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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to our latest deep dive. I want you to

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<v Speaker 1>imagine an employee at a rapidly growing logistics company, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and they just happen to type an extra zero into

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<v Speaker 1>a shipping database.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh happens all the time, right.

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<v Speaker 1>So suddenly a routine three hundred dollars vendor payment just

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<v Speaker 1>magically becomes a three thousand dollars hemorrhage. Or a pictures

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<v Speaker 1>startup that just landed this massive enterprise client, only to

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<v Speaker 1>lose the entire contract because their lead developers stored the

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<v Speaker 1>client's proprietary data on you know, a public cloud server

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<v Speaker 1>open to anyone on the intern exactly anyone could access it.

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<v Speaker 1>So when you hear the word cybersecurity, your mind probably

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<v Speaker 1>jumps street to I don't know, hooded hackers in dark

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<v Speaker 1>basements breaking into main friends.

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<v Speaker 2>You have a classic movie trope, right.

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<v Speaker 1>But the reality of actual organizational survival is well, it's

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<v Speaker 1>far less theatrical and infinitely more structural.

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<v Speaker 2>We really is to actually.

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<v Speaker 1>Protect a business in the modern world, we have to

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<v Speaker 1>look past the firewalls and the malware. So your mission

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<v Speaker 1>for today's deep time is to master the fundamental language

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<v Speaker 1>and architecture of cybersecurity, which is so crucial. It is

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<v Speaker 1>whether you are stepping up to lead an IT department

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<v Speaker 1>or you just want to understand why your companies, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>seemingly frustrating security policies, operate the way they do. We

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<v Speaker 1>are going to cut through the noise and give you

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<v Speaker 1>the ultimate shortcut to being well informed.

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<v Speaker 2>And our roadmap for this comes from a truly authoritative text.

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<v Speaker 2>We were pulling insights today from the CISSP All in

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<v Speaker 2>One Exam Guide, eighth edition by Sean Harrison Fernando Mami.

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<v Speaker 1>A massive book by the way, Oh it's.

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<v Speaker 2>Huge, and within the industry, this isn't just some exam

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<v Speaker 2>prep manual, you know. It is often referred to as

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<v Speaker 2>a golden Bible.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, a golden Bible.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, because the frameworks and the concepts laid out in

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<v Speaker 2>this book they provide the strategic, operational, and tactical blueprint

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<v Speaker 2>used to secure vital corporate and government networks globally.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, reviewers literally credit the methodologies in this book

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<v Speaker 1>with preventing tens of thousands of catastrophic breaches. So okay,

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<v Speaker 1>let's unpact this. Because to defend any system, whether it's

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<v Speaker 1>a global bank or just a mid sized tech startup.

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<v Speaker 1>You have to know exactly what you are protecting, right.

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<v Speaker 2>You need a baseline.

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<v Speaker 1>Exactly, and more importantly, you need a precise, agreed upon language.

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<v Speaker 1>Without that, I mean a business is just throwing money

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<v Speaker 1>at software while leaving the back door wide open.

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<v Speaker 2>And the bedrock of that shared language is something called

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<v Speaker 2>the AIC triad.

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<v Speaker 1>The AIC triad, Right, every.

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<v Speaker 2>Single security control a company implements is ultimately trying to

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<v Speaker 2>provide one or more of these three core protections, availability, integrity,

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<v Speaker 2>and confidentiality.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's break those down. Availability is the one people

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<v Speaker 1>often forget about until well until it's completely.

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<v Speaker 2>Gone, usually when the service crash. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>This is all about reliable, timely access to data and resources.

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<v Speaker 1>So if an e commerce platform goes down on Black

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<v Speaker 1>Friday because of a server crash and they had no backup,

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<v Speaker 1>that is a massive availability failure.

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<v Speaker 2>The business might be technically secure from theft, but they

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<v Speaker 2>are bleeding money by the second exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>Then you have integrity, which ties directly back to that

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<v Speaker 1>opening scenario I mentioned.

