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<v Speaker 1>Chapter thirteen of Considerations on Representative Government. This LibriVox recording

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<v Speaker 1>is in the public domain. Considerations on Representative Government by

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<v Speaker 1>John Stuart Mill, Chapter thirteen of a Second Chamber. Of

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<v Speaker 1>all topics relating to the theory of representative government, none

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<v Speaker 1>have been the subject of more discussion, especially on the continent,

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<v Speaker 1>than what is known as the question of the two chambers.

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<v Speaker 1>It is occupied a greater amount of the attention of

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<v Speaker 1>thinkers than many questions of ten times its importance, and

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<v Speaker 1>has been regarded as a sort of touchstone which distinguishes

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<v Speaker 1>the partisans of limited from those of uncontrolled democracy. For

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<v Speaker 1>my own part, I set little value on any check

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<v Speaker 1>which a second chamber can apply to a democracy otherwise unchecked,

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<v Speaker 1>and I am inclined to think that if all other

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<v Speaker 1>constitutional questions are rightly decided, it is of comparatively little

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<v Speaker 1>importance whether the Parliament consists of two chambers or only

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<v Speaker 1>of one. If there are two chambers, they may either

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<v Speaker 1>be of similar or of dissimilar composition. If of similar,

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<v Speaker 1>both will obey the same influences, and whatever has a

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<v Speaker 1>majority in one of the houses will be likely to

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<v Speaker 1>have it in the other. It is true that the

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<v Speaker 1>necessity of obtaining the consent of both to the passing

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<v Speaker 1>of any measure may at times be a material obstacle

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<v Speaker 1>to improvement, since, assuming both the houses to be representative

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<v Speaker 1>and equal in their numbers, a number slightly exceeding a

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<v Speaker 1>fourth of the entire representation may prevent the passing of

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<v Speaker 1>a bill, while if there is but one house, a

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<v Speaker 1>bill is secure a passing if it has a bare majority.

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<v Speaker 1>But the case supposed is rather abstractedly possible than likely

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<v Speaker 1>to occur. In practice, it will not often happen that

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<v Speaker 1>of two houses similarly composed, one will be almost unanimous

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<v Speaker 1>and the other nearly equally divided. If a majority in

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<v Speaker 1>one rejects a measure, there will generally have been a

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<v Speaker 1>large minority unfavorable to it in the other. Any improvement therefore,

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<v Speaker 1>which could be thus impeded, would in almost all cases

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<v Speaker 1>be one which had not much more than a single

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<v Speaker 1>majority in the entire body, And the worst consequence that

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<v Speaker 1>could ensue would be to delay for a short time

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<v Speaker 1>the passing of the measure, or give rise to a

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<v Speaker 1>fresh appeal to the electors to ascertain if the small

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<v Speaker 1>majority in Parliament corresponded to an effective one in the country,

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<v Speaker 1>the inconvenience of delay, and the advantages of the appeal

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<v Speaker 1>to the nation might be regarded in this case as

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<v Speaker 1>about equally balanced. I attached little weight to the argument

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<v Speaker 1>oftenest urged for having two chambers to prevent precipitancy and

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<v Speaker 1>compel a second deliberation, for it must be a very

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<v Speaker 1>ill constituted representative assembly in which the established forms of

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<v Speaker 1>business do not require many more than two deliberations. The

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<v Speaker 1>consideration which tells most in my judgment in favor of

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<v Speaker 1>two chambers, and this I do regard as of some moment,

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<v Speaker 1>is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any

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<v Speaker 1>holder of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by

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<v Speaker 1>the consciousness of having only themselves to consult. It is

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<v Speaker 1>important that no set of persons should be able, even temporarily,

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<v Speaker 1>to make their sick volo prevail without asking any one

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<v Speaker 1>else for his consent. A majority in a single assembly,

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<v Speaker 1>when it has assumed a permanent character, when composed of

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<v Speaker 1>the same persons, habitually acting together, and always assured a

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<v Speaker 1>victory in their own house, easily becomes despotic and overweening.

