per se. What I'm saying now is that
he has said that individuals do not have the right
to aggress, but that states are allowed to engage in
aggresson but the states would have to engage in aggression.
That would have to involve individuals aggressing, which they don't
have the right to do, apparently right, because.
Speaker 1: I don't believe that only individuals exist. That's what I'm
trying to ask you about universal concepts and collective things
having a real existence, which you want it. You won't
seem to admit even though you said you believe in universals.
Speaker 2: I think things other than individuals exist, right, I think.
Speaker 1: You know, like, do universals exist?
Speaker 2: Plenty of other things exist?
Speaker 1: But what the question universals exist?
Speaker 2: You're currently a contradiction.
Speaker 1: Right, do natures exist and universals exist?
Speaker 2: You're currently calling a contradiction because you say the individuals
both don't right to exists.
Speaker 1: Let's have real collective ontological realities.
Speaker 3: I want you to be able to state firmly what
your what your actual question is here, Like with lou Jay,
let it. Let him get the whole thing out so
we can see what it is that he's after.
Speaker 2: Go ahead, liquid My actual point of contention here is
that Jay has said that individuals absolutely do not have
the right to aggress, right, But then he says that
states are allowed to engage aggression, but that would involve
individuals aggressing. So he has a contradiction here where individuals
are and are not engage in.
Speaker 1: Aggressionally, individuals exist, No, no, no no, it's whether other things exist,
whether other things exist.
Speaker 4: You have to let hem respond now, Liquids.
Speaker 1: This rest on a metaphysical reductionist move that I don't
believe in. I don't believe that only individuals exist. That's
why I'm pointing out that there are real ontological categories
and groupings and collective things that have a real Can
you do? Can you stop typing? When I talked seriously.
Speaker 2: I'm sorry, should I thought I hit the mute?
Speaker 1: No, I mean you're doing that on purpose.
Speaker 2: It wasn't n I thought I hit the meat butt.
Speaker 1: You said in your opening statement, you yourself affirm universal
categories and metaphysical things like nature's existing. That means that
there's more than just particulars. I'm just giving you another
example of a particular that of a universal or a
collective reality that I think actually exists, namely states and
authorities and people groups. There are real collectors like women
are a group, men are a group that have a
real ontological existence, And I'm saying that families are a
real thing that exists. It's a real metaphysical category. And
in the same way states and people groups exist and
they have real ontological categories known as authority. And so
it's not purely a reductionist move of atomized individuals, which
is your Enlightenment philosophy, which denies fundamentally collective ontological realities.
But in your opening statement you made multiple references to
collective metaphysical realities that you can't justify, right.
Speaker 2: So in these groups they have some authority, right, but
can not authority make it such that the individuals who
make up that group have the right to aggress? Say
that again, like these these groups they have some authority.
But can that authority then grant the individuals who make
up that group the right to aggress?
Speaker 1: Yes, because there are authorities. And when I was talking
about individuals, I'm talking about individuals that don't have authority.
Speaker 2: Okay, so what does the authority how can how does
that change the general rule? Now individuals don't have a
right to aggress? How does this authority imbue them with
that right? So I am how does the authority imbew
individuals with the right that they didn't have to aggress?
Speaker 1: Like?
Speaker 2: How does it give them that right?
Speaker 1: Because authority comes from the divine, It comes from God,
and so for us, authority comes via ultimately divine revelation.
And then we have in our worldview the notion of
God ordaining authorities. Church and state have authority in the earth.
Speaker 2: Why does the fact that comes from God imply that
they have the right to aggress?
Speaker 1: Because God gives that right?
Speaker 2: Okay? Can God make contradictions true?
Speaker 1: No?
Speaker 2: Okay, But then you have a particular property theory of
a owning b right.
Speaker 1: I gave you a balanced theory of the one in
the mini you deny that by only saying that there's
particulars as you then turn around and talk about universal categories.
So can you tell me what the universals are that
you referenced?
Speaker 2: No, no, no, I'm saying you're making a particularistic norm here.
Speaker 1: You're not gonna are you not going to answer this question?
Speaker 2: I'm saying you're making a particularistic norm.
Speaker 1: You've asked me five questions. I'm asking you a question.
Speaker 4: Now, So that that is true, liquid Zulu, he did
you did? He did?
Speaker 3: You did ask him a series of questions and he
did answer them. So let's let's see if we can
get this.
Speaker 1: What are the universals that you referred to in your
opening statement? What are those.
