WEBVTT

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<v Speaker 1>Hey Carl here, we're on a mission to find new

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<v Speaker 1>fans of the show. I mean, where else can you

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<v Speaker 1>get real life comedy and horror in one podcast. You

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<v Speaker 1>can do your part by leaving us a review on iTunes,

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<v Speaker 1>Spotify or wherever you get security this week. Also, you

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<v Speaker 1>can get an ad free feed by becoming a five

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<v Speaker 1>dollars a month patron. Go to Patreon dot Security this

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<v Speaker 1>week dot com and sign up, and don't forget discord

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<v Speaker 1>Discord dot security this week dot com. Lots of good

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<v Speaker 1>stuff happening there. Yeah, I think that's it. So on

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<v Speaker 1>with the podcast. Hey guys, what do you call a

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<v Speaker 1>vegetarian with diarrhea? I don't know, a salad shooter? Oh

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<v Speaker 1>my god. All right, Well, enough about that. Let's talk

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<v Speaker 1>about the stories this week. I think we have seven.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's start with RedHook. Android malware now uses wireless

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<v Speaker 1>ADB for shell access.

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<v Speaker 2>New and improved.

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<v Speaker 3>I honestly love AB slices. It's a debugging bug, right, yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>So ADB is Android debugging bridge. The debugging bridge is

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<v Speaker 3>obviously if you're if you're writing code, you're writing an

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<v Speaker 3>APK or whatever, some sort of program for an Android device.

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<v Speaker 3>You generally don't put all your dev tools on there

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<v Speaker 3>and you debugging tools and all that KOD stuff, right,

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<v Speaker 3>because it's it's a phone, or it's a dishwasher, it's

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<v Speaker 3>a refrigerator or whatever. Right, there's all sorts of things

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<v Speaker 3>that run Android. So for you to connect into that

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<v Speaker 3>device and see everything that's going on, deploy packages or

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<v Speaker 3>what we call side loading package packages, that sort of stuff,

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<v Speaker 3>you need this debugging bridge, which is typically turned off

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<v Speaker 3>on most Android devices. However, we found several ways that

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<v Speaker 3>you can turn them on remotely. We found several bugs

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<v Speaker 3>and devices TVs namelessly where we can turn them on

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<v Speaker 3>and connect in and do all sorts of nefarious things.

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<v Speaker 3>So yeah, it's a It is a very very powerful

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<v Speaker 3>access to the device to put you know, back doors

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<v Speaker 3>and all sorts of stuff. Okay, so you may say, okay,

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<v Speaker 3>who cares what happened? What happened here in this case?

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<v Speaker 3>Although yes ADB is there and they say, oh my god,

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<v Speaker 3>this is like an uh, you know, an autonomous wireless

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<v Speaker 3>ADB abuse blah, they still have to trick the victim

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<v Speaker 3>to do something. Right. This isn't like this one. I

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<v Speaker 3>This one I'd call more hype than anything else. And

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<v Speaker 3>I know we talked about having that concept on this show,

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<v Speaker 3>like which ones of these are like, oh my god

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<v Speaker 3>we should worry about and which ones we shouldn't. This

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<v Speaker 3>one somebody's gonna call you up, or somebody's gonna get

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<v Speaker 3>you to click on something and have you jump through

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<v Speaker 3>a whole bunch of hoops, which people do to turn

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<v Speaker 3>on developer options, which people do activate wireless debugging and

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<v Speaker 3>then do all sorts of stuff that then huzza, they're in.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's not just a stupid switch that someone left

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<v Speaker 2>expos Yeah, no, exactly, Like more than twenty years ago

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<v Speaker 2>we found AXD files and debugging left on.

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<v Speaker 3>This isn't that we're twenty years ago. I love that

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<v Speaker 3>more than twenty years ago.

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<v Speaker 1>It require stupid people, not stupid switches.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, we've we've seen debugging files turned on recently.

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<v Speaker 2>That's true, but let's not talk about that.

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<v Speaker 3>Yes, Wayne, let's not talk about that in certain places

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<v Speaker 3>where we can get awesome credit card data anyway. So

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<v Speaker 3>that being said, yeah, in this case, if somebody is

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<v Speaker 3>walking you through, it'd be like somebody showing up at

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<v Speaker 3>your house and being like, hey, i'd really love to

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<v Speaker 3>give you a quote for a new roof, you might

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<v Speaker 3>if we walk around and look at it, and you go, yeah, sure,

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<v Speaker 3>and they were like, to do that, We're going to

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<v Speaker 3>need to come in the house, I'm going to need

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<v Speaker 3>to grab your key, We're going to need to make

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<v Speaker 3>a copy of it. I'm going to go upstairs and

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<v Speaker 3>plant some things in the attic just to monitor the roof.

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<v Speaker 3>And then you know, we may come back on our

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<v Speaker 3>own occasionally. And you're like, yeah, sure, okay, yeah that

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<v Speaker 3>makes sense to give me a quote.

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<v Speaker 1>Hmm.

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<v Speaker 3>Right, So if somebody's jumping you through a whole bunch

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<v Speaker 3>of hoops that don't seem to make any sense, yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>you're probably doing the wrong stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>So this reminds me of a Star Trek Next Generation episode.

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<v Speaker 1>The guy that did Max Headroom just kind of shows

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<v Speaker 1>up in a ship and and has some they noticed

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<v Speaker 1>some temporal anomaly, and then he beams over the Enterprise

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<v Speaker 1>and he says he's from the future. He's a historian.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh I remember that.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, yeah, he's a historian. He just he wants

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<v Speaker 1>to witness this amazing thing that's going on right now,

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<v Speaker 1>and they all want to know what happens in the future.

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<v Speaker 1>He can't tell them right, right, right, and so he

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<v Speaker 1>starts stealing technology and after you know, the thing happens,

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<v Speaker 1>which was a coincidence, he says, well, it's time for

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<v Speaker 1>me to go, and they say not so fast. Turns

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<v Speaker 1>out he was from the past and he's a huckster

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<v Speaker 1>and he stole the time travel ship and came two

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<v Speaker 1>hundred years into the future.

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<v Speaker 2>Started taking tech to get technology so he could invent them.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so he could invent them. That's right. He was

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<v Speaker 1>an inventor. So that that's kind of what it reminds

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<v Speaker 1>me of. You know, you just just be aware when

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<v Speaker 1>people tell you.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm surprised that Elon husins sewell over his life story.

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<v Speaker 3>Wow wow.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, so it's an interesting story. Be careful and

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<v Speaker 1>that's about all we can say.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah. Absolutely, And you know, for those of you. The

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<v Speaker 3>other thing I would say is for those of you

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<v Speaker 3>who do develop on Android and have devices connected to

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<v Speaker 3>your network and maybe do have the ADB port turned

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<v Speaker 3>on on those devices, it may not be a bad

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<v Speaker 3>idea to shut off if you're not developing on them,

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<v Speaker 3>or keep them on an isolated network. Yeah. So it's

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<v Speaker 3>it's not uncommon to be multi homed where I might

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<v Speaker 3>have two network cards or you know, I'm talking on

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<v Speaker 3>an isolated network, you know v LAN where you know

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<v Speaker 3>I'm only talking those devices and they don't have access

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<v Speaker 3>to the Internet. So if you do have to turn this on,

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<v Speaker 3>just you know what you're doing. Just make sure it's

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<v Speaker 3>it's isolated so other people can't connect to it and

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<v Speaker 3>put the various things on there like we like to do,

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<v Speaker 3>right Patrick.

