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This is going to be part two 23 00:01:55,120 --> 00:01:59,959 of Thomas talking about Victor Suveroff and Huckin Hoffman's work. 24 00:02:00,159 --> 00:02:02,280 So Thomas, I hand it over to you. 25 00:02:03,799 --> 00:02:08,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for hosting me. I think I remember where 26 00:02:08,400 --> 00:02:11,319 we left off, but forgive me if this is redundant. 27 00:02:12,319 --> 00:02:17,240 Is something that's fundamentally important as of the date of 28 00:02:17,319 --> 00:02:23,000 Barbarosa's commencement June twenty second, nineteen forty one, it's important 29 00:02:23,039 --> 00:02:26,080 to understand the strategic situated and as of Stalin and 30 00:02:26,199 --> 00:02:33,199 the Soviet Union. Key was the waging of aggressive war 31 00:02:33,240 --> 00:02:38,360 against Poland and Finland. Obviously, Stalin's plan and this was 32 00:02:38,560 --> 00:02:43,840 confirmed by Khrushchev, was, you know, in the immediate aftermath 33 00:02:43,919 --> 00:02:47,520 of the assault and the Japanese at Chalkin Goal, which 34 00:02:48,000 --> 00:02:50,879 in the opinion of Hoffman and I agree with this, 35 00:02:51,120 --> 00:02:55,879 that's what started World War two and suvar ofw of 36 00:02:55,960 --> 00:03:02,840 without saying it abides that perspective. The Molotov Ribbentrop packed 37 00:03:03,319 --> 00:03:06,439 which Stalin confided to the Pullet Burrow as well as 38 00:03:06,479 --> 00:03:13,199 the Kruz chief, was that that would embolden the Hitler 39 00:03:16,319 --> 00:03:20,360 to sue for war with Poland, which he wouldn't have 40 00:03:20,439 --> 00:03:23,560 done had there been the risk of a two front war, 41 00:03:25,360 --> 00:03:35,039 yet Germany's position was precarious, overextended. Stalin didn't think that, 42 00:03:37,520 --> 00:03:44,280 you know, Germany could truly stand up to the UK 43 00:03:44,400 --> 00:03:50,159 and France. He grossly underestimated the Wehrmacht's offensive power. But 44 00:03:50,319 --> 00:03:54,719 even in the event of a German victory, his reasoning 45 00:03:54,800 --> 00:03:58,759 was that, you know, the French army would have its 46 00:03:58,759 --> 00:04:02,280 back broken, Germany would be on this footing a permanent 47 00:04:02,319 --> 00:04:07,159 hostility caught for the United Kingdom and Europe would be 48 00:04:07,439 --> 00:04:11,360 the Communists for the taking. You know that this was, 49 00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:15,599 in Stalin's words, to cruise chieft. Hitler was now wrapped 50 00:04:15,639 --> 00:04:19,360 around our little finger. And one of the reasons for 51 00:04:19,399 --> 00:04:27,759 this confidence or over confidence, you know, and I think 52 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:36,040 I mentioned before as of Barbarossa, Stalin had increased expanded 53 00:04:36,079 --> 00:04:39,480 the territory of the Soviet Union by four hundred and 54 00:04:39,480 --> 00:04:43,000 twenty six thousand square kilometers. Does a quill went to 55 00:04:43,079 --> 00:04:45,199 the service area of the German right because it stood 56 00:04:45,240 --> 00:04:52,079 in nineteen nineteen and especially a petular significance the aggressive 57 00:04:52,160 --> 00:04:56,040 war of the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland and 58 00:04:56,680 --> 00:05:02,519 what amounted to the extortionate annexation of the Baltics, you know, 59 00:05:02,560 --> 00:05:11,399 with waiting Estonia pressuring Romania into further territorial concessions. You know, 60 00:05:11,439 --> 00:05:20,160 the Soviet Union really on September third, nineteen thirty nine, 61 00:05:20,639 --> 00:05:25,199 it was in the strongest position out of all major powers, 62 00:05:26,079 --> 00:05:31,439 and the Soviet Union became a combatant, you know, on 63 00:05:31,560 --> 00:05:36,839 September seventeenth, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland, and of 64 00:05:36,839 --> 00:05:40,720 course there was a deafening silence eminent from emanating from 65 00:05:40,800 --> 00:05:48,040 London in the way of that deployment, which is telling 66 00:05:48,079 --> 00:05:57,079 in and of itself. But you know, this myth that 67 00:05:57,240 --> 00:06:02,519 Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler's posterous for the reasons 68 00:06:02,560 --> 00:06:11,279 just enumerated, and it's essential to understand, I mean demonster 69 00:06:11,439 --> 00:06:15,480 of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically 70 00:06:15,480 --> 00:06:22,160 and militarily towards the German Reich. And secondly the pattern 71 00:06:22,240 --> 00:06:26,560 of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment, 72 00:06:26,720 --> 00:06:32,560 But in terms of the former November twelfth and thirteenth, 73 00:06:32,639 --> 00:06:39,759 nineteen forty, you know, the view from Moscow was that 74 00:06:39,839 --> 00:06:45,560 the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was 75 00:06:46,600 --> 00:06:53,439 not performing well in the relevant battle theaters, which was 76 00:06:53,480 --> 00:06:57,680 compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler had counted 77 00:06:57,720 --> 00:07:00,480 on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire. 78 00:07:04,920 --> 00:07:07,920 There was no indication of a resolution of the war 79 00:07:07,959 --> 00:07:14,160 with the United Kingdom. You know, Jeremy's fear of influence 80 00:07:14,319 --> 00:07:20,600 was totally static. You know, Operations Sea Lion was a 81 00:07:20,639 --> 00:07:24,600 strategic ruse and even were it not, it would have 82 00:07:24,639 --> 00:07:31,480 been a bloodbath. You know. So November twelfth and thirteenth, 83 00:07:33,600 --> 00:07:40,160 Stalin directed Molotov in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through 84 00:07:40,240 --> 00:07:45,680 ribentraup a demand for the expansion of the Soviets fear 85 00:07:45,720 --> 00:07:52,639 of influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom to 86 00:07:52,720 --> 00:07:58,800 deploy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, as well 87 00:07:58,839 --> 00:08:04,959 as Finland. And he also said that, you know, the 88 00:08:05,000 --> 00:08:08,040 Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier. 89 00:08:12,199 --> 00:08:18,360 This is incredibly belligerent. Essentially all of southeastern Europe plus 90 00:08:18,480 --> 00:08:23,240 Finland and a piece of Scandinavia proper. Stalin just declared 91 00:08:23,279 --> 00:08:26,959 that this is now my sphere of influence. And if 92 00:08:27,000 --> 00:08:31,319 you meet this challenge with the hostile deployment, its war. 93 00:08:32,000 --> 00:08:33,679 I mean that sound like a man who's afraid of 94 00:08:33,679 --> 00:08:39,679 Eadolf Hitler and the German Reich. You know, in Stalin's mind, 95 00:08:39,679 --> 00:08:44,720 there was absolutely no possibility of the Wehrmacht assaulting the 96 00:08:44,720 --> 00:08:48,360 Soviet Union, even in terms of parody, let alone from 97 00:08:48,399 --> 00:08:54,559 a position of strategic superiority. Which is somewhat fascinating because 98 00:08:54,600 --> 00:08:58,559 this idea that oh, the Germans underestimated the Soviet Union, 99 00:08:58,639 --> 00:09:02,000 they didn't at all, and stowfully gets into that Holder's 100 00:09:02,919 --> 00:09:06,200 report on the eve of Barbarossa. And Holder had actually 101 00:09:06,200 --> 00:09:11,159 written he'd written an assessment in nineteen thirty seven of 102 00:09:11,279 --> 00:09:15,519 Soviet forces and being and capabilities. It was remarkably accurate, 103 00:09:16,559 --> 00:09:25,000 and von Mannstein and good Darien their assessments quite literally 104 00:09:25,039 --> 00:09:30,639 in the month before Barbarossa. The Soviet forces and being 105 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:34,720 were exactly what they estimated them to be. In reality, 106 00:09:35,159 --> 00:09:37,879 it was Stalin who was looking west and saying that, 107 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:42,240 you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability and the 108 00:09:42,320 --> 00:09:48,600 mighty Soviet Union has nothing to fear, and this is 109 00:09:48,639 --> 00:09:53,559 the key to why the Soviets took such horrific attrition 110 00:09:53,679 --> 00:10:03,639 during barbaross Further relevant to context here, I can't remember 111 00:10:03,639 --> 00:10:08,000 if I got into this or not. There