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Peaking Yona's show. This is going to be part two
of Thomas talking about Victor Suveroff and Huckin Hoffman's work.
So Thomas, I hand it over to you.
Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for hosting me. I think I remember where
we left off, but forgive me if this is redundant.
Is something that's fundamentally important as of the date of
Barbarosa's commencement June twenty second, nineteen forty one, it's important
to understand the strategic situated and as of Stalin and
the Soviet Union. Key was the waging of aggressive war
against Poland and Finland. Obviously, Stalin's plan and this was
confirmed by Khrushchev, was, you know, in the immediate aftermath
of the assault and the Japanese at Chalkin Goal, which
in the opinion of Hoffman and I agree with this,
that's what started World War two and suvar ofw of
without saying it abides that perspective. The Molotov Ribbentrop packed
which Stalin confided to the Pullet Burrow as well as
the Kruz chief, was that that would embolden the Hitler
to sue for war with Poland, which he wouldn't have
done had there been the risk of a two front war,
yet Germany's position was precarious, overextended. Stalin didn't think that,
you know, Germany could truly stand up to the UK
and France. He grossly underestimated the Wehrmacht's offensive power. But
even in the event of a German victory, his reasoning
was that, you know, the French army would have its
back broken, Germany would be on this footing a permanent
hostility caught for the United Kingdom and Europe would be
the Communists for the taking. You know that this was,
in Stalin's words, to cruise chieft. Hitler was now wrapped
around our little finger. And one of the reasons for
this confidence or over confidence, you know, and I think
I mentioned before as of Barbarossa, Stalin had increased expanded
the territory of the Soviet Union by four hundred and
twenty six thousand square kilometers. Does a quill went to
the service area of the German right because it stood
in nineteen nineteen and especially a petular significance the aggressive
war of the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland and
what amounted to the extortionate annexation of the Baltics, you know,
with waiting Estonia pressuring Romania into further territorial concessions. You know,
the Soviet Union really on September third, nineteen thirty nine,
it was in the strongest position out of all major powers,
and the Soviet Union became a combatant, you know, on
September seventeenth, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland, and of
course there was a deafening silence eminent from emanating from
London in the way of that deployment, which is telling
in and of itself. But you know, this myth that
Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler's posterous for the reasons
just enumerated, and it's essential to understand, I mean demonster
of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically
and militarily towards the German Reich. And secondly the pattern
of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment,
But in terms of the former November twelfth and thirteenth,
nineteen forty, you know, the view from Moscow was that
the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was
not performing well in the relevant battle theaters, which was
compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler had counted
on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire.
There was no indication of a resolution of the war
with the United Kingdom. You know, Jeremy's fear of influence
was totally static. You know, Operations Sea Lion was a
strategic ruse and even were it not, it would have
been a bloodbath. You know. So November twelfth and thirteenth,
Stalin directed Molotov in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through
ribentraup a demand for the expansion of the Soviets fear
of influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom to
deploy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, as well
as Finland. And he also said that, you know, the
Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier.
This is incredibly belligerent. Essentially all of southeastern Europe plus
Finland and a piece of Scandinavia proper. Stalin just declared
that this is now my sphere of influence. And if
you meet this challenge with the hostile deployment, its war.
I mean that sound like a man who's afraid of
Eadolf Hitler and the German Reich. You know, in Stalin's mind,
there was absolutely no possibility of the Wehrmacht assaulting the
Soviet Union, even in terms of parody, let alone from
a position of strategic superiority. Which is somewhat fascinating because
this idea that oh, the Germans underestimated the Soviet Union,
they didn't at all, and stowfully gets into that Holder's
report on the eve of Barbarossa. And Holder had actually
written he'd written an assessment in nineteen thirty seven of
Soviet forces and being and capabilities. It was remarkably accurate,
and von Mannstein and good Darien their assessments quite literally
in the month before Barbarossa. The Soviet forces and being
were exactly what they estimated them to be. In reality,
it was Stalin who was looking west and saying that,
you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability and the
mighty Soviet Union has nothing to fear, and this is
the key to why the Soviets took such horrific attrition
during barbaross Further relevant to context here, I can't remember
if I got into this or not. There was a
discrete mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union between November nineteen forty,
when this demand that I just enumerated was issued to
Ribbon traup to deliver to Hitler by way of Molotov
on order of Stalin. Between November ninety forty and the
day of Barbarosa, a massive and unprecedented arms build up
took place in the Soviet Union. This included, as of
the onset of hostilities, the rhetoric of possess no less
than twenty four thousand tanks, including close to two thousand
T thirty fours, which were technically a medium tank, but
they were the all around best tank of the Second
World War. I don't think that's arguable. You know, the
air forces of the Red Army had over twenty three
thousand aircraft, or thirty seven hundred of which were considered
to be cutting edge fighters. The Red Army had close
to one hundred and fifty thousand artillery pieces. The Red Navy,
including a substantial fleet of surface ships of varying types.