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<v Speaker 2>And advice for everyone. If someone asks you to jump

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<v Speaker 2>through hoops, whether it's a person or AI, double check

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<v Speaker 2>find out what they're doing, because the ai'll do that too.

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<v Speaker 2>When I'm when I'm building systems, a lot of times

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<v Speaker 2>it'll try to tell me to do something that's you know, crazy,

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<v Speaker 2>and I'm like, you always should understand what you're being

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<v Speaker 2>asked to do and why.

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<v Speaker 1>Yep.

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<v Speaker 3>AIS tend to look a lot like like hackers. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>so yeah, absolutely, Speaking.

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<v Speaker 1>Of AIS and guardrails, I was I got an email

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<v Speaker 1>from Microsoft that I had to upgrade my Azure storage

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<v Speaker 1>directory from verson GP something from version one to version two.

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<v Speaker 1>And it's happening in October, right, and they'll be unavailable

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<v Speaker 1>if I don't do it. Now. I don't know what

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<v Speaker 1>to do, how to do that. So I opened Codex

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<v Speaker 1>and I said, walk me through this. Now Codex doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>have access to my accounts or anything, my passwords, my credentials,

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<v Speaker 1>but I did log in and I got a PowerShell

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<v Speaker 1>session and it basically gave me the commands step by

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<v Speaker 1>step to go through and do this for each account.

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<v Speaker 1>And it told me it said, look, I don't don't

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<v Speaker 1>ever type in passwords and credentials into an AI, including me.

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<v Speaker 1>So I thought that was really good that it's said that,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, if you just are expected Codex.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, that's good the way.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, yeah, so it was cool. This is a good experience.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, we moved on.

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<v Speaker 3>We've moved on.

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<v Speaker 1>Yes, attacker uses suspected AI generated PowerShell script to map

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<v Speaker 1>active directory.

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<v Speaker 3>Oh no, no, I mean okay, so boy meets AI,

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<v Speaker 3>AI writes no seriously, Like, so what happens is you

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<v Speaker 3>vibe code up something to you know, grab all the

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<v Speaker 3>information you can't out of active directories. So for those

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<v Speaker 3>of you who aren't network administrators, you know active directory

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<v Speaker 3>and a Windows network or usually corporate networks or Windows networks,

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<v Speaker 3>it's now called yeah, it's now called oh that's that.

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<v Speaker 1>That's the cloud version.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, Yeah, that's the cloud version is entra. It doesn't matter.

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<v Speaker 3>They're the same thing. Whether you're running it on your

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<v Speaker 3>own it's active directory, but they're the same thing. It

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<v Speaker 3>was stolen by Microsoft in the nineties from Novel anyways,

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<v Speaker 3>actually legitimately, and this is the story I heard legitimately.

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<v Speaker 3>The story I heard was the head engineer at Novel

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<v Speaker 3>got hired away by Microsoft and that's where active directory

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<v Speaker 3>came from. Was this engineer anyway? So very similar to

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<v Speaker 3>the way that novelle used to work. And most people

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<v Speaker 3>are probably thinking, what the hell is novel? Yeah? Did

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<v Speaker 3>at history class data history talk about and no anyways?

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<v Speaker 3>So I mean to talk about the bindery exactly. Let's

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<v Speaker 3>go in to buyd dns from the seventies. So needless

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<v Speaker 3>is say active directory is. Think of it as like

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<v Speaker 3>a hierarchical database of objects that are have permissions and

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<v Speaker 3>rights to certain things on your network. And those objects

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<v Speaker 3>may be users, they might be desktops, they might be whatever. Right,

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<v Speaker 3>most of the time people just think of the users, right,

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<v Speaker 3>But computers are in there too. Actually, computers could be

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<v Speaker 3>pretty powerful in there. If you can control a computer

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<v Speaker 3>or a machine account. There's all sorts of fun stuff

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<v Speaker 3>you can do. There was actually a really cool exploit

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<v Speaker 3>where you could create as a normal user. If you

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<v Speaker 3>could breach a network and grab normal user credentials, you

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<v Speaker 3>could create up to five fake machines and then store

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<v Speaker 3>them in active directory and then give them all sorts

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<v Speaker 3>of special rights and yeah, anyways, that being said, games

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<v Speaker 3>geeks play, Yeah, yeah, yeah. So in this particular case, yes,

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<v Speaker 3>I'm attacker used vibe coding to go and cull information

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<v Speaker 3>out of out of a active directory that they gained

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<v Speaker 3>access to through remote desktop. So it doesn't it's not

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<v Speaker 3>super clear as to whether remote desktop was installed and

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<v Speaker 3>connected to the internet, whether it was they they get

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<v Speaker 3>asked to us.

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<v Speaker 1>But basically what it did is it looked for the

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<v Speaker 1>domain controller and then mapped users, computers and domains, and

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<v Speaker 1>then created a directory and exported a number of files

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<v Speaker 1>and finally creating a report, an HTML report to measure

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<v Speaker 1>the success of the enumeration attempt. So, you know, it

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<v Speaker 1>was a I think it's a script that you would write.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, that seems like something that you could do.

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<v Speaker 2>Did they say what?

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<v Speaker 1>What?

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<v Speaker 2>What tipped them off that it was Ai've generated? I mean,

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<v Speaker 2>the beautiful output console output, Yeah, with different colors maybe

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<v Speaker 2>a tip off.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, absolutely, a lot of times over engineered code, it

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<v Speaker 3>says I Usually, like anytime you have an icon that's

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<v Speaker 3>spit out, like hey, this is the users and this

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<v Speaker 3>little user icon spits out on the terminal window, you're like, oh, yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>that was a code because no programmers wouldn't do that,

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<v Speaker 3>No developer whatever spend the time to find the right

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<v Speaker 3>unicode for that icon.

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<v Speaker 1>And the colors too, like that said, beautiful console output

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<v Speaker 1>using cyan green red ye.

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<v Speaker 3>Just no, not gonna do it.

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<v Speaker 2>Is that because is that because developers don't have any taste?

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<v Speaker 1>Is perfluis doesn't matter?

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<v Speaker 3>Yes, exactly. It's because it's because we're efficient, is what

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<v Speaker 3>it is. Patrick efficient. So is this novel? Like, oh

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<v Speaker 3>my god, now you can't like no, we use tools

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<v Speaker 3>like this all the time. Uh, you know, whether it's

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<v Speaker 3>Pincastle or Bloodhound or whatever. There's all sorts of tools

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<v Speaker 3>for enumerating active directory that are legitimate tools that you

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<v Speaker 3>can buy a license to and use, and some of them,

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<v Speaker 3>oddly enough, are free tools you can just download and use.