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<v Speaker 2>With the extra zero you have the logistics company. Integrity

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<v Speaker 2>ensures the accuracy and reliability of information. It prevents unauthorized

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<v Speaker 2>or even just accidental changes, so stopping the typo precisely,

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<v Speaker 2>it's the assurance that the data hasn't been tampered with

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<v Speaker 2>in transit or altered by an untrained employee. If your

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<v Speaker 2>financial database lacks integrity, I mean the entire company is

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<v Speaker 2>flying blind.

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<v Speaker 1>That makes total sense. And finally, confidentiality. This is the

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<v Speaker 1>secrecy aspect right preventing unauthorized disclosure.

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<v Speaker 2>It's what most people think of when they hear cybersecurity.

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<v Speaker 1>Right keeping the secret secret. It's ensuring that an automated

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<v Speaker 1>bought can't just scrape your customer list. But it also

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<v Speaker 1>applies to the physical world, which I found super interesting

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<v Speaker 1>in the text. A classic example the book Brings Up

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<v Speaker 1>is shoulder surfing.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, the coffee shop scenario.

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<v Speaker 1>Exactly where someone literally stands behind an executive at a coffee

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<v Speaker 1>shop and just read sensitive emails right off their laptop screen.

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<v Speaker 2>It's so low tech but highly effective. And once an

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<v Speaker 2>organization understands that they are protecting those three pillars availability, integrity, confidentiality,

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<v Speaker 2>they have to define what actually threatens them.

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<v Speaker 1>And this is where corporate communication usually completely breaks down,

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't it.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh entirely. People throw around words like risk and threat

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<v Speaker 2>as if they mean the exact same thing, but there

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<v Speaker 2>was an entirely different stages of a disaster.

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<v Speaker 1>So what's the actual vocabulary we need to use.

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<v Speaker 2>The core terms we need to isolate are vulnerability, threat, risk, exposure,

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<v Speaker 2>and control.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's apply these to a modern business scenario to

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<v Speaker 1>see how they actually interact. So imagine a rapidly growing

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<v Speaker 1>software company that uses cloud storage buckets for their client data.

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<v Speaker 1>Good example of vulnerability is just a flaw or weakness,

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<v Speaker 1>right in this case, maybe an engineer accidentally leaves a

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<v Speaker 1>storage bucket misconfigured, no password protection.

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<v Speaker 2>Just sitting there open, and the threat is the entity

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<v Speaker 2>that could exploit that weakness. So say an automated web

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<v Speaker 2>scraping bot constantly scouring the Internet for open data buckets.

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<v Speaker 1>But notice that the vulnerability the open bucket, and the

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<v Speaker 1>threat the bot. They exist completely independently of the actual

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<v Speaker 1>business impact.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, And that is where risk comes into play. Risk

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<v Speaker 2>is the mathematical probability that the scraping bot actually finds

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<v Speaker 2>your specific misconfigured bucket, combined with the financial and reputational

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<v Speaker 2>damage of losing that specific client data.

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<v Speaker 1>So if the bucket only contains like public press releases,

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<v Speaker 1>that are already on your website. The vulnerability is the same,

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<v Speaker 1>but the risk is virtually.

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<v Speaker 2>Zero because the impact is zero. Who cares if they

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<v Speaker 2>steal a public press.

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<v Speaker 1>Release, right, But if that bucket contains proprietary source code,

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<v Speaker 1>the risk is catastrophic.

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<v Speaker 2>And then exposure is the actual instance of loss. It's

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<v Speaker 2>the moment the bot downloads the code and the damage

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<v Speaker 2>is officially.

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<v Speaker 1>Doed game over right.

