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I hope to expand the show even more than it
already has. Thank you so much. I want to welcome
everyone back to the Pekanana Show. Thomas, how have you been?
I'm right, let's uh, let's finish this up talking about
Russia and Syria and I think, uh, I think I
know where you're gonna go with this one, so just
let loose.
Speaker 2: Yeah, sure thing. Yeah, obviously we're coming up to in
the in the University of the Ramadan War. You're there,
the Yan Kapoor War is wait, which interestingly doesn't get
it doesn't appear a lot in media these days. Some
of the fill have made the point in our discussions
that you know, historical events don't really occur anymore. I
mean that, like you know, like Zazec makes that point
a lot, and so some of these other guys who
are kind of trying to salvage what remains a condo philosophy.
I mean, there's something that that's a deeply psychological mechanism,
you know, and there's like sociological locations to it too,
but in more kind of prosaic terms. That that's an
important point because I'm always emphasizing to the fellas who
don't remember because they weren't born yet, that media narratives
like however corrupt they were corrupted. They were a by
ideology and by conceptual biases. They did in fact build
on a continuing foundation of historical time, you know. I
make the point even really up until two thousand, kind
of like the last instance of this in this in
the spring or no it was like summer or fall
of two And I remember this vividly because I made
my dad really upset and he went in this local
radio show to talk about it, the show Beyond the
Beltway that used to be like based here in Chicago,
and me and like my then girlfriend, we went down
to the studio to meet him, like in the Loop
and the subject that my dad was on this panel
with this like foreign Navy seal guy and this kind
of crusty older dude was a civilian but he'd been
on William Odom's staff in some capacity. But Peter Arnett
and this is one of the things that kind of
crushed his career. I mean, he was getting old up
there in years anyway, but he broke this story where
this guy claimed that First of all, guy claimed that
he was a deserter in the Vietnam War, and he
claimed he ended up in Laos, Okay, and he said
there was this village like full of like you know,
like young white men who were like married to Indigenous women.
And he's like, what's happening here, And they're like, Oh,
we're all deserters. This is like our commune where we're
like escaping the war. And if any anybody who knows
the history of the conflict, that's preposterous on its own terms. Okay,
there's no way that happened, but he was or not
was taking what this guy said is fact. So our
nets like, well, like what happened, there's no record of
this place. So this guy's like, well, you know, he's
like Army special Forces arrived one day after they bombarded
us with nerve gas and everybody died. But I was
out in the fields that day or the rice patties,
so I escaped. And he's like it was called Operation Tailwind,
you know, And my Dad's like, this is outrageous. This
is outrageous is being reported as news, And how dare
this guy like defame these Special Forces operators? But did
it takes that real? Seriously? You know, he was a civilian,
but he got to know a lot of these guys
very well, you know, and he takes the honor of
such people seriously, you know. And I mean for me,
I mean, it was just the I mean, aside from that,
it was like, I mean, our net was just like lying,
like it's if you're a serious journalist, this guy's story
was preposterous, you know. Like I said, I was, I
was like twenty four to twenty five years old, and
I was just kind of like a student of the
Vietnam War, and I'm like, there's no way that happened.
And of course it broke that this guy with some
crazy liars, that our net kind of disappeared. But it
was a big deal, man, because you know, even twenty
five years after Saigon went to put, you know, Vietnam
was still on people's minds man. You know, in conceptual terms,
it was one of their main kind of like pole
stars of historical events. So that it doesn't really that's
it's just like not the case anymore. And part of
its deliberate, it's like a deliberate sort of like whitewashing
of the collective memory. They're not so much it just
kind of like erasing the collective memory of historical time.
But it's also these narratives increasingly are just kind of
generated out of enough thing, you know, they're they draw
upon these kinds of like endure this kind of like
enduring phraseology that regime information or propaganda. Oh, let's disseminate,
you know, So they there's a certain structure to it,
there's a certain conceptual structure, but it's very much like
kind of like every every aspect of it's just kind
of like autonomously situated in psychological term, that's really weird.
But in any event, even uh, even to the late nineties,
they when when there was when when when an kind
of crisis was emergent between like Israel and its and
its enemies, they there there'd be conceptual references to the
Ramanan War, which they called the yan Kapur War, and
the nineteen sixty seven Six Day War, which was Israel's
greatest victory. That's not just cap that Israel had. They
were unusually larded with military talent at operational level for
various reasons. And I mean that was so that was
a big deal. And that's kind of what the myth
of Israeli military supremacy like was emergent, because in sixty
seven it wasn't a myth. I mean, on the one hand,
like modern combat resolves rapidly. That's why I'm trying to
side the people. You know, they people get a corrupted
view of this because pretty much like the only like
the only wars in living memory involve these kinds of
nonsensical paradigms. Were like you know, some Pentagon guy or
some State Department spokesman or woman is suggesting, well, we're
making incremental progress, you know, like the these kind of
like endless deployments that don't resolve anything. Like people think
that that's normal, Like they don't understand that even on condition,
even under conditions are relative parody, you know, like modern
combined arms war, it's battles are usually massively one sided.