They had close to three hundred submarines, and submarines are
expressly offensive. There are no defensive submarines, and this man
as Hoffman raises in his book, the Soviets not only
a larger fleet of submarines than any other country in
the world, but they outnumbered the Royal Navy more than
fourfold in terms of their number of subs. I mean,
this is the most powerful offensive military element the world
has ever seen, you know. So Stalin was essentially fearless
and viewed himself as the imminent master of this planet
in geostrategic terms, as of barbaros as well as an
ideological ones. And we're going to get into that too.
Something essential to understand about the Soviet culture. Stalin was
keenly aware of what had befallen the Jacobin Revolution. He
was also keenly aware of the changing dynamics of of
ideological cultures within great powers. You know. He realized that,
for example, Japan was on the ascendency. He realized that
the German Raich had intense energies that it was drawing from,
even though he viewed them as geostrategically weak and compromised.
He understood that the United Kingdom was undergoing a terrible
existential crisis and that their empire is structured was essentially obsolescent.
And this is one of the reasons why there's been
a series of revolts you know, nascent as well as
well developed and realized, you know, in the years before
the Great War and then in the Inner War years
up to the then president, you know, and socialism in
one country that that was something of that was something
of a propaganda cliche. Donan invoked the sort of give
a branding to you know, the kind of punctuated disturbances
of this mass and megacital restructuring of Russian society and
the Soviet state which was becoming a superpower, as well
as to you know, assuage the Western Powers which were
very much doing his bidding at that moment. Stalin was
very much engaged with the Common tern that had not
changed and in the planning for what was to be
the assault on Europe. In the aftermath of the Icebreaker conflict,
Stalin he called back the Russian delegation to the Common
Turn and he called the common Terns representatives to Moscow
to advise them of what was imminently going to happen.
You know, the Soviet Union needed to realize the World Revolution,
to survive as well as to consolidate its superpower status,
which was not just burgaining, but was being actively realized also,
And I realized I've probably got a bias for testimonial evidence,
especially they're not exclusively in discerning the motives of men
in command roles. But there's not there's not. The direct
testimony is more reliable than circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts
the manifest weight of extrinsic material facts outside the parameters
those declarations and what Stalin said his biographer, Colonel General Bokaganov,
he word for word by Lakov reproduced the speech that
Stalin issued fourth on May fifth, nineteen forty one, and
according to Bolkoganov, the Leader made it quote. The Leader
made it unmistakably clear. War is inevitable in the future.
We must be ready for the unconditional destruction of German fascism.