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<v Speaker 1>If released from the necessity of considering whether its acts

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<v Speaker 1>will be concurred in by another constituted authority. The same

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<v Speaker 1>reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls makes

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<v Speaker 1>it desirable there should be two chambers, that neither of

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<v Speaker 1>them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power,

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<v Speaker 1>even for the space of the single year. One of

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<v Speaker 1>the most indispensable requisites in the practical conduct of politics,

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<v Speaker 1>especially in the management of free institutions, is conciliation. A

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<v Speaker 1>readiness to compromise, a willingness to concede something to opponents,

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<v Speaker 1>and to shape good measures so as to be as

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<v Speaker 1>little offensive as possible to persons of opposite views. And

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<v Speaker 1>of this salutary habit, the mutual give and take, as

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<v Speaker 1>it has been called between two houses, is a perpetual school,

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<v Speaker 1>useful as such even now, and its utility would probably

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<v Speaker 1>be even more felt in a more democratic constitution of

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<v Speaker 1>the legislature. But the houses need not both be of

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<v Speaker 1>the same composition. They may be intended as a check

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<v Speaker 1>on one another, one being supposed democratic, the other will

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<v Speaker 1>naturally be constituted with a view to its being some

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<v Speaker 1>restraint upon the democracy. But its efficacy in this respect

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<v Speaker 1>wholly depends on the social support which it can command

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<v Speaker 1>outside the house. An assembly which does not rest on

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<v Speaker 1>the basis of some great power in the country is

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<v Speaker 1>ineffectual against one which does. An aristocratic house is only

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<v Speaker 1>powerful in an aristocratic state of society. The House of

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<v Speaker 1>Lords was once the strongest power in our constitution, and

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<v Speaker 1>the Commons only a checking body, but this was when

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<v Speaker 1>the barons were almost the only power out of doors.

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<v Speaker 1>I cannot believe that in a really democratic state of

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<v Speaker 1>society the House of Lords would be of any practical

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<v Speaker 1>value as a moderator of democracy. When the force on

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<v Speaker 1>one side is feeble in comparison with that on the other,

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<v Speaker 1>the way to give it effect is not to draw

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<v Speaker 1>both out in line and muster their strength in open

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<v Speaker 1>field over against one another. Such tactics would ensure the

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<v Speaker 1>utter defeat of the less powerful. It can only act

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<v Speaker 1>to advantage by not holding itself apart and compelling everyone

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<v Speaker 1>to declare himself either with or against it, but taking

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<v Speaker 1>a position among the crowd rather than an opposition to it,

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<v Speaker 1>and drawing to itself the elements most capable of allying

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<v Speaker 1>themselves with it on any given point, not appearing at

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<v Speaker 1>all as an antagonist's body to provoke a general rally

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<v Speaker 1>against it, but working as one of the elements in

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<v Speaker 1>a mixed mass, infusing its leaven, and often making what

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<v Speaker 1>would be the weaker part the stronger by the addition

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<v Speaker 1>of its influence. The really moderating power in a democratic

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<v Speaker 1>constitution must act in and through the democratic house. That

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<v Speaker 1>there should be in every polity a center of resistance

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<v Speaker 1>to the predominant power in the constitution, and in a

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<v Speaker 1>democratic constitution therefore a nucleus of resistance to the democracy

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<v Speaker 1>I have already maintained, and I regard it as a

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<v Speaker 1>fundamental maxim of government. If any people who possess a

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<v Speaker 1>democratic representation are from their historical antecedents more willing to

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<v Speaker 1>tolerate such a center of resistance in the form of

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<v Speaker 1>a second chamber or House of lords than in any

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<v Speaker 1>other shape, this constitutes a stronger reason for having it

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<v Speaker 1>in that shape. But it does not appear to me

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<v Speaker 1>the best shape in itself, nor by any means, the

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<v Speaker 1>most efficacious for its object. If there are two houses,

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<v Speaker 1>one considered to represent the people, the other to represent

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<v Speaker 1>only a class, or not to be representative at all,

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<v Speaker 1>I cannot think that where democracy is the ruling power

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<v Speaker 1>in society, the second house would have any real ability

