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Speaker 1: Peaking Yona's show. This is going to be part two
Speaker 1: of Thomas talking about Victor Suveroff and Huckin Hoffman's work.
Speaker 1: So Thomas, I hand it over to you.
Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for hosting me. I think I remember where
Speaker 2: we left off, but forgive me if this is redundant.
Speaker 2: Is something that's fundamentally important as of the date of
Speaker 2: Barbarosa's commencement June twenty second, nineteen forty one, it's important
Speaker 2: to understand the strategic situated and as of Stalin and
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union. Key was the waging of aggressive war
Speaker 2: against Poland and Finland. Obviously, Stalin's plan and this was
Speaker 2: confirmed by Khrushchev, was, you know, in the immediate aftermath
Speaker 2: of the assault and the Japanese at Chalkin Goal, which
Speaker 2: in the opinion of Hoffman and I agree with this,
Speaker 2: that's what started World War two and suvar ofw of
Speaker 2: without saying it abides that perspective. The Molotov Ribbentrop packed
Speaker 2: which Stalin confided to the Pullet Burrow as well as
Speaker 2: the Kruz chief, was that that would embolden the Hitler
Speaker 2: to sue for war with Poland, which he wouldn't have
Speaker 2: done had there been the risk of a two front war,
Speaker 2: yet Germany's position was precarious, overextended. Stalin didn't think that,
Speaker 2: you know, Germany could truly stand up to the UK
Speaker 2: and France. He grossly underestimated the Wehrmacht's offensive power. But
Speaker 2: even in the event of a German victory, his reasoning
Speaker 2: was that, you know, the French army would have its
Speaker 2: back broken, Germany would be on this footing a permanent
Speaker 2: hostility caught for the United Kingdom and Europe would be
Speaker 2: the Communists for the taking. You know that this was,
Speaker 2: in Stalin's words, to cruise chieft. Hitler was now wrapped
Speaker 2: around our little finger. And one of the reasons for
Speaker 2: this confidence or over confidence, you know, and I think
Speaker 2: I mentioned before as of Barbarossa, Stalin had increased expanded
Speaker 2: the territory of the Soviet Union by four hundred and
Speaker 2: twenty six thousand square kilometers. Does a quill went to
Speaker 2: the service area of the German right because it stood
Speaker 2: in nineteen nineteen and especially a petular significance the aggressive
Speaker 2: war of the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland and
Speaker 2: what amounted to the extortionate annexation of the Baltics, you know,
Speaker 2: with waiting Estonia pressuring Romania into further territorial concessions. You know,
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union really on September third, nineteen thirty nine,
Speaker 2: it was in the strongest position out of all major powers,
Speaker 2: and the Soviet Union became a combatant, you know, on
Speaker 2: September seventeenth, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland, and of
Speaker 2: course there was a deafening silence eminent from emanating from
Speaker 2: London in the way of that deployment, which is telling
Speaker 2: in and of itself. But you know, this myth that
Speaker 2: Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler's posterous for the reasons
Speaker 2: just enumerated, and it's essential to understand, I mean demonster
Speaker 2: of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically
Speaker 2: and militarily towards the German Reich. And secondly the pattern
Speaker 2: of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment,
Speaker 2: But in terms of the former November twelfth and thirteenth,
Speaker 2: nineteen forty, you know, the view from Moscow was that
Speaker 2: the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was
Speaker 2: not performing well in the relevant battle theaters, which was
Speaker 2: compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler had counted
Speaker 2: on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire.
Speaker 2: There was no indication of a resolution of the war
Speaker 2: with the United Kingdom. You know, Jeremy's fear of influence
Speaker 2: was totally static. You know, Operations Sea Lion was a
Speaker 2: strategic ruse and even were it not, it would have
Speaker 2: been a bloodbath. You know. So November twelfth and thirteenth,
Speaker 2: Stalin directed Molotov in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through
Speaker 2: ribentraup a demand for the expansion of the Soviets fear
Speaker 2: of influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom to
Speaker 2: deploy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, as well
Speaker 2: as Finland. And he also said that, you know, the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier.
Speaker 2: This is incredibly belligerent. Essentially all of southeastern Europe plus
Speaker 2: Finland and a piece of Scandinavia proper. Stalin just declared
Speaker 2: that this is now my sphere of influence. And if
Speaker 2: you meet this challenge with the hostile deployment, its war.
Speaker 2: I mean that sound like a man who's afraid of
Speaker 2: Eadolf Hitler and the German Reich. You know, in Stalin's mind,
Speaker 2: there was absolutely no possibility of the Wehrmacht assaulting the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union, even in terms of parody, let alone from
Speaker 2: a position of strategic superiority. Which is somewhat fascinating because
Speaker 2: this idea that oh, the Germans underestimated the Soviet Union,
Speaker 2: they didn't at all, and stowfully gets into that Holder's
Speaker 2: report on the eve of Barbarossa. And Holder had actually
Speaker 2: written he'd written an assessment in nineteen thirty seven of
Speaker 2: Soviet forces and being and capabilities. It was remarkably accurate,
Speaker 2: and von Mannstein and good Darien their assessments quite literally
Speaker 2: in the month before Barbarossa. The Soviet forces and being
Speaker 2: were exactly what they estimated them to be. In reality,
Speaker 2: it was Stalin who was looking west and saying that,
Speaker 2: you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability and the
Speaker 2: mighty Soviet Union has nothing to fear, and this is
Speaker 2: the key to why the Soviets took such horrific attrition
Speaker 2: during barbaross Further relevant to context here, I can't remember
Speaker 2: if I got into this or not. There was a
Speaker 2: discrete mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union between November nineteen forty,
Speaker 2: when this demand that I just enumerated was issued to
Speaker 2: Ribbon traup to deliver to Hitler by way of Molotov
Speaker 2: on order of Stalin. Between November ninety forty and the
Speaker 2: day of Barbarosa, a massive and unprecedented arms build up
Speaker 2: took place in the Soviet Union. This included, as of
Speaker 2: the onset of hostilities, the rhetoric of possess no less
Speaker 2: than twenty four thousand tanks, including close to two thousand
Speaker 2: T thirty fours, which were technically a medium tank, but
Speaker 2: they were the all around best tank of the Second
Speaker 2: World War. I don't think that's arguable. You know, the
Speaker 2: air forces of the Red Army had over twenty three
Speaker 2: thousand aircraft, or thirty seven hundred of which were considered
Speaker 2: to be cutting edge fighters. The Red Army had close
Speaker 2: to one hundred and fifty thousand artillery pieces. The Red Navy,
Speaker 2: including a substantial fleet of surface ships of varying types.