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<v Speaker 3>So this is the most puzzling thing for me, is

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<v Speaker 3>this this person decided to write their own when there's

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<v Speaker 3>so many of them out there that exists that anti

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<v Speaker 3>virus generally won't find because they're actually legitimate tools.

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<v Speaker 1>But so here's your criminal career advice. If you're going

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<v Speaker 1>to use AI to generate a script that you plan

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<v Speaker 1>to use to make an attack, don't make it spit

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<v Speaker 1>out colors and icons for Christ's.

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<v Speaker 3>Sake, exactly. And maybe your first prompt should be is

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<v Speaker 3>there already a tool that does this ruse? And that

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<v Speaker 3>might be save you a couple tokens that you can

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<v Speaker 3>use later on for important things.

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<v Speaker 1>That's always the first question. Has this been done before?

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<v Speaker 1>Where can I get it? Yep?

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<v Speaker 3>Absolutely all right?

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<v Speaker 1>So was the did they catch the guy or the

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<v Speaker 1>girl or whatever?

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<v Speaker 3>It's ongoing? It looks like ongoing.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay. Next, SISA warns admins to patch actively exploited SharePoint

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<v Speaker 1>flaws SharePoint who runs share Point? In two six?

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<v Speaker 3>You know that was the most that was the most

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<v Speaker 3>shocking part of this story, Carl, I know, because that

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<v Speaker 3>was like I read that Wrongs probably runs it. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>probably that's I think. Keep track of all those exploits.

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<v Speaker 3>Uh yeah. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency oh,

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<v Speaker 3>I don't think you should have the word of security

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<v Speaker 3>twice in the name, but whatever. SISA warns today that

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<v Speaker 3>attackers are actively exploiting three vulnerabilities to hack Internet exposed

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<v Speaker 3>on premise SharePoint servers. Let me unpack that again. Internet

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<v Speaker 3>exposed on premise share point servers?

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<v Speaker 1>What could go wrong?

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<v Speaker 3>If you, my dear listener, have an Internet exposed on premise.

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<v Speaker 2>Anything, then you you are only listening to this show

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<v Speaker 2>while you sleep.

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<v Speaker 1>That's right?

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<v Speaker 3>I never yeah, like what, no, that's no. Like if

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<v Speaker 3>you had okay, if you had to have SharePoint and

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<v Speaker 3>you had to have people have access to it, you

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<v Speaker 3>got to use something like a VPN, you got to

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<v Speaker 3>hide a point something, because there's so many different ways

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<v Speaker 3>to manipulate things like Sharepoints designed to be an open

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<v Speaker 3>architecture of documents and sharing in that sort of time.

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<v Speaker 1>It was designed before people even gave a rat's butt

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<v Speaker 1>about security.

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<v Speaker 3>Absolutely, and I can't tell it. I call SharePoint the

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<v Speaker 3>cat of document libraries because it has nine lives. Every

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<v Speaker 3>time I've heard about SharePoint, they're like, you know what

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<v Speaker 3>they're getting rid of it? Yeah, sharep and nobody's gonna

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<v Speaker 3>use it anymore. And then it's like, oh share points back,

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<v Speaker 3>look at that. So it's fascinating though, that you would

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<v Speaker 3>take a SharePoint server and then decide to manage it

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<v Speaker 3>on your own, not put it up in the cloud

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<v Speaker 3>where you have you know, people who are watching at

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<v Speaker 3>twenty four to seven and know exactly what they're doing.

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, Microsoft's made it really hard to host anything anymore.

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<v Speaker 2>We gave up on I tried heroically, you did heroically

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<v Speaker 2>to keep us hosting our own exchange, and it just

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<v Speaker 2>made it impossible. I assume SharePoint is far, far beyond that.

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<v Speaker 3>I fought Patrick tooth and nail, fought Patrick, and I

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<v Speaker 3>was like, I will burn this server to the ground. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>there's no need for us to maintain it. Well, it

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<v Speaker 3>used to be back in the day, which was a Wednesday, Carl,

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<v Speaker 3>thank you, Back in the day context managing your own

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<v Speaker 3>if you were in the cloud and the cloud went down,

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<v Speaker 3>you were so well right.

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<v Speaker 2>But we made that switch over ten years ago. Oh absolutely,

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<v Speaker 2>But it's not like we made the switch last Monday.

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<v Speaker 2>No no, no, no, no. But like twenty years ago, fifteen

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<v Speaker 2>years ago, if if Microsoft was down for a day,

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<v Speaker 2>it wasn't unheard of. Yeah, right, for Office three sixty five.

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<v Speaker 2>You go down and then you just didn't get email right,

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<v Speaker 2>and we weren't willing to do that, and that's why

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<v Speaker 2>we were hosting it, just to give you a little

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<v Speaker 2>bit of props. Patrick Well, and we also had taught

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<v Speaker 2>the Microsoft course on how to manage.

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<v Speaker 3>We did do that. So actually do you remember the

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<v Speaker 3>SharePoint course?

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<v Speaker 1>I do.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, we were the first to teach it as far

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<v Speaker 2>as I know. And we had to talk to the course, right,

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<v Speaker 2>I think it's long enough that we can talk about this, yes,

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<v Speaker 2>to get that, and they were like, oh, I'm sorry, man,

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<v Speaker 2>I'm sorry.

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<v Speaker 1>Sahil Malick did a DVD SharePoint training for Franklin's Net.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh I know a lot of people that made a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of money writing share Yeah, aps, but that doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>mean there was secure.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah that the the developer of the course was actually

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<v Speaker 3>in our class and sat down and is watching it.

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<v Speaker 3>And then when when labs and demos didn't work, we

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<v Speaker 3>just looked over explains really really exactly and they were

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<v Speaker 3>just like, we're so sorry, just keep moving but nothing anyway.

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<v Speaker 1>The long and short of it is this, this was

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<v Speaker 1>a you know, of vulnerability and it's patched isn't it.

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<v Speaker 3>And yeah, absolutely so, SISA added three actively exploited, so

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<v Speaker 3>they were actually seeing these exploited in the wild, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>twenty twenty six three two two one, twenty twenty six

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<v Speaker 3>four five six nine, and twenty twenty six five six

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<v Speaker 3>one six four. This is April fourteenth, July first, and

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<v Speaker 3>July fourteenth, so two of these are reasonably new. But

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<v Speaker 3>you are absolutely gonna want to make sure that you

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<v Speaker 3>go patch pit patch, patch, patch.

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<v Speaker 1>Patchy patchy patch. All right, well, let's patch our way

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<v Speaker 1>to a break and we'll be right back after these

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<v Speaker 1>very important messages and we're back. It's security this week.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Carl, that's doing and Patrick and we got a

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<v Speaker 1>few more stories for you here. Ernst and Young discloses

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<v Speaker 1>data breach after support system hack. So hey, guess what

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<v Speaker 1>another data breach? Do you think people are just like yawn?