The world be fought on enemy terror ratory, and victory
will be achieved with a few casualties. And as we
got into last week, and as I think we've raised
before in discussion of World War Two, it was a
matter of formal doctrine that the Red Army was an
offensive purposed element. Its primary mission orientation was as the
standard bearer of the revolution. And it never struck a
defensive posture as a matter of doctrine by choice, you know,
And I've made the point before. I believe Stalin is
probably the single most powerful man who ever lived. And
the momentum that the Communist International had at this moment
was ed Zenith. I'd argue Stalin had to abide that
role or he would have been replaced by a man
who would have you know. It was a convergence of
ideological imperatives and geostrategic realities in a way that is
very rare but was sort of inextricably and splendidly bound
up at this juncture. And I think we talked before
about the secret real I'm jumping around a bit, but
I'm trying to corral the evidence in categorical capacities. The
secret meeting with the polic Bureau, and this is when
the Common Turn delegation was also present in August nineteenth,
nineteen thirty nine, you know, in the concominant with the
assault on the Japanese Imperial Army at calcm Goal. This
meeting that Stalin called the polit Burow and the Russian
section of the Common Tern. Stalin declared that the time
had come to quote apply the torch of war to
the European powder keg. This is when Stalin declared, if
we accept the German proposal for the non aggression picked,
you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland the intervention of
France and England will be inevitable. The resulting, in Shalin's words,
serious and arrest and disorder would lead to a punctuated
destabilization of Western Europe, yet without the Soviet Union being
drawn into the conflict until they permissively opted do and
Stalin referred to what he declared in nineteen twenty five
with respect to the international strategy. You know, the moment
is nigh that we we can pursue the bultimization of
Europe by way of an advantageous entry into the war
through a broad spectrum field of activity which had now
the potential of which had now opened up for their
realization of the world Revolution. And of course, when minutes
from this meeting and the speech were smuggled out and
were obtained by the French news agency Havas by way
of Geneva, you know, and it went, it was, it
was published, and then the Moscow immediately when in damage
control and stalin apologists and propagandas, particularly in London but
also in the United States. You know, they they started
immediately claiming that this is fascist propaganda and this, this
isn't this isn't true, you know. So, I mean this
is important also like when you read books by guys
Chris Bellamy comes to mind. But they're legion these historians
who claim, oh Stuvarov is a liar, there's no evidence
for these things. They're redacting a huge amount of evidence,
or they're just not including it and would question they say, oh,
that that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And
that's incredible, you know. I mean, it'd be like, like
imagine somewhat more approximately, like let's say I was writing
a history of of the American War in Iraq from
two thousand and three eleven, and it'd be like if
I was categorically redacting things that President Bush and Rumsfeld
said in conversations they had and just declaring that, well,
it's not important, or that that's just something liberals say
or allege. I mean, people would laugh at me or
they'd say that's ridiculous. But in the case of you know,
Barbarossa and you know, the icebreaker hypothesis. That's exactly what
they do, you know, and you're just supposed to accept it.
This is this is very abnormal, even accounting for the
fact that research standards and things are often compromised for
ideological and political reasons. But this seems tangential, but it's
essential to understanding Suvarov's and Hoffmann's points. We've got to
ask why Barbara was soutanctically successful for the Rmont and
what that means, because this is sort of the key
in my opinion. The Soviets were planning an assault on
Romania in the autumn of nineteen forty one, and if
you know how to interpret military deployments, this should be clear.
But also if you're going to assault Germany from then
extant frontiers, you're gonna do so from the Baltic and
you're gonna do so through Romania. And of course Germany
was totally dependent on Romanian petroleum. That's one of the
reasons Hitler cultivated the French shup events in so closely
Antonescu held the Knight's Cross. There was very good offices
between him and Germany. Anyway, for cultural reasons, for ideological
reasons and other things. But he and Hitler, despite the
linguistic barrier, they were very close friends too, and Antonescu
was Hitler's strongest allah, I believe, you know, and a
close to a quarter million Romanians fought, you know, for
the Axis cause in the east, which for a country
the size of Romania, that's remarkable. But army groups South
deployed from Romania, and this, if this was a very
delicate issue because Soviet intelligence, which was actually very good,
this the deployment to Romania. The way Hitler, the ruse
Hitler was able to pull off was that the unstable
situation in yugoslav was what was drawing German forces at
scale to be deployed there. But also obviously, through Ledgered
Maine and other things, OKW was effectively able to hide
the scale at which forces were being a mass there.
But you know, not only was it a staging ground
for Barbarosa, but Hitler was react with anxiety that the
Soviets were in with salt Romania because they were so
these forces down there at a dual role. They were
purposed for an offensive mission, but they were also there
to as a bulwark against a army assault, you know,
at least so that they, you know, that there'd be
enough time to reinforce and and not just you know,
endure a collapse of a critical front, which on top
of the geostrategic menace that also of deprived Germany really
of it, it's only source of petroleum and represent quantities
to feel the war machine. But what this led to
was there was massive Soviet deployments in the Baltic and
in Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Wehrmacht assaulted,
the road to Moscow was basically undefended. Okay, that's one
of the reasons why Holder and Manstein they were beside
themselves because they were telling Hitler, we need to move
on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we can't
wait for the weather to turn, and we can't wait
for the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment in
depth on the path to Moscow, you know. And as
the deployment schema in Ukraine, the Army Group South was
exponentially outnumbered, but the Red Army elements there they were
deployed in an offensive pattern. And if you know anything
about the way the Soviet Union fought and the way
the Armforce of the Russian Federation fights, and they very
much scaled down way to they obviously and with very
different localized combined arms platforms. Deep battle is it's it's
it's dependent upon a fixed deployment schema for it to work, okay,
And the way the Red Army deployed offensively, and this
is what they did when the tide turned and after Kursk,
this is how they assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema
is by heavy use of shock armies, a Soviet shock army.