Speaker 2: Not seeing here? And you know I was talking about
a universal ethic, an ethic which applies to the entire set.
Speaker 1: What's the universal? What's the universal there?
Speaker 2: I just told you is a universal ethic I applies
to the entire set.
Speaker 1: So a universal ithic is a universal that's a circular?
What is the universal that you're saying there? No, I
use the word universal? What are they? What's the ontological
status of universals.
Speaker 2: I use the word universal because they applies to the
entire set. It's universal within that sense.
Speaker 1: Okay, so an entire set of what do you have
experience of that entire set?
Speaker 2: No, that's just well, I'm defining a universal antheica.
Speaker 1: How do you justify the claim that you have asccess
to a universal What is a pismology? One on one? Okay?
Speaker 2: This is around the definition of a universal anth to universals,
an antic which applies to the entire class. That's what
I'm saying.
Speaker 1: So a union for the justification if you make class
based claims, I don't I know you think that? How
do you make that claim? That move means the ontological
status of universals? Where are they? What are they?
Speaker 2: Do you disagree with the ability of me to do that?
Speaker 1: So you're not going to answer it because you don't know.
Speaker 2: Okay, But do you have a dispute for my prompty theory?
Speaker 1: You don't have a justification for human ethics as a
universal category.
Speaker 2: No, I'm referring to a universal ethic as applying to
human kind. I meaning that you're deriving an anthems for
humans versal class. So it would have to apply to
all humans. That's what I'm saying universal.
Speaker 1: I gave the justification universal. That's not a justification. You
just stated your position again, so you don't even know
what it rightfication, You don't.
Speaker 2: Know I gave the justification for it, why it would
have to apply to the entire staf humans?
Speaker 1: You don't know what justification is by restating your position,
that's not epistemic.
Speaker 2: I'm telling you I told you the justification why it
would have to apply to all humans.
Speaker 1: What do you think epistemic justification is?
Speaker 2: I mean it would be justifying epistemologically somehow. I don't know.
Speaker 1: So justification is justifying it? Good job? Any any other
circular statements? What is epismic? You can't even tell me
what you e would have in epistemology on one class?
Speaker 2: No, I've not been to an pistology want one class?
Speaker 1: No?
Speaker 2: Okay, right, So now can you tell me how the authority?
Why the fact that comes from God? How does that
imbue humans with the right to aggress?
Speaker 1: Well, I mean if God has the ultimate authority and
he endows people with a derivative authority, then that's.
Speaker 2: How Okay, So God can just decide to that, Okay,
right now, you're allowed to aggress, you're not allowed to aggress.
Speaker 1: Well, human beings have the faculty of reasoning and they
have the ability to make decisions, so it's not arbitrary.
But some rulers are evil and some some rulers do
you know, fight unjust war?
Speaker 2: Sure, right, But it's because whether or not God has
these say so, whether God says yep, if I put my
rubber stamp on this aggression, that's what makes it such
that it's a just aggression.
Speaker 1: Well, what makes it just depends upon the situation, because
there might be agitation or provocation that's unjustified, and so
the war fear in that case might be justified. So
there's not an easy, you know, a priori situation as
to you know, how in every case the war might
be good or bad.
Speaker 2: So so let's just get the upshelf. That is it
that God gives his rubber stamp to some aggressions that
makes them okay.
Speaker 1: The upshot is that this worldview gives an account for
how there is a party in the earth and how
there is the possibility of metaphysical groupings and classes, which
your position denies even though it uses it. At the
same time.
Speaker 2: But is it God giving is rubber stamp to certain aggressions?
Is that what makes them just?
Speaker 1: Well, what makes them just is that they are a
reflection of eternal divine justice.
Speaker 2: Okay. And what does it mean to be a reflection
of eternal divine justice?
Speaker 1: It means to act justly according to divine law, things
like the Ten Commandments and so forth.
Speaker 2: Okay, So how do you how do you know what?
Like so is the Tank Commandment?
Speaker 1: Is that just?
Speaker 2: Is that all there is to the divine law?
Speaker 1: Those are basic principles that would then kind of be
delineating the rest of law. Fair. I mean, if you're
a fan of Western civilization, then you would know that
you know, the history of Western civilization incorporates Greek philosophy, Aristotle,
you know, Church law, can in law, all these things,
you know, English common law. All of these things go
into how states engage in judicious activities.
Speaker 2: Okay, So you said a bunch of things go into
eternal divine law. Its not just the tank moments. So
what is eternal divine law?