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<v Speaker 3>I think so. I mean, I've I've had family members

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<v Speaker 3>come to me and be like what else could they take? Yeah, Like, honestly,

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<v Speaker 3>there's not much that I haven't like, social security member, address,

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00:17:52.079 --> 00:17:55.519
<v Speaker 3>credit card number, pass where it's like there's really not much. Helse,

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<v Speaker 3>so lock your credit account. We told you how to

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<v Speaker 3>do that before. Yeah, and you know, be change your

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<v Speaker 3>passwords in your password.

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<v Speaker 2>Managers, change all your money for gold, exchange all your

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<v Speaker 2>money for golden, ammo.

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<v Speaker 3>Both one golden.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that doesn't kill were wolves.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, but if it's silver, it'll kill.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it's silver, Emma, and then you're good, sell it,

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<v Speaker 3>shoot it whatever. Yeah. This this is this is another

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00:18:26.359 --> 00:18:29.359
<v Speaker 3>sort of story we've seen time and time again over

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<v Speaker 3>I'd say, over the last two years, this has been

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<v Speaker 3>more and more prevalent. Third parties support ticketing system managed

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<v Speaker 3>by somebody else, not Ernst and Young gets breached supply chain, right, listen,

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<v Speaker 3>Ernst and Young is they're they're good at what they do.

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<v Speaker 3>They actually have an auditing and cyber division, this particular

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<v Speaker 3>one that says Ernst you and offers tax consulting and

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<v Speaker 3>transaction advisory services to major organizations in one hundred and

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<v Speaker 3>fifty countries, so not a small organization.

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<v Speaker 2>You know.

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<v Speaker 1>What they didn't mention in this article is how many

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<v Speaker 1>records that you know, they are customers.

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<v Speaker 3>They're they're good at what they do, so when they

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<v Speaker 3>got breached, they know exactly what to say, which is nothing.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, they're not like anything really.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, because they will say they're not going to say

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<v Speaker 3>what records were breached. They're not going to say what

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<v Speaker 3>the attackers had access to. They're not going to say.

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<v Speaker 3>They're not going to say anything unless it forensically is

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<v Speaker 3>identified as true, and then they'll put a letter out.

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<v Speaker 3>So the letter of the law is they need to

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<v Speaker 3>notify their user the potential user base, that some of

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<v Speaker 3>their data may potentially have been leaked, and then they

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<v Speaker 3>don't have to exactly say what was leaked until the

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<v Speaker 3>forensics audit is done, which may take forever. Right, So the.

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<v Speaker 1>Article does say the company employs four hundred and six

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<v Speaker 1>thousand people and reported a global revenue of fifty three

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<v Speaker 1>point two billion dollars last year.

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<v Speaker 3>The other thing that it's interesting, I like humble bragging,

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<v Speaker 3>I know, right, yeah, you know, we're small whatever, just

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<v Speaker 3>a little company, just fifty four billion, fifty three to

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<v Speaker 3>two really, I.

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<v Speaker 2>Mean that is small by AI standards.

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<v Speaker 3>But yeah, yeah, I mean, so from the attackers had

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<v Speaker 3>access to the platform from March twenty eighth to April twelfth,

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<v Speaker 3>and then Ian Ernst and Young and whoever the third

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00:20:27.880 --> 00:20:31.680
<v Speaker 3>party is didn't notice it till later on twenty third.

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<v Speaker 3>It was like, yeah, till the twenty third, So there

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<v Speaker 3>was a fair bit of time where the attackers were

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<v Speaker 3>in there for weeks pulling information and then finally they went,

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00:20:40.279 --> 00:20:43.039
<v Speaker 3>oh crap, somebody's been in here. And that points to

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<v Speaker 3>another issue like what was where's the auditing in here?

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<v Speaker 3>Why was it found weeks and weeks afterwards and not

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<v Speaker 3>immediately during exfiltration of the data? Right? So I think

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<v Speaker 3>a lot of that may come out as well.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, so big mystery right now? Okay, Well, next story.

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<v Speaker 1>SISA urges immediate action on actively exploited Fortinet flaws.

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<v Speaker 3>Are old friends at Fortinet, Carl, what is this fortunet

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<v Speaker 3>you talk about?

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know. I've never heard of it before. They're

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<v Speaker 1>only in every episode.

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<v Speaker 3>Well, listeners, if you were a reoccurring character, this is

399
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<v Speaker 3>the first episode you've listened to, But you too will

400
00:21:19.160 --> 00:21:21.000
<v Speaker 3>get fordinite one percent of your episodes.

401
00:21:21.079 --> 00:21:24.440
<v Speaker 1>More importantly, which forty X?

402
00:21:25.400 --> 00:21:26.240
<v Speaker 3>It does it matter?

403
00:21:26.319 --> 00:21:27.000
<v Speaker 1>Product? Does it?

404
00:21:27.039 --> 00:21:28.359
<v Speaker 2>Which of the forty things?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah?

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00:21:29.200 --> 00:21:33.599
<v Speaker 1>I don't think it even it's the forty sandbox. It is,

407
00:21:33.720 --> 00:21:36.039
<v Speaker 1>and you can get that in small, medium or large

408
00:21:36.039 --> 00:21:40.279
<v Speaker 1>with extra fries. I like the forty sandbox, please with

409
00:21:40.720 --> 00:21:43.039
<v Speaker 1>doesn't it sound like a like a you know, fast

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<v Speaker 1>food they put forty in front of every product.

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<v Speaker 3>Right, everything's like geez. So these X plays we've talked about,

412
00:21:51.119 --> 00:21:52.799
<v Speaker 3>some of these have been around for a little while.

413
00:21:53.119 --> 00:21:58.200
<v Speaker 3>I think the earliest one was dating to April fourteenth,

414
00:21:58.279 --> 00:22:00.720
<v Speaker 3>So we're looking at CV twenty twenty six thirty three

415
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<v Speaker 3>nine eight oh eight and twenty twenty six two fiveh

416
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<v Speaker 3>eighty nine, So this is April fourteenth and June ninth.

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<v Speaker 3>We have talked about both of these exploits on this show.

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<v Speaker 3>We have talked about the patches and or ways to

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<v Speaker 3>mitigate both these exploits on this show. At the time

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<v Speaker 3>when we had announced these in April and June, there

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<v Speaker 3>was not active exploitation in the field, right. The experts

422
00:22:26.000 --> 00:22:29.000
<v Speaker 3>that be weren't saying, oh my gosh, this is you know,

423
00:22:29.039 --> 00:22:31.720
<v Speaker 3>we're seeing massive amounts of people trying to exploit these.