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<v Speaker 2>To prevent that exposure, the organization has to implement a

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<v Speaker 2>control or a countermeasure like what well, this could be

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<v Speaker 2>an automated script that constantly scans the company's cloud infrastructure

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<v Speaker 2>and instantly locks down any open buckets it finds.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, now, speaking of countermeasures, the source outlines this deeply

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<v Speaker 1>flawed mindset that businesses fall into when they try to

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<v Speaker 1>design these controls. It's called security through obscurity.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, a terrible idea.

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<v Speaker 1>It's literally the equivalent of hiding your house key under

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<v Speaker 1>a fake rock on the porch and just assuming a

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<v Speaker 1>burglar won't notice it. In the tech world, the text

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<v Speaker 1>gives the example of an administrator changing a network port

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<v Speaker 1>from the standard port eighty to say port eighty eighty, just.

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<v Speaker 2>Hoping that malicious actors simply won't find the traffic because

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<v Speaker 2>it's slightly hidden.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>What's fascinated here is how this mindset fundamentally misunderstands the

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<v Speaker 2>modern threat landscape. I mean, security through obscurity relies on

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<v Speaker 2>the assumption that your adversary is lazy or less intelligent than.

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<v Speaker 1>You are, just rarely the case exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>In reality, attackers use automated port scanners and protocol analyzers

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<v Speaker 2>that will detect traffic on Port eighty eighty in milliseconds.

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<v Speaker 2>It doesn't hide anything from a machine.

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<v Speaker 1>Or like a company deciding to write its own proprietary

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<v Speaker 1>encryption algorithm, thinking well, if no one knows how the

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<v Speaker 1>math works, no one can break it.

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<v Speaker 2>Which inevitably ends in absolute disaster. Highly motivated adversaries have

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<v Speaker 2>sophisticated reverse engineering tools. They will just deconstruct a homegrown algorithm,

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<v Speaker 2>find the mathematical flaws, and exploit them.

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<v Speaker 1>Because they always have flaws.

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<v Speaker 2>Always. True robust security relies on Cookoff's principle. This is

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<v Speaker 2>the idea that a system should be secure even if

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<v Speaker 2>everything about the system except the key itself is public knowledge.

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<v Speaker 2>You have to rely on proven, pure viewed industry standard algorithms,

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<v Speaker 2>not on hiding your flaws.

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<v Speaker 1>In the dark, right, because hiding in the dark doesn't work,

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<v Speaker 1>so we have to actively build defenses. But a single

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<v Speaker 1>control like that automated bucket scanner we talked about, isn't enough,

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<v Speaker 1>is it?

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<v Speaker 2>No, not at all, because if this scanner fails where

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<v Speaker 2>an employee bypasses it, the system is completely exposed again.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's where the text introduces the concept of defense

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<v Speaker 1>in depth. This is basically the practice of layering your

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<v Speaker 1>protection exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>You want to introduce calculated friction. The logic is that

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<v Speaker 2>an adversary has to defeat multiple distinct, overlapping mechanisms just

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<v Speaker 2>to reach the critical asset. The source categorizes these layers

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<v Speaker 2>into three main types, administrative, technical, and physical.

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<v Speaker 1>I found the administrative controls fascinating because they are basically

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<v Speaker 1>the psychological and procedural layers. Right. These are your corporate

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<v Speaker 1>security policies, your mandatory pre employment background checks, the annual

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<v Speaker 1>security awareness training.

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<v Speaker 2>They dictate human behavior, right.

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<v Speaker 1>And then technical or logical controls are the software and

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<v Speaker 1>hardware enforcing those policies. Firewalls, encryption protocols, multi factor authentication.

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<v Speaker 2>Intrusion detection systems, all the.

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<v Speaker 1>Tech stuff exactly. And then physical controls are exactly what

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<v Speaker 1>they sound like. They're the literal bearer protecting the actual

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<v Speaker 1>hardware and.

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<v Speaker 2>Personnel fences, biometric locks on data center doors, security guards,

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<v Speaker 2>and mantraps.