It's usually at it usually resolves like within days, you know,
but just the same. Uh, the IDEAS performance in sixty
seven was unusually strong, but all of that, all that
basically came to an end in the seventy three war.
And it's significant to US. I mean, even people who
aren't particularly invested in Israel Palestine. I don't think that's
a correct disposition because if you know, within the current paradigm,
you you can't just kind of like selectively choose what
you quote care about. It's not wasn't caring about it either,
Like everything is impactful. You know anywhere that anywhere that
the US forces are deployed under roscas in NATO or
the IDEF has deployed you know, with the full with
the full faith and blessing and operational integration with and
the United States. You know that this has this has
implications for everything that occurs in a political name. Sure,
but you know, in seventy three, I I believe that
that was a more dangerous crisis h modality than the
Cuban missile crisis, like the cumanical prizes, the way it
was unfolding in real time, and the way these Soviet
naval vessels were approaching Cuba, and there was a question
like will they run the black hate or not? Or
like how will this resolve? Like and as like the
days and hours were ticking away in Kennedy's war room.
You know, people got the perception that this wasn't especially
critical and it was don't get me wrong, However, there
was nothing approaching strategic parody. Then in nineteen seventy three,
there absolutely was, like the Soviets didn't officially accomplish like
strategic parody in terms of forces in being, you know
that were in fact deployed until seventy six to seventy seven.
By seventy three, that they they had the capability to
absolutely devastate watching Europe and the conne of the United States,
you know, and uh owing to command and control duances
and the shrinking of the window where human decision makers
are capable of reacting. You know, that window of opportunity
to render decision had had shrunk dramatically from a decade previous,
you know, And so I maintaining that nineteen seventy three
when America went to deaf Con three and that it's
the only time that's ever happened, you know. And for context,
it's not like during the early years that War on
Terror with those like goofy like color coded alerts like
today you look the terror thread as purple, so like
Scholvin drubel up your ass or whatever, like you're supposed
to do. It wasn't like that, Like, it was quite serious.
And at def Con three, you know, basically that means
America shifted to a war footing and missileers in their silos.
They strapped into their siege to prepare for deep impact
and awaited launch orders and like the little doors like
atop the silo went like you know, which is kind
of horrifying. But and Brezhnev he mobilized the Soviet Union operationally.
In some ways they mirrored the native order of battle,
but in other ways they were totally different. But they
had you know, America's kind of America's kind of rapid
reaction force during the Cold War was uh, it was
the eighty second Airbroune Division. The Soviets mirrored that like
the Soviet airborne troops and at that point were like
an air assault element. They they went on high alert
and they were preparing to deploy to the Middle East
to relieve the Egyptian Army. You know, so this was
this was really really bad. But that it's interesting that
that's been conspicuously absent. I mean, it's to somebody in
my age, the absence is conspicuous. I haven't read one
reference to it. And since the IDF assaulted that Russian target,
which don't get me wrong, It's happened many times before, okay,
but it does constitute, if only in the court of
public opinion, and public opinion in wartime takes on and
outside significance, it does represent a kind of escalation that
you know, the idea is flagrantly assaulting Russian targets. And
it was one thing to do that during the Serian
Civil Wars. Nothing to do that now. But I would
think that any newsman or lady would uh, you know,
kind of like invoke the seventy three war as the
direct precedent to contextualize what's happening, you know, and they're
not doing that at all. So that's just something that
sort of jumped out of me. But like moving on
to you know, the topic of the day. You know,
once again, I as I indicated, I don't want to
sound like some crazy old person. But if I'm repeating myself,
let me know, because I do forget sometimes where we
left off, and I try to refresh my recollection from
the last episode, but it I don't always have time
to like totally go through it. So I'm not going
to be offended if if you stop me and say, like,
we already covered that. But I think where we ended
we were talking about, you know, the Russian Federation in
Syria and how one of the major, one of the
major foreign policy moves, even even in the yelts in
air was to absolutely you know, guarantee that you know,
the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet could still base in Syria, and
the Syrians were still obviously very much amenable to that.
But you know, despite even even Jelson's either you know,
apathy or gross in confidence or combination of both on
paraplitical matters, you know, it wasn't just him obviously either.