424
00:22:33.519 --> 00:22:36.519
<v Speaker 3>Now they are and this is so A. If you

425
00:22:36.519 --> 00:22:38.559
<v Speaker 3>were listening to this and you did go patch, great,

426
00:22:38.640 --> 00:22:42.400
<v Speaker 3>good for you, Good for you. B One of the

427
00:22:42.440 --> 00:22:44.279
<v Speaker 3>things I did want to point out here as well

428
00:22:44.680 --> 00:22:50.000
<v Speaker 3>is the difference between the CVE, which is a common

429
00:22:50.079 --> 00:22:54.279
<v Speaker 3>vulnerability exploit, which is like, hey, you know, we know

430
00:22:54.400 --> 00:22:57.799
<v Speaker 3>that you can exploit the system doesn't necessarily mean somebody

431
00:22:57.839 --> 00:22:59.880
<v Speaker 3>in the Internet has done it. It may be a

432
00:22:59.880 --> 00:23:06.440
<v Speaker 3>security researcher found the issue reported it responsibly, not like

433
00:23:06.599 --> 00:23:11.200
<v Speaker 3>Midnight Eclips, which we'll talk about later, reported it for shadow. Yeah,

434
00:23:11.200 --> 00:23:14.680
<v Speaker 3>I know, reported it responsibly. The security even the software

435
00:23:14.759 --> 00:23:17.920
<v Speaker 3>vendor fixed it. And there's a patch that gets a

436
00:23:17.960 --> 00:23:22.240
<v Speaker 3>CVE right. Software software companies get banks of cvees that

437
00:23:22.279 --> 00:23:25.480
<v Speaker 3>they can assign themselves to security issues.

438
00:23:25.599 --> 00:23:25.680
<v Speaker 2>Right.

439
00:23:26.240 --> 00:23:31.359
<v Speaker 3>A known vulnerability exploited vulnerability SISA has the UH the

440
00:23:31.640 --> 00:23:36.920
<v Speaker 3>Known Exploited Vulnerabilities database. When something gets added to that database,

441
00:23:37.079 --> 00:23:38.720
<v Speaker 3>it's already going to be an exploit we know about.

442
00:23:39.359 --> 00:23:42.559
<v Speaker 3>So it's not new from the exploit standpoint, it's new

443
00:23:42.599 --> 00:23:45.960
<v Speaker 3>from the usage standpoint. We're starting to see attackers use.

444
00:23:45.839 --> 00:23:49.519
<v Speaker 2>It, and I think there's a trigger with government agencies

445
00:23:49.599 --> 00:23:52.920
<v Speaker 2>on like they're in trouble if they haven't fixed it

446
00:23:53.000 --> 00:23:53.920
<v Speaker 2>by them.

447
00:23:53.599 --> 00:23:56.039
<v Speaker 3>Correct, Yeah, and then they get some sort of ultimatum

448
00:23:56.119 --> 00:23:57.160
<v Speaker 3>like fix it by Monday or.

449
00:23:57.279 --> 00:23:58.519
<v Speaker 2>Or else we'll ask you on Tuesday.

450
00:23:58.480 --> 00:24:08.319
<v Speaker 3>Ye all. Yeah. That so needless to say this, it

451
00:24:08.359 --> 00:24:09.920
<v Speaker 3>is one of the reasons we brought this back up.

452
00:24:09.960 --> 00:24:12.119
<v Speaker 3>It isn't to beat the dead horse that is Fortinet.

453
00:24:12.240 --> 00:24:15.920
<v Speaker 3>It's the fact that now that it's being reported as

454
00:24:15.960 --> 00:24:19.240
<v Speaker 3>a known expletive vulnerability, you really do want to go

455
00:24:19.319 --> 00:24:21.920
<v Speaker 3>through and make sure that everything's buttoned out and tight.

456
00:24:22.240 --> 00:24:24.480
<v Speaker 1>Right. And if you were one of those people who

457
00:24:24.519 --> 00:24:29.240
<v Speaker 1>went to your CSO and said patch this and they did,

458
00:24:29.319 --> 00:24:38.559
<v Speaker 1>you can say, ah, wave the finger right, okay?

459
00:24:39.319 --> 00:24:39.519
<v Speaker 3>Uh.

460
00:24:39.720 --> 00:24:45.319
<v Speaker 1>Cybersecurity News report seven zip vulnerability exposes millions of users

461
00:24:45.359 --> 00:24:46.240
<v Speaker 1>to remote.

462
00:24:46.400 --> 00:24:51.920
<v Speaker 2>It's been a minute since we've seen a compressor vulnerability.

463
00:24:51.839 --> 00:24:56.319
<v Speaker 1>Remote code execution risk. What happened with old seven zip?

464
00:24:56.720 --> 00:24:59.440
<v Speaker 3>Oh? Seven zip's neat. So for those of you that

465
00:24:59.480 --> 00:25:01.599
<v Speaker 3>don't use to zip, you might use wind zip, you

466
00:25:01.680 --> 00:25:04.240
<v Speaker 3>might use wind rar. You might have no idea what

467
00:25:04.279 --> 00:25:04.960
<v Speaker 3>any of those are.

468
00:25:05.799 --> 00:25:08.400
<v Speaker 1>Just use what's in Windows. You can compress and uncompression.

469
00:25:08.519 --> 00:25:13.519
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so compression dates all the way back to p

470
00:25:13.720 --> 00:25:16.079
<v Speaker 3>k's hip Phil Cats a long time ago.

471
00:25:16.599 --> 00:25:20.359
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, yep, even arc before that. Yes, you wrote that too.

472
00:25:20.400 --> 00:25:21.480
<v Speaker 3>Where was Phil Cats from?

473
00:25:21.519 --> 00:25:23.480
<v Speaker 1>I don't know. I don't even know if he's still

474
00:25:23.480 --> 00:25:24.519
<v Speaker 1>alive or what he does.

475
00:25:24.720 --> 00:25:28.880
<v Speaker 3>I'd venture to say New England area, smart guy, probably right, Probably.

476
00:25:28.759 --> 00:25:30.559
<v Speaker 2>A little island that just got smaller and.

477
00:25:30.559 --> 00:25:34.160
<v Speaker 3>Smaller exactly as he was compressing it.

478
00:25:34.400 --> 00:25:36.759
<v Speaker 1>We should find him, We should find him and see

479
00:25:36.799 --> 00:25:37.240
<v Speaker 1>if we could.

480
00:25:38.240 --> 00:25:41.119
<v Speaker 3>Oh my god, it'd be great, great, that would be great.

481
00:25:41.240 --> 00:25:42.920
<v Speaker 3>All right, We're on the hunt for the old folks,

482
00:25:43.519 --> 00:25:46.480
<v Speaker 3>for the old folks, for the old folks, the people

483
00:25:46.480 --> 00:25:47.599
<v Speaker 3>who make us feel younger.

484
00:25:48.039 --> 00:25:51.880
<v Speaker 1>Old folks home probably guming his neat low.

485
00:25:54.319 --> 00:25:59.720
<v Speaker 3>That's what we gotta do. We're gonna broadcast live from

486
00:25:59.759 --> 00:26:07.240
<v Speaker 3>shape Acres. It's Phil Katz. So, yeah, So these are

487
00:26:07.240 --> 00:26:11.279
<v Speaker 3>compression utilities, right, seven zip, win zip when whatever?