Speaker 2: They had close to three hundred submarines, and submarines are
Speaker 2: expressly offensive. There are no defensive submarines, and this man
Speaker 2: as Hoffman raises in his book, the Soviets not only
Speaker 2: a larger fleet of submarines than any other country in
Speaker 2: the world, but they outnumbered the Royal Navy more than
Speaker 2: fourfold in terms of their number of subs. I mean,
Speaker 2: this is the most powerful offensive military element the world
Speaker 2: has ever seen, you know. So Stalin was essentially fearless
Speaker 2: and viewed himself as the imminent master of this planet
Speaker 2: in geostrategic terms, as of barbaros as well as an
Speaker 2: ideological ones. And we're going to get into that too.
Speaker 2: Something essential to understand about the Soviet culture. Stalin was
Speaker 2: keenly aware of what had befallen the Jacobin Revolution. He
Speaker 2: was also keenly aware of the changing dynamics of of
Speaker 2: ideological cultures within great powers. You know. He realized that,
Speaker 2: for example, Japan was on the ascendency. He realized that
Speaker 2: the German Raich had intense energies that it was drawing from,
Speaker 2: even though he viewed them as geostrategically weak and compromised.
Speaker 2: He understood that the United Kingdom was undergoing a terrible
Speaker 2: existential crisis and that their empire is structured was essentially obsolescent.
Speaker 2: And this is one of the reasons why there's been
Speaker 2: a series of revolts you know, nascent as well as
Speaker 2: well developed and realized, you know, in the years before
Speaker 2: the Great War and then in the Inner War years
Speaker 2: up to the then president, you know, and socialism in
Speaker 2: one country that that was something of that was something
Speaker 2: of a propaganda cliche. Donan invoked the sort of give
Speaker 2: a branding to you know, the kind of punctuated disturbances
Speaker 2: of this mass and megacital restructuring of Russian society and
Speaker 2: the Soviet state which was becoming a superpower, as well
Speaker 2: as to you know, assuage the Western Powers which were
Speaker 2: very much doing his bidding at that moment. Stalin was
Speaker 2: very much engaged with the Common tern that had not
Speaker 2: changed and in the planning for what was to be
Speaker 2: the assault on Europe. In the aftermath of the Icebreaker conflict,
Speaker 2: Stalin he called back the Russian delegation to the Common
Speaker 2: Turn and he called the common Terns representatives to Moscow
Speaker 2: to advise them of what was imminently going to happen.
Speaker 2: You know, the Soviet Union needed to realize the World Revolution,
Speaker 2: to survive as well as to consolidate its superpower status,
Speaker 2: which was not just burgaining, but was being actively realized also,
Speaker 2: And I realized I've probably got a bias for testimonial evidence,
Speaker 2: especially they're not exclusively in discerning the motives of men
Speaker 2: in command roles. But there's not there's not. The direct
Speaker 2: testimony is more reliable than circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts
Speaker 2: the manifest weight of extrinsic material facts outside the parameters
Speaker 2: those declarations and what Stalin said his biographer, Colonel General Bokaganov,
Speaker 2: he word for word by Lakov reproduced the speech that
Speaker 2: Stalin issued fourth on May fifth, nineteen forty one, and
Speaker 2: according to Bolkoganov, the Leader made it quote. The Leader
Speaker 2: made it unmistakably clear. War is inevitable in the future.
Speaker 2: We must be ready for the unconditional destruction of German fascism.