was a 112 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:13,960 discrete mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union between November nineteen forty, 113 00:10:14,279 --> 00:10:19,000 when this demand that I just enumerated was issued to 114 00:10:21,639 --> 00:10:24,960 Ribbon traup to deliver to Hitler by way of Molotov 115 00:10:25,200 --> 00:10:29,360 on order of Stalin. Between November ninety forty and the 116 00:10:29,480 --> 00:10:33,759 day of Barbarosa, a massive and unprecedented arms build up 117 00:10:33,799 --> 00:10:42,039 took place in the Soviet Union. This included, as of 118 00:10:42,039 --> 00:10:45,480 the onset of hostilities, the rhetoric of possess no less 119 00:10:45,480 --> 00:10:50,200 than twenty four thousand tanks, including close to two thousand 120 00:10:50,279 --> 00:10:53,919 T thirty fours, which were technically a medium tank, but 121 00:10:54,399 --> 00:10:58,440 they were the all around best tank of the Second 122 00:10:58,480 --> 00:11:05,600 World War. I don't think that's arguable. You know, the 123 00:11:06,960 --> 00:11:11,440 air forces of the Red Army had over twenty three 124 00:11:11,600 --> 00:11:17,320 thousand aircraft, or thirty seven hundred of which were considered 125 00:11:17,320 --> 00:11:25,279 to be cutting edge fighters. The Red Army had close 126 00:11:25,360 --> 00:11:32,279 to one hundred and fifty thousand artillery pieces. The Red Navy, 127 00:11:32,679 --> 00:11:37,759 including a substantial fleet of surface ships of varying types. 128 00:11:40,399 --> 00:11:44,360 They had close to three hundred submarines, and submarines are 129 00:11:44,399 --> 00:11:49,759 expressly offensive. There are no defensive submarines, and this man 130 00:11:49,879 --> 00:11:57,360 as Hoffman raises in his book, the Soviets not only 131 00:11:57,480 --> 00:12:00,440 a larger fleet of submarines than any other country in 132 00:12:00,480 --> 00:12:05,799 the world, but they outnumbered the Royal Navy more than 133 00:12:05,919 --> 00:12:10,399 fourfold in terms of their number of subs. I mean, 134 00:12:10,480 --> 00:12:14,799 this is the most powerful offensive military element the world 135 00:12:14,840 --> 00:12:22,720 has ever seen, you know. So Stalin was essentially fearless 136 00:12:22,720 --> 00:12:25,399 and viewed himself as the imminent master of this planet 137 00:12:27,279 --> 00:12:30,240 in geostrategic terms, as of barbaros as well as an 138 00:12:30,240 --> 00:12:32,919 ideological ones. And we're going to get into that too. 139 00:12:34,600 --> 00:12:41,399 Something essential to understand about the Soviet culture. Stalin was 140 00:12:41,519 --> 00:12:47,000 keenly aware of what had befallen the Jacobin Revolution. He 141 00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:54,799 was also keenly aware of the changing dynamics of of 142 00:12:54,799 --> 00:12:59,919 ideological cultures within great powers. You know. He realized that, 143 00:13:00,120 --> 00:13:04,919 for example, Japan was on the ascendency. He realized that 144 00:13:04,960 --> 00:13:08,559 the German Raich had intense energies that it was drawing from, 145 00:13:08,559 --> 00:13:12,600 even though he viewed them as geostrategically weak and compromised. 146 00:13:14,200 --> 00:13:17,320 He understood that the United Kingdom was undergoing a terrible 147 00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:23,559 existential crisis and that their empire is structured was essentially obsolescent. 148 00:13:23,679 --> 00:13:27,480 And this is one of the reasons why there's been 149 00:13:27,519 --> 00:13:30,679 a series of revolts you know, nascent as well as 150 00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:39,759 well developed and realized, you know, in the years before 151 00:13:39,840 --> 00:13:41,840 the Great War and then in the Inner War years 152 00:13:41,919 --> 00:13:47,639 up to the then president, you know, and socialism in 153 00:13:47,720 --> 00:13:54,639 one country that that was something of that was something 154 00:13:54,639 --> 00:14:01,639 of a propaganda cliche. Donan invoked the sort of give 155 00:14:01,679 --> 00:14:07,720 a branding to you know, the kind of punctuated disturbances 156 00:14:07,840 --> 00:14:13,799 of this mass and megacital restructuring of Russian society and 157 00:14:13,840 --> 00:14:18,360 the Soviet state which was becoming a superpower, as well 158 00:14:18,399 --> 00:14:23,960 as to you know, assuage the Western Powers which were 159 00:14:24,039 --> 00:14:28,039 very much doing his bidding at that moment. Stalin was 160 00:14:28,200 --> 00:14:30,720 very much engaged with the Common tern that had not 161 00:14:30,879 --> 00:14:37,879 changed and in the planning for what was to be 162 00:14:38,519 --> 00:14:45,919 the assault on Europe. In the aftermath of the Icebreaker conflict, 163 00:14:47,000 --> 00:14:52,240 Stalin he called back the Russian delegation to the Common 164 00:14:52,279 --> 00:14:56,080 Turn and he called the common Terns representatives to Moscow 165 00:14:56,279 --> 00:14:58,720 to advise them of what was imminently going to happen. 166 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:05,159 You know, the Soviet Union needed to realize the World Revolution, 167 00:15:05,799 --> 00:15:12,120 to survive as well as to consolidate its superpower status, 168 00:15:12,159 --> 00:15:21,679 which was not just burgaining, but was being actively realized also, 169 00:15:24,559 --> 00:15:32,519 And I realized I've probably got a bias for testimonial evidence, 170 00:15:35,279 --> 00:15:41,240 especially they're not exclusively in discerning the motives of men 171 00:15:41,320 --> 00:15:51,759 in command roles. But there's not there's not. The direct 172 00:15:51,799 --> 00:15:58,440 testimony is more reliable than circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts 173 00:15:58,440 --> 00:16:07,759 the manifest weight of extrinsic material facts outside the parameters 174 00:16:07,799 --> 00:16:18,080 those declarations and what Stalin said his biographer, Colonel General Bokaganov, 175 00:16:21,960 --> 00:16:27,960 he word for word by Lakov reproduced the speech that 176 00:16:29,600 --> 00:16:42,159 Stalin issued fourth on May fifth, nineteen forty one, and 177 00:16:42,240 --> 00:16:48,159 according to Bolkoganov, the Leader made it quote. The Leader 178 00:16:48,200 --> 00:16:51,559 made it unmistakably clear. War is inevitable in the future. 179 00:16:51,960 --> 00:16:57,559 We must be ready for the unconditional destruction of German fascism. 180 00:16:57,759 --> 00:17:01,320 The world be fought on enemy terror ratory, and victory 181 00:17:01,320 --> 00:17:04,160 will be achieved with a few casualties. And as we 182 00:17:04,240 --> 00:17:07,160 got into last week, and as I think we've raised 183 00:17:07,160 --> 00:17:11,119 before in discussion of World War Two, it was a 184 00:17:11,119 --> 00:17:16,160 matter of formal doctrine that the Red Army was an 185 00:17:16,240 --> 00:17:25,559 offensive purposed element. Its primary mission orientation was as the 186 00:17:25,599 --> 00:17:32,839 standard bearer of the revolution. And it never struck a 187 00:17:32,920 --> 00:17:39,359 defensive posture as a matter of doctrine by choice, you know, 188 00:17:42,279 --> 00:17:45,119 And I've made the point before. I believe Stalin is 189 00:17:45,200 --> 00:17:49,319 probably the single most powerful man who ever lived. And 190 00:17:49,559 --> 00:17:58,240 the momentum that the Communist International had at this moment 191 00:17:59,640 --> 00:18:06,160 was ed Zenith. I'd argue Stalin had to abide that 192 00:18:06,359 --> 00:18:08,759 role or he would have been replaced by a man 193 00:18:08,839 --> 00:18:15,440 who would have you know. It was a convergence of 194 00:18:15,480 --> 00:18:24,400 ideological imperatives and geostrategic realities in a way that is 195 00:18:24,519 --> 00:18:33,720 very rare but was sort of inextricably and splendidly bound 196 00:18:33,799 --> 00:18:45,720 up at this juncture. And I think we talked before 197 00:18:46,160 --> 00:18:48,480 about the secret real I'm jumping around a bit, but 198 00:18:48,839 --> 00:18:56,079 I'm trying to corral the evidence in categorical capacities. The 199 00:18:56,160 --> 00:18:58,480 secret meeting with the polic Bureau, and this is when 200 00:18:58,519 --> 00:19:02,200 the Common Turn delegation was also present in August nineteenth, 201 00:19:02,240 --> 00:19:10,599 nineteen thirty nine, you know, in the concominant with the 202 00:19:10,640 --> 00:19:15,960 assault on the Japanese Imperial Army at calcm Goal. This 203 00:19:16,160 --> 00:19:21,559 meeting that Stalin called the polit Burow and the Russian 204 00:19:21,599 --> 00:19:27,839 section of the Common Tern. Stalin declared that the time 205 00:19:27,920 --> 00:19:30,759 had come to quote apply the torch of war to 206 00:19:30,799 --> 00:19:35,839 the European powder keg. This is when Stalin declared, if 207 00:19:35,839 --> 00:19:38,680 we accept the German proposal for the non aggression picked, 208 00:19:39,680 --> 00:19:43,039 you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland the intervention of 209 00:19:43,039 --> 00:19:47,440 France and England will be inevitable. The resulting, in Shalin's words, 210 00:19:47,440 --> 00:19:52,880 serious and arrest and disorder would lead to a punctuated 211 00:19:52,920 --> 00:19:58,000 destabilization of Western Europe, yet without the Soviet Union being 212 00:19:58,119 --> 00:20:05,920 drawn into the conflict until they permissively opted do and 213 00:20:07,039 --> 00:20:10,000 Stalin referred to what he declared in nineteen twenty five 214 00:20:10,480 --> 00:20:15,440 with respect to the international strategy. You know, the moment 215 00:20:15,599 --> 00:20:23,440 is nigh that we we can pursue the bultimization of 216 00:20:23,519 --> 00:20:26,400 Europe by way of an advantageous entry into the war 217 00:20:27,119 --> 00:20:33,279 through a broad spectrum field of activity which had now 218 00:20:34,920 --> 00:20:37,200 the potential of which had now opened up for their 219 00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:42,799 realization of the world Revolution. And of course, when minutes 220 00:20:42,839 --> 00:20:46,640 from this meeting and the speech were smuggled out and 221 00:20:46,720 --> 00:20:52,279 were obtained by the French news agency Havas by way 222 00:20:52,279 --> 00:20:57,119 of Geneva, you know, and it went, it was, it 223 00:20:57,160 --> 00:21:00,559 was published, and then the Moscow immediately when in damage 224 00:21:00,599 --> 00:21:06,400 control and stalin apologists and propagandas, particularly in London but 225 00:21:06,400 --> 00:21:10,599 also in the United States. You know, they they started 226 00:21:10,640 --> 00:21:13,720 immediately claiming that this is fascist propaganda and this, this 227 00:21:13,799 --> 00:21:19,480 isn't this isn't true, you know. So, I mean this 228 00:21:19,519 --> 00:21:22,799 is important also like when you read books by guys 229 00:21:23,519 --> 00:21:28,039 Chris Bellamy comes to mind. But they're legion these historians 230 00:21:28,039 --> 00:21:31,640 who claim, oh Stuvarov is a liar, there's no evidence 231 00:21:31,640 --> 00:21:36,559 for these things. They're redacting a huge amount of evidence, 232 00:21:37,519 --> 00:21:40,480 or they're just not including it and would question they say, oh, 233 00:21:40,559 --> 00:21:44,599 that that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And 234 00:21:46,720 --> 00:21:53,279 that's incredible, you know. I mean, it'd be like, like 235 00:21:53,400 --> 00:21:57,799 imagine somewhat more approximately, like let's say I was writing 236 00:21:57,839 --> 00:22:01,880 a history of of the American War in Iraq from 237 00:22:01,880 --> 00:22:04,279 two thousand and three eleven, and it'd be like if 238 00:22:04,319 --> 00:22:08,279 I was categorically redacting things that President Bush and Rumsfeld 239 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:11,920 said in conversations they had and just declaring that, well, 240 00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:14,759 it's not important, or that that's just something liberals say 241 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:17,920 or allege. I mean, people would laugh at me or 242 00:22:17,960 --> 00:22:21,839 they'd say that's ridiculous. But in the case of you know, 243 00:22:22,839 --> 00:22:27,400 Barbarossa and you know, the icebreaker hypothesis. That's exactly what 244 00:22:27,440 --> 00:22:30,319 they do, you know, and you're just supposed to accept it. 245 00:22:33,200 --> 00:22:38,119 This is this is very abnormal, even accounting for the 246 00:22:38,119 --> 00:22:42,039 fact that research standards and things are often compromised for 247 00:22:42,160 --> 00:22:48,920 ideological and political reasons. But this seems tangential, but it's 248 00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:58,960 essential to understanding Suvarov's and Hoffmann's points. We've got to 249 00:22:59,000 --> 00:23:05,039 ask why Barbara was soutanctically successful for the Rmont and 250 00:23:05,119 --> 00:23:09,400 what that means, because this is sort of the key 251 00:23:10,480 --> 00:23:21,920 in my opinion. The Soviets were planning an assault on 252 00:23:22,119 --> 00:23:28,640 Romania in the autumn of nineteen forty one, and if 253 00:23:28,640 --> 00:23:31,680 you know how to interpret military deployments, this should be clear. 254 00:23:33,160 --> 00:23:39,839 But also if you're going to assault Germany from then 255 00:23:39,920 --> 00:23:44,799 extant frontiers, you're gonna do so from the Baltic and 256 00:23:44,799 --> 00:23:50,680 you're gonna do so through Romania. And of course Germany 257 00:23:50,799 --> 00:23:57,119 was totally dependent on Romanian petroleum. That's one of the 258 00:23:57,119 --> 00:24:02,480 reasons Hitler cultivated the French shup events in so closely 259 00:24:02,519 --> 00:24:05,759 Antonescu held the Knight's Cross. There was very good offices 260 00:24:05,799 --> 00:24:09,039 between him and Germany. Anyway, for cultural reasons, for ideological 261 00:24:09,079 --> 00:24:13,160 reasons and other things. But he and Hitler, despite the 262 00:24:13,240 --> 00:24:17,720 linguistic barrier, they were very close friends too, and Antonescu 263 00:24:17,839 --> 00:24:22,759 was Hitler's strongest allah, I believe, you know, and a 264 00:24:22,799 --> 00:24:30,039 close to a quarter million Romanians fought, you know, for 265 00:24:30,079 --> 00:24:32,519 the Axis cause in the east, which for a country 266 00:24:32,559 --> 00:24:37,880 the size of Romania, that's remarkable. But army groups South 267 00:24:38,319 --> 00:24:44,400 deployed from Romania, and this, if this was a very 268 00:24:44,440 --> 00:24:50,079 delicate issue because Soviet intelligence, which was actually very good, 269 00:24:50,640 --> 00:24:55,359 this the deployment to Romania. The way Hitler, the ruse 270 00:24:55,440 --> 00:24:58,400 Hitler was able to pull off was that the unstable 271 00:24:58,480 --> 00:25:03,880 situation in yugoslav was what was drawing German forces at 272 00:25:03,920 --> 00:25:08,359 scale to be deployed there. But also obviously, through Ledgered 273 00:25:08,359 --> 00:25:13,680 Maine and other things, OKW was effectively able to hide 274 00:25:13,799 --> 00:25:17,119 the scale at which forces were being a mass there. 275 00:25:17,160 --> 00:25:19,759 But you know, not only was it a staging ground 276 00:25:19,759 --> 00:25:23,880 for Barbarosa, but Hitler was react with anxiety that the 277 00:25:23,920 --> 00:25:27,440 Soviets were in with salt Romania because they were so 278 00:25:28,319 --> 00:25:31,319 these forces down there at a dual role. They were 279 00:25:31,359 --> 00:25:35,359 purposed for an offensive mission, but they were also there 280 00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:39,880 to as a bulwark against a army assault, you know, 281 00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:43,640 at least so that they, you know, that there'd be 282 00:25:43,759 --> 00:25:47,720 enough time to reinforce and and not just you know, 283 00:25:47,880 --> 00:25:51,559 endure a collapse of a critical front, which on top 284 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:58,079 of the geostrategic menace that also of deprived Germany really 285 00:25:58,119 --> 00:26:04,200 of it, it's only source of petroleum and represent quantities 286 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:08,359 to feel the war machine. But what this led to 287 00:26:08,720 --> 00:26:15,319 was there was massive Soviet deployments in the Baltic and 288 00:26:16,640 --> 00:26:24,279 in Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Wehrmacht assaulted, 289 00:26:24,559 --> 00:26:30,160 the road to Moscow was basically undefended. Okay, that's one 290 00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:38,000 of the reasons why Holder and Manstein they were beside 291 00:26:38,039 --> 00:26:40,519 