488
00:26:11.480 --> 00:26:14.920
<v Speaker 1>Right? And seven seven zip is the feature set is

489
00:26:14.960 --> 00:26:18.359
<v Speaker 1>that it can handle multiple formats. Yeah, seven formats in fact,

490
00:26:18.839 --> 00:26:21.000
<v Speaker 1>or is it Heine's fifty seven formats?

491
00:26:21.000 --> 00:26:25.279
<v Speaker 3>I don't, oh, Patrick, if they'd only changed the spelling of.

492
00:26:25.240 --> 00:26:27.319
<v Speaker 2>The I know, if I had only been in the will.

493
00:26:27.680 --> 00:26:32.799
<v Speaker 3>Yeah. So in this particular case, you know, there is

494
00:26:32.839 --> 00:26:35.920
<v Speaker 3>a buffer overrun what they call the x Z compression,

495
00:26:36.920 --> 00:26:40.039
<v Speaker 3>the algorithms where you can then get it to execute code.

496
00:26:40.680 --> 00:26:43.240
<v Speaker 3>What it does is it executes code under the context

497
00:26:43.319 --> 00:26:45.880
<v Speaker 3>of the user. So this isn't to provask. This isn't

498
00:26:45.920 --> 00:26:48.359
<v Speaker 3>like I'm a normal user in Hazzan. Now I'm an administrator.

499
00:26:48.799 --> 00:26:51.519
<v Speaker 3>This isn't an attack your computer firm, you know, across

500
00:26:51.599 --> 00:26:54.440
<v Speaker 3>the internet. This is you get some weird ZIP file

501
00:26:54.519 --> 00:26:58.759
<v Speaker 3>from some rando or from you know III cloud at

502
00:26:59.279 --> 00:27:02.000
<v Speaker 3>you know gmail dot com, and you download it, you write,

503
00:27:02.039 --> 00:27:03.759
<v Speaker 3>click on it, and you happen to open it with

504
00:27:03.799 --> 00:27:06.559
<v Speaker 3>seven zip, and they may get a command to run

505
00:27:06.599 --> 00:27:06.799
<v Speaker 3>as you.

506
00:27:08.000 --> 00:27:12.440
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you can trigger a heap based buffer overflow, a

507
00:27:12.480 --> 00:27:15.000
<v Speaker 1>memory corruption issue that occurs in data was written to

508
00:27:15.079 --> 00:27:16.839
<v Speaker 1>a buffer exceeds the allocated space.

509
00:27:16.960 --> 00:27:19.680
<v Speaker 3>Yeah. So if you're not running it as administrator, if

510
00:27:19.680 --> 00:27:22.599
<v Speaker 3>you're running with what we call lease privileges that will

511
00:27:22.640 --> 00:27:25.640
<v Speaker 3>help mitigate some of this. You can go patch this.

512
00:27:25.680 --> 00:27:28.039
<v Speaker 3>The vulnerability has been fixed in twenty six oh two

513
00:27:28.480 --> 00:27:36.359
<v Speaker 3>of seven zip. Interestingly enough, that x X compression. We've

514
00:27:36.359 --> 00:27:40.160
<v Speaker 3>seen issues with this this algorithm in the past, I

515
00:27:40.240 --> 00:27:42.720
<v Speaker 3>think we I know, we had reported on the z

516
00:27:42.880 --> 00:27:45.400
<v Speaker 3>backdoor a while ago, in twenty twenty four. We had

517
00:27:45.440 --> 00:27:45.960
<v Speaker 3>talked about this.

518
00:27:46.039 --> 00:27:46.599
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, long time.

519
00:27:46.640 --> 00:27:48.200
<v Speaker 3>So for those of you who haven't been listening to

520
00:27:48.240 --> 00:27:51.839
<v Speaker 3>this show since twenty twenty four, shoot, actually we've been here.

521
00:27:51.640 --> 00:27:53.839
<v Speaker 2>Since five years man, twenty sixteen.

522
00:27:53.920 --> 00:27:58.000
<v Speaker 3>Yeah's twenty twenty. It's been a while. Five twenty sixteenth yeah,

523
00:27:58.359 --> 00:28:04.960
<v Speaker 3>twenty one. You're right, Yeah, you're twenty twenty twenty one.

524
00:28:05.039 --> 00:28:10.279
<v Speaker 3>Around there, COVID sucked. We decided to start a podcast anyway. Anyhow,

525
00:28:10.440 --> 00:28:14.240
<v Speaker 3>back in twenty twenty four, it was discovered that there

526
00:28:14.359 --> 00:28:17.519
<v Speaker 3>was a developer there is an open source project. Yeah,

527
00:28:17.599 --> 00:28:19.880
<v Speaker 3>it was discovered that there was a developer who had

528
00:28:19.920 --> 00:28:25.599
<v Speaker 3>been working on the x Z compression algorithm for for

529
00:28:25.960 --> 00:28:28.319
<v Speaker 3>all sorts of utilities, right, whether it's seven zip or

530
00:28:28.359 --> 00:28:30.440
<v Speaker 3>built in compression and Linux and that sort of stuff.

531
00:28:31.119 --> 00:28:35.440
<v Speaker 3>And for two years, this developer built up CLOUTEP would

532
00:28:35.440 --> 00:28:39.359
<v Speaker 3>do good things, would add you know, add good features,

533
00:28:39.559 --> 00:28:42.559
<v Speaker 3>would go through your thicks, actual bugs for two years.

534
00:28:42.720 --> 00:28:44.480
<v Speaker 2>And his name was Dwayne Laflotte.

535
00:28:46.200 --> 00:28:52.359
<v Speaker 3>That's the long con, baby son, it is the long con.

536
00:28:52.559 --> 00:28:58.519
<v Speaker 3>And then silently added back doors right that hooked like

537
00:28:59.720 --> 00:29:02.000
<v Speaker 3>rs public keys and that sort of how you get

538
00:29:02.039 --> 00:29:03.799
<v Speaker 3>access to us to ah riverers and that sort of thing.

539
00:29:04.480 --> 00:29:07.640
<v Speaker 3>And they're still seeing ramifications of that today because it

540
00:29:07.640 --> 00:29:10.079
<v Speaker 3>it went wide fast because they didn't know to look

541
00:29:10.119 --> 00:29:11.079
<v Speaker 3>for this guy. Right.

542
00:29:11.160 --> 00:29:14.240
<v Speaker 1>So you know what occurs to me here is that

543
00:29:14.480 --> 00:29:18.200
<v Speaker 1>this buffer overflow, heap based buffer overflow tells me that

544
00:29:18.240 --> 00:29:20.839
<v Speaker 1>this was not written in a managed language like C

545
00:29:21.079 --> 00:29:23.880
<v Speaker 1>sharp or Java. Yeah, this must be the SEA or

546
00:29:23.920 --> 00:29:27.160
<v Speaker 1>C plus plus or some other bare metal you know,

547
00:29:27.240 --> 00:29:29.240
<v Speaker 1>manual memory allocation kind of thing.