Speaker 1: Then? Well, it's as the statutes in the expectations that
God has, which are a reflection of his divine character.
Speaker 2: All Right, so what are those statutes and expectations that
God has.
Speaker 1: Again, So, I mean there's moral law, there's natural law,
there's divine law, there's church law, and then there's practical
things like common law. All of these things can in
varying ways be reflections of those principles.
Speaker 2: Right, So if they're in varying ways reflections of the principles,
can you just give me the principles?
Speaker 1: So I gave you the Ten Commandments, I mean you
can have the rest of the Torah. You can have
the rest of the Bible, the New Testament, the history
of the church. It's church, church, can and law. I mean,
all those things go into this. I'm giving you lists
of them. What do you want?
Speaker 2: Sure? So I don't know the rest of the Torah
or the rest of these other things. Can do you
have like a list of these principles that you could
give me, like just you know, state principal one, Principle two,
Principal three, YadA, YadA YadA.
Speaker 1: Well, I don't think anybody, even libertarian law theory, has
some like ultimate perfect list because encapsulate a lot of things.
Speaker 2: I've got my perfect list right now, I can give
it to you. Attem number one. Not an agress principle,
that's it.
Speaker 1: Why are we supposed to follow the non aggression principle?
Speaker 2: No, I was just demonstrating to you that I can
give you the list. Can you give me your list?
Can you give me your list?
Speaker 1: Why are we supposed to follow it?
Speaker 2: Can you give me your list?
Speaker 1: Already listed? The tank commandments is an easy example. Why
are we supposed to follow?
Speaker 2: But it's not just tank moments, they were these different things.
Speaker 1: Reflect noticed that he can't justify an at once again.
It's arbitrary. I've asked him and he's not going to
answer it because he doesn't have an answer to this.
Speaker 2: You said, you said that you're different.
Speaker 1: Followed the nap, you said, we followed it in.
Speaker 2: You said that you're different. You're different types of laws,
these differents, different degrees.
Speaker 4: Both on guys.
Speaker 1: And you noticed it's like the bab.
Speaker 4: I got it and I got a guy.
Speaker 3: I gotta get in here, just real quick break it
up for a second, Liquidzulu. He is asking a very
direct question. Is there some this is some take it
a reason that you don't want to answer it, or.
Speaker 2: I think it's an invasion technic. I think it's an
invasion tactic because he's trying that.
Speaker 1: You say that we ought to follow I'm asking you
why we should follow that, and you're saying that to
an invasion.
Speaker 2: I'm going to explain to you why it's innovasion tactic,
because every every time I try and pin you down
with something, you go, okay, well, but this other thing. Okay,
well by this other thing. So I'm asking you your
legal code is.
Speaker 1: I couldn't answer universal, and now what your legal code
is another. Basically, I've only asked you two basic questions
and you won't answer them.
Speaker 2: I'm asking you what your legal code.
Speaker 1: Has an answer. You can't tell me why I should.
You can't give me one basic reason why I ought
to follow your n A P. I'm asking you what
your leg You're the worst debate in the last five years.
You should go. Can you have t jump on like dump?
Speaker 3: So so let me I am I am trying. I
am trying to figure this out myself. I'm taking notes
here as they go. If if he's you're putting down
the justification for why aggression is wrong, and you're basing
that on the NAP you say that this is my list,
my whole list and nothing but my list n A P.
If he asked you for your justification for the n P,
it seems like a fair I don't see how that's
an unfair question. If it's a if your query is
about aggression itself.
Speaker 2: Sure, I'm not saying it's an unfair question in a vacuum, right,
if he was interrogating my position and he got down
to let me answer, I said, if he got down,
if he was answering Jesus Christ, I'm saying, if he
was interrogating me down and it's like, okay, right, so
we get down to the n P, and then why
don't we do that? Okay, that would be fine, right.
But instead, what was happening is I was introgating his
legal code. I was trying to get out of him
what his principles are of law, of divine law, and
he instant and then he evaded, like he's always doing
every single.
Speaker 1: Every everything, every multiple.
Speaker 2: And you said they you said they were reflect divine
law to varying degrees. So I want to know what
the actual core of divine law is. And every time
I try and push you in something you're vague, you
bring something else up. You say what about this? What
about that?
Speaker 1: You're never going to say why we ought to follow
the NAP?
Speaker 4: I do think. I do think it's a fair it's
a fair question.
Speaker 3: For instance, if you asked him, why do you think
we ought to follow the tank commandments? I think Jay
I got to answer that too.