They were larded with firepower and totally front loaded. Okay.
So when Army Group South engaged the Red Army through
the ky Of Corridor, they were engaging this forward element
that was loaded down with firepower that was supposed to
break through the mainline of resistance, but that had a
limited operational capacity, often of only a few days. Then
they were to be rapidly reinforced by fresh elements who
would continually assault in waves, and then when that shock
element was was re equipped and refitted, they would smash
through again. But obviously, if the Wehrmacht assaults with mass
armored columns, when you're deployed offensively, with your floaded shock
army as the sharp punk They're gonna smash that shock army,
and then they're gonna cut through your reinforcement elements like butter,
you know. And as they break through wave after wave,
that frontloaded element is gonna be fighting on reversed fronts
and they're gonna get cut to pieces, which is exactly
what happened. Okay, So the Soviet for taking catastrophic casualties
in the North and in the South. Meanwhile, Army Group
Center was racing to Moscow quite literally, and Hitler didn't
know quite what to make of this because there were
sort of two Hitlers, and slowly makes this point. When
Hitler felt confident politically and when he had had a
what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the
battle space, Hitler was hyper aggressive. When fog of war
questions or political uncertainty clouded that perspective, Hitler developed a
siege mentality, and that's exactly what happened. And Hitler viewed
Stalin as incredibly dangerous as he should have. So Hitler
essentially halted Army Group Center well Army Group South surrounded
this massive element plus the reserves that the Kremlin had
ordered like rushed to the front immediately, and Hitler was
afraid to push the attack for a decisive victory at
Moscow until this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized.
The ont of casualties the Soviets endured is utterly catastrophic
and unprecedented. And the Germans took something like three three
quarters of a million prisoners alone. Okay, but by the time,
by the time the fear order the attack to be
pushed on Moscow was too late. Okay, that's what happened.
People misunderstand that. It says, you know, oh, the Germans
were plotting to attack all along because the Soviets were
weak in some ways. But then Stalin got it together,
and you know, because the Germans underestimated Soviet capabilities. You know,
Hitler lost the war. That's not true at all. That
doesn't make any sense. And you know, if Stalin was like,
look at it like this. Okay, the Germans were halted
at Moscow, but they reached the Gate of Moscow, they
reached Leningrad and laid it to siege. They reached Stalingrad.
The German the very mug reached all of its objectives
in months. How long did it take the Red Army
to march on Berlin. It took them almost four years.
So why was there this plotting, grinding blood bath if
the Soviets were this grossly underestimated force, you know, and
the Germans didn't know what they were doing like this,
the Germans killed the Red Army, you know, Obviously the
Russians still had enough to hold Moscow and they did
and that was incredibly valiant. And Russians are incredibly tough,
and there's a simplicity to the way the Ivans fight,
but it's a simplicity that works, you know. I think
it's as guided when people suggest otherwise, and especially today
because people are you know, they've adopted prejudices and stuff
in this regard. There's really really stupid things that come
out of the Pentagon in terms of their assessment of
Russian capabilities and things. And incidentally, Eric von Mannstein's the
book it's called Lost Victories. It's for I think it's fascinating,
but it's kind of for military hounds only. It's you know,
not like late Sunday reading. But what that book was
the US War Department, back when there was a war department.
There's not anymore, no matter what like special needs, Higgs
Seth says. But in the last months of the Department
of War, they debriefed Manstein on basically on you know,
his experience over four years of fighting the Soviet Union
and a general officers role, and the War Department soon
to be the Defense Department, they took this very seriously.