Speaker 2: The world be fought on enemy terror ratory, and victory
Speaker 2: will be achieved with a few casualties. And as we
Speaker 2: got into last week, and as I think we've raised
Speaker 2: before in discussion of World War Two, it was a
Speaker 2: matter of formal doctrine that the Red Army was an
Speaker 2: offensive purposed element. Its primary mission orientation was as the
Speaker 2: standard bearer of the revolution. And it never struck a
Speaker 2: defensive posture as a matter of doctrine by choice, you know,
Speaker 2: And I've made the point before. I believe Stalin is
Speaker 2: probably the single most powerful man who ever lived. And
Speaker 2: the momentum that the Communist International had at this moment
Speaker 2: was ed Zenith. I'd argue Stalin had to abide that
Speaker 2: role or he would have been replaced by a man
Speaker 2: who would have you know. It was a convergence of
Speaker 2: ideological imperatives and geostrategic realities in a way that is
Speaker 2: very rare but was sort of inextricably and splendidly bound
Speaker 2: up at this juncture. And I think we talked before
Speaker 2: about the secret real I'm jumping around a bit, but
Speaker 2: I'm trying to corral the evidence in categorical capacities. The
Speaker 2: secret meeting with the polic Bureau, and this is when
Speaker 2: the Common Turn delegation was also present in August nineteenth,
Speaker 2: nineteen thirty nine, you know, in the concominant with the
Speaker 2: assault on the Japanese Imperial Army at calcm Goal. This
Speaker 2: meeting that Stalin called the polit Burow and the Russian
Speaker 2: section of the Common Tern. Stalin declared that the time
Speaker 2: had come to quote apply the torch of war to
Speaker 2: the European powder keg. This is when Stalin declared, if
Speaker 2: we accept the German proposal for the non aggression picked,
Speaker 2: you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland the intervention of
Speaker 2: France and England will be inevitable. The resulting, in Shalin's words,
Speaker 2: serious and arrest and disorder would lead to a punctuated
Speaker 2: destabilization of Western Europe, yet without the Soviet Union being
Speaker 2: drawn into the conflict until they permissively opted do and
Speaker 2: Stalin referred to what he declared in nineteen twenty five
Speaker 2: with respect to the international strategy. You know, the moment
Speaker 2: is nigh that we we can pursue the bultimization of
Speaker 2: Europe by way of an advantageous entry into the war
Speaker 2: through a broad spectrum field of activity which had now
Speaker 2: the potential of which had now opened up for their
Speaker 2: realization of the world Revolution. And of course, when minutes
Speaker 2: from this meeting and the speech were smuggled out and
Speaker 2: were obtained by the French news agency Havas by way
Speaker 2: of Geneva, you know, and it went, it was, it
Speaker 2: was published, and then the Moscow immediately when in damage
Speaker 2: control and stalin apologists and propagandas, particularly in London but
Speaker 2: also in the United States. You know, they they started
Speaker 2: immediately claiming that this is fascist propaganda and this, this
Speaker 2: isn't this isn't true, you know. So, I mean this
Speaker 2: is important also like when you read books by guys
Speaker 2: Chris Bellamy comes to mind. But they're legion these historians
Speaker 2: who claim, oh Stuvarov is a liar, there's no evidence
Speaker 2: for these things. They're redacting a huge amount of evidence,
Speaker 2: or they're just not including it and would question they say, oh,
Speaker 2: that that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And
Speaker 2: that's incredible, you know. I mean, it'd be like, like
Speaker 2: imagine somewhat more approximately, like let's say I was writing
Speaker 2: a history of of the American War in Iraq from
Speaker 2: two thousand and three eleven, and it'd be like if
Speaker 2: I was categorically redacting things that President Bush and Rumsfeld
Speaker 2: said in conversations they had and just declaring that, well,
Speaker 2: it's not important, or that that's just something liberals say
Speaker 2: or allege. I mean, people would laugh at me or
Speaker 2: they'd say that's ridiculous. But in the case of you know,
Speaker 2: Barbarossa and you know, the icebreaker hypothesis. That's exactly what
Speaker 2: they do, you know, and you're just supposed to accept it.
Speaker 2: This is this is very abnormal, even accounting for the
Speaker 2: fact that research standards and things are often compromised for
Speaker 2: ideological and political reasons. But this seems tangential, but it's
Speaker 2: essential to understanding Suvarov's and Hoffmann's points. We've got to
Speaker 2: ask why Barbara was soutanctically successful for the Rmont and
Speaker 2: what that means, because this is sort of the key
Speaker 2: in my opinion. The Soviets were planning an assault on
Speaker 2: Romania in the autumn of nineteen forty one, and if
Speaker 2: you know how to interpret military deployments, this should be clear.
Speaker 2: But also if you're going to assault Germany from then
Speaker 2: extant frontiers, you're gonna do so from the Baltic and
Speaker 2: you're gonna do so through Romania. And of course Germany
Speaker 2: was totally dependent on Romanian petroleum. That's one of the
Speaker 2: reasons Hitler cultivated the French shup events in so closely
Speaker 2: Antonescu held the Knight's Cross. There was very good offices
Speaker 2: between him and Germany. Anyway, for cultural reasons, for ideological
Speaker 2: reasons and other things. But he and Hitler, despite the
Speaker 2: linguistic barrier, they were very close friends too, and Antonescu
Speaker 2: was Hitler's strongest allah, I believe, you know, and a
Speaker 2: close to a quarter million Romanians fought, you know, for
Speaker 2: the Axis cause in the east, which for a country
Speaker 2: the size of Romania, that's remarkable. But army groups South
Speaker 2: deployed from Romania, and this, if this was a very
Speaker 2: delicate issue because Soviet intelligence, which was actually very good,
Speaker 2: this the deployment to Romania. The way Hitler, the ruse
Speaker 2: Hitler was able to pull off was that the unstable
Speaker 2: situation in yugoslav was what was drawing German forces at
Speaker 2: scale to be deployed there. But also obviously, through Ledgered
Speaker 2: Maine and other things, OKW was effectively able to hide
Speaker 2: the scale at which forces were being a mass there.
Speaker 2: But you know, not only was it a staging ground
Speaker 2: for Barbarosa, but Hitler was react with anxiety that the
Speaker 2: Soviets were in with salt Romania because they were so
Speaker 2: these forces down there at a dual role. They were
Speaker 2: purposed for an offensive mission, but they were also there
Speaker 2: to as a bulwark against a army assault, you know,
Speaker 2: at least so that they, you know, that there'd be
Speaker 2: enough time to reinforce and and not just you know,
Speaker 2: endure a collapse of a critical front, which on top
Speaker 2: of the geostrategic menace that also of deprived Germany really
Speaker 2: of it, it's only source of petroleum and represent quantities
Speaker 2: to feel the war machine. But what this led to
Speaker 2: was there was massive Soviet deployments in the Baltic and
Speaker 2: in Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Wehrmacht assaulted,
Speaker 2: the road to Moscow was basically undefended. Okay, that's one
Speaker 2: of the reasons why Holder and Manstein they were beside
Speaker 2: themselves because they were telling Hitler, we need to move
Speaker 2: on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we can't
Speaker 2: wait for the weather to turn, and we can't wait
Speaker 2: for the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment in
Speaker 2: depth on the path to Moscow, you know. And as
Speaker 2: the deployment schema in Ukraine, the Army Group South was
Speaker 2: exponentially outnumbered, but the Red Army elements there they were
Speaker 2: deployed in an offensive pattern. And if you know anything
Speaker 2: about the way the Soviet Union fought and the way
Speaker 2: the Armforce of the Russian Federation fights, and they very
Speaker 2: much scaled down way to they obviously and with very
Speaker 2: different localized combined arms platforms. Deep battle is it's it's
Speaker 2: it's dependent upon a fixed deployment schema for it to work, okay,
Speaker 2: And the way the Red Army deployed offensively, and this
Speaker 2: is what they did when the tide turned and after Kursk,
Speaker 2: this is how they assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema
Speaker 2: is by heavy use of shock armies, a Soviet shock army.