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<v Speaker 1>So within those three types, these controls have specific jobs

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<v Speaker 1>or functionalities. According to the book, preventive controls try to

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<v Speaker 1>stop an incident before it happens. Detective controls identify that

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<v Speaker 1>an incident is currently happening or has happened. Corrective controls

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<v Speaker 1>fix the damage.

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<v Speaker 2>And don't forget Deterrent controls.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh right. Deterrent controls discourage the attacker from even trying

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<v Speaker 1>in the first place, like a massive warning banner on

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<v Speaker 1>a login screen stating that unauthorized access will be prosecuted.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, just trying to scare them off.

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<v Speaker 1>And then there are compensating controls. Now, okay, I have

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<v Speaker 1>to push back on the texts definition of this one

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<v Speaker 1>because it honestly tripped me up initially. Well, if a

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<v Speaker 1>fence and an armed security guard both serve the exact

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<v Speaker 1>same function keeping people out of a restricted area, why

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<v Speaker 1>is the fence classified as a compensate and control?

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<v Speaker 2>Ah, I see a way that's confusing. It really comes

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<v Speaker 2>down to the realities of corporate governance and pudgetary constraints.

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<v Speaker 2>A compensating control is not just a random alternative. It

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<v Speaker 2>is a formalized substitute when a primary requirement simply cannot

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<v Speaker 2>be met. Okay, So suppose a company's risk assessment dictates

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<v Speaker 2>that the strict physical security of an armed guard is

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<v Speaker 2>the required primary control for a specific facility.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, the guard is plan A.

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<v Speaker 2>But then the CFO looks at the quarterly budget and says, yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>we absolutely cannot afford a full time guard rotation.

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<v Speaker 1>But the risk doesn't magically disappear just because the budget

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<v Speaker 1>is tight, exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>The organization still has to implement an alternative that provides

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<v Speaker 2>a comparable level of mitigation. So the fence compensates for

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<v Speaker 2>the lack of the guard. Oh, I get it now,

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<v Speaker 2>And technologically it is the same thing. If a legacy

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<v Speaker 2>of business application absolutely requires an outdated, vulnerable protocol to

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<v Speaker 2>communicate through the firewall, the security team can't just block.

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<v Speaker 1>It because it would break the business right.

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<v Speaker 2>Instead, they might set up an isolated proxy server specifically

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<v Speaker 2>to monitor and filter that traffic. The proxy is the

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<v Speaker 2>compensating control.

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<v Speaker 1>That reframes it perfectly. It's a calculated, documented compromise. And

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<v Speaker 1>the real magic is how all these functionalities harmonize. You

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<v Speaker 1>build a preventive model, but you support it with detective

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<v Speaker 1>and corrective mechanisms. You have to work together, right, Like

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<v Speaker 1>if a preventive control, say an electronic lock on a

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<v Speaker 1>server room, fails because someone just props the door open.

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<v Speaker 2>With a chair, which happens all the time, all the.

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<v Speaker 1>Time, a detective control, like an alert from a thermal camera,

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<v Speaker 1>catches the intrusion and this immediately triggers a corrective control

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<v Speaker 1>like dispatching a guard or automatically terminating active server sessions.

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<v Speaker 2>Then you have constructed a highly secure environment. But here

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<v Speaker 2>is the critical pilit the book makes. You can have

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<v Speaker 2>the most perfectly layered firewalls and the most brilliant compensatory

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<v Speaker 2>controls in the world. If the layout of this security

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<v Speaker 2>architecture actively prevents the sales team from accessing client data

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<v Speaker 2>or prevents the developed for some shipping code, the business

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<v Speaker 2>goes bankrupt.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, which brings us to the massive concept of enterprise architecture.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a huge shift in thinking.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, because there is this deeply rooted, almost adversarial divide

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<v Speaker 1>between technology practitioners and business leaders. The text highlights how

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<v Speaker 1>technology people tend to speak in acronyms, udp ip sec,

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<v Speaker 1>raid arrays.