It was you know, the the the equivalent of the
General Staff of the Enforced Russian Federation and and and
the Foreign Ministry and other things. But they even when
they were not at all in a position to, you know,
be pursuing a true kind of world velt politique strategy,
you know, they made sure they locked in a continuation
of of good offices with Syria, you know. And this
is the nineteen seventy one Naval Treaty that was signed
with Halfes al Asad. It granted the Soviet Union he
basically gonterstricted their access to the naval basic artists that
it had built, and it they continue to this day,
you know. And the treaty runs for twenty years and
there's automatic five year extensions and it's one of the
parties ops Eternity agreement. But it but it's it's a
rubber stamp sort of thing, you know. And the UH,
the Syrian state. Asad, who passed away in two thousand,
he was one of the first UH heads of state
to recognize the Russian Federation, you know, basically immediately as
a Soviet Union became the Russian Federation, he recognized it
and made clear that the Syrian government was going to
abide any and any military agreements and specifically the the
naval treaty regards tartsts. But you know, and the uh
I can remeb we got into this or not. We
were talking about the Continuity War between sixty seven and
seventy three and how the the Israeli Air Force, you know,
they fought this pitch it this pitched air battle, you know,
between the Israeli Air Force and and and Soviet megs.
But during the during the the Ramanan War, Jogapor War itself.
Uh you know, there's thousands of Soviet advisors on the
ground as well as you know, direct action military elements,
you know, technicians know, a veritable battalion and technicians to
assist the Syrian Arab army and and and you know,
to maintain the their equipment and their armored playet forms,
their aircraft all of that. And twenty at least twenty
of them died the Russian SOVI least twenty k I
A and probably more. I mean, that's just what the
Kremline acknowledged. But there was during the war, there was
over thirty seven hundred tons of aid airlifted to the
battlespace by the end of October, I mean seventy three
by sea. The Soviet Union that transported sixty three thousand
tons to Steea or replace its military and infrastructural losses.
That's a massive commitment in relative and absolute terms. I'm
not sure people recognize that, because you know, America throws
money around like water, and it's constantly just like dumping
these like aid packages and secondary theaters. That this was
a big deal. Okay, I think I got into the
fact that there was some tension in seventy six seventy
seven between Damascus and Moscow. The Syrian Arab Army deployed
to the Lebanese battle space, which put them directly opposite
the PLO, and you know the PLO the Popular Front
and the Popular Front delivery of Palestine. They were very
warsaw packed adjacent. There's a big concern in the Soviet
camp that this would upset the kind of delicate balance
that was in place in the Arab Cold War as
it's called. This was remedied basically one hundred and ten
percent when the when the Soviet twents were in Afghanistan.
Because I can't remember if I mentioned this or not
either like a side immediately like declared like solidarity with
the Soviet Union in the war from in Afghanistan. And
obviously that put him at odds with basically every other
Arab government, you know, and that that and that's huge.
That and it's also it's significant too, I mean because
the there's obvious and inherent tensions between the Soviet between
there were between the Soviet Union and I Ran and
thereut a day between the Russian Federation and Iran. Some
of the is a sectarian and religious theological. Some of
these are ethnic. You know, I that the persons in
the Russians aren't aren't particularly cozy, but there's there's a
very large Azeri minority in Iran, you know, Amadina jobs
and ethnic Azeri. There's there, there's there's some bad blood there,
you know. Aside from the the intrinsic value with Syria
in absolute geo strategic terms to the Russian Federation, it's
it's also very much like a con it represents kind
of like it faciliates concord between the Russians and and
and Tehran in a real way. You know. The uh,
I'm sorry one second, oh and it's in uh in
April of seventy seven, like it has this kind of
Lebanon situation was developing as he traveled the Moscow and
there's some interesting sort of like cool footage that the
Russians shot and there was there's also some there's also
some British media guy in the ground. The British were
very well, very well indexed with the Soviet Union and
in terms of media for whatever reason. So a lot
of this, but there's this this footage of Hafesi Sad
arriving in Moscow and receiving you know, like great honors.
You know, it's really it's really interesting, and especially for
a small country. You know, it's Syria has a very
outsized relevance for this reason. But it's uh he he
got a sod gotten, not just an audience with bresd
and but uh with Alexei Kasigan, who uh was uh he.