Speaker 2: They were larded with firepower and totally front loaded. Okay.
Speaker 2: So when Army Group South engaged the Red Army through
Speaker 2: the ky Of Corridor, they were engaging this forward element
Speaker 2: that was loaded down with firepower that was supposed to
Speaker 2: break through the mainline of resistance, but that had a
Speaker 2: limited operational capacity, often of only a few days. Then
Speaker 2: they were to be rapidly reinforced by fresh elements who
Speaker 2: would continually assault in waves, and then when that shock
Speaker 2: element was was re equipped and refitted, they would smash
Speaker 2: through again. But obviously, if the Wehrmacht assaults with mass
Speaker 2: armored columns, when you're deployed offensively, with your floaded shock
Speaker 2: army as the sharp punk They're gonna smash that shock army,
Speaker 2: and then they're gonna cut through your reinforcement elements like butter,
Speaker 2: you know. And as they break through wave after wave,
Speaker 2: that frontloaded element is gonna be fighting on reversed fronts
Speaker 2: and they're gonna get cut to pieces, which is exactly
Speaker 2: what happened. Okay, So the Soviet for taking catastrophic casualties
Speaker 2: in the North and in the South. Meanwhile, Army Group
Speaker 2: Center was racing to Moscow quite literally, and Hitler didn't
Speaker 2: know quite what to make of this because there were
Speaker 2: sort of two Hitlers, and slowly makes this point. When
Speaker 2: Hitler felt confident politically and when he had had a
Speaker 2: what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the
Speaker 2: battle space, Hitler was hyper aggressive. When fog of war
Speaker 2: questions or political uncertainty clouded that perspective, Hitler developed a
Speaker 2: siege mentality, and that's exactly what happened. And Hitler viewed
Speaker 2: Stalin as incredibly dangerous as he should have. So Hitler
Speaker 2: essentially halted Army Group Center well Army Group South surrounded
Speaker 2: this massive element plus the reserves that the Kremlin had
Speaker 2: ordered like rushed to the front immediately, and Hitler was
Speaker 2: afraid to push the attack for a decisive victory at
Speaker 2: Moscow until this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized.
Speaker 2: The ont of casualties the Soviets endured is utterly catastrophic
Speaker 2: and unprecedented. And the Germans took something like three three
Speaker 2: quarters of a million prisoners alone. Okay, but by the time,
Speaker 2: by the time the fear order the attack to be
Speaker 2: pushed on Moscow was too late. Okay, that's what happened.
Speaker 2: People misunderstand that. It says, you know, oh, the Germans
Speaker 2: were plotting to attack all along because the Soviets were
Speaker 2: weak in some ways. But then Stalin got it together,
Speaker 2: and you know, because the Germans underestimated Soviet capabilities. You know,
Speaker 2: Hitler lost the war. That's not true at all. That
Speaker 2: doesn't make any sense. And you know, if Stalin was like,
Speaker 2: look at it like this. Okay, the Germans were halted
Speaker 2: at Moscow, but they reached the Gate of Moscow, they
Speaker 2: reached Leningrad and laid it to siege. They reached Stalingrad.
Speaker 2: The German the very mug reached all of its objectives
Speaker 2: in months. How long did it take the Red Army
Speaker 2: to march on Berlin. It took them almost four years.
Speaker 2: So why was there this plotting, grinding blood bath if
Speaker 2: the Soviets were this grossly underestimated force, you know, and
Speaker 2: the Germans didn't know what they were doing like this,
Speaker 2: the Germans killed the Red Army, you know, Obviously the
Speaker 2: Russians still had enough to hold Moscow and they did
Speaker 2: and that was incredibly valiant. And Russians are incredibly tough,
Speaker 2: and there's a simplicity to the way the Ivans fight,
Speaker 2: but it's a simplicity that works, you know. I think
Speaker 2: it's as guided when people suggest otherwise, and especially today
Speaker 2: because people are you know, they've adopted prejudices and stuff
Speaker 2: in this regard. There's really really stupid things that come
Speaker 2: out of the Pentagon in terms of their assessment of
Speaker 2: Russian capabilities and things. And incidentally, Eric von Mannstein's the
Speaker 2: book it's called Lost Victories. It's for I think it's fascinating,
Speaker 2: but it's kind of for military hounds only. It's you know,
Speaker 2: not like late Sunday reading. But what that book was
Speaker 2: the US War Department, back when there was a war department.
Speaker 2: There's not anymore, no matter what like special needs, Higgs
Speaker 2: Seth says. But in the last months of the Department
Speaker 2: of War, they debriefed Manstein on basically on you know,
Speaker 2: his experience over four years of fighting the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: and a general officers role, and the War Department soon
Speaker 2: to be the Defense Department, they took this very seriously.
Speaker 2: An early NATO force structure wasn't a substantial on the
Speaker 2: infantry side, ground on the imagery and armor side. It
Speaker 2: was substantially based around what von Manstein had. It's said, Okay,
Speaker 2: so this book was sometime in the fifties, the first edition,
Speaker 2: it was edited to make them more readable, and it's
Speaker 2: it's literally Managelin is debriefing with some added stuff, you know.
