Speaker 1: Part one of the Apology of Socrates by Plato. This
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Speaker 1: LibriVox dot org. Recording by phil Chinavert Apology by Plato,
Speaker 1: translated by Benjamin Jowitt, Part one, How you o Athenians
Speaker 1: have been affected by my accusers? I cannot tell, but
Speaker 1: I know that they almost made me forget who I was.
Speaker 1: So persuasively did they speak, And yet they have hardly
Speaker 1: uttered a word of truth. But of the many falsehoods
Speaker 1: told by them, there was one which quite amazed me.
Speaker 1: I mean, when they said that you should be on
Speaker 1: your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by
Speaker 1: the force of my eloquence. To say this when they
Speaker 1: were certain to be detected as soon as I opened
Speaker 1: my lips and proved myself to be anything but a
Speaker 1: great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless, unless
Speaker 1: by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth.
Speaker 1: For if such is their meaning, I admit that I
Speaker 1: am eloquent, but in how different away from theirs? Well
Speaker 1: as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth
Speaker 1: at all. But from me you shall hear the whole truth, not, however,
Speaker 1: delivered after their manner in a set oration, duly ornamented
Speaker 1: with words and phrases. No, by Heaven, but I shall
Speaker 1: use the words and arguments which occur to me at
Speaker 1: the moment, for I am confident in the justice of
Speaker 1: my cause, or I am certain that I am right
Speaker 1: in taking this course. At my time of life, I
Speaker 1: ought not to be appearing before you, o men of Athens,
Speaker 1: in the character of a juvenile orator. Let no one
Speaker 1: expect it of me, and I must beg of you
Speaker 1: to grant me a favor. If I defend myself in
Speaker 1: my accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words
Speaker 1: which I have been in the habit of using in
Speaker 1: the agora, at the tables of the money changers, or
Speaker 1: anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised
Speaker 1: and not to interrupt me on this account, for I
Speaker 1: am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now
Speaker 1: for the first time in the court of law, I
Speaker 1: am quite a stranger to the language of the place,
Speaker 1: and therefore I would have you regard me as if
Speaker 1: I were really a stranger whom you would excuse if
Speaker 1: he spoke in his native tongue and after the fashion
Speaker 1: of his country. Am I making an unfair request of you?
Speaker 1: Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good,
Speaker 1: but think only of the truth of my words, and
Speaker 1: give heed to that. Let the speaker speak truly, and
Speaker 1: the judge decide justly. At first I have to reply
Speaker 1: to the older charges and to my first accusers, and
Speaker 1: then I will go on to the later ones. For
Speaker 1: of old I have had many accusers who have accused
Speaker 1: me falsely to you during many years, and I am
Speaker 1: more afraid of them than of Anetus and his associates,
Speaker 1: who are dangerous to in their own way. But far
Speaker 1: more dangerous are the others who began when you were
Speaker 1: children and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods.
Speaker 1: Telling of one's Socrates, a wise man who speculated about
Speaker 1: the heavens above and searched into the earth below, and
Speaker 1: made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators of
Speaker 1: this tale are the accusers whom I dread, for their
Speaker 1: hearers are apt to fancy that such inquirers do not
Speaker 1: believe in the existence of the gods, and they are many,
Speaker 1: and their charges against me are of ancient date, and
Speaker 1: they were made by them in the days when you
Speaker 1: were more impressible than you are now, in childhood, or
Speaker 1: it may have been in youth, and the cause, when heard,
Speaker 1: went by default, for there was none to answer. And
Speaker 1: hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell
Speaker 1: the names of my accusers, unless in the chance case
Speaker 1: of a comic poet, all who from envy and malice
Speaker 1: have persuaded you, some of them having first convinced themselves.
Speaker 1: All this class of men are most difficult to deal with,
Speaker 1: for I cannot have them up here and cross examine them.
Speaker 1: And therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my
Speaker 1: own defense, and argue. When there is no one who answers.
