Speaker 1: Chapter thirteen of Considerations on Representative Government. This LibriVox recording
Speaker 1: is in the public domain. Considerations on Representative Government by
Speaker 1: John Stuart Mill, Chapter thirteen of a Second Chamber. Of
Speaker 1: all topics relating to the theory of representative government, none
Speaker 1: have been the subject of more discussion, especially on the continent,
Speaker 1: than what is known as the question of the two chambers.
Speaker 1: It is occupied a greater amount of the attention of
Speaker 1: thinkers than many questions of ten times its importance, and
Speaker 1: has been regarded as a sort of touchstone which distinguishes
Speaker 1: the partisans of limited from those of uncontrolled democracy. For
Speaker 1: my own part, I set little value on any check
Speaker 1: which a second chamber can apply to a democracy otherwise unchecked,
Speaker 1: and I am inclined to think that if all other
Speaker 1: constitutional questions are rightly decided, it is of comparatively little
Speaker 1: importance whether the Parliament consists of two chambers or only
Speaker 1: of one. If there are two chambers, they may either
Speaker 1: be of similar or of dissimilar composition. If of similar,
Speaker 1: both will obey the same influences, and whatever has a
Speaker 1: majority in one of the houses will be likely to
Speaker 1: have it in the other. It is true that the
Speaker 1: necessity of obtaining the consent of both to the passing
Speaker 1: of any measure may at times be a material obstacle
Speaker 1: to improvement, since, assuming both the houses to be representative
Speaker 1: and equal in their numbers, a number slightly exceeding a
Speaker 1: fourth of the entire representation may prevent the passing of
Speaker 1: a bill, while if there is but one house, a
Speaker 1: bill is secure a passing if it has a bare majority.
Speaker 1: But the case supposed is rather abstractedly possible than likely
Speaker 1: to occur. In practice, it will not often happen that
Speaker 1: of two houses similarly composed, one will be almost unanimous
Speaker 1: and the other nearly equally divided. If a majority in
Speaker 1: one rejects a measure, there will generally have been a
Speaker 1: large minority unfavorable to it in the other. Any improvement therefore,
Speaker 1: which could be thus impeded, would in almost all cases
Speaker 1: be one which had not much more than a single
Speaker 1: majority in the entire body, And the worst consequence that
Speaker 1: could ensue would be to delay for a short time
Speaker 1: the passing of the measure, or give rise to a
Speaker 1: fresh appeal to the electors to ascertain if the small
Speaker 1: majority in Parliament corresponded to an effective one in the country,
Speaker 1: the inconvenience of delay, and the advantages of the appeal
Speaker 1: to the nation might be regarded in this case as
Speaker 1: about equally balanced. I attached little weight to the argument
Speaker 1: oftenest urged for having two chambers to prevent precipitancy and
Speaker 1: compel a second deliberation, for it must be a very
Speaker 1: ill constituted representative assembly in which the established forms of
Speaker 1: business do not require many more than two deliberations. The
Speaker 1: consideration which tells most in my judgment in favor of
Speaker 1: two chambers, and this I do regard as of some moment,
Speaker 1: is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any
Speaker 1: holder of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by
Speaker 1: the consciousness of having only themselves to consult. It is
Speaker 1: important that no set of persons should be able, even temporarily,
Speaker 1: to make their sick volo prevail without asking any one
Speaker 1: else for his consent. A majority in a single assembly,
Speaker 1: when it has assumed a permanent character, when composed of
Speaker 1: the same persons, habitually acting together, and always assured a
Speaker 1: victory in their own house, easily becomes despotic and overweening.
Speaker 1: If released from the necessity of considering whether its acts
Speaker 1: will be concurred in by another constituted authority. The same
Speaker 1: reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls makes
Speaker 1: it desirable there should be two chambers, that neither of
Speaker 1: them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power,
Speaker 1: even for the space of the single year. One of
Speaker 1: the most indispensable requisites in the practical conduct of politics,
Speaker 1: especially in the management of free institutions, is conciliation. A
Speaker 1: readiness to compromise, a willingness to concede something to opponents,
Speaker 1: and to shape good measures so as to be as
Speaker 1: little offensive as possible to persons of opposite views. And
Speaker 1: of this salutary habit, the mutual give and take, as
Speaker 1: it has been called between two houses, is a perpetual school,
Speaker 1: useful as such even now, and its utility would probably
Speaker 1: be even more felt in a more democratic constitution of
Speaker 1: the legislature. But the houses need not both be of
Speaker 1: the same composition. They may be intended as a check
Speaker 1: on one another, one being supposed democratic, the other will
Speaker 1: naturally be constituted with a view to its being some
Speaker 1: restraint upon the democracy. But its efficacy in this respect
Speaker 1: wholly depends on the social support which it can command
Speaker 1: outside the house. An assembly which does not rest on
Speaker 1: the basis of some great power in the country is
Speaker 1: ineffectual against one which does. An aristocratic house is only
Speaker 1: powerful in an aristocratic state of society. The House of
Speaker 1: Lords was once the strongest power in our constitution, and
Speaker 1: the Commons only a checking body, but this was when
Speaker 1: the barons were almost the only power out of doors.