Speaker 2: So and that that was one of his core premises
Speaker 2: is that fighting the Russians on Russian territory, they're they're
Speaker 2: they're they're unbelievably and savagely tough, you know, and that
Speaker 2: that's a force multiplier and also makes up for some
Speaker 2: of their shortcomings. And the Russians also they they know
Speaker 2: what they know the limits of their capabilities, you know.
Speaker 2: And on the one hand, and super ofw of his
Speaker 2: book inside the Red Army, which is very much worth
Speaker 2: reading too, especially if you got an interest in the
Speaker 2: late Cold War stuff, because it's very much a breakdown
Speaker 2: of you know, the the brisn of era the Soviet Army.
Speaker 2: You know. He makes the point and Harold Coyle made
Speaker 2: this point too, that doctrine in the Soviet Army was
Speaker 2: almost like regulation. There was there were no mission oriented
Speaker 2: tactics and the whole ethos of the Soviet Army's general
Speaker 2: staff was to eliminate uncertainty wherever and whatever however possible,
Speaker 2: so they didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as
Speaker 2: emerged from you know, superior orders. But nevertheless, the Russian,
Speaker 2: the Soviets and the Russians do very well with what
Speaker 2: they're good at, you know, and deep battle is what
Speaker 2: they were good at. Heavy reliance on combined arms and
Speaker 2: a shock element capacity went on the offensive that tended
Speaker 2: towards the kind of inflexibility which I think they later
Speaker 2: remedied somewhat during the Cold War. But the ability to
Speaker 2: rapidly shift from an offensive posture to defending the Hrmont
Speaker 2: was very very good at that, and the British are
Speaker 2: pretty good at that too. The Soviets were catastrophically bad
Speaker 2: at it and the French were bad at it. But
Speaker 2: part of it too, though, is that Stalin had every
Speaker 2: reason to believe that the Vermont wasn't capable of what
Speaker 2: it was capable of as of June nineteen four. Won
Speaker 2: I mean, that was a blind spot. But at the
Speaker 2: same time, you know, the Germans tend to surprise people
Speaker 2: on uh matters of military affairs. But that's key because
Speaker 2: it's not it's not as internet guys and an armchair
Speaker 2: goofballs who claimed, well, Subra was an idiot who's a
Speaker 2: liar like looking out bad the Soviets got mald That's
Speaker 2: the whole, the whole point, Like that makes his point
Speaker 2: not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, I
Speaker 2: I'm not I'm not just dwelling on Minutia to play
Speaker 2: cake the the you know, the the military hounds among
Speaker 2: us or something. But you know it's also you know,
Speaker 2: it was you know the point too that I think
Speaker 2: a lot of lay people don't understand these days. You know,
Speaker 2: modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't know, you
Speaker 2: don't plan for quagmires because then you're planning to lose
Speaker 2: a war, so you know, within ideally in about ten
Speaker 2: weeks in the outer temporal limits six months, you know,
Speaker 2: Moscow had to fall to the Hrmoncht and Stalin was
Speaker 2: over confident, absolutely, But it stands the reason his kind
Speaker 2: of poor view of the Wehrmacht, not in terms of
Speaker 2: its quality of men or firepower, but the geo strategic
Speaker 2: situation and what he viewed as it's over extended commitments
Speaker 2: and things. You know, he reasoned that, you know, even
Speaker 2: in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know,
Speaker 2: we can hold him at bay long enough to reinforce
Speaker 2: and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer
Speaker 2: be realizable. You know, this all kind of falls into
Speaker 2: place is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look
Speaker 2: at the sudeological culture. You gotta take Stalin's own statements,
Speaker 2: you gotta look at the statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev.
Speaker 2: You've got to look at the pattern of deployment. You've
Speaker 2: got to taken if you know what to look for.
Speaker 2: But even I mean it's even more persuasive, or are
Speaker 2: more obvious or other, But you know, taking in totality,
Speaker 2: i mean, it's clear that super off was telling the truth,
Speaker 2: you know, but all of a Suddan, Well, it's not
Speaker 2: it's not clear what what the alternative was. I mean
Speaker 2: it this unprecedented million he build up coupled with the transformative,
Speaker 2: globally transformative aspects of the Bolshek Revolution, the heart and
Speaker 2: lungs of which proverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean,
Speaker 2: what's the alternative Stalin was he ordered this build up
Speaker 2: for purely defensive purposes, to which would inevitably at some
Speaker 2: point provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, that
Speaker 2: doesn't that that doesn't make any sense. And generally, when
Speaker 2: you're talking about conditions of approximate parody with conventional combined
Speaker 2: arms at scale, or when you're talking about near peer
Speaker 2: strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked. You always
Speaker 2: push the assault, you know. Then that's I mean, this,
Speaker 2: this this is very basic stuff.
Speaker 1: Well it also also it doesn't make sense to say
Speaker 1: Stalin was this interested in this social national version of
Speaker 1: socialism that that would emerge out of the Bolsheviks When
Speaker 1: you send troops and you send advisors and you send
Speaker 1: tanks to Spain. Yeah, no, I mean you don't, you
Speaker 1: don't care about Spain. You don't care what's happening in Spain.
Speaker 1: If if this is supposed to be for Russia only.
Speaker 2: Well it's also the Soviet Union. Like, don't get me wrong.
Speaker 2: You know, one of the one of the one of
Speaker 2: the living few living people who I I really find
Speaker 2: common ground with and in terms of political theory, is
Speaker 2: an historical subject matter is a Kerrie Bolton. Like he's
Speaker 2: just great. I don't know the guy. Unfortunately, he doesn't
Speaker 2: leave New Zealand much of these days because he's elderly,
Speaker 2: you know, and I think most people know of him
Speaker 2: because he wrote this really great exhaustive biography of Francis Yacky.