548
00:29:29.440 --> 00:29:32.839
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and I'll tell you he heap manipulation is, I mean,

549
00:29:32.880 --> 00:29:36.519
<v Speaker 3>not as easy as stack like stack buffer overflows. Yeah,

550
00:29:36.559 --> 00:29:39.880
<v Speaker 3>you overload a field and huzzah, now you're you're on

551
00:29:39.920 --> 00:29:43.720
<v Speaker 3>the running execution stack. Heaps need to be groomed, so

552
00:29:43.960 --> 00:29:47.200
<v Speaker 3>you actually have to like allocate space, dellogate space, allocate space,

553
00:29:47.240 --> 00:29:50.599
<v Speaker 3>dellocate space, find angling pointers. Right, it's there. There has

554
00:29:50.640 --> 00:29:53.319
<v Speaker 3>to be a fair bit to go into, you know,

555
00:29:53.400 --> 00:29:54.279
<v Speaker 3>heapex plaint.

556
00:29:54.160 --> 00:29:56.559
<v Speaker 1>And the objects and the heap get rearranged, just kind

557
00:29:56.559 --> 00:29:58.519
<v Speaker 1>of like a hard DISTI fragment I used to do

558
00:29:58.640 --> 00:30:00.039
<v Speaker 1>in the two thousands and then.

559
00:30:00.599 --> 00:30:05.119
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, absolutely, Yeah, So not an easy class of overflow.

560
00:30:05.160 --> 00:30:08.039
<v Speaker 3>If you're looking for easier class stacks, stack is easier

561
00:30:08.039 --> 00:30:12.160
<v Speaker 3>class than a heap butt Yeah, needless to say, go

562
00:30:12.279 --> 00:30:13.960
<v Speaker 3>patch seven zip if you have. If you know what

563
00:30:14.039 --> 00:30:16.319
<v Speaker 3>seven zip is, go patch it or just stop using

564
00:30:16.400 --> 00:30:18.799
<v Speaker 3>it for crying out loud, or just use what's built

565
00:30:18.799 --> 00:30:19.400
<v Speaker 3>in the windows.

566
00:30:20.079 --> 00:30:25.000
<v Speaker 1>All right. Our top story this week new Windows Legacy

567
00:30:25.119 --> 00:30:28.279
<v Speaker 1>Hive zero day gives hackers admin privileges.

568
00:30:28.519 --> 00:30:29.319
<v Speaker 2>Who could this be?

569
00:30:29.720 --> 00:30:31.759
<v Speaker 1>This sounds very familiar to me.

570
00:30:32.160 --> 00:30:33.680
<v Speaker 2>Who could this be?

571
00:30:34.839 --> 00:30:37.759
<v Speaker 3>Yes, dear listeners, Nightmare Eclips, the same guy who brought

572
00:30:37.799 --> 00:30:41.640
<v Speaker 3>you Blue Hammer, Red Sun, Undefended, Yellow Key, Green Plasma,

573
00:30:41.720 --> 00:30:44.839
<v Speaker 3>Mini Plasma, Rogue Planet, and Great XML. These are all

574
00:30:44.880 --> 00:30:48.559
<v Speaker 3>exploits that this person has released. Yeah, and.

575
00:30:50.240 --> 00:30:55.960
<v Speaker 1>He basically went rogue after he warned Microsoft of some

576
00:30:56.039 --> 00:30:57.200
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities and they're like.

577
00:30:57.240 --> 00:31:03.359
<v Speaker 3>Eh, yeah, right, They're like whatever, whatever, and he's like, okay, okay, fine, cool, right.

578
00:31:03.480 --> 00:31:06.079
<v Speaker 3>I mean some of it, some of these exploits are

579
00:31:06.240 --> 00:31:08.640
<v Speaker 3>awesome if you go, if you go through some of.

580
00:31:08.599 --> 00:31:11.359
<v Speaker 1>Them and Wayne flat sense of the word.

581
00:31:11.279 --> 00:31:14.920
<v Speaker 3>Bypassing BitLocker key, I mean, there's nice stuff. There is

582
00:31:14.960 --> 00:31:18.440
<v Speaker 3>a really great list of exploits here. And this one

583
00:31:18.759 --> 00:31:23.880
<v Speaker 3>is no joke as well. So Live Legacy Hive is

584
00:31:23.920 --> 00:31:28.240
<v Speaker 3>the newest one, and Microsoft is quote unquote looking into it.

585
00:31:28.279 --> 00:31:30.440
<v Speaker 3>But what this guy has now taken to do and

586
00:31:30.480 --> 00:31:32.960
<v Speaker 3>I say guy generically, could be a girl, could be

587
00:31:32.960 --> 00:31:37.279
<v Speaker 3>a guy. I don't know, but I'm saying guy, what

588
00:31:37.319 --> 00:31:42.359
<v Speaker 3>this guy has done is releases. He waits till patch. Tuesday,

589
00:31:42.880 --> 00:31:45.480
<v Speaker 3>Microsoft puts out this massive patch and says, so, za,

590
00:31:45.559 --> 00:31:48.720
<v Speaker 3>we fixed three hundred things, and then like hours later

591
00:31:50.000 --> 00:31:52.240
<v Speaker 3>he releases an exploit that works on that patch. Ye,

592
00:31:52.400 --> 00:31:54.640
<v Speaker 3>and he goes, oh, Microsoft patch today, look at that.

593
00:31:54.720 --> 00:31:57.160
<v Speaker 3>It doesn't work. It doesn't fix anything, you know, blah

594
00:31:57.200 --> 00:31:57.680
<v Speaker 3>blah blah.

595
00:31:57.759 --> 00:32:00.920
<v Speaker 1>Right, that's why we this week had patch Wednesday as

596
00:32:00.920 --> 00:32:02.240
<v Speaker 1>well as patch Tuesday.

597
00:32:02.400 --> 00:32:04.920
<v Speaker 3>Soon we'll have patch Thursday in patch Friday.

598
00:32:05.839 --> 00:32:07.960
<v Speaker 1>So I did, didn't we We had a patch on

599
00:32:08.039 --> 00:32:09.720
<v Speaker 1>Tuesday and then one again on Wednesday.

600
00:32:10.000 --> 00:32:12.759
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, yep. So what's interesting about this one is this

601
00:32:12.839 --> 00:32:16.400
<v Speaker 3>is a this is a potential remote code execution, well

602
00:32:16.440 --> 00:32:20.000
<v Speaker 3>not remote code execution, privileged escalation really, where I can

603
00:32:20.039 --> 00:32:23.319
<v Speaker 3>get another account to execute a command. Typically you're going

604
00:32:23.359 --> 00:32:25.279
<v Speaker 3>to do the administrative account, right or anybody who has

605
00:32:25.279 --> 00:32:26.960
<v Speaker 3>administrative privileges.

606
00:32:28.519 --> 00:32:28.599
<v Speaker 2>It.