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<v Speaker 2>And business executives speak in terms of net profits, operational efficiency,

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<v Speaker 2>market share.

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<v Speaker 1>They are speaking two entirely different languages while trying to

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<v Speaker 1>run the exact same company, and.

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<v Speaker 2>This disconnect leads to what the industry calls stovepipe solutions.

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<v Speaker 2>The IT department buys an expensive new software tool to

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<v Speaker 2>solve one specific technical problem completely without considering how it

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<v Speaker 2>impacts the broader business workflow.

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<v Speaker 1>They're just living in their own bubble exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And the result is an exhausted organization constantly putting out

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<v Speaker 2>localized fires instead of executing a unified strategy. Enterprise architecture

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<v Speaker 2>is the discipline of fixing. This provides conceptual blueprint that

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<v Speaker 2>translates the complex organization into digestible, interconnected layers.

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<v Speaker 1>Think about walking into a medical clinic. Right on one wall,

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<v Speaker 1>there is a poster showing the human skeleton. On another wall,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a diagram of the circulatory system, and on a

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<v Speaker 1>third a map of the nervous system.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a great analogy, right.

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<v Speaker 1>They were all the exact same human body, but they

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<v Speaker 1>are viewed through completely different lenses depending on what the

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<v Speaker 1>specific specialist actually needs to see. A surgeon needs the organs,

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<v Speaker 1>a physical therapist needs the skeleton. An enterprise architecture does

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<v Speaker 1>this for a corporation.

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<v Speaker 2>It allows the CEO and the network engineer to look

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<v Speaker 2>at the same company and understand their distinct roles within it.

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<v Speaker 2>The Zachmann framework is one of the classic models for this.

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<v Speaker 1>How does that don't work?

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<v Speaker 2>It is essentially a two dimensional matrix. It takes six

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<v Speaker 2>basic interrogatives what, how, where, who, when and why and

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<v Speaker 2>maps them across different audience perspectives from the executive planner

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<v Speaker 2>all the way down to the technician.

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<v Speaker 1>So if we look at the who column, the executive

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<v Speaker 1>planner sees the com company's macro organizational chart and department heads.

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<v Speaker 1>Right the business manager sees the specific workflow teams. But

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<v Speaker 1>by the time you get down to the technician perspective,

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<v Speaker 1>who translates into active directory groups and specific database access

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<v Speaker 1>control lists.

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<v Speaker 2>It's the exact same concept of identity, just translated down

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<v Speaker 2>the chain.

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<v Speaker 1>That traceability is vital, It really is.

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<v Speaker 2>Another major model the book covers is two OgF The

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<v Speaker 2>open group architecture framework. This one divides the enterprise into

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<v Speaker 2>four domains business, data, applications, and technology.

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<v Speaker 1>So it forces a specific order exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>This ensures that before you buy a piece of technology,

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<v Speaker 2>you verify it supports an application which utilizes the correct data,

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<v Speaker 2>which ultimately drive the business goal.

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<v Speaker 1>The source also dives into frameworks born from the military,

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<v Speaker 1>like DOUGHDAF in the US and MODAFF in Britain, and

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<v Speaker 1>these highlight a totally different kind of friction interoperability.

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<v Speaker 2>Military systems are incredibly complex.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, modern warfare relies on wildly diverse systems. You have

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<v Speaker 1>a spy satellite in orbit capturing imagery, an intelligence analyst

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<v Speaker 1>on another continent processing it, and a drone in the

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<v Speaker 1>air waiting for targeting data.

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<v Speaker 2>And if those systems are built by different defense contractors

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<v Speaker 2>using proprietary data formats, they cannot communicate.

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<v Speaker 1>Seamlessly, which means the mission fails right.