Speaker 1: I cannot believe that in a really democratic state of
Speaker 1: society the House of Lords would be of any practical
Speaker 1: value as a moderator of democracy. When the force on
Speaker 1: one side is feeble in comparison with that on the other,
Speaker 1: the way to give it effect is not to draw
Speaker 1: both out in line and muster their strength in open
Speaker 1: field over against one another. Such tactics would ensure the
Speaker 1: utter defeat of the less powerful. It can only act
Speaker 1: to advantage by not holding itself apart and compelling everyone
Speaker 1: to declare himself either with or against it, but taking
Speaker 1: a position among the crowd rather than an opposition to it,
Speaker 1: and drawing to itself the elements most capable of allying
Speaker 1: themselves with it on any given point, not appearing at
Speaker 1: all as an antagonist's body to provoke a general rally
Speaker 1: against it, but working as one of the elements in
Speaker 1: a mixed mass, infusing its leaven, and often making what
Speaker 1: would be the weaker part the stronger by the addition
Speaker 1: of its influence. The really moderating power in a democratic
Speaker 1: constitution must act in and through the democratic house. That
Speaker 1: there should be in every polity a center of resistance
Speaker 1: to the predominant power in the constitution, and in a
Speaker 1: democratic constitution therefore a nucleus of resistance to the democracy
Speaker 1: I have already maintained, and I regard it as a
Speaker 1: fundamental maxim of government. If any people who possess a
Speaker 1: democratic representation are from their historical antecedents more willing to
Speaker 1: tolerate such a center of resistance in the form of
Speaker 1: a second chamber or House of lords than in any
Speaker 1: other shape, this constitutes a stronger reason for having it
Speaker 1: in that shape. But it does not appear to me
Speaker 1: the best shape in itself, nor by any means, the
Speaker 1: most efficacious for its object. If there are two houses,
Speaker 1: one considered to represent the people, the other to represent
Speaker 1: only a class, or not to be representative at all,
Speaker 1: I cannot think that where democracy is the ruling power
Speaker 1: in society, the second house would have any real ability
Speaker 1: to resist even the aberrations of the first. It might
Speaker 1: be suffered to exist in deference to habit and association,
Speaker 1: but not as an effective check. If it exercised an
Speaker 1: independent will, it would be required to do so in
Speaker 1: the same general spirit as the other house, to be
Speaker 1: equally democratic with it, and to content itself with correcting
Speaker 1: the accidental oversights of the more popular branch of the legislature,
Speaker 1: or competing with it in popular measures. The practicability of
Speaker 1: any real check on the ascendancy of the majority depends
Speaker 1: henceforth on the distribution of strength in the most popular
Speaker 1: branch of the governing body, and I have indicated the
Speaker 1: mode in which, to the best of my judgment, a
Speaker 1: balance of forces might most advantageously be established there. I
Speaker 1: have also pointed out that even if the numerical majority
Speaker 1: were allowed to exercise complete predominance by means of a
Speaker 1: corresponding majority in Parliament, yet if minorities also are permitted
Speaker 1: to enjoy the equal right due to them on strictly
Speaker 1: democratic principles of being represented proportionally to their numbers, this
Speaker 1: provision will insure the perpetual presence in the House by
Speaker 1: the same popular title as its other members of so
Speaker 1: many of the first intellects in the country, that, without
Speaker 1: being in any way banded apart or invested with any
Speaker 1: invidious prerogative, this portion of the national representation will have
Speaker 1: a personal weight much more than in proportion to its
Speaker 1: numerical strength, and will afford, in a most effective form,
Speaker 1: the moral center of resistance which is needed. A second
Speaker 1: chamber therefore, is not required for this purpose, and would
Speaker 1: not contribute to it, but might even in some degree
Speaker 1: tend to compromise it, if, however, for the other reasons
Speaker 1: already mentioned, the decision were taken that there should be
Speaker 1: such a chamber, it is desirable that it should be
Speaker 1: composed of elements which, without being open to the imputation
Speaker 1: of class interests adverse to the majority, would incline it
Speaker 1: to oppose itself to the class interests of the majority,
Speaker 1: and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against
Speaker 1: their errors and weaknesses. These conditions evidently are not found
Speaker 1: in a body constituted in the manner of our House
Speaker 1: of Lords. So soon as conventional rank and individual riches
Speaker 1: no longer over all the democracy, a house of lords
Speaker 1: becomes insignificant. Of all principles on which a wisely conservative
Speaker 1: body destined to moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy could possibly
Speaker 1: be constructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in
Speaker 1: the Roman Senate itself, the most consistently prudent and sagacious
Speaker 1: body that ever administered public affairs. The deficiencies of a
Speaker 1: democratic assembly which represents the general public are the deficiencies
Speaker 1: of the public itself want of special training and knowledge.