Speaker 2: But he wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the
Speaker 2: Enduring Legacy, and people who haven't read the book, they
Speaker 2: they they panted at some sort of oh he's some Eurasianist.
Speaker 2: That's like, that's not what he's saying at all. He's
Speaker 2: saying Stalin's legacy was complicated. He basically abides the same
Speaker 2: viewpoint that Paul Godfrey does, although for some of different
Speaker 2: reasons about a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving
Speaker 2: from the Stalin versus Trotsky paradigm. You know, but that
Speaker 2: doesn't mean that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist. And
Speaker 2: even you know, the Soviet Union can name dozens of ethnicities.
Speaker 2: You know, a huge Moslim population, you know, a huge
Speaker 2: Asiatic population, you know, a huge number of Near Eastern people.
Speaker 2: You know, it spanned one fifth or one six of
Speaker 2: this planets, like the Soviet Union was the ultimate international superpower,
Speaker 2: you know, and the only way the Soviet Union survives.
Speaker 2: And one of the reasons why the later Cold War
Speaker 2: was so dangerous as human you know, for technological reasons
Speaker 2: in historical ones and the sidelining of human decision makers
Speaker 2: and misconditions of strategic nucleator parodying things. But the reason
Speaker 2: why I drop off who was a fascinating guy. And
Speaker 2: I mean, like I've said, I believe I'm not a
Speaker 2: sovietologist and I'm not a Russia expert at all, but
Speaker 2: I do know something and it's clear to me that
Speaker 2: post Khrush Jeff, there was a shadow trifecta of and
Speaker 2: drop of Ustanov and Gramigo with a real Soviet executive.
Speaker 2: Breshnev was a frontman, which made sense because before he
Speaker 2: became kind of elderly and compromised people liked Brezhnev, and
Speaker 2: he resonated with with the people even today, like he's
Speaker 2: fondly remembered, you know, like uh as as as you know, uh,
Speaker 2: it's like a man who was like a like a
Speaker 2: great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities. But
Speaker 2: you know, and drop of I mean Brensnev was very
Speaker 2: much a Stalinist, you know, and as was in drop
Speaker 2: of but a drop of seminal speech right in eighty two,
Speaker 2: right after he became a general secretary, you know, he
Speaker 2: this is when uh project Rion, which a lot of
Speaker 2: people attribute as contributing substantially to the war Scare of
Speaker 2: eighty three in the Able Archer era. I think people
Speaker 2: still misunderstand that aspect of it, but because it may
Speaker 2: the reason why the subject of the speech to the
Speaker 2: Presidium he said, we're going to lose the Cold War
Speaker 2: if we don't take drastic measures to countermeasures against Rima,
Speaker 2: you know, the revolution military affairs. I think it's being
Speaker 2: specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which
Speaker 2: was true. There's there's something, there's something insane. There's only
Speaker 2: like five thousand computers in the entire Soviet Union. In
Speaker 2: nine eighty two. It was something that it was some
Speaker 2: insanely primitive state of affairs or regards high tech, you know,
Speaker 2: And you know, it's whole point was basically the risk
Speaker 2: of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving,
Speaker 2: is well as these command and control aspects and the
Speaker 2: sideline of human decision makers, that the risk of war
Speaker 2: is probably greater than it's ever been since you know,
Speaker 2: the forties. But also we're going to lose that war
Speaker 2: if we don't find a way to develop meaningful countermeasures
Speaker 2: that you know, are our technologies of parody, or unless
Speaker 2: we find a way out of the Cold War, you know.
Speaker 2: And that was Gorbachev's whole notion, because Gorbachev wasn't a
Speaker 2: drop off protege. He wasn't some big liberal chevid Narsee
Speaker 2: I think was subverting things. But point being, you know,
Speaker 2: Gorbachev was very much the anti Yeltsin quite literally, and
Speaker 2: Yelson was the neocon's guy. You know. Gorbachev's notion was,
Speaker 2: you know, to reform the command economy with certain qualifications,
Speaker 2: you know, and and and basically do ay with God's
Speaker 2: plan in favor of something else that could abide innovation
Speaker 2: in the high tech sector and to bring about peace
Speaker 2: with the United States. But surrendering to the United States
Speaker 2: or dismantling the Soviet Union that was not at all
Speaker 2: within the cards. And one of the reasons why Gorbachev
Speaker 2: was had rapport with Bush and Baker. Bush and Baker
Speaker 2: assured him, we're not gonna try and dismantle the Soviet Union,
Speaker 2: and they weren't for a very specific reason. Bush said,
Speaker 2: where you know, until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not
Speaker 2: even gonna talk about, you know, a post Soviet future,
Speaker 2: you know. And obviously the Neo con perspective and their
Speaker 2: shoehorning of Yelsen was, you know, break the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: to pieces. Now. Their notion was, and one of the
Speaker 2: reasons for the why this crusading against Moscow is proceeding
Speaker 2: from Ukraine. Their notion was to break the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: into essentially three discrete like client regimes, you know, like
Speaker 2: the former Soviet Far East. And in those days especially too,
Speaker 2: because the Pentagon was still looking at China as essentially
Speaker 2: friendly and obviously like you know, seed some of that
Speaker 2: territory to the to pick king, but you know, base
Speaker 2: they'll be like a Ukraine like commissariat. They'll be like,
Speaker 2: you know, the Moscow kind of central Commissariat, and then
Speaker 2: they'll be this like former like Russian Far East that
Speaker 2: can you know, just that's just kind of like, uh,
Speaker 2: this sort of like hyper exploited, you know, hinterland for
Speaker 2: the United States and and adjacent finance capital and stuff.