themselves because they were telling Hitler, we need to move 292 00:26:40,559 --> 00:26:45,960 on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we can't 293 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:49,319 wait for the weather to turn, and we can't wait 294 00:26:49,359 --> 00:26:56,240 for the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment in 295 00:26:56,359 --> 00:27:04,000 depth on the path to Moscow, you know. And as 296 00:27:04,039 --> 00:27:10,799 the deployment schema in Ukraine, the Army Group South was 297 00:27:11,400 --> 00:27:18,319 exponentially outnumbered, but the Red Army elements there they were 298 00:27:18,359 --> 00:27:21,519 deployed in an offensive pattern. And if you know anything 299 00:27:21,519 --> 00:27:24,359 about the way the Soviet Union fought and the way 300 00:27:24,400 --> 00:27:27,559 the Armforce of the Russian Federation fights, and they very 301 00:27:27,599 --> 00:27:30,079 much scaled down way to they obviously and with very 302 00:27:30,119 --> 00:27:41,880 different localized combined arms platforms. Deep battle is it's it's 303 00:27:41,920 --> 00:27:46,440 it's dependent upon a fixed deployment schema for it to work, okay, 304 00:27:47,079 --> 00:27:49,599 And the way the Red Army deployed offensively, and this 305 00:27:49,720 --> 00:27:53,200 is what they did when the tide turned and after Kursk, 306 00:27:53,799 --> 00:27:59,039 this is how they assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema 307 00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:04,359 is by heavy use of shock armies, a Soviet shock army. 308 00:28:04,640 --> 00:28:09,200 They were larded with firepower and totally front loaded. Okay. 309 00:28:09,599 --> 00:28:15,240 So when Army Group South engaged the Red Army through 310 00:28:15,279 --> 00:28:20,599 the ky Of Corridor, they were engaging this forward element 311 00:28:21,400 --> 00:28:24,319 that was loaded down with firepower that was supposed to 312 00:28:24,440 --> 00:28:27,960 break through the mainline of resistance, but that had a 313 00:28:27,960 --> 00:28:32,279 limited operational capacity, often of only a few days. Then 314 00:28:33,039 --> 00:28:36,400 they were to be rapidly reinforced by fresh elements who 315 00:28:36,440 --> 00:28:39,759 would continually assault in waves, and then when that shock 316 00:28:39,799 --> 00:28:45,000 element was was re equipped and refitted, they would smash 317 00:28:45,079 --> 00:28:55,319 through again. But obviously, if the Wehrmacht assaults with mass 318 00:28:55,440 --> 00:29:00,799 armored columns, when you're deployed offensively, with your floaded shock 319 00:29:00,960 --> 00:29:06,279 army as the sharp punk They're gonna smash that shock army, 320 00:29:06,400 --> 00:29:09,480 and then they're gonna cut through your reinforcement elements like butter, 321 00:29:10,720 --> 00:29:14,160 you know. And as they break through wave after wave, 322 00:29:17,720 --> 00:29:20,680 that frontloaded element is gonna be fighting on reversed fronts 323 00:29:21,799 --> 00:29:26,000 and they're gonna get cut to pieces, which is exactly 324 00:29:26,039 --> 00:29:33,400 what happened. Okay, So the Soviet for taking catastrophic casualties 325 00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:38,279 in the North and in the South. Meanwhile, Army Group 326 00:29:38,400 --> 00:29:44,480 Center was racing to Moscow quite literally, and Hitler didn't 327 00:29:44,519 --> 00:29:51,240 know quite what to make of this because there were 328 00:29:51,279 --> 00:29:55,440 sort of two Hitlers, and slowly makes this point. When 329 00:29:55,480 --> 00:30:00,440 Hitler felt confident politically and when he had had a 330 00:30:00,799 --> 00:30:04,359 what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the 331 00:30:04,400 --> 00:30:09,839 battle space, Hitler was hyper aggressive. When fog of war 332 00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:17,480 questions or political uncertainty clouded that perspective, Hitler developed a 333 00:30:17,559 --> 00:30:26,400 siege mentality, and that's exactly what happened. And Hitler viewed 334 00:30:26,400 --> 00:30:33,799 Stalin as incredibly dangerous as he should have. So Hitler 335 00:30:33,920 --> 00:30:41,359 essentially halted Army Group Center well Army Group South surrounded 336 00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:48,119 this massive element plus the reserves that the Kremlin had 337 00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:54,400 ordered like rushed to the front immediately, and Hitler was 338 00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:58,519 afraid to push the attack for a decisive victory at 339 00:30:58,559 --> 00:31:02,519 Moscow until this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized. 340 00:31:03,640 --> 00:31:07,440 The ont of casualties the Soviets endured is utterly catastrophic 341 00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:12,920 and unprecedented. And the Germans took something like three three 342 00:31:13,000 --> 00:31:18,400 quarters of a million prisoners alone. Okay, but by the time, 343 00:31:20,400 --> 00:31:22,279 by the time the fear order the attack to be 344 00:31:22,359 --> 00:31:26,119 pushed on Moscow was too late. Okay, that's what happened. 345 00:31:27,039 --> 00:31:33,039 People misunderstand that. It says, you know, oh, the Germans 346 00:31:33,039 --> 00:31:36,119 were plotting to attack all along because the Soviets were 347 00:31:36,160 --> 00:31:40,079 weak in some ways. But then Stalin got it together, 348 00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:45,680 and you know, because the Germans underestimated Soviet capabilities. You know, 349 00:31:45,759 --> 00:31:48,480 Hitler lost the war. That's not true at all. That 350 00:31:48,519 --> 00:31:53,279 doesn't make any sense. And you know, if Stalin was like, 351 00:31:53,279 --> 00:31:58,000 look at it like this. Okay, the Germans were halted 352 00:31:58,039 --> 00:32:01,839 at Moscow, but they reached the Gate of Moscow, they 353 00:32:01,960 --> 00:32:05,680 reached Leningrad and laid it to siege. They reached Stalingrad. 354 00:32:06,359 --> 00:32:08,920 The German the very mug reached all of its objectives 355 00:32:08,920 --> 00:32:13,440 in months. How long did it take the Red Army 356 00:32:15,240 --> 00:32:18,079 to march on Berlin. It took them almost four years. 357 00:32:19,240 --> 00:32:22,240 So why was there this plotting, grinding blood bath if 358 00:32:22,240 --> 00:32:26,319 the Soviets were this grossly underestimated force, you know, and 359 00:32:26,359 --> 00:32:29,400 the Germans didn't know what they were doing like this, 360 00:32:29,559 --> 00:32:36,960 the Germans killed the Red Army, you know, Obviously the 361 00:32:37,039 --> 00:32:41,079 Russians still had enough to hold Moscow and they did 362 00:32:41,119 --> 00:32:44,440 and that was incredibly valiant. And Russians are incredibly tough, 363 00:32:45,440 --> 00:32:49,319 and there's a simplicity to the way the Ivans fight, 364 00:32:49,480 --> 00:32:52,839 but it's a simplicity that works, you know. I think 365 00:32:52,839 --> 00:33:00,079 it's as guided when people suggest otherwise, and especially today 366 00:33:00,759 --> 00:33:05,359 because people are you know, they've adopted prejudices and stuff 367 00:33:05,359 --> 00:33:08,559 in this regard. There's really really stupid things that come 368 00:33:08,559 --> 00:33:10,559 out of the Pentagon in terms of their assessment of 369 00:33:12,200 --> 00:33:21,440 Russian capabilities and things. And incidentally, Eric von Mannstein's the 370 00:33:21,519 --> 00:33:25,279 book it's called Lost Victories. It's for I think it's fascinating, 371 00:33:25,279 --> 00:33:27,839 but it's kind of for military hounds only. It's you know, 372 00:33:27,920 --> 00:33:33,400 not like late Sunday reading. But what that book was 373 00:33:34,720 --> 00:33:37,680 the US War Department, back when there was a war department. 374 00:33:37,720 --> 00:33:42,119 There's not anymore, no matter what like special needs, Higgs 375 00:33:42,119 --> 00:33:47,640 Seth says. But in the last months of the Department 376 00:33:47,680 --> 00:33:53,640 of War, they debriefed Manstein on basically on you know, 377 00:33:53,839 --> 00:33:56,880 his experience over four years of fighting the Soviet Union 378 00:33:56,880 --> 00:34:05,799 and a general officers role, and the War Department soon 379 00:34:05,880 --> 00:34:08,920 to be the Defense Department, they took this very seriously. 