An early NATO force structure wasn't a substantial on the
infantry side, ground on the imagery and armor side. It
was substantially based around what von Manstein had. It's said, Okay,
so this book was sometime in the fifties, the first edition,
it was edited to make them more readable, and it's
it's literally Managelin is debriefing with some added stuff, you know.
So and that that was one of his core premises
is that fighting the Russians on Russian territory, they're they're
they're they're unbelievably and savagely tough, you know, and that
that's a force multiplier and also makes up for some
of their shortcomings. And the Russians also they they know
what they know the limits of their capabilities, you know.
And on the one hand, and super ofw of his
book inside the Red Army, which is very much worth
reading too, especially if you got an interest in the
late Cold War stuff, because it's very much a breakdown
of you know, the the brisn of era the Soviet Army.
You know. He makes the point and Harold Coyle made
this point too, that doctrine in the Soviet Army was
almost like regulation. There was there were no mission oriented
tactics and the whole ethos of the Soviet Army's general
staff was to eliminate uncertainty wherever and whatever however possible,
so they didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as
emerged from you know, superior orders. But nevertheless, the Russian,
the Soviets and the Russians do very well with what
they're good at, you know, and deep battle is what
they were good at. Heavy reliance on combined arms and
a shock element capacity went on the offensive that tended
towards the kind of inflexibility which I think they later
remedied somewhat during the Cold War. But the ability to
rapidly shift from an offensive posture to defending the Hrmont
was very very good at that, and the British are
pretty good at that too. The Soviets were catastrophically bad
at it and the French were bad at it. But
part of it too, though, is that Stalin had every
reason to believe that the Vermont wasn't capable of what
it was capable of as of June nineteen four. Won
I mean, that was a blind spot. But at the
same time, you know, the Germans tend to surprise people
on uh matters of military affairs. But that's key because
it's not it's not as internet guys and an armchair
goofballs who claimed, well, Subra was an idiot who's a
liar like looking out bad the Soviets got mald That's
the whole, the whole point, Like that makes his point
not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, I
I'm not I'm not just dwelling on Minutia to play
cake the the you know, the the military hounds among
us or something. But you know it's also you know,
it was you know the point too that I think
a lot of lay people don't understand these days. You know,
modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't know, you
don't plan for quagmires because then you're planning to lose
a war, so you know, within ideally in about ten
weeks in the outer temporal limits six months, you know,
Moscow had to fall to the Hrmoncht and Stalin was
over confident, absolutely, But it stands the reason his kind
of poor view of the Wehrmacht, not in terms of
its quality of men or firepower, but the geo strategic
situation and what he viewed as it's over extended commitments
and things. You know, he reasoned that, you know, even
in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know,
we can hold him at bay long enough to reinforce
and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer
be realizable. You know, this all kind of falls into
place is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look
at the sudeological culture. You gotta take Stalin's own statements,
you gotta look at the statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev.
You've got to look at the pattern of deployment. You've
got to taken if you know what to look for.
But even I mean it's even more persuasive, or are
more obvious or other, But you know, taking in totality,
i mean, it's clear that super off was telling the truth,
you know, but all of a Suddan, Well, it's not
it's not clear what what the alternative was. I mean
it this unprecedented million he build up coupled with the transformative,
globally transformative aspects of the Bolshek Revolution, the heart and
lungs of which proverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean,
what's the alternative Stalin was he ordered this build up
for purely defensive purposes, to which would inevitably at some
point provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, that
doesn't that that doesn't make any sense. And generally, when
you're talking about conditions of approximate parody with conventional combined
arms at scale, or when you're talking about near peer
strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked. You always
push the assault, you know. Then that's I mean, this,
this this is very basic stuff.
Speaker 1: Well it also also it doesn't make sense to say
Stalin was this interested in this social national version of
socialism that that would emerge out of the Bolsheviks When
you send troops and you send advisors and you send
tanks to Spain. Yeah, no, I mean you don't, you
don't care about Spain. You don't care what's happening in Spain.
If if this is supposed to be for Russia only.
Speaker 2: Well it's also the Soviet Union. Like, don't get me wrong.
You know, one of the one of the one of
the living few living people who I I really find
common ground with and in terms of political theory, is
an historical subject matter is a Kerrie Bolton. Like he's
just great. I don't know the guy. Unfortunately, he doesn't
leave New Zealand much of these days because he's elderly,
you know, and I think most people know of him
because he wrote this really great exhaustive biography of Francis Yacky.