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<v Speaker 1>to resist even the aberrations of the first. It might

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<v Speaker 1>be suffered to exist in deference to habit and association,

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<v Speaker 1>but not as an effective check. If it exercised an

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<v Speaker 1>independent will, it would be required to do so in

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<v Speaker 1>the same general spirit as the other house, to be

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<v Speaker 1>equally democratic with it, and to content itself with correcting

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<v Speaker 1>the accidental oversights of the more popular branch of the legislature,

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<v Speaker 1>or competing with it in popular measures. The practicability of

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<v Speaker 1>any real check on the ascendancy of the majority depends

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<v Speaker 1>henceforth on the distribution of strength in the most popular

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<v Speaker 1>branch of the governing body, and I have indicated the

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<v Speaker 1>mode in which, to the best of my judgment, a

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<v Speaker 1>balance of forces might most advantageously be established there. I

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<v Speaker 1>have also pointed out that even if the numerical majority

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<v Speaker 1>were allowed to exercise complete predominance by means of a

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<v Speaker 1>corresponding majority in Parliament, yet if minorities also are permitted

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<v Speaker 1>to enjoy the equal right due to them on strictly

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<v Speaker 1>democratic principles of being represented proportionally to their numbers, this

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<v Speaker 1>provision will insure the perpetual presence in the House by

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<v Speaker 1>the same popular title as its other members of so

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<v Speaker 1>many of the first intellects in the country, that, without

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<v Speaker 1>being in any way banded apart or invested with any

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<v Speaker 1>invidious prerogative, this portion of the national representation will have

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<v Speaker 1>a personal weight much more than in proportion to its

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<v Speaker 1>numerical strength, and will afford, in a most effective form,

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<v Speaker 1>the moral center of resistance which is needed. A second

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<v Speaker 1>chamber therefore, is not required for this purpose, and would

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<v Speaker 1>not contribute to it, but might even in some degree

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<v Speaker 1>tend to compromise it, if, however, for the other reasons

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<v Speaker 1>already mentioned, the decision were taken that there should be

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<v Speaker 1>such a chamber, it is desirable that it should be

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<v Speaker 1>composed of elements which, without being open to the imputation

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<v Speaker 1>of class interests adverse to the majority, would incline it

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<v Speaker 1>to oppose itself to the class interests of the majority,

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<v Speaker 1>and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against

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<v Speaker 1>their errors and weaknesses. These conditions evidently are not found

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<v Speaker 1>in a body constituted in the manner of our House

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<v Speaker 1>of Lords. So soon as conventional rank and individual riches

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<v Speaker 1>no longer over all the democracy, a house of lords

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<v Speaker 1>becomes insignificant. Of all principles on which a wisely conservative

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<v Speaker 1>body destined to moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy could possibly

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<v Speaker 1>be constructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in

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<v Speaker 1>the Roman Senate itself, the most consistently prudent and sagacious

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<v Speaker 1>body that ever administered public affairs. The deficiencies of a

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<v Speaker 1>democratic assembly which represents the general public are the deficiencies

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<v Speaker 1>of the public itself want of special training and knowledge.

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<v Speaker 1>The appropriate corrective is to associate with it a body

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<v Speaker 1>of which special training and knowledge should be the characteristics.

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<v Speaker 1>If one house represents popular feeling, the other should represent

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<v Speaker 1>personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service, and

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<v Speaker 1>fortified by practical experience. If one is the People's Chamber,

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<v Speaker 1>the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen, a council

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<v Speaker 1>composed of all living public men who have passed through

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<v Speaker 1>important political office or employment. Such a chamber would be

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<v Speaker 1>fitted for much more than to be a merely moderating body.

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<v Speaker 1>It would not be exclusively a check, but also an

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<v Speaker 1>impelling force. In its hands, the power of holding the

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<v Speaker 1>people back would be vested in those most competent, and

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<v Speaker 1>who would then be most inclined to lead them forward

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<v Speaker 1>in any right course. The council, to whom the task

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<v Speaker 1>would be entrusted of rectifying the people's mistakes, would not

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<v Speaker 1>represent a class believed to be opposed to their interest,

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<v Speaker 1>but would consist of their own natural leaders in the

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<v Speaker 1>path of progress. No mode of composition could approach to this.