380 00:34:09,360 --> 00:34:15,159 An early NATO force structure wasn't a substantial on the 381 00:34:15,199 --> 00:34:19,079 infantry side, ground on the imagery and armor side. It 382 00:34:19,119 --> 00:34:27,400 was substantially based around what von Manstein had. It's said, Okay, 383 00:34:27,440 --> 00:34:30,760 so this book was sometime in the fifties, the first edition, 384 00:34:31,920 --> 00:34:34,559 it was edited to make them more readable, and it's 385 00:34:34,840 --> 00:34:39,280 it's literally Managelin is debriefing with some added stuff, you know. 386 00:34:39,519 --> 00:34:44,320 So and that that was one of his core premises 387 00:34:44,480 --> 00:34:48,440 is that fighting the Russians on Russian territory, they're they're 388 00:34:48,480 --> 00:34:53,280 they're they're unbelievably and savagely tough, you know, and that 389 00:34:53,280 --> 00:34:55,880 that's a force multiplier and also makes up for some 390 00:34:55,920 --> 00:35:02,239 of their shortcomings. And the Russians also they they know 391 00:35:02,519 --> 00:35:07,239 what they know the limits of their capabilities, you know. 392 00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:10,199 And on the one hand, and super ofw of his 393 00:35:10,280 --> 00:35:13,679 book inside the Red Army, which is very much worth 394 00:35:13,719 --> 00:35:15,440 reading too, especially if you got an interest in the 395 00:35:15,480 --> 00:35:18,960 late Cold War stuff, because it's very much a breakdown 396 00:35:19,000 --> 00:35:24,360 of you know, the the brisn of era the Soviet Army. 397 00:35:24,840 --> 00:35:27,519 You know. He makes the point and Harold Coyle made 398 00:35:27,519 --> 00:35:32,440 this point too, that doctrine in the Soviet Army was 399 00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:36,360 almost like regulation. There was there were no mission oriented 400 00:35:36,440 --> 00:35:44,679 tactics and the whole ethos of the Soviet Army's general 401 00:35:44,760 --> 00:35:49,679 staff was to eliminate uncertainty wherever and whatever however possible, 402 00:35:50,360 --> 00:35:55,880 so they didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as 403 00:35:55,920 --> 00:36:04,599 emerged from you know, superior orders. But nevertheless, the Russian, 404 00:36:04,719 --> 00:36:07,400 the Soviets and the Russians do very well with what 405 00:36:07,480 --> 00:36:10,920 they're good at, you know, and deep battle is what 406 00:36:10,960 --> 00:36:18,559 they were good at. Heavy reliance on combined arms and 407 00:36:18,599 --> 00:36:26,000 a shock element capacity went on the offensive that tended 408 00:36:26,039 --> 00:36:28,880 towards the kind of inflexibility which I think they later 409 00:36:28,960 --> 00:36:33,159 remedied somewhat during the Cold War. But the ability to 410 00:36:33,320 --> 00:36:37,880 rapidly shift from an offensive posture to defending the Hrmont 411 00:36:38,039 --> 00:36:40,599 was very very good at that, and the British are 412 00:36:40,599 --> 00:36:45,840 pretty good at that too. The Soviets were catastrophically bad 413 00:36:45,880 --> 00:36:50,079 at it and the French were bad at it. But 414 00:36:50,360 --> 00:36:54,440 part of it too, though, is that Stalin had every 415 00:36:54,480 --> 00:36:57,519 reason to believe that the Vermont wasn't capable of what 416 00:36:57,559 --> 00:37:00,320 it was capable of as of June nineteen four. Won 417 00:37:01,239 --> 00:37:02,800 I mean, that was a blind spot. But at the 418 00:37:02,800 --> 00:37:08,400 same time, you know, the Germans tend to surprise people 419 00:37:08,480 --> 00:37:14,960 on uh matters of military affairs. But that's key because 420 00:37:15,880 --> 00:37:18,599 it's not it's not as internet guys and an armchair 421 00:37:20,000 --> 00:37:23,679 goofballs who claimed, well, Subra was an idiot who's a 422 00:37:23,679 --> 00:37:26,079 liar like looking out bad the Soviets got mald That's 423 00:37:26,079 --> 00:37:28,320 the whole, the whole point, Like that makes his point 424 00:37:28,960 --> 00:37:32,480 not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, I 425 00:37:32,480 --> 00:37:37,519 I'm not I'm not just dwelling on Minutia to play 426 00:37:37,559 --> 00:37:43,559 cake the the you know, the the military hounds among 427 00:37:43,639 --> 00:37:55,280 us or something. But you know it's also you know, 428 00:37:55,320 --> 00:38:00,599 it was you know the point too that I think 429 00:38:00,639 --> 00:38:04,119 a lot of lay people don't understand these days. You know, 430 00:38:04,199 --> 00:38:10,039 modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't know, you 431 00:38:10,039 --> 00:38:13,280 don't plan for quagmires because then you're planning to lose 432 00:38:13,280 --> 00:38:20,199 a war, so you know, within ideally in about ten 433 00:38:20,280 --> 00:38:28,039 weeks in the outer temporal limits six months, you know, 434 00:38:28,159 --> 00:38:35,639 Moscow had to fall to the Hrmoncht and Stalin was 435 00:38:35,679 --> 00:38:43,079 over confident, absolutely, But it stands the reason his kind 436 00:38:43,079 --> 00:38:45,360 of poor view of the Wehrmacht, not in terms of 437 00:38:45,400 --> 00:38:49,920 its quality of men or firepower, but the geo strategic 438 00:38:49,960 --> 00:38:52,760 situation and what he viewed as it's over extended commitments 439 00:38:52,760 --> 00:38:57,840 and things. You know, he reasoned that, you know, even 440 00:38:57,840 --> 00:39:01,119 in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know, 441 00:39:03,079 --> 00:39:06,719 we can hold him at bay long enough to reinforce 442 00:39:06,800 --> 00:39:11,519 and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer 443 00:39:11,559 --> 00:39:15,000 be realizable. You know, this all kind of falls into 444 00:39:15,039 --> 00:39:20,199 place is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look 445 00:39:20,239 --> 00:39:23,840 at the sudeological culture. You gotta take Stalin's own statements, 446 00:39:23,880 --> 00:39:28,920 you gotta look at the statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev. 447 00:39:29,519 --> 00:39:32,559 You've got to look at the pattern of deployment. You've 448 00:39:32,599 --> 00:39:35,599 got to taken if you know what to look for. 449 00:39:35,800 --> 00:39:40,239 But even I mean it's even more persuasive, or are 450 00:39:40,280 --> 00:39:45,559 more obvious or other, But you know, taking in totality, 451 00:39:47,199 --> 00:39:49,400 i mean, it's clear that super off was telling the truth, 452 00:39:50,519 --> 00:39:52,079 you know, but all of a Suddan, Well, it's not 453 00:39:52,440 --> 00:39:55,239 it's not clear what what the alternative was. I mean 454 00:39:55,280 --> 00:40:05,880 it this unprecedented million he build up coupled with the transformative, 455 00:40:06,239 --> 00:40:14,880 globally transformative aspects of the Bolshek Revolution, the heart and 456 00:40:16,440 --> 00:40:20,599 lungs of which proverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean, 457 00:40:20,599 --> 00:40:24,599 what's the alternative Stalin was he ordered this build up 458 00:40:24,639 --> 00:40:29,079 for purely defensive purposes, to which would inevitably at some 459 00:40:29,159 --> 00:40:33,159 point provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, that 460 00:40:33,280 --> 00:40:40,679 doesn't that that doesn't make any sense. And generally, when 461 00:40:40,719 --> 00:40:46,559 you're talking about conditions of approximate parody with conventional combined 462 00:40:46,679 --> 00:40:51,360 arms at scale, or when you're talking about near peer 463 00:40:54,119 --> 00:40:59,119 strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked. You always 464 00:40:59,119 --> 00:41:08,239 push the assault, you know. Then that's I mean, this, 465 00:41:08,239 --> 00:41:10,599 this this is very basic stuff. 466 00:41:11,760 --> 00:41:15,840 Speaker 1: Well it also also it doesn't make sense to say 467 00:41:15,960 --> 00:41:22,599 Stalin was this interested in this social national version of 468 00:41:22,639 --> 00:41:27,239 socialism that that would emerge out of the Bolsheviks When 469 00:41:27,280 --> 00:41:31,559 you send troops and you send advisors and you send 470 00:41:31,719 --> 00:41:36,599 tanks to Spain. Yeah, no, I mean you don't, you 471 00:41:36,599 --> 00:41:39,519 don't care about Spain. You don't care what's happening in Spain. 472 00:41:40,280 --> 00:41:43,119 If if this is supposed to be for Russia only. 473 00:41:43,519 --> 00:41:46,679 Speaker 2: Well it's also the Soviet Union. Like, don't get me wrong. 