But he wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the
Enduring Legacy, and people who haven't read the book, they
they they panted at some sort of oh he's some Eurasianist.
That's like, that's not what he's saying at all. He's
saying Stalin's legacy was complicated. He basically abides the same
viewpoint that Paul Godfrey does, although for some of different
reasons about a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving
from the Stalin versus Trotsky paradigm. You know, but that
doesn't mean that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist. And
even you know, the Soviet Union can name dozens of ethnicities.
You know, a huge Moslim population, you know, a huge
Asiatic population, you know, a huge number of Near Eastern people.
You know, it spanned one fifth or one six of
this planets, like the Soviet Union was the ultimate international superpower,
you know, and the only way the Soviet Union survives.
And one of the reasons why the later Cold War
was so dangerous as human you know, for technological reasons
in historical ones and the sidelining of human decision makers
and misconditions of strategic nucleator parodying things. But the reason
why I drop off who was a fascinating guy. And
I mean, like I've said, I believe I'm not a
sovietologist and I'm not a Russia expert at all, but
I do know something and it's clear to me that
post Khrush Jeff, there was a shadow trifecta of and
drop of Ustanov and Gramigo with a real Soviet executive.
Breshnev was a frontman, which made sense because before he
became kind of elderly and compromised people liked Brezhnev, and
he resonated with with the people even today, like he's
fondly remembered, you know, like uh as as as you know, uh,
it's like a man who was like a like a
great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities. But
you know, and drop of I mean Brensnev was very
much a Stalinist, you know, and as was in drop
of but a drop of seminal speech right in eighty two,
right after he became a general secretary, you know, he
this is when uh project Rion, which a lot of
people attribute as contributing substantially to the war Scare of
eighty three in the Able Archer era. I think people
still misunderstand that aspect of it, but because it may
the reason why the subject of the speech to the
Presidium he said, we're going to lose the Cold War
if we don't take drastic measures to countermeasures against Rima,
you know, the revolution military affairs. I think it's being
specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which
was true. There's there's something, there's something insane. There's only
like five thousand computers in the entire Soviet Union. In
nine eighty two. It was something that it was some
insanely primitive state of affairs or regards high tech, you know,
And you know, it's whole point was basically the risk
of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving,
is well as these command and control aspects and the
sideline of human decision makers, that the risk of war
is probably greater than it's ever been since you know,
the forties. But also we're going to lose that war
if we don't find a way to develop meaningful countermeasures
that you know, are our technologies of parody, or unless
we find a way out of the Cold War, you know.
And that was Gorbachev's whole notion, because Gorbachev wasn't a
drop off protege. He wasn't some big liberal chevid Narsee
I think was subverting things. But point being, you know,
Gorbachev was very much the anti Yeltsin quite literally, and
Yelson was the neocon's guy. You know. Gorbachev's notion was,
you know, to reform the command economy with certain qualifications,
you know, and and and basically do ay with God's
plan in favor of something else that could abide innovation
in the high tech sector and to bring about peace
with the United States. But surrendering to the United States
or dismantling the Soviet Union that was not at all
within the cards. And one of the reasons why Gorbachev
was had rapport with Bush and Baker. Bush and Baker
assured him, we're not gonna try and dismantle the Soviet Union,
and they weren't for a very specific reason. Bush said,
where you know, until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not
even gonna talk about, you know, a post Soviet future,
you know. And obviously the Neo con perspective and their
shoehorning of Yelsen was, you know, break the Soviet Union
to pieces. Now. Their notion was, and one of the
reasons for the why this crusading against Moscow is proceeding
from Ukraine. Their notion was to break the Soviet Union
into essentially three discrete like client regimes, you know, like
the former Soviet Far East. And in those days especially too,
because the Pentagon was still looking at China as essentially
friendly and obviously like you know, seed some of that
territory to the to pick king, but you know, base
they'll be like a Ukraine like commissariat. They'll be like,
you know, the Moscow kind of central Commissariat, and then
they'll be this like former like Russian Far East that
can you know, just that's just kind of like, uh,
this sort of like hyper exploited, you know, hinterland for
the United States and and adjacent finance capital and stuff.