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<v Speaker 1>In giving weight and efficacy to their function of moderators.

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<v Speaker 1>It would be impossible to cry down a body, always

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<v Speaker 1>foremost in promoting improvements, as a mere obstructive body, whatever

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<v Speaker 1>amount of mischief it might obstruct. Were the place vacant

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<v Speaker 1>in England for such a senate, I need scarcely say

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<v Speaker 1>that this is a mere hypothesis. It might be composed

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<v Speaker 1>of some such elements as the following. All who were

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<v Speaker 1>or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in

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<v Speaker 1>a former chapter, and which I regard as an indispensable

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<v Speaker 1>ingredient in a well constituted popular government. All who were

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<v Speaker 1>or had been chief justices or heads of any of

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<v Speaker 1>the superior courts of law or equity. All who had

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<v Speaker 1>for five years filled the office of puisne judge. All

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<v Speaker 1>who had held for two years any cabinet office. But

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<v Speaker 1>these should also be eligible to the House of Commons,

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<v Speaker 1>and if elected members of it, their peerage or senatorial

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<v Speaker 1>office should be held in suspense. The condition of time

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<v Speaker 1>is needed to prevent persons from being named cabinet ministers

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<v Speaker 1>merely to give them a seat in the Senate, and

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<v Speaker 1>the period of two years is suggested that the same

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<v Speaker 1>term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them

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<v Speaker 1>to a senatorship. All who had filled the office of

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<v Speaker 1>Commander in Chief, and all who having commanded an army

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<v Speaker 1>or a fleet have been thanked by Parliament for military

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<v Speaker 1>or naval successes. All Governors General of ind or British America,

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<v Speaker 1>and all who had held for ten years any colonial governorships.

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<v Speaker 1>The permanent civil service should also be represented. All should

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<v Speaker 1>be senators who had filled during ten years the important

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<v Speaker 1>offices of Under Secretary to the Treasury, permanent under Secretary

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<v Speaker 1>of State, or any others equally high and responsible. The

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<v Speaker 1>functions conferring the senatorial dignity should be limited to those

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<v Speaker 1>of a legal, political, or military or naval character. Scientific

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<v Speaker 1>and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable. They imply

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<v Speaker 1>a power of selection, whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves.

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<v Speaker 1>If the writings by which reputation has been gained are

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<v Speaker 1>unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the special

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<v Speaker 1>qualities required, while if political, they would enable successive ministries

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<v Speaker 1>to deluge the House with party tools. The historical antecedents

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<v Speaker 1>of England render it all but certain that unless in

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<v Speaker 1>the improbable case of a violent subversion of the existing constitution,

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<v Speaker 1>any second chamber which could possibly exist, would have to

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<v Speaker 1>be built on the foundation of the House of Lords.

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<v Speaker 1>It is out of the question to think practically of

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<v Speaker 1>abolishing that Assembly, to replace it by such a Senate

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<v Speaker 1>as I have sketched, or by any other. But there

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<v Speaker 1>might not be the same insuperable difficulty in aggregating the

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<v Speaker 1>classes or categories just spoken of to the existing body

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<v Speaker 1>in the character appears for life an ulterior and perhaps

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<v Speaker 1>on this supposition a necessary step might be that the

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<v Speaker 1>hereditary peerage should be present in the House by their

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<v Speaker 1>representatives instead of personally, a practice already established in the

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<v Speaker 1>case of the Scotch and Irish peers, in which the

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<v Speaker 1>mere multiplication of the order will probably at some time

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<v Speaker 1>or other render inevitable. An easy adaptation of mister Hare's

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<v Speaker 1>plan would prevent the representat neative peers from representing exclusively

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<v Speaker 1>the party which has the majority in the peerage. If,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, one representative were allowed for every ten peers,

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<v Speaker 1>any ten might be admitted to choose a representative, and

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<v Speaker 1>the peers might be free to group themselves for that

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<v Speaker 1>purpose as they pleased. The election might be thus conducted.