The way to think of him is he was kind
of in the role that Lavrov is today. You know,
it's an imperfect analogy, but for foreign policy purposes and
war and peace terms, especially like the he's of via
the Arab world, it tracks and you know, it's not
that's that's no small thing, and it's not you know,
that's why when people when people talk about the Assad
family like they're like they're like, you know, like like
they're like Saddam and his clan, they're they're not at all,
you know, they're there, sad was anything. But there's some
like tinpot dictator, you know. I mean I I I
think they're I think the Syrians are a noble people generally,
and I find the Assad is particularly impressive. But that
that's not that's not just that, that's not just cap
I mean a conceptual bias or something, you know. Fas
Aside visited at Moscow again in early spring eighty seven
April nineteen eighty seven, and he traveled there with the
then serving Defense Minister Mustafa Class and he has to
require the this advanced service, the air missile system it
UH and Gorbachev denied him, which is really interesting. And
this was during a time when it's a critical period
when when when avionics were becoming hyper advanced. You know,
obviously the stealth like the beefy stealth armber it was
a very differ kind of plant for him than those
that the these missile systems that the Syrian to acquire
were tailored the as a counter measure for but that
that entire sort of like skunk Works series of projects
that was the emergent from this this kind of culture
of high tech avionics. Okay, so you know the Syrians
were asking, were requesting this for a reason, you know,
they they need they desperately needed countermeasures because Israel, uh Israel,
and in Western Germany you're in the Cold War. They
were getting America's best equipment. I mean, the Germans in
their own right, I think the I think the Leopard
tank is the best like modern bail tank, like hands down,
but the but they the West Germans in Israel, I
mean in the in the in the former case and
you know, obviously cold residencies, the latter was ideological and
the ladder obviously still this is the case in terms
of what they received, but they weren't getting like, they
weren't getting like knockoff versions of of American aircraft. They're
getting the real thing, you know. And this obviously decides
to give the series pause because even before even before
UH stealth technology became the norm, you know, long before
it advanced, Divionyx were making it increasingly difficult really to
but he developed any counter any counter versions at all.
And the Soviets, uh. One of the things the Worshaw
packed did very very well was hir aircraft countermeasures, okay,
particularly serviced their missiles, like you know the old the
old book and film Flag of the Intruder. It's it's
a dumb movie, but it's a pretty good book. If
you're in a sit in the air where I read.
I read the book and saw the movie. Yeah, the
book is a lot better. Yeah, but it's And Stephen
koons Is is kind of a he's kind of a
strange guy, but he he flew ay sixes over Vietnam
and the part where the the the kind of the
kind of John Wayne type aviator Jake Rafton, you know,
his new his new UH Radar intercept Officer, his new
RAO is is this kind of like wild guy. But
even he like fu sorties were downtown Hanoi is like
a terrifying prospect for American aviators because other other than Moscow,
like it was like the most hardened like target on
this planet. Like that that's not that wasn't creative license.
That was including the book or something, and that owed
the fact that, I mean, the Soviets built it up
to make it that way. You know, it wasn't it.
Obviously there was you know, they the Vietnamese are an
industrious people, but they they had nothing approaching that kind
of technology, and you know, they the Soviets knew that.
I mean that was before the sound of Soviets split.
But you know, the like like the Chinese had nothing
remotely honorable, you know, like the check on equivalent was junk.
But in any event, so this was, uh, that was
kind of a turning point obviously in eighty seven when
Garbashcheff refused basically the kind of honor the good offices
that had been sustained with serious really since day one
at least, you know, in as regards military necessities and exigencies.
But you know, that was the what what Garbage was
attempting to accomplish. I was writing something about this the
other day, but that's kind of a subject for another episode.
I know, if if we go off on that tangent,
like we'll be here all night. But it is, uh
that that that was definitely like a nominalist though, you know,
like I said it, even even even under Yelson's tenure,
the you know, the Moscow never made any indication that
they any intention of abandoning Syria. But moving forward, what's
I mean, obviously it was most relevant to the present
is you know, the Syrian Civil War, you know, and
I it's it's hard to dominate really what's what people
are thinking in in Washington because you don't have a
serious foreign policy establishment and you haven't since you know,
nineteen ninety two. But when Obama's people, when they were
saying that Damascus is imminately going to fall, that that
that was that was in fact accurate at the outset
of the intervention, the Russian intervention, and there's another case
of pot putin waited far too long intervene. I mean
it it's a credit to the Syrian people, you know,
those loyal to Asade and the Hezebla and those Russian
forces who were deployed that they won. But it was
becoming critical, you know, the the Syrian government they officially
only controlled about a quarter of the country. You know,
the statistics that read is like twenty six percent of
overall like territory. And how how much that territory you
can deploy in depth or defend it. I mean, they
had they they had the built up areas buying large
but you know they were they were essentially there was
this there's this garrison Damascus who was like becoming a
frontline city, you know. And assad uh Asad sends his
wife away, and he sent his sister bus Assad away,
and you know he I developed huge respect for Bashar
the Son because he said, I'm not leaving Damascus if
I have to well die here. And that's you know,
I'm like, Okay, this guy's a real man, and he's
a real president. You know, he's he's a real leader
of he's a real warlord now, you know, because that's
the way it has to be. You know, when the
Russians did arrive, you know, they rapidly integrated with you know,
a lot of the Syrian Arab army defected. You know,
I think a lot of that the degree to which
that Sunny Bath elements and the Iraqi Bath and the
Syrian Bath party are very different animals, but there is
like a common ideological core and there's and there's a
common sociological rationale like the men who were in our
heavily index with the party, and you know, a bunch
of Saddam's officers who were you know, part of the
Sunni minority in Iraq, like they clipped they clipped up
with ISIS basically immediately, not all of them, but a
lot of them did. And they were accepted by these guys,
which is really interesting. And some of the same thing
happened in Syria, you know, and the uh, the Syrian
bath party even like at the top is more ecumenical
than they're credited, but it still is. I mean, it's
it's basically, you know, like an an alley like minority
rule situation. But and it's it's interesting. And in May
twenty ten, like before the formal on set of hostilities,
Medyedev had visited Syria and that mid Medviedev's like brief
tenure as the president is interesting, man, And it's interesting
how we became it was like out bad with Putin subsequently.