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<v Speaker 2>DOTEF is created to enforce a standardized architecture so that

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<v Speaker 2>all these disparate systems share a common operational picture, and

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<v Speaker 2>corporations use these same principles during massive mergers and acquisitions

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<v Speaker 2>to ensure two entirely different it infrastructures can actually talk

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<v Speaker 2>to each other.

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<v Speaker 1>Here's where it gets really interesting, though, Where does cybersecurity

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<v Speaker 1>actually sit inside these massive organizational blueprints. Do we just

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<v Speaker 1>slap a firewall on the drone?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, that brings us to SABBS The show would Applied

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<v Speaker 2>Business Security Architecture SADBSA is a security specific framework and

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<v Speaker 2>its primary mechanism is creating a chain of traceability.

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<v Speaker 1>Traceability again, yes, it insists.

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<v Speaker 2>That security does not exist in a vacuum. You started

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<v Speaker 2>at the very top layer with the contextual business needs

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<v Speaker 2>and the executive risk models. Every single security decision must

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<v Speaker 2>trace backup to that top layer.

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<v Speaker 1>So an IT director doesn't just buy a next generation

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<v Speaker 1>firewall because they read an article saying it's the best

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<v Speaker 1>new tech.

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<v Speaker 2>No, they can't.

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<v Speaker 1>They have to prove that the firewall supports the new

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<v Speaker 1>secure remote work policy, and that remote work policy traces

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<v Speaker 1>directly up to the CEO's strategic objective of reducing the

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<v Speaker 1>company's commercial real estate footprint by allowing employees to work

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<v Speaker 1>from home.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, the technology justifies itself by enabling a business goal.

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<v Speaker 2>If we connect this to the bigger picture, the security

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<v Speaker 2>apparatus is simply the immune system and the business itself

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<v Speaker 2>is the human body. I love that the immune system

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<v Speaker 2>exists entirely to support, protect, and enable the body to

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<v Speaker 2>explore the world safely. The body does not exist to

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<v Speaker 2>serve the immune system.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. If security acts as a roadblock, the business dies.

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<v Speaker 2>Good security architecture enables the business to take calculated risks

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<v Speaker 2>and offer new services securely.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So having a brilliant architectural blueprint is amazing on paper.

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<v Speaker 1>You know where the data flows, you know why the

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<v Speaker 1>firewalls exist. But a blueprint doesn't manage people, No, it doesn't.

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<v Speaker 1>How do organizations ensure that thousands of human beings actually

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<v Speaker 1>follow the rules day in and day out without the

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<v Speaker 1>whole operation just descending into chaos.

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<v Speaker 2>The architecture provides the structure, but you need process and

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<v Speaker 2>control frameworks to actually manage the daily activities within that structure.

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<v Speaker 1>And this is where the source throws a massive alphabet

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<v Speaker 1>soup of acronyms at the reader.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, there are so many.

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<v Speaker 1>COVID nissed SP eight hundred and fifty three COSO itil CMMI.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean when you first look at this list, the

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<v Speaker 1>immediate reaction is just total overwhelm. How is any company

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to implement all of these simultaneously.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, the secret is that you don't. You should view

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<v Speaker 2>these frameworks as a highly specialized toolbox. You wouldn't use

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<v Speaker 2>a wrench to drive a nail, right, right, You pull

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<v Speaker 2>out the specific framework designed to solve the organizational friction

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<v Speaker 2>you are currently experiencing. Let's break down the mechanisms of

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<v Speaker 2>how they are actually applied.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's start at the executive level. Say you have a

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<v Speaker 1>board of directors and they are terrified of financial fraud,

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<v Speaker 1>insider trading, or running a foul of regulations like Sarbanzoxley.

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<v Speaker 2>They aren't worried about malware.

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<v Speaker 1>No, they are worried about going to prison for inaccurate

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<v Speaker 1>financial reporting.

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<v Speaker 2>For that specific friction, they implement the COOSO framework. COSO

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<v Speaker 2>is a model for corporate governance and internal control. It

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<v Speaker 2>helps management identify and assess risks related to financial reporting

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<v Speaker 2>and operational efficiency, completely independent of the IT department.