Speaker 1: I will ask you, then to assume with me as
Speaker 1: I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds,
Speaker 1: one recent, the other ancient. And I hope that you
Speaker 1: will see the propriety of my answering the latter first,
Speaker 1: for these accusations you heard long before the others, and
Speaker 1: much oftener. Well, then I must make my defense and
Speaker 1: endeavor to clear away in a short time a slender
Speaker 1: which has lasted a long time. May I succeed? If
Speaker 1: to succeed be from my good and yours, or likely
Speaker 1: to avail me in my cause. The task is not
Speaker 1: an easy one. I quite understand the nature of it,
Speaker 1: And so, leaving the event with God, in obedience to
Speaker 1: the law, I will now make my defense. I will
Speaker 1: begin at thee and ask what is the accusation which
Speaker 1: has given rise to the slander of me, and in
Speaker 1: fact has encouraged Melitus to prove this charge against me. Well,
Speaker 1: what do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors,
Speaker 1: and I will sum up their words in an affidavit.
Speaker 1: Socrates is an evildoer and a curious person who searches
Speaker 1: into things under the earth and in heaven, and he
Speaker 1: makes the worse appear the better cause, and he teaches
Speaker 1: the effort said doctrines to others. Such is the nature
Speaker 1: of the accusation. It is just what you have yourselves
Speaker 1: seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, who has introduced a
Speaker 1: man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that
Speaker 1: he walks in air and talking a deal of nonsense
Speaker 1: concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know
Speaker 1: either much or not, that I mean to speak disparagingly
Speaker 1: of any one who is a student of natural philosophy.
Speaker 1: I should be very sorry if Melitus could bring so
Speaker 1: grave a charge against me. But the simple truth is,
Speaker 1: o Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations.
Speaker 1: Very many of those here present are witnesses to the
Speaker 1: truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak, then,
Speaker 1: you who have heard me, and tell your neighbors, whether
Speaker 1: any of you have ever known me. Hold forth, in
Speaker 1: few words or in many upon such matters. You hear
Speaker 1: their answer, and from what they say of this part
Speaker 1: of the charge, you will be able to judge of
Speaker 1: the truth of the rest. As little foundation is there
Speaker 1: for the report that I am a teacher and take money.
Speaker 1: This accusation has no more truth in it than the other.
Speaker 1: Although so if a man were really able to instruct
Speaker 1: mankind to receive money for giving instruction, would, in my opinion,
Speaker 1: be an honor to him. There is Gargius of Leontium,
Speaker 1: and Proticus or Chius and Nepius of Elis, who go
Speaker 1: to the rounds of the cities and are able to
Speaker 1: persuade the young men to leave their own citizens by
Speaker 1: whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to
Speaker 1: them whom they not only pay, but are thankful if
Speaker 1: they may be allowed to pay them. There is at
Speaker 1: this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of whom
Speaker 1: I have heard, and I came to hear of him.
Speaker 1: In this way I came across a man who has
Speaker 1: spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callius, the
Speaker 1: son of Hipponeus, And knowing that he had sons, I
Speaker 1: asked him, Calius, I said, if your two sons were
Speaker 1: folds or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding
Speaker 1: someone to put over them. We should hire a trainer
Speaker 1: of horses, or a farmer, probably, who would improve and
Speaker 1: perfect them in their own proper virtue and excellence. But
Speaker 1: as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of
Speaker 1: placing over them? Is there any one who understands human
Speaker 1: and political virtue? You must have thought about the matter,
Speaker 1: for you have sons. Is there any one there is?
Speaker 1: He said? Who is? He said I? And of what country?
Speaker 1: And what does he charge? A venus the Parian? He replied,
Speaker 1: he is the man and his charge is five minae?
Speaker 1: Hap he is a venus. I said to myself. If
Speaker 1: he really has this wisdom and teaches at such a
Speaker 1: moderate charge, had I the same, I should have been
Speaker 1: very proud and conceited. But the truth is that I
Speaker 1: have no knowledge of the kind I dare say, Athenians,
Speaker 1: that's some one among you. Will reply, yes, Socrates, but
Speaker 1: what is the origin of these accusations which are brought
Speaker 1: against you? There must have been something strange which you
Speaker 1: have been doing. All these rumors and this talk about
Speaker 1: you would never have arisen if you had been like
Speaker 1: other men. Tell us, then, what is the cause of them?
Speaker 1: For we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.