Speaker 1: The appropriate corrective is to associate with it a body
Speaker 1: of which special training and knowledge should be the characteristics.
Speaker 1: If one house represents popular feeling, the other should represent
Speaker 1: personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service, and
Speaker 1: fortified by practical experience. If one is the People's Chamber,
Speaker 1: the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen, a council
Speaker 1: composed of all living public men who have passed through
Speaker 1: important political office or employment. Such a chamber would be
Speaker 1: fitted for much more than to be a merely moderating body.
Speaker 1: It would not be exclusively a check, but also an
Speaker 1: impelling force. In its hands, the power of holding the
Speaker 1: people back would be vested in those most competent, and
Speaker 1: who would then be most inclined to lead them forward
Speaker 1: in any right course. The council, to whom the task
Speaker 1: would be entrusted of rectifying the people's mistakes, would not
Speaker 1: represent a class believed to be opposed to their interest,
Speaker 1: but would consist of their own natural leaders in the
Speaker 1: path of progress. No mode of composition could approach to this.
Speaker 1: In giving weight and efficacy to their function of moderators.
Speaker 1: It would be impossible to cry down a body, always
Speaker 1: foremost in promoting improvements, as a mere obstructive body, whatever
Speaker 1: amount of mischief it might obstruct. Were the place vacant
Speaker 1: in England for such a senate, I need scarcely say
Speaker 1: that this is a mere hypothesis. It might be composed
Speaker 1: of some such elements as the following. All who were
Speaker 1: or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in
Speaker 1: a former chapter, and which I regard as an indispensable
Speaker 1: ingredient in a well constituted popular government. All who were
Speaker 1: or had been chief justices or heads of any of
Speaker 1: the superior courts of law or equity. All who had
Speaker 1: for five years filled the office of puisne judge. All
Speaker 1: who had held for two years any cabinet office. But
Speaker 1: these should also be eligible to the House of Commons,
Speaker 1: and if elected members of it, their peerage or senatorial
Speaker 1: office should be held in suspense. The condition of time
Speaker 1: is needed to prevent persons from being named cabinet ministers
Speaker 1: merely to give them a seat in the Senate, and
Speaker 1: the period of two years is suggested that the same
Speaker 1: term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them
Speaker 1: to a senatorship. All who had filled the office of
Speaker 1: Commander in Chief, and all who having commanded an army
Speaker 1: or a fleet have been thanked by Parliament for military
Speaker 1: or naval successes. All Governors General of ind or British America,
Speaker 1: and all who had held for ten years any colonial governorships.
Speaker 1: The permanent civil service should also be represented. All should
Speaker 1: be senators who had filled during ten years the important
Speaker 1: offices of Under Secretary to the Treasury, permanent under Secretary
Speaker 1: of State, or any others equally high and responsible. The
Speaker 1: functions conferring the senatorial dignity should be limited to those
Speaker 1: of a legal, political, or military or naval character. Scientific
Speaker 1: and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable. They imply
Speaker 1: a power of selection, whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves.
Speaker 1: If the writings by which reputation has been gained are
Speaker 1: unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the special
Speaker 1: qualities required, while if political, they would enable successive ministries
Speaker 1: to deluge the House with party tools. The historical antecedents
Speaker 1: of England render it all but certain that unless in
Speaker 1: the improbable case of a violent subversion of the existing constitution,
Speaker 1: any second chamber which could possibly exist, would have to
Speaker 1: be built on the foundation of the House of Lords.