Speaker 2: Sure, So I'll answer this and then can I please
go back to interrogating what exactly your legal code is?
Speaker 4: Yeah? I think that's fine.
Speaker 2: Yeah, sure, So I think it's incoherent to justify any
anti anyp norm, any negation of the NAP. You're going
to fall into contradiction when you try and justify that.
Speaker 1: How's the justification. Maybe it's okay to contradict.
Speaker 2: No, contradictions are falsehoods.
Speaker 1: If you say we are, hey, it's over time to
pack it up. He said, no, don't do it.
Speaker 2: Okay, So you think constrictions are fine?
Speaker 1: I mean again, maybe if you'd had a basic.
Speaker 2: Class, do you think contradictions are fine?
Speaker 1: That's not what justification is. That doesn't get you justification
to saying no. Okay.
Speaker 2: So if I say I ought aggress and that implies
a contradiction, that means I not aggress. Do you think
contradictions are fine.
Speaker 1: I want to know on your worldview, why we ought
to do anything.
Speaker 2: I just explained what to I just explained it what
I did.
Speaker 1: What's the How do we get an ot from it?
Speaker 2: Is proposing certain statements, like the negation of the NP
implies contradiction contractions are false, so therefore this must be false.
Pretty simple, Okay.
Speaker 1: The fact that something is false doesn't tell you that
it ought or ought not be followed unless you have
some justification for that move. If an statement, this is
a basic abystomology problem. Getting an aught from it is.
Speaker 2: If an statement is false, it's a negation has to
be true. If an a statement is false, negation has
to be true.
Speaker 1: It doesn't matter because it doesn't tell you that you
ought it doesn't do you know what normativity is? It
doesn't grant your normativity. Go look up basic philosophical concepts.
Speaker 2: So you think the negation of an at statement is
not also an a statement.
Speaker 1: You're you're not understanding the words.
Speaker 2: I think you're an understanding the words.
Speaker 1: I understand that it's a contradiction that doesn't get you
to normativity.
Speaker 2: Okay, So it's a contradiction to propose certain statements therefore
they are false, therefore their negation.
Speaker 1: It doesn't matter.
Speaker 2: It's not whether you ought contradict or not. That's a
relevant to your easy contradiction.
Speaker 1: Drink more of your loco. Whatever it is.
Speaker 2: Certain statements aren't contradictions, loco. Certain you think a negation
of an AT statement is also an ALT statement?
Speaker 1: You don't even understand what that. You don't even understand
the categories are different. An art statement is not relevant
to what you're claiming. I want I'm sorry not is
it a contradiction? Of course? I don't believe in contradictions.
Speaker 2: Okay, okay, what do you think the negation of I
an't wear a blue shirt?
Speaker 1: You know what narrativity is?
Speaker 2: What do you think the negation of that is?
Speaker 1: Okay? So again, it doesn't even This is like talking
to a kid man.
Speaker 2: It's like you thought you were going to come on
here and to be a human or something. You don't
even and you only prepared against you talking to.
Speaker 1: A teenager who doesn't even know the basic concepts. What
do you think is going to come?
Speaker 2: Do you think the negation of an ALT statement is
an IS statement or do you think it's an ALT statement?
Speaker 1: I want to know it's a simple that's.
Speaker 2: What I want to know in place.
Speaker 1: Hello, he's nervously.
Speaker 2: Are we back?
Speaker 1: Okay?
Speaker 2: Are back?
Speaker 4: I think, I think tell.
Speaker 1: Me what the problem is before we continue.
Speaker 2: Sure, the problem is the fact value that called me
I e. You cannot get fact factual values because there's
a line separating them. You can't. You can only start
get values from Yeah, right, and I don't.
Speaker 1: I don't agree that there is a solve this with
an ap.
Speaker 2: I just explained it to you like ten times. So
certain statements, you.
Speaker 1: Didn't solve it. It's a classics Okay, So you what
solved this classic problem with philosophy and after you googled it? Yeah?
Speaker 2: I I googled it right now and I solved it
on the spot.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: If that's why you want to believe? So certain art statements.
Speaker 1: And what was this delusion? Because you cut out.
Speaker 2: Certain art statements imply contradiction. Contradictions are false. Therefore the
art statement implies that contradiction has to be false. This
negation has to be true. Jesus Christ.
Speaker 1: Fact that something false doesn't tell you that you ought
to follow what's true? Do you understand that difference?
Speaker 2: Okay? Irrelevant irrelevant, all right, this guy's a reason I'm done.