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<v Speaker 1>But wait, the IT department manages the systems where all

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<v Speaker 1>that financial data lives. So how do you align the

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<v Speaker 1>tech guys with the COSO mandates?

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<v Speaker 2>That is precisely what COVID was designed to do. COVID

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<v Speaker 2>derives many of its principles from COSO, but it translates

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<v Speaker 2>them into IT governance.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh, so bridges the gap exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It provides a set of processes and metrics that allow

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<v Speaker 2>the business executives to measure whether the IT department is

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<v Speaker 2>actually delivering value and managing risk in a way that

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<v Speaker 2>aligns with the broader corporate strategy.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, what if your company does work for the US government.

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<v Speaker 2>Then you reach for nist SP eight hundred and fifty three.

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<v Speaker 1>That sounds intense.

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<v Speaker 2>It is. This is a massive catalog of highly specific

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<v Speaker 2>security and privacy controls required for federal information systems. It's prescriptive.

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<v Speaker 2>It tells you exactly the baseline controls you need to

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<v Speaker 2>implement to be compliant.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's pivot to the daily grind. The help desk,

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<v Speaker 1>the classic friction point where employees submit a ticket because

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<v Speaker 1>their laptop is broken and they feel like it just

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<v Speaker 1>vanishes into a black hole.

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<v Speaker 2>Everyone's been there.

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<v Speaker 1>Meanwhile, the IT staff feels completely overwhelmed and underappreciated.

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<v Speaker 2>Right to solve the friction of service delivery, you use ITEL.

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<v Speaker 2>ITEL focuses on IT service management. It shifts the IT

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<v Speaker 2>department's mindset from just fixing broken hardware to delivering a consistent,

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<v Speaker 2>measurable service to internal.

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<v Speaker 1>Customers, complete with standard incident management and change management processes.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. It smooths everything out.

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<v Speaker 1>And finally, how does an organization know if it's actually

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<v Speaker 1>getting better at any of this overtime?

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<v Speaker 2>They use cm CMMI. Yeah, the Capability Maturity Model Integration

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<v Speaker 2>developed by Carnegie Mellon CMMI measures maturity. It helps an

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<v Speaker 2>organization recognize if their processes are at level one, which

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<v Speaker 2>is chaotic, ad hoc and completely dependent on individual heroics.

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<v Speaker 1>Meaning if your lead developer goes on vacation, the whole

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<v Speaker 1>system crashes.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. The goal is to evolve through the levels until

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<v Speaker 2>you reach level five, where processes are optimized, measured, and

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<v Speaker 2>continuously improving based on quantitative data.

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<v Speaker 1>It really is a toolbox. But regardless of whether a

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<v Speaker 1>company is using cobit for governance or IEL for help

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<v Speaker 1>desk tickets, the text emphasizes one absolute, non negotiable rule

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<v Speaker 1>for implementing security. It must be a top down approach.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, the underlying psychology and power dynamics of a corporation

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<v Speaker 2>dictate that a bottom up approach is simply doomed. To fail.

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<v Speaker 1>A bottom up approach is when the IT staff recognizes vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 2>Right and it creates immense friction.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, think about it. If a mid level IT

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<v Speaker 1>administrator emails the vice president of sales and says, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>you must start using complex, rotated passwords and a VPN,

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<v Speaker 1>the VP.

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<v Speaker 2>Of sales is going to view that as an annoyance

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<v Speaker 2>that slows down their team exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>They will likely just ignore it or complain to their boss.

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<v Speaker 1>The IT administrator does not have the authority to punish

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<v Speaker 1>non compliance or force cross departmental changes.

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<v Speaker 2>Furthermore, the IT staff does not hold the purse strengths.