Speaker 1: Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I
Speaker 1: will endeavor to explain to you the reason why I
Speaker 1: am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please
Speaker 1: to attend, then, And although some of you may think
Speaker 1: that I am joking, I declare that I will tell
Speaker 1: you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of
Speaker 1: mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which
Speaker 1: I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom,
Speaker 1: I reply, wisdom such as may perhap apps be attained
Speaker 1: by man. For to that extent, I am inclined to
Speaker 1: believe that I am wise, whereas the persons of whom
Speaker 1: I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom which I may
Speaker 1: fail to describe, because I have it not myself. And
Speaker 1: he who says that I have speaks falsely and is
Speaker 1: taking away my character. And here o, men of Athens,
Speaker 1: I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if
Speaker 1: I seem to say something extravagant, for the word which
Speaker 1: I will speak is not mine. I will refer you
Speaker 1: to a witness who is worthy of credit. That witness
Speaker 1: shall be the God of Delphi. He will tell you
Speaker 1: about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what
Speaker 1: sort it is. You must have known Cherophone. He was
Speaker 1: an early friend of mine and also a friend of yours,
Speaker 1: for he shared in the recent exile of the people
Speaker 1: and returned with you. Well. Charophone, as you know, was
Speaker 1: very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to
Speaker 1: Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether,
Speaker 1: as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt.
Speaker 1: He asked the oracle to tell him whether any one
Speaker 1: was wiser than I was, And the Pithian prophetess answered
Speaker 1: that there was no man wiser. Cherophon is dead himself,
Speaker 1: but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the
Speaker 1: truth of what I am saying. Why do I mention
Speaker 1: this because I am going to explain to you why
Speaker 1: I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer,
Speaker 1: I said to myself, what can the God mean? And
Speaker 1: what is the interpretation of his riddle? For I know
Speaker 1: that I have no wisdom, small or great? What then
Speaker 1: can he mean when he says that I am the
Speaker 1: wisest of men? And yet he is a god god
Speaker 1: and cannot lie that would be against his nature. After
Speaker 1: long consideration, I thought of a method of trying the question.
Speaker 1: I reflected that if I could only find a man
Speaker 1: wiser than myself, then I might go to the God
Speaker 1: with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him,
Speaker 1: here is a man who is wiser than I am,
Speaker 1: But you said that I was the wisest. Accordingly, I
Speaker 1: went to one who had the reputation of wisdom and
Speaker 1: observed him. His name I need not mention. He was
Speaker 1: a politician whom I selected for examination, and the result
Speaker 1: was as follows. When I began to talk with him,
Speaker 1: I could not help thinking that he was not really wise,
Speaker 1: although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser
Speaker 1: by himself. And thereupon I tried to explain to him
Speaker 1: that he thought himself wise, but he was not really wise,
Speaker 1: And the consequence was that he hated me, and his
Speaker 1: enmity was shared by several who were present, and hurt me.
Speaker 1: So I left him, saying to myself as I went away, well,
Speaker 1: although I do not suppose that either of us knows
Speaker 1: anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than
Speaker 1: he is, for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows.
Speaker 1: I neither know nor think that I know. In this
Speaker 1: last particular, then I seemed to have slightly the advantage
Speaker 1: of him. Then I went to another, who had still
Speaker 1: higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same.
Speaker 1: Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many
Speaker 1: others beside him. Then I went to one man after another,
Speaker 1: being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked. And
Speaker 1: I lamented and feared this, But necessity was laid upon me.
Speaker 1: The word of God, I thought ought to be considered first,
Speaker 1: and I said to myself, go, I must to all
Speaker 1: who appear to know and find out the meaning of
Speaker 1: the oracle. And I swear to you Athenians by the
Speaker 1: dog I swear, for I must tell you the truth.
Speaker 1: The result of my mission was just this. I found
Speaker 1: that the men most in repute were all but the
Speaker 1: most foolish, and that others less esteemed were really wiser
Speaker 1: and better. I will tell you the tale of my
Speaker 1: wanderings and of the Herculean labors, as I may call them,
Speaker 1: which I endured, only to find at last the oracle irrefutable.