474 00:41:47,960 --> 00:41:51,000 You know, one of the one of the one of 475 00:41:51,079 --> 00:41:56,480 the living few living people who I I really find 476 00:41:56,480 --> 00:41:59,719 common ground with and in terms of political theory, is 477 00:42:00,440 --> 00:42:04,079 an historical subject matter is a Kerrie Bolton. Like he's 478 00:42:04,119 --> 00:42:06,679 just great. I don't know the guy. Unfortunately, he doesn't 479 00:42:06,719 --> 00:42:09,280 leave New Zealand much of these days because he's elderly, 480 00:42:09,320 --> 00:42:12,320 you know, and I think most people know of him 481 00:42:12,320 --> 00:42:15,800 because he wrote this really great exhaustive biography of Francis Yacky. 482 00:42:16,599 --> 00:42:19,480 But he wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the 483 00:42:19,599 --> 00:42:24,719 Enduring Legacy, and people who haven't read the book, they 484 00:42:24,519 --> 00:42:29,000 they they panted at some sort of oh he's some Eurasianist. 485 00:42:29,039 --> 00:42:31,440 That's like, that's not what he's saying at all. He's 486 00:42:31,440 --> 00:42:35,960 saying Stalin's legacy was complicated. He basically abides the same 487 00:42:37,719 --> 00:42:40,280 viewpoint that Paul Godfrey does, although for some of different 488 00:42:40,280 --> 00:42:45,079 reasons about a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving 489 00:42:45,119 --> 00:42:51,119 from the Stalin versus Trotsky paradigm. You know, but that 490 00:42:51,400 --> 00:42:54,760 doesn't mean that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist. And 491 00:42:54,840 --> 00:42:59,280 even you know, the Soviet Union can name dozens of ethnicities. 492 00:42:59,719 --> 00:43:04,239 You know, a huge Moslim population, you know, a huge 493 00:43:04,280 --> 00:43:10,559 Asiatic population, you know, a huge number of Near Eastern people. 494 00:43:11,400 --> 00:43:15,599 You know, it spanned one fifth or one six of 495 00:43:15,639 --> 00:43:20,480 this planets, like the Soviet Union was the ultimate international superpower, 496 00:43:21,400 --> 00:43:27,000 you know, and the only way the Soviet Union survives. 497 00:43:27,079 --> 00:43:31,320 And one of the reasons why the later Cold War 498 00:43:31,480 --> 00:43:35,679 was so dangerous as human you know, for technological reasons 499 00:43:36,079 --> 00:43:39,400 in historical ones and the sidelining of human decision makers 500 00:43:39,440 --> 00:43:43,159 and misconditions of strategic nucleator parodying things. But the reason 501 00:43:43,159 --> 00:43:46,400 why I drop off who was a fascinating guy. And 502 00:43:46,440 --> 00:43:49,159 I mean, like I've said, I believe I'm not a 503 00:43:49,159 --> 00:43:55,639 sovietologist and I'm not a Russia expert at all, but 504 00:43:57,480 --> 00:44:01,000 I do know something and it's clear to me that 505 00:44:01,960 --> 00:44:08,639 post Khrush Jeff, there was a shadow trifecta of and 506 00:44:08,760 --> 00:44:12,719 drop of Ustanov and Gramigo with a real Soviet executive. 507 00:44:12,800 --> 00:44:17,320 Breshnev was a frontman, which made sense because before he 508 00:44:17,360 --> 00:44:21,840 became kind of elderly and compromised people liked Brezhnev, and 509 00:44:21,880 --> 00:44:25,599 he resonated with with the people even today, like he's 510 00:44:25,599 --> 00:44:31,440 fondly remembered, you know, like uh as as as you know, uh, 511 00:44:32,199 --> 00:44:34,519 it's like a man who was like a like a 512 00:44:34,559 --> 00:44:39,239 great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities. But 513 00:44:40,280 --> 00:44:43,199 you know, and drop of I mean Brensnev was very 514 00:44:43,280 --> 00:44:46,719 much a Stalinist, you know, and as was in drop 515 00:44:46,760 --> 00:44:53,159 of but a drop of seminal speech right in eighty two, 516 00:44:53,519 --> 00:44:59,880 right after he became a general secretary, you know, he 517 00:45:00,599 --> 00:45:05,519 this is when uh project Rion, which a lot of 518 00:45:05,519 --> 00:45:10,199 people attribute as contributing substantially to the war Scare of 519 00:45:10,239 --> 00:45:12,760 eighty three in the Able Archer era. I think people 520 00:45:12,800 --> 00:45:16,960 still misunderstand that aspect of it, but because it may 521 00:45:17,519 --> 00:45:20,519 the reason why the subject of the speech to the 522 00:45:20,639 --> 00:45:24,679 Presidium he said, we're going to lose the Cold War 523 00:45:24,960 --> 00:45:32,280 if we don't take drastic measures to countermeasures against Rima, 524 00:45:32,559 --> 00:45:34,719 you know, the revolution military affairs. I think it's being 525 00:45:34,800 --> 00:45:39,880 specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which 526 00:45:39,960 --> 00:45:42,599 was true. There's there's something, there's something insane. There's only 527 00:45:42,679 --> 00:45:46,000 like five thousand computers in the entire Soviet Union. In 528 00:45:46,079 --> 00:45:48,000 nine eighty two. It was something that it was some 529 00:45:48,079 --> 00:45:52,880 insanely primitive state of affairs or regards high tech, you know, 530 00:45:53,239 --> 00:45:59,679 And you know, it's whole point was basically the risk 531 00:45:59,760 --> 00:46:04,280 of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving, 532 00:46:04,400 --> 00:46:09,000 is well as these command and control aspects and the 533 00:46:09,039 --> 00:46:12,199 sideline of human decision makers, that the risk of war 534 00:46:12,360 --> 00:46:15,840 is probably greater than it's ever been since you know, 535 00:46:15,880 --> 00:46:20,000 the forties. But also we're going to lose that war 536 00:46:20,960 --> 00:46:27,960 if we don't find a way to develop meaningful countermeasures 537 00:46:28,000 --> 00:46:35,159 that you know, are our technologies of parody, or unless 538 00:46:35,159 --> 00:46:37,880 we find a way out of the Cold War, you know. 539 00:46:37,920 --> 00:46:40,559 And that was Gorbachev's whole notion, because Gorbachev wasn't a 540 00:46:40,719 --> 00:46:44,480 drop off protege. He wasn't some big liberal chevid Narsee 541 00:46:44,599 --> 00:46:52,679 I think was subverting things. But point being, you know, 542 00:46:52,760 --> 00:46:56,320 Gorbachev was very much the anti Yeltsin quite literally, and 543 00:46:56,440 --> 00:47:04,000 Yelson was the neocon's guy. You know. Gorbachev's notion was, 544 00:47:06,079 --> 00:47:10,280 you know, to reform the command economy with certain qualifications, 545 00:47:10,960 --> 00:47:14,199 you know, and and and basically do ay with God's 546 00:47:14,320 --> 00:47:18,760 plan in favor of something else that could abide innovation 547 00:47:18,960 --> 00:47:23,119 in the high tech sector and to bring about peace 548 00:47:23,119 --> 00:47:27,320 with the United States. But surrendering to the United States 549 00:47:27,400 --> 00:47:30,239 or dismantling the Soviet Union that was not at all 550 00:47:30,320 --> 00:47:35,599 within the cards. And one of the reasons why Gorbachev 551 00:47:37,679 --> 00:47:43,199 was had rapport with Bush and Baker. Bush and Baker 552 00:47:43,960 --> 00:47:47,079 assured him, we're not gonna try and dismantle the Soviet Union, 553 00:47:47,119 --> 00:47:50,559 and they weren't for a very specific reason. Bush said, 554 00:47:51,440 --> 00:47:55,800 where you know, until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not 555 00:47:55,800 --> 00:47:59,079 even gonna talk about, you know, a post Soviet future, 556 00:48:00,280 --> 00:48:05,800 you know. And obviously the Neo con perspective and their 557 00:48:05,880 --> 00:48:11,719 shoehorning of Yelsen was, you know, break the Soviet Union 558 00:48:11,800 --> 00:48:14,639 to pieces. Now. Their notion was, and one of the 559 00:48:14,639 --> 00:48:18,400 reasons for the why this crusading against Moscow is proceeding 560 00:48:18,440 --> 00:48:21,440 from Ukraine. Their notion was to break the Soviet Union 561 00:48:21,480 --> 00:48:26,000 into essentially three discrete like client regimes, you know, like 562 00:48:26,599 --> 00:48:30,719 the former Soviet Far East. And in those days especially too, 563 00:48:30,920 --> 00:48:35,199 because the Pentagon was still looking at China as essentially 564 00:48:35,239 --> 00:48:38,880 friendly and obviously like you know, seed some of that 565 00:48:39,039 --> 00:48:42,199 territory to the to pick king, but you know, base 566 00:48:42,280 --> 00:48:45,679 they'll be like a Ukraine like commissariat. They'll be like, 567 00:48:45,719 --> 00:48:48,360 you know, the Moscow kind of central Commissariat, and then 568 00:48:48,360 --> 00:48:53,159 they'll be this like former like Russian Far East that 569 00:48:53,280 --> 00:48:55,800 can you know, just that's just kind of like, uh, 570 00:48:56,719 --> 00:49:04,800 this sort of like hyper exploited, you know, hinterland for 571 00:49:06,119 --> 00:49:09,760 the United States and and adjacent finance capital and stuff. 