But it's pretty obvious that NATO, Israel and I'm sure
their proxies in these ISIS types as well, because those
guys weren't stupid. They realize, you know, look, the time
to move, you know, the time to truly escalate is
when the Russians are are even some kind of crisis
of leadership, you know, or if not not, if not
so much a crisis and a literal like you know,
war in the Kremlin like happened after a drop off.
You know, you when the civilian executive is kind of headless,
that that causes problems, you know, it causes problems in
terms of like grand schemes, peated decision making, it all
the way down to the operational level. That's that's one
of the reasons why that YAHOO was secure. Unfortunately, because
even people who despise them, you know, they're playing musical
chairs with with the civilian executive. Is not what you
want to do at war, but because it may. When
the Russians did deploy, they immediately integrated, you know, with
HESGLO and the syen Arab army and commanding control capacities,
you know, like like deeply and this how this you know,
there were the Russians no like wartime diplomacy, man, I
mean that during the Cold War, I'd say the key ways,
I mean NATO had them beat in all kinds of
capacities like material, political and otherwise. But you know what
the Russians had was I mean they had firepower. Obviously,
they had a very tough in game population in the
Russian people, but they were very they weren't are very
adept at like war and peace politics and that that
that that's how they were able to accomplish that, you know,
because like I I mean obviously especially considering the the
tactical situation on the ground in Syria. I mean, his
blah wasn't about to say like we won't index with
the Russian or the Russian Federation. But there's always tensions
in trying to integrate a command and control structure, you know.
And this was accomplished seamlessly essentially. But the well, you know,
the Russians, they the Russians brought in like real firepower
to bear. You know, the Russians can't do high tech
like America can. But the war tech as during the
Cold War is now was good enough. And the Syrian
intervention and the way they you know, they they pursued
it truly scorched earth policy in the in the in
the battle space like against their against four and it
paid off, you know, the and and putin declared and
knowing certain terms that you know, the the like the
Asad government is not going to be allowed to fall
there is some momentum behind Syria two in the quart
of world opinion. It's like we talked about I'm not
successful to propaganda, and I mean I am not some
young naive person. I was legitimately horrified by those scenes
from you know, like the subbers of a Lepo over
these these isis barbarians. You know, we're beheading people and
putting heads on steaks. You know, like I said, I
saw the video of them. You know, they were doing
their afternoon prayers and their prayer mats and uh, there's
like a forest of hits. You know, it's it's like
a horror movie. But you know people were seeing that
kind of thing. And I remember a Bath Party spokeswoman
and knowing certain terms, telling some European media type like, look,
we're not we do not negotiate with people who we
will not negotiate with. We're not going to change our
government because terrorists are are are bombing us and killing
people and beheading people. Like what that's you can't ever
allow that you know this is and you know this
was also too when the War on Terror was still on.
It's like, so you America is telling us in telling
the world like you know, we're waging the war on terror,
yet you're you're trying to bring down a secularist eye
doctor who uh it's got like a pretty wife who
looks kind of like any white woman in the United States,
and you're saying that like isis are the good guys?
Like that's that's really when America lost all credibility, you know,
like even more so I think than the Iraq fiasco,
because that was just like laid bare. You know, it's
like we we will burn down civilization and handed to barbarians.
You know, that basically accounts what we want, and that's
the opposite of civilization, you know, the same nothing of
the fact that that's I mean, nine eleven should never happen,
but it did happen. And it's like okay, so ook
at decades, you know, a mere decade subsequent, like now
now now you're willing to like accept that as you know,
just kind of like the verbal costs of doing business.
It's like that's that's unconstable. The scoresesque, but you know,
and then putin clarified in twenty fifteen. It's really interesting too.
It was when speaking of the Medvita situation for three
four years when when Putin, you know, he's kind of
like second uh permanent tenure as President of Russian Federation.
There's this kind of window where he was speaking very candidly.