Speaker 2: And you know, butch and Baker realize like, no, we're
Speaker 2: not We're not gonna grind these people's faces into the concrete,
Speaker 2: and we're not gonna destabilize the whole region. And you know,
Speaker 2: we're certainly not gonna do anything until there's full nuclear disarmament.
Speaker 2: You know that that was a tangential discussion. Should give
Speaker 2: me what. Baker was a great man, and I've got
Speaker 2: a lot of respect for him and push forty one.
Speaker 2: It was not a particularly likable guy, I leave it
Speaker 2: to Dad, but he had a very serious and sophisticated
Speaker 2: view of geopolitics and political affairs. So that administration looks
Speaker 2: better and better in my opinion, And I mean I
Speaker 2: felt that way at the time. As a teenager, I
Speaker 2: realized this country. I realized something really, really really bad
Speaker 2: was underway. When when when when Clinton was elected I mean,
Speaker 2: it would have been one thing if it was like
Speaker 2: a twenty twenty steel but the body political was excited
Speaker 2: about this pig and that was insane, you know. And
Speaker 2: it's not just because he was crushing our people. I mean,
Speaker 2: I knew guys who got indicted and with the prison
Speaker 2: under Clinton reno for when they hadn't done anything. You know,
Speaker 2: I'm not just speaking, I mean as a matter of
Speaker 2: law as well as a matter of fact or ethics
Speaker 2: or whatever. But as it may the to bring it
Speaker 2: back a bit, you know, there there's a brief moment
Speaker 2: really from about ninety two to ninety six, and that's
Speaker 2: when that's when these these historians first mother David Irving,
Speaker 2: you know, he got access to the as B archives
Speaker 2: and there was all this incredible stuff that came to
Speaker 2: like that, you know, the old Soviet system had suppressed
Speaker 2: and kept from probably eyes. But then, I mean very
Speaker 2: quickly things became even more opaque than in some ways
Speaker 2: than they had during the Soviet era because the regime
Speaker 2: will never tell the truth about what's going on with Russia,
Speaker 2: I mean, or with Europe. But this is an issue
Speaker 2: with peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I don't think need
Speaker 2: to be elaborately explicated. But I realized I talked more
Speaker 2: about Hoffmann as well as the nulange of barbaras that
Speaker 2: I did specifically suber of. If you want to a
Speaker 2: part three, I'll remedy that and i'll speak specifically to
Speaker 2: subro OFV and I'll include some aspects of inside the
Speaker 2: Red Army. I've got a paperback of that, and I
Speaker 2: take it on the road with me.
Speaker 1: Now that sounds good to me, getting into the Yeah,
Speaker 1: the thing about reading subar Off is it's just this
Speaker 1: fire hose of just this date, that what was dismantled
Speaker 1: on this date, what was put in this place on
Speaker 1: this date, And it's just like just running down this
Speaker 1: whole list of things, just chapter after chapter, where it's
Speaker 1: it's mind boggling. The the mountain of circumstantial evidence he
Speaker 1: is able to provide for his for his thesis, which
Speaker 1: he took.
Speaker 2: He took like a lot of Russians, the particularly guys
Speaker 2: who were in intelligence roles or military roles. He was
Speaker 2: a prolific documentary and he wrote down a huge amount
Speaker 2: of things. But also you know, obviously English wasn't his
Speaker 2: first language, and it's written kind of like a debriefing,
Speaker 2: but with like added extensic comedy, I mean, which makes sense.
Speaker 2: I mean, he was a defector and he he he
Speaker 2: spent literally years being debriefed by the American and NATO
Speaker 2: military people, you know, I mean, I get it. It's
Speaker 2: not that it's not a fun life, like the defector
Speaker 2: actually sucks.
Speaker 1: What's your take on defectors. I interviewed one once, and
Speaker 1: he was a defector from Soviet Union, like in early
Speaker 1: nineteen eighty nine, and I mean I just caught him
Speaker 1: not exactly lying, just I caught him in not being
Speaker 1: willing to have certain conversations that would just seem like,
Speaker 1: you know, it's like, oh, you know, well, tell me
Speaker 1: what Carl Marx got right. It's one of the things
Speaker 1: I asked him. I said, tell me what Carl Marks
Speaker 1: got right. He's like nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm like, yeah,
Speaker 1: I see these defectors come out of like North Korea,
Speaker 1: and like immediately they get debriefed by the State Department,
Speaker 1: and then they get boob job and they're driving brand
Speaker 1: new cars and they're in freaking condos, and I'm like, yeah,
Speaker 1: I think I think defectors were a lot different back
Speaker 1: then than they are.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I have to say, Okay, some guy, some some
Speaker 2: DDR guy or some Soviet Union like GRU officer who
Speaker 2: defected in like May nineteen eighty nine, totally different than
Speaker 2: a guy who defected in nineteen seventy nine or nineteen
Speaker 2: sixty nine, night and day, because the former is just
Speaker 2: like some dickhead like looking to get paid and like
Speaker 2: looking for a way out of his life in a
Speaker 2: failing system. Guys like super off first of all, they're
Speaker 2: taking a huge risk, you know. And secondly, for regular
Speaker 2: people man like it it pete Cold War, you know. Uh,
Speaker 2: life wasn't that different than the Soviet Union or America.
Speaker 2: It really wasn't.
Speaker 1: So.
Speaker 2: I mean it's not like you's some GRU big shot.
Speaker 2: It's not like you're gonna get great stuff in America.