572 00:49:10,519 --> 00:49:15,519 And you know, butch and Baker realize like, no, we're 573 00:49:15,519 --> 00:49:18,800 not We're not gonna grind these people's faces into the concrete, 574 00:49:19,360 --> 00:49:22,760 and we're not gonna destabilize the whole region. And you know, 575 00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:27,360 we're certainly not gonna do anything until there's full nuclear disarmament. 576 00:49:28,480 --> 00:49:32,760 You know that that was a tangential discussion. Should give 577 00:49:32,800 --> 00:49:36,079 me what. Baker was a great man, and I've got 578 00:49:36,280 --> 00:49:38,880 a lot of respect for him and push forty one. 579 00:49:41,239 --> 00:49:43,119 It was not a particularly likable guy, I leave it 580 00:49:43,199 --> 00:49:46,920 to Dad, but he had a very serious and sophisticated 581 00:49:47,000 --> 00:49:53,840 view of geopolitics and political affairs. So that administration looks 582 00:49:53,880 --> 00:49:57,119 better and better in my opinion, And I mean I 583 00:49:57,119 --> 00:50:01,800 felt that way at the time. As a teenager, I 584 00:50:01,880 --> 00:50:04,800 realized this country. I realized something really, really really bad 585 00:50:04,880 --> 00:50:10,239 was underway. When when when when Clinton was elected I mean, 586 00:50:10,559 --> 00:50:11,639 it would have been one thing if it was like 587 00:50:11,639 --> 00:50:15,320 a twenty twenty steel but the body political was excited 588 00:50:15,360 --> 00:50:18,079 about this pig and that was insane, you know. And 589 00:50:18,159 --> 00:50:21,920 it's not just because he was crushing our people. I mean, 590 00:50:21,920 --> 00:50:24,920 I knew guys who got indicted and with the prison 591 00:50:25,440 --> 00:50:31,639 under Clinton reno for when they hadn't done anything. You know, 592 00:50:34,400 --> 00:50:36,480 I'm not just speaking, I mean as a matter of 593 00:50:36,519 --> 00:50:39,000 law as well as a matter of fact or ethics 594 00:50:39,079 --> 00:50:45,280 or whatever. But as it may the to bring it 595 00:50:45,360 --> 00:50:49,320 back a bit, you know, there there's a brief moment 596 00:50:51,599 --> 00:50:55,159 really from about ninety two to ninety six, and that's 597 00:50:55,199 --> 00:50:58,440 when that's when these these historians first mother David Irving, 598 00:50:58,760 --> 00:51:01,119 you know, he got access to the as B archives 599 00:51:01,880 --> 00:51:03,960 and there was all this incredible stuff that came to 600 00:51:04,159 --> 00:51:07,199 like that, you know, the old Soviet system had suppressed 601 00:51:07,599 --> 00:51:13,519 and kept from probably eyes. But then, I mean very 602 00:51:13,559 --> 00:51:18,559 quickly things became even more opaque than in some ways 603 00:51:18,559 --> 00:51:20,960 than they had during the Soviet era because the regime 604 00:51:21,000 --> 00:51:23,119 will never tell the truth about what's going on with Russia, 605 00:51:23,199 --> 00:51:26,480 I mean, or with Europe. But this is an issue 606 00:51:26,480 --> 00:51:30,400 with peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I don't think need 607 00:51:30,480 --> 00:51:34,280 to be elaborately explicated. But I realized I talked more 608 00:51:34,280 --> 00:51:41,760 about Hoffmann as well as the nulange of barbaras that 609 00:51:41,800 --> 00:51:43,880 I did specifically suber of. If you want to a 610 00:51:43,920 --> 00:51:46,599 part three, I'll remedy that and i'll speak specifically to 611 00:51:46,639 --> 00:51:52,000 subro OFV and I'll include some aspects of inside the 612 00:51:52,039 --> 00:51:54,280 Red Army. I've got a paperback of that, and I 613 00:51:54,360 --> 00:51:55,239 take it on the road with me. 614 00:51:57,199 --> 00:52:00,360 Speaker 1: Now that sounds good to me, getting into the Yeah, 615 00:52:00,800 --> 00:52:03,239 the thing about reading subar Off is it's just this 616 00:52:04,159 --> 00:52:10,400 fire hose of just this date, that what was dismantled 617 00:52:10,440 --> 00:52:12,960 on this date, what was put in this place on 618 00:52:13,000 --> 00:52:15,599 this date, And it's just like just running down this 619 00:52:15,719 --> 00:52:19,559 whole list of things, just chapter after chapter, where it's 620 00:52:19,760 --> 00:52:24,719 it's mind boggling. The the mountain of circumstantial evidence he 621 00:52:25,719 --> 00:52:29,880 is able to provide for his for his thesis, which 622 00:52:30,079 --> 00:52:30,400 he took. 623 00:52:31,199 --> 00:52:34,599 Speaker 2: He took like a lot of Russians, the particularly guys 624 00:52:34,599 --> 00:52:39,679 who were in intelligence roles or military roles. He was 625 00:52:39,719 --> 00:52:42,440 a prolific documentary and he wrote down a huge amount 626 00:52:42,480 --> 00:52:45,320 of things. But also you know, obviously English wasn't his 627 00:52:45,320 --> 00:52:50,119 first language, and it's written kind of like a debriefing, 628 00:52:50,599 --> 00:52:54,239 but with like added extensic comedy, I mean, which makes sense. 629 00:52:54,280 --> 00:52:57,480 I mean, he was a defector and he he he 630 00:52:57,519 --> 00:53:02,519 spent literally years being debriefed by the American and NATO 631 00:53:04,000 --> 00:53:06,760 military people, you know, I mean, I get it. It's 632 00:53:06,800 --> 00:53:11,760 not that it's not a fun life, like the defector 633 00:53:11,800 --> 00:53:13,440 actually sucks. 634 00:53:13,679 --> 00:53:17,960 Speaker 1: What's your take on defectors. I interviewed one once, and 635 00:53:18,639 --> 00:53:22,360 he was a defector from Soviet Union, like in early 636 00:53:22,480 --> 00:53:28,760 nineteen eighty nine, and I mean I just caught him 637 00:53:29,920 --> 00:53:35,920 not exactly lying, just I caught him in not being 638 00:53:35,960 --> 00:53:40,639 willing to have certain conversations that would just seem like, 639 00:53:40,840 --> 00:53:42,639 you know, it's like, oh, you know, well, tell me 640 00:53:42,679 --> 00:53:44,599 what Carl Marx got right. It's one of the things 641 00:53:44,719 --> 00:53:46,440 I asked him. I said, tell me what Carl Marks 642 00:53:46,480 --> 00:53:52,320 got right. He's like nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm like, yeah, 643 00:53:52,519 --> 00:53:55,400 I see these defectors come out of like North Korea, 644 00:53:55,960 --> 00:53:59,000 and like immediately they get debriefed by the State Department, 645 00:53:59,000 --> 00:54:01,039 and then they get boob job and they're driving brand 646 00:54:01,079 --> 00:54:06,679 new cars and they're in freaking condos, and I'm like, yeah, 647 00:54:06,920 --> 00:54:09,800 I think I think defectors were a lot different back 648 00:54:09,840 --> 00:54:10,519 then than they are. 649 00:54:11,039 --> 00:54:14,719 Speaker 2: Yeah, I have to say, Okay, some guy, some some 650 00:54:14,920 --> 00:54:21,159 DDR guy or some Soviet Union like GRU officer who 651 00:54:21,239 --> 00:54:25,239 defected in like May nineteen eighty nine, totally different than 652 00:54:25,239 --> 00:54:27,719 a guy who defected in nineteen seventy nine or nineteen 653 00:54:27,760 --> 00:54:31,599 sixty nine, night and day, because the former is just 654 00:54:31,760 --> 00:54:34,639 like some dickhead like looking to get paid and like 655 00:54:34,679 --> 00:54:36,159 looking for a way out of his life in a 656 00:54:36,199 --> 00:54:42,400 failing system. Guys like super off first of all, they're 657 00:54:42,400 --> 00:54:50,039 taking a huge risk, you know. And secondly, for regular 658 00:54:50,119 --> 00:54:56,840 people man like it it pete Cold War, you know. Uh, 659 00:54:56,920 --> 00:55:00,639 life wasn't that different than the Soviet Union or America. 660 00:55:01,599 --> 00:55:02,360 It really wasn't. 661 00:55:02,440 --> 00:55:02,519 Speaker 1: So. 662 00:55:02,519 --> 00:55:06,079 Speaker 2: I mean it's not like you's some GRU big shot. 663 00:55:06,320 --> 00:55:08,599 It's not like you're gonna get great stuff in America. 