607
00:32:29.480 --> 00:32:35.400
<v Speaker 3>You know. Two nightmare eclipses credit. The POC that uh

608
00:32:36.480 --> 00:32:41.480
<v Speaker 3>that was released was defanged a little bit. It required

609
00:32:41.519 --> 00:32:44.359
<v Speaker 3>that you at least knew a username and password on

610
00:32:44.359 --> 00:32:47.519
<v Speaker 3>the system, and it required that you at least knew

611
00:32:47.559 --> 00:32:52.039
<v Speaker 3>a third name of a different account. Although I think

612
00:32:52.359 --> 00:32:55.920
<v Speaker 3>Kevin Beaumont said, uh, if you have half a brain,

613
00:32:55.960 --> 00:32:58.319
<v Speaker 3>you know how to rip those out exactly and then

614
00:32:58.359 --> 00:33:00.880
<v Speaker 3>get it to work. He did the stripe Mary West,

615
00:33:01.200 --> 00:33:03.279
<v Speaker 3>just take it and use it. Yeah, exactly. So I

616
00:33:03.279 --> 00:33:06.559
<v Speaker 3>think you probably could take the POC, maybe put it

617
00:33:06.599 --> 00:33:08.319
<v Speaker 3>in codex and ask it to fix it.

618
00:33:08.400 --> 00:33:10.920
<v Speaker 2>And he's a modern day Robinhood. And then you get

619
00:33:11.240 --> 00:33:13.039
<v Speaker 2>decide whether you're on the side of the Sheriff of

620
00:33:13.079 --> 00:33:14.680
<v Speaker 2>Nottingham or not in this case.

621
00:33:15.640 --> 00:33:17.680
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean it's interesting.

622
00:33:17.759 --> 00:33:20.559
<v Speaker 2>Also known as Sachin as Yellow pushes.

623
00:33:20.880 --> 00:33:25.440
<v Speaker 1>He pushes Microsoft to fix things. He does, he does,

624
00:33:25.559 --> 00:33:28.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, that's that's how it works. He's kind of

625
00:33:28.440 --> 00:33:29.160
<v Speaker 1>a jerk about it.

626
00:33:29.319 --> 00:33:33.359
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and you know he's gone rogue from the I

627
00:33:33.480 --> 00:33:36.440
<v Speaker 3>get it, like I get We've had plenty of times

628
00:33:36.640 --> 00:33:38.480
<v Speaker 3>I can't talk about on the air, but we've had

629
00:33:38.480 --> 00:33:41.519
<v Speaker 3>plenty of times where we've discovered zero day exploits that

630
00:33:41.559 --> 00:33:45.960
<v Speaker 3>were very damaging to massive amounts of people in financial

631
00:33:45.960 --> 00:33:49.559
<v Speaker 3>institutions and when we released them and they just don't

632
00:33:49.559 --> 00:33:52.359
<v Speaker 3>want to hear it. Chew the software company, I'd say

633
00:33:52.400 --> 00:33:55.039
<v Speaker 3>seventy percent of the time we get so or what

634
00:33:55.039 --> 00:33:57.680
<v Speaker 3>are you doing looking at this? Like that's yeah, yeah,

635
00:33:57.799 --> 00:33:59.240
<v Speaker 3>or what are you doing looking at this? Or or

636
00:33:59.519 --> 00:34:02.240
<v Speaker 3>you're kind of fat so it's not a feature you know,

637
00:34:02.559 --> 00:34:04.759
<v Speaker 3>that's not going to sell features sell, So have a

638
00:34:04.839 --> 00:34:08.199
<v Speaker 3>nice day. And then, as you know, not nightmare eclipse people.

639
00:34:08.199 --> 00:34:09.760
<v Speaker 3>What do we do about it? Right?

640
00:34:09.800 --> 00:34:12.119
<v Speaker 2>Well, I mean the only way, the way that works

641
00:34:12.119 --> 00:34:16.159
<v Speaker 2>for us is that we represent their customers. Yes, And

642
00:34:16.239 --> 00:34:19.199
<v Speaker 2>so the customer comes and says, hey, you got notified

643
00:34:19.599 --> 00:34:21.760
<v Speaker 2>that was a pen test for us. You need to

644
00:34:21.760 --> 00:34:23.280
<v Speaker 2>fix this or we're not going to renew.

645
00:34:23.039 --> 00:34:24.480
<v Speaker 3>Or we're not going to buy it anymore. And then

646
00:34:24.519 --> 00:34:28.119
<v Speaker 3>that catches their eye, you'd think. And there are some

647
00:34:28.159 --> 00:34:30.960
<v Speaker 3>companies we've caught numerous times on this and they still

648
00:34:31.039 --> 00:34:31.840
<v Speaker 3>won't talk.

649
00:34:31.679 --> 00:34:34.199
<v Speaker 1>To us directly changed their policies.

650
00:34:35.559 --> 00:34:39.280
<v Speaker 3>Yeah. So it's frustrating. And so I'm not saying I

651
00:34:39.480 --> 00:34:42.239
<v Speaker 3>condone just taking a you know, a zero day and

652
00:34:42.280 --> 00:34:45.519
<v Speaker 3>throwing it out on the internet and saying, good look everybody.

653
00:34:45.840 --> 00:34:48.880
<v Speaker 3>But you know, I understand the frustration. Let's put it

654
00:34:48.880 --> 00:34:49.119
<v Speaker 3>that way.

655
00:34:49.159 --> 00:34:50.320
<v Speaker 2>It has its effects, does well.

656
00:34:50.360 --> 00:34:53.039
<v Speaker 1>The whole goal is to get the company to fix it, right,

657
00:34:53.440 --> 00:34:54.039
<v Speaker 1>that's the goal.

658
00:34:54.360 --> 00:34:54.760
<v Speaker 3>Absolutely.

659
00:34:54.800 --> 00:34:57.320
<v Speaker 1>You don't want to harm anybody, Nope.

660
00:34:57.039 --> 00:34:58.639
<v Speaker 3>No, if you wanted to harm somebody, you would take

661
00:34:58.679 --> 00:35:00.000
<v Speaker 3>this and you would have released it on the dark

662
00:35:00.079 --> 00:35:02.760
<v Speaker 3>webs somewhere. Yeah, made some money on it, right, and

663
00:35:02.760 --> 00:35:05.440
<v Speaker 3>then they would do one mass damage. Yeah yeah, yeah,

664
00:35:05.480 --> 00:35:07.440
<v Speaker 3>exactly right, monetize it.

665
00:35:07.840 --> 00:35:12.960
<v Speaker 1>That's right. That's a that's a little grab bag of

666
00:35:13.000 --> 00:35:16.119
<v Speaker 1>stories that happened last week. You guys cut anything else.

667
00:35:16.360 --> 00:35:17.239
<v Speaker 2>That's a wrap.

668
00:35:17.559 --> 00:35:18.880
<v Speaker 3>That's it. Yeah all right.

669
00:35:19.119 --> 00:35:21.440
<v Speaker 1>I guess we'll see you next week on security this week,

670
00:35:21.480 --> 00:35:36.639
<v Speaker 1>bye bye, thanks bye,