I think I think Putin quotes himself pretty well generally,
but he plays so close to the chest and kind
of issues he's like non answers the policy questions. There
was like this brief period of a few years where
he was he was kind of trying to like humanize
his image. I think I remember in October twenty fifteen. Yeah,
it was like it was like October November twenty fifteen.
He gives us an interview and he's like, look, he's
like this. He's like, you know, our the Syrian intervention
is prepared well in advance. Despite the way made have appeared,
we weren't just responding with an emergency situation on the ground.
We knew that America and Israel one had to bring
down the bath regime. We consider this unacceptable. We still do.
It was really interestings like he never he doesn't. He
just doesn't talk that way anymore, you know. And one
of the things people criticize him for is is this
kind of like ambiguous language about Ukraine. You know, oh no,
this this is a special military operation, and you know,
not not being clear about objectives and things. It's it's
very different. But I think it's relevant, you know it,
I know it is, but uh, the uh in Putin's terms,
and Russian speakers I'm sure will suggest and suggest correctly.
This is an imprecise, imprecise translation, but it's the most
coherent when I found, like in the same interview he said,
quote that that the objective wasn't remains quote stabilizing the
legitimate power in Syria and creating conditions for political compromise.
And that's very much a Putinism. His Putin's always resorting to,
you know, the rules based international order that purportedly exists,
and like, I understand why he does that, but I
think the time has passed for that those sorts of appeals.
But it's just it's just interesting, the uh and if
I can't remember, we dropped the brass tax, like the
like the literal numbers of what this operation constituted in Syria.
In some ways, especially considering a lot of the discussion
about the deterioration of Russian capabilities, in some ways, this
was as much a coup in world opinion terms, as
as the UK's UH effort in the falk Ones, you know,
because people were I mean, Washington's always suggesting that the
Russians can't do anything right in military terms, but even
relatively serious people were prone to talking that way. But
the Russian Air Force, it carried out over nineteen thousand sorties,
seventy one thousand direct strikes on what they call the
quote infrastructure of terrorists. You know, I interpret that in
like real human language, not military language, as a combination
of you know, ground support, attack missions, you know, as
well as you know, as well as bonding of any
positions and things. But I close air support and direct
support of ground element forces is what really carried the day.
And again the Russians, they've always viewed warfare as it's
kind of the advance of fire. You know, they're very
clouds of witsy end and they're like literally clouds of
whitsy end in their perspectives. You know, that's who train
them to fight modern war. You know, it was UH
clouds with himself and Prosian officers and there are for
the Russian Federation on parade. They still you know, perform
the goose step. This, you know, not a coincidence or
because they they think it looks really sharp, which it does,
but it's because that's how they learned drill, you know.
And that's this This solidified Russia as a as a
real military power on the world stage once again, you know.
And that's why it's there's it's not as like a
conceptual bias or like a categorical ignorance, and it's both
those things too. What you know, like the Honesset of
hoscilities in Ukraine, like however mismanaged that war has been,
and it's kind of like gross and mismanaged on on
the Russian side. Okay, but this idea that like Russia
lacks the capability to deploy its scale, it's like, what
are you talking about? I mean that that's that's at
odds of reality, you know. And if you're gonna if
you're gonna fight the uh, you're gonna fight the arm
force of the Russian Federation like literally on their own frontier,
you know. The the direct precedent, the constant bears well
what happened in Syria. You know, I not make a mistake.
I there is no like military objective on you know
that that Ukraine is pursuing because there's no there's no
path in victory in military terms. And it's but if
you accept that, you know, US, NATO, Israel their only
interest is you know, and it is a creating attrition.
You know it, Uh, it makes perfect sense. But this
idea that these these it's not as these fools like
blink in either, like is you know there's this people.
I don't think there's any serious people in the foreign
policies stay as men, but even people less kind of
you know, out of it than he is. You know,
they were talking like, well, yeah, you know, the the
Russian mainline resistance is just going to collapse. You know
the moment basically we start popping off combined arms and
you know from a borough communitions or whatever, and and
then like the you know, the the United Russia is
just going to collapse. It's like what's like, are you
smoking crack? Like that's you know. The one thing, the
one thing the Russians have going for them again is
the fact that they can bring firepower to bear. They've
got a very game population, and I as long as
as long as Putin is alive and relatively healthy, like
United Russia is like never been stronger, Like they're Their
problem is that apparently they can't achieve consensus on who
on a man to take his place. But this idea
that but some of the Russians literally took twenty five
million dead. You know, if you lose one in seven
of your population to the Wehrmacht in four years, and
not only do you not fall apart, you you can
reconstitute into a superpower, albeit a crippled one, immediately subsequent.