Speaker 1: After the politicians, I went to the poets, tragic dithyrambic
Speaker 1: in all sorts, and there I said to myself, you
Speaker 1: will be instantly detected. Now you will find out that
Speaker 1: you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took
Speaker 1: them some of the most elaborate passages in their own
Speaker 1: writings and ask them what was the meaning of them,
Speaker 1: thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me?
Speaker 1: I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I
Speaker 1: must say that there is hardly a person present who
Speaker 1: will not have talked better about their poetry than they
Speaker 1: did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do
Speaker 1: poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration.
Speaker 1: They are like diviners or soothsayers, who also say many
Speaker 1: fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them.
Speaker 1: The poets appear to me to be much in the
Speaker 1: same case. And I further observe that upon the strength
Speaker 1: of their poetry, they believe themselves to be the wisest
Speaker 1: of men, and other things in which they are not wise.
Speaker 1: So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them,
Speaker 1: for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.
Speaker 1: At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious
Speaker 1: that I knew nothing at all, as I may say,
Speaker 1: and I was sure that they knew many fine things.
Speaker 1: And here I was not mistaken, for they did know
Speaker 1: many things of which I was ignorant, and in this
Speaker 1: they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed
Speaker 1: that even the good artisans fell into the same error
Speaker 1: as the poets. Because they were good workmen, they thought
Speaker 1: that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and
Speaker 1: this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom. And therefore I
Speaker 1: asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether I would
Speaker 1: like to be as I was neither having their knowledge
Speaker 1: nor their ignorance, or liked them in both. And I
Speaker 1: made answer to myself and to the Oracle, that I
Speaker 1: was better off as I was. This inquisition has led
Speaker 1: to my having many enemies of the worst and most
Speaker 1: dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies.
Speaker 1: And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine
Speaker 1: that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting others.
Speaker 1: But the truth is O Men of Athens, that God
Speaker 1: only is wise, And by his answer he intends to
Speaker 1: show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing.
Speaker 1: He is not speaking of Socrates. He is only using
Speaker 1: my name by way of illustration, as if he said he,
Speaker 1: O Men is the wisest who likes Socrates knows that
Speaker 1: his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I
Speaker 1: go about the world, obedient to the God, and search
Speaker 1: and make inquiry into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen
Speaker 1: or stranger, who appears to be wise. And if he
Speaker 1: is not wise, then in indication of the oracle, I
Speaker 1: show him that he is not wise. And my occupation
Speaker 1: quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give
Speaker 1: either to any public matter of interest, or to any
Speaker 1: concern of my own. But I am in utter poverty
Speaker 1: by reason of my devotion to the God. There is
Speaker 1: another thing. Young men of the richer classes, who have
Speaker 1: not much to do, come about me of their own accord.
Speaker 1: They like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often
Speaker 1: imitate me and proceed to examine others. There are plenty
Speaker 1: of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they
Speaker 1: know something, but really know little or nothing. And then
Speaker 1: those who are examined by them, instead of being angry
Speaker 1: with themselves, are angry with me. This confounded Socrates. They say,
Speaker 1: this vilenous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them,
Speaker 1: why what evil does he practice or teach? They do
Speaker 1: not know and cannot tell. But in order that they
Speaker 1: may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat
Speaker 1: the ready made charges which are used against all philosophers,
Speaker 1: about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth,
Speaker 1: and having no gods, and making the worse appear the
Speaker 1: better cause, for they do not like to confess that
Speaker 1: their pretensive knowledge has been detected, which is the truth.
Speaker 1: And as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and
Speaker 1: are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues.
Speaker 1: They have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies.
Speaker 1: And this is the reason why my three accusers, Militus
Speaker 1: and Anaitis and Lycon have set upon me. Melitus, who
Speaker 1: has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets,
Speaker 1: Anitis on behalf of the craftsmen, and politicians like on
Speaker 1: on behalf of the rhetoricians. And as I said at
Speaker 1: the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such
Speaker 1: a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this,
Speaker 1: o Men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth.
Speaker 1: I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet
Speaker 1: I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me.