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<v Speaker 2>They cannot allocate the massive budget required for enterprise wide controls. Initiation,

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<v Speaker 2>Visible support and constant direction must come from senior management

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<v Speaker 2>and the Board.

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<v Speaker 1>Of directors because they have the power.

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<v Speaker 2>They are the only ones with the authority to mandate

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<v Speaker 2>behavior across all departments and align the budget. When the

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<v Speaker 2>CEO mandates the use of a VPN, the VP of

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<v Speaker 2>sales complies.

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<v Speaker 1>So what does this all mean? We've journeyed from the

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<v Speaker 1>absolute foundational elements all the way to the executive boardroom.

436
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<v Speaker 1>We unpacked the AIC triad, realizing that security is just

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<v Speaker 1>as much about keeping the business running and accurate as

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<v Speaker 1>it is about keeping secrets.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a balancing act.

440
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<v Speaker 1>We learned that hiding vulnerabilities in the dark through obscurity

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<v Speaker 1>is a recipe for disaster. Instead, we must rely on

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<v Speaker 1>defense and depth, introducing calculated friction through overlapping administrative, technical,

443
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<v Speaker 1>and physical.

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<v Speaker 2>Controls layers upon layers.

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<v Speaker 1>We zoomed out to view the organization through enterprise architecture

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<v Speaker 1>models like Zachman and CBSA, proving that the security immune

447
00:22:36.759 --> 00:22:40.920
<v Speaker 1>system must serve the overarching business body. And finally, we

448
00:22:40.960 --> 00:22:44.240
<v Speaker 1>open the toolbox of processed frameworks like COBIT and CMMI

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<v Speaker 1>to manage the daily chaos driven entirely by top down leadership.

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<v Speaker 2>It's the only way it works.

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<v Speaker 1>Understanding the structure is the ultimate shortcut. You're no longer

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<v Speaker 1>just looking at isolated firewalls and policies. You can finally

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<v Speaker 1>see the entire board and how all the pieces move together.

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<v Speaker 2>Ating that macroscopic perspective is exactly what separates the strategic

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<v Speaker 2>professional from someone who merely knows how to configure a router.

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<v Speaker 2>As we wrap up, I want to leave you with

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<v Speaker 2>a final thought, inspired by the way the source material

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<v Speaker 2>describes the CISP exam itself.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh, this is fascinating.

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<v Speaker 2>The text notes that the English version of this certification

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<v Speaker 2>uses computer adaptive testing. As you take the exam, it

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<v Speaker 2>dynamically feeds you between one hundred and one hundred and

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<v Speaker 2>fifty questions. But here is the brilliant part. It constantly

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<v Speaker 2>adjusts its difficulty based on your previous.

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<v Speaker 1>Answers, so it's actively analyzing you.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, it is deliberately programmed to hunt for your weak spots.

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<v Speaker 2>It adaptively probes your knowledge, digging deeper into the specific

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<v Speaker 2>areas where you show hesitation, Meaning the test always feels

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<v Speaker 2>incredibly difficult because it refuses to let you rest on

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<v Speaker 2>what you already know.

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<v Speaker 1>It actively weaponizes its algorithm to find your unlocked door precisely.

472
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<v Speaker 2>So, my question for you to ponder is this, If

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<v Speaker 2>the ultimate benchmark test for a security professional is designed

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<v Speaker 2>to relentlessly and adaptively probe their deepest areas of ignorance

475
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<v Speaker 2>until they feel like they are failing, how much does

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<v Speaker 2>your own organization rely on testing only the systems and

477
00:24:11.359 --> 00:24:14.680
<v Speaker 2>processes you already know you're good at, rather than actively

478
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<v Speaker 2>hunting for your weakest links.

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<v Speaker 1>That is a phenomenal question to end on, because if

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<v Speaker 1>you aren't hunting for your own vulnerabilities, you can guarantee

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<v Speaker 1>that the automated bots, the scraping algorithms, and the adversaries

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<v Speaker 1>already are