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<v Speaker 1>All peers who were candidates for the representation of their

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<v Speaker 1>order should be required to declare themselves such and enter

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<v Speaker 1>their names in a list. A day and place should

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<v Speaker 1>be appointed at which peers desirous of voting should be present,

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<v Speaker 1>either in person or in the usual parliamentary manner by

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<v Speaker 1>their proxies. The votes should be taken, each peer voting

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<v Speaker 1>for only one. Every candidate who has as many as

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<v Speaker 1>ten votes should be declared elected. If any one had more,

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<v Speaker 1>all but ten should be allowed to withdraw their votes,

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<v Speaker 1>or ten of the numbers should be selected by lot.

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<v Speaker 1>These ten would form his constituency, and the remainder of

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<v Speaker 1>his voters would be set free to give their votes

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<v Speaker 1>over again for someone else. This process should be repeated

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<v Speaker 1>until so far as possible, every peer present, either personally

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<v Speaker 1>or by proxy, was represented. When a number less than

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<v Speaker 1>ten remained over. If amounting to five, they might still

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<v Speaker 1>be allowed to agree on a representative. If fewer than five,

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<v Speaker 1>their votes must be lost, or they might be permitted

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<v Speaker 1>to record them in favor of somebody already elected. With

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<v Speaker 1>this inconsiderable exception, every representative peer would represent ten members

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<v Speaker 1>of the peerage, all of whom had not only voted

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<v Speaker 1>for him, but selected him as the one among all

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<v Speaker 1>open to their choice, by whom they were most desirous

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<v Speaker 1>to be represented. As a compensation to the peers who

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<v Speaker 1>were not chosen representatives of their order, they should be

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<v Speaker 1>eligible to the House of Commons, a justice now refused

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<v Speaker 1>to Scotch peers and to Irish peers in their own

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<v Speaker 1>part of the kingdom, while the representation in the House

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<v Speaker 1>of Lords of any but the most numerous party in

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<v Speaker 1>the peerage is denied equally to both. The mode of

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<v Speaker 1>composing a Senate, which has been here advocated, not only

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<v Speaker 1>seems the best in itself, but is that for which

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<v Speaker 1>historical precedent and actual brilliant success can to the greatest

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<v Speaker 1>extent be pleaded. It is not, however, the only feasible

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<v Speaker 1>plan that might be proposed. Another possible mode of forming

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<v Speaker 1>a second chamber would be to have it elected by

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<v Speaker 1>the first, subject to the restriction that they should not

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<v Speaker 1>nominate any of their own members. Such an assembly, emanating,

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<v Speaker 1>like the American Senate, from popular choice only once removed,

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<v Speaker 1>would not be considered to clash with democratic institutions, and

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<v Speaker 1>would probably acquire considerable popular influence from the mode of

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<v Speaker 1>its nomination. It would be peculiarly unlikely to excite the

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<v Speaker 1>jealousy of, or to come into hostile collision with the

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<v Speaker 1>popular House. It would, moreover do provision being made for

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<v Speaker 1>the representation of the minority, almost sure to be well composed,

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<v Speaker 1>and to comprise many of that class of highly capable men, who,

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<v Speaker 1>either from accident or from want of show equalities, had

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<v Speaker 1>been unwilling to seek or unable to obtain the suffrages

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<v Speaker 1>of a popular constituency. The best constitution of a second

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<v Speaker 1>chamber is that which embodies the greatest number of elements

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<v Speaker 1>exempt from the class, interests and prejudices of the majority,

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<v Speaker 1>but having in themselves nothing offensive to democratic feeling. I repeat, however,

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<v Speaker 1>that the main reliance for tempering the ascendancy of the

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<v Speaker 1>majority can be placed in a second chamber of any kind.

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<v Speaker 1>The character of a representative government is fixed by the

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<v Speaker 1>constitution of the Popular House. Compared with this, all other

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<v Speaker 1>questions relating to the form of government are insignificant. End

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<v Speaker 1>of Chapter thirteen, Recording by Bill Burst