Speaker 1: And what is their hatred but a proof that I
Speaker 1: am speaking the truth. Hence has arisen the prejudice against me,
Speaker 1: And this is the reason of it. As you will
Speaker 1: find out, either in this or in any future inquiry,
Speaker 1: I have said enough in my defense against the first
Speaker 1: class of my accusers. I turn to the second class.
Speaker 1: They are headed by Militus, that good man and true
Speaker 1: lover of his country, as he calls himself against these two,
Speaker 1: I must try to make a defense. Let the wh
Speaker 1: affidavit be read. It contains something of this kind. It
Speaker 1: says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts
Speaker 1: the youth, and who does not believe in the gods
Speaker 1: of the state, but has other new divinities of his own,
Speaker 1: such as the charge. But now let us examine thee
Speaker 1: particular accounts. He says that I am a doer of
Speaker 1: evil and corrupt the youth. But I say, o, men
Speaker 1: of Athens, that Melitus is a doer of evil, in
Speaker 1: that he pretends to be in earnest when he is
Speaker 1: only in jest, and is so eager to bring men
Speaker 1: to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters
Speaker 1: in which he really never had the smallest interest. And
Speaker 1: the truth of this I will endeavor to prove to you.
Speaker 1: Come hither, Melitus, and let me ask a question of you.
Speaker 1: You think a great deal about the improvement of youth? Yes,
Speaker 1: I do. Tell the judges, then, who is their improver?
Speaker 1: For you must know, as you have taken the pain
Speaker 1: to discover their corruptor, and are citing and accusing me
Speaker 1: before them. Speak then, and tell the judges who their
Speaker 1: improver is. Observe Melitus that you are silent and have
Speaker 1: nothing to say. But is this not rather disgraceful and
Speaker 1: a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that
Speaker 1: you have no interest in the matter, Speak a friend
Speaker 1: and tell us who their improver is the laws. But that,
Speaker 1: my good, sir, is not my meaning. I want to
Speaker 1: know who the person is who in the first place
Speaker 1: knows the laws. The judges, Socrates, or are present in court.
Speaker 1: What do you mean to say, Melitus, that they are
Speaker 1: able to instruct and improve youth? Certainly they are what
Speaker 1: all of them, or some only and not others? All
Speaker 1: of them, by the goddess hair, That is good news.
Speaker 1: There are plenty of improvers then, And what do you
Speaker 1: say of this audience? Do they improve them? Yes they do?
Speaker 1: And the senators, Yes, the senators improve them. But perhaps
Speaker 1: the members of the assembly corrupt them? Or do they
Speaker 1: too improve them? They improve them? Then every Athenian improves
Speaker 1: and elevates them all, with the exception of myself, and
Speaker 1: I alone am their corruptor? Is that what you affirm?
Speaker 1: That is what I stoutly affirm. I am very unfortunate
Speaker 1: if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question,
Speaker 1: how about horses? Does one man do them harm and
Speaker 1: all the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth.
Speaker 1: One man is able to do them good, or at
Speaker 1: least not many the trainer of horses, that is to say,
Speaker 1: does them good? And others who have to do with
Speaker 1: them rather injure them? Is that not true, Militus, of
Speaker 1: horses or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is
Speaker 1: whether you and anidas say yes or no. Happy Indeed
Speaker 1: would be the condition of youth if they had one
Speaker 1: corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were
Speaker 1: their improvers. But you, militus, have sufficiently shown that you
Speaker 1: never had a thought about the young. Your carelessness is
Speaker 1: seen in your not caring about the very things which
Speaker 1: you bring against me. And now, Malitus, I will ask
Speaker 1: you another question, by zeus, I will which is better
Speaker 1: to live among bad citizens or among good ones? Answer? Friend,
Speaker 1: I say, the question is one which may be easily answered.
Speaker 1: Do not the good do their neighbors good? And the
Speaker 1: bad do them evil? Certainly? And is there anyone who
Speaker 1: would rather be injured than benefited by those who live
Speaker 1: with him? Answer? My good friend, the law requires you
Speaker 1: to answer, does anyone like to be injured? Certainly not.
Speaker 1: And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth,
Speaker 1: do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally intentionally?
Speaker 1: I say, but you have just admitted that the good
Speaker 1: do their neighbors good, and the evil do them evil.