And you know, butch and Baker realize like, no, we're
not We're not gonna grind these people's faces into the concrete,
and we're not gonna destabilize the whole region. And you know,
we're certainly not gonna do anything until there's full nuclear disarmament.
You know that that was a tangential discussion. Should give
me what. Baker was a great man, and I've got
a lot of respect for him and push forty one.
It was not a particularly likable guy, I leave it
to Dad, but he had a very serious and sophisticated
view of geopolitics and political affairs. So that administration looks
better and better in my opinion, And I mean I
felt that way at the time. As a teenager, I
realized this country. I realized something really, really really bad
was underway. When when when when Clinton was elected I mean,
it would have been one thing if it was like
a twenty twenty steel but the body political was excited
about this pig and that was insane, you know. And
it's not just because he was crushing our people. I mean,
I knew guys who got indicted and with the prison
under Clinton reno for when they hadn't done anything. You know,
I'm not just speaking, I mean as a matter of
law as well as a matter of fact or ethics
or whatever. But as it may the to bring it
back a bit, you know, there there's a brief moment
really from about ninety two to ninety six, and that's
when that's when these these historians first mother David Irving,
you know, he got access to the as B archives
and there was all this incredible stuff that came to
like that, you know, the old Soviet system had suppressed
and kept from probably eyes. But then, I mean very
quickly things became even more opaque than in some ways
than they had during the Soviet era because the regime
will never tell the truth about what's going on with Russia,
I mean, or with Europe. But this is an issue
with peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I don't think need
to be elaborately explicated. But I realized I talked more
about Hoffmann as well as the nulange of barbaras that
I did specifically suber of. If you want to a
part three, I'll remedy that and i'll speak specifically to
subro OFV and I'll include some aspects of inside the
Red Army. I've got a paperback of that, and I
take it on the road with me.
Speaker 1: Now that sounds good to me, getting into the Yeah,
the thing about reading subar Off is it's just this
fire hose of just this date, that what was dismantled
on this date, what was put in this place on
this date, And it's just like just running down this
whole list of things, just chapter after chapter, where it's
it's mind boggling. The the mountain of circumstantial evidence he
is able to provide for his for his thesis, which
he took.
Speaker 2: He took like a lot of Russians, the particularly guys
who were in intelligence roles or military roles. He was
a prolific documentary and he wrote down a huge amount
of things. But also you know, obviously English wasn't his
first language, and it's written kind of like a debriefing,
but with like added extensic comedy, I mean, which makes sense.
I mean, he was a defector and he he he
spent literally years being debriefed by the American and NATO
military people, you know, I mean, I get it. It's
not that it's not a fun life, like the defector
actually sucks.
Speaker 1: What's your take on defectors. I interviewed one once, and
he was a defector from Soviet Union, like in early
nineteen eighty nine, and I mean I just caught him
not exactly lying, just I caught him in not being
willing to have certain conversations that would just seem like,
you know, it's like, oh, you know, well, tell me
what Carl Marx got right. It's one of the things
I asked him. I said, tell me what Carl Marks
got right. He's like nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm like, yeah,
I see these defectors come out of like North Korea,
and like immediately they get debriefed by the State Department,
and then they get boob job and they're driving brand
new cars and they're in freaking condos, and I'm like, yeah,
I think I think defectors were a lot different back
then than they are.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I have to say, Okay, some guy, some some
DDR guy or some Soviet Union like GRU officer who
defected in like May nineteen eighty nine, totally different than
a guy who defected in nineteen seventy nine or nineteen
sixty nine, night and day, because the former is just
like some dickhead like looking to get paid and like
looking for a way out of his life in a
failing system. Guys like super off first of all, they're
taking a huge risk, you know. And secondly, for regular
people man like it it pete Cold War, you know. Uh,
life wasn't that different than the Soviet Union or America.
It really wasn't.
Speaker 1: So.
Speaker 2: I mean it's not like you's some GRU big shot.
It's not like you're gonna get great stuff in America.