Speaker 2: You can't back home. I mean, yeah you can. You
Speaker 2: might be able to get like blue jeans for your
Speaker 2: mistress and like good Scotch, But there's not some like,
Speaker 2: there wasn't some like huge difference in quality of life
Speaker 2: or something. Guys like stuber Of defected because they they
Speaker 2: had ethical reasons for it, and they developed a moral
Speaker 2: contempt for the system. I really liked the book The
Speaker 2: Hunt for at October. It's just like an awesome book,
Speaker 2: and I reread it lately because I I'd forgotten how
Speaker 2: good it was. But you know, the uh, the Captain
Speaker 2: of the Red October, the whole deal. I mean it's
Speaker 2: in parts of character. I mean it's not it's a
Speaker 2: brilliant meditation on on late Cold War strategic nucles your
Speaker 2: platforms and the deep parodies they're in, but it's under
Speaker 2: my character study. Like the Soviet naval officer, you know, he's, uh,
Speaker 2: he's this guy from the He's this Lithuanian guy. He
Speaker 2: doesn't really relate to the Russian culture. His wife, uh
Speaker 2: need an operation and uh the doctor who operated on
Speaker 2: or was drunk when he put in the surgery, so
Speaker 2: he boxed it and she died. But the doctor was
Speaker 2: the son of some polit baro big shots. They're like,
Speaker 2: you know, you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man.
Speaker 2: So the so the this naval officeries just like what
Speaker 2: the hell am I doing? You know, like I and
Speaker 2: also too in it. He's like deeply religious. He's like,
Speaker 2: so there's like this atheist, uh chauvinistic Russian government that
Speaker 2: killed my wife and I am I'm supposed to. I
Speaker 2: was supposed to kill fifty million people and event a
Speaker 2: wharl like on behalf of it. Like, no, I'm not
Speaker 2: doing that. I mean there there's a there's a deeper
Speaker 2: moral quag mari too, because the Red October it's a
Speaker 2: Typhoon class sub but it's got what's called a caterpillar drive,
Speaker 2: so it's invisible to SOSIS and passive sonar. So basically
Speaker 2: it's a splendid first strike weapon. So he realizes, like
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union can alter the strategic balance and basically, uh,
Speaker 2: bring America to terms through the thread of through the
Speaker 2: threat at nuclear assault, and like, I mean, he've used
Speaker 2: that as morally fucked. Also, you know, like if we're
Speaker 2: gonna win, like let's win the Cold War clean, you know,
Speaker 2: not not do it basically by like holding America hostage
Speaker 2: with the nuclear trigger. I mean that's kind of moralistic.
Speaker 2: But at the same time, I mean, I I don't know, man,
Speaker 2: like if it's no being uh being the captain of
Speaker 2: a of a Typhoon class sub that that there was
Speaker 2: a counter value like mega death machine, you know, it's
Speaker 2: it's its role is to assault counter value targets. And
Speaker 2: kill millions of people if you don't believe in the
Speaker 2: system you serve. That's a pretty horrible role to be in.
Speaker 2: You know, You've got to be a true believer to
Speaker 2: do that job. It's not like any other job in
Speaker 2: the military, and it's not like any other role in
Speaker 2: any other era. You know, I commanding a commanding a
Speaker 2: first strike platform that that can that can kill millions
Speaker 2: of people, you know. So I obviously that's like a
Speaker 2: fictional example, but what Clancy was drawing upon was the
Speaker 2: real ethos a defectors in the Cold War. And on
Speaker 2: the other side you had guys like the Cambridge five.
Speaker 2: But I think we're pretty disturbed guys, but they were
Speaker 2: true believers. That's totally different than these days. Like some
Speaker 2: I think snout In is a is a sincere guy.
Speaker 2: Whatever problems he might have, you know, he's basically yeah,
Speaker 2: I mean, he could never leave Russia now, Like it's
Speaker 2: not a happy life, you know. I I think, uh,
Speaker 2: you can argue, I mean snowed and I don't want
Speaker 2: to get into a deep meditation on the ethics of
Speaker 2: what snowed and did. But I my point is, like
Speaker 2: I whatever his motives, I don't think if we can
Speaker 2: say he did that for clout. But you know, these
Speaker 2: people who come the other way, like some of these
Speaker 2: Chinese or North Koreans, they're they're just not going to
Speaker 2: get paid, it's obvious, but they think they're not being
Speaker 2: respected like they should be in, you know, whatever role
Speaker 2: they're in. You know, but the Cold War was a
Speaker 2: Cold War is a different world, I mean literally, you know.
Speaker 1: Yeah, all right, Well we'll pick this up on episode
Speaker 1: three when you, uh, when you get back from the
Speaker 1: travels of Thomas on the Road and everything.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, everybody about thirty six hours ago.
Speaker 1: Yeah, remind everybody where they can find your work.
Speaker 2: Yeah, he said, check out my subst it's real Thomas
Speaker 2: seven seven seven dots substack dot com. Alternatively, go to
Speaker 2: the website. It's number seven h on mes seven seven
Speaker 2: seven dot com. But that stuff in the show notes
Speaker 2: so people can find it easy. But uh, my website
Speaker 2: is a good one stop, and uh my substick is
Speaker 2: where the podcast and other good stuff is at. And
Speaker 2: I've I just got off the road from DC. Then
Speaker 2: we had the Halloween all says say Cemetery Walk. I'm
Speaker 2: trying to make progress. I gotta make substantial progress on
Speaker 2: this manuscript. By December, things have been very hectic, so
Speaker 2: in good ways, and then I injured myself like a
Speaker 2: fucking idiot. But it's uh, the mind Phaser Pod. Uh,
Speaker 2: It's gonna be another couple of weeks before a fresh
Speaker 2: episode drops, so forgive me for this, but Jay Burden
Speaker 2: and I will continue to drop fresh stuff on his
Speaker 2: platforms and on radio for Chicago, So just bear with me.
Speaker 2: I promise we'll be back to regular uploads when I
Speaker 2: get back from the road.
Speaker 1: All right until episode three? Thank you Thomas, Yeah, thank
Speaker 1: you man.