There's nothing sort of incredible, and I think I think
it's basically unprecedented, you know, like some some sort of
comparable scenario or a state endoors that level of devastation
and is able to you know, it's not profit from
it to uh, you know, immediately reconstitute and project power
in a way theretofore unthinkable even prior to the onset
of hostilities. But you know, the uh, that's one of
the reasons why I mean the the You've gotta understand
the Ukraine War as as literally like another a secondary front,
a secondary theater of the same conflict as was underway
in Syria. And one of the things facility Russian facilitated
by Russian victory there was not just cloud in the
international stage, but UH it basically guaranteed them access to
the Eastern Mediterranean, you know, and UH from there you
can stage you can stage combat operations like fear wide basically,
you know, including in places like Libya that for reasons,
some of which are within the bound rationality of AH
you know, NATO decision making, and for some reasons they
have it Libya. That makes sense, there's some that don't.
But like point being, Russia absolutely can deploy their in
depth if they're not tied down in their own frontier
because of Ukraine. And that's really the key to understanding
what is underway there in in in in like hard
material terms, I mean, but the uh Asad himself apparently
on the UH on the eve of Russian intervention, he
I assume this came from his general staff. And I
the Syenniray of Army. I know, people claim that they're
ship like the Egyptian Army or something. I don't accept that.
I don't accept that because the nineteen seventy three war,
and like I said, the issue with the Syrian Airy
of Army, it wasn't that like they were getting mauled
in this field. It's that basically like this soon, he said,
like we're not gonna fight this war, you know, but
asad again, I'm certain through like his general staff ors equivalent,
they issued this series of reports to Moscow saying like
this is the this is the tactical situation, this is
what we absolutely need, this is what needs to be
brought to bear. You know. They basically like identified and
characterized op for and like how it was hurting them,
and in a very concise and clear headed way said
like this is why we're going to lose this war
unless you're able to deploy and guarantee A B and C,
you know, and that that eventce is like a remarkable
level of trust because like among other things, if you
invite a great power and in very reduced terms, Russia
still is a great power in relative terms, although like
nothing you know, like a superpower. You know, you invite
the Russians to deploy in depth and in hand your
command and control mechanism over to them, they maybe will
just decide that like now serious part of Russia for
all practical purposes like that that's not just cap like
when people like you know, who's gonna attack all one
like it's it's no small measure inviting like five or
eight thousand like armed Russians and their commed air craft
and guys in their general staff like into your country
and saying like okay, fellas, like you know, do do
what you do best, the implement like death at scale
among like those people, but then like kind of politely
bow out when it's done. I mean, it's it's a
rare case of like real kind of like respect and
reciprocity at like cultural level as well as practical levels.
But yeah, and that's why, uh, you know, like I said,
if I could, if I can meet the when I
go head to state, like I find a little interesting
as Bashar al Assade, like you know, he's uh, he's
a fascinating dude, and I find out highly relatable. But yeah,
the I think that's uh yeah, I was gonna get
at some point. And we covered some of this earlier,
I mean in like a different series. I mean we
were talking about, you know, the the Jackson Vanic Amendment
and what prompted it, which was in a large measure,
you know, the the public bro and the Supreme Soviet
moving moving to literally like outlaws of Zionism, like it
became it became a political crime against the state to
you know, like advocate for Zionism, you know. And there
was a party official in in April eighty three there
like this full page this full page ad titled quote
from the Soviet leadership laying out the case against Desionism
as as as viewed from Moscow, which is fascinating, you know,
and this, and then subsequently, you know, that's when you
started hearing in media this narrative like, okay, Soviet Jews
the r at risk of annihilation, you know, the Soviet
Union is this you know, anti Semitic country. I mean,
they've been at war for decades already, but it's it, uh,
it took on like an overt the you know and
above board like character, you know, and this, uh, the
the you know, the purported plight of Soviet jewelry. It
it was something that was endlessly bandied about by not
just NGOs and sympathetic media people, by the Reagan administration.
Like it's really it's really wild. And you know, speaking
of Cold war movies or cold War theme movies, the
movie Firefox is a really good movie. This if you can,
I mean, you've got a lot like the propaganda. But
when I was like a little kid, my mom and dad,
I want to see it with them, and it like
blew my mind. But uh, you know, one of the
subtexts of it is that you know that Clint Eastwood
is like the Russo American like non era comic pilot.
You know, he uh he goes his mission is like
steal what the then fictional mid thirty one, Like there
is an actual mid thirty one. It's it's call signs
is Fox Bad, but it didn't exist when Firebox came out.
But the the meg thirty one Firefox is like the
super plane and it directly interfaces with the pilot's brain waves.
So like if you so you think commands to the
central processing unit and then it responds. And because Eastwood
in the film, his character is this Russian guy, Russian.