You can't back home. I mean, yeah you can. You
might be able to get like blue jeans for your
mistress and like good Scotch, But there's not some like,
there wasn't some like huge difference in quality of life
or something. Guys like stuber Of defected because they they
had ethical reasons for it, and they developed a moral
contempt for the system. I really liked the book The
Hunt for at October. It's just like an awesome book,
and I reread it lately because I I'd forgotten how
good it was. But you know, the uh, the Captain
of the Red October, the whole deal. I mean it's
in parts of character. I mean it's not it's a
brilliant meditation on on late Cold War strategic nucles your
platforms and the deep parodies they're in, but it's under
my character study. Like the Soviet naval officer, you know, he's, uh,
he's this guy from the He's this Lithuanian guy. He
doesn't really relate to the Russian culture. His wife, uh
need an operation and uh the doctor who operated on
or was drunk when he put in the surgery, so
he boxed it and she died. But the doctor was
the son of some polit baro big shots. They're like,
you know, you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man.
So the so the this naval officeries just like what
the hell am I doing? You know, like I and
also too in it. He's like deeply religious. He's like,
so there's like this atheist, uh chauvinistic Russian government that
killed my wife and I am I'm supposed to. I
was supposed to kill fifty million people and event a
wharl like on behalf of it. Like, no, I'm not
doing that. I mean there there's a there's a deeper
moral quag mari too, because the Red October it's a
Typhoon class sub but it's got what's called a caterpillar drive,
so it's invisible to SOSIS and passive sonar. So basically
it's a splendid first strike weapon. So he realizes, like
the Soviet Union can alter the strategic balance and basically, uh,
bring America to terms through the thread of through the
threat at nuclear assault, and like, I mean, he've used
that as morally fucked. Also, you know, like if we're
gonna win, like let's win the Cold War clean, you know,
not not do it basically by like holding America hostage
with the nuclear trigger. I mean that's kind of moralistic.
But at the same time, I mean, I I don't know, man,
like if it's no being uh being the captain of
a of a Typhoon class sub that that there was
a counter value like mega death machine, you know, it's
it's its role is to assault counter value targets. And
kill millions of people if you don't believe in the
system you serve. That's a pretty horrible role to be in.
You know, You've got to be a true believer to
do that job. It's not like any other job in
the military, and it's not like any other role in
any other era. You know, I commanding a commanding a
first strike platform that that can that can kill millions
of people, you know. So I obviously that's like a
fictional example, but what Clancy was drawing upon was the
real ethos a defectors in the Cold War. And on
the other side you had guys like the Cambridge five.
But I think we're pretty disturbed guys, but they were
true believers. That's totally different than these days. Like some
I think snout In is a is a sincere guy.
Whatever problems he might have, you know, he's basically yeah,
I mean, he could never leave Russia now, Like it's
not a happy life, you know. I I think, uh,
you can argue, I mean snowed and I don't want
to get into a deep meditation on the ethics of
what snowed and did. But I my point is, like
I whatever his motives, I don't think if we can
say he did that for clout. But you know, these
people who come the other way, like some of these
Chinese or North Koreans, they're they're just not going to
get paid, it's obvious, but they think they're not being
respected like they should be in, you know, whatever role
they're in. You know, but the Cold War was a
Cold War is a different world, I mean literally, you know.
Speaker 1: Yeah, all right, Well we'll pick this up on episode
three when you, uh, when you get back from the
travels of Thomas on the Road and everything.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, everybody about thirty six hours ago.
Speaker 1: Yeah, remind everybody where they can find your work.
Speaker 2: Yeah, he said, check out my subst it's real Thomas
seven seven seven dots substack dot com. Alternatively, go to
the website. It's number seven h on mes seven seven
seven dot com. But that stuff in the show notes
so people can find it easy. But uh, my website
is a good one stop, and uh my substick is
where the podcast and other good stuff is at. And
I've I just got off the road from DC. Then
we had the Halloween all says say Cemetery Walk. I'm
trying to make progress. I gotta make substantial progress on
this manuscript. By December, things have been very hectic, so
in good ways, and then I injured myself like a
fucking idiot. But it's uh, the mind Phaser Pod. Uh,
It's gonna be another couple of weeks before a fresh
episode drops, so forgive me for this, but Jay Burden
and I will continue to drop fresh stuff on his
platforms and on radio for Chicago, So just bear with me.
I promise we'll be back to regular uploads when I
get back from the road.
Speaker 1: All right until episode three? Thank you Thomas, Yeah, thank
you man.