Speaker 1: Now is that a truth which your superior wisdom has
Speaker 1: recognized this early in life? Or am I, at my
Speaker 1: age in such darkness and ignorance as to not know
Speaker 1: that if a man with whom I have to live
Speaker 1: is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be
Speaker 1: harmed by him, And yet I corrupt him, and intentionally too.
Speaker 1: So you say, although neither I nor any other human
Speaker 1: being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But
Speaker 1: either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally,
Speaker 1: and on either view of the case, you lie. If
Speaker 1: my offense is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of
Speaker 1: unintentional offenses. You ought to have taken me privately and
Speaker 1: warned me and admonished me, Or if I had been
Speaker 1: better advised, I should have left off doing what I
Speaker 1: only did unintentionally, no doubt I should, but you would
Speaker 1: have nothing to say to me, and refused to teach me.
Speaker 1: And now you bring me up in this court, which
Speaker 1: is a place not of instruction but of punishment. It
Speaker 1: will be very clear to you Athenians, as I was
Speaker 1: saying that Melitus has no care at all, great or
Speaker 1: small about the matter. But still I should like to know, Melitus,
Speaker 1: in what I am affirmed to corrupt the youth. I
Speaker 1: suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that
Speaker 1: I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the
Speaker 1: state acknowledges, but some other new divinities are spiritual agencies
Speaker 1: in their stead. These are the lessons by which I
Speaker 1: corrupt the youth. As you say, yes, I say that emphatically.
Speaker 1: Then by the gods, Melitus, of whom we are speaking,
Speaker 1: tell me in the court in somewhat plainer terms what
Speaker 1: you mean, For I do not as yet understand whether
Speaker 1: you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods,
Speaker 1: and therefore that I do believe in gods and am
Speaker 1: not an entire Atheist's this you do not lay to
Speaker 1: my charge, but only you say that they are not
Speaker 1: the same gods which the city recognizes. The charge is
Speaker 1: that they are different gods? Or do you mean that
Speaker 1: I am an atheist simply and a teacher of atheism?
Speaker 1: I mean the latter, that you are a complete atheist.
Speaker 1: What an extraordinary statement. Why do you think so, Melitus?
Speaker 1: Do you mean that I do not believe in the
Speaker 1: godhead of the Sun are moon like other men? I
Speaker 1: assure you, judges that he does not, for he says
Speaker 1: that the Sun is stone and the moon earth. Friend, Melitus,
Speaker 1: you think that you are accusant Anaxagoras, And you have
Speaker 1: but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy
Speaker 1: them illiterate to such a degree as not to know
Speaker 1: that these doctrines are found in the book of Anaxagoras
Speaker 1: the Plazomenian, which are full of them, and so forsooth
Speaker 1: the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates,
Speaker 1: when there are not unfrequently exhibition of them at the theater.
Speaker 1: Probably an allusion to Aristophanes, who caricatured, and to Euripides,
Speaker 1: who borrow the notions of Anaxagorus, as well as other
Speaker 1: dramatic poets. Price of admission won Drachma at the most,
Speaker 1: and they might pay their money and laugh at Socrates
Speaker 1: if he pretends to follow these extraordinary views. And so, militus,
Speaker 1: you really think that I do not believe in any god?
Speaker 1: I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely and none
Speaker 1: at all. Nobody will believe you, Melitus, And I am
Speaker 1: pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot
Speaker 1: help thinking men of Athens that Melitus is reckless and imprudent,
Speaker 1: and that he has written this indictment in a spirit
Speaker 1: of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded
Speaker 1: a riddle? Thinking to try me? He said to himself,
Speaker 1: I shall see whether the w my Socrates will discover
Speaker 1: my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be able to
Speaker 1: deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly
Speaker 1: does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment,
Speaker 1: as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty
Speaker 1: of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing
Speaker 1: in them. But this is not like a person who
Speaker 1: is in earnest. I should like you, o, men of Athens,
Speaker 1: to join me in examining what I conceive to be
Speaker 1: his inconsistency, And do you, Melitus answer? And I must
Speaker 1: remind the audience of my request that they would not
Speaker 1: make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner.
Speaker 1: Did ever man, Melitus believe in the existence of human beings?