He he speaks Russian, you know, so it's so he
can think in Russian to manipulate the avionics. But any event,
like a subplot is there's this Jewish avionics engineer and
the Soviets are basically they're like threatening to like waste
his family if he doesn't build the Firefox, and like
uh at one point, like Queen Easwood's character makes cotted
with him, and he's like, yeah, you know, like the
the Soviets are you know, they're they're as bad as
like the German Reich. And it's kind of like obvious
propaganda insinuated, you know. But that he like he even
that wasn't just like Hollywood stuff like that's that was
the narrative being presented, but that that's kind of a
tangential when it's a long topic. But yeah, I think
uh uh, I think we're coming up in the hour. Yeah. No,
that's uh, That's about all I got for this series.
I don't I don't want to break off another like subtopic. Man,
and forgive me if I repeated myself, but uh yeah,
I think uh unless uh and unless I'm I got
a real gap and uh my recollection, I think we
I think we covered quite a bit of the of
uh what's relevant you know over these past few sessions.
Speaker 1: Can I hit you with one question from current events? Yeah,
what was your what was your take on the the
Iranian UH missile offensive?
Speaker 2: The Iranians had to do something? I mean, yes, like
his blase is for all practical purposes, you know, like
the foreign the Iranian foreign lesion. But there's a plausible
deniability that the Iranians a great sort of jealously guard there,
but also just in in terms of in terms of
parapolitical terms as well as for domestic consumption as well
as in the court of world opinion. Like I Ran
had to respond somehow, and this is this is basically identical.
It's basically a redux of when when Solomoni was ordered,
you know, it the same thing. It was just like
it was just like very very controlled response. You know,
the target the areas targeted really exclusively counter value. You know,
it was announced that this was going to happen. So
that's the way I read it. And it's more for
the benefit of like it ran in regime desplay, the
tabout media says this, it's not like the Taliban or something.
And it's it's also like it's very they actually hold
election as I ran all the time, and like the
regime does have like certain credibility problems. But like I'm
a Dana Jodd. You know he was not only in
a ZERI, but the reason why he's were that like
members only jacket. I remember, like media people that make
fun of him. But it's like the dude work he
was like he was he was he was like an
oil rig worker or like a pipeline like a like
a foreman, and like that's why he was trying to
look the part of like you know, mister like AZERI
working man. He was like this big like socialist kind
of like labor leader, like rabble rouser. And like the
religious authorities didn't like him at all, like they basically
allowed him they into the top job because they had to,
you know. And so talking about some Islamist it's like
that's most like you like smoking crack if you think that.
But point being I RAN's it gets it's a complicated
situation domestically and the regime there, they do have to
cater to public opinion more than people acknowledge in the West,
and especially if it looks like I mean, even if
even if these like retaliatory strikes like don't mean anything,
it doesn't matter. It's for domestic consumption anyway, you know,
Like Iran's Iran's ground element in real terms, as Hesbela.
That's my interversation.
Speaker 1: Yeah, And it seems like with some of the incursions
that I've been monitoring over the past twenty four to
thirty six hours, he was doing a pretty damn good
job on the ground there. Yeah, there, it seems like
it seems like Israel they're only they can only do
anything from the air right now.
Speaker 2: Yeah, they don't want Well, it's also too what are
they gonna do? Are they gonna assault Lebanon Like it's
the eighties early nineties, you were in two thousand and
six and they tried that. You're not You're not gonna
they don't have the forces, they don't have the force
structure or the political will to assault Beirut and try
and like route Hezbla from the Shia urban heartland. You're
gonna fight house to house against Hesbla off for the
next five years and you know, and take like twenty
thousand dead in a few months. Like, no, you're not
gonna do that. No, his was They're they're no joke, man,
They're they're definitely the most capable ground element other than
I d F in the region.
Speaker 1: Cool, well, do your plugs. We'll get out of here,
and I guess the next uh, next time we get together,
we'll finish up the Gladiol and then move on to
something after.
Speaker 2: That that's great. Yeah, yeah, yeah man. You can find
me on substec. It's real Thomas seven seven seven of
substack dot com. That's where the pot is at, and
as well as like longer form stuff and just like
various things. I uh, I'm a social media at Capital
R E A L underscore number seven h O M
A S seven seven seven. I'm on Instagram, I'm on
t Gram. I got my own website. It's Thomas seven
seven seven dot com number seven each O M E
S seven seven seven and I got uh, I got
like morse that I sell because owing to popular demand.
I'm not trying to be corny, like that's literally why
like I started doing it with my friend and partner
in crime, Hair Cree. But if you would include a
link to that in the description, that would be a
great help so people can find it.
Speaker 1: Yep, last time it'll be it'll be there this time.
Speaker 2: Yeah, thank you.
Speaker 1: I appreciate it, Thomas. It's all the next time. Thankwise.
Speaker 2: H