Speaker 1: It is out of the question to think practically of
Speaker 1: abolishing that Assembly, to replace it by such a Senate
Speaker 1: as I have sketched, or by any other. But there
Speaker 1: might not be the same insuperable difficulty in aggregating the
Speaker 1: classes or categories just spoken of to the existing body
Speaker 1: in the character appears for life an ulterior and perhaps
Speaker 1: on this supposition a necessary step might be that the
Speaker 1: hereditary peerage should be present in the House by their
Speaker 1: representatives instead of personally, a practice already established in the
Speaker 1: case of the Scotch and Irish peers, in which the
Speaker 1: mere multiplication of the order will probably at some time
Speaker 1: or other render inevitable. An easy adaptation of mister Hare's
Speaker 1: plan would prevent the representat neative peers from representing exclusively
Speaker 1: the party which has the majority in the peerage. If,
Speaker 1: for example, one representative were allowed for every ten peers,
Speaker 1: any ten might be admitted to choose a representative, and
Speaker 1: the peers might be free to group themselves for that
Speaker 1: purpose as they pleased. The election might be thus conducted.
Speaker 1: All peers who were candidates for the representation of their
Speaker 1: order should be required to declare themselves such and enter
Speaker 1: their names in a list. A day and place should
Speaker 1: be appointed at which peers desirous of voting should be present,
Speaker 1: either in person or in the usual parliamentary manner by
Speaker 1: their proxies. The votes should be taken, each peer voting
Speaker 1: for only one. Every candidate who has as many as
Speaker 1: ten votes should be declared elected. If any one had more,
Speaker 1: all but ten should be allowed to withdraw their votes,
Speaker 1: or ten of the numbers should be selected by lot.
Speaker 1: These ten would form his constituency, and the remainder of
Speaker 1: his voters would be set free to give their votes
Speaker 1: over again for someone else. This process should be repeated
Speaker 1: until so far as possible, every peer present, either personally
Speaker 1: or by proxy, was represented. When a number less than
Speaker 1: ten remained over. If amounting to five, they might still
Speaker 1: be allowed to agree on a representative. If fewer than five,
Speaker 1: their votes must be lost, or they might be permitted
Speaker 1: to record them in favor of somebody already elected. With
Speaker 1: this inconsiderable exception, every representative peer would represent ten members
Speaker 1: of the peerage, all of whom had not only voted
Speaker 1: for him, but selected him as the one among all
Speaker 1: open to their choice, by whom they were most desirous
Speaker 1: to be represented. As a compensation to the peers who
Speaker 1: were not chosen representatives of their order, they should be
Speaker 1: eligible to the House of Commons, a justice now refused
Speaker 1: to Scotch peers and to Irish peers in their own
Speaker 1: part of the kingdom, while the representation in the House
Speaker 1: of Lords of any but the most numerous party in
Speaker 1: the peerage is denied equally to both. The mode of
Speaker 1: composing a Senate, which has been here advocated, not only
Speaker 1: seems the best in itself, but is that for which
Speaker 1: historical precedent and actual brilliant success can to the greatest
Speaker 1: extent be pleaded. It is not, however, the only feasible
Speaker 1: plan that might be proposed. Another possible mode of forming
Speaker 1: a second chamber would be to have it elected by
Speaker 1: the first, subject to the restriction that they should not
Speaker 1: nominate any of their own members. Such an assembly, emanating,
Speaker 1: like the American Senate, from popular choice only once removed,
Speaker 1: would not be considered to clash with democratic institutions, and
Speaker 1: would probably acquire considerable popular influence from the mode of
Speaker 1: its nomination. It would be peculiarly unlikely to excite the
Speaker 1: jealousy of, or to come into hostile collision with the
Speaker 1: popular House. It would, moreover do provision being made for
Speaker 1: the representation of the minority, almost sure to be well composed,
Speaker 1: and to comprise many of that class of highly capable men, who,
Speaker 1: either from accident or from want of show equalities, had
Speaker 1: been unwilling to seek or unable to obtain the suffrages
Speaker 1: of a popular constituency. The best constitution of a second
Speaker 1: chamber is that which embodies the greatest number of elements
Speaker 1: exempt from the class, interests and prejudices of the majority,
Speaker 1: but having in themselves nothing offensive to democratic feeling. I repeat, however,
Speaker 1: that the main reliance for tempering the ascendancy of the
Speaker 1: majority can be placed in a second chamber of any kind.
Speaker 1: The character of a representative government is fixed by the
Speaker 1: constitution of the Popular House. Compared with this, all other
Speaker 1: questions relating to the form of government are insignificant. End
Speaker 1: of Chapter thirteen, Recording by Bill Burst