664 00:55:08,760 --> 00:55:11,000 You can't back home. I mean, yeah you can. You 665 00:55:11,079 --> 00:55:12,760 might be able to get like blue jeans for your 666 00:55:12,800 --> 00:55:17,360 mistress and like good Scotch, But there's not some like, 667 00:55:17,719 --> 00:55:20,039 there wasn't some like huge difference in quality of life 668 00:55:20,119 --> 00:55:25,079 or something. Guys like stuber Of defected because they they 669 00:55:25,079 --> 00:55:29,599 had ethical reasons for it, and they developed a moral 670 00:55:29,679 --> 00:55:32,320 contempt for the system. I really liked the book The 671 00:55:32,360 --> 00:55:34,639 Hunt for at October. It's just like an awesome book, 672 00:55:34,639 --> 00:55:39,159 and I reread it lately because I I'd forgotten how 673 00:55:39,159 --> 00:55:44,760 good it was. But you know, the uh, the Captain 674 00:55:46,760 --> 00:55:50,559 of the Red October, the whole deal. I mean it's 675 00:55:50,760 --> 00:55:52,800 in parts of character. I mean it's not it's a 676 00:55:52,800 --> 00:56:00,159 brilliant meditation on on late Cold War strategic nucles your 677 00:56:00,199 --> 00:56:02,960 platforms and the deep parodies they're in, but it's under 678 00:56:02,960 --> 00:56:08,559 my character study. Like the Soviet naval officer, you know, he's, uh, 679 00:56:08,639 --> 00:56:10,800 he's this guy from the He's this Lithuanian guy. He 680 00:56:10,840 --> 00:56:15,039 doesn't really relate to the Russian culture. His wife, uh 681 00:56:15,920 --> 00:56:20,679 need an operation and uh the doctor who operated on 682 00:56:20,800 --> 00:56:23,119 or was drunk when he put in the surgery, so 683 00:56:23,199 --> 00:56:25,760 he boxed it and she died. But the doctor was 684 00:56:25,800 --> 00:56:28,159 the son of some polit baro big shots. They're like, 685 00:56:28,199 --> 00:56:32,639 you know, you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man. 686 00:56:33,400 --> 00:56:35,880 So the so the this naval officeries just like what 687 00:56:35,920 --> 00:56:38,519 the hell am I doing? You know, like I and 688 00:56:38,599 --> 00:56:40,840 also too in it. He's like deeply religious. He's like, 689 00:56:40,840 --> 00:56:46,519 so there's like this atheist, uh chauvinistic Russian government that 690 00:56:46,679 --> 00:56:50,639 killed my wife and I am I'm supposed to. I 691 00:56:50,679 --> 00:56:52,880 was supposed to kill fifty million people and event a 692 00:56:52,920 --> 00:56:55,360 wharl like on behalf of it. Like, no, I'm not 693 00:56:55,400 --> 00:56:58,639 doing that. I mean there there's a there's a deeper 694 00:56:58,719 --> 00:57:02,039 moral quag mari too, because the Red October it's a 695 00:57:02,079 --> 00:57:05,280 Typhoon class sub but it's got what's called a caterpillar drive, 696 00:57:06,159 --> 00:57:09,559 so it's invisible to SOSIS and passive sonar. So basically 697 00:57:09,599 --> 00:57:15,000 it's a splendid first strike weapon. So he realizes, like 698 00:57:15,039 --> 00:57:19,320 the Soviet Union can alter the strategic balance and basically, uh, 699 00:57:19,679 --> 00:57:23,639 bring America to terms through the thread of through the 700 00:57:23,679 --> 00:57:25,840 threat at nuclear assault, and like, I mean, he've used 701 00:57:25,880 --> 00:57:28,280 that as morally fucked. Also, you know, like if we're 702 00:57:28,320 --> 00:57:31,239 gonna win, like let's win the Cold War clean, you know, 703 00:57:31,320 --> 00:57:34,880 not not do it basically by like holding America hostage 704 00:57:34,920 --> 00:57:37,480 with the nuclear trigger. I mean that's kind of moralistic. 705 00:57:37,559 --> 00:57:40,639 But at the same time, I mean, I I don't know, man, 706 00:57:40,760 --> 00:57:47,239 like if it's no being uh being the captain of 707 00:57:47,320 --> 00:57:52,800 a of a Typhoon class sub that that there was 708 00:57:52,840 --> 00:57:57,079 a counter value like mega death machine, you know, it's 709 00:57:56,880 --> 00:58:00,719 it's its role is to assault counter value targets. And 710 00:58:01,360 --> 00:58:04,440 kill millions of people if you don't believe in the 711 00:58:04,519 --> 00:58:08,320 system you serve. That's a pretty horrible role to be in. 712 00:58:09,440 --> 00:58:11,960 You know, You've got to be a true believer to 713 00:58:12,039 --> 00:58:15,119 do that job. It's not like any other job in 714 00:58:15,159 --> 00:58:17,679 the military, and it's not like any other role in 715 00:58:17,719 --> 00:58:26,840 any other era. You know, I commanding a commanding a 716 00:58:26,880 --> 00:58:31,119 first strike platform that that can that can kill millions 717 00:58:31,159 --> 00:58:35,280 of people, you know. So I obviously that's like a 718 00:58:35,320 --> 00:58:39,360 fictional example, but what Clancy was drawing upon was the 719 00:58:39,679 --> 00:58:42,320 real ethos a defectors in the Cold War. And on 720 00:58:42,360 --> 00:58:45,400 the other side you had guys like the Cambridge five. 721 00:58:45,440 --> 00:58:49,800 But I think we're pretty disturbed guys, but they were 722 00:58:49,840 --> 00:58:53,239 true believers. That's totally different than these days. Like some 723 00:58:53,920 --> 00:58:56,320 I think snout In is a is a sincere guy. 724 00:58:56,360 --> 00:59:01,119 Whatever problems he might have, you know, he's basically yeah, 725 00:59:01,119 --> 00:59:02,960 I mean, he could never leave Russia now, Like it's 726 00:59:02,960 --> 00:59:08,559 not a happy life, you know. I I think, uh, 727 00:59:08,639 --> 00:59:10,480 you can argue, I mean snowed and I don't want 728 00:59:10,480 --> 00:59:13,719 to get into a deep meditation on the ethics of 729 00:59:13,719 --> 00:59:17,079 what snowed and did. But I my point is, like 730 00:59:17,119 --> 00:59:19,280 I whatever his motives, I don't think if we can 731 00:59:19,320 --> 00:59:21,320 say he did that for clout. But you know, these 732 00:59:21,360 --> 00:59:23,039 people who come the other way, like some of these 733 00:59:23,119 --> 00:59:26,599 Chinese or North Koreans, they're they're just not going to 734 00:59:26,599 --> 00:59:29,960 get paid, it's obvious, but they think they're not being 735 00:59:30,000 --> 00:59:33,599 respected like they should be in, you know, whatever role 736 00:59:33,599 --> 00:59:35,360 they're in. You know, but the Cold War was a 737 00:59:35,880 --> 00:59:38,800 Cold War is a different world, I mean literally, you know. 738 00:59:40,320 --> 00:59:44,360 Speaker 1: Yeah, all right, Well we'll pick this up on episode 739 00:59:44,360 --> 00:59:47,360 three when you, uh, when you get back from the 740 00:59:47,400 --> 00:59:50,199 travels of Thomas on the Road and everything. 741 00:59:50,639 --> 00:59:54,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, everybody about thirty six hours ago. 742 00:59:54,639 --> 00:59:56,920 Speaker 1: Yeah, remind everybody where they can find your work. 743 00:59:57,719 --> 01:00:02,360 Speaker 2: Yeah, he said, check out my subst it's real Thomas 744 01:00:02,400 --> 01:00:06,039 seven seven seven dots substack dot com. Alternatively, go to 745 01:00:06,079 --> 01:00:09,360 the website. It's number seven h on mes seven seven 746 01:00:09,440 --> 01:00:12,039 seven dot com. But that stuff in the show notes 747 01:00:12,079 --> 01:00:16,159 so people can find it easy. But uh, my website 748 01:00:18,039 --> 01:00:21,760 is a good one stop, and uh my substick is 749 01:00:22,239 --> 01:00:24,559 where the podcast and other good stuff is at. And 750 01:00:25,599 --> 01:00:29,639 I've I just got off the road from DC. Then 751 01:00:29,679 --> 01:00:32,559 we had the Halloween all says say Cemetery Walk. I'm 752 01:00:32,559 --> 01:00:35,239 trying to make progress. I gotta make substantial progress on 753 01:00:35,239 --> 01:00:38,760 this manuscript. By December, things have been very hectic, so 754 01:00:39,239 --> 01:00:41,760 in good ways, and then I injured myself like a 755 01:00:41,840 --> 01:00:47,559 fucking idiot. But it's uh, the mind Phaser Pod. Uh, 756 01:00:48,039 --> 01:00:50,320 It's gonna be another couple of weeks before a fresh 757 01:00:50,360 --> 01:00:53,199 episode drops, so forgive me for this, but Jay Burden 758 01:00:53,199 --> 01:00:56,079 and I will continue to drop fresh stuff on his 759 01:00:56,199 --> 01:00:59,840 platforms and on radio for Chicago, So just bear with me. 760 01:01:00,079 --> 01:01:06,360 I promise we'll be back to regular uploads when I 761 01:01:06,360 --> 01:01:07,480 get back from the road. 762 01:01:09,480 --> 01:01:13,320 Speaker 1: All right until episode three? Thank you Thomas, Yeah, thank 763 01:01:13,360 --> 01:01:13,639 you man.