Speaker 1: And not of human beings? I wish men of Athens
Speaker 1: that he would answer and not be always trying to
Speaker 1: get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in
Speaker 1: horsemanship and not in horses? Are in flute playing and
Speaker 1: not in flute players? No, my friend, I will answer
Speaker 1: to you and to the court. As you refuse to
Speaker 1: answer for yourself, there is no man who ever did.
Speaker 1: But now please to answer the next question. Can a
Speaker 1: man believe in spiritual and divine agencies and not in spirits?
Speaker 1: Are demi gods? He cannot? How lucky I am to
Speaker 1: have extracted that answer by the assistance of the court.
Speaker 1: But then you swear in the indictment that I teach
Speaker 1: and believe in divine are spiritual agencies new or old?
Speaker 1: No matter for that at any rate, I believe in
Speaker 1: spiritual agencies, so you say and swear in the appidavit.
Speaker 1: And yet if I believe in divine beings, how can
Speaker 1: I help believing in spirits are demigods? Must I not?
Speaker 1: To be sure? I must? And therefore I may assume
Speaker 1: that your silence gives consent. Now, what are spirits or
Speaker 1: demi gods? Are they not either gods or the sons
Speaker 1: of gods? Certainly they are. But this is what I
Speaker 1: call the facetious riddle invented by you. The demigods are
Speaker 1: spirits or gods? And you say first that I do
Speaker 1: not believe in gods, and then again that I do
Speaker 1: believe in gods, that is if I believe in demigods.
Speaker 1: For if the demi gods are the illegitimate sons of gods,
Speaker 1: whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers of
Speaker 1: whom they are said to be the sons, what human
Speaker 1: being will ever believe that there are no gods? If
Speaker 1: they are the sons of gods, you might as well
Speaker 1: affirm the existence of mules and deny that of horses
Speaker 1: and asses. Such nonsense belitis could only have been intended
Speaker 1: by you to make trial of me. You have put
Speaker 1: this into the indictment because you had nothing real of
Speaker 1: which to accuse me. But no one who has a
Speaker 1: particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that
Speaker 1: the same men can believe in divine and supernatural things
Speaker 1: and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods
Speaker 1: and heroes. I have said enough in answer to the
Speaker 1: charge of Malitus. Any elaborate defense is unnecessary. But I
Speaker 1: know only too well how many are the enmities which
Speaker 1: I have incurred. And this is what will be my
Speaker 1: destruction if I am destroyed. Not Alitus, nor yet Anitis,
Speaker 1: but the envy and detraction of the world, which has
Speaker 1: been the death of many good men, and will probably
Speaker 1: be the death of many more. There is no danger
Speaker 1: of my being the last of them. Some will say,
Speaker 1: are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life
Speaker 1: which is likely to bring you to an untimely end?
Speaker 1: To him, I may fairly answer, there you are mistaken.
Speaker 1: A man who is good for anything ought not to
Speaker 1: calculate the chance of living or dying. He ought only
Speaker 1: to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right
Speaker 1: or wrong, acting the part of a good man or
Speaker 1: of a bad Whereas, upon your view, the heroes who
Speaker 1: fell at Troy were not good for much, and the
Speaker 1: son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in
Speaker 1: comparison with disgrace. And when he was so eager to
Speaker 1: slay Hector, his goddess Mother said to him that if
Speaker 1: he avenged his companion Petrocolus and slew Hector, he would
Speaker 1: die himself. Fate, she said, in these are the like
Speaker 1: words waits for you next after Hector. He received this
Speaker 1: warning utterly despise danger and death, and instead of fearing them,
Speaker 1: feared rather to live in dishonor and not to avenge
Speaker 1: his friend. Let me die forthwith, he replies, and be
Speaker 1: avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the
Speaker 1: beaked ships, a laughing stock and a burden of the earth.
Speaker 1: Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever
Speaker 1: a man's place is, whether the place which he has
Speaker 1: chosen or that in which he has been placed by
Speaker 1: a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour
Speaker 1: of danger, he should not think of death or of
Speaker 1: anything but of disgrace. And this omen of Athens is
Speaker 1: a true saying. End of Part one